the german federal archives i was able to get documents and transcripts of people who had been on shore. for instance, the women's naval auction silly, -- auxiliary. they all died. they were in the swimming pool which had been emptied and many if their remains -- some of the bodies were recovered, and so some of the people on shore after it had the duty to try to identify. but most of the identification really was for any of the military personnel. so the civilians who are on board, many of them are lost to history. people say, i think that i grew up in -- i think my great uncle was aboard but i don't know, and it's very difficult to be able to find that out. yes, ma'am? >> was there a charge to go on board and who paid it? >> no, no charge to go on board. you were able to get -- they

wanted documentation and tickets to go aboard, but they were really giving them only to -- initially the elderly or mothers with children...

>> with they, they decided this was not something to speak of with people. yes, sir? >> how many ships or busses were used in operation hanibal, and when did it begin and end? >> so it started just ?t last weeks of january, and it went on through almost the end of the war. the land route by the time that people were going was almost closed, almost impossible, and some of the -- in terms of ships, there were, you know, hundreds that were to be involved. they could have been anywhere from, you know, a small sort of pleasure boat but not too many of the large military boats. the idea was to go back and

forth across the baltic sea and still be in germany, german territory, but the idea was to get them as close to the american and british lines as possible. >> yes, sir? >> can you talk about the investigation of the sinking of the ship, whether it was classified as a war crime and any reliability of the russian government was made to pay? >> yes, sure. well, it was never classified as a war crime. there was the inquiry afterwards, the board of inquiry, but that was internal. that was the german navy itself. what happened though was they wanted the soviet union, would have been the highest military honor, but as i mentioned, the track record didn't serve him well. he -- there was another incident where he had fired on a boat, and he exaggerated his report, so he had this history of that. he was responsible for tore

torpedoing another space to general stevens a few weeks after this. he does not get the recognition that he craves. the soviet government doesn't classify, you know, just moves on, and they don't want to talk about it again because that would capitalize on their atrocities. it was the soviet liberators of concentration camps. their stories was not told, a positive story for them, but because of what was beginning on with stalin and forced labor camps. he's not -- it's not until power shifts, and he's long dead that he does get hero of the soviet union, and he's, today where many survivors come from, there's a huge stock today, and so he's slowly becoming and

considered a hero for this. it's one of these if you believe this was a legitimate target because of military personnel on board, you know, to me the fact is the numbers of civilians, you know, far outweigh that, but regardless, these are people who were very much caught up between two madmen, you know, hitler and stalin. >> yes? >> here's where i have a name, and i understand that she was used in rescue operations after the war. did you ever run into that? >> i did not. actually, hitler actually never visited it either so it's just -- thank you. yes, sir? >> what was the water temperature and did the baltic ice over? >> it was that winter in particular.

many of the treks people took to get there themselves were treks people could ice skate on occasionally. they were iced over, and as they were going, russian planes were strafing them. they were targeting civilians all along the way. it was, like, minus 4 celsius. the water was frigid, again, an understatement to me. the most -- most of them -- many died of exposure until they were rescued. thank you very much for listening. thank you. [applause]

>> look, the old adage, a wonderful book, you want to move the mouse, you move the chase. if you want to change behavior, you have to change incentives. there's never incentive for focusing only information technology, technology in general in government. it's not lost on us that the last group of people that come in an advocate in a budgets crisis for technology over health care or over programs 23-r seen -- for seniors, they don't exist. people don't line up with stickers in busses coming to city hall or state government demanding more information technology, and so the challenge for governmental leaders is to realize its potential and possibility, and its meaning and purpose. that said, does it surprise any of you that last week, big headline in the l.a. times, the department of motor vehicles just gave up on a six year

effort to update its 40-year-old technology for the issue of licenses. we already spent more than half the money. it's not even close to half way down, and they just ended the contract. is it a surprise to any of you? talk about scandal in government, that the court system of california in 2004 identified a 260 # million upgrade to be complete in 2008, $260 million. today, the estimate is 1.9 billion dollars to connect 58 counties in the case management system with no expectation in sight it's done before 20 # 15. the payroll upgrades in california, contracts, the contract was also just fired, less attention a week ago than the dmv. the calpers consolidating 49

data centers into one, the cost overrun, at 228 million dollars and they are more upset with the consolidation than previously, but we fixuate in southern california. we had a few extra million dollars in the recreation and parks department that we didn't spend, but the money is there and it was not used in the down time. there's been hundreds of articles on that, and not about billions of dollars of waste and inefficiency and i argue corruption by those that service that industry but not service it well. it's no a surprise. >> they didn't know the money was there. it wednesday underground or disappeared, didn't it? >> and no one's pleased with that and that deserved attention, but my gosh, think about the other examples, and i could go on and on. those are contemporary truths. >> are you saying the government is not working as it should be? it's not --

>> it's not focused. >> all right. where do the citizens come in? >> well, what's happened, so increasingly my argument in the book is there's this new digital divide taking shape, and it's less and less, and five years ago, if i was on the show, michael, and i was, talking about free wifi and social issues of technology and providing access to broadband and high speed, not just access in terms of ubiquity, but increasingly that's taking shape with the cost of the devices dropping precipitously. the cost not only relates to access here in america, but around the rest of the world, 63% of people in india have access to cell phones, only 47% access the toilet. a world remarkable where we are a world brain people talk about, but with government, it gets wider and wider and wider.

on amazon, shop 24/7 and then go down to the local building department, go to pay a parking ticket, and then you realize that divide, and the fear is this, citizens are now more engaged peer-to-peer, more engauged directly as we move through a frame work of social networks, mobility, localization of services and access and ubiquity of the cloud. we're stuck with this all top-down i.t. cartel mind set, i say lovingly. [laughter] this notion we can build systems and servers in a world where now there's an on demand resource, the cloud, getting the next best it ration, you're renting, not buying, and, yet, we're still building in government. >> you sound like you are on that score, but engaugement,

citizen to citizen, it's virtual, isn't it? >> the engagement, peer-to-peer, i think of donors choose, kick starter, and i could go on and on, examples where people say, you know what? i'm fed up with local government, state government, federal government. i'm sick and tired of haggle hearings and haggling with filibusters, cloture, i don't know what that is, sequestering, who made that word up? i'm disconnected, but i want to solve problems, want to engage and make a difference. particularly, the millennial generation, 30 and younger, the generation of choice, the net generation, generation of you, a world where -- >> and you have a great deal in faith and confidence in them, but in many republics, i mean, aside from wanting to commit themselves because, of course, you know, i work with them as college professors and so forth, and, i mean, they are around you to a great extent and we're in the campaign, but perhaps maybe some of your confidence there is

inflateith optimism on commitment to -- apathetic, caring about environmental issues, education, and fixes government, what you are talking about here. reforming government. they checked out of that. >> well, i'm not predicting government an end in and of itself, but a means to deal with the great challenges. this generation is more empathetic than any in history. this generation's more engaged in volunteering the data that clears that out. >> watch this and other programs online at booktv.org.

[applause] >> thank you, thank you, christine, for the kind introduction. i want to express special things to the organizations, the center for security policing, and the fund for american status, and the american forum. i'm pleased with the attendance tonight. that's a really good job by the sponsoring organization, special things to announce, in charge of the security project, service adviser, and coeditor of american support as christine mentioned, and, of course, very special thanks to the president and ceo of the center for security policy and chief operating officer of the center, for the general support for the project and for having supported throughout the years our work at the center. i also would like to thank purdue from the fund for

american status for helping making tonight's presentation possible. in terms of the book, the reason why i wrote the book was in order to make sense of the nature of these phenomena called chavez and his resolution, and not only for our region and the united states, but in general. ias connell: tent with views of the situation in latin america, but particularly those who define chavez as a socialist or populist regime that emerged, the failure of neoliberal policies, free market policies.

most of these explanations are economics, economic phenomena, and they believe that chavez more or the rule for chavez is not good, but could last as long as oil prices and old prices go down, and they will no longer be in the revolution. i reject that notion because i believe that chavez -- that the revolution that chavez initiated is not just domestic revolution, but the transnational revolution, a revolution that goes beyond boundaries of venezuela in the same way any other was totalitarian, a fascist revolution, or others.

i also like to challenge those who claim that the region is going to proliferation of democracy and that revolutions are merely exceptions to the rule and only temporary phenomena. i disagree with those views because i believe that they do not take intoing the the ideology, scope, and the actions of what they have done. it's important to point out it is revolutionary and attempt to refound the state, refound the foundations of the stasis -- of the states, and similarly, the project is connected to transnational project.

in addition, there's relations with countries like iran, with organizations such as the revolutionary armed forces of colombia, established relations with drug cartels, with other rogue states, if you wish, and with china also. even those point out the finger on those dangerous relations very often and tend to be informative. they intend to be districtive, but what they fail felt was lacking was something that would put all dots together. the relation between the, you know, the fact that the revolution goes against democracy, 30 years after democracy has been restored in latin america, particularly in the southern court. the fact that this is

establishing relations, and i tried to make sense of all these phenomenas together, but not only with objective of explaning or trying to understand that, but also in trying to project and trying to project future scenarios. in order to clarify, what, in my view, is the situation in latin america. they want to make sense from the reality to have lenses, if you wish, or some sort of frame work through which we can look at the reality of latin america today. so the book is compromised by nine chapters. in the first chapter, i discuss

the roots of the revolution. there's revolution in venezuela, but also in the countries that actually had a following in the venezuela motive, like bolivia, ect.. the explanation they give to why the bolivia revolution emerged is not necessarily an economic explanation, but i can identify the reasons why it emerged, but mostly i attribute the merchants of the revolutions to the fact that these were very efficient democracies. they were responses so democracies, and it was limited to just the agent of voting. people would vote for the leaders and the pears, and the

parties do way they want and then wait for the next election. there was no connection. there was -- they all -- the mention of representatives didn't exist. with the emergence of democracy early in the 1980s and the 1990s, we have a situation where more and more mar gypallized groups including indigenous groups, and those are the groups previously marginalized, all the sudden come to the political scene and they get mobilized. the -- the political system is unable to absorb new forces, and what they do is they act in the old way, in the old way that i describe before. for instance, there's cases that

promises everything to the indigenous populations, and they promise to respond to the indigital nows populations, and once he comes to power, he does exactly the opposite of what he had promised during the election. these kind of political behaviors, these kind of eventually breaks the system, and there's a crisis of the democratic system that lapses collapses, and that is sealed by the leaders that comes out of the traditional political parties and fill it out. in other words, to summarize, they emerge in venezuela and other countries because democracy failed. it's not an institutionalized democracy, no connection between state and society.

the state does not respond. there's no way to -- for integration of different social forces, and i come back to these issues later at the end of the book. exarpt two expresses the nature of the regime, and i say the regime is neither -- it not a classic populist regime, and it's not a topical democracy. neither, i say, can refuse the veeps venezuela government as being merely a socialist government. it is highly ideological, and in addition, which is important to

point out, even though we have elections taking place in those countries, those elections are mostly referendums. that's the only form of democracy that still prevails in a way. these regimes have the characteristics. what are they? basically, the regime calls for institutional reform, and that constitutional reform, usually a constitution resolution that is usually provides more rights to society. it's an extinction of rights. they are constitutions that tend to strengthen the power of the state at the except of the right of civil society, so what we are having is attacks against the

basic civil economic rights. in other words, these are against private property, private property actually is demolished by the venezuela government in particular, violation of individual rights, intimidation of the citizenry and the media, and the elimination of organized civil society groups like the trade unions, you know, one of the things that chavez just destroyed the previous trade yawnons that existed. of course, the use of existing prerogatives to weaken institutions, judiciary, and the political opposition. all these things you say are characteristics for totalitarian regimes. the ideology, the government trying to induct as much as possible, and in addition, it

sog gaits the system to the will of the regime. i give you an example. the case of maria. maria's a judge. that judge released a person that they wanted to be in jail. the reason why that judge released that person is because he said he already served enough time, if i follow the spirit of the law, he doesn't need to serve more time. she followed the legal system, but instead, they didn't like the verdict and put the judge in jail, later raped and got pregnant. that reminds us very much of i don't want to be -- but there is a book called "hitler's justice," and "hitler's justice," the judges knew exactly what the regime wanted,

and they gave them according to what the regime wanted. they didn't follow a legal logic, but they followed the logic of what the supreme leader wanted, and had is the reason why they, you know, german judges send a lot of people to death for nothing. the president didn't like the verdict of that judge and puts them in jail, typical of totalitarian regimes, typical. this is exactly what these -- what the government of chavez is based on accumulation of power, what it means is the invasion of state into all the arenas of civil society, and for that, he sees as crucial an alliance between the government and the military.

they created outside the institutional of the state in order to create more and more lawyers into the regime, more institutions of the state. i hope i am explaning myself. not to speak on the part of every aspect of venezuela life, but he expelled, perts, and instead he appointed a people lawyer, and the person in charge is no other than a family member of the same last name. the regime is that there's

obsession with accumulating power that they have complete disregard for immediate consequences and national interest. for instance, look at what chavez has done with the united states. most of the old venezuela itself sells to the united states. at one point from economics magazine asked a question whether i believe chavez is going to nationalize this and that company. i forgot what company exactly. he says it doesn't make sense, not convenient for vens way la, and the answer was totalitarian rulers do not have speculations of national gain or calculations of national interest. they are very much stuck in their own power in trying to accumulate as much power as

possible. this is why people who believe chavez is going to fall on economics, they are wrong. this is a regime assigned to be this way forever, for a long, long time, and they believe those who actually can with the friends radicalize further. in the next chapter, i talk about how the aspect of the revolution, chavez has put a lot of resources in trying to find candidates that have an ideology akin to his own and also try to

use other means, sometimes violence, in order to make sure that somebody actually follows his line and gains power or is elected. in different countries, sometimes through elections, sometimes not so much. the reason he's very clear is if other countries create the same type of regime, namely having a full power as much as possible, that means that it will be easier for the revolution to achieve unity in the continent because most of these positions will be in whatever position that are in the hands of a handful of people. now, what is a threat here?

it's been made clear. the government of venezuela established relations with the farc, iraq, drug companies, and others did the same thing. when democracy is undermind in the countries, we should be very much aware that they are creating a major geopolitical problem because we have not talking about an internal issue where the country became totalitarian, but it's revolutionary, anti-american, and also have connections with a number of enemies or enemies of all in general. the democracy here is equal to

the political threat. the more dictators like this are being elected, less and less accountable to society or less accountable to the power, that means the more they accumulate power and more free to make decisions and some of the decisions are not good. therefore, as i said, i repeat, democracy, the lack of democracy, the countries is a geopolitical threat by the definition. i talked about the groups i talked about before like the marginal groups that existed

there. if the revolution tried to reach to these groups, today, we have many, many groups in chile and brazil in particular that actually see chavez as a symbol of revolution, and liberation, as a symbol of anti-americanism. it's not clear to what extent they succeeded in reaching out to all these groups, but definitely, we have some clear examples of powerful groups that today they don't hold their own leaders as symbols, but they hold the word "chavez," and they have the moment in brazil that are active, support the word "chavez," and the grassroots of

the workers party that has ruled brazil since the year 2003, the grassroots is for chavez. the moment in arian jen argentid in the early 2000s protesting the government there is also pro-chavez and other groups that are also prochavez. in the future, if the democratic systems do not absorb the forces, most could fall in the hands of some revolutionary movement. in this case, the movement, which, in my opinion, very much alive despite the fact that chavez is dead now, and in chapter 5, i try to make sense of the relation with the farc and drug cartels. the relation with the farc is

based on my opinion in two points issue and it's something that we can see clearly if we read the files. the first is that the farc can serve as a a force, and another system that he and his allies have created to protect regimes from internal threat they claim in case the united states invade, highly unlikely, not impossible, inconceivable, or in case he's threatened by internal enemies so the farc that is the organization since the 1960s is based on what is called -- you know, a marxist oriented group

originally, but has been defeated in colombia slowly, not entirely, but slowly, they lost a lot of power. if you look at the ideology of the farc, the farc has moved from having an ide -- ideology of marxism to adopting the revolution. it's something that we can see, and the revolution, they -- they endorse it, and they embrace the revolution, and if you look at the farc, and that document, we can see clearly that the revolution seized, used the farc as a means to promote the revolution across la la la -- latin america.

the people, has words, and it has word with the -- these are not big groups, but they are big enough to create, and big enough to big enough to create challenge in america. in terms of the cartels, there's two -- two elements to cartels. at this point, everyone knows, according to the report, that we have in 2009 by the government office, that they are enabling the transit from columbia through venezuela, through the united states, and even to europe. all the venezuela port and

airportses enables drug cartels to operate, and a lot of the drags that we receive here in the united states or even in europe originate in venezuela airports, and that was denounced by state department officials too. at the time we fight drug cartels in mexico, that means on the one hand we are trying to fix a problem, and the venezuelans help drug cartels own the on the other hand. what is the logic of cooperating with drug cartels? the drug cartels do not only poise on our is the with drags burks not only intoxicate our kids with drags and send it here, but the drug cartels

destroy the state. they bribe politicians, they bribe charges, they bribe and destroy the state. today, for instance, countries like guatemala are failed states. they are in state of anarchy, and i think it extends throughout central america and already happening in other countries in latin america so that means that what we find very soon is an afghanistan right in our backyard. what would be the interest of the revolution to drug cartels? simple, to create skills and anarchies in those countries, and that anarchy would probably or at least likely that it would bring a leader that can claim to

put back order and then they will have it, a taxover of the governments, and, of course, they can operate freely so this is, i think, a major damage that the drug cartels are doing. remember, in states where we have anarchy, it's also very easy taken over by gangs, terrorist group, and foreign countries have influence in countries that are in a state of anarchy so here we have the presence of iran, and so the more they are, the more we see the presence of the possibility of the revolution or increase in

crime or more and more presence of iranians or other rogue states, but particularly iranians. the chapter 6 actually deals with iran and here i try to dispate another means about the of iran in latin america, and many people think iranis speak to break isolation to which they are subject as a result of international sanctions. the reality is that -- the reality is that there is one reason why they are there, but in order to understand how a -- what is the weight in latin america, we have to take intoing the what the agenda of iran and

the revolution. i argenziano the presence of iran in the continue innocent is not from iran's interest to avoid sanctions, but there's an element of this and in order to understand that, we have to look at what is the agenda, the interest of iran and interest of venezuela, so they have the agenda that they are seeking nuclear weapons. of course, the countries are supporting this iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. remember once iran obtains a nuclear weapon, they can use venezuela soil and become a

threat to the united states in shorter distance than the distance between iran and israel. that really could be problematic. the other thing that iranians are looking for in latin america is probably having a base for a war fund. the presence of revolutionary guards in latin america, the presence of latin america representing the presence of terrorists. they back them in latin america, and they could also serve to cause some harm to the united states of some american interest. what happened in october 20 # 11 when iran tried to kill the saudi ambassador using the center of drug cartel in mexico.

there's a strong presence in latin america with connections to drug cartels, and they also have connections, of course, to the government. what's the interest in the government in having relations to iran? here egoback to the same logic with the farc. iranians are experts in creating or consolidating a totalitarian state, and therefore this is where it's not surprising why we have revolutionary guards in latin america. secondly, the iranians, of course, are experts, and that's another thing that they would like to adopt, which is what is

called guerrilla war, protection of the own regime, and these are things that the iranians are experts on. particularly, i think what the government is taking intoing the is the possibility that cuba undergoes any type of reform and they decide to have transition to democracy and have the speed of influence, they can always fill that back. i think there is some mutual interest between the venezuelans and iranians, and that's the reason why they are in latin america. i don't think iranians alone went to latin america because they wanted, but they were

called by the revolution and called by chavez to join. i discuss the relations with china, and i'm quick here before i finish. china is usually understood as a country that is seeking to grow economically. they are looking to increase economic power. i claim that china is seeking to increase political power and influence around the world, ands situation right now is that the united states has a lot of influence in china's backyard. we have very strong relations with the philippines, japan, south korea, and we provide weapons to taiwan. we are not allowing the chinese to sole taiwan, and that is getting on the chinese nerves. they offer china a great

opportunity to be in network's backyard. i know latin americans don't like to call themselves in the united states, and i don't blame them for that, but having that chie need presence in the united states is important card for the chinese, but it's not that the chinese would have influence in our own backyard m i think the threat is that the chinese help the revolution with all its implications. they provide them with economic help. they sell them, you know, we and we are seeing that behavior in the world. we wanted sanctions on iran, the chinese opposed subjectively. we tried to impose sanctions on

sudan, and the chinese objected. of course, in the syria case is the same. we are in the same situation. they also objected. they continue to october. therefore, there is in the interest of china to help perpetrate the revolution and all the allies of the revolution. that is something important to take into account. finally, i talk about the regional and u.s. policy and i try to leave that for the question and answer period. you prefer me to stop right now and then take questions because the other two chapters deal with the regional and u.s. policy, how the region and the united states reacted to react to the u.n. revolution, and finally, i

propose also policy prescriptions, so shall we leave that and stop right here? [applause] >> we have a microphone here. state jr. -- your name and affiliation. >> i'm russell king, a federal employee, and i had a question -- i thought i heard that chavez's body is embalmed to lie in state permanently, and the only thing i know is in communism countries like vietnam, russia, china, places like that, and i think what they are doing is invalidating the expleases potion-chavez, and we

have -- is this something that was has no prez didn't? >> well, if you look at the stories, and even in latin america, i mean, that was the case, you know, they talk about, you know, you know, that, you know, they became a place like the mekkah, and they believe what they are doing makes sense because it is very much that era, and the only difference and i believe the government is going to continue to go in the direction of chavez because he left behind a huge, huge structure, and as i said in the presentation, the government of

this has been designed to perpetrate itself, so i believe that using this as the image and it's interesting those in the last election did not vote for chavez, they did not like him, but they still like chavez, interesting. showing the charisma or the appeal to the sectors was really, really effective, something that, i think, he has more difficulties to achieve. i don't think he succeeds in -- even if we accept the results in venezuela, what we see there is support for the ruling party diminished, all right? so in i think what that talks about the will of the foreign

government to continue the state of chavez. i believe there's more social rewards in vends -- venezuela, more organization by the party organizations, but i believe that sthai respond with more and more oppression, and we are already seeing that now, so i believe that eventually the elections are going to be abolishes because the message was, you know, we may lose the next election. either they continue to commit fraud or they are going to eliminate elections all together. >> i'm from chile. >> oh, yes, we know each other, i think. >> your presentation left me, i

must say, deeply, how should i say possess miss tick? let me try on you, and an alternative scenario. if you look at the performances are doing on the one hand, and you look at peru, colombia, mexico on the other hand and how they integrate amongst themselves and across the more developed regions, is it conceivable to take the long term view that something is happened that happened between democratic and capitalist systems on the one side and communism regimes on the other where the lack of viability, at some point, may be noticed and

others implode because there's weaker economies that underpin regimes as, again, coach yet union and others in the past? is it conceivable? i want to leave with an upbeat spirit so i ask you this. >> i'm sorry that i actually left you with the sense of pessimism. in moi opinion, they implode, but they survive while being poor. look at north korea, look at cuba, and so they can survive even if they don't have enough resources or, you know, they can place rewards, but they can also repress rewards. you see, i think it is, in my opinion, up to the local population, the local civil

society, to raise those issues, and i think it they continue to be agtive in the way that now they have been active in the leadership, but that's not enough. they have to also begin to be active at the international limit. they have to begin to be active at the international limit because part of the reason why the revolution survives is because the regional environment support the revolution, and first and foremost, oh, yes, and brazil in particular. the revolution sported it all along, and politically, internationally providing, i would say political support so i believe there's a situation like that, but that does not mean they exist, but it's up to the local population to mobilize

against the regime, and the population raises awareness and pressure in countries like brazil, and more than on the united states because the united states actually has little leverage in latin america. brazil has much more leverage in latin america, and that's as long as the workers party, the wp, is in control in brazil, we'll continue to give political support to the revolution and to the government. >> i come from venezuela, and we make part of an organization called one that translated, and there's three teams you didn't mention, and i wonder why. one of them is the portion of

the forum in all the outlibs of political issues, and the other is why gnt you mention the intervention of cuba? we have in all 120,000 militaries in venezuela, but we have 60,000 humans there in political activities and military too. ..