examines the inner workings of the continental congress and continental army and britain's fifth political and military reaction to the start of the war. this is about one hour. [applause] thank you for that gracious introduction and thank you, all, for making it out on a not so pleasant evening, whether one is at least. i was supposed to be here a couple of years ago and i think i had a hip operation and it knocked me out and i've always regretted that i missed this, so i'm back here to sort of makeup. i want to talk about the book i just have written and so this is a thinly disguised propaganda campaign to get you to purchase this undoubtably magisterial book. [laughter] called "revolutionary summer."

but i don't feel comfortable just talking about my own wares, so there will be the last time that we actually mention the book per say, except to say that it's a great beach reading -- [laughter] it's really short and that all the royalties from the book will go directly to the alexander ellis scholarship fund, and he is my youngest son. [laughter] i'm trying to tell the very familiar story, a story that virtually every generation of historians has told before and each generation is a new interpreted the clause which is like another layer of wallpaper across all come and in some sense, one of my tasks was to try to strip away the wallpaper and get back to the wall itself. and so some of the things i have to say our fresh are fresh

because they are not really new they are just sold a they've been forgotten. but given the fact this is a story that is the subject of one of the more performed plays in the american theatrical repertoire, the place 1776 i'd better have something new to say. i think i do. but that is very much up to you. want to talk for 35 to 40 minutes. i don't want to read to you. i want to talk to you. is that okay? [applause] i have some notes and i thought about what i want to say, but i don't want to worry you. if i was going to just read to you i would pass about and we could read it later. i began this project with a presumption and a question the presumption is this camano event

in american history which looks as inevitable in retrospect was as an improbable and problematic at that time. and part of my task was to recover for the modern reader the sense of crisis and confusion and in improvisation that was occurring in the late spring and summer of 76, 1776i have trouble because i beat my letters like 1713 in 2013. it's not easy to write clearly and illicitly about confusion. but that is one of the things i wanted to be able to do and recover that mentality, if you will. and i think you will see a little bit of what i'm talking

about fairly shortly. the question i had i called the wilkes-barre question after pennsylvania. is anybody here from wilkes-barre? no kidding to the unbelievable. unbelievable. there was nobody from wilkes-barre in san francisco last week i can tell you that right now. [laughter] the population of contemporary wilkes-barre is slightly larger than the population of virginia in 1776 now if we go out there to wilkes-barre now, do you think we can find george washington, thomas jefferson, james madison, george mason, john marshall and patrick henry?

we are not going to find them. now on some theoretical level, they, are there. that is human beings with the capacity for leadership, are there, but the situation doesn't permit the group to rise to the surface. and so the question is why did the situation accessed in 1776? now there is an answer to this after arnold, which is that great leadership only emerges during times of great crisis and this makes sense the pressure the crisis creates. yet we can all think of examples where there is a great crisis

and there is no leadership like now. [laughter] in the coming of world war i and europe. so, was a special you can't say there was something special in the water back there then. you can't say god look down upon the american colonies and bless them. i mean, supernatural explanations are not admitted even if he wore an angel local you are not allowed to use those in a historical conversation. i don't know whether i have a good answer to this. some of it is in the book and an implicit way. but i will give you an anecdotal version of a partial answer to the question. it relates to george washington. in may of 1775, george

washington puts on his military uniform and decides to go to the second continental congress. he's the only one that is going to be wearing a military uniform making a statement. he thinks the war has already begun. and it has we know in retrospect lexington and concord have happened in april. bunker is keen to happen in june which is one of the bloodiest battles on the war. but notice this. i know that chronology is the last refuge of the people minded. but it is the only refuge for historic. notice this, it is under reported, it is under discussed in history texts. the war starts 15 months before independence is declared.

it's going to cause -- it's going to shape things in this explanation i'm going to offer you. anyway, washington is getting ready to leave mount vernon, and he says to his -- what is that? [inaudible] flood warning. okay, great. [laughter] biblical here. [laughter] somebody gave me that line. yes, thank you, sir. washington said to his manager at mt. vernon, lawrence washington, who was his second cousin, when the british come up the potomac to burn mount vernon, get out my books, and martha, presumably not in that order. [laughter] he presumed he was going to lose

and everything. when jefferson eventually gets around to writing those famous words cut our lives and fortunes and sacred honor, the sounded pretty rhetorical. they were for real. it was everything. it was all and. you had to be willing to do that. and he was. later in 1779, a british forget comes up the potomac and washington's is again going to send out a skiff with fruit and presents to appease the british captain. so he does that. and the british captain says i'm just fishing for herring. i have no evil intentions. he doesn't even know that this is not vernon.

so, washington since a report of this to george, sort of proud that he defended the homestead. washington write back and says i am extremely distressed at what you have told me. you have sullied my honor. if it happens again, let them burn it to the ground. these are the kind of guy is the we are talking about here. there is a special quality to this particular crisis that generates a level of leadership, not just in virginia, but beyond. by the way, this isn't a claim that the founders for all iconic heroes or worthy of devotee or anything like that. they were all human beings come each of them have their flaws. i tried to write about that. they don't solve the slavery problem with the native american problem.

those are major problems. but all that said, this is the greatest generation of political leadership in american history. and the revolution is a test. one of the better things that i discovered that these presidents of scholarly literature in some ways not in a sufficient way i think, is that this was and i'm necessary war. there was a diplomatic solution to the crisis that was visible and known by prominent figures on both sides. on the british side, both william and the house of lords and edmund burke in the house of commons advocated the solution, and in the continental congress, both thomas jefferson and john dickinson crafted a resolution called -- would you call it, it was a resolution appealing to

the king on this principle. you let us tax ourselves and our legislatures and legislate for ourselves and our perspective which its leaders and we will remain an entire recognizing the authority of the king and recognizing our membership in the british empire economically. because we're both beneficiaries of that. as i say, both sides -- there are people on both sides arguing for this. up through the middle of the spring of 1776 this is the answer that the british will later regret they do not accept or act on. this will be the biggest blunder in the history of british statecraft. why don't they wanted to it?

why don't they see that this is the way? for three reasons. first of all, william blackstone, the great jurist has ruled in 1765 or asserted that there must be a single source of sovereignty in the empire and in any government. there cannot be many gods, they're must be one and the source of sovereignty in the british empire and the british government is parliament will really intrude the king and parliament. and the american solution is unacceptable because it creates multiple versions of sovereignty. each colony will have its own even though they claim to work within the canopy of the british king. we can't have that. since aristotle everybody knows you have to have a final source of sovereignty.

by the way the whole american constitution is based on fencing with that idea and james madison is the major architect. there's an early 18th-century version of what we will become to know the domino theory. if we grant the americans this degree of latitude politically, what happens in ireland? what happens in scotland? what happens in india? we can't send that signal. it's a sign of weakness. it's a sign we are not really an entire. again, if they had acted on this, they would have discovered the british commonwealth 100 years early. but they are not ready to act on this and there is the third reason they are not ready to

act. there's no reason to make a diplomatic solution when we have the militarily dominant force. we could squash this thing. the colonies have never cooperated any military or political venture before. and the british army and the british navy, when combined, is the dominant military force on the planet. the prussian army is better call the french army is as good. if you put the navy and, british dominance. ask yourself this question how many wars did great britain lose between 1750 and 1950, two of them. the american revolution and the war in afghanistan. everybody loses in afghanistan. [laughter] graveyard for empires.

okay. and in order to the implement the decision mcgeorge free himself -- and it's important to hear that, george iii himself, it doesn't come from parliament, it comes from george free himself. he says we will prepare an invasion force larger than any ever forced to cross the atlantic. 42,000 soldiers and sailors, over 400 ships, the largest amphibious ever to cross the atlantic. the only time it succeeded then as world war i or world war ii. and we are going to squash this rebellion in the cradle. and we are going to attack new york and occupy new york as our major headquarters and spread from there. but a deadly and devastating knockout blow at the

beginning. what's the situation politically in the american colonies? there is a really good book about the year 1775 the talks about that fact and this cannot recently, that there was a political consensus that have already formed by the time you got to leave 75. that is true i would say in new england, because new england has been occupied, but it's not true down as you get into new york, pennsylvania, new jersey and virginia. those colonies and states are divided. now, we know there's about 20% of the colonial population actually 19% that is loyalist. but in new england, they have all been driven out. you don't want to be a loyalist

and living in new england. they will tear your house down and kill you. that doesn't mean, however, that the other 80% are all patriots. this is tough to figure and it varies from colony to call me and from region to region. it's like going on cnn during an election watching the blue states and read states and purple states come on the screen and within the states' different counties. my own best judgment is that of the percent, about 60% were pre-committed to the cause, and they called it the cause. but there is another 40% of the 80% that are really undecided or

they will go wherever the nearest army happens to be. okay? give you an example, in valley forge, the continental army starts on the most productive area and the american colonies because the farmers sell their produce to the british army in philadelphia because they get more money for it. some from the quakers, too so they have that to excuse them. at any rate, up until the middle of the spring, the moderates dominate the continental congress and the public opinion in the country at large is divided. the moderate position is most effectively defended by john dickinson. the radical position of independence by john adams. that's one thing to play 1776 gets right.

what changes the chemistry of the political situation is the realization that we are about to be invaded. people talk about the impact of thomas kane's pamphlet, common sense which comes out in late january and is very influential. no question. but one of the reasons it is influential, and is influential in the relationship between the colonies and the king, not just the parliament but the king is because it is published and is read in a specific context, and that context is these some of the guns are sending the largest amphibious force with 15,000 prussian troops who are committed to know -- to taking no prisoners. they are sending them to get us. how do i know this? why am i confident that what i just said is hysterically supported by the evidence?

in may, may 15th 1776, the congress sends a resolution that is written by john adams requesting each of the colonies to review the colonial charters as state charters. adams says for obvious reasons this is a defacto declaration of independence. i mean, if you're going to rewrite your charter it is because you decided to go to independence. they send these to every governor and the governor sent it to the legislature and the legislature sent it to all of the counties and towns in each of the colonies. this reasonably obscure source called american archives edited by a guy in the 1840's named charles force has preserved all of the responsibilities. for example, there are 42 towns

in massachusetts that respond. they all say the same thing. we cannot imagine having this conclusion only six months ago when we still believe in our king and the membership of the british empire. but he has betrayed us, he is no longer our friend coming and in effect he has declared his independence of us. therefore, we have no choice and they use this phrase, and this is where jefferson uses it we pledge our lives and fortunes on our sacred honor. this must come from a british cullom that i don't know, but i tried to find it. but that is where jefferson gets the phrase and it is almost unanimous. there is one town in massachusetts that says i'm not sure that the british navy is going to bombard us as soon as we see this. [laughter] anyway, the real reason why there is a political consensus

for independence by the early summer of 76 is that they are being invaded. and so, in effect the british decision to squash the rebellion generates the political will to cement the rebellion. does this began to sound familiar? the attack is going to be in new york. now if you look at a map, new york is a la kaput, s.i., long island whoever controls the sea controls the battle and there is no question about who controls the sea. in retrospect even at the time, new york is indefensible. so why did decide to defend it?

this is where the military side of the story and the political side keep interacting. the british fleet lands on july 2nd committee entering segments of the british fleet, july 2nd, s.i.. that is the day the colonists built on independence, the resolution from virginia that these colonies are and have every right to be independent states. the continental congress says look, how would it look if we just declare independence? and then the army retreats to the mainland? either connecticut or new jersey well, another question that might have been asked is how what it will give the army doesn't retreat and is annihilated there is a second reason why they defend it, and washington is a believer in civilian control. congress wants them to defend

new york he's going to defend new york. there is another reason. washington is an honor driven man as my earlier example test fais. it's almost medieval chivalry. it washington believes the enemy in this case william how presents himself on the field, he is honor bound to meet him and the same way that he is to answer a summons to dual. this is stupid. [laughter] he needs to get over this. [laughter] he will eventually get over this, but it's going to come at an enormous cost on long island and on manhattan. the average experience of a soldier in the continental army is five and a half months. the average experience of a soldier is seven and a half years. within the officer class it is even more dramatic.

henry knox, the head of artillery, a general head of artillery a year earlier was a bookseller in cambridge. so, both in terms of the terrain and in terms of the power of the professional power of the two armies, this is going to be a debacle. why did they think a chance? all of the messages from headquarters at this time are part of this republican virtuous rhetoric. soldiers who believe in their cause and fight for their own values and their own country can defeat mercenaries in any field of battle. if you believe, and you are a better soldier.

at some level this sounds really great, except it doesn't work. and in the battle of long island, the continental army is routed easily. they suffer over 1500 casualties and they are trapped on long island. this could be the end of the war. what would happen if the continental army was destroyed, and washington and his staff were all killed and captured? but they get off in a miraculous everything has to work perfectly -- it is a perfect storm of the benevolent storm, the current in the east river have to follow a certain way, the fog has to come in at just the right time coming and they get across on the night of august 30th sort of like an even more dramatic version of dunkirk. it is in some ways the most political campaign of the war

because if it didn't happen, i'm not sure the war would have continued. we can't know that. i will mention that in a second. but, at the end of this defeat in long island, richard howell, the admiral, asks for a meeting with the american representatives from the congress. there's all kind of going back and forth on whether they can diplomatically do that. but eventually, they sent three people in the benjamin franklin, john adams and john rutledge to meet with him, with richard howell in the stone house on staten island. september 11th after the battle. and he says look, we've just demonstrated to you that you cannot win. it is a hopeless cause. step back from independence.

listen to the terms the kaine will offer you. they will be generous. i can tell you he is going to let you govern yourselves as you want to. although i can't guarantee it. and we will probably have to hang most of the leaders. [laughter] he doesn't say that, but that's what they mean. and both adams and franklin say something really interesting. adams says it makes no difference what happens here. if you destroy the continental army, we will raise another. demographically there are over 500,000 american males between the ages of 15 and 50. it's the same thing ho chi minh says to us. so, go ahead, but it doesn't make any difference.

franklin says something like that, but he's friends with richard how. they had been friends in london and tried to end the war. the brothers really don't think that the war is a good idea. and he says sir richard cullen you tell us that we cannot ban and i tell you you cannot win. you are not fighting in army coming you are fighting the people to read you must subjugate the american population. you will never be able to do that unless you raise troops will never be justified in the british -- in terms of cost or british public. this will be seen like the crusades, he said. and you will be an ignominious in your defeat. so i advise you just take your fleet and ships and go back now and save as much of your reputation as you possibly can.

well, it's really interesting question, and it's an unanswerable question. what would have happened if the british had destroyed the continental army on long island and manhattan, and they had several chances to do so. and the howes as i suggested really didn't want to destroy the continental army. they wanted to -- as they said to rough it up, proportionally demonstrate that they couldn't possibly win, but they didn't want the war to become the kind of war against the irish and scottish that was a genocidal war. they wanted to ended in a way that they could all come back together. and they valued as peace makers more than generals or have add

models. that is a question that as i said is on answerable but i have an obligation having spent four or five years thinking about it as what to say. i think that if they had gotten lost they could replace the army's year than they could have replaced washington. i think what would have happened is that each state is reverted back to its own state militia as the source of authority and what have become a guerrilla war. the british would have still lost, but what has been a different kind, the course would have been longer. there is a possibility i would say a 20% possibility that the destruction of the continental army would have destroyed the will of the rebellion because that little group. that is what i can't know in this impossible to answer. i don't think would happen if i

was betting i would put my odds on the american victory in the end. one of the things that happened as a result of this experience is that washington began to understand the strategic fact that became absolutely central to his success. this wasn't the way to fight the war. the american army was never going to be competitive with the british army in a man for man situation. let's fight a war of posts. that's what they called it. it's not quite a guerrilla war because it is a conventional army but in which you don't fight unless you have a superior number or superior to remain. you adopt a defensive strategy. and this will work for you for a reason that's really important. we don't have to win.

they have to win. as long as we don't lose, we win. and that's what happens. we never really when the war. they just decide to give up. you know, at the end of the war on the trees and there's over 3,000 british troops still in north america. but they just decided to leave. washington learns this lesson and some of 1776 or the thought process that leaves at the the lesson is that at that time to the it's hard for him to accept this. a potentially, he does. and if you think about it, many of the great generals in world history are losers. hannibal, napoleon, robert e.

lee rommel. washington was not a good general. he lost more battles than he won. but he was a winner. he was a winner because of his resilience and the insight he had at the strategic level. i think my time is kind of up. i will end with one somewhat controversial question or statement. when the war in iraq was ratcheting up, i got a call from one of the hotbeds of the l.a. times that said i want you to write an op-ed on what washington would have done about iraq. [laughter] or what he would do about iraq. so i said stephanie, washington wouldn't know where iraq was.

[laughter] he wouldn't know about weapons of mass destruction, jihad, whatever. she said that's right. now write the piece. [laughter] so, i wrote this piece in which the main point was washington would have said we are the british and i don't understand that. now if you take the poll among american citizens as to whether the united states is an entire, the overwhelming majority of americans but say no. if you take a poll in the rest of the world, everybody says yes. and we have become an inferior power since world war ii and in inherited since 1945, 46. and we've made specific

decisions and specific contexts. the cold war, more recently iraq and afghanistan. we are facing syria and egypt. i want to step back from specifics of the context and say the reason we are an empire in denial is because we know that the core values of the republic are incompatible with imperialism. that the republic must depend upon the power of her ideas to succeed voluntarily. an entire depends on the power of its arms to succeed. now, i'm not a pacifist or an isolationist. i supported the korean war and the gulf and the bosnian war. but i think i would like to encourage a national conversation about the conflict between our origins and we are now. we could then say george washington as part of another era.

jefferson is in a lost world. we are in a different place. but, if we believe in the original intentions and if we believe the core values of the republic were established at the moment, i think that we should have a seminar on this, and would be an interesting conversation which liberals and conservatives might be able to come together. thank you for having me. [applause] >> don't embarrass me by not having any questions, for heaven's sakes. thank you. there was wonderful. i am a big fan of yours and growing up i was a big fan of thomas jefferson. i thought he was the greatest president that there was.

i loved he's growing up in he gerdemann monticello, i like wind, he went broke drinking wine. i just loved him. i thought he was fantastic and then i read or book. [laughter] >> it is a fantastic book. i changed my mind on jefferson. i have two questions. one of my questions is in all of your research have deliver change your mind on any of the people you've written about and by reading your book on adams' right now so i think, you know, they tend to agree with him more i know it's difficult to bring the past and the modern times. but when i read the books i try to figure out where politically and jefferson and adams and jefferson and hamilton where

they would be politically on the spectrum. i kind of gets the feeling jefferson and the it team party guy that he did the government. so can you just briefly go down a couple of those and see where you think they are politically right now. >> what i sense of the l.a. times reporter that i don't think i mentioned -- maybe i did -- try to bring them into the present like trying to plant cut flowers and they want to grow. you have to make a translation that is a better analogy. i will stick with the second question first. i think that jefferson is the

ultimate ideal last. he is wilsonian making the world silver democracy. he's a believer in small government. and in some sense, but the industrial revolution and the end of the society in the beginning of the urban society with the thick demography, washington -- excuse me, jefferson's values become irrelevant, and he would say that pitted when we stop being an agrarian society, nothing i believe continues to apply, but of course it does because he's one of the most resonant icons in his bonnet on the tidal basin of the most lovely in the most visited. i think jefferson would have gone with the confederacy in 1861. i think jefferson would have opposed the civil rights act of 1965 because he believed blacks

were biologically inferior not just because of nature. adams is the real list -- realist, george kennan, the american state department guys like adams. adams is also a contrarian who could never possibly be elected to any government in the 21st century. [laughter] and would be thrilled to be able to tell you that and will be proof of his virtue. will was the first question? it had to do with -- i never changed my mind. once i change my mind -- nuance is pitted i believe with certain convictions that probably don't change at the root.

my first impression of washington is that he was really boring and flat and i didn't completely -- he is the single most depressing of the founders. he's the founding father of them all. [laughter] and they all agreed with that. franklin was the wisest, adams was the best, jefferson was the most intellectually sophisticated, madison was the most politically agile, hamilton was probably the greatest. he got the highest grades on the sats. but they all agreed washington was the greatest they recognized and respected. i don't want to reiterate this

isn't to sanctify these guys. one of the i think conspicuous qualities of this fall schogol the popular literature the last ten to 15 years is that they all flawed. but you do not have the kind of detection. it is moving off in a fundamentally different direction. it's being done by people like ron churn now, david mccullough. i am a professional historian. i have a ph.d. from yale

university. thank you for the question. yes, sir. the bulk of the patriots' -- >> are you talking about the new england patriots now? >> the general in the early part of the country were either out of new england or out of virginia. the ones we read about and hear about -- >> you mean like the army or the political realm? >> pub the call. >> i was wondering do you care to talk about the plate in the to end of the dumbbells so to speak? >> the sixth president of the united states come from massachusetts and virginia.

virginia is the biggest by far. it's a really big state and it is a moderate state meaning they are the source of the moderate movement that is reluctant to declare revolution. new york is also a moderate state. so these other middle states play a role they don't have the leadership. a lot of the guys in pennsylvania think that there's this moment and 1776, it never happened. never happened. the never signed a document once. most of them signed it on august

the vote on independence was adams of the the date for the anniversary of independence of july 2nd. but there are some that signed in october from a philadelphia, pennsylvania, new york and like robert moss, one of the last ones to sign it and he signs of the very top. [laughter] >> like he was their first but it really isn't true. the importance of massachusetts and virginia is true. leadership comes from the two colonies and states but it doesn't accurately reflect the importance of the colony's shaping the political opinion in this crucial period. yes, sir. >> i want to ask about a male that you haven't written about and is somewhat neglected, maybe not as ackley founding falcon but sometimes career spanned a

number of the presidents and his importance to the making of the nation is every bit as important. >> i can't wait to hear who this is. >> you mean to an earlier and these virginians that rose in this wonderful class of people. we are talking of john marshall. >> don't have to persuade me on this, sir. i would love to write a great biography on marshall. the problem as he destroy his correspondence with his wife and you don't have the same level of information. you have all of this legalistic information about his cases and the papers have been published at the college of william and mary which is home to the school of law. but he was a real stud. this is a guy that at valley

forge was known as -- well, he had high jumper from something come he had the athletic competitions, and he was the leader of what was the equivalent of a special forces team to wilbur knorr mackey had six or seven platoons shot out from under him. and then he goes on to become a major figure in virginia politics and secretary of state for a brief time under adams and then the greatest chief justice and american judicial history serving from 1800 to 1835, 36. i used to tell the story about how when the marshall died, he was visiting his daughter in new york and they carried the body down and when they passed through the wing of the liberty bell and a cracked. [laughter] it's a great story but turns out not to be true. [laughter] everything about him that is written now tends to be from a

purely judicial point of view and although there are a couple of good biographies, he is a little young -- the criteria is as if this makes any difference you have to have been a prominent leader both in the time of the war for independence and at the time of the constitution and the 17 nineties he is just a soldier in the first one, he's too young. but he is a great man. thank you. "revolutionary summer: the birth of ameican independence" do you see any parallels between the revolution and the arab spurring >> why see any parallels between

the revolution and the arab spring? i see more differences than parallels. egypt has been governed by most of its 20th century history and there's no tradition of space politics on which to build and the sectarian strife and division between the different ethnic groups and muslims in the muslim world and the secular world. but those divisions have been hampered down or controlled by the autocratic power you remove the autocratic power and they come leaping into the surface. just as they did in bosnia and yugoslavia. the american colonies had all developed these habits of political -- what we call the political democracy.

they know how to govern themselves. they have their own legislatures for 100 years there was a dissertation that america has become different than in england and europe. there isn't nearly the shock value experience of the united states when they move through the revolutionary experience. the revolution really wasn't a revolution. it was more of an evolution. and the egyptians are going to have a very difficult time discovering what came naturally to less. this isn't a comment on muslim although it is part of the package they have no history. the have no history of practicing democratic politics.

>> thank you for coming and for being a professional historian. a question about how the american revolution is taught. the past legislation is saying that all segments of american history now have to give portions to gay and transgendered. i'm not sure -- >> that is another thing. [laughter] >> my children who attended woodward academy was divided between african-americans, native americans, very segmented now. you have an overview coming out of the levels of education and history is becoming more relevant. i would like to know your thoughts on how teaching -- how the american revolution is being taught today and how the legislatures are getting involved in the teaching of history and what that means for us in the future.

>> i don't like the involvement of state legislatures deciding on what kind of textbooks and that kind of thing. i think the current situation is close to a disastrous in terms of the historical illiteracy of this generation and the rising generation and all of the surveys and polls show you that something is really. they don't know what century the symbol war happened. all kind of specific and horrible things. i think that the emphasis on testing has handicapped good teachers especially the middle school and secondary level not

forcing them into certain kinds of pedagogies but really don't work very well. i think the social scientific asian of metal and secondary school education has made history not really history but the blend of geography, sociology, economical, really intellectuals do which is nothing at all. on the point you made come i understand your concern that in effect, the native american experience, the women's experience is being given a new emphasis. and this is true that the college and the graduate school level, too. if you want to go on an animal the american period, it would be a good idea to do native american stuff because you will get a good job. this is the compensation for the past years of neglect. is it a bit extreme? wellcome it depends on where you

stand. i am here to simply argue that in effect the late 18th century was shaped by a group of dead white males who were an elite. and you're not supposed to say that but i do believe that is the case. and nobody shot me, so i would say let a thousand flowers bloom. but the situation of the secondary and the middle school level with regards to the teaching of history is not -- it is to put it mildly pretty desperate. >> one last question. >> thank you for the comment, sir. given the performance of the continental army in 1776, losing britain, manhattan, dreading the new jersey, why did the continental congress continue to have confidence in washington? there were some almost rebellion among his close staff?

>> you are right about that. >> if you want study washington's life and career, this is the period that he is at his very worst, both as the commander and the psychological he is clinically depressed throughout the late summer and fall because he is the defeat of the army as the defeat of himself. the army is a projection of his own character. there are a couple people that are talking to people in the continental congress saying he is not up to the job and that he's made some strategic blunders that could have cost us the whole thing. nathaniel greene isn't one of them. but there is talk and rumors back there. they don't amount to much in 76. they come to some sort of a crescendo the following year there is something called the

conaway couple when he is holed up in valley forge and they try to -- again it fails. adams is behind him and is ahead of the bottle law or ordinance. and whenever some kind of challenge comes, washington says if anybody wants to do this job -- [laughter] you can have it. because he thinks he isn't being given sufficient support by the congress and he's right about that. and you can hear rumblings but while the british changes commanders three times, the americans never change. hence the stability of the election and the continental army that makes a difference. and washington is a guy that makes mistakes but learns from them. and that makes a big difference. >> thank you, all, for coming

tonight. [applause] .. >> i am chuck snyder and senior fellow today with an anthropologist and