while he despised radical lik clergy, he felt they are his allies to determine at thetime th time that communism is the h main threat. and the potential ally of the united states. that is why he had thathadhe policy to allow them to continue to organize with high schools or elementary schools or camps and to create mosques on reading with every university before and after the revolution.

but that tolerance as compared. >> >> host: was the everpopular mo popular among the iranian people? >> guest: i think she was think popular when he came to power. . . he had a reputation so i think he was popular until about 51 or 52 but then it a very tense relationship developed with the nationalist movement and the fact that he fled and then came back i

think that damaged his popularity but after 63 he really began to look at the reform and into the political system all of these make more popular through 73 or 74 but then it got to his head and it abolished the party system and then he began to lose his popularity and then he was sick with cancer. he was diagnosed in 73 and the iranian people never knew he had cancer.

>> host: you write in your book. >> host: in the chapter called the perfect storm it is hard to pinpoint the moment the coalition eventually overthrew the -- the shah began to coalesce. president carter's human-rights policies had an impact to reinvigorate the dormant democratic movement. >> guest: one of the things that is not in the book but i had written about it, i was a political prisoner under the shah and overnight prison conditions began to change and a torture ended and overnight we understood amnesty international was coming they begin to clean up the prison and issue blankets

and then with the rise of democracy with society at large people felt the shah is under pressure from jimmy carter and all of these suppressed pressures you cannot create a middle-class or educated technocratic class when jimmy carter came they do the shah could not be as tough. >> host: why real a political prisoner? >> guest: i was young. the radicalism of the age

that was easy to catch and i felt iran did not have a government but needed a more democratic government but with that idealism like many in the era to demand a more just and democratic government from when wetback i began to teach until the police caught up with me. i spent one year in prison that made for the year particularlynterestg wmont of i0

months they would become the leaders of the country which was the entire clerical class. they were all there within six months. >> host: where did they catch up with you? >> we met and discussed politics and organizing was not permitted at the time with those leftist ideas they cave and arrested me.

>> host: review at the university or at home? >> guest: at the time when they arrested me i was the minister of education. he was a colleague at the university where he invited me to his office. >> host: he was the shah minister. >> guest: he was. many people thought but halfway through my meeting we got a call of internal security that said my name had come up as someone who had associations with these groups and i was about to leave the ministry they grabbed me the way they wave grabbed with political

prisoners to make sure you don't have the cyanide pill that was very popular in those days. the regime is far more butte -- brutal today but then they take me to the place and i spent six months there in the famous prison where the clergy was. >> host: where you tortured? >> guest: acquisition as solitary confinement for one month which was the worst torture. i was beaten a couple of times but when we arrived jimmy carter was elected.

and overnight you fluency of the borders have come down but if they rested my wife when she was involved and

other subtle forms of torture but the kind most of the regime is engaged in after word that was massive and the kind that the regime was engaged before we came because iran had a terrorist problem with pacs of terrorism and then they arrested those people. >> host: abbas milani how well did you get to know the mullahs? >> guest: some of them i got do you know fairly well and i used to spend one hour per day with them. i used to teach english

occasionally and was elected to become the next leader after kohmeni and when he found out they tortured in the islamic president people were killed with very sorry trials coming he spoke out and lost his job and his been imprisoned most of his life. that is 20th-century politics someone within a breath of being the leader said i could not watch people being tortured and executed and he lost his job i got to know him. but all that is most people

have reviewed the book from the "wall street journal" they have appointed more or less to keep their personal views to keep their preferences out of this to look at the shaw with the account. >> host: at the end who was still boyle to the shah? >> guest: at the end unfortunately he did not remain loyal to them. he would be executed by the regime of the military again what is less known is that

the carter administration around of member 1970 decides the shah is no longer capable of power since he becomes very active to create the rapprochement of the military and the clergy in to pick the most likely successor said the army chose to realize the american government go bonkers supported the shah there in the streets for almost a year and a half but only to that end but what the shah decided to do is interesting. he arrested some of his most loyal servants because this

way he thought he could stay ahead of the curve but i think anybody who studies the revolution it only increases the appetite ucb is when you put your own prime minister in prison may now want your head. >> host: we have been talking with abbas milani this book has been reviewed by "the wall street journal" , at the end in the biography and the l.a. times says splendid the detailed biography. published by palgrave

>> did is an honor to introduce from the national security council to speak

but currently a professor at spent -- penn state and also with handed is hillary who served at the state department and negotiated with the u.s. government with the iranian officials now a senior professor lecture at american university in washington and they're riding has appeared in your times and washington monthly of long others said they came to us last night from virginia and took the late-night train and put up with like to do is turn it over to you for comments to start off. >> thank you very much. i will start off for us today and then the begin by saying thank you for hosting us and for coming it is an honor and pleasure and me led ford to the interesting discussion today. i will start with too provocative themes from our

book is going to tehran by the united states must come to terms with the republic of iran. and the first of the theme is the united states is today and has been for the past two years in power it relative to the decline in the middle east and also we have been the beneficiary of america is ongoing decline in the middle east is the islamic republic of iran. if you are not sure you agree with these propositions of want to ask you to prepare their relative position of the united states and the islamic republic of vibration in the mideast today with where they were even with 9/11 just over 10 years ago. on the eve of 9/11, every single government in the middle east was every'' one dash pro-american dash egypt

and turkey are in negotiations to become pro-american like syria or libya or the taliban government in afghanistan are staying in iraq every single government was either pro-american in negotiations it to become pro-american or anti-iranian that is a good position for the united states in the middle east. but because of elections today governments across the middle east in egypt egypt, tunisia, libya, leban on egypt, tunisia, libya, lebanon,, they're all though longer pro-american or anti-iranian. they are all pursuing a least, at least independent forum policies which are by definition much less enthusiastic about strategic cooperation with the united states and much more open to

the islamic republic of iran. simply put today's relatively speaking united states is a profoundly weaker position in the middle east and the islamic republic of iran is in a stronger position. this is essentially happened because there has been a dramatic shift in the middle east balance of power. in our book, going to terrebonne, we describe why part of this shift is occurring because of the mistakes of the american policy in the middle east. but we also described in our book part of what is going on is something vastly underappreciated in the west, which are these successes of the islamic republic of iran that also drive the shift of the regional balance of power. we argued in our book, these two are inextricably linked with the success of the

islamic republic is driving that they're linked and in fact, a very coz dysfunctional policy toward the islamic republic of tehran that is at the heart of our decline in the middle east. we also argue that it will take a strategic realignment by the united states with the republic of iran to enable america's strategic recovery in the middle east. we unpacked use arguments first by examining the basis for u.s. dominance in the middle east. something increasingly driven since the end of the cold war by america's unique capability to project the enormous amounts of conventional military force into the middle east. no one else, not even chided can project this kind of military force into the middle east today or four years to come. this has given the united

states extraordinary economic and political influence in the middle east and we forced the military dominance in other key parts of the world. but our failures in afghanistan and iraq in particular have underscored and especially for the middle east republics, the limits of what american military might can accomplish. we argue these failures of the middle east policy are not just idiosyncratic generated products of the george to be bush said ministration but as we described in our book fees stemming from a much deeper source that cut through both democratic and republican did frustration than something we describe as the united states each essentially giving in to the post cold war temptation to act as an imperial power in

the middle east and this turned in policy with little regard for the reality on the ground in the middle east's proven deeply damaging to american interests, as a candidate in 2008 now president obama then seems to understand and he talked about courageously during the campaign and pledged not just to draw american troops from iraq but also the american mindset that had gotten into the strategic mistake to invade iraq in the first place and pledged to change the middle east policy but instead the obama administration has pursued policies as the predecessors the same policies that did such damage to our strategic position and as a result the

obama administration today is not just providing a stalled middle east peace process but the demise of the true state solution to the palestinian conflict and while the above it ministration military intervention in libya can and overthrow gadaffi it is now e. incubating in libya a significant threat to american security interests and as the detail in our book, going to tehran deal gone bad restoration has gone beyond the bush administration to trim the islamic republic to argue what we say is ward dangerous to discredit a gauge of it as a strategy to deal with the islamic republic of iran to say they tried to reach out and failed and therefore the engagement is the house of fools.

but with these policies under obama as watch the middle east balance of power has shifted even further away from the united states even more than at the end of the bush to administration. this brings me to a critically important parts of our book which is out the republic of iran it is the biggest beneficiary of the middle east. in our book how by pursuing a foreign policy to build a domestic political order to attract the middle eastern republic it has been able to take advantage of american mistakes to include -- improve its own position dramatically. the key to the islamic republic success is beyond

the shift of their distribution of power. . . it is both encouraging and taking advantage of this very important transformation in the middle east. one of the most remarkable things about this shift in the middle east over the last decade away from the united states and our allies and toward iran and its allies, is that it has had virtually nothing to do with

iran's use of military force or economic coercion. the republic has not invaded anyone or sanctioned them. it is all about the islamic republic. in our book we have set the islamic republic and reliance on this power in this strategic context. the critical set of sources or the unique and unparalleled opportunity that we have had sit and listen to why the officials and diplomats explain how the world looks strategically from their point of view our research and our interviews, we detail how we look at the world from

tehran. nearly all of whom have been hostile to the very idea of an islamic republic. not just afghanistan but iranian diplomats inner conflicts that were killed. the islamic republic neighbor to its west, iraq under saddam hussein had helped them in other aerators killing 300,000 of its citizens. and today many of those same error countries that have helped iraq invaded and fight the obama or public, today they have thousands of u.s. troops and billions of dollars worth of the weapons system. all ways and threatening to attack the republic to disarm it

of weapons of mass destruction. they have built a strong defensive capability especially beyond its borders. they have acted ostensibly beyond the borders that's what have they done with the national security strategy to develop this cross power strategy. a strategy that they galvanizes these most intense grievances, including their grievances against the united states and israel in their grievances against their own unrepresented pro-western settlements and regimes. it has aligned itself with

public opinion itself in the middle east to constrain hostile governments from attacking it. just think about how they are a largely shia population that would react as we use this to attack the islamic republic today. now, u.s. military planners could hope that offering population could be passive, as i think that they assumed even maybe five years ago. but today that seems a little reckless. so for all the ridiculing that they have, the islamic republic appeals to regional public actually works. it works to constrain the neighboring iran.

iran has also worked to reinforce these strategies over a number of years. why as they pick what we would call winners from shia groups in and the rock and even the muslim brotherhood in egypt. he keeps political allies in key regions across the middle east. a years long bet on these groups has paid off. because now the regional allies has become the most influential player in their respected amounts today. the result is that is the islamic republic of iran. and if ideas of the pacific tory government and independent foreign policy has real influence and power in countries across the middle east from egypt to other places that were once clearly in america's

sights. and strategic return, it has been and is using not drones and tanks, but they are using the political awakening of the middle eastern republic to author the very nature of power politics in the middle east. as we described in our book, this has been an effective foreign policy and national security policy. one that is repeatedly underappreciated in the united states. >> to pick up on hillary's point of this strategy being a real strategy for a regional balance of power that policymakers have long seen against the islamic republic, i think it is important to note that

especially for americans to understand that it is only an islamic republic which can include the kind of games. the shaw could not have done it. only the islamic republic of iran could do it. it persists in depicting the republic is an illegitimate system it is in imminent danger of overthrow. virtually since the republic's founding out of the iranian revolution. and it has consistently defied

their relentless predictions of its class or deceased. it has emancipatory election of islamic governance and a strong commitment to foreign policy. this model is what a majority of iranians living inside their country one. they don't want a political order rounded and secular liberalism. they want to generate a political order that reflects their cultural values. they want freedom and independence and in the

context of national identity. that is what the islamic republic offers them the chance to pursue. this was the difference of them in the constitution and even though the iranians who want the islamic republic to revolve in significant ways come at the end of the day even most of those iranians in the course of our visits, a number of those policymakers that we talked to have pointed out to us that they don't call themselves an islamic state. that implies that iranians know

that they have not obtained. enron, the islamic republic is by definition something that is very much a work in progress. and they have made progress in a number of impressive ways. contrary to deeply rooted but ill-informed western stereotypes. they have achieved progressive outcomes in alleviating poverty and in promoting educational access and expanding opportunities for women in the shaw's routine everyday. we are happy to go into this more in the question-and-answer session. but let me give you examples are not what i am talking about. the islamic republic had developed a health care system that has greatly increased life

expectancy and greatly reduce infant and child mortality and ron. the provision of health care has been particularly impressive since the revolution and it is basically equalized to help out the urban and rural settings in a manner that is quite extraordinary in international context. it introduces rural health care delivery and underserved parts of the mississippi belt. it is about flea increasing literacy rates basically eliminating gender disparity in educational aspects and one fact of the progress is almost

completely unappreciated in the last is the way that access to higher education includes a status iranian women. especially that westerners would consider this unacceptable in their own societies and the majority of universities are now female. the majority of them are now female. and women's presence is now felt across many disciplines. notwithstanding, we had this with no direct connection on the

ground and a cadre of so-called iran experts, many of whom are ex-patriots were iranian americans will flood the revolution in don't see the islamic public. they continue to misinterpret the iranian politics. telling us that the system is on the verge of collapse. we will continue to lose ground in the middle east. and a good example in 2009 we will have an office of wishful thinking on the green movement

that emerged out of this campaign, it is solving america's strategic problem for the middle east. they did so even though every logic was before or after the election, including polls conducted and it shows what with the reelection of roughly two thirds of the vote and we embrace election fraud even though neither this nor anyone else ever presented evidence of

how the election was stolen we portray this as a mass popular uprising anyone prepared to look soberly at reality the green movement did not represent anything close it was already contracting. but the myth of the islamic instability did not die. it continues to shape the

iranian politics. most of the pundits who had jumped onto the regime hopped back on for no regardless. undergird 21st, 2011, he appeared on cnn and offered to bed at the arena and iranian res work.

i worked with two of them and that is what we did. we even bet that not only what the islamic republic still be iran's government in a years time, but that the balance of influence and power in the middle east would be soaking further in its favor. almost two years since it made its wager that we were eager to collect on. later in 2011, the islamic republic supreme leader and president over the intelligence industry and the same task of the iran experts said that this was overblown, per train him as unprecedented as part of a insecure regime fracturing it.

and this included mental ignorance about the political history, which since the revolution has been marked by much the same kind of intense conversation amongst these individuals in the united states. tensions between the founding father and first elected president resulted in the impeachment during war crimes during 1981 after the reformist became president in 1997. so in iran, between the elected presidents and leaders and they are not in indicator of systemic crisis, but politics as usual in

a system with institutionalized checks and balances. creating this approach among many experts in the united states and if iranians display distortive position within their system that virtually everywhere else in the world we call minor politics, then our experts tell us that this is something abnormal and pathological and that the system must be coming apart. it is not. despite these experiences and other similar experiences that we go through in the book, american political and policy leads continue the idea of the myth of elizabeth simi and fertility.

this comes into two interlocking productions, that sanctions are finally working and number two that the air in awakening has left them isolated in its own neighborhood. hillary and i have just returned last month and we are happy to talk about economic conditions in the q&a. let me just say that no one who has walked the streets of tehran, who has seen that the economy is not collapsing one who has talked to a range of iranians could think that they are compelling either the implosion or surrender to americans on the nuclear issue. that is delusional. the same pundits who say that sanctions are working, they

advise you to embrace the logical defined proposition that the same social currency that proposed american leaders in tunisia and egypt are empowering those across the arab world. and will ron transform this into a secular liberal state? that is truly logic defying. they see the air of a ranking as hugely positive they judge correctly and it will also become less enthusiastic about your teacher cooperation in the united states, let alone israel, and more open to the message of tehran about foreign independence.

tehran doesn't need to be more pro-iranian, it just needs him to be less pro-american unless pro-israel and more independent. one hears in washington that because of the arab awakening, tehran is going to lose syria end its only arab ally with dire consequences of the regional position or even its internal stability. first syria is not their only ally today. it is not even their most important ally today. thank you to all those who supported us after 9/11. it will be over some drone and

about half the syrian society, even if bashar al-assad felt compelled and under the circumstances this is hardly likely to become an ally of the west. any sort of representative post-bashar al-assad government isn't going to be more pro-israel in such a government may be less about keeping and that will be just fine with the islamic republic. and iranian officials believed that overall developments in the middle east are continuing to steer the regional balance hillary and i think that one of the most dangerous myths promoted by some of america's growing experts is that the

islamic republic is that they are so ideologically committed to anti-americanism puts domestic legitimacy that it can't ever contemplate improving relations with the united states. this is thoroughly contradicted by the historical record. the islamic republic has been prepared for decades. they are prepared for this. but in the uranium deal, this is only possible on the basis of equality and mutual respect, meaning that the united states needs to accept the islamic republic. it is the united states it hasn't that hasn't been willing to deal on this basis. his administration has participated in negotiations

with irn e unwillingness to surrender u.s. demands in these talks intensify sanctions and launch cyberwar against the islamic republic and come closer to regime change as the ultimate goal of american policy. u.s. officials are being to internally conflicted to negotiate seriously, it is washington that has not been diplomatically serious. iran has been prepared except more intrusive including its nuclear activities if western powers recognize its rights with the international safeguards. the president obama, like his predecessor refuses to acknowledge the right to enrich. this would require acknowledging the islamic republic as a

legitimate order representing the interests and a rising regional power on willingness to coordinate its foreign policy to washington, as for example, washington expected this and this is why hillary and i say that obama has done more damage even than george w. bush because he has discredited the idea of engagement by saying that he tried but failed when in fact he has not seriously tried. >> we have time for questions? >> yes. >> no american president has been prepared to do this and accept the islamic republic. but this is a key argument. this is the only way that diplomacy can succeed and there is an important precedent for this in modern american history.

nixon and kissinger are open to china. it was not that they talked to beijing. the united states has been talking to them for years. in ambassadorial level talks that have gone nowhere. their achievement was that they accepted and persuaded their countrymen to accept the people's republic of china as legitimate political order representing legitimate national interests were its own interest needed to come to terms with this. that is what we need to do. so is obama going to be up to this in his second term? thank you very much. [applause] >> we have about 20 minutes left and i just wanted to ask one

question as i read through your book. iran has never threatened to attack another state or even attack one. we got a little bit of experience when i was at west point on the 21st of january in 1981. when we had dinner with the hostages as they came back and i think that there would be some argument there long that regard. i spent two years in afghanistan in several of the operations we did. we uncovered caches and weapons that were marked with iranian markings and our assessment was that they had come from iran.

we have had some discussions there about iranian involvement in that aberration. so i hear you they have not invaded other countries, but clearly supporting in other ways , something that i have seen. i'm wondering how you could respond to those activities. >> these are all such important points. especially when it comes to an aggressive state that the rhetoric of some of the rhetoric is translated or construed that the islamic republic is aggressive and particularly so vis-à-vis the state of israel. they are annihilating an off the now. it doesn't accept its way this

includes a large segment of the population and they are opposed to that. the republic also has views in terms of its neighbors and how the orders are that see a lot of these political orders as hostile. but what we're trying to get across is what iran does to what it sees as the threat. not to threaten or attack or invade and they have never attacked or invaded any other country. that is not what it does. what it does is something even more powerful, something even more potent vis-à-vis the united states and as we have a conventional military power. which is it develops relationships with groups on the ground in those relationships have much to do with us.

with the soft power of your and governance and foreign policy and its resistance to occupation. whether that is the u.s. occupation in afghanistan, essentially or as it was our rock. it does that very effectively. like other states, especially with their support. that is not the problem. we can outrun them anytime. the u.s. military can project overwhelming military force in any arena. that's not the problem that we have especially those across the

region. that is what we don't have an answer to that is what is radically shifting the balance of power. we would be in the great situation that we were in the 1980s and 1990s. were the islamic republic had no way to oppose this. but what they have done is they have seized on this political awakening in the middle east. >> cohead? >> please identify yourself. >> he said some very important things. but what we have lost with iran is trust. we did not allow the shots come in and we ended a relationship since we started in the united states. goes back 2500 years. but let's realize that every

tempo has the everlasting light. suddenly you have this population. it's not just the jewish population. we are admiring everything we have said. but put yourself, any one of us and would we trust america we were ahead of the state of what they did to the shop. this is what is frightening. if that could ever be repaired. it is fragile, in my opinion. i know iran, i traveled with them, i believe everything, what about egypt today. the islamic republic. what will happen there because

no one even knows. they are going to give relations to israel. >> it is a very difficult issue. we argue in the book that the one known antidote is transparency. and i think for many americans, this issue comes squarely focused on the nuclear issue today. that we cannot possibly trust what they may or may not say or may or may not do with the mechanism. for many they are not going to trust us and for many iranians they won't trust in the state. but the key is transparency.

if there is a better relationship between them and the united states, the real strategic alignment, then we argue that the islamic republic would sign onto and would agree to more international mechanisms and treaties and agreements or increase transparency so for example on the nuclear issue, we are never going to get the islamic republic to stop, as they see it. i think there is a lot of credibility to it. it is a sovereign and hvd right. what you can get there the better relationship is for the islamic republic to sign onto even more more protocols and the additional protocol that would allow even more intrusive expansions. if you have this you could have

joint ventures. i know today that seems a bit crazy. but that is really a long-term answer if you have iranians and americans working together, and that is the way that you will know that they don't have a secret nuclear program. as much intelligence as you want to put out there, and having scientists work together. but that cannot happen unless the united states accepts them as a legitimate political order and respects the national interests. >> we are talking about the resident correspondent and my question is a little bit different. i appreciate all you have said about the things that we should

understand. but i don't think that's the real issue. i think that a few of us had wanted better advice and more realistic assessment. so i think that is secondary. why are they pushing this an accurate assessment. and to me, what i see is that maybe they don't want iran to do this for peaceful purposes. so when it comes to their enrichment capabilities, i'm wondering from your experience

what your senses of this whole situation. >> it is a profoundly important observation. and from our experience in government since we left, and in some ways you could argue the imperial inclination was always there. we were constrained in terms of our ability to put large amounts of force on the ground. we were on the whole pretty reluctant to do it. once the cold war ends, that

constraint appears to be gone. so the united states embarks on his 20 year project. we are imposing the sanctions on iraq that killed more than a million iraqis. we do it with post-9/11 campaigns in iraq and afghanistan. that has made the united states weaker and less able to achieve its own goals in this important part of the world. but it is both culturally and politically still overdetermined in the united states.

we cannot be safe and secure. all people really want to live like us. when this is not working, and this is actually not congruent with reality. we are having ideological change in cultural change and that is really really hard. it is really, really hard to do and i believe that that is why that people keep coming back to

the same experts time after time after time. they say the right things. they say the comforting things. we honestly don't say particularly comforting things in this way. >> hello, for all of the indications that you advertise them you are rather optimistic about what could've happened.

we are optimistic in terms of what happens. we detail in our book, "going tehran" tehran: why the united states must come to terms with the islamic republic of iran", particularly in the last part of the chapter, how the president of the united states is able to recover its position in a similarly vexing time when it could've faced strategic disasters in vietnam and korea. we were able to rescue her position by coming to terms with the peoples republic of china. for many years people said that the united states can possibly accept the people's republic of china. our allies would be in dire straits that we accepted the people's republic of china all of this economic principally because our approach with china took away the dramatic

instability in asia that the conflict had brought. not only to our two countries but to our allies. but china has not accepted it either. but if we argue that they couldn't come to terms and have strategically aligned with each other, we could, in a sense, like china and the united states, bracket issues where we disagree and resolve and commit to look at these issues and discuss these issues and perhaps to resolve these issues so took

that this is a fools errand. not only is it a fools errand with the republic of iran, but it has gained ground. but another question about egypt earlier as well. egypt is going the same direction. we had a settlement and not having to accept a political order that they saw as repressive to follow arabs and muslims. not just for iran, but for all of the other countries that needed to come to terms we can help do that with the islamic republic.

>> think you're taking my question. i am very interested in the opportunity and when i look at the middle east today and what goes on across the middle east, i see a few big problems. while this is a two-part question, i would like to talk about military terms and influence. and on the question of energy. we are using saudi arabia and iran and if that is possible, that a potential of domestic energy production open the door to an energy solution?

cement i think i understand what you are saying. >> what is going on in the middle east is that saudi arabia, as it has done that in a number of points in its modern history is basically using a particular sort of islam, we tend to call it something in the west, although the saudis don't like that term. this actively promotes this tool of its foreign policy even

though a saudi is part of the united states come i don't think that is in the interest of the united states. we call this the leading state sponsor of terrorism there is something that the saudis are doing here. it is part of their own national security strategy the united states by tying itself with this aspect, this is only going to contribute to the further erosion over time.

especially because of shale oil, that we don't really need is for energy purposes. i think that this is quite foolish over the long run. this has been built up subtly and the energy producers have been increasing they need a hundred dollar barrel of oil. they are worried if they don't have those kinds of revenues that they can put into these kinds of population kinds of

things. or we could take these off the market and the saudis will increase production and cover everything and it will all be okay. well, it doesn't exactly work that way. the world doesn't work that way.