tv Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 14, 2013 6:00am-7:01am EDT
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in pennsylvania, they would have had to end the contest that they would have attempted it that we at home now. that would've been only the best scenario and i do not hesitate to express the conviction that had the army then hit at gettysburg, it would have dissolved. doubtless some of the other volunteer regiments were held together and made some sort of retreat towards the susquehanna. but the others had simply deserted in much the same way that napoleon's army disintegrated after waterloo, leaving the rubble at liberty to go where and do what he pleased. that would've been the queue for the mob rule over atlantic city
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and thus paralyzing the whole machinery of our government. captain alfred lee fought at gettysburg and dreaded the prospect of the northern sympathizers with secession, establishing rule over the whole chain of cities, tearing up the railroads, destroying supplies, cutting off reinforcements. as it was, new york city blew up in draft riots 10 days after the battle. if robert lee had been crossing with the army of northern virginia, the susquehanna on that day, instead as he was crossing in retreat, that might now have been the army of northern virginia, which was called in to restore order in new york city ,-com,-com ma rather than union veterans fresh from their victory at gettysburg.
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gettysburg did not end the war in one stroke. but it was decisive in us to restore the sinking morale of the union. to keep at bay the forces that hope that lincoln could be persuaded to revoke emancipation. decisive enough to make people look back and understand that the confederacy would never be able to mount a serious invasion again. lincoln, however, he was not satisfied with a decisive enough result. now, by the way have this strange feeling that there may be some reconstructive confederate veterans. [laughter] who are getting in the last word on the subject lincoln was not
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satisfied with a decisive enough result and after a 10 day pursuit which ended, backing lee's army into a pocket with its rain flooded potomac river, no knockdown blow was struck at the rebels and leaves damaged army was able to slip across the potomac through barely usable for it. we had them in her grasp, wailed lincoln. we had only to stretch forth our hands, and they were ours area a great deal of the blame for lee's escape was laid by lincoln and others at the feet of george meade. i do not believe that you appreciate the magnitude of the
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misfortune involved in lee's escape, he wrote. the image of the unclosed hand came. he was within your easy grasp and to have closed upon him with our other late successors had ended the war. but deciding instead to be grateful for what he had actually had at gettysburg, lincoln filed the letter away, scribbling on the envelope to general need, never sent or signed. but the failure to make gettysburg a complete victory that lincoln had been hoping for has always hung like a cloud over the unhappy george meade. there is an element of injustice. he had only been shoved into command of the army of the potomac three days before the battle and he was compelled by circumstances to pick up the army of the potomac where he
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found it using a staff that he had no time to replace and under the unappreciative days of other major generals in our army, he saw no reason to yield automatic deference. on those grounds there have had been serious efforts are time to time to refashion in more glowing colors as the unsung genius who battered robert e. lee. the most recent biographer has portrayed him as the rodney dangerfield of civil war generals. and he gets no respect, it is that. [laughter] but the major cost about lack of respect lies primarily with meat himself. the first meeting of the aristocrat, he had been taken for a clergyman, that is, unless one approached him when he was
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mad for he possessed a volcanic temper, which it did not require much to trigger. behind his back, the men in the ranks called him a dam died snapping turtle. no one question his personal courage or confidence, but he was not a lovable or dashing commander and his disciplinary behavior would have made george look like a wuss. in october of 1862, he chased down a private with a great bundle on his back, which the soldier had pilfered from a nearby farm and he demanded to know where the corn had come from and talk himself into such a rage that he stuffed them aside of the head and almost knocked him over. unabashed, the private picked himself up and merely returned
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the favor but stopped and said that if it weren't for those shoulder straps, i give you the darndest thrashing that you ever had in your life. [laughter] he was just as hard on his subordinates and superiors. i'm tired of this playing war without risks, he declared angrily. we must encounter risks if we fight and we cannot carry on war without fighting. yet the real flaw was not his fiery temper but ironically the same aversion to taking risks that he complained about and others once in command he saw his task as purely defensive end shadowing in its great swift arc between the rebels and washington and the susquehanna
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river. i can only say now that it appears to me that i must move toward the susquehanna, keeping washington and baltimore well covered, only if the enemy is checked or if he turns toward baltimore when he tried to give him battle once is army turned away to concentrate near gettysburg, he considered his work done. in his first impulse was to pull his own army back and dig in and behind the creek 25 miles to the southeast and not keep a shield in place between the confederates in the capital. he was not inclined to go hunting with robert lee. having thus relieved here is a bird in philadelphia, he concluded that it was now time to look to his own army and
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assume positions for offense or defense, or rest to the troops and that meant the collecting of our troops behind pike creek. it was john reynolds picture -- alas i don't have it here. [laughter] unless my faithful assistant wants to click for me on this. click someone. [laughter] there we go. john bolton reynolds. john was directing the army corps than made that made up the army of the potomac's left wing. and it was he who really could precipitated an encounter at
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gettysburg. reynolds complained the command of one of his divisions. if they gave them defensive positions, they would strip pennsylvania of everything. he was eager to attack the enemy at once to prevent his plundering of the whole state. in a few minutes he would be shot dead as the battle opened west of gettysburg. and reynolds said while i am aware that it is not your desire to force an engagement at that point, still i feel at liberty to advance and develop the strength of the enemy. even after his death, he still tried to recall his prematurely committed troops from gettysburg
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and reynolds successor in command of the left wing was rumored to have received five distinct orders from general made to withdraw his forces and not attempt to hold the position he had chosen on cemetery hill. not until he set off his own eyes and ears in the form of winfield scott hancock. relating an order of concentration at gettysburg and even then after the battering, giving the army of the potomac on july 2, which rivaled as the single bloodiest day of the civil war, he was still debating whether to fall back to pike's creek or call a war council to consider it. they refuse. but not without expressing an element of surprise that he even wanted to talk about withdrawal.
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good, god, he explained, and the general is not going to retreat, is he? and no, he was not. but the credit may not be long as much as it does to a hefty list of line officers who time and again during the three days of the battle seized the initiative and kept the army from falling apart. means that most of us have never heard before. alexander webb, strong vincent, governor warren, norman hall, and one who you probably have heard all too much about, joshua chamberlain.
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these introduced men who over and over again stepped out of themselves for a moment and turned the corner or a time at some right moment and save the day. these became almost routine for union officers at gettysburg. by comparison, it was almost entirely reactive, in other words, the confederates acted and he responded, but not the other way around. and above all, he failed to run the army of northern virginia and at that moment when it was at the weakest it would ever see. taking a little of his own advice about risks might have made him the most famous general in american history.
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it remained for abraham lincoln to renew him the ultimate significance of gettysburg. one more and another. [laughter] in fact, let's give it the last click and we will give it everything up there. you see what wonderful place the atlanta history center is. i just say something and it appears. marvelous. if only my students in class could deliver like that the words were spoke at the dedication of the national cemetery laid out on cemetery hill in the months after the battle. the words of his gettysburg
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address have been so familiar with usage that it may be hard now to realize what it means in lincoln's view brief remarks. all of the method in turn dedication. but in lincoln's mine, the fundamental significance and importance of gettysburg and the civil war lay in the survival of democracy itself. and whether any nation so dedicated can long endure it. in 1863, democracy was by no means a given. by no means was it called the end of history. far from it. every experiment in democracy launched in the heyday of
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popular revolutions have gone up in smoke. but the most smoke emerging from the french revolution. everywhere in 1863, monarchy and privilege seemed to be on the march. while the last outpost was obligingly suiting itself through the head in the war and water and thereby demonstrating that they are inherently unstable. and arguing how could democracy help but be unstable. they are run by the consent of the government. an ordinary people can be ordinary and very selfish or cowardly and very dull ways. american democracy had been
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exhibiting signs of dysfunction ever since its founding by tolerating the abomination of slavery. how could they talk about equal man they were allowed to own others in the same way that one might own a horse or a pig. whether they could triumphantly survive or indirectly perish. it was proof that proved that there were a great many of those otherwise dull and ordinary people who are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to
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preserve the solidarity of the nature and the right to self-government and the propositions around, which it was built. they could not look through the semicircular avenues of the dead were a quarter of the 3900 men buried her were unknowns. and not be confirmed in the longevity of democracy. and in calling on living americans to dedicate themselves to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of delusion and thus insuring all the monarchies and aristocracies to the contrary that government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish. that brings us, i think, the real answer to the question of
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gettysburg's importance. yes, it had military significance, as the victory that cracked the image and the power of robert e. lee and his army and gave human army their second wind. and the sheer scale of the carnage which the battle visited not only on the soldiers, but on every family and household linked to those soldiers that is passed with any calculating the numbers can do, but even more. gettysburg things for us because of how abraham lincoln translated the war experience of the black hole of battle into an anthem of democracy. so was alex webb right after all? was gettysburg really the
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waterloo of the rebellion? thank you very much. [applause] [applause] professor, we will take some questions. try as we might to promote the theater, maybe somebody can ask a question and we will be able to better answer it. thank you. >> thank you, doctor. what an excellent speech. my great-grandfather was jasper green of alabama or the roanoke invincible, and he was one of the 70 that were cadged into allegedly picked up this and
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according to harry, i have been to you at your hometown and it is absolutely breathtaking and i couldn't see where my great-grandfather was captured because they're playing golf over there right now. but anyway, my point is that one of the things i learned through my family history studying this is that the iron brigade of the unit that faced the 13th in alabama that day, had tediously faced those at the stonewall inn fredericksburg where doubleday had been thrown off and then they had also faced, if i'm not mistaken in the cornfield and it strikes me that it's highly unusual for one or alabama and
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another from wisconsin to face off in three of the most important battles of the area. what do you suppose was the reason for that? >> somebody like somebody else. [laughter] is there a particular reason? probably not. probably not. unless you know something that your ancestors have revealed that the rest of us have not been privy to. the 13th alabama along with archers brigade coming in together, believing that at best what they are going to be up against is just the yankee calvary and maybe at worse some pennsylvania militia. and as they move down to willoughby run and moving to the woods to the other side of the ravine, what do they see coming at them but the second wisconsin
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and you hear the voices running through the alabamans. that is no militia. it's those sellers and that is the arofhe potomac. so the big an unpleasant surprise to find out not only were they facing the iron brigade again but that the army of the potomac was there when they had been assured that no elements were anything closer than a day's march away. that was the ultimate big surprise that gettysburg. >> they also point out one other thing in so doing this, i have already bought your book. and i did a study of my own family history my
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great-grandfather was sent off to be interred up at fort delaware. when i went there to reenact that for the delaware historical society, it was pointed out that archer was actually a prisoner at fort delaware and tried to lead a rebellion and i noticed on your page, 150, you don't mention that. you mention mentioned that he went to ohio, so you might want to look at a revision. and if you take that version. >> he went to fort delaware along with most of the confederate prisoners, but since he was an officer and a general officer, he was then segregated out to sandusky, ohio, where he came down with the disease that even after he was exchanged in 1864, and ended up killing him, so we are both right. unless you would like me to deliver a book twice the size of
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the one that you have. [laughter] >> there are some details i can't quite put in there. but it does give you something of an idea of the intensity of which the battle of gettysburg had been studied. it is an attribute to the importance of gettysburg and what it assumes an american memory that unlike almost all of their civil war battles, we can get together and start talking about what individual regiments and companies were doing at gettysburg, almost where you can ask people what kind of tool or would you like. would you like this on the regiment level or company level depending on how detailed you want to get. but that is the detail that is for anyone who wants to begin the study of the battle and you can get together with some good gettysburg nerds and really have a fun heyday. by the way the golf course, be at ease, it is gone.
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the gettysburg country club went bankrupt. and the property was brought up by the national park service to be added to the battle field. only in a place where civil war memory plays such a big role could've put a golf course out of business. [laughter] all right, thank you, doctor. we enjoyed your talk so much. >> they didn't have anything to do this, that they? >> no, i don't think so. >> you place a lot of importance and i now see it in a new light as a pivotal point. but would you entertain the idea that had the british not done their part, the british curb on
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the day? >> people sometimes ask me what i think the turning point of the civil war was and i always answer that mathematics. that is the safest because it is true, there're any number of factors, even in 1864, which might have pointed to a different result. palouse george mcclellan was elected rather than lincoln. at that point, the confederacy is bleeding from every pore, but it's still there. but the election would've led almost at once for the opening of some kind of negotiations. once the negotiations began, no one was going to start shooting again. not after what people have gone through for the previous three years. even as late as that point, the confederacy might still have old
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chestnuts from the fire and achieve some kind of independence. but this is to speak of extraordinary situations and details that could derail the locomotive. what gettysburg established is that the rails and the locomotive's themselves are pointing towards the station at appomattox. borrowing some extraordinary intervention of some sort. the real result was already in the cards after gettysburg and it might've come quicker had george meade been quicker. he was not, but still. after that, the confederacy is really fighting a series of defensive campaigns which bit by bit drained the last of its strength away and maybe end if not outright inevitable about as predictable as we can make it.
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>> i have to admit that as soon as i got the book, i did not start at the beginning but i turned to the part about stewart's ride because i wanted to see how you have handled that. you quote the statement that no one could define what he did or didn't do because of stewart's activities and that prompts my questions, i would like your analysis of his comment. has someone been able to come up with something he did or did not do because of his absence, and i would like to follow up on. >> ari, the story of jeb stuart and his absence became important after the battle because the
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confederacy was looking for a scapegoat and blame and someone to whom they could point the finger. actually there were a number of nominees and soon was only one of them. but over time he became one of the real goats of the game and the argument runs like this. he sets off on this joyride that he is supposed to be covering the far right flank of the army of virginia but he manages by his own ineptitude and vanity to get diverted around the other side of the potomac and for all practical purposes right out of the campaign, leaving robert lee to fumble around blindfolded and bump into the army of the potomac by accident and the result is that he loses the battle and the south loses the war and it is all jeb stuart's fault. but there are a couple of problems with it. one is that lee was not rendered
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blindfolded simply because calorie in the american civil war does not function as an intelligence arm. calgary is entirely like calgary and the proportions are much smaller and the american civil war armies than they were in the european armies. and the chief functions are twofold. screening and rating. stewart had never been responsible for gathering intelligence for robert lee. that function was performed by spies and secondly individual scouts. in the case of robert lee, there was a third source of northern
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newspapers and we love to read more than newspapers. the so obligingly proved this in their columns. the fact that he wrote himself as foolishly as he did in his recklessly as he did did not mean that robert lee had no idea what he was doing and where he was going or what you likely to meet. he knew very well what he was doing. in fact, he complained to george campbell brown that he had been reading from the newspapers stewart was riding around baltimore and washington and he knew where he was. what he was irritated with was not that he was in this way, but
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that he was violating the principle of concentration of forces. it was not intelligence, it was stewart and his calorie that he wanted. and that was what was irritating robert lee. so was he responsible for the body? no, he knew exactly what he was doing when he ordered the concentration of the army of northern virginia at gettysburg. rather he disappointed them by mishandling the role he was supposed to have been providing a screening for the right flank of the army. but it was not a case where he blundered because jed had somehow left him blind and groping around the countryside. that became a convenient excuse for the results of the campaign. and that is what informed john
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mosby's comments. he defended stewart and was bitterly critical of charles marshall who was leave the secretary and the principal finger pointer at jeb stuart. then they go back and forth over stewart. stewart is of course dead. he was killed in may of 1864 but mosby kept pointing out and i think much to the point that stewart's absence was not a critical factor in his decision to fight at gettysburg. the decision to fire was not by default because of jeb stuart. we are hoping to understand us
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and the thing that amazes me is that on the 26th of june, my question is had he known as early as the 26th and 27 that the potomac is what it was, could he have concentrated beginning then and be in much better shape as he was on the first of july? >> we does not order his concentration until the evening of the 27th of june. it is not until that point that he finally has sufficient intelligence the conference to him that the army is strung out and vulnerable and has been learned that he can now turn it for what it was at carlisle and bring up hell hell from where they had been position. to bring them all together to concentrate and then bite off
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the head of the army of the potomac. we might've done on earlier, but he didn't have a need to do that earlier. it's not until the 27th once they have moved on. but he orders his concentration and does not in fact see this because john reynolds pushes in there and sees his efforts. it was a missed opportunity in that respect. >> it sounds like he could have ordered that concentration in it might've changed history. >> more so even than 12 or 18 hours and after that you get intervals of 15 minutes. in which the entire outcome of events hangs that illustrates the timing is everything.
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>> this is not a question but a quick story during a the battle or right before the battle, we had many troops down a in my ancestor had broken his leg and he was recovering from it and he was called up to go down there and fight. so he started to go to down there and he ran into a blind man that had been called up to fight. the blind man says that i will help you and you tell me what ago, but sure enough they turned out to be two generations of the family. >> we have one more question. >> i don't know if i can top that, but the question that i have is that compared to the
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napoleonic warfare is that if you don't have this, you don't have an annihilation that dissolves. i guess maybe the closeness is what you seek with the army. >> would you think causes this cohesiveness in the civil war and is that the land? would he think? >> is actually a good deal more simple and that is ineptitude. you have to remember that as much as we bade them in the romantic you over amendments, honorable as they were in many respects. nevertheless, these were civilians and the army consisted of 16,000 men and it was not
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much better than a frontier structure. no cadres of existing formations or anything for newly recruited volunteers to move into. everything had to be made up on the spot. everything was in prague. but the result that large parts of these armies, officers and generals have never commanded large formations before in their lives and many of them have only the faintest idea what they are doing. among them are drilling their men for holding the tactic books in their hands. and while that sounds slightly amusing, it is no joke when you're under fire. when the shells are screaming in your head. the great general is supposed to
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have said that the american civil war was like two armed mobs chasing each other around the countryside and that's not very complimentary. we don't really like that. but unfortunately close to the truth. these were not well disciplined armies. one is that his army is going to turn so happily towards leaving that the riches of pennsylvania will accomplish what the army has been less unable to do, that is dissolve it into a mob of bandits. in these armies are constantly cheering, they are amateurs, they are inexperienced, they are commanded by inexperienced people, even those who are professional soldiers, many of them like dick ewell contends
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that watch them turn once he graduated from he spent the next 15 years for getting everything he learned except how to command a company. and what was more was the education you got was an education in combat and tactics and strategy. west point was an engineering school and still is maintained under the corps of engineers. so the education was about building things and not about combat. they didn't even hold target practice for the most part. something which comes so dramatically as he remember from one part of the book. you sit there and you calculate how many shots are fired versus how many actually hit a target.
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and the average like it takes 100 and 25 fired shots. well, that's not a compliment to marksmanship, but that is about how well i do shooting. it's all a function of lack of discipline and lack of training. so it means you never quite get things together that means that they follow the most extraordinary rockridge.
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this shows you how to load and fire the guns and the part is that they were there in combat. all of them are breaking and running for for their lives and they did not gettysburg either. that is what is sublime about the soldiers that is the stubbornness and consistency with which they did their duty. not because they loved it, anything but. time and time and again on this battlefield, what we see is people shooting at each other one moment and 10 minutes later they are at the other side. the humanity because really they were not professionals. but they were doing a job performing a duty that they were called to do and it was not a
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but instead of manned aircraft if you have a flying robot, very few limits on that activity. >> let's drill down just a little bit. when we talk about surveillance that has a negative connotation to it. at any time we are observing something we could say we are surveying it. let's drill down a little bit into two major categories of
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public safety missions specifically what enforcement so the first type of mission would be say things like disaster, reconnaissance, searching for lost persons, that type of thing versus a pervasive anti-terrorist counternarcotics surveillance. to have you focus for a moment on the question of public safety related use of you a/s and think hazardous material spills, search for lost children and that type of thing does the aclu have concerns about those types of applications of small you a fs? >> in general we do not. we are happy to see drones used for specific operations whether it is search and rescue, disaster response, police used in particular operations, police have a warrant to storm the state and want to use the drone as part of the
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