there and then anita raghavan will be virtually disclosing the whole book so just take the last question. >> not actually a question but just a comment. ..

>> i mean, i wonder if this is actually -- i don't want to say "progress," but i mean, -- [laughter] i'm not trying to be funny. [laughter] >> okay. >> i'm this is just outside your point of view, as in i wonder -- i'm listening to everybody talk about how -- [inaudible] a very good stereotype attached to you, and now here's just one bad case. i guess, i don't know if michael, who just was indicted is an indian, so, i mean, this is -- >> yeah. >> this is the second one. [laughter] i think -- already --

>> we will be available to sign the book if you're interested in that, and thank you so much. that was fantastic. thank you very much. >> thank you, thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> next on booktv, pretty ser prize winning author examines the inner workings of continental congress and army and britain's political and military reaction to the cart of the war. this is about an hour.

[applause] >> thank you for that gracious introduction, and thank you, all, for making it out on a not so pleasant evening, whether-wise at least. i was supposed to be here a couple years ago, and i think i had a hip operation, and it knocked me out, and i always regretted that i missed it, and so i'm back here to sort of make up. this is a campaign to get you to purchase this book. [laughter] called "revolutionary summer," but i don't feel totally comfortable talking my own wares so that's the last time we actually mention the book per se, except to say it's great beach reading -- [laughter]

it's really short, and all the royalties from the book go directly to the scholarship fund, my youngest son, dylan. [laughter] i'm trying to tell a very familiar story, a story that virtually every generation of historians has told before, and each generation had added a new interpretive gloss, sort of like another layer of wall paper across the wall, and in some sense, one of my tasks was to try to strip away the wall paper and get back to the wall itself, and so some of the things are so old, they have been forgotten. given the fact this is a story of one of the more performed

plays, the play, "1776", i better have something new to say. i think i do, but that's up to you. i'll talk for 35-40 minutes. i don't want to read to you. i want to talk to you. is that okay? [applause] i began this project with a presumption and a question. the presumption was this, that no event in american history which looks as inevitable in retrospect was as improbable and problematic at the time, and task was to recover for theder f

crisis and confusion and improvisation that was occurring in the late spring and summer of 76 -- 1776. i have trouble because i date my letters like in 1713 rather than 2013. [laughter] it is not easy to write clearly about confusion. [laughter] but that was one of the things that i wanted to be able to do and recover that mentality, if you will. i think you'll see a little bit about what i'm talking about fairly shortly. the question i had i called the wilkes bera question, after

wilkes bera, pennsylvania. anybody here from there? are you kidding? [laughter] unbelievable. unbelievable. there was nobody from there in san fransisco last week, i can tell you that right now. [laughter] the population of contemporary welcome is slightly larger than the population of virginia was in 1776. now, if we go out there to wilkes bera now, do you think we can find george washington, thomas jefferson, james madison, george mason, john marshall, and patrick henry? we ain't going to find them. on some theoretical version, they are there. that is human being with the

capacity for leadership are there, but the situation doesn't permit that group to rise to the surface. the question is, why did that situation exist in 1776? now, there is the answer to this, which is that great leadership only emerges during times of great crisis. this makes imminent sense, the pressure that the crisis creates. yet, we can all think of the examples where there's a great crisis, and there's no leadership, like now. [laughter] [applause] or the coming of world war i in

europe. what was special, you can't say there was something special in the water back there then. you can't say god looked down upon the american colonies and blessed them. i mean, supernatural explanations are not admitted, even if you're an evangelical, you cannot use those in the historical conversation. i don't know whether i have a good answer to this. some is in the book in an implicit way, but i have an antedotal version of a partial answer to the question. it relates to george washington. in may of 1775, george washington puts on his military uniform and decides to go to the second continue thenal congress.

he's the only one wearing the military uniform. he's making a statement. he thinks the war has already begun. it has, we know in retrospect. lexington on concord happened in april. bunker hill's going to happen in june, which is actually one of the bloodiest battles in the war, but notice this, i know that cronology is the last refuge of the feeble-minded -- [laughter] but it is the only refuge for historians. notice this, it's under reported, under discussed in history textbooks. the war starts 15 months before independence is declared. it's going to cause and shape things in this explanation that i'm going to offer you. anyway, washington is preparing to leave mount vernon, and he

says to his -- what is that? [inaudible conversations] >> flood warning, oh, okay, great. here comes -- [laughter] biblical here! [laughter] yeah, somebody gave me that line. yes, thank you, sir. [laughter] washington said to his manager of mount vernon, washington, a second cousin, lund, when the british come up the river to burn mount vernon, get out my books and martha, presumably, not in that order. [laughter] he presumed he was going to lose everything. when jefferson gets around to writing the famous words, our lives, our fortune, and our sacred honor. they sounded pretty rhetorical.

hey, they were for real. it was everything. it was all in. you had to be willing to do that, and he was willing. later in 1779, a british frigot comes up the river, and they say, i'm going to send out a skiff with fruit and presents to appease the british captain. he does that. the captain says, hey, man, i'm just fishing for herriing. [laughter] i have no evil intentions. he does not even know this is mount vernon. lund washington sends a report of this to george sort of proud he defended the homestead, and washington writes back and says i'm extremely distressed at what

you have told me. you have sullied my honor. if it happens again, let me burn it to the ground. these are the kinds of guys we're talking about here, okay? there is a special quality to the particular crisis that generates a level of leadership, not just in virginia, but beyond. by the way, this is not a claim that the founders were all iconic heros or worthy of divinity or anything like that. they are human beings, flawed, each had their flaw, and i tried to write about that. they don't solve the slavery problem. they don't solve the native american problem. those are major problems, but all that said, this is the greatest generation of political leadership in american history. the revolution is it passed the test. one of the other things that i

discovered that is present in the scholarly literature in some ways, but not in a sufficient way, i think, is that this was an unnecessary war. there was a diplomatic solution to the crisis that was visible and known by prominent figures on both sides. on the british side, pith, house of lords, burke, and in the house of commons, advocated the solution, and in the continental congress, both thomas jefferson and john dickinson crafted a resolution called the -- what do you call it? it was a resolution appealing to the king on this principle. you let us tax ourselves and our legislatures and legislate for ourselves in our respective legislatures, and we remain in

the empire recognizing the authority of the king and recognizing our membership in the british empire economically, because we are both beneficiaries of that. as they said, both sides, there's people on both sides argue r for this. up through the middle of the spring of 1776. this is the answer that the british will later regret they don't accept or act on. this will be the biggest bluppedder until history of british state craft. why don't they want to do it? why don't they see this is the way? three reasons. first of all, william blackstone, the great jurist ruled in 1775, or asserted, that there must be a single source of

sovereignty in the empire. and in any government. there cannot be many god, must be only one gods. the source of the british empire, the british government is the king in parliament. the american solution is unacceptable because it creates multiple versions of sovereignty, each colony has its own sovereign government. even though nay claim to work under the canopy of the british king. we can't have that. since aristotle, everybody knows you have a final source of sovereignty. by the way, the whole american constitution is based on with dispensing that idea and having multiple sources of sovereignty. james madison is the major architect. a second reason is an early 18th

century version of what we call the domino theory. if we grant the americans this degree of latitude politically, what happens in ireland? what happens in scotland? what happens in india? we can't send that signal. it's a sign of weakness. it's a sign we're not really an empire. again, if they had acted on this, they would have discovered the british commonwealth a hundred years early. they are not ready to act on it. there's a third reason they are not ready to act. there's no reason to make a diplomatic solution when we have the militarily dominant force. we can squash this thing. the colonies have never cooperated in any military

veepture or political venture before, and the british army and british navy, when combined, is the dominant military force on the planet. the french army's as good, but you put the navy in, huh, british dominant. ask yourself this question, how many wars did great britain lose between 1750 and 1950? two. the american revolution and the war against afghanistan. everybody loses in afghanistan. [laughter] graveyard for empires. okay. and in order to implement the decision, george iii himself -- it's really important you hear

that -- george iii himself, doesn't come from parliament or from his ministers, but it comes from george iii himself, says, we will prepare an invasion force larger than any other invasion force to cross the atlantic, 42,000 soldiers and sailors, over 4 # 00 -- 4 00 ships, largest amphibious force to cross the atlantic. only time it's exceeded then is in world war i and world war ii, and we're going to squash this rebellion in the cradle, and we're going to attack new york, occupy new york as our major head quarters, and spread from there. there's a deadly devastating knockout blow in the very beginning. what's the situation politically in the american colonies? there's a really good book about

the year 1775 that talks about the fact that this came out recently that, you know, there was a political consensus that it already formed by the time you got to late 75. that's true, i would say in new england because new england has been occupied, but it's not true down as you get into new york, pennsylvania, new jersey, and virginia. those colonies and states are divided. now, we know that there's about 20% of the colonial population -- actually 19%, that is loyalist, but in new england, they've all been driven out. you don't want to be a loyalist and be living in new england. they will tear your house down and kill you. that doesn't mean, however, that the other 80% are all wig

patriots. this is tough to figure, and it varies from colony to colony and region to region. it's like going on cnn during an election watching the red states and the blue states and the purple states come on the screen, and then within those states different counties. my own best judgment is that of the 80%, about 60% were pretty committed to the cause. they called it "the because," capital c-a-u-s-e, the cause. there's another 40% of the 80% that are really undecided or will go wherever the nearest army happens to be. okay? give you an example. in valley forge, the continental armyarved amist the most

productive farming area in the american colonies because farmers sold produce to the british in the philadelphia colonies because they get more money for them. some of them are quakers too so they have that to excuse them. at any rate, up until the middle of the spring, the moderates dominate the continue thenal congress and the public opinion and country at large is divided. the moderate position is effectively defended by john dickinson, and the radical position, independence by john adams. that's one thing to play 1776 clearly gets right. what changes the chemistry of the political situation is the realization that we are about to be invaded. people talk about the impact of

tom payne's pamphlet, "common sense," coming out formally in late january and very, very influential, no question, but one of the reasons it's influential, and it's influential in severing the relationship between the colonies and the king, not just the parliament, but the king, is because it's published and read in a specific context, and that context is, these sons of a guns is sending the largest amphibious force with 15,000 troops who are committed to taking no prisoners, sending them to get us. how do i know this? why am i confident that what i've just said is historically supported by the evidence? in may, may 15th of the 1776, the congress sends a resolution that's written by john adams, requesting each of the colonies to redo their colonial charters

as state charters. adams says, for obvious reasons, this is a de facto independence. if you're a state who will rewrite their charter it's because you decided to go to independence. they sent these to every governor. the governor sent it to the legislature. the legislature sent it to all counties and towns in each of the kohlnys. the reasonably obscure source, the archives, charles force, has preserved all the responses. for example, there are 42 towns 234 -- in massachusetts that respond. they all say the same thing, we cannot imagine having this conclusion only six months ago. if they still believed in our king and membership as a british

empire, but he's betrayed us. he is no longer our friend. in effect, he has declared his independence of us. therefore, we have no choice, and then they used this phrase, and this is where jefferson gets it, we pledge our lives, fortune, and sacred honor. this must come from a british poem i don't know, and i tried to find it, but this is where jefferson gets the phrase. it's unanimous. there's one town on the cape that says, i don't know, the british navy will bombard us as soon as we say it. [laughter] anyway, the real reason why there is a political consensus for independence by the early summer of 76 is that they are being invaded, and so in effect the british disitionz to squash the rebellion generates the

political will to cement the rebellion. does this begin to sound familiar? the attack will be in new york. now, if you look at a map, new york is an ark flock go. it's three islands. whoever controls the sea controls the battle. there is no question about who controls the sea. in retrospect, even at the time, new york is indefensible. why do we decide to defend it? well, this is where the story -- the military side of the story and political side keep interacting. the british fleet lands on july 2, the entering segment of the british fleet, july 2, stanten

island. that's the day the colonists vote on independence. the resolution from virginia, that these colonies are and have every right to be independent states. okay. the congress says, look, how would it look if we just declare independence, and then the army retreats to the mainland, either connecticut or new jersey. well, another question that might have been asked is, well, how would it look if the army does not retreat and is annihilated? [laughter] there's a second wherein in they defend it, and -- but washington is a believer in civilian control, and congress wants to defend new york, he's going to defend new york. there's another reason. washington is an honor-driven man, as my earlier example testifies. almost medieval chivalry.

washington believes that if the enemy, in this case, general william howe, presents himself on the field, he's honor bound to meet him in the same way he is bound to answer a summons to dual. this is stupid. [laughter] he needs to get over this. [laughter] he will eventually get over this, but it's going to come at an enormous cost on long io wha- island and manhattan. the average experience of a soldier in the army is five and a half months. average experience of the soldier in the british army is seven and a half year, and within the officer class, it's more dramatic. i mean, henry knox, a book seller a year before in cambridge, so both in terms of

the terrain and in terms of the professional power of the two armies, this is going to be a debacle. why did they think that they had a chance? all messages from head quarters at this time are part of the republican virtuous rhetoric. soldiers who believe in their cause and fight for their own values and their own country can defeat mercenaries in any field of battle. if you believe, you are a better soldier. at some level, this sounds really great. it doesn't work. in the battle of long island, the continue continental army id easily. they suffer over 15 # 00

casualty, and they are trapped on long island. this could be the end of the war. what would happen if the army was destroyed and washington and his staff were all killed and captured? they get off in a mir rack cue louse, everything works perfectly, a nor'easter comes in, currents in the east river, the fog at just the right time, and they get across in the night of august 30th, saved. that's like an even more dramatic version. if this didn't happen, i don't know that the war would have continued. we can't know that. i'll mention that in a second. at the end of this defeat in

long island, richard, the admiral, asked for a meeting with the american representatives from the congress whether they can do that, blah, blah, blah, but eventually, they sent franklin, adam, and rutledge to meet with howe, richard howe, in this stone house on stan ten island on september 11th, after the battle. howe says, look, we just demonstrated to you that you can want win. it is a hopeless cause. step back from independence. listen to the terms the king will offer you. they will be generous. i can tell you these going to let you govern yourselves as you want to, although, i can't guarantee it. [laughter]

we'll probably have to hang most of the leaders. [laughter] he doesn't say that, but means it. [laughter] both franklin and adams say something interesting. adams says, it makes no difference what happens here. if you destroy the continental army, we'll raise another army. demographicically, there's 500,000 males between the ages of 15 and 50. it's the same thing said to us. go ahead. it doesn't make a difference. franklin says something like that, but he is friends with richard howe, friends in london, tried to end the war. the brothers don't think this american war is a good idea.

he says, sir richard, you tell us that we can want win. i tell youssef -- you you cannot win. you are not fighting an army. you are fighting the people. you must subject the american population. you will never be able to do that unless you raise troops that will never be justified in british -- in terms of cost or the british public. this will be seen like the crusaes, he says, and you will bic no min yows in the defeat. take your ships and fleet, go back now, save as much of your reputation as you poly can. well, that's an interesting question. it's an unanswerable question. what would happen if the british had destroyed the continue thenal island on long island and

manhattan, and they had several chances to do so, and the howe, as i suggested, really didn't want to destroy the continental army. they wanted to rough it up, proportionally demonstrate that that -- they didn't want the war to become the kind of war against the irish and scottish. that was a genocide war. they wanted it to end in a way it could all come back together and value the role as peacemakers more than add miles per -- admirals. i think that that's a question that is, as i said, unanswerable, but there's an obligation spending four or five years thinking about it, you know, what to say. i think that if they had gotten -- they could replace the army easier than they could

replace washington. what would have happened is that each state would have -- is reversed to its own state militia as the source of authority, and it would become a guerrilla war. the british would have still lost. the course of the war would have been probably longer. there is a possibility, i would say, a 20% possibility, that this -- the destruction of the continental army would have destroyed the will of the rebellions because that middle group, that's what i can't know. it's impossible to answer. i don't think it would happen, if i was a betting man ornate silver, i put odds on american victory in the en. one of the things that happened as a result of this experience was that washington began to understand a strategic fact that

became absolutely central to his success. this is not the way to fight the war. the american army was never going to be competitive with the british army in a man-for-man situation. let's fight a war of posts. that's what they called it. it's not a guerrilla war because of the conventional army. you adopt a defensive strategy. this will work for you for a reason that is really important. we don't have to win. they have to win. as long as we don't lose, we win. that's what happensment --

happens. we don't really win the war. they decide to give up. the end of the war, treaty signed, over 30,000 british troops in north america, but they just decided to leave. washington learns this lesson in the summer of 1776 or the thought process that leads to the learning lesson begins at that time. it's hard for him to accept this, but, eventually, he does. if you think about it, many of the great generals in world history are losers. hanibal, napolean, robert e. lee, rommel, washington was not a good general. he lost more battles than he won, but he was a winner. he was a

because of the resilience and strategics he had at the inside level. i think my time is kind of up. i'll end with a somewhat controversial question or statement. when the war in iraq was wrash eting up, i got a call from the woman who does op-eds at the l.a. times and said shsh -- she said, i want you to write an op-ed on what washington would have done about iraq. [laughter] or what he would do. i said, stephanie, washington wouldn't know where iraq was. [laughter] he wouldn't know about weapons of mass destruction, jihad, whatever. she said, that's right; now

right the piece. [laughter] i wrote this piece in which the main point was washington would have said, we're the british. i don't understand that. now, if you take a poll amongst american citizens as to whether the united states is an empire, the overwhelming majority of americans say no. if you take a poll in the rest of the world, everybody says yes. we have become an imperial power since world war ii and inherited a mantle of power from great britain since 1945-46. i'm not, you know, we made specific decisions and specific contexts, the cold war, more recently iraq, afghanistan, we're facing syria and egypt. i want to step back from the specifics of those particular contexts and say that there is the reason we're an empire in

denial is because we know that the core values of our republic are incomecompatible with imperialists, that a republic must depend upon the power of her ideas to succeed voluntarily. an empire depends on the power of the arms to succeed. now, i'm not a pass vies or an isolationist, but i supported the korean war, gulf war, bosnia war, all that stuff. i don't want to be pigeon-holed, but i want a conversation about the conflict of our origins and who we are now. now, we can then say, well, george washington was part of another era. jefferson in a lost world. we're in a different place. if we believe in the original intentions, and if we believe that the core values of our republic were established at that moment, i think we should have a seminar on this.

it will be an interesting conversation in which liberals and conservatives alike could come together. thank you for having me. [applause] don't embarrass me by not having any questions for heaven's sake. [laughter] >> thank you, that was wonderful. so i'm a big fan of yours, and growing up, i was a big fan of thomas jefferson thinking he was the greatest president that there was, and i loved peas growing up, and he grew peas, and i like wine, he went broke drinking wine, and i just loved him thinking he was fantastic, and then i read your book. [laughter]

it's a fantastic book. it changed my mind on jefferson. i got two questions. one of the questions is in all your research, have you ever changed your mind on any of the people that you've written about? i'm reading your book on adams right now, and i love adams, and i'm a yankee, so i think, you know, tend to agree with him more. that's one of the questions is do you ever change your mind about people you write about? number two, i know it's difficult to put people in the past into the modern time, but when i read your books, i try to figure out where politically jefferson and adams and jefferson and washington and hamilton, where they would be politically, you know, on the spectrum. i get the feeling that jefferson would be a tea party guy. hated big government, you know -- >> there's reason for that. he's a libertarian. >> could you just briefly go

down a couple of the big guys and say where you think they would fall? >> oh, man. [laughter] >> politically right now. >> well, what i really said to the l.a. times reporter that i don't think i mentioned -- maybe i did -- is that hard to bring the guys into the present. it's like trying to plant cut flowers. [laughter] they won't grow. i mean, now you can make -- what you do need -- it's like you have to make a translation almost like a translation from one language into another language, okay? that's a better analogy. i'll stick with the second question first. like, i think that jefferson is the ultimate idealist. he's wilsonian, making the world safe for democracy. he's a believer in small

government. in some sense, with the industrial revolution and the end of the society and the beginning of an urban society with a thick demography, jefferson's values become irrelevant, and he would say that. when we stop being that society, nothing that i believe continues to apply. of course, it does because he is one of the most resonant icons on the basins, one of the most lovely and most visited. i think jefferson would have gone with confederacy in 1861 #. i think jefferson would have opposed the civil rights act of 1965. he believed blacks were bilomingically inferior, not just because of nurture. adams is the realist. george cannon, american state

department guys like adams, oh, adams is also a contrarian who could never possibly be elected to any government in the 21st century. [laughter] and would be thrilled to be able to tell you that. [laughter] would be proof of his virtue, you know? now, what was the first question? had to do with -- [inaudible conversations] >> oh, do i change my mind. i never change my mind. once i make it up, i'm absolutely certain. [laughter] i do. it's nuances. i begin with certain convictions that probably don't change at the root, but -- my first impression of washington was that he was really boric and flat and i didn't completely change -- he's the single most

impressive of the fathers. he's the foundingist father of them all. [laughter] they all agreed on that. you know? like franklin was the wisest. adams was the best read, jefferson the most intellectual sophisticated, madison the most political aiming jill, and they all agreed wash was the greatest. it was a judgment. judgment. they recognized and respected. again, i don't want to reiterate, this is not to sanctify the guys. one of the most conspicuous qualities of the founders over the last ten to 15 years -- or i

like it because i make money on it, obviously, is that there -- they are all flawed. you don't have the graphic depiction, and much of the profession, the american historical profession is moving off in another direction, and the work done on founders and political work of the 18th century is done by people like ron, david mccallough, walter isakson, they are not professional historics. i'm a professional historian. i have a ph.d. from yale yiewfers, but people in the profession move off in the direction of social history, race, class, gender, women, native americans, african-americans, so, you know, they would say you studied white

males. i said, that's right. [laughter] thank you for the question. yes, sir? >> my impression, may be wrong, the bulk of the pay -- >> the new england patriots now? [laughter] >> no. >> i'm sorry. >> they were out of new england or virginia, not in between, but what we read about and hear about -- >> like in the army or in the political realm? >> political, yeah. >> yeah. >> and i was wondering, would you care to talk about the interplay between the two ebdz of the dumbbell so to speak? >> well, the first six presidents of the united states came from massachusetts and virginia so those are the big states. virginia's the biggest state by far, and within the continental congress, pennsylvania is really

big. it's a big moderate state meaning they are at the source of the moderate movement reluctant to declare revolution. new york is also a moderate state. other middle states play a role, but they don't assume leadership with the revolution, but they, in effect, are resistant to it until the very end. a lot of guys from pennsylvania -- you know issue everybody thinks there's this moment, and this is in 1776 where on july 4th, they go, they sign the documents; right? never happens. they never sign the documents all at once. most signed on august 2. the real vote on independence, which adams thought would be the day of an anniversary of independence was july 2, but there are some guys signing in

octobers from, like, pennsylvania and new york, and morris, one of the last ones to sign, and he signs at the very top. [laughter] like he was there first. it was not true. the importance of mass and virginia is true, leadership comes from there, and it doesn't accurately reflect the importance of the middle colonies in shaping political opinions in this crucial period. yes, sir? i want to ask about a dead white male that you have not written about, and that's somewhat neglected, maybe not exactly a founding father, but someone that has a career spanning a number of the presidents and his importance to the making of the nation as every bit of important. >> i can't wait to hear who it is. >> you named him earlier in the virginians that arose in the

wonderful class of people. we're talking about john marshall. >> oh. >> there's no -- you read about him. jefferson -- >> you don't have to persuade me on this, sir. i would love to write a really great biography of john marshall. the problem is he destroyed all his correspondence with his wife. you don't have the same level of information that you have -- you have all this legalistic information about his cases and the papers that have been published at the college of william and mary, which is home to the marshall school of law, but this is a guy who was a real stud. , and this is a guy who at valley forge had a high jumper, something, you know, won all the athletic competitions, and he was the leader of what was the equivalent of a special forces

team throughout the war. he had six or seven platoons shot out from under him. he goes on to be a major figure in virginia politics, secretary of state under adams, and greatest chief justice in american judicial history serving from 1800 to 1835-36. i used to tell a story about how when marshall dieded #, he was visiting his daughter up in new york, and they carried the body down to his home in virginia, and when it passed through philadelphia, they rang the liberty bell, and it cracked. [laughter] it's a great story. it turns out not to be true. [laughter] but everything about him that most -- that is written now tends to be from a purely judicial point of view, and although there's a couple good biographies, but -- he's a little -- he's a little young to -- ellis' criteria is, as if

this makes a real difference, that you have to have been a prominent leader both in the time of the war for independence and at the time of the constitution and the 1790s, the implementation of the constitution, that the -- it's really two foundings. you have to be president of both of them. he's a big player in this second one, but he's just a soldier in the first one. he's too young. he is a great man. thank you. >> do you see any parallels between the revolution and the arab spring? >> oh, do i see any parallels between the revolution and the arab spring? huh. i see more differences than parallels. i think that egypt has been governed by rulers for most of

its 20th century history, and there's no tradition of democratic politics on which to build. they have to discover it and make it in the midst of sectarian strife and divisions between ethnic groups, muslims, within the muslim world, in between the muslims and secular world. those divisions have been tamped down or controlled by autocratic power. remove that autocratic power, and they leap into the surface. just as they did in bosnia and former yugoslavia. the american colonies had already developed a habit of political -- of what we come to call democracy. they knew how to govern themselves. they had their own legislatures, own elected officials, and they had, you know, been for a hundred years -- adams writes about this in dissertation on the cannon and feudal law, but

americans are different than europe in terms of politics for basic reasons so that there's not nearly the shock value as there is -- i mean, the shock experience in the united states when they move through the revolutionary experience because it's not really revolutionary, but more evolutionary. the secret of the american revolution is that it was not really a revolution. it was more of an evolution. the egyptians are going to have a very difficult time discovering what came naturally to us. this is not a comment on muslimism, okay? although, it's part of the package, but that they have no history or history of practicing democratic politics. you're welcome. >> thank you for coming and being a professional historian. question about how american revolution is taught. california just passed legislation saying that all segments of american history now has to give portions to gay and

transgender. i don't know where that would be with jefferson and washington -- >> that's another thing they would not understand. >> right. [laughter] my children who atippedded woodward academy, their american revolution was divided between women, african-american, native americans, very segmented now. you know? you have an overview, and teach college students, see them coming in and out of levels of education or knowledge. >> uh-huh. >> history's becoming more and more relevant, unfortunatelily. i want to know your thoughts on how the american revolution is taught today and how legislators are getting involved in the teaching of history and what that means for us in the future. >> i don't like -- >> [inaudible] >> i don't like the involvement of state legislators deciding on what kind of textbooks and that kind of thing. i think that the current situation is close to disastrous

in terms of the historical ill ill lit -- illiteracy of this generation and the rising generation. all the surveys and polls tell you something that is really awful. you know, they don't know what century the civil war happenedded. all kinds of specific, horrible things. i think that the -- the emphasis on testing has handicapped good teachers, especially at the middle school and secondary school levels by forcing them into areas that really don't work very well. i think that the social scientific of middle and secondary school education has

made history not history, but a blend of geography, sociology, economics, and an intellectual stew that's nothing at alling on the points you made, i understand your concern that, in effect, the native american experience, the african-american experience, and the women experience is being given a new emphasis, and this is true at the college and graduate school level too. if you want to go on in american history, the early american period, it's good idea to do native american stuff because you're going to get a job. this is the compensation for past years of neglect. is it a bit extreme? well, depends on where you stand. i'm here to simply argue that, in effing, the late 18th century was shaped by a group of dead white males who were an elite. you're not supposed to say that.

i do believe that's the case, and nobody shot me, so i say let a thousands flowerings bloom. the situation at the secretary and middle school level with regard to the teaching of the history is not -- is to put it mildly, is pretty desperate. >> one last one. >> thank you for your comment, sir. given the performance of the continental army in 1776, losing brooklyn, manhattan, driving down new jersey, i mean, what -- why did the continue thenal congress continue to have -- continental congress continue to have washington? there's rebellion among the close staff. >> there was, you're right, you're right about that. to study washington's life and career, this is the period that he's at his very worst, both as the commander and psychologically.

he's clinically depressed throughout the late summer and fall because he sees the defeat of the army as the defeat of himself. the army is a projection of his own character. there are a couple people on his staff that are talking to people in the continue then -- continue neapal congress saying he's not up to the job, and he's made some strategic blunders that could have cost us the whole thing. greene is not one of them, but there are talks, rumors back there. ..