centuries before sacrificed and determined that they should survive. the best examples of our civilization, and that we should have the chance to have them and pass on the responsibility to make sure they were protected. fred hartt and dean heller risk their lives on numerous occasions walking through booby-trapped buildings trying to protect these works of art. in fact, two officers in northern europe, a story i described in "the monuments men" were killed. they were there on the front line doing their job. they came back after the war, many of them resumed their careers, someone onto even bigger and better things. and i daresay there's not a museum our major cultural institution in this country that doesn't have a connection with the monuments officer. i want to let you see a couple of the prominent people and institutions that they represented in the years that followed.

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>> we don't have any monuments officers nearby that were able to make it tonight. one, in fact, does live not too far from philadelphia. however, we're very fortunate and it's such an honor for me to introduce to you all dean heller's other son and his wife are with us here tonight. thank you very much. [applause] i recall reading a quotation by president kennedy that said a nation reveals itself not only by the men it produces, but the men it honors and the men it remembers. and by that standard, we as a country today very poor job

because we don't remember. we didn't know this amazing, remarkable legacy of our country during the most destructive conflict in history. and we paid a horrible price for it in the years that followed, not having monuments officers. in particular, in the aftermath of the looting of the national museum of iraq in baghdad in 2003. this is one of the things that i created the monuments been foundation for the preservation of art to deal with, not only with a legacy of these great deals but put it to you so we can reestablish the united states leadership in the protection of cultural treasures. one of the things we did was interview and modern-day monuments officer, a woman, who served with distinguished, had distinguished service in the army who went to iraq following this disastrous initial response to help try and fix things. since, became a curator in minneapolis. and that after this question about the importance of the monuments officers, and here's

what she had to say. >> the museum in 2003 cause a lot of finger but it wasn't just bad pr for us and iraq. it was bad pr for us throughout the world and we have to be every very -- ever vigilant in trying to educate our elected leaders and the top of the military on the importance of protecting cultural property during armed conflict. during world war ii, it was an ethicist area for general eisenhower. he took great measures to do that, not just because of the right thing to do but because it was one of his tools in his toolkit to help win that war. >> those of you that are keep an eye on world events no of the ongoing civil war in syria. these challenges continue to this day. we see destruction of some of these extraordinary roman columns with the syrian tanks driving across them. combat fire, tank fire aimed at

them. aleppo recently come just in recent weeks this wonderful power was destroyed, this 11th century minaret. i believe this is a great opportunity for us, a call to action for all americans to reemphasize the people, spread the word of what we did during world war ii with the leadership of president roosevelt and general eisenhower. this historic action by these men and women, a handful of them it and i say to all people, surely in the world war with no technology, no more than 40 monuments officers ever in italy, about 100 northern europe, if we can do the job we did then, we can certainly do a better job today, and that is why in 2007 i did found at the monuments been foundation for the preservation of art, and i would like to share with you a few minutes about the initial years of our work.

♪ ♪ >> the vision and leadership of western outlet leaders coming particular general eisenhower, made the protection of artistic and cultural treasures a priority and the return of stolen property and violence. the monuments been implemented and defected of that policy. their legacy is rich and filled with incredible examples of how to protect cultural treasures from armed conflict. but their legacy has been all but lost. we as a nation paid a high price for not having preserved and

utilized that legacy. time is running out. for that reason i am announcing today the creation of the monuments men foundation for the preservation of art. its mission is to preserve the legacy of the unprecedented and heroic work of the monuments in during world war ii, by raising public awareness of the importance of protecting and safeguarding civilization most important and artistic cultural treasures of armed conflict. >> i think recognizing the monuments men as we're doing today is very appropriate and, thank you for having the wisdom, the culture and the awareness of this very important part of preservation of the world for the future. thank you. >> it's an honor.

it's a great american story and we need to know about it. >> the colonel said when he once was in beauties of there's a cause greater than patriotism, and a higher cost than victory. our allegiance with the art, truth and justice. >> the medal for the preservation of art for sustained efforts to identify and recognize the contributions of the scholars, soldiers of the second world war. we are forever indebted to the men and women who in an era of war, rescue and preserve the precious portion of the world heritage. [applause] >> [inaudible]

>> in addition to completing our research on these men and women, the foundation will promote and support educational programs about the monuments men and the work in schools and in universities. >> i think this is one of the most significant find related to this premeditated theft. it is exciting to know that original documents are still being located, especially -- [inaudible] >> we appeal to people of

goodwill from everyone walk of life to join us so breading these great heroes in the most appropriate manner possible, preserve and utilize your legacy. >> thank you. thank you for what you did. thank you for coming and telling your story. >> let us announce again and again and again to the people of the world, that fair culture will be cherished as long as they respect the culture of all. god bless you. god bless america. [applause] >> one of the things i'm quite proud of is i serve as a trustee of the national world war ii museum in new orleans.

part of the remarkable campus, about $160 million campus, another $169 to go, and incredible talent of the american role in helping, as they say, help americans understand the freedom is not free, and learn about these men and women who sacrificed so much to make sure we have the opportunity day, including the monuments been. the museum have so embraced this story that they will be the first place in the world to build a permanent exhibition to the monuments men sometime in the next two years that we will re-create a salt mine and give people both kids and adults the chance to experience the exhilaration, the fear, the remarkable journey that these monuments officers experienced during world war ii. of course, marlowe was kind enough to mention my new best friend, george clooney. [laughter] i certainly share all the reviews about this matter.

it's been a wonderful opportunity working with two gifted artists and businessmen, george and his partner, and currently dedicated to the telling of this story. again, focus on telling the story of the monuments of effort and northern europe, yes, indeed to the question, of course i do hope they make a film about the story but it's an incredible, incredible experience to see the concentrated effort that they have thrown into this, and this once-in-a-lifetime cast as far as i'm concerned, matt damon, bill murray. i know i've left some people out but i think you get the idea. it will be out in december, december 18, and i'm so excited about it for one reason, the towers above all the others, and that is this. it was my hope and my dream as

the project unfolded and has invested more years of my life, and it has defined my life and provided such a meaningfulness that other people around the world, not just in our country, would have a chance to know this story. and i believe that as a result of this film there will be some, i don't know, you can people around the world that will never be confused anymore when they see the phrase monuments men, or wonder when they see destruction of cultural property. and that is going to allow us to get back to the standard that i talked about. because politicians are going to know that there's a billion voters around the world that know this story and art, are going to want to make sure that we honor the great achievements of these men and women. i want to close to reestablish a perspective on things, because general eisenhower, after the war in june 1945, returned to london to receive an award and made his first remarks following the end of the war.

at the guild hall in london, and she can see people stand on the façades of these buildings, leaning out the windows, to do with his victorious general had to say. and true to general eisenhower, he deferred the credit and give it where it belonged. and i'm always reminded of that at these august moments when we run through these images and you see lots of recognition on the part of the work of the monuments men foundation, but it rebounds to the work of the monuments men. general eisenhower said, his high sense of distinction i feel, receiving this great honor is inescapably mingled with feelings of profound sadness. humidity must be the portion of any man who receives acclaim earned in blood of his followers and sacrifices of his friends. he made given everything to this hard in my to make the spiritual and physical needs of his comrades. he may have written a chapter that will go forever in the

pages of military history. still, such a man, if he existed, would sadly face the fact that his honors cannot had -- cannot hide in his memories, crosses marking the resting places of the day. they cannot through the anguish of the widows were the orphans whose husband or father will not return. the only attitude with which a command made with satisfaction received attributes of his friends is in the humble acknowledgment that no matter how unworthy he may be, his position is a symbol of great human forces that have labored arduously and successfully for a righteous cause. my righteous cause, and one i played with you to embrace and share with your friends and every possible way, is the great achievements and legacy left to us by these monuments men and women. thank you very much. [applause]

>> while robert takes a drink of water and breeze for all of it, he has agreed to answer a few questions come at the we'll give him a minute and then he can answer a few questions from the audience. once again, our microphones ready? we have a mic year and a mic there. they will watch for your hands. why don't you point out to people spent why don't we start right in front of you? >> thank you for a beautifully delivered a presentation but i didn't see a teleprompter so you have it a little better than some other politicians. i was wondering what could, works that had been renowned to the american image in italy, even though things are quite a mess now again, do they still

remember the americans, who not only saved the country would also save their culture? >> i believe that's a good question and yes, in fact, i think that only in italy but also in germany. i was there when, with filming going on, and there was a press conference there about the book. they don't really have press conferences in the united states for a book because most publishers know nobody would. but in berlin and there were 25 accredited media journalist from the most important magazines there, coming because they didn't know about monuments men. and italy is pretty much in that same position. and they are fanatically interested in it because they have heard me say, and i say to you, these are not just hearers of the war, they are heroes of civilization. those of us who travel to museums and churches and to visit them, we can't pay them a debt of gratitude that they deserve for the fact that these things are still there.

as i said the people in berlin and i have sent to friends in florence and rome and other cities, no beneficiary greater than jeremy gunn if you go to the museum island today, not only are these things that are there works of art that monuments officers found in caves and salt mines and castles, or works better in these pieces can we get them all back at the end of the war. this is a policy of the western allies, is to make sure these works of art were not considered spoils of war, rather that they would be returned to the countries from which they were stolen. an incredibly important inflection point in how wars and the consequences of the war have been fought. everly redefined how we look at these cultural objects since world war ii. yes, ma'am. let us get you a microphone. we have very speedy runners so you won't have to wait long. >> what's next for you?

>> well, let's see. i was in kansas city last week to watch it snow. [laughter] i had to retire my scarf this morning in chicago because it was threatening to do so. tomorrow i will get to see my mother and she will be very happy. i had to explain to her that the gestation period for a book is greatly in excess of the amount of time she's been carrying me around. we have, i will be traveling around the country for the next month talking about "saving italy," saving -- sharing these stories, having a chance to see my friends and other monuments officers who are living and a lot of the kids. the kids are my age. these are important opportunities for us and for me in particular because i get information from you. the monuments men foundation can't find all the missing works of art. no organization can come and despite all the wealth of bill gates and warren buffett and others, there aren't enough detectives in the world to go

look for these things. however, we can raise public awareness, and we do that through these books, "saving italy" now and ultimately this film come where people around the world realize, one, there's still hundreds of thousands of things missing from world war ii. and if they were portable then, they're probably out there now. this is a chance for people to participate in the writing. called action never too. for all you young people out there across the country and were able to reach them today, thankfully because of having all authors favorite television station in the world, c-span, here with us today. this is it. if you want to be involved in something bigger than you, get out here and let's make the worldgo let's put the world back the way it was. use your technology skills to help us find ways to protect these cultural treasures that are under fire around the world today. there are ways. i'm not smart enough to do this

or know how to do it but i can certainly speak to the opportunity for us to establish this leadership position that we once held. it's an opportune to use these technology skills that you've got to help us find and put us in contact with families who had veterans or displaced persons during world war ii that have things that in the years ago and become in the next five to 10 years when we lose the rest of our world war ii veterans. i lost my dad five years ago. the things that are hanging on walls in basements and in attics, they will all have a new owner. we are at great risk for these things and four leverages our old musty documents of being thrown away. this is the chance to help with the tip of the iceberg we're getting ready now to see the last, help things get back to the people they belong to. so it's a great moment, and so for that reason we're spending a lot of time with the work of on the foundation, and the film

coming up. i'll be headed back to berlin, and when i'm done with the book tour here, and then doing whatever i'm asked to do by the people involved with that as the fall picture, but really the work focuses now on the foundation. the writing of the book is something that i do. the foundation, 501(c)(3) not-for-profit entity, is out there to try to help people. we don't charge anybody anything. we can do everything but we can make a difference. we can do what mother teresa said, solve hunger one at a time. we have been involved in the return of some historically important documents to berlin, and our national archives, and we will soon be announcing another important discovery and the return involving italy as it turns out. yes, sir.

>> i thought you meant a very, very important point when you said not a lot of the monuments that exist today exist because of the efforts of past generations, which seems to imply that allows the generation today, namely young people, are aware that they will not be doing that in the future. as a look at our school curricula in the united states we see that with ex-im this emphasis on standardized tests, global history, art, global cultures, all that is being pushed by the side. i work with a lot of teachers. i'm university faculty member. what we do about this? our young people are not getting historical consciousness and i don't think they will have the same kind of concern that many of us here do, the older generation of preserving these monuments. >> it's a great question. i have plenty of faults. one is not, either party to understand of what i know and i've a pretty good understand of what i don't know. i wish i had an easy answer that could solve the issue of education. we put together an educational program that's available on the

monuments men foundation website with lesson plans. and i took the approach that bigger better, longer better, and little did i know that part of action of teachers was there so much material here we are overwhelmed because he got a time we have to teach we have to teach is s so small. tomato-tomahto study what we need to teach is so small. and so we are now going back and reevaluating how we go about packaging this ag but your that includes archival footage and some of these videos. i can certainly infuse them with a passion that i've got but it's not as good of the guys who did. i'm not the hero they are. and i think that's an important thing. and is what i believe the film is so important. because i travel six, seven months a year. and i love speaking to audiences, whether they are on

television or in person. one, 500, audiences have gotten bigger and bigger, but i can't reach everybody and i don't have the biggest bullhorn in the world. that's what we went in search of. when i wrote "the monuments men," a story like you're sitting with an expense in what they are expensive but it's why the discovery of the letters home during the war to their loved ones and drawings like bill keller's dad sent home to his brother, are so critically important because that's what people connect with, it's the human stories. there's plenty of people to go to all the facts and figures, et cetera, et cetera. and that's not unimportant. the things that move us, are the sacrifices and tribulations, and sometimes funny things that people get involved in. and it was through these letters home that they described whether they were scared are homesick or exhilarated or drawings they conveyed what it's like for a 42 year old guy that was a father

at 39 do not see his son for three years. so i think by the time we have had in other people have a chance to see this whole concerted effort of what these officers minted in europe and in a film coming out that albeit his focus on known in europe, by actors are like glue, sticky paper, young audiences alike, that they're going to go and we're not trying to educate anybody directly. we're not trying to beat anything into the. we want people to go and have great time. here a great story and be amazed but there's also nothing wrong with understanding heroism, sacrifice, nobility and respect as our monuments office, youngest monuments officer says, respect for other people that are going to respect these things ourselves. and i think at that point in time we embark on a different world than the one in which we live right now but i believe every political leader including

the president of the united states will have to look at this in a different context because they're going to know all you all know about it was going to have military leaders and state department leaders that have a different appreciation for it instead of seeing it as something that they had to do so we don't have problems like we had in baghdad. they can embrace it and say this is something we have an opportunity to do that will engender goodwill of around people throughout the world that the united states sometimes we don't necessarily reflect the greatest cultural understanding. we did at a point in time if ever we deserved a freak pass for forgetting, we didn't forget. and that's the message that i try and convey today, that it all begins and ends with leadership. we have young men and women. our people in the military are so different that they need and want direction. they take orders, and the owners had to come from the top. the people who are training to be arts officers today.

but i fear without a bottom driven effort, in my opinion, destined at some point in time to fill but it's got to be top down but it's got to be worked at the bottom. business careers or been involved in the military know that the ceo of the united states is the president and i believe that's where it's got to begin. i say that it is that's what worked in world war ii. president roosevelt endorsed this commission, general eisenhower received the orders and issued this incredibly important sea change directive and empower these men and women to be the instruments of the policy to go out and get it done. we've got people trying to do the job. we have people that work above them understand why it's important. when we have haiti conventions and important unesco treaty's from 1954, were missing in my

opinion the leader of the free world standing up and saying, say what president rosa and general eisenhower said, we will protect as much as we're allowed. if it comes down to the lives of our men and women are an object, allies count more. we're going to do all we can do. this is where young people can come in to play. technological skills, most of us won't understand that this is a chance to find a way to use them to do good, especially in these difficult situations like syria where we don't have boots on the ground, we will not send in troops for the cultural objects. these works of art are like little kids. they need to be taken care of, and that in my opinion is our responsibility as custodians and guardians as happened for why they are here today. perhaps one more question.

>> relating to what you just said, we have a lot of powerful culture institutions in this country and all over the world to do you think we doing enough to raise the consciousness of this subject matter? >> i don't believe we are. how many people in here have ever heard about the monuments men before this? thank you very much for reading "the monuments men." [laughter] we have institutions all over the country in places that we aren't able to get people to come, and young people are the key. i mean, this is such an opportunity as a growing area. so i venture to say this film is going to draw an awful lot of interest for many, many reasons, ma not just the people that are in it, either feeling the people around the world are going to ask themselves the same two questions that i asked that got me into all this trouble. how in the face of the most destructive conflict in history did so many works of art in europe survive, and to what the

people who say them? i believe people are going to go into thinking, i know a fair bit about world war ii. the can't be any good stories left and they will be leading a surprise as i did but it's been a great honor to be with you tonight. thank you very much. [applause] our coverage of the tv in prime time continues tonight. >> you're watching c-span2 with politics and public affairs, we

do section live coverage of the u.s. senate. on weeknights watch key public policy events and every week in the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and get our schedules at our website and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. >> what are you reading this summer? booktv wants to know. >> right now i'm reading "where'd you go, bernadette" by maria semple it's a novel that is told in the form of largely e-mails as a daughter tries to piece together clues about why her mother disappeared to the mother is quite eccentric and the story is set in seattle with some really interesting, quirky characters. it's a lot of fun. i don't know where it's going but i'm really looking forward to finishing it. after that i'm going to be doing something of a book club with my son, miles, who is 16. this is something we did a couple of summers ago. we picked a couple of books and

we region and then we would go to our local diner to discuss them and have breakfast. and this summer we have picked twup two books so far. we're reading a biography of bruce springsteen, which i think should be a lot of fun. we're both springsteen fans. and interested to learn a little bit more about his background in new jersey and how he got to be who he is. and we're also going to read dan brown's "inferno," which i think is the ultimate summer beach book. i've read the other dan brown books and i think miles will enjoy this one. he has a real knack for ending his chapters with cliffhangers that make you turn the page. and so i think miles will enjoy that a lot, and i think we have lots to talk about. so should be a fun summer of reading. >> let us know what you reading this summer. tweet us at the booktv, posted

on a facebook page or send us an e-mail at the booktv@c-span.org. >> the national business group on health conducted a survey on how large employers view the role of health insurance exchange is in providing benefits to employees and retirees and what you'll be doing in 2014. wednesday at the national press club announced the results of that survey. see it live at 10 a.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> our coverage of booktv in prime time continues tonight with a look at events from this years book fairs and festivals. from the harlem book fair a panel on science and health. then from the "los angeles times" festival of books, and interview. and later from the gaithersburg book festival, lynn olson on her book.

that's 18 eastern here on c-span2. >> now, a discussion on the u.s. defense strategies toward northeast asia. brad roberts, former deputy assistant defense secretary with the obama administration talked about the north korea nuclear threat, china's modernization of its arsenal, and the u.s. nuclear deterrence policy at an event hosted by the stimson center on monday. this is 90 minutes. >> good morning, everyone. i'm ellen laipson and a delight to welcome you to this event, this monday morning in late august. were delighted to see all of you for discussion on a very important international security topic, extended deterrence and strategic stability in east

asia. we're really delighted to welcome brad roberts was recently finished a long tour of the defense department working on these issues as deputy assistant secretary of defense and who' who is just back from g visit in japan, talking in particular with japanese about their views of extended deterrence. and end of his remarks today will be focused in part on his research in japan but also more broadly how the u.s. looks at these issues for all of its presence and engagements in east asia. i'm very happy to turn the baton to yuki tatsumi, who is our lead japan expert here at stimson as part of our east asia program led by alan r. burkett in the first row. site hope we'll have a discussion that will illuminate some of the issues on the minds of our japanese allies and more broadly think about american and asian interest on these topics. so welcome, brent. that you coming, and yuki, it's over to you.

>> good morning and thanks again for coming to stimson for this first thing monday morning event. you all will be very interested in the topic that dr. roberts is talking about, which is extended deterrence in northeast asia. i think dr. roberts was indeed in japan very important period of time. as many of you may know, japan is in the middle of revising its program guideline which is a five year one of the core defense policy documents that they renewed every five years or so. and just when he was in japan, i think mr. a defense was finishing up its interim report. so i don't know if he had any of the interim report content that went in there, but i'm sure he provoked a lot of thinking on the policymakers and minister of defense, who are thinking through these issues. dr. roberts don't need too much of an introduction. you all have the program mr. here, but very quickly, he just came back from a six week

assignment as a visiting fellow at the national institute of institutinstitut e for defense studies in which is a fully with the ministry of japan in spring 2013. and from 2009 to early 2013, dr. roberts served in the obama administration as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy. and at the and of them at the conclusion of his fellowship at national institute for defense studies, he wrote the paper on the extended deterrence and u.s. extended deterrence and the content of northeast asia strategic environment. many of you might have already picked up a copy up front when you signed in. for those of you don't, for those of you who don't have copies, we will put up the link to his paper shortly after this event along with the summer and the videos of this event. dr. roberts will speak -- how

long? i will live to dr. roberts. he can take as many time for as brief time as he wants to take on this topic. and following that i will open the floor to questions and answers. so with that, bread. >> thank yothank you very much,. venture for the opportunity to be here, thank all of you for making time on august monday morning to be here for the discussion. i will try and set out remarks in 25 or so minutes to get the conversation going. i would like to make it clear i speak for myself but i don't represent the administration any longer. i'm not it is because the government of japan. the ideas are my own. the views are my own. i will try not to attribute use to others that i don't have a good basis for a tribute and. this story really begins from an administration perspective with the nuclear posture review of 2009. when we received a clear guidance from the president to highlight issues that extended deterrence and assurance in our over all analysis, and when we

began the review with extensive international consultations, we actually begin the npr with the consideration of lessons learned from prior in the ours, and one of them was that there been too little opportunity for international stakeholders in america nuclear strategy to express their views to the prior administrations. so we composed a team from jointly led by the office of the secretary of defense and the state department, to conduct consultations on npr issues and, indeed, we conducted nearly 60 such consultations in that first year. this directly informed the analysis of the npr in many useful ways, highlighted the fact that we, the united states, have a number of allies who are anxious about the kinds of decisions the united states makes in the area of nuclear policy and capabilities.

and one of the countries most eager to seize this opportunity was japan. and japan came early and often to the state dod process and to my office, and this was pathbreaking kind of activity from the perspective of both countries. it had been a longtime since the united states had spoken with its allies outside of europe about these issues. and in follow-up to the nuclear posture review, we, i can't say that anymore. day, the obama administration, began sustained dialogues with the number of allies in order to carry on the spirit of dialogue that had begun in the npr. we established, well, within the european context we then took on the deterrence and defense posture review.

in the persian gulf area we took on a number of idle issues and existing dialogue processes. but in northeast asia we recognize the need to actually institutionalize some new processes. and so with republic of korea, for example, we institutionalized the extent of deterrence policy committee, and with japan we extended deterrence dialogue. and these are unofficial dialogues that are on the u.s. site come and they serve three primary functions. the first is to ensure the needed transparency about policy and the thinking behind it. as it develops in both countries. a second purpose is to think through together some comment emerging challenges of deterrence. and a third purpose is to give our allies the opportunity for

firsthand, hands-on experience of the deterrent capabilities that the united states contributes to their defense. so, for example, in the context of the extended deterrence dialogue, the united states and japan, this team is visited strategic command, looked at the planning capabilities there, visited an airbase, visited a naval base where ballistic missile submarines are located. and this has been highly informative for the japanese side to understand the kinds of capabilities and the kind of investments the united states has made in japan's security in this regard. the president also put a high level focus on strategic stability, and we were asked to get out pashtun carry out the npr with an iq enhancing strategic stability even as we take steps to reduce the role of number of nuclear weapons. this presents one set of

challenges in u.s.-russian and thus transit and context, and another set of challenges in the u.s.-china and hence transpacific context. in both cases we have generally seen as a possible 49 states and its allies to partner to develop, to improve capabilities for the extended deterrence challenge in a manner that doesn't jeopardize strategic stability with russia and china. and this is because in particular the ballistic missile defense is relevant to the regional challenge, don't jeopardize the strategic deterrence of russia and china. with china, we propose a dialogue on strategic stability, and that has not happened. so far. a very important point to make as an opening point, because it's sensitive in the u.s.-japan relationship it's sensitive in

every single relationship with allies, as it is domestically in the united states. and the point is, if we are putting all of this emphasis on extended deterrence, assurance of allies and strategic stability with major powers, how in our nuclear policy, how can we possibly also be fulfilling our commitment to strengthen nonproliferation and take practical steps towards that long-term goal of disarmament? and in the case of east asia, the answer is fairly simple. if we were to fail as a project, we, the united states, were to fail as a project of assuring our allies and deterring north korea, will then surely there would be nuclear proliferation pressures. there wouldn't be for the progress towards disarmament. they would be progress or steps away from disarmament. and similarly, if we were to fail as a project of strategic stability with china, we are not going to china, sooner or later,

join in the reductions process. and greater stability and the u.s.-china relationship and greater cooperation on nonproliferation and disarmament, but we would have something going in the other direction. this is a view strongly held and the japanese community that thinks about nuclear issues, that the credibility of extended deterrence and the effectiveness of strategic stability are essential to creating the conditions that allow us to make further progress in a practical way towards long-term goals. the paper that i was asked to write, which have copies of, which is written primarily for a japanese audience, to be clear, and will shortly appear in japanese translation on the website and is a view of

strategic stability and extended deterrence in northeast asia from the perspective of the is japan's alliance. the papers principal purpose was to shift the thinking of the u.s. and japanese committees working on these questions on to the next set of questions. after four years of dialogue between us at the official level, there was a desire to bring greater clarity to the emerging analytic agenda in a way that would motivate additional research and analysis from the analytic community, additional transpacific debate, and additional discussion at the track 1.5 level with china and perhaps the rok and other stakeholders in these issues. the paper begins with a reflection of the view that's emerged -- perhaps i should

speak only for myself here -- my view of the deterrence challenges in northeast asia security environment as a result of changing factors. the changing factors are simply too. the fact that north korea is making steady progress towards developing and deploying the capabilities that could deliver nuclear weapons on to u.s. allies in the region him and ultimately onto the united states as well. this raises a series of familiar to those who studied the cold war, a series of similar questions about coupling and decoupling and is america going to be there or be blackmailed away by north korea in time of crisis? and the other significant development in the strategic environment is them of course the wholesale change in china's military posture and what the pentagon has a shorthanded the development of anti-access aerial denial capabilities, but a modernization program in

china, including a nuclear component but not principally nuclear, that is changing the overall balance of force in the western pacific, and raising questions again about is america going to be there or be blackmailed away by the risks it would run and defending japan in time of crisis? in my analysis, this brings three-21st century deterrence challenges which were set out in the paper, but the first is the very highest in challenge of deterring nuclear attack on the united states or an ally. second, at the opposite end of the conflict spectrum, the lowest and of the conflict spectrum, which the japanese defensdefense white paper refers gray zone conflicts, think coercion, think implicit threats, but not hot war.

and the third is in the middle here of this conflict spectrum, a new challenge. not so much a new challenge but taking new shape, of in time of war, north korea, perhaps china, trying to determine how much leverage its gotten out of its new capabilities, and coercing us and making explicit nuclear threats, and perhaps taking action that it calculates fall beneath our nuclear response threshold. these are three different kind of nuclear deterrence challenges. the high-end one of the ones that are supposed to move to people who have thought about nuclear deterrence for a long time, the two lower end ones are largely incognito to a lot of people, and that's an opportunity rich in homework opportunity. the paper then goes on to set

out the strategy that the administration has them and to emphasize the point that i think this is the strategy that essentially enjoys bipartisan support and has since the early 1990s, and it's a strategy to strengthen extended deterrence with states like north korea and iran, by diversifying our military toolkit to add all the things that had deterrence value that supplement the nuclear component. missile defenses, conventional strike capabilities, advanced isr capabilities, resilience in cyber and space. there's a comprehensive strategy for dealing with these deterrence challenges in these regions that would be silly and perhaps unwise, but certainly politically impossible to rely simply on u.s. nuclear threats to deal with these emerging deterrence challenges. and so we, the administration, have tried to pursue a broad and

comprehensive approach. and if you take that view of your response to the emerging deterrence challenges, then this is a strategy that provides many opportunities for allies to contribute meaningfully to extended deterrence and meaningfully to the credibility of u.s. commitments. and the paper sets out a number of arguments about where and how japan is contributing. looking ahead, which is the core function of the paper, i had like four issues i think are going to be a subject of continuing discussion within japan and the united states, and between us and among all of the other stakeholders. meaning south korea and china and perhaps on some of these issues russia. first, conventional strike capability for japan.

as i said, our comprehensive strategy talks about introducing prompt conventional strike capabilities as a supplement to our nuclear strike capabilities as a way to add credibility to our threats to strike preemptively, raises a logical question to what you allies contribute to conventional strike capabilities? it's not obvious in the u.s. governments, generally, that allies should always contribute something to strike, conventional strike. the united states has approximately 40 allies. and of those, approximately a dozen have strike capabilities, longer range cruise missiles or ballistic missiles of some kind. so the majority do not. so should japan be in that category are not?

this is, too many close followers of japan, a new issue raised by the new leadership. this is not a new issue in japan. japan has been debating, adding conventional strike you below is of new kind since the 1950s. and of course there will be significant negative political repercussions from among some of its neighbors. there would be a significant domestic political debate about how consistent this is with the spirit and letter of the constitution, and there should also be a debate about what this would and would not contribute to deterrence. i'm not here to take a position on the issue. i'm not on any of these four issues. the point is to say this is an issue that is coming onto our agenda that we need to be able to debate in a serious and thoughtful way based on good, supporting analysis. second topic, missile defense. how much is enough for japan?

japan is probably the most important missile-defense partner of the united states. we have important partners in europe as well, important partners in the middle east, but with japan, and, of course, my time at nids is a great joy to sit after four years of thinking about nothing for longer than 30 minutes in the pentagon, because that's the way life is, to actually sit and read things and reflect on them, and one of the interesting reports i came across was from a prominent american think tank, not the stimson center, that in 2000 projected it would be decades before japan got really seriously in the missile-defense business. well, a decade later, we, the united states and japan, our joint operating nuclear defense capabilities. we are joined at developing an advanced interceptor. this is very close and very

productive and very important relationship from certainly from the u.s. perspective. we, the obama administration, tried to set out some arguments about how much missile defense is enough for america. instead of arguments about how much is enough for homeland defense, a regional defense, and japan has no such initial set of analytic answers. and partially that's because the next set of questions involved is the missile-defense about china or not. and much more sensitive question, obviously, from whether or not the missile-defense is adequately compose to deal with the north korean threat. this is not an issue requiring an urgent answer. be in dpg will take on a number of questions in this area, whether japan should consider some military capabilities, whether it should consider

capabilities of testing i states to play with us in nato allies in europe. so there are some important questions embedded in the current process, but the advanced interceptor doesn't become available until late in the decade so there is time to work these questions. third topic, which i shorthand as is more nuclear tailoring required of the united states in northeast asia? now, let me set the context here a little bit for that. in that comprehensive strategy, strengthen regional deterrence architectures with all of those different elements, we, the administration, argued that they will always remain a nuclear component so long as there's a nuclear threat that we are trying to deter. but we will tailor the nuclear component to the particular requirements of the individual regions where we extended

nuclear guarantees on behalf of allies. because what it might make sense and the european context isn't the same thing that might make sense somewhere else, so the approach needs to be tailored. and we, the administration, tailored both nuclear declaratory policy and nuclear posture capabilities following very close consultations with the government of japan, among others, and i can review in the q&a discussion what those adaptations work that followed in the tailoring, but the very high level strategic question is, is that enough catering, or do we need more? and there are analysts in japan who have various ideas about how to strengthen the credibility of the u.s. nuclear commitment,

and, of course, there are some individuals advocating for japan acquiring capabilities of its own. my way to organize this discussion, and conceptually, was to say that i think they are for simple models that we, the u.s. and japan together, should be talking through to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in perspective of japan's security. the first is the current model, which is based on the commitment of the united states to employ its strategic forces, whenever the need might arise on half of an ally, and on the ability to forward deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons, while all nuclear weapons are strategic, to forward deploy a nuclear weapon within nonstrategic delivery system. not deployed, the capacity, the capability to forward deploy in

time of crisis as a way to signal the resolve of the alliance to stand up to some particular act of nuclear bullying. second model would be to go back to the cold war, east asian model. .. which is essentially every alliance on the u.s. try at but

also british and french strategic deterrence contribute to nato's overall nuclear deterrent posture. and the unique nato arrangement where a handful of allies participate with the united states in preparing for the possible employment of nuclear-weapons by stationing on their territories aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons and stationing of the weapons themselves. and that model, because these would be joint operations conducted by nato supported by a joint planning process and a ministerial level body called the nuclear planning group. today the nuclear planning group has won a function which is to enable nato to have a discussion of nuclear policy without the french minister. because when france rejoined nato it did not rejoin the

nuclear part of nato and this model has a lot of appeal and in south korea as well. it is natural america's allies would want to know if there were ever a moment when the american president was considering nuclear employment on their behalf. they would want to know. where is my seat at the table. al am i going to have, what is the consultant process that is going to allow me to shape this really big deal decision. the nato model was awfully alluring from afar. but what is the analog to the french minister in the u.s.-japan relationship? who is the party that has to be excused? why do you need a special mechanism for that? defense ministers in the u.s./japan context are able to talk about any issue on the

bilateral agenda. that is the third model and the fourth model is one where the models that is presented by the independent national deterrence of the united kingdom and france which isn't really a model of the u.s. extending deterrents to them. it is a different model but also as a model got some very clear distinctions from the current practice obviously. my case was i think rather than trying to be individual proposals for taking steps to strengthen deterrence or reduce the role of nuclear, let's talk together as allies about these models. fourth and final issue looking forward is strategic stability with china. what does that mean and how do we get it?

the obama administration set out a commitment to strategic stability in the u.s./china relationship without adding any content to what that may require. this was a calculated decision. intended to create an incentive for china to finally join an official dialogue with the united states on issues of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. we came into the administration keenly aware of a long track record here of essentially each of the three preceding presidents of the united states has achieved agreement with their chinese counterparts to initiate a dialogue on nuclear weapons issues and he sensually nothing happened. this is an unsatisfying answer politically particularly if your ambition for the president is to

continue the process of nuclear production and your ambition as an ally is to try to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the northeast asian security environment china needs to be part of these processes, not a bystander and not a party that is building up and increasing the role of nuclear weapons while everybody else is building down. china has asked, by the way, what do you mean about strategic stability, do you mean what you meant historically in the u.s./russia relationship which is to say that in the u.s./russia relationship we have accepted mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationship, we are not contesting the credibility of russia's deterrent as seen strategic value to the united states and our allies doing so since may be the 1950s, and the

government of china would like to hear the united states say they did accept a neutral color ability as the basis of the strategic relationship. that is not something japan wants to hear. go back to the earlier point about coupling and decoupling, the cold war thinking about how alliances work and the problem is not just relevant to the cold war but relevant in the twenty-first century and that is to say that if america were to say we accept usual vulnerability with china as a basis of the strategic relationship, what some in japan year as okay, we want a conflict, and china is issuing threats america will stand down from the defense of japan. so this is a short description

of the fact that the three key stakeholders in this discussion have difference starting points for the discussion. we all believe in the value of strategic stability. we all think it should be possible to sustain and indeed deepened the conditions of strategic stability with china but precisely how requires a lot more work and it requires a lot more than the united states saying we accept mutual vulnerability which we are not going to say. so with that, let me reiterate the news i expressed in my personal view i try to attribute to the administration or the government of japan only when i think they are very broadly held. i am not here to defend any particular answer to any of these four questions.

this was an analytic activity intended to shift the focus on to the things that i think personally we as allies should be talking about and i don't think this is the discussion just for the u.s. and japan. all of these questions in which south korea has a stake. we can't possibly have a strong extended deterrent posture and strategic stability in asia without a greater convergence of thinking among the united states, japan and south korea on these questions. south korea can't just be set aside from these discussions and similarly china is a stakeholder and has many shared interests in finding strategically acceptable answers to these questions and as i say i pink russia has some stake in these things as well. with that, let me thank you for your attention and let me polk have thrown enough fuel on a fire to keep the monday morning discussion going and turn it

back over to you. >> i think you all agreed that we are thinking about this issue for a long time and has been. please identify yourself and keep your comments and questions or so i can accommodate as many as possible. the gentleman over here. >> thank you very much for your presentation. my question -- >> identify yourself. >> justin anderson. strategic stability as we discussed with russia as you mentioned in your presentation, a lot of strategic thought going all the way back to the late 40s and 50s and at the center is mutual vulnerability. strategic stability with russia is the core mutual

vulnerability, strategic stability with china does not. what is the alternate basis for strategic stability purely in terms of analytic as the size the u.s. and china would have? >> great question. i wish i knew the answer. there was -- it is a great question and something you should all be working on. there was an effort to gather a group of analysts on this topic year-ago at the army war college that produced and edited volume that came out in the string -- sporting. the introduction was by thomas schelling, still writing at the age of 90. and he says it took 12 years to figure out strategic stability.

it was about two countries with roughly comparable capabilities. a largely bipolar world. now we are in a much more multi dimensional world. we shorthand it by calling it multipolar, a short name that is in many ways misleading and is revealing. the elements of strategic balance are more numerous than before. how could we accept mutual vulnerability in the nuclear domain and reject it in cyber and space, how would that work? cyber and space have to be part of the discussion. moreover, i think we have models

of strategic relationships among countries that are capable of destroying each other. we don't worry about it. we have a relationship of mutual vulnerability with the united kingdom. no one gives it any thought because we see the potential pathway to conflict. could we make mutual vulnerability with the united kingdom go away? we could, but it would be a gigantic we expensive project and foolish. maybe there is a model that includes an element of vulnerability but we don't call that the cornerstone of strategic stability. the foundation of strategic stability is something else. i do think our vocabulary for strategic stability predates shelling's will peer phase. there was a long history of thinking of major stability under major powers. it will do as well to look into

the historical foundations. >> ville roslyn, previously at princeton. my question is about the coordination since so much affect south korea, particularly to the extent that china comes into the picture, are we finding that these kinds of -- you have been in japan and heard what they are saying. do you see them taking the right steps to bring south korean into the picture or narrow the difference or is there more concerned that the gap is widening between japan and south korea and how to deal with

extended deterrence? >> that is an excellent question and i think there are few government officials who would express satisfaction with the state of cooperation with japan and south korea and among the three of us, that said, while there are periodic or constant troubles at the high political level there are important things that happen at the working level. i think there has been a lot of convergence in the thinking of the three allies about these

issues. not enough convergence. i am not really sure that this is something that can be accomplished in the manner that is needed at the officials' level and this is an opportunity for track 2 and track 1.5 to bring to bring the government community along when there are reasons to find that difficult. i don't want to pass judgment, i was very impressed by the degree of the depth of thinking how to deal with china. the depth of thinking in japan about america's china policy.

and significant misalignment as perceived in japan between japan's deepening vulnerability to conventional, not nuclear, conventional by the t r a, and america's relative in vulnerability to that problem. ten 2-seat china, conventional military as over the horizon, time lines for japan here and now, it dispenses white paper of three years ago said the problem of japan, security and environment related from international expansion, and the most recent paper says china succeeded in using the status

quo. this captors, a encapsulates significant hardening of thinking and the change of government in japan but accumulation of experience and so there are elements of japan's china policies that i might not fully agree with, i think the depth of their work on this is born of their own experience -- one thing strikes me as being in tokyo. the government of japan is probably the most deterrent fluent government of any american ally. the extent of deterrence dialogue has created an alumni

group. they had tours and tabletop exercises and pentagon policy, power point briefing, but they haven't gone into retirement. they have all rotated up and this is that a time when these issues are very prominent of their security environment, very prominent of their view in their relationship with the united states and also at a time when japan is moving to create its own national security council structure, and the people who are going to be leading that activity and staffing it are basically veterans and this is different. this is not the character of dialogue united states has had with japan, an extension of the china discussion because there china discussion emerges out of the deterrence community, it is very broad indeed. hours tends to come out of our

china watching community or china policy community. so we now have a partner who is ready to exert a lot of intellectual and policy leadership in this ariane aea a this casts a new obligation not simply to practice with the past which was to handle long policy on deterrence and nuclear strategy rather than interact in its development. >> over here and get to you next. >> josh pollack. during your talking talked-about tailoring capabilities and posture in the region and invited us to ask what has been

done so i am asking has that been done? >> you are a good, straight man. tailoring the nuclear peace and the missile defense peace. and the nuclear peace. the four models of tailored approaches, the parent, the adaptations that were made in u.s. nuclear policy and posture as a result not solely as the result of consultation with northeast asian allies but made in follow-up, two kinds, declaratory policy and posture and declaratory policy of course we adapted the negative security

assurance, strategic posture commission, the/injured commission that advise the incoming administration on declaratory policy that said fix the problem without specifying how and the problem i bnt pify str- yofateto ls'stabl

use nuclear how consideration of the declaratory policy included discussion of at the appropriate time to move towards the sole purpose formulation of declaratory policy to say that it is not only the fundamental purpose but the sole purpose of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attack on the united states or its allies. many of our allies have strong views on this topic. some in favor, some opposed and we came out where we did. which was in rejection of sold purpose. on posture as opposed to declaratory policy, the agitation we made was to -- the question of how do you forward part of your nuclear deterrent

to an ally in the time of crisis and following the presidential nuclear initiatives of the 1990s when the united states retired everything it had for really deployed the two nuclear posture reviews that followed highlighted the remaining role of a nuclear tomahawk, an attack submarine nuclear cruise missile and in europe we were maintaining a different posture, the united states describe no role to nuclear tomahawk in defense of our nuclear commitments in europe. we were pursuing the model of unique sharing arrangements which i previously described, the dual capable fighter bombers

and associated bombs and the policy question was do you need to keep both of these approaches? do you need either of these of rochees? is there a better approach to consider? the assessment of the administration, well, the analytic question was how do we strengthen extended the terms? how do we strengthen it? what needs to be strengthened? what is it we would be the turning? if you take my three part model, the high end, the gray zone and the red zone in the middle, it is sort of the red zone in the middle that needs help. where we focused our policy and strategy to strengthen the capabilities that we bring to that problem. again, what was the red zone? you are actually in a war and

the enemy is taking steps right at your nuclear declaratory policy, texting your results. and to is that? not just the united states . and to is that? not just the united statesolve . and to is that? not just the united states. and to is that? not just the united states but the allied too. one of the key ideas is to separate the united states from its allies, isolate the united states and make it more difficult to bring our power to bear. tomahawk or dual capable aircraft, which is better for that problem? which is better for signaling the resolve of an allied or the shared commitment of allies as opposed to just the united states alone? and our conclusion was dual

capable aircraft which can be operated from the territory of an allied or near the territory of an ally, visible signals of deployment and not simply the plymouth of strategic systems from the american homeland. this is a way to signal resolve. we took the step following lots of dialogue with many different allies, to retire the tomahawk nuclear cruise missile and to ensure that the fleet of dual capable aircraft and associated nuclear bombs that go with them are capable of being globally tdeployed in time of crisis. >> the status was rather murky and the terms of the mutual defense pact with japan. seems like we could have told the japanese we don't take a

position, you have to work that out with the chinese. we have given the japanese and implicit guarantee. is it comparable to the british guarantee of poland's leading into world war ii? has it been superseded? >> one of the benefits of being a nuclear guy working the u.s./japan relationship is i don't know everything. i am not steeped in every element of this relationship. so i am not prepared to comment on the nature of our commitment. what i am prepared to comment on is the distention i encountered. i have a lot of good help from

japanese colleagues when writing my paper pointed out opportunities for improvement and one of the most interesting points of dialogue in an early draft of the paper in trying to explain the purposes of the u.s. nuclear umbrella, and i said it is in part to assure our allies that the united states was prepared to assist in their defense in the most dire circumstances and this produced a strong reaction from a couple of japanese who said that nato language come to the assistance of an allied. that is native language. you have a specific treaty obligation to defend japan in specific circumstances and we have limited roles because of the nature of the constitution we have and the way we have interpreted it and if you are expecting us to take a role that to us these two commentators,

seems like it falls in your job box, not our job box, that is a new expectation, that is different, that seems to fall outside the traditional interpretation of the different roles of the two allies in this relationship. i am not steeped in that issue but it did highlight the different expectations we seem to have about the role of the united states in japan? sorry. >> over here. >> two questions. is an implicit presumption that north korea will become -- a nuclear weapons country and i want to make sure i got that. number 2, from the north korean and chinese point of view, tremendous downside is too a

missile defense system which for example the russians interpret in a very negative way, as an effort to gain a first strike capability. >> the first part of the second question was chinese and south korean views? >> the north koreans and the chinese would view the missile defense system, because the north koreans are the north koreans, that they would view it as going towards a first strike. >> on the first question, north korea is a state with existing nuclear capability. the status of its capability to deliver nuclear weapons on to the united states is uncertain. if north korea were to choose to

renounce nuclear weapons and long-range missiles this regional deterrence architecture, the parts of it that are tailored could disappear tomorrow. that is not the comment on how much progress they've made in miniature rising, don't know, that is sort of in the ten year time frame i am trying to look at. i am just positing that they are continuing to make progress and if they don't -- north korea understands -- i don't know what north korea understands. as a matter of policy for two decades it has been the policy of the united states to negate their of the lead to coerce others with missiles.

the intent is clear. the chinese, to me it is very minor, the fact that today many analysts comment on the fact that china has not said much about ballistic missile defense because for ten years, until 2001, we heard them say nothing but missile defense is bad news for china, watch out, and when the bush administration withdrew from that treaty they basically said fine, okay, that is the route you are going, we will make sure our deterrent remains a credible in the face of that. no administration has articulated a policy of so composing missile defense that it could negate china's

strategic deterrent. we as an administration articulated a statement that we were strengthening regional missile defense against all threats whatever their source including all threats in east asia so a mixed message to china. this is another topic where we have been prepared as an administration to have a more substantive dialogue with russia and china and neither has wanted that dialogue. if they are not taking the opportunity but have all of these complaints, what does that tell us? something interesting. >> i am from the japanese and the seeing -- embassy. thank you for all the research

into the process. thank you so much. my question about the situation in syria the reason i am asking is the united states, however united states reacts to the use of chemical weapons could help with indications in my region and also an interesting case of what kind of deterrent message the united states might send. on the one hand you want to send a message to dissuade the syrian government not to use chemical weapons. on the other hand if the message is too strong government might be farther put into the quarter so there is a message you want

to send so i want to share your comments on this issue. >> thank you. anyone who has questions about firsthand life in the adb can offer you a private deal. first of all your question allows me to make a broader point which is the point i tried to bring earlier in the paper. which is we, the united states, when we think of these extended deterrence issues think mostly about europe and not much about the other two regions. and we think not at all about the cross connections across the region. that is not the way it looks from the region's. you can find plenty of japanese analysts writing about nato's policy decisions on extended deterrence. find fewer but still some european analysts writing about

the extent of dialogue and decisions in northeast asia. there is a lot of watching and learning going on that we americans have been blind to and one of the most important functions of japanese diplomacy in the deterrence and arms control business has been to remind nato of the way in which decisions made in the euro atlantic security environment can impact the northeast asian security environment. case in point nato set out in the strategic concept two years ago the ambition to take steps to work with russia to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the euro atlantic security environment with an eye to their ultimate elimination and this might include transparency measures and relocations. relocations. any of you again to think again

about the age differences, those who were around for the nato nuclear modernization debate and the decision of the early 1980s might recall there was a moment when the united states and russia and the soviet union seemed to have agreed to an arms control deal that would have given the soviets the right and sort of the response ability to move s s 20s out of europe within range of japan. and japan quickly said please rethink and japan has had to say please read think again. you as a nato alliance have focused just on what is happening in your security environment and have not taken a global view of this problem. a suit and appropriate critique of our policy.

your question, i am going to -- i am not involved in the syria policy development at this time but this is a sensitive time from the standpoint of what the president chooses to do in light of what is clearly stepping across the red line the president set out. what can be done effectively at this point? to somewhat contradictory argument i just made, at least when it comes to deterrence messaging the administration and the white house in particular are very attuned to the fact that any deterrent message is received by a cast of thousands and when you say something like a red line and the decisions you make about how you follow up on that our decisions that will be closely watched in tokyo, seoul,

beijing, canberra, the list goes on. whitehouse is clearly aware of these presidential contacts now and i can't predict the outcome because it is quite obvious there is no simple military act to take and today's washington post includes the formulation, somebody has an op-ed, something like a feel-good strike to make good on our threat that is not going to accomplish something. if we are going to use force it should accomplish something other than demonstrating resolve to demonstrate resolve but i don't know the answer. >> over here, to the back.

back row. >> stanley clover along with brad. >> another old guy. >> back to the background of this. the history of the korean war. that is why we are so concerned about north korea doing something really crazy. even kim il sung's didn't attack until the got the approval from china and the soviet union which he discusses stalin's approval of the request to attack. if we are talking about any major north korean use of military force, that would seem to make some assumptions about the russian and chinese positions. it is not just about us, there has to be some implicit assumption about them. can we imagine they would sign off on such an attack the way

they did in 1950? if not, could north korea's regime be so irrational, so totally out of touch as is this something in the teeth of opposition of russia and china or either one of them? let's have some discussion of what the assumptions are regarding russia and china. >> that is an excellent question. thank you for opposing it. i hope conventional wisdom is true and those are constraints that will be meaningful if ever the moment comes when the new leader seriously contemplate military action.

i am wary of conventional wisdom, particularly in this area. it is plausible to me -- we have a young man in power in pyongyang who might be in power longer than castro. maybe his ambition is to play the status quo game, brinksmanship, keep the regime going, at enrich himself and his family, led the state and society fester as they do. maybe that is the limit of his ambition. and maybe he believes that he needs to be deferential to the

preferences of beijing and moscow and maybe not. to me, it is sort of impossible that his vision for a castro like tenure would be to preserve this very ugly status quo. i am equally concerned with the possibility that he might have the ambition to fulfilled the unfinished work of his predecessor, his father and grandfather and it is plausible with missiles capable of reaching the united states that he does not have to account for the preferences of moscow and beijing and i think it is plausible that he would think he could blackmail the united

states out of the game. i think this would be a series of strategic miscalculations of a grand order. i don't think we would be blackmailed out of the game. i think we would discover if we didn't already perceive them, that we would discover vital interests about not being coerced in that fashion and not abandoning an ally under a nuclear threat. these would be strategic miscalculations of the first border. i think we have plenty of evidence to think they are capable of strategic miscalculation. we have plenty of evidence from the experience with saddam hussein to understand how regimes of that type miscalculate. i am not predicting war at all. but i think the conventional wisdom that these capabilities are for the purpose of

essentials the porcupine state don't mess with me, leave me alone and you will be fine, and i am wary of those conventional wisdoms and i think japan and south korea are more than wary. they are deeply anxious and they wonder how anxious we are about this problem. are we in america discounting the possibility of these weapons being used? they are after all understood to be very powerful instruments for shaping outcomes, these new capabilities, a they going to sit on the shelf as if the people who work so hard to get the money not going to try to change something? so i hope that it works the way history suggests but i think there is good reason to be concerned that it might not and hence my interest in

strengthening extended deterrence. >> right upfront. >> good morning, thank you. my name is commander dan schneider, the japan desk guy in the joint staff. i have a question about something you mentioned regarding japan's consideration of strike capability. you mentioned they put it in that there going to start looking at this in the n p d g and something they have been considering since the 1950s. so something they are really considering now, what has changed? i saw later in your paper you mentioned it might be a risk that they will signal outside of northeast asia, they may stop, may send a message that people are losing confidence in the u.s. ability to protect especially the red line area you were talking about and i was wondering if it could not just

the result but the actual cause of this. i wonder about your thoughts. >> i don't think japan's current interest in acquiring some conventional strike capabilities of its own is -- there is no policy to do so. current discussion of this, i don't think it is driven by a doubt about what the united states would and would not do and japan is concerned about signaling that that is the motivator because it is not the motivator. we have now spent four years talking about how to strengthen extended deterrence and how to strengthen the regional deterrence architecture and we have spoken clearly and closely as allies about the role of nuclear weapons and what they are credible for and what they are not credible for. the nuclear umbrella is not credible as a deterrent to create a conflict. if we were to say don't mess

with the sincaccus or we will do you that is not credible. have a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which nuclear threats are credible and which are not, leads you to an awful lot of interest in what you can do to strengthen deterrence. the driver, a believe, in japan, is a perception that the requirement, the requirement for a credible regional deterrence architecture is rising because of developments in the security environment, developments in north korea's military posture, the ability to deliver by missiles the posturing to do so, and the development in china's

conventional power projection capability and regional nuclear capability. the drive, a question of what is the appropriate response, how do we -- if we just tread water while these developments happen, our security interests going to be safeguarded in the long term? we don't need to compete in every area, but where should we compete? what advantages should we secure? this is an appropriate discussion to have. not because of doubts about the united states but because of changes in the security environment to drive a rising appetite for discussion about strengthening not just the discussion, practical steps to strengthen the regional deterrent architecture. >> you have a question. >> in my heart --

>> ian reinhardt, a want to ask about be indeed. you mentioned china's response recently has been sort of engaged in a quiet arms race for increase in interceptors and at this point we don't have the capability to intercept from china but technology is progressing slowly and steadily so in coming decades maybe beyond your ten year of rising what is the dialogue, the action reaction dynamic as numbers and capability of interceptors in proof and is there a way to talk with china to keep strategic stability without causing them to go higher, more sophisticated in their nuclear capability? >> i hope there is that it takes two to dialogue and china has a long track record of resisting

its own leadership commitments to this area. and my personal assessment is not china's involvement. you had a good modifier, almost an arms race or an arms race like response. recalled ten years ago secretary of defense donald rumsfeld articulated a discern the dickens turn, the number of nuclear weapons under the moscow treaty, he was defending that number as a right number in part because it dealt with potential strength to parity by china but ten years later there was no sprint and no parity. we americans should be careful as we characterize what china is up to re.

china is modernizing and diversifying its strategic nuclear forces, its nuclear forces, strategic is a term we used to associate with long-range intercontinental, that is a misleading term. they are modernizing and diversifying. in order to respond to multiple changes in their security environment of which development in the u.s. and japanese missile defense posture are one or two. and the fact, the nature of the ballistic missile defense in the united states is now pursuing is such -- maybe i can get away with a flat statement. it will never be capable against six, seven, its generation

missiles and weapons such as big modern states will have for the long term. this is the business of countermeasures and decoys and the speed of these things. we have designed ballistic missile defense within a very specific box of capabilities and it can get better in that box but it is fundamentally what it is. and unless we were to go away from it to kill and back to nuclear-tipped ballistic missile defense which is utterly implausible, or forward to directed energy based which is a long way away, we will be working with in that box. and united states is not going

to have the ability even if it set itself the goal to negate, to eliminate completely, to withstand full eruption and chinese first strike, that is simply beyond our technology and beyond our money and the repercussions, we have an action/reaction cycle that would fit the arms race characterization. of course the russians and chinese don't really worry, they don't apparently contemplate the bulls out of the blue wake of the angry and think it is the good day to wipe out america, their strategy seems to be, china's strategy is counterdeterrence, to absorb the first blow, counterattack and reattached as directed by political authorities. that is not firingrything all at once.

so when we, the u.s.a. we will never have missile defense big enough to deal with russia and china but if our strategy is to fire one or two or three you already do. but not against long-range, fast burning icbms. there is a lot to talk with china about. there is a lot of technical analysis we could be doing together that would help them to fully understand the attributes of our system as it would influence their interests or not and i would say fundamentally for china as for rush of the issue is not the operational characteristics of the defense, but the political impact of the defense. china's long term ambition for the region is american alliance structures will attenuate and disappear and the more we integrate operationally and the more we take on new common

projects together the less likely that becomes. just as for russia one of the relief corps points of opposition for missile defense is this is business we are doing with their former allies in the territorial countries where we said if way coming to nato we will not deploy nuclear weapons and we are not, but the russians want to not deploy anything strategic in those countries. and there isn't really the possibility of having a technical discussion that dissuades the fundamental political objections they have to missile defense. >> last question in the middle of the room. >> thank you, my name is kobayashi. a question about the missile defense. i need to ask you a series of recent failures of the

interceptor tests, ground-based interceptor tests. do you think, how do you think these events could affect the overall deterrence policy in the u.s. in particular do you think you expect these events could encourage the united states to try to make japan play more of a role in a sea bass interceptor system? thank you. >> excellent question. for those not steeped in the missile defense topic, get to really go back one step. so the bush administration in 2001 assessed that it was possible that by 2005 north

korea could deployed a nuclear-tipped icbm and if it were deployed in one, it could deployed more and give were deploying them it might soften anybody. by 2005 america needed to have some missile defense in the ground. so over four years america produced and deployed but didn't test or develop the initial set of interceptors, the first group of ground-based interceptors. these are different from the regional defense interceptors. these are kind of small icbm size interceptors. they were 0 originally conceived as the one abm compliance base.

in north dakota. and be capable of telling long distances in any direction to intercept something coming in. that difference from the regional systems which go on the front of naval vessels are smaller, capable of going much shorter distances and go much more slowly. and in 2005 the bush administration got to declare their was an initial lift operational capability, they achieved their goal, and put more of these ground-based interceptors in tucson lows in alaska, and try to make them work because they were in a rush to get this work done and these

gb is have essentially been in development while they have been in operational status. .. >> one batch has a lot of problems, one doesn't. and the president in march, i believe it was, late march, made the decision to proceed.

so they ballistic missile defense review of 2010 reflected the commitment of the administration to be prepared to continue to grow the homeland defense posture over the longer-term, if we have clear evidence, if the threat from north korea or iran or someone else was emerging -- somewhere else was emerging. if it didn't really begin to emerge until the 2020 timeframe, well then, we would try to thicken the defense of the homeland with the advancement of such, or beyond the one we are jointly developing. and we would do that principally in europe with european faith adopted approach for this. and that would have the benefit of the giving us the ability to see something coming from the middle east, shoot at it once, figure out if we intercepted or not, and then shoot at it again

with something from the homeland. and well, the evidence came along, didn't it? that north korea has been making progress and iran has making rockers as well. congress declined to provide the funding every year that we, the initiation, requested. so its availability was receding up somewhere in the far future so that we had also in 2010 said that if we need to in the interim between being tossed at 30 -- tossed at 2030, if we need more in the middle, well, we are going to finish the 14 silos that secretary rumsfeld decided to go, secretary rumsfeld planned 44 ground-based interceptors as the initial commitment. we paused at 30. we said let's finish those just

in case. and so the decision the president made in march was to go ahead and finish the deployment of ground-based interceptors to bring the number from 30 to 44. on the understanding that the test program will show that we fixed the problems with the gbi, and, unfortunately, not only flat but he declined budget environment the money needed to pay for that had to come from somewhere inside the missile defense budget. so it came out of the 2b. that's a long answer, it's a long bit of context to answer your question, which is it's difficult to see if there's something that japan could do in the way of deploying interceptors that would substitute for something the united states isn't prepared to

do for itself. the important footnote to the conversation is about censoring as opposed to interceptors. the more attack pathways, trajectories, the more trajectories there are for missiles that might come out of east asia and strike the united states, the more need there is for radars that can see all the different trajectories. and so japan and the united states has made a decision to work together to deploy -- this is a public fact -- to deploy a second radar to the region that will supplement the performance of the first, and contribute to both the defense of japan and the defense of the american homeland. so i wouldn't rule out additional cooperation in the area, not that i envision any particular time, but i don't think there's something more japan would need to be doing

other than illegal time. let me closer. this is a significant ongoing issue in japan discussion of constitutional reform, which is to say, japan does not interpret its constitution as allowing it to participate in collective defense activity. so this means that as an ally of the united states, according to the current interpretation of japan's constitution, if it were to watch a missile launched from north korea and headed to the american homeland, it would not be constitutional for japan to conduct an intercept, or even perhaps to support with sensors and american intercept of that missile. a reinterpretation of the right to collect and defense would help in this regard. this would be a very significant impact, political change and would enhance the credibility of

the alliance in these deterrence challenges. thanks for your question. >> with that, i would like to close this event. i would ask you to join me in thanking dr. roberts in his very frank answers to all your question. and that also of course with his initial remarks, thank you, brad. >> thank you. [applause] >> the transportation department is considering new rules requiring airlines to disclose the fees for travelers buying tickets online. the congressional internet

caucus will hold a hearing about that today at noon eastern here on c-span2. now, a look ahead to next month's g20 summit in saint petersburg, russia. analyst at the center for strategic and international studies discuss the priorities for the summit and the president's trip to stockholm, sweden. this is just under one hour. >> good morning and welcome to the center for strategic and international studies. i had the pleasure of presiding over this briefing today with two of my favorite colleagues,

soon-to-be three of my favorite colleagues. one of them is stuck in traffic. we'll be talking about the president's trip to the g20 summit, and we will go through this from a couple different angles. but first i would like to introduce heather conley, director of the year program at csis. prior to work at csis heather served in a variety of positions including deputy assistant secretary of state for europe. and with that i will not have their takeover. >> thank you, andrew. good morning. it's hard to believe that matt and i, too, have months ago were sitting before you doing everything before the president traveled to ireland and the g8 summit, and we question how much city would overwhelm the g8 summit. here we are two months later, and we are now following the president as he makes his way en route to st. petersburg for the g20 summit, and wondering how much of course will syria

dominate the corridor conversation. i guess you could summarize the president's unanticipated stop in stockholm as russia's loss and sweden's gain. after president obama canceled his bilateral summit with president putin, a stopper need to be added to the itinerary come and looking around the flight path, certainly the nordic countries came to mind but, of course, president obama had already been to copenhagen in 2009 for the u.n. climate conference. you been to oslo, norway, to accept his nobel prize. he is welcoming the three presidents of the baltic states on friday in the oval office that canceled out any of the three baltic states. sweden, finland were the most logical choice is, and stockholm one that choice. this is, in fact, the first time a president has faded sweden and a bilateral capacity.

president bush was the first president to visit sweden i believe in 2009 for a useu summit, but this is the first time that will have a president visit the capital. president obama arrives in sweden and will be greeted by prime minister fredrik reinfel reinfeldt, he has led a center-right government for the last seven years. he will face elections next year. certainly sweden has experienced some unsettled times in its own challenges dealing with integration of immigrants. if you recall in may about six days of riots in the suburbs of stockholm dealing with a police shooting and continues to be a very great topic of conversation with that immigration aspect. so certainly that will be part of the domestic conversation. prime minister reinfeldt has been very gracious in gathering his four other nordic colleagues

to join with president obama in a dinner. the evening after he arrives. and i would since the conversation will be quite robust about the region, and certainly, i hope, and csis has been engaged in a four-year study on the arctic. i think president major quite a bit about the arctic from his swedish and nordic counterparts. secretary kerry as you will recall was just in sweden, northern sweden in mid-may, to attend the arctic council ministerial where historic decision was made to welcome several asian countries as permanent observers to the arctic council. we have a chinese cargo ship passing through the northern sea route. so the opening of the arctic happens, the geopolitical dynamics are changing and i'm sure the president will hear from his colleagues about that. and, finally, one word on the

bilateral discussion between president obama and the swedish prime minister. sweden has been an extraordinary ally across a range of issues. they have a true personnel in afghanistan, approximately 600. they were on standby for operations in libya. they contributed over 100 kids in mali for a neutral country, this is a robust level of engagement, and i think we have certainly appreciated that great solidarity. the breath of the conversation, clearly, prime minister wright felt will want to provide president obama with an update on the european debt crisis, although that is certainly faded from the top of the agenda. this is going to be the first time the president returned to europe after his visit following the g8 and then to his visit to berlin but i'm sure he will hear from colleagues about the ratification of the nsa prism as that continues to be a topic of concern in europe. russia will only be a topic and,

of course, syria, egypt, the middle east and the unrest there. so i believe you'll see every fool some bilateral conversation, a more dynamic regional conversation with the nordic states, and i think it's an excellent preparation to get the president ready as he travels to st. petersburg to meet with his g20 colleagues. matt, i will let you take the baton. >> let me introduce matt will quickly. matt goodman here at csis hold our william simon chair in political economy. the simon chair examines current issues in international economic policy with a particular focus on the asia-pacific but i should also say that matt previously served as the white house coordinator for the east asia summit for the asia-pacific summit, but he also served as director for international economics on the nsc staff and was responsible for the g20, g8, and other international forums. with that i would like to introduce my colleague, matt goodman. >> thank you.

so the president will be participating in the eighth g20 summit on september 5 and 6th at the constantine palace in strelna, outside st. petersburg. when andy gets unique and knows how to actually pronounced strelna. the g20 as you know just to recap is a gathering of leaders of 19 individual countries and the european union which has its own seat, and then another five invited guests, including spain, singapore and a couple of african countries that i've forgotten at the moment, tanzania i think, ethiopia and one other. and then a number of international institutions, the u.n., the imf, the oecd and others will be in attendance as well. the schedule begins actually with sherpa meetings, that is

the leaders, senior economic advisers will meet starting september 2 together with the finance of deputies, because the g20 is really built on a finance ministers process as you know, and so the sherpas and finance deputies will meet in parallel and then together in the days leading up to the rival of the leaders on set in order to hammer out the communiqué and the deliverables as it were, such as they are. incidentally, this will be the first summit attended by the new u.s. sherpa caroline atkinson who replaced mike froman when he moved over to us ustr. mike has been that all the other obama g20 summit's. they were probably the, well, let me quickly go through what we understand the schedule to be. this hasn't been formally published, but the formal summit plenary session's will begin after lunch on september 5 and

go through dinner that night. the next morning there will be a continuation of discussions, but interrupted, this is a small innovation by the russians. they are going to have an interaction with business leaders during the morning, the so-called b20, a proliferation of alphabet groups that have the 20 after the name and the b20 is that is as gripping as it will be an interaction that morning. and as i understand it, some separate bilateral time as well for leaders. and then the meeting will continue through lunch into sort of mid-to-late afternoon, and end with a press conference on september 6. there will undoubtedly be bilateral on the site of president obama will be involved in those, have not been announced yet, and when andy to get think he will tell you it's unlikely president obama and president putin will have the bilateral which is the normal practice that happens at these summits.

and one can speculate that there will probably be a summit with the chinese president, president she and japanese prime minister abe but none of that has been a source i know has been made public. in terms of the agenda, the russians have laid out three come welcome one sort of mixing one sort of big sandwiches sustainable inclusive and balanced growth and creating jobs. and specifically they have three specific priorities, growth through a quality jobs and investment, growth through trust and transparency, and growth through effective regulation. those are all sort of waves of reorganizing and capturing the long-standing g20 agenda which really covers, and they list the eight areas that have traditionally been covered under summits, so those include strong, sustainable job growth, jobs, international financial institution, reform, strengthen

financial regulation come energy sustainability, development, trade and anticorruption. so all of those things will be on the formal agenda. not all those things we talked about by the leaders. and at the end of this there will be probably a lengthy communiqué and then attach documents. it would be probably unreasonable to expect that this communiqué is going to be significant exporter -- shorter than the lost -- los cabos communiqué which was, ran 85 paragraphs. i would be surprised if it was a mythical shorter than that. because it has to cover all the topics i mentioned. went to this really talk about probably will revolve around in addition -- in addition to see which will not be on the formal agenda. unlike the g8 really does not have a formal place for discussion of broad geopolitical issues, but, of course, inevitably it is going to dominate the corridor

conversation. in the actual sessions among leaders, the agenda, formal agenda will cover economic and economic related issues. and i was a probably three or four big topics, obviously the global economy will dominate. you will have some european, and here is andy joining us. great. good timing. i'm stalling here, andy, just to make it -- >> doctor andy kuchins, ladies and gentlemen,. >> so the europeans will obviously probably grow a little bit about the second quarter gdp numbers which were positive for the first time in eight or nine quarters i think. the u.s. will probably still express concern about the fact that while the us economy is doing better, it cannot be the only engine of growth in the global economy, and they will express concern about the risks and the imbalances which remain in the global economy. emerging markets are probably

going to talk about the financial market volatility which they attributed in large part to the concerns about tapering by the u.s. fed and other monetary authorities from this extraordinary period of monetary easing, which they also were uncomfortable with decisive because it created a sort of financial risk the advanced countries will probably push back with those. those reactions and the markets are first of all a natural consequence of strategies by these countries, the u.s. and japan and european countries, to keep the economy's growing. and inevitably these policies are going to have to end. they'll also argue that a lot of the problems in emerging markets are homegrown, so the problems in india or brazil or other countries are, as i said,

home-grown. this issue is not going to be resolved, but i would say on balance, and i think it's fair to say also that that little discussion has just revealed, that there is not the same sort of sense of consensus and shared sense of crisis in the group. although i think the sense of crisis generally may be starting to pick up again, but not everybody agrees on what the causes or solutions to those issues are. but overall, i think it will be a largely conversation about those issues. there will also probably be a significant amount of discussion of international tax cooperation both to deal with tax evasion and tax avoidance. this was a major theme at the g8 summit and certainly the g8 members are going to be interested in talking about those issues. and potentially there could be, there won't be any kind of breakthrough agreements but it

could be a reinforcement of some of the work that was agreed to in the g8. oecd work on tax sharing, information sharing and so forth. and then a third area would be trade. i think that there will be a fairly robust discussion of trade. the g20 has several times now laid down a commitment, a standstill against protectionist measures which they have most recently extended through 2014, and they may and likely to we up that. of course, this commitment has been honored and breached, but they would probably make a strong standing but it also talk about the doha round at this point remains -- the main focus is on the valley ministerial in december, which is the last real chance i think to potentially save the doha round but most people i think in the trade world don't think that's likely to happen, that there may be a more focused, focused look at

what the g20 continue to push forward specific agreements, but whether that's going to progress or not remains to be seen. and then there may be discussions about development issues, food security, infrastructure investment and so forth. finally, i'll wrap up and let andy talk about the interesting stuff and russia, but i would just say, i think that the white house certainly still feels the g20 is an important forum. it's the only forum in which the leaders of, a group of countries that represent 85% of the global economy can get together and talk about both the short-term risks of global growth and the longer-term challenges of sustained and balanced growth. and it is an opportunity to sort of broadly set the agenda for the global economy, and finally, to build habits of cooperation among members of the group have not had the same experience that

the g8 countries in particular have had in guiding these issues. so broadly this is still a trip that comments are you not withstanding, that the president looks forward to as an opportunity to engage on this set of issues. i'll stop there and turned the andy. >> andy is our director of our russia and eurasia program and he will put forward what's going on with the russians. >> thanks, andrew. and my apologies for being late. unlike mr. putin last year, deciding not to come to the g8, and unlike mr. obama decided not to meet mr. putin in moscow, i did decide to come to the press briefing today. it's kind of an odd role. you know, in russian literature there's a tradition of -- the

superfluous man, and in some ways i feel a bit like a superfluous man talking about a meeting that is not going to happen. but in a relationship which frankly is not in a good place. how's that for an exciting quote? some might call it a train wreck. it's been like watching a slow-moving train wreck for nearly two years right now. what's the good news? well, the good news is that this is not the cuban missile crisis. the good news that this is not even the georgia more of five years ago in which one could have examined the -- georgia more, u.s. and russian entry forces perhaps by accident coming into conflict of each other in the black sea. but one thing is clear to me that this is the worst personal

relationship between u.s. and russia, perhaps even u.s. and soviet leaders, in history. and one has to kind of think about, you know, what does that mean? what does that hurt in the relationship? i really think these two guys, mr. putin and mr. obama, don't like each other at all. i think there's a deeper degree of disrespect. i think when our president says something like comparing mr. putin to the kid in the back of the classroom kind of slouching, not really interested in things, you have taken the relationship to a personal level. even more so i think than the comments he made, which was i think the mistake four years ago, that mr. putin had one foot in the cold war and one foot in the future.

mr. putin is not a person that forgets i think many personal insults, and certainly is not played well in the relationship. it's something to think about. i mean, really, i do think there's been a case even in the soviet period, obviously mr. lennon didn't meet with any american leaders that i know of. we know about the relationship between uncle joe and fdr, but clearly to me this is the worst personal relationship of the u.s. and russian leader in history. and i think that's obviously not a good thing. let's look a little bit more at the recent history. the obama administration made an effort in the spring and early summer to engage russia to try to put the relationship that was obvious he for number of reasons that figure could ever in this room, that was on the rocks and getting worse. , but basically mr. putin was

not interested in what the obama administration was trying to something that i think essentially what the effort to engage mr. putin was principally around issues of further cuts in offensive nuclear arms, tied to some kind of agreement about missile defense. and that was, that was, like i said, that was a deal that mr. putin decided he was just not terribly interested in. i think that is what the effort began with a trip of former national security advisor tom donnelly to moscow in the spring was about mainly. and that's what this sort of effort to bring the two sides together. now, it was pretty clear from the g8 meeting, just looking at the body posture as to what, how much that can tell us come we don't know, but it was a pretty

powerful statement. you have to wonder, you know, what was the thinking of the position at the time that gave them some degree of hope and optimism that there would be enough to agree on at a meeting to justify a summit meeting in some timber? you know, i don't know exactly, but it looks to have been a miscalculation. and then, of course, we have to factor in just how much of an effect the snowden of their head on the decision to cancel the summit. -- snowden affair. the snowden affair, you know, i was not particularly impressed with the way it was handled on our site, to be frank. i think there was far too much so-called public diplomacy come if you want to call public demands diplomacy. and i don't think there was adequate behind the scenes

backdoor communication between the administration at a high enough level to make some kind of face saving you possible if, indeed, that were possible in the first place. you know, i think, to me, i constantly ask myself the question, let's imagine that edward snowden arrived in dulles airport at the same kind of information about the domestic and foreign surveillance systems that the russian federation was using. you know, would we have extradited him back to russia? i think almost, i think almost impossible to imagine that we would have done that. and so it does make me wonder why did we think the russians would do it in this case. i think, i don't know this for sure, but my sense is the administration thought that they were making progress in these discussions through law enforcement channels, but,

frankly, you know, this was a case where i think if there was an opportunity to resolve this, the only way that you could have done it i think was for mr. obama to pick up the telephone and have some very frank conversations with mr. putin, and try to work through a personal relationship and try to find some kind of face-saving solution. but i won't beat that horse -- the horses not quite dead yet, but i won't belabor that point any longer. because, frankly, we don't know whether the would've been a summit if it hadn't been a snowden affair. i know if, in fact, it was a decision that there wasn't adequate progress on key issues in a bilateral relationship but we don't know. we are not likely to find out for quite a long time. where do we go from here? gosh, it's pretty tough to find a way in which, or find a reason

for which either leadership is going, you know, to want to find or see the incentives for themselves to resurrect the relationship. i think it's very likely that we could see this relationship model along -- model along at this very, very kind of unpleasant level for the next three years. unit coming to we're looking at a new administration and the united states. and who knows how long we will be looking at the same administration in moscow? such as to cut it short, always try to find some kind of silver lining in this one. well, i will just pull one out of left field for you. it's not really about the u.s.-russian relationship. there are some interesting things going in the russo-japanese relationship. and you know, i thought one of

the reasons why mr. putin and the russians have some incentive to try to improve their ties with the united states going back four years ago was their concern about the growing power of china and that they would like to have a more balanced foreign policy. well, it looks like i think mr. putin is trying to address his concerns about the possibility he is overleveraged in china in other ways. and i think russo-japanese relationship is number one on on the list. unlikely to make the prediction that the northern territory issue is going to be resolved, but i would say the possibility of resolution, now 60 years, is greater than i've seen at anytime in the last 25 years or so that i can following it. you have to leadership in both countries that are wrote particularly strong domestically, which i think is necessary, and i think both have the outside factor of their concern increasing about chinese activities. and we may see this finally in

the next year or so lead to a breakthrough in that relationship, which would frankly be good for the u.s.-russian relationship as well. so with that note from a field, trying to bring some optimism to the discussion, let me finish my prepared remarks, thanks. >> we will open up to questions in just a second. if you could identify yourself and if you're at the table, please speak into the microphone. this briefing will be available in transcript form later today. i will mail it out. i also want to assure you that we still do have a board of trustees. as many of you know, dr. brzezinski's rhetoric dr. kissinger is run. we are moving our office in a couple of weeks and that's why we have such emptiness here. our new building will be at 1616 rhode island avenue and you can follow us on twitter at csis for more updates about that but it's an exciting moment in the 50 to

understand -- 50 year period. so thank you again for being here. with that i would like to open it up to questions. right here. >> dimitri. i would like to ask members of the panel a little more meat on the issue of what's going to happen next on bilateral relationship, and since mr. putin mentioned on there will be no bilateral meeting -- [inaudible] spend i would like to hear that. is there any chances that this someone might be a warning off point, or not at all? >> thanks, dmitri, for the question that i was thinking this morning commute, it could be a statesman like a move on

the part of president obama in particular since it was the united states they cancel the summit meetings, to request a one on one bilateral meetings with president putin. but i think the chances of that happening are far less than 5%, slim to none. i think there is a high degree of anger on the part of the obama administration, about relations with russia. and i think about mr. obama in particular in his personal regard for mr. putin. i think that's what that comment

about the personal comment about the slouching kid in the back of the room. it seems, with that, it's hard to imagine that you can see them if it, kind of walk back and make decisions, well, in fact we would like to meet with you. maybe the situation in syria, which is extremely grave and dangerous could justify that, but -- >> questions? roger. >> roger, bloomberg news. what would be the deliverables? for any of you. >> on the stockholm stock i'm not sure there's going to be a deliverable other than an underscoring of both bilateral ties as well as our regional engagement, and for the

president to visit with the nordic colleagues as was the baltic presidents in the span of a week speaks to a deeper regional engagement which is very welcome. i think there will be an opportunity, for the stockholm stop to really hear from five european leaders, some within the eu, some just within nato, their concerns obviously about syria and the regional issues. i think there will be an extraordinary amount of outrage in the corridors of the g20 summit with david cameron, with the european colleagues as this gives close to resolve. we saw reports prime minister cameron has recalled the british part of it back in session on thursday to discuss this. so this tells me we're going to see a very intense dialogue and in some way that visit is a preview of those issues. and it sort of have on the first question, certainly it's not just u.s.-russian bilateral relations that are undergoing some reassessments. european-russian relations also.

there's been challenges both with the liberalization questions, energy issues. and i think the europeans themselves are deeply examining what the health and future state of russia's democracy, human rights, civil society and what it means for the relationship. so it's an important moment for consultation transatlantically about russia as well. and i would suspect you will hear with the exception of norway which is not a member of the eu, another strong statement for the transatlantic trade and investment partnership that will echo the theme of trade for the g20. and i think you will hear certainly from the swedish side how critical that will be for u.s. transatlantic relations. >> well, as i implied but i guess i didn't state it, so thanks for the question, i wouldn't expect some major headline deliverable out of the g20 summit. i think that is not been the

pattern in recent past, and so certainly there looking for large headline numbers or initiative, i wouldn't expect that. but as they say, 85 plus paragraph communiqué there will be a lot of language about growth and the importance and and i would say a tilt towards growth versus austerity. that killed has been happening the last meetings -- that tilt has been happening at the rear entry level and that, you'll see that i think again here, you know, but, of course, talk about the other aspects of the global economy i mentioned. an affirmation of all the things the finance diminishes have been doing on financial regulation which i did part on, but the leaders probably won't talk about the stuff in them but they will be paragraphs about progress on basel iii and oecd regulations and other things. as i said, the tax pieces, the tax avoidance and tax evasion

issues i think will be featured, and for the specifics on that i would refer you, action on all this, go back to the finance ministers communiqué of july 20 or something, which i think is really what you will find the leaders embracing and endorsing mostly across the board. so i don't think, i would be surprised if there any dramatic breakthroughs on anything, but again, a lot of this is about the conversation and trying to get people on the same page and moving in the same direction on global economics and financial issues. >> no meeting, no deliverables. i would just add, we have to kind of wonder about the likelihood of u.s. military strikes on syria, august increase for a significantly, and imagine the g20 be taking place right after that perhaps.

so the mood of the principle, the principle players of your, united states, russian and chinese would have to be very, very sour. and i can't think that's going to help the g20 meeting itself. >> questions? >> yes, right here. >> i'm from "the guardian" newspaper. enter, follow up on that. two things. one, you said it wasn't clear to you that the snowden affair was, bilateral summit would have occurred if it had not been for the snowden affair but all the noise you hear from the white house and the run up to the senator was the meeting was likely to take place and it was only after russia -- the meeting

was canceled. so what else could account for the cancellation of the bilateral meeting? and another question for math is pretty talk to us a bit more about how corridor conversations about syria the impact more formal meetings. >> i think administration faced a k the administration faced a dilemma, trying to factor out the snowden affair, that the principle proposal that they've been making to the russians, not just security issues, principally the nuclear offense of reduction, strategic stability set of issues which i think is the foremost a they wanted to make progress on. this is the area that mr. obama just made the berlin speech. russians yawned, and there was

no response to those proposals. and from what officials who have been no responses to other things that was proposing including any of economic cooperation and trade were at least they are rhetorically for the last year or so for the commission had been singing basic from the same song sheet, we want a broader economic russian ship and this would provide a balance for the bilateral relationship and provide more constituencies in each country to support the relationship. but my sense was the administration was kind of getting no response really across the board. so, you know, snowden doesn't happen, you know, certainly they made every effort i think to try to carry on and have the meeting, but it's just, yeah, you have to ask yourself, well, what's the point. we don't we a photo opportunity, and you look at where we are on a whole set of conditions, syria

obviously, iran has made it very clear that the russians don't want to go any further with sanctions on iran. the area that with the most common interest, afghanistan, welcome the problem is we still won't have a bilateral security agreement with the afghans so we can't really talk to the russians and others about what we envisioned to be the future potential for cooperation and kind of a multilateral front. >> one of the disadvantages of being a world leader, and maybe a journalist as well, is that you have to walk and chew gum at the same time. you have to be able to cover a wide range of issues, and i think in this case, in a formal sense, as i said, the g20 is not about geopolitical issues. so syria will not be on the formal agenda. i would be very, i mean, possible but very unlikely that the russians would introduce into the agenda, the formal

meeting, or that some member would raise their hand as i want to talk about syria. all of that said, all of that said, of course, it is going to be, it's going to have a huge impact in terms of, again, what's being talked about in the corridors, which i expect it would be the dominant topic there. and as andy said, i think it will affect the kind of mood in the room. i don't think there will be a sense of great camaraderie, and let's get stuff done together, because on the global economy, on economics, ma other issues. so i think it will have, it will have an effect, but in a formal sense it will be part of the g20 over deliberations. >> i'm reminded, the g20 september of '09 in pittsburgh, that the g20 which is as a backdrop for then gordon brown and nicolas sarkozy and president obama to announce about the iranian disclosure. so it can be used obviously with the media watching, a platform to advance but some wondered if we will see a lot of perhaps

some press conferences. or can be used on occasion. >> again, one of the advantages, i don't have to worry about important things like rush and serious so much. i totally agree with it. i think they are very well may be things on the margins where people pull aside certainly to talk but possibly to say things, announce things. but just in a formal g20 cents i don't think it will be in the communiqué spent my image is kind of hold your nose for a lot of the participants. [laughter] >> bataan death march. >> questions? scott. >> i[inaudible] having one foot in the cold war. did you think it was a mistake to say that out loud or the assessment itself?

>> actually, i disagreed with the assessment as well, but i think the larger mistake was to say it publicly. and i think that common i think it was a little bit, maybe a cavalier assumption that mr. putin was not a significant of a policymaker as he actually was. and/or the possibility that mr. putin would return as a future, as the future de facto and de jure leader of the russian federation. my view putin on the cold war, i think he's been more affected i've what he's seen with u.s. behavior after the cold war. and in the 1990s, he reflects a very broad kind of consensus in russia that the united states in particular, the west more broadly, was taking advantage of russia during a period of

historical weakness. and a lot of this sort of developments, particularly in the international security system, sort of nato expansion, being the big one, and the experience of the serbia war in particular with the u.s. and russia view operating outside of international law, had a deep impact on putin. and then subsequently, i think maybe even a deeper impact was, you know, after 9/11 when the russians worked closely with us and others to take out the taliban in afghanistan, there was a sense that this was, that was the high point of view is russian relations and probably the last 20 years, even talk of possible allies in such. i think mr. putin felt that the bush administration subsequently really didn't reciprocate or didn't acknowledge russian interest on a whole series of issues, particularly walking away from the abm treaty and missile defense but again, nato

vetoed expansion and other things. it's that sense of grievances that built up in putin i think are much more significant than the impact of the cold war. >> questions? josh. >> can you talk about nsa spying -- [inaudible] will obama have the conversation, reassuring, apologizing on some of those? >> well, i think he will certainly hear concerns expressed in his conversations in stockholm, both bilaterally as those with the dinner with the nordic heads of government. clearly i think the focal point within europe is germany. and this is at significant ramifications, both prior to the

german election, national election on september 22, but also i think it goes much deeper. and i think and mr. nunnelee as the documents were released there's a sense of administration sort of being dismissive about it, you know, everyone engages in the practice, you know, this being motionless and hysteria that was coming needed to be downplayed. it's taken deep root and it's impacting trancelike relationships, particularly again the transatlantic trade and investment partnership, ttip, we have a have statement certainly given the most forcefully expressed by berlin, both opposition as those government officials as saying, we can't move forward with his trade until we get much more rigorous both transparency on the nsa program, but in the case of germany a new agreement that the u.s. will not spy on germany. so this is not going away. it's not even going away after the german election, quite

frankly but it will continue. he needs to be taken very safely. there is now a real breach in confidence and trust that we have to manage, and work through so we can get back to working on the bilateral engagement and agenda, and first and foremost is that ttip, that trade investment. we can't allow this issue to sideline that. and right now, you know, it has the potential to do that. so he certainly will hear it, and he may if he has an opportunity to have a sideline discussion, which i assume he will with chancellor merkel in the quarters of the g20, he may hear additional words on that. >> well, the revelations of the program are i think are hard to underestimate as a blow to u.s. credibility, as a moral leader in many places, and it plays in perfectly to the hands of the russians and to the chinese i

think. just the fact, and even the united states, edward snowden is viewed by very significant part of the private population as, you, as doing the right thing. and so you can imagine what the view is in other countries, and other countries in which we repeatedly are very watching very carefully their violations of human rights. it's a big pr, public relations gaffe i think, and the ironing that mr. snowden -- ironing, mr. stone goes to china and russia which are certainly i think taking more intrusive measures to surveil their own citizens, the irony is kind of staggering. >> questions? >> a follow-up question on that. one of the significant

disclosures from snowden has been to the extent and depth of surveillance after the summit. the germans at least are genuinely -- genuinely surprised, spying on its diplomats. what impact will that have on this summit? practicalities and the way in which leaders will approach it. >> interesting. i mean, i think that's another data point in that broader conversation. and, you know, and i assume your point about practical issues that every delegations security team and, you know, i.t. team will be a little more vigilant. i don't really know how to answer the question because i think it is part of a broader conversation that heather and

andy have talked about. i don't think, as i sit here trying to answer your question, i do see any kind of profound impact on the g20 conversation itself. but, you know, but it's an issue among the members who are there, so it will probably be a part of that conversation. >> yes, right over here. >> i have a question -- [inaudible] >> unless japan wants to be mentioned as a specific example of how japan is taking on its fiscal challenges, it will almost certainly not be mentioned. this is a decision that prime minister abe has debate about whether to increase as planned and legislated an increase in

their value-added tax, so-called consumption tax, which he, a decision he may make him he probably will make before that summit but he make -- he may make in september. and so, no. i mean, there will be a broader conversation about what countries are doing to consolidate their fiscal positions and the timing and sequencing and phasing out that, those moves, but not a specific conversation in the g20 about that issue. if prime minister abe meets with president obama, no doubt prime minister abe is going to talk about that. but again i don't think you'll be part of the formal output even a bilateral meeting between the two. >> right in the back. >> you mentioned the upcoming german election and the nsa scandal but i was wondering if any of you saw any potential impacts of those elections on

broader conversations of the g20, perhaps austerity discussions or anything along those lines? >> well, i think in some ways as matt reflected this will be one of the first g20 conversations where the euro crisis is not very much front and center of the conversation of how europe is addressing this. this has been, i would argue, a pause in the crisis. hopefully, we are seeing some early signs of healing. but i think we are far from over, and that certainly been part of the conversation in recent days with the minister suggesting the greece package will have to be reassessed. obviously, some continued concerns about the health of the french economy. so the euro crisis has taken a pause but it will return back to the conversation. it is a legitimate question, certainly recurring theme since 2000 has been this rebalancing initiative of the current account surplus countries versus the deficit countries and that

certainly puts germany and china squarely in the surplus camp and needing to find that rebalancing. i would argue in looking at the platform we are seeing a bit of stimulus in the german perspective of encouraging additional spending, but this is certain not going to address the concerns of the enormous current account surplus that germany currently holds. i would not suspect, what i guess i'm watching very closely is out syria could potentially impact the german elections and that conversation as the merkel spokesman came against the with a very strong statement of support that action must be taken and that was very supportive so i'm wondering how the issue may i may not play in. this has been a very quiet and subdued german election with very few issues, other than the nsa prism issue name first and foremost, so i don't anticipate extraordinary volatility leading up to september 22.

>> just very quickly. i would say heather is right. i think that the euro crisis is no longer front and center as the main issue for the g20 leaders to discuss at this summit. but elements of, a, i guess i would first say i think certainly the u.s. and probably others are not going to be quite as comforted by one quarters, you know, modestly positive growth in thinking that the overall crisis is solved. and, second, i think there will be elements of the your situation, including germany's six, 7% of gdp current account surplus that will appear in the rebalancing conversation, or banking union will be something that people will be interested in and the progress on the in the financial discussion. ..

>> fiscal consolidation has been part of the conversation at the -- >> we'll leave the last couple of minutes of this program to go live now to the national press club here in washington where the national business group on health is releasing its annual survey on health benefits. the survey is on what large employers will be doing with their health benefits next year and how much it will cost. this is just getting underway. >> with me is karen mar low who conducted this survey. i guess i should have mentioned i'm helen darling, and this is the national business group on health. we're a nonprofit organization