back into political affairs, religious atears, etc. affairs, etc. unfortunately, there was no security sector reform during the first couple of years tolling the egyptian -- following the initial egyptian revolution in january 2011 when there was an opportunity to do so. there were very few, you know, the interior minister, yes, was tried and so forth, but there was very little -- there was no, no reform of the security services, there was just about no accountability for abuses that they carried out either during the revolution or before that. and so because of that, in this situation we now see the military and the internal security services which had been kind of rivals during the mubarak era cooperating very, very closely and trying to really reconstruct something

very much like the mubarak regime now. and this is not unusual, right? in countries around the world where there are revolutions, there are eventually counterrevolutions and so forth. and that is not to diminish, as i said, what an unsuccessful and bad president mohamed morsi was, how badly the -- how much the muslim brotherhood overreached and how much public opposition there was to morsi and the brotherhood. ..

president obama is going russia next week. this just getting underway. >> i'll give a sort of brief introduction of them. say that have yet more accomplishments in your biography panel, but it's a all brookings panel. we're proud of. on my far right is steve pfeiffer. he has held every position related to russia. he's been the ambassador to ukraine. he's most recently the author of "the opportunity" which is about new opportunity for arms control. to my right is angela -- stint who is director of the

center director on russia, and a nonresident senior fellow here. she has a book coming out in january called "the limit of partnership: u.s.-russia relations." it's a more substantial book than this. and i think, you know, it promises, i guess, to have 85 years worth of pre-- predictions in it. that's very impressive. i look forward to it. [laughter] on my left is cliff who is senior fellow at brookings, and the author of two recent i think very important book you should read. the first is called "mr. putin operative" which is almost a -- psychoanalysis how mr. putin became to be who he is.

and bear trap on russia's road to modernization. i think we're not going have any formal presentation. i'm going to ask a few questions and then we'll throw it open to the audience to follow up and ask better questions than i can think of. i think i want to start with a question to all of you. we'll take it one by one. the most generally and obvious question that bring us here, which is on the surface it certainly appears that u.s. russia relations are -- we look at the snowden over the antigay legislation, over syria, the canceled summit that happened a few weeks ago. at least on the surface appears pretty bad. i'm wondering who people who look at it closely.

is it what it appears? whatever happens to the russian recess? what is from each of your perspective, the overall u.s.-russian relations. i think we'll start with steve. >> let me make three points in response to providing the context. the first point would be whenever you have two large countries like the united states and russia where the interests intersect on a wide range of issues, it's unrealistic to expect they're going agree on every point. that's one of the challenges of u.s.-russia relations is to manage differences in a they still allows do you defend your position, but also allows advice to cooperate. where interest intersect. the second point i would make is go back to the reset, i think was actually a success at define by what the reset was originally

intended to do. bring the u.s.-russia relationship out of the negative point it was at in 2008, and try make that relationship productive in terms of securing russia cooperation on issues that were important to the obama white house. and over 2009, and 2010 you saw the conclusion of the new start treaty. you saw russia be more helpful on iran in 2010. russia supported a new security could council which -- [inaudible] and certainly when i was working on the issues back in 2002 and 2003 and the u.s. government, nobody would have anticipated russia going that far at that point. you had russia becoming more cooperative on afghanistan allowing greater access and logistical support for american nato forces there. so i think the reset was successful this those term. i adopt think it was designed to take the relationship to an area we're cooperating on every single question.

i guess the third point i would make is that some pundits today say that the relationship is not only in turmoil, it's the worst since the end of the cold war. i think that's wrong. go back about five years and three weeks ago, to the after math of the russian georgia conflict. at the time where there was really no major cooperation from moscow. where you have nonstrategic arms with the treaty expire in 2009 and no prospect for a success or so. therenot nearly the degree cooperation on iran like you see today. like wise afghanistan. major differences between washington and moscow how to deal with in the post soviet aid and the russia georgia conflict recordedly some u.s. official were advocating air strikes and would have skill -- killed russian forces. it's sort of in a difficult point now.

you need to have some perspective to sort of appreciate there's a balance between areas where they differ. but areas where cooperation continues. >> it could be worse. [laughter] angela, you've pointed out in the past there's a certain nature to u.s.-russia relations. is that what we're seeing here in can we -- if we want to be method logically about it. is there ?on blame. >> that's a russiasha question, who is guilty? i think there's a patent i would take -- left off and that is relations -- [inaudible] 1999 at the end of the clinton administration when we were bombing closet vow. -- kosovo i don't know if we start bombing syria. they were worth in 2008 at the end of the georgia war. you had a pattern in the last

twenty years since the soviet collapse. in the first term of both the clinton and bush administrations, there were great expectations that there were hopes the relationship with russia would improve quantitatively there would be something different. and by the end of both those president's second term in office, the disillusionment set in. in the obama case it happened sooner. i would agree that the reset accomplished what it was supposed to do. it was successful from an american-point of view. it was not a poll that the russians took ownership of. they said the reset is an american project, we're correcting mistake that we made under the bush administration, and we have seen the error of our way. i think there was never a common agreement on what the reset meant. i would also say something that did make difference and maybe we'll come back to that more. in u.s.-russia relations not too much gets done unless it's cone

at -- done at the very top. simply because we don't have a large group of stakeholders in the relationship. and we can talk about economic relationships. there aren't that many people on either side that are involved in it. and so president obama -- it was important that he dealt with the president even though decisions wouldn't have been taken presumably without prime minister's consent with the exception maybe of libya. since there's been a change at the top, and we have a different president in the russia. i think that's made it more complicated too. so we are -- [inaudible] spir really a now. steve, of course, pointed out the issues we have 0 to work with the russians and continue to work with them. i would say one thing, again, it's not completely new but it's striking if you look at what lead up to the cancellation of the summit, and you start with a preparation for the summit at least from the u.s. point of view. even before mr. snowden touched

down, there was a feeling there wasn't much of a response from the russian aid about what the summit was going accomplish. and when you have these summit, you is to have deliverables. there's a question what was it the russian side wanted. who was making the decision. snowden landed and you have the whole period of rather fraught decisions about that. you can ask questions and question have seen article in the last few day how the decisions made. i think there's a general issue of in the u.s.-russia relationship. what is they would like from the relationship with the united? do they even know what they want? you had contradictory signal from the mr. putin himself. the choice was made to grant political asylum to snowden knowing it might jeopardize the summit. we can say it shows us something

about values an decisions that were then made. i don't think it's the worse of the relationship has ever been. it will continue. ting raises questions about the russian side and how to go to dream with them going forward. that is why i think it's entirely correct to say you push the button at the moment and step back and think how is we want to engage with them? >> thank you. cliff, angela brings up something i was going to maybe get to in the next question. i think we'll -- even though i'm interested in what you think about. i want to get your thought on what she said about mr. putin. there's a consensus here that the relationship has taken bit of a nose dive in the last couple of years, i guess. and that's consequences at least with mr. putin coming back to the kremlin. i think as pundit in the media,

we can often focus obsessively on personals, and we can sort of see people slouching at summits and read entire world moving events to them. when it might just be a bad day. in putin's case, there is an argument that, you know, having been in control of russia, roughly speaking, for over ten years. he sort of is the state. louis the xiv kind of way. i'm wondering the degree of problems that steve and angela both pointed to in the relationship a result of mr. putin, and his new approach to u.s.-russia relations. >> i think what you say is true. and i add mr. putin coming back and the fact u.s. administrations policy toward russia was very much a premise.

the reset was exactly -- it was all that steve said. it was a list of practical and important issues between the united and russia that needed to be dealt with. needed to be tackled. and as steve described successfully tackled during the period of the reset. the reset was more than that. it was a bet on democratic national dmitry as a new gorbachev. it was a long shot, admitly so by people who thought of the whole idea. but it was worth hoping that -- like gorbachev, a young man appointed by the old guard to preserve their power, to stweek the system enough to make it striebl -- viable to survive and turned in to something different set in motion processes that were i

don't his and anyone else's control. that the same thing would happen with -- no illusions on the part of u.s. thinkers that hef anything else than an appointee of putin to serve strategic interests that putin saw. but there was a possibility that something different would happen. that didn't happen. the problem was that even though i think it was recognized as kind of a long shot bet. the probability it would happen was not all that high. there was no plan b. there was no fallback option. wait a minute, what happens if it doesn't work out, and putin clearly shows he's in control? i think after that this was essentially an abandonment of any idea have a real strategy toward russia on part of the obama administration, and i think in many ways that's what thread our situation now. every decision is simply a

one-off type -- lam reflects decision not put in the context of some overall well-defined strategic interest. it leads to all kinds of confusion of people operating at all levels of armed government. not to mention the confusion it produces in people outside the united states whether they be our allies and of course the russians themselves. they adopt know what we want with russia. by the way, this is not the first instance of this kind of as angela indicated starting an administration starting off with a clear idea how they deal with russia and finding it doesn't work out and not having any idea. the same thing happened with george bush, of course. didn't call it recess. he called it looking to putin's eye and seeing his soul thinking he could understand the guy and do business. it didn't take him long to find out he didn't really have it right. there was no fallback, after that, i think it was the same situation. of just, you know, floundering

about not knowing exactly how to deal with the russians. so yes, it really comes down to the person of valid my putin. it was always a sense of vladmir putin. things have definitely shifted since he announced he would come back and all of, by the way, the processes set in motion inside of russia. i'll thought about later. i think it's shaping very much how putin deals not only in domestic -- politics but foreign politicses. it's the lack of a notion how to deal with putin is kind of in the heart of a lot of these problem. >> that could be hard. he's a unique -- personality. i guess maybe we can sort of follow on that by pivoting off of cliff's point it's a little bit difficult to discern what the american strategy toward

russia is. i have a lot of trouble discerning russia and putin's strategy toward america. angela alluded to this, i'm not entirely clear what putin wants from the united states. isn't -- i'm wondering from your perspective, steve, is putin interested in u.s.-russia relations or the united some sort of foil for his domestic politics? >> i think what you have seen in the last couple of years. it comes back to the return of pew tone presidency. you have have seen his foreign policy sproach shaped by his perception of what is going on domestically. with the large demonstration putin became a bit unsure where the constituency was. the polls show he's still the most popular person by far in russia. but the polls show that most

russians don't want to see him run again in 2018. it seems to me that from about the end you have seen this greater sense of antiamericannism in russia, which has been encouraged bit kremlin and used by the kremlin. the notion that having the united states as a potential adversary out there a rallying point that putin used to secure and build domestic support primarily with the constituencies, i think. it's done in the context putin probably concluded for the most part he lost the middle class in moscow. he's looking to the more conservative constituency. american americanism has still presence. >> it has no cost for him in term of foreign poem. is he worried about any foreign policy issues that come up? the united states would be useful for those. >> there are costs. and beyond the specific there's a cost intoned. you segregate your domestic

message now from what goes over to the foreign policy side. when you talk to people in the administration you sense this irritation that putin has plaid the antiamerican card so strongly. it caused ander thaition is not helpful to the relationship. >> angela, well let you follow up but i have a more specific question for you. one thing you talked about is the economic modernization, if i'm not mistaken that he needed the west in a variety of ways in order accomplish his development goals for russia. his modernization goals for russia. does putin recognize that need at all? or does he have a different plan for modernization. >> first of all, his understanding of modernization,

sing probably different a that from what we understand understanding was. but i think on the one hand you'll hear putin talk about one more u.s. investment in russia. that this is the one area where he praises, you know, u.s.-russian relations and theoretically and rhetorically committed to it. when you get down to the detail it's less clear that he really is, and he does not -- i think he understood the cost of modernization as maybe we understand it or and others use it it would be come at the cost to domestic political control and vested interest. cliff can talk about that in the russian economy i.t. and the tenth annual fault mode say we're going continue the way we're going and talk about modernization sometimes. but we don't -- there is little evidence at the moment there's any plan in place in moscow.

you know, concerted plan for modernization. it's not something that the creme slin promoting. i want to get back to the question how putin views the united states and what he thinks he needs from it. first of all, you have to remember what he comes from and his background. being in the gkgb -- view of the united states to put it mildly. then i think from his own perspective iraq and then much more close to home and more sensitively the revolution in georgia and the orange revolution in ukraine clearly on some level convinced him that the united states was involved in regime change. obviously in iraq but, i mean, his understanding what was said about what happened in georgia and ukraine. there was that concern. they try to insulate russia from this by greating their own youth movement that was supposed to resist the kind of activity that happened in georgia, ukraine,

and other countries in the area. i think this came back again and it gets back to what steve and cliff were saying in 2012 there was suddenly massive demonstration in moscow. the people whom he feels helped to get where they were by russia having the birthrate of -- those people were out in the street protesting against him. he blamed the united states for aid, and abetting the demonstration. i think on one level he use -- views the united has harboring a desire for someone else to be in office in the regime strange. on the other hand we have seen on many different occasions, he favors pragmatic cooperation with the u.s. steve said some of the issues that worked well during the reset putin had supported them.

shows he's not against the kinds of cooperation. you look at afghanistan and some of the other issues. it's very do listic. when you read what he said on the snow an they fair on the one hand if edward snowden stays in the country. he that's to promise to stop harming the american. on the other hand he said, snowden is like andre. so the question is, and this comes back how do you deal with mr. putin, which one it's not which one do you believe. which one are you going deal with and find way of getting better results for these interactions. perhaps the reason putin said that it was important that snowden stopped harming the united states is because he has people to do that.

[laughter] he needed to -- [inaudible] i'm wondered. you said many times that in fact lot of putin's modernization plans have to do with the vested interest that angela referred to. what degree did that the vested interest in prebs have to inform putin's approach to the united states? it certain informs had his approach to the foreign policy in general. and economic policy. the question about is there a difference between the push for a modernization that would involve integration that putin represents. of course, whatever represented he represented as well. it didn't do anything that putin didn't sanction or at least tolerate. that was part of the whole idea was to throw out new idea that

could explore and see how they work. putin keeps his options open. that's the hallmark of never locks himself to a path that cuts off the opportunities when they might arise. right now; however, i think after the global financial crisis in 2008 which was the decisive event though he had and quite proud of the fact he had done a number of things to prepare russia for bad economic time and building up the reserve. staying off the debt. having a sound fiscal policy. having a budget surplus and so forth. i think he was shocked by the magnitude of the crisis. more important, i think in the subsequent period, he has become impressed by the duration of the crisis, and the likelihood probability it might go on for a long time the global recession or even repeat itself with another downward wave.

and have cited that the important thing to focus on is not absolute economic growth rate. it's not who wins in this struggle. it is a competitive struggle in the global economy. he's quite aware that have. who wins is not going the win that can record high growth rate for four years, five years, ten years, it's going to be the one that can survive crises that will inevitably happen and come out of them politically and economically stable. in other words he's choosing between focusing on efficiency, high growth rate when you can get them. and on the other hand a robustness and ability to withstand negative shock and crisis. he's choosing the latter. he's pull bag from the global economy. pulling back from any sort of major initiative that would rove russia's economy being more

dependent than it is. and will ultimate and making itself more self-sufficient. explain why he's the number of economic policy he's adopted domestically inside of russia for a large project and so forth that will provide a domestic -- stronger domestic market for russia's big manufacturers. but also his extraordinary focus on the union. the idea of united many of the former soviet countries back in a tighter economic union to provide that market. and so i think this explains putin is not particularly interested in; therefore, a global type of based on globalization. it happens to coincide.

they are separate issues. but it happens toen coincide the risk angela identified with political -- domestic political threat represented by so the-called creative class. that part of the middle class is mainly based based in moscow. that examplely example fie, represent, and are connected to the global economy. they are the future of russia. they will be key. they have to be empowered. they have to be multiplied. and of course; therefore, one has to listen to their aspirations including their politicals a spie ration -- saspirations. he's making two choices. he's not going let it happen. the people are against him. he cannot empower them. he cannot proceed along the path of modernization based on global

integration. the other argument i gave about the the focus on making the russian economy more robust rather than simply concentrating on growth and efficiency. >> okay. i learned in brookings moderator school, they used to always talk about the issue of the day. i checked this morning and the issue of the day is syria. [laughter] i want to ask some questions about syria and the russian position particular on syria. it seems as if the u.s. and russia are headed for another yet series of -- [inaudible] intervention. you mentioned already some of them. kosovo, iraq, libya, georgia, and it's an intriguing pattern here. russia seem to be pacing itself yet gone the familiar corner.

it sort of blanket obstructionism reduces the leverage one might have from the u.n. security council in the united states or at least incentivize them to go around it. and eventually it seems right russia out of the e division which seems to be what is happening on syria. i'm wondering from each of your prospective what motivates russia's policy on. what is their plan if it's to prevent regime change or something else. what is their plan? >> i would start by saying i think from the beginning the russians have calculated there's a good chance that aside will prevail. and i think given what happened recently they may still have that i think the second thing is they are worried about, you know, slammist governments

coming to power in the region. about instant in the region, and the impact of the instability on the russian federation itself. the rise in the part of the world had some impact in the caucuses and surrounding areas. so definitely a domestic partisans that concerns them. i think they, you know, they prefer dealing with secular authoritarian government in that part of the world, and, you know, they viewlet say using -- is further going destabilize things and can have a regional and domestic impact. i think that's the previs on which you have to start. it's not necessarily they have any particular love for the current regime. i think they look at the alternative.

they look at the makeup of the deash and point there. you could ironically say in the longer run, our interests diverge that much and as much as no one wants extremist to come to power there. and one for stability. obviously by now we're, you know, we're at the point where what point it would be largely symbolic what the best do. >> i recall we a meeting with them once. we said we have an interest and extremist not coming to power in syria. they said, yes, that's why we support assad. >> that does god to a point. the russians on the one hand you don't have any -- [inaudible] i think from their perspective the west hasn't come up with a good answer to the question what come after aside. and as they think through the possible scenario. they can come up with several scenarios which are portion both

for the region but also the potential concern it could sped to russia. i think there's an aspect that is pay back for libya. the west took the revolution which they -- [inaudible] and stretched in various ways the russians went beyond the resolution. and also it gets back to a bit of russia pair paranoia. the attachment to interference. it gets back to hard as a see as a concern. i think the russians see it it weakened. it used against russia. is that an excuse? the west would never think about. from what the russians say it's an thash drives part of the policy regard to sir imra. it lead them to take a position particularly in the u.n. security council the extend

considerations are being made in washington, lyndon, and paris and other capitols. my guess is everyone assumes -- it would be a fruitless exercise. any action taken will go around the security council. >>? >> i'm sorry let me set you up a little bit. i want to follow up on that. t cure you to me. we are at the moment discussing in just the way steve said what they assume will be soon. i'm wondering how the russians how the rush shall bees are going to react to that. are they going to retaliate to the fact that the security counsel has been worked around. is if going affect u.s.-russian issues that are important like iran or afghanistan? >> i think it probably will affect -- it will be a further negative on

impact on the relationship. no question about it. the russians won't retaliate. they won't risk anything for assad in syria. the whole point of their policy on syria is they are trying to protect themselves. angela put it clearly. and what they're afraid of is instability. they want the status quo assuming that the status quo -- that's what they want. and not really caring that much about who is in power as long as the people in power and -- as best they see. the possibility of some great outcome down the road is not at risk of temporary destabilization. t not something putin, i should say -- i should put in term of putin. this is probably the principle reason why what drives putin's

attitude toward the united states. i don't think putin is anti-american at all. and for whatever is happening, i think there's a huge antiamerican sentiment in the russian population that comes out very clearly in social media and so forth. that can take on a life like any hate-filled sentiment can take on a ready namic if it's not held in check. i can assure you that many alternatives to putin in power in russia would not be able to hold that in check as well as he has. putin; however does see the u.s. almost exclusively now as a threat. not an opportunity. and the threat u.s. could possibly -- in foreign policy actions could come from three types. one we're just downright by design inclined to russia and doing things russia intelligencely to hurt russia.

the second is we are doing things that harm russia we cinchly don't -- somebody might check it off. it's not going to be god for russia. who cares it's about u.s. policy. we don't think or take in to consideration how our actions might affect russia. we blunder. we make mistake. we're the bull in the china shop. we do things that hurts all kinds of people inside the countries we're trying to help as well as everybody else. we don't even think about that before we embark on the venture. putin sees all three. he's been saying for thirteen years what you guys are doing. think about what you're doing. it it could hurt us. i think by now he has given up way trying to distinguish. he doesn't care whether we do it out of incompetence. is it going to have negative cobs consequences -- consequences for russia. i don't think he has a plan. the overall plan to protect

russia from the bad things bhap will he do in syria? there are tens of thousand russians in syria. they're evacuating bunches of them now they won't be able to evaluate everyone. it's going to be very, very costly for russia even what we do in syria. even if it doesn't spill over. it will cost russia. maybe they'll actually earn money by the oil price going up in the short term. those kinds of things have cost for russia. that's what he would like to try to find some way to just calm things down constrain the united states. does he have an alternative plan? absolutely not. i'm still not fie -- fied. -- fied. i can accept that. he has a frustration with the

united and worried that the united states action in syria will undermine the norm and second instance destabilize the region all the way up to russia. but what is he done about it as everything he's done has he hasn't work out how to get the united not to do that. what we have right now is on the cog. of another intervention crisis. we are by everyone's account for whatever reason the extremism problem has gotten worse in syria. he's certainly not accomplishing any of his goals in syria. and so one might argue the reason he approached the united states is a little bit ham handed. >> [inaudible] from mouse cow's point of view. they have been supplying him with weapon. it's not as if they were enact

there had. it was worse from their point of view if he was overthrown by some coalition of rebel groups which they would see as a threat. from their point of view -- he's not completely a failure. >> enough of me then. i think we should turn to the audience and get questions. please, when you ask questionses, identity yourself. tell yourself where you're from. i have a question mark on the end of the questions. [laughter] >> thank you very much. [inaudible] not the only agenda. and angela made the strong point that american precedence in the long-term -- [inaudible] leader and -- more complicated pew stint --

[inaudible] president obama would be well advised putin -- [inaudible] thank you. [laughter] we still have issues where obviously we have to talk to the russians and we will. and even after the cancellation of the summit, we had the secretary of defense and state meeting with the russian counter parts. i mean, technically, i guess there's a possibility at the g8 summit next year that you could have a by -- bilateral presidential meeting. i think it's narrowed on the arms control issue. we haven't had much of a response. it includes missile receives. it's still an issue. that will depend on what is happening in syria.

so yeah the question is what would be on the agenda? so right now i can't see any pressing reason why there would be another presidential summit in obama's term. you never know. in >> in my experience, the lack of agenda is not a reason to have a meeting. i think the white house pulled the plug on the moscow summit. look at the big issue. when you talk to people in the administration in june they were saying they wanted to make progress on further nuclear cuts. president obama made a speech in we are lung. they wanted to resolve the missile defense differences.

important to the white house yeandlet go back to conversation going back to 2009 when the administration official were talking about the launch of the reset. they put it in very practical and actually calllated in term. they said president obama in 2009 is prepared to make an investment in the u.s. better relationship. he's prepared to make the investment in hope of securing cooperation with russia would be mutually beneficial and sol -- solve questions. they said if he makes the investment after four or five months there's no return, he'll cut his losses and look elsewhere. what happened is that first meeting between obama and -- [inaudible] in 2009 went well. the progress and so the perspective on the white house there was a tangible real return on the invest. they continued to make that.

i think right now what is the investment and what is the payoff. if they see no payoff. t not like the president doesn't have other demands on the time. and so i suspect that while open to the idea of a summit, the question is is there's a -- and if not they may be well content. i think it's more likely than not. dot russian need it more than the united? they think they don't need it. they think they wanted the summit more than they did. objectively where you come down on them. i think if we believe that we could work together more productively in solving some of these issues we wouldn't need them. it's hard to see where we can

work together as opposed to prevent things from getting worse. >> i think a part of vladmir's image is i'm the head of the super power. it creates a dent in that if the american president speandz day on and off in palm springs talking with the president of china and cancel the summit with you. i thought it was interesting even after the cancellation of the summit, the questions i think were a bit surprised even though my sense in july i think the white house was el grating it was in jeopardy. last week there was summit not canslated is postponed. i think there -- as bad as abrupt cutoff as the white house intended. >> the white house -- [inaudible] >> i do.

i don't think -- somehow have the idea we can punish putin by not giving him -- status and recognition. i don't think it's true. i don't think we are hurting him at all by cans canceling summits. >> [inaudible] >> thank you. michael with -- ask a question about the -- with the indull again of the army. one point fact about what steve said the absurdity of the idea of the united states would intervene. fifteen years ago after the first war the u.s. senate ratified something called the, you know, arms control, steve. the cfe document conventional force document by a vote of 100-0. and we knew exactly what was going on. we knew exactly what might

happen there. it gives the lie to the rewriting of history that mr. putin has been doing ever since the munich speech in 2011. i would like that ask what used to be -- [inaudible] whatever you want to call it. central and eastern europe. it seems to me that putin has been embarked upon a pretty forward-leaning pots in the last few months. whether it's basically ham handed economic threat against ukraine if they sign an agreement with the -- european union. or even if the positive way going to john and trying to woo them. i would appreciate it if our panelists might discuss this aspect of russian diplomacy.

>> i'll start. i think it's -- i don't think putin likes to recreate the soviet union. he wants to use -- economic union that will increase moscow's influence in neighboring capital. and what the russiansment is essentially on big questions in baku or -- the big issue that affects russian interest they want the capital thinking about the impact on russia when they make their decision. but i think the russian pursue the last twenty years has been somewhat ham handed. if anything the big result of russian pressure here has been to cause their neighbors to look for connection to the outside world and give them greater maneuver. maybe an camp of ukraine. i think ukraine has consistently the last three years expressed a

preference to the association agreement with the european union. there's a separate question whether they prepared to sign the agreement in november given some of the domestic problems in ukraine. i think they made the argument that they can have a integrated relationship with the european union and still have a positive relationship with the russia. what i think we saw two and three weeks ago the russians trying to change the calculation saying no you can't. they try to tilt that and say there will be cost, there will be consequences and basically making this to a geopolitical struggle. a struggle i think likely -- [inaudible] because i think the ukraine see what coming too close to the russians will mean. that t will probably encourage them to build the link to the european unitten yo. that would enable. i think you look around and you

have other countries looking for connections to the outside world. they don't want to be to close on moscow. and part is a direct result that the russian policy that would last twenty years i think has been counter productive in materials of their objectives of trying to increase influence in neighboring capitals. i would say it remains one of the goal of the kremlin to make sure that none of the former soviet states join the form -- [inaudible] it's been the goal for a long time. it hasn't changed. you talk about month -- obviously beyond the former soviet states. i agree with steve, i think the economic union is a way of binding countries more closely together. it obviously has a political aspect to it too that is very important. the final thing is not that any of these countries think of joining structure.

i think what is so russians are banking on is once the united states and allies get out of afghanistan, love and go away. central asia will be less interested on our part in central they. it will give russia opportunities obviously strog did deal with china. it's a long-term strategy. frontier -- [inaudible] [inaudible] [inaudible] first time i hear the recess was about -- [inaudible] about the issue the issue handle -- [inaudible] responsible political figure. that's why the research failed. the first pew tib is -- [inaudible]

no questions. for putin we understand it's a domestic issue not an -- [inaudible] asymmetry of how many -- how many times america is mentioned in the russian immediate yo ya. -- media. it's almost something about america in russia. nothing about russia here. so what does russian foreign policy then? how russia conducts the foreign policy -- the foreign policy -- [inaudible] the -- [inaudible] something, something, something that has been in georgia. and american -- beef, chicken, nothing. nothing to -- [inaudible]

if you look at the former soviet union -- yes. they want nothing more than that. they want your asia union. and u.s. foreign policy priority. the russia -- [inaudible] handling and going back to syria they believe that russians can afford to do nothing if americans -- [inaudible] bump syria or whatever? that wasn't a great job of putting a question mark on the end of it. [laughter] they have a sanitary foreign policy which is certainly innovation. do you have anything to comment on? >> on the last part about

syria. i think really interesting to me if the military action happens in the next several days, it's going happen right on the eve of the g20 summit. i think putin has a way to showcase saint saint peters berg and showcase russian leadership. i think it's going to be in putin's power to decide how big an issue he wants to make it. two or three leaders who ordered military strikes will be coming to his hometown. i'm not quite sure how he's going play it. i think more the challenge the russians had is particularly if the west goes around the security council. it's not clear what the russians have to respond or block it. i think that leads to a question as to how putin decide to make it a big issue or maybe decides to sort of manage it in a way that won't rain too much water on the summit.

[inaudible] over there. up here. i'm sorry. >> several of you -- my name is steven. have spoken russia's need to modernize and be more integrated with the west. i think the -- danish shipyards, katherine the great, alexander ii, stalin -- it seems the task is always beyond the confidence of any russian leader. will this -- why does russia always fail at modernizing and integrating with the west? [laughter] >> 100 words or less, please. >> it's an economic question. [laughter] >> it may not be an economic question. it may be more than that. that's true. it's an eternal question. they have always sought to do

it, and so far always failed. i think it probably a very long complicated answer to it, and maybe a specific answer for everyone of those that you identified to some extent. right now i gave my reasons for why i think modernization right now is not going work because modernization in today's world is not like modernization it might have been stalin's time or peter the great's time. modernization today is more like pert the great. it means the emergence of people who are themselves. it's driven very much by people. it's driven by people who are entrepreneurial, innovative, creative. that's why i think this concept for the creative class is excellent discrepancies -- description for the key players on the russian side. those are the very people who simply cannot tolerate putin's

system. they cannot tolerate the way he treats them. take them for granted, and those two things can't be reconciled. what putin is doing is square the circle by creating his own, quote, creative class, that won't be so socially active. they will, nevertheless, somehow do good things and create things and scientists and engineers and skilled workers. i think that's just not going to work. and so modernizing russia without taking the step of recognizing that these people have the right to be in power and the right to voice themselves politically. they have a right to think what they want, and, of course, in most ways will go against what putin is trying to establish as the traditional value of russia. it leads him, at least, in the current situation to be a complete dead in. whether that there -- bears resemblances or not to other period in russian history

is beyond any time i have in my knowledge discuss right now. >> could is to out another example. you also mentioned sillon valley -- silicon valley a couple of years ago. what happened if you walked down the street of palo alto. one of the most common language is russian. there are so many immigrants working in the tie -- high-tech. you don't hear that much now the idea of russia in a suburb of moscow build its own silicon valley. they encouraged companies to come in. they built a campus. i'm not sure they figured out what make silicon valley work. it's not just that consequence of technical expertise. i think the russian have smart technical people. it's the environment. what makes silicon valley work you have a legal structure. a legal structure that protects patents. two years ago they were suggesting it would be a patent-free zone.

that's not likely to encourage the future steve jobs of russia to do something there. you have have a court system you can protect it. the court system in russia is pretty shaky. .. and heat directed but that's not how silicon valley works. you can't deduct innovation from above.

it has to come from below. so they are allowing people to use that talent from below and that percolates up. so you always have this idea of the patrimony all system without getting into a political discussion to commit it possible to modernize a society like that but very difficult. in russia's case and i'm surprised he didn't mention this since he co-authored a book on this but it had to do with russia as size and the difficulty of administering running and the modernizing such a vast country that is so heterogeneous. the challenge is quite. >> he didn't read it. [laughter] >> thank you very much. my name is sean gray from the university. i was in russia for seven years. i would like to ask the panel a

question about russia's future. i have seen my peers and the generation younger than me growing up in russia and i noticed that basically if they are smart and if they are liberals who are thinking they will try to leave the country and you mentioned silicon valley about how russia is one of the languages and they are very smart but unfortunately they are not looking to improve their country and the legal systems and so forth. then you see the other guys that are staying there and a lot of these nationalists and people like that who are going and protesting in the beating and stuff like that. others protests and then they are rising of taking positions in the government as well.

that's the future in russia itself. he's not going to be around for very long and this is a question that always [inaudible] [laughter] >> sorry about that. [laughter] >> speaking as a member of the younger generation looking for work in the future i didn't mean to offend anybody. unfortunately it's had -- it's very difficult giving power to 1 liter when they leave behind some sort of struggle. that is what a lot of people fear would happen if he leaves.

anyway i would love to hear your thoughts. >> to formulate that in a question is there a succession plan? can the system actually operate without putin? >> i believe there is a system in place and at the moment obviously with mr. putin as the head but he is powerful he's the one thing different interests in different groups so its theoretical to have the system survive and have somebody ahead of it. depending on who they are and if they are able to work out a deal with all of these different groups. so i think you shouldn't assume that if at some point he decides to retire that his successor would run the country very differently now and anticipate things would change but this is a system and it functions as

such. it's not totally dependent just on one person even though it looks as if it is on the outside. >> somebody put it contrary to me if there is a system but it's like juggling knives and handing over the operation to somebody else. >> i disagree. the system does demand on one person and wouldn't survive without putin. he doesn't rely but he is not balancing because he feels he has to to keep the power. without putin, no agreement could possibly be reached among the really important people especially the oligarchs there is no control over them and all hell breaks loose. no, that system will not survive without putin and there is no succession plan. that is the big weakness.

everybody is right to worry a lot about that. >> there is no institutional plan for what happens. if he gets run over by a truck tomorrow, there is no plan that goes into effect that says what happens next. so there is i think a recipe for quite a bit of instability after he disappears from the stage. >> he's written a lot about this. would you like to talk about this? >> i would like to ask a question [inaudible] i see a contradiction here. time after time with russia you

don't know what to do [inaudible] there is something always wrong with american foreign policy in russia. if it's guilty it's russia. if they can't understand him it's his fault. i think that putin is a simple guy. it is much here. of course it's like a subjective judgment. they have a great knowledge of russia to understand what russia was. [inaudible] what's wrong here? that is what my question is.

>> can you talk about the issue in the system? >> i agree on that. if the system is designed for putin -- remember a couple years ago himself he said it will collapse and he said the same thing. do you have any success of any politicians who can be the challenge princeton's mr. medvedev? and that is the problem. [inaudible] i agree on this. it will not survive without

putin. thank you. [laughter] >> i will start. one of the things i don't think the u.s. is good at as a generalization is putting ourselves in the position of the country or individuals we are dealing with and try to figure out how the book looks to them. we try to approach the world given our history and what we have done as thinking that more or less everybody can operate on similar lines. i think that we fail to understand and following up with what he said and obviously the mistakes that were made very early on in the clinton administration thinking you could just do a few things in russia and suddenly began to develop like the united states so we have to do a better job of trying to figure out how things are understood in russia. having said that it is very difficult to figure out exactly how the system works in russia. it's much easier to figure out

how it works in this country because we are more transparent. so we should go through this exercise its going to be a very tough exercise and then i think another thing is we have the for your election cycles so every time the president comes in you better -- you have eight years to do it and then you only have four there for you often raise expectations and you have an agenda that is too ambitious or is not really appropriate for the difficulty of the task at hand. dealing with russia is a very long term -- you have to be meticulous but you have to have a very long-term horizon to think where you can achieve something and i think that is much more difficult. our system mitigates against that and the fact the british have a sort of permanent civil service of course we have the foreign service offices that are very important and deal with that in the country but we don't have the continuity in policy making that you do in other

systems where you don't have the political appointees that change all the time so those are just a few reasons. >> we might disagree on whether vladimir putin himself was anti-american but there is an anti-american tendency within the russian population which i think in some ways hasn't gotten beyond the cold war but there's also been a problem in the united states. you can look a certain parts of the american society and it's not yet come to terms with the fact the cold war is 20-years-old and congress is one element of this. and let me just take the fact. what happened when he was appointed? the united states has every right to say we aren't going to let the people connected with this murder into this country. but when you look at russia and i think russia has been going in the wrong direction the last ten years in terms of the democratic

situation there are dozens of countries around the world that have worse human rights records in russia get the signal in russia i think is a reflection of attitudes and also i think it unfortunately undercuts the message congress was trying to send. congress was trying to send a message of felt rage against what happened in the abusive legal system to murder sir sergie. it's about america and that is sometimes constrained of the policy traces domestically. >> if i were just a simple guy that likes to dress up like migratory birds and hang gliding them hang gliding from of them, why don't we understand him? [laughter] >> i was hoping you were not going to ask me that. i think that he answered that very well.

>> obviously people have very different opinions about him and there is no right magic answer that needs to be translated. more importantly to me it is always why don't we have strategies towards russia as a country. it's worth comprehending and understanding who is the leader and how powerful they are and what they want. but more important is to have a clearly defined long-term strategy within which you can then react sometimes to the unexpected events and planning issues rather than having the summit based on the longer issues and somehow there is an idea that here is what we want to achieve in this country and our relations with this country in the long term. alves steve said it requires a great deal of patience. therefore we can weather the ups and downs. when you don't have that sort of a strategy, then it is just

floundering about with people. frankly many vested interests who are passionate in their interest and their causes. but they're simply going to present those without any countervailing sense of cost benefit. everybody has something they want to accomplish when it comes to russia and everything else. it's only when you are having to put this in the context of an overall goal that you can say all right. i get it. i would like to see this happen. i think we should push this. but by a understand it might impinge upon the more important and strategic interests. without that latter part of the phrase the nets everybody just piling on and everybody comes in. this in part is very confusing because they said what are you really trying to say to us because you have people lobbying and every that he seems to have an equal voice in terms of the way they are voiced and the

mideast as the preponderance of how many times do they hear it from different people. that right now is an unfortunate situation we are in which is why it makes all the sense in the world not to have a summit and i don't think that what makes sense to have a summit until we can do it with a sense of what is the purpose of this, what is the overall strategy. >> another question. >> my name is yale richmond. a retired officer that work on soviet exchanges for many years. first regarding the reference of silicon valley. years ago we brought a leading soviet economist to the united states. he toured a silicon valley and all of the other hot spots and he said he was convinced that there has to be a secret office that runs the system or it

couldn't work so well. [laughter] you have to recognize that at a new generation is slowly but surely coming to power in russia and this is a generation that knows the west and is free to travel and can buy western books and in the time will be succeeding in the leadership. whoever rules russia whether it is putin ha or the kgb they have to consider new generations that are slowly but surely coming to power. what is to be done? we have to remember much of the changes that have taken place in the soviet union and now russia are the result of exchanges between americans and russians. we have to do everything we can to encourage those exchanges

because they are the ones who are going to make the decisions on the problems that we are discussing here today. >> not sure that i heard a question there so let's just continue over year on the left. >> i noticed in the afternoon's meeting the second party is what was next. with the u.s. is going to do to adjust relations or what kind of measure the u.s. is going to take to stabilize. >> to amend that a little bit by saying we have all said there

isn't much to accomplish. is that at least from the u.s. perspective the problem? is their anything that needs to be accomplished and needs to be done or can we let this adrift? >> i don't think it is going to drift in the sense that we will still have talks between, you know, the defense of the state, the russian counterpart still engaged in discussions and cooperations on afghanistan and those sorts of things. there are discussions on counterterrorism. obviously we have issues that we both face since the boston marathon bombing that has become more important. so we will still be talking to russia about a variety of issues and we have a bilateral presidential commission that will continue to function and it's the expectations of

achieving something and the defense etc. the expectations are being scaled back and on the issues that we would like to have achieved. i don't think it is a draft but it is a backward relationship. >> is there any urgency to change the dynamic? >> the question that drove the reset back in 2009 seems to be an arms control. the new start agreement is a good agreement. the president would like to build on not. the russians at this point don't be prepared to play so i actually going to move on that. on iran, they're seems to be with of the new presents an opportunity for the five plus

one talks to be more productive and over the last several years to disrupt that. by the same token we are not going to get the russians to crank up more pressure on iran did so again, you don't need to have a big engagement there. and on afghanistan, the russians at the end of the day don't want to see the united states and nato failed because if there is a failure in afghanistan is a big problem and it is a problem closer to russia than it is to the united states. they worry about the effect in central asia. so i think on a lot of questions where the big issues were four or five years ago things were going to go forward and they don't really require a presidential engagement if the white house concludes the presidential meetings were unlikely to produce something.

>> i have a question. you had mentioned that putin's economic strategy is to make the country more robust and more on topic. it seems to me the main thing that ties the russian economy to the rest of the world is that it does nothing but produce hydrocarbons. you talked about the eurasian yet this isn't a poor market. it doesn't seem to be doing it that much capacity to russia. did he try to make it more robust or i'm not going to go the rate of the immigration route and not do a lot to change the status quo either. >> there is no easy answer for him to make himself robust in today's world to the i don't think he sees and i don't think it is true that the union is a

small market especially ukraine. without ukraine it is kind of meaningless. that is a part of his estimate to try to force ukraine to choose as others said. on oil and gas, in my opinion and is a very common misperception that somehow the oil and gas is a liability and would be better off if a diversified the oil and gas. i don't think that that is true. they could stop producing oil and gas and then you would be extremely poor. but you wouldn't be a defendant on the outside world. that is the trade-off that you have to make. if you want to have the wealth that allows you to just make yourself independent from the

international lenders and the imf and it reveals the prosperity comes from the oil and gas. there are ways of dealing with the liability of oil and gas on the economic sense. you try to deal with that without building up the reserve funds so there is a way of dealing with the production side which is you share the risk with other entities, other investors other than you're own domestic companies in your own state. that means inviting of the foreign producers who would share a part of the price risk for these big project. again, we run into a problem there but yes, that solves part of the risk problem has been a big oil and gas producer but you are now exposing yourself to this globalization phenomenon of having the international companies, a lot of

international companies operating inside of russia not because they are going to steal your wealth or any of that kind of stuff or the oil and gas still in russia but it's back to this political risk the creative class that these young people didn't treat as a question. it was a younger generation or the st. petersburg graduate. this generation is the one that is the potential to link up with the global economy and then introduce these ideas and translate these ideas into the russian context or whatever the that leads us to what putin he doesn't want that, he wants little of that at the same time that he needs modernization. so every step of the way, he has got these the dilemma.

you need to completely diversify away as a practical economic issue that's not possible. you have to figure out a way how do we commit to oil and gas and replace the reserves that are there as a big producer at the same time that we don't make ourselves excessively vulnerable from the world economy. i'm not saying that. i don't think he can. but in general have an outlook that says okay right now we are going to make ourselves more robust than we did leading up to the 2008 crisis when we overestimated like everybody else in the world the likelihood that this whole boom was going to continue. >> kenneth meyer. how is the insistence on the

noninterference and syria more obstruction than our insistence from the regime change? >> that seems like a loaded question. >> obstructionism is always in the eye of the beholder. does anybody have a comment on that? >> i don't have a good answer on that. >> in what sense? to the relationship? between the u.s. and russia? >> what i meant was of destruction to the u.s. policy which is simply from the u.s. perspective. it's not intended to be evaluated. and i take your point obstructionism is definitely in the eye of the guilder. i think we have one, time for one more question. >> i would say again let's get

back to the other side. let's imagine the strikes and syria have been before the g8 senate -- >> g20. yes, the g20. of course. so can you imagine that mr. putin would cancel or postpone the summit? >> i would doubt that because it is g20. he might not like them involved in this but there are all of the editor countries. so i very much doubt that he would cancel the summit where he would insult the leaders.

>> i think that she 20 happens and putin would have to decide between now held does he interact if there is a military strike on nasiriyah? i don't know the answer to that and will be interesting to see how he decides to play it. >> let's give a round of applause to the speakers. thank you for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

the permanent members of the u.n. security council have been named to discuss a language of the draft resolution that would authorize the military force against syria. it's in response to the government's in damascus last week. the general was urging them to hold off on any attacked until the u.n. chemical weapons inspectors finished their investigation in damascus. they say they should take the inspectors about four days to finish their work on the site and the findings have to be analyzed. >> thousands have gathered on the mall to hear president obama and others mark the 50th anniversary of martin luther king's i have a dream speech. they have been hearing of the civil rights act assess the

progress and what is still to come. congressman don edwards declared that today is a call for actioni >> for the congressionalngressii district as the first african-american woman to the represent maryland in the house of representatives and on behalp of my sisters and congress, i am proud to stand with you today on the shoulders of the women come courageous women like fannie low hamer and vivian malone and ros. many others. i'm proud to stand on the shoulders of our domestic workers to be wrapped in thee arms arms of three, for a little inrls in a birmingham church ins a chicago teenager on vacation in mississippi. is it is a new day, but the day isn't over. the struggle for the civil rights for civil rights, social justice, and economic opportunity to man our engagement and our voice.

to realize fully our dream we must raise our voices and take action. we must lift our voices to challenge government and our community and neighbors to be better. we must lift our voices for wages that enable families to take care of themselves, for a health care system that erases disparities, for communities and homes without violence, for clean air and water to protect our environment for future generations, and for a just justice system. we must lift our voice for the value of our boat and have our votes counted without interference. as we stand here today, dr. king would know, and john lewis certainly knows, that today is not just a commemoration or celebration. it is a call to action for the work remains undone in the communities that remain unchanged. our foremothers and forefathers 50 years ago closed the books on the last century. well, when the book closes on the 21st century and civil- rights, which chapter will you

have written? what fight will you have fought in the halls of congress or on the town halls of your community? for men and women, black and white, latino, asian, muslim, christian, jew, gay, straight, i hope this includes you. the final chapter must include your voice to providing live coverage of the march. we will show the entire 50th anniversary commemoration tonight at eight eastern on c-span. you can also see today's speeches at c-span.org. all this week about 7:15 eastern on c-span2 we feature the washington

with a vacuum cleaner or in the kitchen and that actually does obscure one of the most important trends and of the labor force participation in greece in the 1950's. american women workers not only did not go home after a bold were too, but they increasingly entered the labour market across the 1950's. the decade that we powerfully

associate with women's domesticity. on the summit in russia the center for strategic and international studies discuss the priorities for the summit and the president's trip to stockholm sweden. this is about an hour and a half. >> good morning and welcome to the center for strategic and international studies. i'm the senior vice president at csis and i have the pleasure of presiding over the briefing today with two of my favorite

colleagues, to be three of my favorite colleagues, one of whom is stuck in traffic. we are going to be talking about the president's trip to bg 20 summit and we will go through this from a couple of different ingalls but first i would like to introduce heather conley, senior fellow and director of the year program at csis. ponder to working at csis, heather serve a variety of positions including the deputy assistant secretary of state for europe. with that i will let heather take it. >> thank you, andrew. good morning. it's hard to believe that matt and i2 and a half months ago were sitting before you giving a briefing before the president traveled to ireland and the g8 summit and we questioned how much they would overwhelm of the g8 summit. here we are two months later, and we are now following the president as he makes his way on route to st. petersburg to the g20 summit and wondering how much of course how much will

syria dominated the corridor conversation. in stockholm as well loss and sweden. after president obama canceled his bilateral summit with president putin, a stop needed to be added to the terrie and looking across the country came to mind but of course president obama had already been to copenhagen in 2009 for the u.n. climate conference to be to oslo, norway. he is welcoming the three presidents of the state on friday that cancel out any of the baltic states so sweden and finland were the most logical traces and stockholm one that choice. this is in fact the first time a president has visited sweden and

a bilateral capacity to the president bush was the first president to visit i believe in 2009 for the u.s. summit. but this is the first time we will have a president to visit the capitol. president obama arrived in sweden and will be greeted by the prime minister fredrick who's led the government for the last years and he will face elections next year. certainly sweden is experienced unsettling times in his own challenges dealing with integration of immigrants if you will recall about the six days of riots and in the suburbs of stockholm dealing with a police shooting and continues to be a great topic of conversation with that aspect. so certainly that will be part of the domestic conversation. he has been gracious in gathering his other colleagues

to join with president obama and a dinner the evening after he arrives. i would sense that the conversation would be quite robust about the region to the it and certainly i hope that they have been engaged in a four year study on the arctic. i think they heard quite a bit about the arctic from his swedish and nordic counterparts. the secretary as you will recall was to attend the arctic council where a decision was made to welcome several asian countries as permanent observers to the arctic council we have a shift now passing through the northern sea route. so as the opening heavens, the geopolitical dynamics are changing and i am sure the president will hear from his colleagues about that. and finally, wan no word on the

bilateral discussion between president obama and of the swedish prime minister sweden has been an extraordinary ally across a range of issues they have the personnel in afghanistan approximately 600. they were on standby for operations in libya and they contributed over 100 trips for the country this is a robust level of engagement and i think that we have certainly appreciated that great solidarity. the breadth of the conversation clearly the prime minister will want to provide president obama with an update on the european debt crisis although that certainly stated from the top of the agenda this is going to be the first time the president returns to gear up after his visit in the g8 and his visit to berlin and sure he will hear about the ramifications as that continues to be a topic of concern in europe and russia

will be a topic and of course syria, egypt, the the least to become the least. i'm sure that you'll see the conversation on the dynamic regional conversation with the nordic states and i think that it's an excellent preparation to the president ready as he travels to st. petersburg to meet with his g20 colleagues. with that i will let you take the baton. >> to introduce matt real quickly, matt goodman and csis holds the william simon chair in political economy. the chair examines current issues in international economic policy with a particular focus on the asia pacific but i should also say that he previously served as the white house coordinator for the east asia summit for the asia pacific but he also served as the director for international economics on the staff and was responsible for the other international forums. with that i would like to introduce my colleague, matt goodman.

>> the president will be participating in the summit on september 5th and 6th at the lee constantine palace outside of st. petersburg. he can tell us how to pronounce that and not to mention st. petersburg. the g20 is a gathering of leaders of 19 individual countries and the european union which has its own seat. and then another five invited guests including spain, singapore and a couple other african countries that i have forgotten that the moment. ethiopia and one other. and then a number of international institutions in the u.n., the imf, the oecd and others will be in attendance as well. the schedule begins with

meetings with the leaders on the senior economic advisers who will meet starting october 2nd together with the finance devotees because the g20 is built on the finance minister process and so the finance deputies will meet in parallel together leading up to the arrival of the leaders on the fifth in order to hammer out the communique and the deliverable is as it were. incidentally this will be the first time that it's attended by the new caroline afton sinnott replaced mark when he was over at the u.s. tiahrt and he has been with all of the other summits. let me quickly go through what we understand the schedule to be that hasn't been formally published. but the plenary session is will

begin after lunch on september september 5th and go through dinner that night. the next morning there will be a continuation but a small innovation by the russians and they are going to have an interaction with business leaders during the morning of the so-called be 20 that is a proliferation of alphabet groups that have a 20 after their name and the 20 is the business grouping and there will be interaction that morning. and as i and understand, some separate bilateral time for the leaders and then the meeting will continue through lunch into the sort of mid to late afternoon and end with a press conference on september 6th. there will undoubtedly be bilaterals on the side president obama will be announced and when andy gets here he will tell you that president obama and president putin will have a bilateral that is the normal practice that happens in these

summits and one can speculate that there will probably be a summit with the chinese president and the deputy minister but none of that has been as far as i know none of that has been made public in terms of the agenda, the russians have laid out one big scene which is sustainable and inclusive and balanced growth and is creating new jobs. specifically they have the priorities of growth through the quality jobs and investments and growth through the trust and transparency and growth through effective regulation. those are all sorts of ways of reorganizing and capturing the longstanding g20 agenda which recovers and the list of the eight areas that have traditionally been covered under the summit's so those include strong sustainable balanced growth, jobs, international financial institution reform,

strengthening financial regulation, energy sustainability, development, trade and anti-corruption. so all of those things will be on the formal agenda but not all of those will be talked about by the leaders. and at the end of this there will be probably a lengthy communique and the attached document that would be probably unreasonable to expect it's going to be significantly shorter than the communique that is the last statement which was 85 paragraphs and i would be surprised if it were significantly shorter than that because it has to cover all of the topics i mentioned. what the leaders will really talked about will probably revolve around in addition to cirio which will not be on the formal agenda, this group really doesn't have a formal place for the discussion for the geopolitical issues. but of course inevitably is going to dominate the

conversations in the actual sessions among the leaders on the formal agenda will cover economic and economic related issues. and i would say probably three or four big topics. obviously the global economy will dominate and you will have some european. here is andy joining us. >> bye europeans will go a little bit of the second quarter gdp numbers of a positive for the first time in eight or nine quarters i think. the u.s. will probably still express concern about the fact that while the u.s. economy is doing better, it cannot be the only engine of growth in the global economy and will express concern about the risks and the imbalance is every man and the

global economy. emerging markets are probably going to talk about the financial market volatility the attribute in large part to the concerns about tapering by the u.s. fed and other monetary authorities to this extraordinary period. the reactions in the market are first of all a natural consequence of strategies by these countries, the u.s. and japan and european countries to keep the economy growing and inevitably they you're going to have to end and they will also argue that a lot of the problems of emerging markets are home grown so the problems in india and brazil and other countries are homegrown.

on balance it is fair to say that there is that little discussion that has just revealed that there is not the same sense of the consensus and shared sense of crisis in the group also the sense of the crisis may be starting to pick up again but not everybody agrees with the causes or the solutions to those issues are. overall it will be largely a conversation about those issues and there will also probably be a significant to note of discussion of international cooperation to deal with tax evasion and tax avoidance. this was a major theme of the g8 summit and the members are certainly going to be interested in talking about those issues. there won't be any kind of

breakthrough agreement but there will be a reinforcement of some of the work that was agreed to in the g8 were on the tax sharing information and so forth. then a third area would be trade. i think there will be a fairly robust discussion on trade. the budgie 20 has several times now laid down a commitment standstill against protectionist measures which they've most recently extended through 2014 and they are likely to adopt that. this commitment has been honored in the breach what they will probably make a strong stand and also talk about the ground at this point the main focus is on the volley ministerial in december which is the last chance to save the around but most people in the trade world don't think that's likely to

happen. there may be looked to see what they can put forward on the specific agreements on the facilitation for example but whether that is going to progress or not remains to be seen. there may be a discussion about the development issues in the infrastructure and investment and so forth. finally i will wrap up and let and the talk about the interesting stuff in russia. the white house still feels that she 20 is an important for, and it's the only forum in which the leaders that represent 80% of the global economy can talk about both the short-term risk and the global growth and longer-term challenges of sustained and balanced growth. it is an opportunity to set the agenda for the global economy and finally to build habits of cooperation among the members of

the group that haven't had the same experience in the countries in particular in guiding these issues so this is still a trip that the syrian notwithstanding the president looks forward to as an opportunity to engage. >> dr. kuchins is the director of the eurasia program and he will put forth what has gone on with russians. >> thanks, andrew and my apologies for being late. unlike mr. putin last year in deciding not to come to the g8 and mr. obama decided not to meet mr. putin in moscow i did decide to come to the press briefing today. it's kind of an odd role. in russian literature there is a

tradition of a superfluous man and in some ways i feel a bit like a superfluous man talking about the meeting that is not going to happen. but in a relationship which frankly is not in a good place -- how is that for an exciting quote. some might call it a train wreck. it's like watching a slow-moving train wreck for two years right now. what is the good news? this isn't the cuban missile crisis. of the good news this isn't even the georgia war of five years ago in which one could have imagined the possibility of the u.s. and russian military forces coming into conflict with each other in the black sea. one thing is clear to me that this is the worst personal

relationship between the u.s. and russia, perhaps even the russian and soviet leaders in history. one has to kind of think about what does that mean? what does that hurt in the relationship? i think these two guys mr. putin and mr. obama don't like each other at all. i think there's a deep degree of disrespect. when our president says something like comparing mr. putin to the kid in the back of the classroom kind of slouching and not interested in things you've taken the relationship to a personal level. even more so i think than the comment he made that i think was a mistake four years ago that mr. putin had 1 foot in the cold war and 1 foot in the future.

mr. putin is not a person that forgets i think personal insults and certainly hasn't played well when the relationship. but it's something to think about. i don't think that there has been a case even in the soviet period. mr. linen didn't meet with any of the american leaders that i know of. we know about the relationship between on called joe and fdr. but to me this is the worst personal relationship of the u.s. and russian leader in history and that is obviously not a good thing. let's look a little bit more of the recent history. the administration made an effort in the spring and the early summer to engage russia and put the relationship that was for a number of reasons clear to everyone in this room it was on the ruffian deutsch was getting worse.

basically mr. putin wasn't interested in what the obama administration was trying to sell them and the effort to engage mr. putin was principally around the issue of further cuts in offensive nuclear arms tied to some kind of agreement about missile defense. that was a deal mr. putin decided he was not particularly interested in and that is the effort with the former national security advisor in the spring was about and this effort to bring the two sides together. it was pretty clear from the meeting and just looking at how much that can actually tell us

we don't know what it was a pretty powerful statement. you have to wonder what was the thinking in the administration that gave them some degree of hope and optimism that there would be enough of an agreement at the meeting to justify the meeting in september. i don't know exactly but it looks to have been a miscalculation. then of course we have to factor how much of an effect the snowden affair have on the decision to cancel the summit. now, the snowden affair i was not impressed with a way that it was handled on our side to be frank. there was far too much public diplomacy if you want to call it public demand and i don't think

there was adequate to behind the scenes back toward communications between the administration at a high enough level to make some kind of face-saving deal possible if indeed that were even possible in the first place. you know, i think i constantly ask myself the question let's imagine that edward snowden arrived at the airport with the same kind of information about the domestic and foreign surveillance system that the russian federation was using. what we have extradited him back to russia? it's impossible to imagine we would have done that and so it does make me wonder why did we think the russians would do it in this case. i don't know this for sure but by my senses the administration thought they were making progress in the discussions to

bill will enforcement channels but frankly, you know, this was a case where if there was an opportunity to resolve this, the only way you could have done it is for mr. obama to pick up the telephone and ask him in a very frank conversation with mr. putin and try to work it out through a personal relationship and find some kind of a basic solution. but i want to beat that -- well, the horse isn't quite dead yet but i won't belabor the point any longer because frankly we don't know if there would have been a summit if there hadn't been a snowden affair. was the decision that there was not adequate progress on the key issues in the bilateral relationship. we don't know and we are not likely to find out for quite a long time. where do we go from here? it's pretty tough to find a way

in which or find a reason for which either leadership is going to, you know, want to see the incentives for themselves for the resurrected relationship. it's very likely that we could see this relationship model along at this very unpleasant little for the next three years until we are looking at a new administration in the united states and who knows how long we are going to be looking at the same administration and moscow. so just to cut it short always try to find some kind of silver lining. i will pull one out of the left field for you. it's not about the u.s. russia relationship. there are interesting things going on in the russian and japanese relationship.

i thought one of the reasons why mr. putin and the russians have an incentive to improve ties with the united states going back four years ago was there a concern about the growing power of china and that they would like to have a more balanced foreign policy? ..

>> so with that note from left fie, let me finish my prepared remarks. thanks. >> we're going to open up to questions in just a second. if you could identify yourself, and if you're at the table, please speak into the microphone. this briefing will be available in transcript form later today, i'll mail it out. i also want to assure you that we still do have a board of trustees. as many of you know, you know, dr. brzezinski's around, dr. kissinger's around. we're moving our office in a couple of weeks, so that's why we have such sort of emptiness here. our new building will be at 1616 rhode island avenue, and you can follow us on twitter @csis for more update, but it's an exciting moment in the 50-year history of csis and, actually, i

think this'll probably be the last press briefing we do in this old building so thank you, again, for being here. with that, i'd like to open it up for questions. right here. >> dmitri -- [inaudible] i would like to ask the members of the panel to put a little more meat on the issue of what's going to happen next in the bilateral relationship, and since mr. goodman mentioned that probably there will be no bilateral meeting between -- >> andy would -- [inaudible conversations] >> well, i would like to hear that. >> [inaudible] >> is there any chances that the summit might be a warming-off point or none at all? >> um, thanks, dmitri, for the question. i was thinking this morning it would, you know, it could be a

statesmanlike move on the part of president obama in particular since it was the united states that canceled the summit meeting to request a one-on-one bilateral meeting with president putin. but i think the chances of that happening are less than 5%. slim to none. i think there's a high degree of anger on the part of the obama administration about relations with russia, and i think mr. obama in particular in his personal regard for mr. putin, i think that's what that comment about, the personal comment

about the slouching kid in the back of the room. it seems with that it's harder to imagine that you could see them pivot and kind of walk back and make the decision, well, in fact, we would hike to meet with you -- we would like to meet with you. you know, maybe the situation in syria which is extremely grave and dangerous could justify that. but -- >> questions. roger? did you have -- >> yeah. roger -- [inaudible] bloomberg news. what are going to be the deliverables for any of you? >> you know, on the stockholm stop i'm not sure there's really going to be a deliverable other than an underscoring of both the strong bilateral ties as well as our regional engagement. i mean, for the president to

visit with the nordic colleagues as well as to see the baltic presidents in the span of a week really speaks to, i think, a deeper regional engagement which is very welcome. i think it will be an opportunity to, for the stockholm stop to really hear from five european leaders, some within the e.u., some just within nato, their concerns, obviously, about syria and the regional issues. i think there'll be an extraordinary amount of outreach in the corridors of the g20 summit with david cameron, with francois hollande, with the european colleagues as this gets closer. we just saw reports this morning that prime minister cameron has recalled the british parliament back in session on thursday to discuss this. so this tells me we're going to see a very intense dialogue, and in some ways that stockholm visit is a good prebe view of those issues. and to sort of tap on the first question, certainly it's not just russian/u.s. bilateral

relations, european/russian relations also. there have been challenges both with liberalization questions, energy issues, and i think the europeans themselves are deeply examining what the health and future state of russian democracy, human rights, civil society and what it means for their relationship. so it's an important moment for consultation transatlanticly about russia as well. and i would suspect you'll hear with the exception of norway -- which is not a member of the e.u -- another strong statement for the transatlantic trade and investment partnership that will echo the theme of trade for the g20. and i think you'll hear certainly from the swedish side how critical that will be for u.s./transatlantic relations. >> well, as i implied but i guess i didn't state explicitly, i wouldn't expect some major headlines deliverables out of the g20 summit. i think that has not been the

pattern this the recent past, so certainly if you're looking for large headline numbers or, you know, initiatives, i wouldn't expect that. but, you know, as they say, in an 85-plus-paragraph communique, there will be a lot of language about growth and the importance of -- and i would say a tilt towards, you know, growth versus austerity. that tilt has been happening in the last few meetings of g20 folks from the ministry level, and that will, you'll see that, i think, again here. you know, but, of course, talk about the other aspects of the global economy i mentioned. you know, an affirmation of all the things the finance ministers have been doing on financial regulation which i didn't really harp on because the leaders probably won't talk about that stuff in the room, but there'll be be paragraphs about progress on basel iii and otc derivatives, regulation and other things. as i said, the tax pieces, the

tax avoidance and tax evasion issues, i think, will be featured, and for the specifics on that i'd refer grow -- actually, on all of this, go back to the finance mysters' communique of july 20th or something which i think is really what you'll find the leaders embracing and endorsing mostly across the board. so i don't think, i'd be surprised if there were any dramatic breakthroughs on anything, but, you know, again, a lot of this is about the conversation and trying to get people on the same page and moving in the same direction on global economic and financial issues. >> no meeting, no deliverables. >> got it. [laughter] >> i would just -- >> [inaudible] >> we have to kind of wonder about the likelihood of a u.s. military strike on syria has, obviously, increased very significantly, and imagine the g 20 meeting taking place right

after that perhaps. so the mood of the principal players, the europeans, the united states, the russians and chinese is going to, i would have to think, would be very, very sour. and i can't, i can't think that's going to, you know, help the g20 meeting itself. >> questions? yes, right here. >> yeah, paul -- [inaudible] from "the guardian" newspaper. andrew, follow up on that. two things. one, you said that it wasn't clear to you that the snowden affair was finish the bilateral summit would have to occurred had it not been for the snowden affair, but all of the noises you had in the white house in the runup was that the meeting was likely to take place, and it was only after russia agreed to

temporary sang chew tear a -- sanctuary that the meeting was canceled. so what else could account for that? and another one for matthew, could you talk to us a bit more about how corridor conversations about syria may impact the more formal meetings? >> i think the administration faced a dilemma. try to factor out the snowden affair and the principal proposals they'd been making to the russians not just on security issues and principally the nuclear offensive reductions, missile defense, strategic stability set of issues which i think is sort of the foremost area they wanted to make progress on, this is the area that, you know, mr. obama just made the berlin speech. russians yawned. and there was no response to those proposals that mr. done

lin wrought in. from what administration officials told me, there have been no response to other things including in the air of economic -- the area of economic cooperation and trade where at least rhetorically for the last year or so the two administrations had been singing virtually from the same song sheet, we want a broader economic relationship, and this would provide ballast in rocky times and provide more constituencies in each country to support the relationship. but my sense was that the administration was kind of getting no response be really a-- response really across the board. so snowden doesn't happen, you know, certainly they would have made every effort to try to carry on and have the meeting, but it's just, you know, you have to ask yourself, well, what's the point, you know? we don't really need a photo opportunity. and you look at where we are on a whole set of issues, and, i

mean, syria, obviously, iran has been very clear that the russians don't want to go any further with sanctions on iran. the area that we have the most common interest, afghanistan, well, the problem there is that we still don't have a bilateral security agreement with the afghans, so we can't really talk to the russians and others about what, you know, we envision to be the future potential for cooperation and the kind of multilateral context. >> you know, one of the disadvantages of being a world leader and maybe a journalist as well is that you have to walk and chew gum at the same time, you have to be able to cover a wide range of issues, and i think in this case in a formal sense, as i said, the g20 is not about geopolitical issues, and so syria will not be on the formal agenda. it will be very -- i mean, it's possible, but very up likely that the russians would introduce it into the agenda in

the formal meetings or that some member would raise their hand and say i want to talk about syria. l all of that said, all of that said, of course, it is going to be, it's going to have a huge impact in terms of, again, what's being talked about in the corridors which i expect it would be the dominant topic there. and as andy said, i think it will affect the kind of mood in the room. i don't think there will be a sense of great camaraderie and let's get stuff done together because on the global economy, even on these other issues. so i think it will have a, it will have an effect, but in a formal sense it won't be part of the g20 deliberations. >> well, matt, i'm reminded at the g20 in september of '09 in pittsburgh that the g20 was used for a backdrop for then gordon brown and nicolas sarkozy and president obama to announce the disclosures. it can be used, obviously, with a media to advance a platform.

so i'm worlding if we'll have some press conferences -- >> again, one of the ideas of being a specialist, i don't have to worry about important things like russia and syria so much. i totally agree with that. i mean, i think that there very well may be things on the margins where people pull aside certainly to talk, but possibly to say things, announce things but just in a formal g20 sense, i don't think it will be in the communique. >> my image for the summit is it's the kind of hold your nose summit for a lot of the apartments. >> that's the headline. [laughter] >> baton death march. >> questions? is -- scott. >> [inaudible] you said it was a mistake for obama to make his remark about putin having one foot in the cold war. did you mean it was a mistake to say that out loud, or did you mean the assessment itself? >> actually, i disagree with the

assessment as well, but i think the larger mistake was to say it publicly. and i think, i think it was a little bit too -- maybe a cavalier assumption that mr. putin was not as significant of a policy policymaker as he actually was and/or the possibility that mr. putin would return as a future, as the future de facto and du jour leader of the russian federation. my view on putin, it's not so much that he has a toot in the cold war -- a foot in the cold war, i think he's been more affected by, you know, what he's seen with u.s. behavior after the cold war and in the 1990s. and i think he reflects a very broad kind of consensus in russia that the united states this -- in particular, the west more broadly, was taking advantage of russia during a period of historical weakness.

and a lot of the sort of developments in the, particularly in the international security system of sort of nato expansion being a big one and the experience of the serbia war in particular with the u.s. in their, russians', view, operating outside of international law had a deep impact on putin. and then subsequently, i think, maybe even a deeper impact was, you know, after 9/11 when the russians worked closely with us and others to take out the taliban in afghanistan, there was a sense that this was a high point in the u.s./russia relations, probably in the last 20 years even talk of possible alliance and such. i think mr. putin felt that the bush administration subsequently really didn't reciprocate or didn't really kind of acknowledge russian interests on a whole series of issues, particularly walking away from the abm treaty and missile

defense. again, nato expansion and other things. and it's, so it's that sense of grievances that built up in putin that i think are actually much more significant than the impact of the cold war. >> questions? josh. >> josh -- [inaudible] can you talk about -- [inaudible] have to be reassuring or apologizing or -- [inaudible] on some of those? >> well, i think he will certainly hear concerns expressed in his conversations in stockholm both biwith laterally as well as -- bilaterally as well as with the dinner with the nordic heads of government. clearly, i think the focal point within europe is germany, and this has had significant ramifications both prior to the

german election, national elections on september the 22nd, but also i think it dose much deep -- it goes much deeper. and i think initially as the documents were released, there was a sense in the administration of sort of being dismissive ant it, you know, everyone engages in this practice, you know? this emotionalism, hysteria that was coming just needed to be downplayed. well, actually, it's now taken deeper root, and it's impacting the transatlantic relationship, particularly, the trade and investment partnership where you now have statements certainly again being her forcefully expressed by berlin, both opposition as well as government officials saying we can't move forward with this trade until we get much more rigorous both transparency on the nsa programs, but in the case of germany, a new agreement that the u.s. will not spy on germany. so this is not going away. it's not even going away after the german election, quite

frankly. it will continue. it needs to be taken very seriously. there is now a real breach in confidence and trust that we have to manage and work through so we can get back to working on the bilateral engagement and agenda, and first and foremost is that ttip, is that trade investment. we can't allow this issue to sideline that. and right now, you know, it has the potential to do that. so he certainly will hear it, and he may, if he has an opportunity to have a sideline discussion which i assume he will with chancellor merkel in the corridors of the g20, he may hear additional words on that. >> well, it's a -- the revelations of the program are, i think, are hard to underestimate as a blow to, you know, u.s. credibility as a moral leader in places. and it plays perfectly into the hands of the russians and to the

chinese, i think. you know, just the fact that -- even the united states. edward snowden is viewed by a very significant part of the population as a, you know, as doing the right thing. of and so you can imagine what the view is in other countries. and so in other countries in which we repeatedly are very, watching very carefully their violations of human rights, it's a kind of -- a big pr, lick relations gift, i think -- public relations gift, i think. and the irony that, you know, mr. snowden goes to china and russia which are certainly, you know, i think taking more intrusive measures to surveil tear own citizens -- their own citizens, the irony is kind of staggering. >> questions? paul. >> just a follow-up question on that. one of the significant

disclosures from snowden has been the extent and depth of surveillance at the summit. the germans at least appear to have been genuinely surprised that the nsa which supposedly deals with terrorism is spying on its diplomats. what impact are that have on this stunt and both the pact -- this summit and the practicality in the way in which leaders will approach it? >> yea, yeah. interesting. i mean, i think that's another data point in that broader conversation, and i, you know, and i assume to your point about pacts call issues that -- practical issues that, you know, every delegation's security team and, you know, i.t. team will be a little more vigilant. i don't really know how to answer the question because i think it is, it's part of the broader conversation and the tensions that heather and andy have talked about.

i don't think it -- i mean, as i sit here trying to answer your question, i don't see any kind of profound be impact on the g20 conversation itself. but, you know, but it is, it's an issue among the members who are there, and so part of that that conversation. >> yes, right over here. >> [inaudible] >> unless japan wants it to be mentioned as a specific example of how japan is taking on its fiscal challenges, it will almost certainly not be mentioned. this is the decision that prime minister abe has to make about whether to increase as planned and legislated a, an increase in

their value-added tax, the so-called consumption tax which he may, a decision he may make. well, he probably won't make it before that summit, but he may make it in september. and so, no. i mean, i hi there will be a broader -- i think there will be a broader conversation about what countries are doing to consolidate their fiscal positions and the timing and sequencing and pacing of that, those moves, but not a specific conversation in the g20 about that issue. if the prime minister abe meets with president obama, no doubt prime minister abe's going to talk about that. but, again, i don't think it'll be art of the formal output of even a bilateral meeting between the two. >> great. right in back. >> hi, i'm ann walters -- [inaudible] you mentioned the upcoming german elections -- [inaudible] in connection with the nsa scandal. i was wondering if any of you thought any other potential

impacts of those elections on broader conversations in the g20 perhaps -- [inaudible] or anything along those lines. >> well, i think in some ways as matt reflected, this will be one of the first g20 conversations where the euro crisis is not very much front and center of the conversation of how europe is addressing this. this has been, i would argue, a pause in the crisis. hopefully, we're seeing some early signs of healing, but i think we are far from over, and that's certainly been part of the conversation this recent days -- in recent days with one of the ministers suggesting the greek package will have to be reassessed. and, you know, obviously, some continued concerns about the health of the french economy. so the euro crisis has taken a pause, but it will return back to the conversation. it is a legitimate question, certainly a reoccurring theme since tween has -- since 2009, d that certainly puts germany and

china squarely in that, the surplus camp, and needing to find that rebalancing. i would argue looking at the cdu platform we are seeing a bit of stimulus in the german perspective of encouraging additional spending, but this is certainly not going to address the concerns of the enormous current account surplus that the germany currently holds. i would not suspect -- what i guess i'm watching very closely is how syria could potentially impact the german elections and that conversation as merkel's spokesman yesterday came out with a very strong statement of support that action must be taken. so i'm wondering how that issue may or may not play in. but this has been a very quiet and subdued german election with very few issues other than the nsa prism, so i don't anticipate extraordinary volatility leading up to september 22nd. >> just very quickly, i'd just

say i think heather's right. i think that the euro crisis is no longer, you know, front and center as the main issue for the g20 leaders to discuss at this summit. but elements of -- well, a, i guess i'd first say i think certainly the u.s. and probably others are not going to be quite as comforted by one quarter's, you know, modestly-positive growth -- >> we'll take -- >> in -- in thinking that the overall crisis is solved. and second, i think there will be elements of the euro situation including germany's 6, 7% of gdp current account surplu appear in the rebalancing conversation, or banking union will be something that people are interested in and the progress on that in the financial discussion. so it will emerge, but it won't be the central theme, i think, of conversation. >> over here. >> my name's -- [inaudible] my name is --

[inaudible] i just wanted to ask you about the fiscal -- [inaudible] i think, you know, g20 countries are expected to set some kind of targets for their government debts after 2016, so how much do you think, how much dominant will this discussion on fiscal consolidation? >> well, again, i mean, fiscal consolidation has been part of the conversation at the g20 since, i mean, in some sense since the beginning, but certainly since the toronto summit in 2010 where there were those commitments to reducing fiscal deficits and debt. that were laid out. i mean, that was partly because i think there was a little bit more optimism at that point in 2010 that the worst of the crisis was over and that things were beginning to pull back up, and so it was time to start focusing on what i think everyone agrees is a critical medium-term challenge for many countries in the g20.

but i think the debate has shifted over time partly because growth has not performed as well as people hoped in the first part of 2010, partly because i think the impact of some of the more austere policies that some members of the g20 have pursued have ended up, you know, fairly, you know, ostensibly hurting growth, and i think there have been domestic debates that have shifted. and so i think the conversation is a little different now, and it's more about, yes, we need to do medium-term consolidation. but in the short term, the priority -- and i expect the first, well, the first sentence of the communique will be we met in strelna outside st. petersburg. the second paragraph will be growth and jobs are our top priority. and that's, that's a subtle shift from earlier. well, it's, again, been in the last couple of communiques. but i think that's going to be the focus, growth and jobs

versus immediate, you know, fiscal consolidation or austerity. so -- >> i was personally tickled, we've now rebranded it growth-friendly fiscal consolidation. so i think we're seeing that sensitivity balance. but, again, just in the european context, we have the fiscal compact treaty where constitutional requirements for balanced budgets will start coming into play in 2016. again, that will, in some ways, impact the leeway for stimulus spending, and it cements legally fiscal consolidation. >> additional questions? with that, i'd like to thank everybody for coming to our briefing this morning. again, follow us on twitter @csis for updates on when the transcript will be available. should be available later today. we'll be mailing it out to all of you. thank you again, and we'll see you soon. ..

u.s. chemocam weapons inspector finish their investigation. it should take the inspector four days to finish their work on site. this week in about 7:15 eastern on c-span2, we're featuring "washington journal" spotlight on magazine.

tonight on booktv in prime time fairs and festival. we beginning at 8:00 eastern with the harlem book fair. booktv is in prime time tonight starting at 8:00 eastern. in our original series first ladies influence and image we looked at the public and private lives of the women who served as first lady. as we move to the modern era we'll feature the first ladies in their own words. >> the building of human rights would be one of the foundations on which we would build in the world an atmosphere in which

peace could grow. >> i don't think the white house can completely belong to one person. it belongs to the people of america. and i think whoever lives in it the first lady should preserve it and enhance it. the season two features 21st leads from the beginning of the 21st century to the present. live monday night including your call, facebook comments, and tweets starting at 9:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. now u.s. defense strategy toward northeast asia. a former deputy defense secretary with the obama administration brad roberts talked about extented nuclear deterrence. he addressed the threat and modernization of the arsenal. they posted the hour and a half event.

we're delighted to see all of you for a discussion on a very important international security topic. extended deterrence and strategic stability in east asia. we're really delighted to welcome brad roberts who recently finished a long tour of the defense department working on the issue of the deputy secretary of defense and just back from a long visit in japan talking in particular with japanese about their views of extended deterrence and i know that his remarks today will be focused in part on his research in japan but also more broadly how the u.s. looks at these issues for all of its presence and engagement in east asia. i'm happy to turn the baton to yuki tatsumi.

so i hope we'll have a discussion that will illuminate some of the issue on the minds of our japanese allies and more broadly think about americans and asian interest on the topic. welcome brad, thank you for coming. yuki, it's over to you. >> thank you. good morning, everyone. thank you again for coming to this. the first thing monday morning event. so you to be barely within the stay within the topic which is extended deterrence in the northeast asia. i think dr. roberts was indeed in japan very important period of period of time -- time. japan is in the middle of the revising the program guideline which is a five year one of the core defense policy document they renew every five years or so, and just when he was in japan, i think the minister of defense was finishing up the report. so i don't know if he had handed

any of the interim report content that went in there. i'm sure he provoked a lot of thinking on the policy makers and the minister of defense who are thinking through these issues. dr. roberts don't need too much of an introduction. you have the program here. but very quickly he just came back from the six weeks assignment and visiting fellow at the defense study. which is affiliated in the administrate of japan in the spring of 2013 and 2009 to 2013 he served in the obama administration, the deputy assistance secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy. and at the end of the conclusion of the fellowship he wrote a paper on the extended deterrence u.s. extended deterrence and the strategic environment.

and many of you might have already picked up the copy of it when you signed in. for those who don't have copies, we will put up the link to his paper shortly after the event along with the summary and the videos of this event as a whole. dr. roberts will speak how long? i will leave it to dr. roberts. he can take as many times or as brief as he wants to take on the topic. following that, i'll open the floor to questions and answers. with that, brad. >> thank you, yuki. thank you for the opportunity to be here. i thank you for making the time on august monday morning to be here for the discussion. i will try to set out remarking of twenty five or so minutes to get the conversation going. i would like to make it clear, i speak for myself. i don't represent the administration any longer. i'm not here to speak for the government of japan. the ideas are my own. the views are my own. ly try not to attribute to ohs

they don't have a good basis for attributing. this story really begins from an administration perspective with the nuclear posture review of 2009. when we received clear guidance from the president to highlight issues of extended deterrence and assurance in our overall analysis, and when we began the review with extensive international consultations, we actually began the mpr with a consideration lesson learned from prior. one was there was too little opportunity for international stakeholders in american strategy to express the view to the prior administrations. we composed a team from joint legal -- by the office of secretary of defense and the state department to conduct consultations on issue and indeed we conducted nearly 60 such consultation in the first year.

this directly informed analysis of the np are in many useful ways. highlight the fact we have -- we the united states have a number of allies who are anxious about the kinds of decisions that the united states makes in the area of nuclear policy and capabilities. and one of the countries most eager to ease this opportunity was japan. and japan came early and often to the state the dodd process, and to my office and this was path breaking kind of activity from the perspective of both countries. had had been a long time since the united states spoken with the allies outside of europe about these issues, and followup to the nuclear review, we -- the -- i can't say that -- they the obama administration

began a sustained dialogues where a number of allies in order carry-on the spirit of dialogue that begun in the npr. we established well within the european context we took the deterrence of the defense posture review and the persian gulf area we took on the number of by literal issue. institutional new processes and so with the republican of korea, for example, we institutionalize extended deterrence policy committee, and with japan the extended the term dialogue. and these were -- these are official do ilg that are lead at the level on the u.s. side. and they served three primary functions.

the first is to ensure the needed transparency about policy and the thinking behind it. as it develops in both countries. a second purpose to think through together some common emerging challenges of deterrence. and a third purpose is to qvc give our allies the opportunity for firsthand hands on experience of the deterrence capability that the united states contributes to their defense. so, for example in the context of the extended deterrence dialogue, the united and japan the team has visited the strategic plan, and look at the planning capability and visited and airbase and that value base where ballistic missiles are located. this has been highly informative to the japanese side to understand the capability of and investment the united states has made in japan's security in this

regard. the president also put a high level to co on strategic ability. we were asked to carry out the npr with enhancing strategic ability it presents one set of challenges in the u.s.-russian and transatlantic context. and another set of challenges u.s.-china and transpacific context. and in both cases we have generally seen it to be possible for the united states and the allies partner to develop improve capabilities for the extended deterrence challenge. and a manner doesn't jeopardize. this is because in particular the baa l.a.ic missile defense relevant to the regional challenge don't jeopardize the

strategic deterrence to russia and china. with china we propose a dialogue on strategic stability. and that has not happened. so far. a very important point to make as an opening point because of sensitive and u.s.-japan relationship, but sensitive in every single relationship with allieses as it is domestically in the united states. and the point is if we're putting all of this emphasis on extended deterrence, assurance of ally and strategic ability with power and our nuclear policy. how can we possibly also be fulfilling our commitment to strengthen nonproliferation and take practical step toward the long-term goal? in the case of east asia the answer is fairly simple. it we torp fail with the project, we the united states, torp fail at the project of assuring our allies and

deterring north korea. surely there would be new proliferation pressure. there would be finish progress toward the disarmament. there would be progress for steps away. and similarly, if we torp fail with the project of strategic ability with china, we're not going to have china sooner or later join the reduction process and greater stability in the u.s.-china cooperation. and disarmament with we would have something goinged in the other direction. and this is a view strongly held in the japanese community. that thinks about nuclear issue. the credibility of extended deterrence and the effectivenesses of strategic ability are essential to allow us make further progress in a practical way toward long-term goals.

the paper they was asked to write, which you have a copy of, and which is written primarily for a japanese audience, to be clear, and will shortly appear in japanese translation on the website. and is a view of strategic stability and extended deterrence in northeast asia from the perspective of the u.s.-japan alliance. the paper's principle purpose was to shift the thinking of the u.s. and japanese communities working on these questions. on to the next set of questions. after four years of dialogue between us at the official level, there was a desire to bring clarity to the emerging an lettic agenda in a way that would motivate additional research and able sphris the a

lettic community. the additional transpacific debate and additional -- with china and perhapses r orbing k and other stakeholders in these issues. the paper begins with a reflection of the view that is emerged perhaps i should speak only for myself here. my view of the deterrence challenges and the northeast asia security environment as a result of changing factors there. the changing factors are simply two. the fact that north korea is making steady progress toward developing and deploying the cape thability could deliver nuclear weapons on to u.s. allies in the region and ultimately on to the united states as well. this raisings a series of familiar to those who study the cold war a series of familiar questions about coupling and decoupling is america going to

be there or blackmailed away by north korea in time with crisis? and the other significant development in the strategic environment, of course, is the wholesale change in china's military posture, and what the pentagon shorthand the development of anti-access denial capabilities. but a modernization program in china including a nuclear component but not principally nuclear that is changing the overall balance in the western pacific and raising questions, again, is america going to be there or blackmailed away by the risks it would none defending japan in a time of crisis? and in my house, this brings three-21st century deterrence challenges that are set out in the paper. the first is the highest

challenge of deterring nuclear attack on the united or ally. the second that the -- conflict speck trup, the lowest end of the conflict spectrum is gray-zone conflicts. think coerce. think implicit threats. but not hot war. and the third is in the middle here of the conflict spectrum. a new challenge. not so much a new challenge but taking new shape of in time of war north korea perhaps china trying to determine how much leverage has got the capability and cohearsing us and making explicit nuclear threat and perhaps taking action that it calculates fall beneath our nuclear response threshold. these are three different kind of deterrence challenges.

and the high end one is the most familiar to people who thought about nuclear deterrence for a long time. the two lower end one are largely incognito to a lot of people. and thus an opportunity rich in hallmark opportunity. the paper goes ton set out the strategy that the administration has and to emphasize the point that i think this is a strategy that essentially enjoys bipartisan support and has since the early 1990s. and strategy to strengthen the extended deterrence of state like north korea and iran by diverse fying our military tool kit to add all the things that add deterrence value that supplement the nuclear component. missile defense, conventional strike capabilities, advanced isr capability, resilience and cyber and space. there's a comprehensive strategy

for dealing with these deterrence challenges and these regions that would be silly and perhaps unwise but certainly politically impossible to rely summerly on u.s. nuclear threats to deal with these emerging deterrence challenges. and so, the administration have tried to pursue a broad comp hepsive approach and if you take that view of your response to the emerging deterrence challenges, then is a strategy that provides many opportunities for allies to contribute. meaningfully to extend the deterrence and meaningfully to the credibility of u.s. commitment. and the paper sets out a number of arguments on where and how japan is contributing. looking ahead, the core function

of the paper. i highlight four issues, i think are going to be a subject of continuing discussion within japan and the united states and between us and the other stakeholders. meaning south korea, china, and perhaps some of these issues russia. first, conventional strike capable of japan. as i said, our comprehensive strategy. introduce prorcht conventional strike capability to the it's not obvious to u.s. governments generally that allies should add

to something that strike conventional strike. the united states has approximately 40 allies, and of those approximately a dozen have strike capability capabilities longer range missile or some kind. the majority deny. should japan be in the category or not? this is to many close followers of japan a new issue this is not a new issue in japan. this is -- debating adding conventional strike capability and there would be significant -- there would be about how consistent it is with the spirit and letter of the constitution. there should be a debate about what it would and would not

contribute. i'm not here to take position on the issue. i'm not on any of these four issues. the point is to say it's an issue coming on to our agenda we need to be able to debate in a serious and thoughtful way based on good supporting analysis. second topic is missile defense. how much is enough for japan? japan is probably the most important missile defense and partner in the united states. we have an important partner in europe as well. important partners in the middle east. with japan and of course my -- to actually sit in things and reflect on them and one of the interesting report i came across was from a prominent american

think tank and not the simpson center. in 2002 projected it would be decade before japan got serious in the business. we the united states and japan are jointly operating missile defense capabilities. we are jointly developing invanced intercepter. this is a very close and productive and important relationship from certainly from the u.s. perspective. we the obama administration try to set out some argument about how much missile defense is enough for america. a set of argument about how much is enough for homeland defense, regional defense, and japan has no such initial set of an lettic answers. and partially that's because the next set of questions involve the missile defense about china or not. a much more sensitive question, obviously from whether or not the missile defense is adequately composed to deal with

the north korea threat. this is not an issue requiring an urgent answer. the ndpg will take on a number of questions in the area. whether japan should consider some middle tier capabilities, whether it should consider some ashore capability such as the united states deploy with the nato allies in europe. there are some important questions embedded in the current process, but the advanced intercepter doesn't become available until late in the decade. there's time to work the questions. third topic which i shorthand as more nuclear tailoring requiring of the united states in northeast asia? now -- let me set the context a little bit.

in the comprehensive strategy to strengthen regional deterrence architecture with the element, we the administration argue there will all day -- always remain a nuclear component as long as there's a nuclear threat. this is the npr argue we will tailor that nuclear component to the particular requirement of the individual regions where we extent nuclear guarantee on behalf of ally. what makes -- what might make sense in a european context. the approach need to be tailored. and the administration tailored both nuclear declaratory policy and nuclear posture capabilities. the following very close consultations with the government of japan among others. and i can review and the q & a discussion what those adaptations were that followed in the tailoring.

but the high level of strategic question is that enough tailoring do we need more? there are analysts? japan who have various ideas about how to strengthen the credibility of the u.s. nuclear commitment, and of course there are some individuals advocating for japan acquiring capability of it own. my way to organize the discussion conceptually was to say that i think there are four simple models that we the u.s. and japan together should be talking through to see what their strength and weaknesses are from the perspective of japan's security. the first is the current model, which is based on the commitment of the united states to employ the strategic forces whenever

the night might arise on behalf an ally. and on the ability to forward-deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but well, all nuclear weapons are strategic to toward forward-deploy a nuclear weapon with a nondelivery system. not deployed the capacity the capability to forward-deploy in time of crisis is a way to signal the resolve the alliance to stand up to some particular act of nuclear bullying. second model would be to go back to the cold war east asia model. there were a lot of u.s. nuclear weapons in east asia. they were dpe employed on the ground in south korea, and aboard naval service. at the end of the cold war in the context of the presidential nuclear initiative of the early 1990 they were always on and

retired and dismantled. and one option would be to go back to that forced posture. a third would be to adopt the current nato posture, which is essentially have a reliance on the u.s. triad but also the british and french strategic -- contribute to the overall deterrent posture. and the unique nato nuclear sharing arrangement or a handful of allies participate with the united states and preparing for the possible employment of nuclear weapons by stationing on their territories aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. and stationing the weapon themselves. and that model because these would be joint operations conducted by nato is supported

by a joint planning process, and a ministerial body called the nuclear planning group. today the nuclear planning group certainly has one function, which is enable nato to have a discussion of nuclear policy without the french minister. because when fran rejoined nato, it did not rejoin the nuclear part of nato. and this model has a lot of appeal in japan, and frankly south korea as well. of course it's natural that americas allies would want to know if there were ever a moment when the american president were considering nuclear employment on their behalf, they would want to know. where is my seat at the table? how am i -- what is the consult assistant to the process that is going to allow me to somehow shape the really big deal at the station? and the nato model looks awfully

alluring from afar. but then what is the analog to the french and the u.s. japan relationship? who is the party that has to be excused. why do you need a special mechanism for that? the defense ministers in the u-japan context are able to talk about any issue that is on the bilateral agenda. so that's the third model the fourth model is one where the u.s. is the model presented by the independent national deterrence of the united kingdom and france. it's a different model. but it's also as a model got some very clear distinctions from the current practice, obviously. so my case was i think rather than try to get individual proposal for taking this step to

strength the independent deterrence. let talk together as ally about the two models. four models. sorry. fourth and final issue is strategic wability china. what does mean and how do we get it? the obama administration set out a deployment strategic stability in the u.s. china relationship without adding any content to what it might require. it was a calculated decision. we came to the administration keenly aware of a long track record here of essentially each of the three proceeding

president of the united states having achieved agreement with their chinese counter part to initiate a dialogue on nuclear weapons issues. and then essentially nothing happened. this is a unsatisfying answer. china need to be a part of the processes not a bystander and not a party building up and increasing the role of nuclear weapon while everybody else is building down. china has asked -- , by the way, what do you mean about strategic stability? do you mean what you have meant in historically in the u.s.-russia relationship.

which is to say in the u.s.-russia relationship we have accepted that mutual vulnerability is the basis. strategic relationship. we are not contesting the credibility of russia's deterrent. see no strategic value to the united states and our allies in doing so since maybe the 1950s. and the government of china would like to hear the united states say it accepts mutual vulnerability as a basis of the strategic go back to my point about coupling and decoupling. and thinking about how alliance work. and the problem is not just real toift cold war. it's relative to the 21st century. and that is to say that if america torp say we accept mutual vulnerability with china

as the basis of the strategic relationship bhap some in japan is okay when there's a conflict, and china is issuing threats. americans will stand down. so this is a short description of the fact that the three key stakeholders in the discussion have different starting points in the discussion. we all believe in the value of strategic stability. we all think that it should be possible to sustain and deepen the condition of strategic stability with china. precisely how requires a lot more work and requires a lot more than simply the united states saying we accept mutual vulnerability, which we're not

going say. so with that, let me say -- reintegrate the view i have prexes -- expressed my personal view. i'm not here to defend any familiar answer to the four questions. this was an an lettic activity intended to kind of shift the focus on to the i think i think if -- things we should be talking about. and i don't think it's a discussion just for the u and japan. these are all of these questions in which south korea has a stake. we can't possibly have a strong extended deterrence posture and strategic stability in northeast asia without a greater convergence. has many shared interest with us

and finding politically acceptable strategically acceptable answers to these questions. i think russia has some stake in some of these as well. let me thank you for your attention and hope i have thrown enough fuel on the fire to keep a monday morning discussion going. and turn back over to you. >> thank you. i want to thank -- i think you all agree that brad has thinking about the finish are long time. he really has been. the floor is open to ask you question. when you ask the question please wait the microphone gets to you and please keep your comment and question short so i can accommodate as many questionses as possible. over here the second row. thank you very much for your presentation. my question has to do -- >> identify yourself.

>> john. strategic ability as we discuss with russia and mention a presentation along -- strategic thought going back -- [inaudible] and of course at the center of that is the concept of mutual vol nerkt. if strategic ability with russia as the core new chiewl ability. the alternate base for strategic ability purely turn the an lettic exercise that the u.s. and china would have. >> it's a great question. i wish i knew the answer. there was -- it's a great question. it's something some of you should be working on. thrft an effort to gather a group of analyst on the top ache year ago --

on strategic stability. the introduction of the written by thomas. still writing at the age of 90. and he said it took us twelve years to figure out strategic stability. when it was about two countries was roughly comparable cases of -- [inaudible] in a largely bipolar world. now we are in a more multidimensional world. we shorthand by calling it multipolar. there's a shorthand in many ways is misleading and misrevealing. and the element of the strategic plan are more numerous than before. to me how can we accept mutual

vulnerability in the nuclear domain and reject it in the cyber and space. how does work? cyber and space has to be a part of the discussion. so more over, i think we have models of strikic relationship among countries that are capable of destroying each other. we worry about it. we have a relationship of mutual vol nesht with the -- we don't see the potential path way to conflict. could we make it with the united kingdom go away? we could be but it would be a huge project and foolish. maybe there is a model that include an vulnerability. we don't call it the corner stone of strategic stability.

the foundation of the streelic stability is something else. i think our vocabulary predates shellings 12-year phase. there was a long history of thinking about strategic substantial among the powers before that. it would do us well to look at the historical foundations pre1945. >> gill -- [inaudible] my question is about the coordination in this thinking that between japan and south korea. since so much here -- you haven't said much about it. particularly to the extend that china comes to the picture. are we finding that the kinds of

you have been in japan. you heard what they're saying. do you see them taking the right kind of step to try bring south korea to the picture ordinary row the difference or is there more concern at the gap is widening between japan and south korea. and how to deal with extended deterrence. >> that's ab excellent question. thing are few government officials who would express satisfaction with the stay and cooperation between japan and south korea. and among the three of us,. that said, while there are periodic or constant trouble in

to high political level, there are important things that happen at the working level, and i think there has been a lot of convergence in the thinking of the three ally about the issue. not enough convergence, but i'm not really sure that this is something that can be accomplished in the manner needed at the official level. and that this is an opportunity to attract 1.5 to bring the government community along the track one community along when it has reasons to find it difficult. i don't want to pass judgment on all of japan's china policy, i was very impressed by the degree

of the depth of thinking about how you deal china. the depth of thinking in japan about america's china policy, and the significant misaliement as perceived in japan between japan's existing and deepening vulnerability to conventional not nuclear but conventional by the pla and america's relative invulnerability to that problem currently. we tend to see that china conventional military problems the rise and time wise for japan

it's here and now. the sans white paper of three years ago said the problem in japan's security environment related to china is, quote, creeping international expansionism and the most white paper said no, china has succeeded in using force to change status quo. the capture encapsulate the significant hardining of thinking. it's not just because of a change of government in japan. it's because of accumulation experience. and so while there are element of the japan china policy i might not fully agree with. i think the depth of their work on this is born of their own experience. that allows me to make one related point, which i neglect to make at the start. that is that one thing that really strikes me being tokyo is

the government of japan is probably the most -- government of any american ally. the extended deterrence dialogue has created an alumni group say that had tours. they had table top exercises, they had pentagon policy powerpoint, briefing, blackmailed, blackmailed, they haven't gone retirement. they rotated up. it's at the time when the issues are very prominent in the view of the security environment. very prominent in the view with the united states relationship. and also at the time when japan is moving to korea the own national security council structure. and the people leading that activity and staffing it are basically veterans.

and this is different. this is not the character of dialogue the united has had with japan. it's an tension of the china discussion. their china discussion emerges out of the deterrence community. it's broad indeed. ours tend to cowment of china-watching community or china policy community. and the -- so we have a partner who is ready to exteeter a lot of intellectual and policy leadership in the issue. this casts a new obligation on us to react, interexact them in a way that is suited to this new relationship and not simply the practice of the past which was sort of hand along policy on deterrence and nuclear strategy

rather than interact the development. >> thank you. i'll get to you sir, next. >> i don't know from ncic. during your talk you mentioned a question of tailoring capability and posture in the region, and invited us ask how you think it has been done. i'm asking how has it been done? >> thank you, josh. you're a good man. this is the nuclear piece. there's the missile defense piece. the conventional strike piece. the nuclear piece sort of foreshadow in the characterization of the model of tailored approaches. but the current -- the adaptation that were made in the u.s. nuclear policy and

posture as a result of not solely as a result of consultations with northeast asia allies but were made in followup. of are two kind. declaratory policy and posture. the declaratory policy we adapted the negative security assurance. the strategic posture commission, which the ferry -- that advised the incoming -- they said fix the problem without specifying how. and the problem is the declaratory policy was essentially for decade the united states spoken out of two sides of its mouth saying on the one hand we promise not to use nuclear weapons but, by the way, saddam hussein here is a letter saying watch out.

we were advised by the commission to sort out those inconsistency without being told how. and the answer was to add a provision to the negative security assurance that basically said that you're a ben beneficiary as long as you're in good standing. consideration of that policy including the discussion of what was it an appropriate time to move forward the sole purpose declaratory policy. say that it's not only the fundamental purpose but the sole purpose of the u.s. nuclear weapons. of our allies have strong views. some in favor, some opposed. we came out where we did. s which was in regeek of the

sole purpose. posture, as posed to declaratory policy, the adaptation we made was to it bears on the question ever how to you deploy in support of the alloy in time of crisis? following the presidential initiative when the united retired everything that forward deployed. the two nucleares posture review that followed highlighted the remaining role of tomahawk nuclear tomahawk. so a submarine, an attack submarine deliverable nuclear cruise missile. and in europe we were

maintaining a different posture. we the united strived overall to tomahawk -- nuclear tomahawk in deafen of our nuclear commitment in europe rather than pursuing all of the nato unique sharing range which i previously described. the dual capable fighter bombers and the associated bomb. and the policy question was you need to keep both of these approaches? do you need either of these approaches? is there some better approach to consider? and the assessment of the administration, well, the an lettic question was how do we strengthen extended deterrence? it's what thed asked us to do. how do we strengthen that? what needs to be strengthened? what is it we would be deterring? if you take my three-part model,

the high end, the gray zone, and the red zone and the middle, it's sort of the red zone in the middle that needs help. where we have focused our policy and strategy to strengthen the capabilities we bring to that problem. what was the red zone. that was actually in a war and the enemy is taking steps right at your nuclear declaratory policy test your resolve, and your result -- the resolve with the ally too. one of the clear objective of those who cob template the possibility of war again the united and ally is to separate the united states from the allies. this would isolate the united and name more difficult for us bring our power tobar.

tomahawk or dual capable aircraft which is better for the problem? which is better for signaling the resolve of the ally or the shared commitment of the ally to the united alone? and our conclusion was dual capable aircraft, which can be operated from the territory of the ally or near the territory of an ally but visible signal of deployment and not simply the strategic from the american homeland. this is a way to signal resolve. and so we took the step following dialogue with many ally to retire the tomahawk nuclear cruise missile and ensure the fleet of dual-capable aircraft and the associated nuclear bomb that go with them are capable of being global

deployed in the time of crisis. >> ken -- [inaudible] as i understand it, the status was left murky under the term of the defense pact. it seems like we could have japan japanese we don't take a -- [inaudible] you have to work it out with the chinese. is this exriebl comparable to the british guarantee to poll land after world war ii. certain -- super seeded -- [inaudible] one of the benefits of being a nuclear guy working the u.s.-japan relationship is i don't know everything. i'm not if every element of the relationship.

i'm not really repaired to comment on the nature of sin sin -- what i'm prepared to comment on is the distinction i encouraged. i had a lot of good help from japanese colleagues in writing my paper pointed out many opportunity for improvement. one of the most interesting point of dialogue then i had an early draft of the paper in trying to explain the purpose of the u.s. nuclear umbrella. i said it's in part to assure our ally that the united states is prepared to assist in the defense and even in the most dire circumstanceses. this produced a strong reaction from couple of japan niece who said come to the assistance of an ally. that's nato language.

you have a specific treaty obligation to defend japan in specific circumstances. and we have very limited roles because the nature of the institution we have and the way we interpreted it. if you are expecting us take a role -- seems like it's all the traditional interpretation of the two ally in the relationship. i'm not in the issue. it did highlight the different expectations that we seem to have about the role in the united. i'm bill from sci. i had two questionses app an

implicit perception that north korea will become a nuclear we'll country. and i guess i want to make sure that i got that. are there from the north korea and -- tremendous downsize to a missile defense system, for example, russian interpret in a negative way. the first part of the second was chinese and south korea. the north korea and the chinese would view the missile defense system and that because the north korea are the north korea.

the first question is north korea is existing nuclear capability. the -- cape tobility deliver nuclear weapons to the united states. if north korea choose to renounce nuclear weapons this region on the part tailored in to disappear tomorrow. that's not the comment on how much progress they have knead miniaturizing. don't know and that sort of in the ten-emperor time frame i'm trying to look at. i'm -- they are continuing to make progress. if they don't, if they choose to stop north korea understands --

i don't know what north korea understands. as a matter of policy for two decades it's been the policy of the united states to negate north korea's ability to coerce others with missiles. it's unclear whether they understand it. i don't know. the chinese to me it's a remieshed -- reminder of the fact that today many analysts comment on the fact china hasn't said much about the ballistic missile. ..

we as an administration articulated the statement that we were strengthening regional missile defense against all threats whatever their source, including all the threats and east asia. so a mixed message to china. this is another topic will be house and administration have been prepared to have a dialogue with both russia and china and neither has wanted that

dialogue. so if they are not taking the opportunity that they have all the complaints what does that tell us? something interesting. >> [inaudible] thank you for all of the resources you have put into the process. we are still in the running process. my question for you today -- the reason i am asking is how the united states react to the possible use of chemical weapons could have some indication in the region and also this is an interesting case of what kind of

message the u.s. might want to send. on the one hand, you want to send a message to the syrian government not to use the weapons. on the other hand, if that message is too strong, then the government might be further in the corner. so there is a dedicated balance. i appreciate your comments on this issue. thanks. >> thank you. anyone has questions about what the first hand life has been like, ken can offer you a private view. your question allows me to make a broad point that i tried to bring through in the paper.

we think mostly about europe and the only to region and not all about the cross of the connections across the region. that's not the way it looks in the region. you can find japanese analysts decisions on the extended deterrence. you can find fewer but still some and analysts on the dialogue and the decisions made in northeast asia. there is watching and learning going on that we have generally been blind to. one of the important functions of diplomacy in the deterrence in the arms control business has been to remind nato the way decisions are made in the atlantic environment to impact the northeast asian security environment. case in point, nato set out in

the strategic concept of two years ago. emt in addition to take steps to work with russia to reduce the number of weapons in the atlantic security environment with an eye to the ultimate elimination, and this might include initial steps of transparency measures and relocation. relocation. any of you, again, to think about the age differences in the room those that were around for the decision in the early 1980's may recall that there was a moment when the united states and russia and the soviet union seems to have agreed on an arms control that would have given the soviets the right and sort of the of responsibility to move out of europe and within range of japan. japan quickly said please

rethink. japan has had to say please rethink again. you as a nato alliance have focused just on what is happening in the environment and you haven't taken a look at this problem and the astute and appropriate critique of the policy. your question -- i'm not involved in the policy at this time. this is a sensitive time for with the administration chooses to do and they are clearly stepping along the red line the president set out what can be done effectively at this point. i know to somewhat contradict the argument i just need at least when it comes to determines messaging the

administration and the white house in particular are immune to the fact any deterrents message is received by the cast of thousands and when you say something like a red line and then the decisions you make about how you follow-up on matt are decisions that will be closely watched in tokyo, the shane, the list goes on. i think the light else is aware of the context now and i can't predict the outcome because there is no act at the table and today's "washington post" includes the formulation somebody has an op-ed but it's something like a feel-good strike to make good on our

threat that it's not going to accomplish something. if we are going to use force it should accomplish something other than resolve to demonstrate resolve. but i don't know the answer. i'm sorry. >> over here in the back row. >> stanley along with brad. >> another old guy. >> in the background of this that's why we are so concerned about most korea doing something really crazy. but even kim ill sung didn't attack until he got the approval from the soviet union and his memoirs discuss this, stalin's approval of the request to

attack. if we are talking about any major north korean use of military force, that would seem to make some assumptions about the russian and the chinese positions. it's not just about us. there has to be some implicit assumption about them. can we imagine that they would sign off on some attack the way they did in 1915? if not, could the north korean regime be so irrational and out of touch to do something in the opposition of both russia and china or either one of them? i would like to hear the assumption of the discussions are regarding russia and china. >> that is an excellent question, stanley. thank you.

i hope the conventional wisdom is true and that those or constraints that will be meaningful if the moment comes the new leader seriously contemplates military action at that moment comes. i am weary of conventional wisdom and particularly in this area. it's plausible to me. we have a young man now in pyongyang who might be in power longer than castro. maybe his ambition is to play the status quo game.

brinksmanship, keep the regime going, enriched himself and his family. maybe that is the limit of his ambition and maybe he believes he needs to be detrimental to the preferences of beijing and moscow and maybe not. to me it is impossible that his vision for the tenure would be to preserve this very ugly status quo and i am equally concerned with the possibility that he might have the ambition to fulfill the unfinished work of his predecessors, his father

and grandfather, and i think it's possible but with nuclear weapons and hand and missiles capable of reaching the united states he would conclude he doesn't need to account for the preferences of moscow and beijing. and i think it's plausible he would think he could blackmail the united states out of the game. i think this would be a series of strategic miscalculations of grand order. i don't think that we would be blackmailed out of the game. i think we would discover if we didn't already perceived them that we would discover vital interests about not being coerced in that fashion and not abandoning an ally under the nuclear threat. so i think these would be strategic miscalculations under the first quarter. i think we have plenty of evidence to think they are capable of the miscalculations

with pyongyang and plenty of evidence from the experience that saddam calvinist calculate. i'm not predicting war but i think the conventional wisdom that these capabilities are for the purpose of essentially the porcupine states don't mess with me, leave me alone and then you will be fine and i am weary of those and i think japan and south korea are more than weary. they are anxious and they wonder how anxious we are about this problem. are we just discounting the possibility of these weapons being used? they are after all understood to be very powerful instruments for shaping outcomes. these new capabilities, are they just going to sit on the shelf

and not to try to change something? i hope it works the way that history has suggested that there is reason to believe that it has not. and it has my interest in strengthening the deterrence. >> i am in the joint staff and i have a question about something you mentioned earlier regarding japan's consideration of the capability to the human ginned they are going to start looking at this in the next. you also mentioned it's something they've been considering since the 1950's. so my question is it something they are considering now and what has changed.

i saw leader in the paper you mentioned that it might be a risk but the worst signal outside of northeast asia they may stop and send a message that people are losing confidence in the devotee to protect especially sort of that that red line area that you were talking about. and i am wondering if this couldn't just be the result but the actual cause of this. the current discussion of it is that there was no policy to do so. its current discussion of this i don't think it is driven by doubt about what the united states would and would not do and japan is concerned about signaling that that is the motivator here because it is not the motivator.

we spent four years to talk about how to strengthen the extent of the deterrence and the regional deterrence architecture we have spoken closely as allies about a role of the nuclear weapon and what they are credible and not credible for. the nuclear umbrella is to create its own conflict. if we were to say don't mess with them or we will nuke you. that isn't credible and to have a detailed discussion about the circumstances in which the threats are credible and not, this leaves you to an awful lot of interest between what else you can do to strengthen the deterrence. and the driver is i believe a perception the requirement for the credible regional deterrence

architecture is rising because of the developments in the security environment in the north korea's military posture the ability to deliver nuclear weapons by missile, the posture to do so, and the development in china's capability and the regional nuclear capability. they drive the question of what is the appropriate response. if we just tread water are the securities and to be safeguarded in the near term? we don't need to compete in every area. but where should we compete? what advantages should be secure? this is an appropriate discussion to have so it isn't because of the doubts about the united states. it's the changes in the security

environment and the rising appetite for the discussion about strengthening not just the discussion of the practical steps to strengthen the regional the terrence architecture. >> any other questions? >> i wanted to ask a question you mentioned that china's response has been sort of engaged in a quiet arms race versus our increasing number of interceptors and at this point we don't have the capability to intercept from china but the technology is progressing steadily and slowly so it may be beyond the ten year horizon. what does the dialogue look like and what does that act will dynamic as the numbers and keep the of the interceptors improved and is there a way that we can

talk with china to keep the strategic stability without costing them to go higher and more sophisticated in their nuclear capability. >> i hope there is that it seeks to to dialogue and china has a long track record of resisting american and its own leadership in this dialogue area. let me be clear you have a good modifier but almost an arms race or an arms race response recall ten years ago rumsfeld articulated a concern defending the number of nuclear weapons under the moscow treaty, the

strategic treaty defending that right number in part because it dealt with a potential sprint to parity by china. ten years later there was no sprint or parity so we need to be careful as we characterize what china is up to. in my assessment china is modernizing and diversifying its strategic nuclear forces, its nuclear forces. strategic is the term that we used to associate the continental and that is a misleading term. so they are modernizing and diversifying to respond to multiple changes in their security environment of which developments in the u.s. and japanese missile defense posture or both 102.

and the affect -- the nature of the ballistic missile defense in the united states is now pursuing is such that maybe i can get away with a flat statement. it will never be capable against sixth come seventh and eighth generation missiles and weapons such as big modern states are going to have for the long term. this is the business of countermeasures and declaims and the speed of these things we have designed a ballistic missile defense within a very specific box of capabilities and it can get better but it's fundamentally what it is. unless we were to go away from

fat to kill and back to the nuclear ballistic missile defense, which is utterly implausible or forward to the directed energy base which is a long way away, we are going to be working in that box and the united states is not going to have the ability even if it set itself as the goal of the ability to be eliminated completely, to withstand the russian and chinese first strike that's beyond our technology and beyond our money and their repercussions than we have an action and reaction cycle that would fit the arms race characterization. they apparently contemplate that kind of out of the blue when they wake up and think it is a

good day to wipe out america. their strategies seem to be the chinese strategy is a counter deterrence on the second artillery is to absorb the first blow, counter attack. that isn't firing everything all what once. and so when we are never going to have a defense big enough to deal with russia and china they say if our strategy is to fire one or two or three, you already do but not against the long range icbm. i think that there is a lot with china to talk about. there is a lot of analysis we can be doing together that would help them to fully understand the attributes of our system as it will influence their interests or not. and i would say that fundamentally for china as for

russia, the issue isn't the operational characteristics of the defense. it is the political impact of the defense. china's long-term ambition for the region is that american alliance structures will attenuate and finally disappeared. and the more we integrate operational the and the more we take on the common projects together, the less likely that becomes. just as for russia one of the points of opposition to the missile defense is this is business we are doing with their former allies in the territory of the country where we said if the command to nato we are not going to deploy nuclear weapons, and we are not. but the russians want us not to deploy anything strategic in those countries and there isn't really the possibility of having a technical discussion that the speech is the fundamental political objection that they have on the missile defense. >> the last question goes to the

gentleman in the middle. >> i have another question about the missile defense. on the recent failures of the tests, how do you think the event could affect the powers in the u.s. when in particular do you think -- do you expect the event could encourage the united states to try to make japan play the role in the fee based intercepted system? thank you. >> that is an excellent question

for those of you that are not deep in the defense topic i guess to really go back one step, the bush administration in 2001 assessed that it was possible by 2005 north korea could deploy and nuclear-tipped icbm. and if it were deploying more it could deploy more and if it were then i could sell them to anybody. so by 2005, american needed to have some missile defense in the ground. and so over four years, america produce and deploy it but didn't test or develop the initial set of interceptors the first group

of ground-based interceptors. and these are different from the regional defense interceptors. these are kind of small icbm interceptors that were originally conceived they were going to go into the one compliance face in minnesota. and they are capable of going long distances in any direction to enter intercept something coming in. the difference in the regional system that has gone in front of the naval vessels are much smaller capable going much shorter distances and going much more slowly. in 2005 the bush administration got to be clear that there was

an initial capability. the achieved the goal and they continued to put the ground-based interceptors into the silos and alaska and then to try to make them work because they were in a rush to get this work done. so they had been he essentially in development while they had been an operational status. this is part of the reason secretary gaetz in april of 2009 decided to pause in the deployment of the further dbi. on the other hand here we were in 2009 and there was no nuclear icbm or an eye rhenium one and we were at the point of having the ratio of the interceptors to the threat missiles so they have

the position to stop and try to fix some of these problems. there are two batches. one batch has a lot of problems and another one doesn't. the president and march i believe it was made the decision to proceed. so the ballistic missile defense review in 2010 reflected the commitment of the administration to continue to grow the homeland defense posture over the longer term if we got evidence that read from north korea or iran or somewhere else was emerging. and if it didn't begin to emerge until the 2020 time frame, then we would try to fit in the defense of the homeland with the

beyond the one that we were jointly developing. we would do that principally in europe with the adoptive approach. that would have the benefit of giving us the ability to see something coming from the shootout that is intercepted or not. the evidence came along that north korea has been making progress and the congress declined to provide the funding every year the out ministration requested it. so, its ability was reseeding out somewhere into the for future. so we had also in 2010 said that if we needed to in the interim between being paused at 30 and

after 2020 growing. if we need more in the middle, we are going to finish the 14 silos and secretary rumsfeld to go to the ground-based interceptors as the initial commitment. .. so it came out of the to be.

so that is a long answer, along bit of context to answer your question which is, it is difficult to see that there is something in japan -- that japan could do in the way of deploying interceptors that would substitute for something the united states is not prepared to do for itself at this time. the important footnote to that conversation is about sensors as opposed to interceptors. the more attack pathways, trajectories, the more trajectories there are for missiles that might come out of east asia and strike the united states the more need various for radars that can see all of these different trajectories. and so japan and the united states have made a decision to work together to deploy a second

radar to the region that will supplement the performance of the first and contribute to both the defense of japan and the americans. so i would not rule out additional cooperation in that area it not that i envision any particular kind, but i don't think there is anything more that japan would need to be doing other than -- let me close. this is a significant, ongoing issue in japan, the discussion of constitutional reform which is to say japan does not interpret its constitution as allowing it to participate in collective defense activities. so this means that as an ally of the united states according to the current interpretation of japan's constitution, if it were to watch a missile launched from north korea and headed at the american homeland, it would not

be constitutional for japan to conduct an intercept or even, perhaps, to support with sensors and american interceptor that. a reinterpretation would help in this regard. very significant political change that would enhance the credibility of the alliance in beating these deterrance generally. thank you for your question. >> with that i would like to close this event. i will ask you to join me in thanking dr. roberts. answers to all of your questions and, of course, his initial remarks. thank you very much. [applause] >> all this week at about 715

eastern here on c-span2 we feature a washington journalist spotlight on magazines. today atlantic magazine correspondent james fallows to recently wrote about california governor jerry brown. tonight on book tv in prime-time , fairs and festivals. we begin at 8:00 eastern with the harlem book fair. then from los angeles times festival books author of the still the best hope. that is followed by the gaithersburg book festival, those angry days, roosevelt, bloomberg, and america's fight over world war ii. in prime time tonight starting at 8:00 eastern. >> one of the things i looked at , a lot of the county records in which these colleges are. and when you look at the colonial records and very often you have the name of the

professor listed with their taxable property. and enslaved person are two or three. >> brought their slaves to school with them. and so if you think about this, if you look at the name of the president, and then three lines over, the taxable property is an enslaved person. what you will often have in the case of princeton, you will actually have the president's name did of the college. well, who owns the person? in this sort of common knowledge of the town, the local area, the president and the college are kind of inseparable in the wake. >> craig steven while they're on the connection between in the universities and the past intertwined with slavery sunday night at 9:00, part of a 3-day holiday weekend on book tv on c-span2. and book tv book club returns in september with this town to

parties and a funeral plus plenty of valet parking. read the book and engage on our facebook page and twitter. >> headstart is reducing services to 57,000 children because of sequestration budget cuts. the center for american progress today hosted a discussion on what the cuts will mean, the federally funded program that serves about a million low-income children. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning, everybody. welcome. i am the executive vice president for policy here at the center for american progress. we are delighted to be hosting this event today with the national head start association on the impact that budget cuts are having on our youngest and most volatile children.

we are lucky to have practitioners' here today who will know better than any of us what the impact of these cuts on the children and the communities , and we are grateful to them for coming to share their stories with us. it is fitting that we are doing this event today on the anniversary of the march on washington because this really is a critical issue from the perspective of civil rights. too often children of color from low income communities into school behind their peers. programs like head start help them level the playing field and prepared those children to enter school ready to learn. when programs like head start are cut it is children of color who are disproportionately impacted. two of the states that will experience the largest debts under sequestration in their enrollment, california and texas are over 70 percent of the children of color.

high-quality early childhood education programs or of the best tools we have to insure that children have an equal shot at success. in washington we are continuing to focus on the concept of budget cuts rather than investments in our future. this is the wrong debate for us to be having. recently one of our panelists today, are managing director for our economic team recently put out a paper that called for a reset in this debate in light of the fact we have already had over $1 trillion in deficit reduction and because of lower costs we are on track, even without sequestration, to reach goals set over four years ago. and michael's paper we also pointed out that a fiscal austerity measures are failing to -- in stifling economic growth. we challenge congress to take

these facts into evidence and to shift the debate from cuts into investments in our future. there is no better place for us to invest in our young children and in that paper we do call upon congress to embrace the president's plan to make substantial investments in early childhood education. the evidence for these investments we believe our overwhelming. the average tab is not receive high-quality early child education is 20 percent more likely to drop out of school, 40 percent more likely to become a teen parent, 50 percent more likely to be placed in special education, 60 percent more likely never to attend college and 70 percent more likely to be arrested for violent crime. other countries are acting on this evidence. china has pledged to increase preschool enrollment by 50 percent by 2020. mexico has committed to provide preschool to all its four year olds. india has announced plans to reach 60% of its children with preschool education.

these countries know that these investments will lead to a more competitive work force for their countries, and if we want to continue to compete in the global economy we need to do the same. now i would like to turn over the podium to the executive vice president and our partner for this event, executive vice president for the national head start association. a long-term advocate for children with families and in her current role she represents the voices of millions of headstart families and staff. we are happy to have her here today to talk about how the sequester is affecting bad start community on a national level. >> thank you for that kind introduction. good morning, everyone. by the way, we have a small staff, and the executive director. we have no room for executive vice president yet. and i really want to take a moment to think the center for

american progress for the generosity and willingness to call attention to this really important issue. all of us in this room care deeply about the fate of the nation's average children, and i am glad for a forum that actually allows us to talk frankly about the impact of sequestration on the population that head start serves. i think all of you in the audience for being here when i know you all rather be in front of the lincoln memorial today. so this is an auspicious time for us to be thinking about ensuring that all children have access to greater opportunities. we have all been moved by the celebration this weekend at the 50th anniversary on the march of washington. and today is the day to actually reflect on the majestically important moment in our nation's history. the joy of knowing how far we've come and the stark reminder of

how far we still have to go. and just to mention that head start has its roots in his push for equality. our colleague from mississippi is here. history shows that 40 years ago there were a drive-by shootings. and some employees were threatening. we have come some way, and we have ways to go. in 2012 scan 40 percent of all eligible children. a waiting list. over several years of funding with rising costs and rant, energy, health insurance, programs that have already begun deferring maintenance and shrinking support staff and lower salaries. so we have almost always

operated at the margins because it seems inconceivable not to spend every available dollar of providing the best possible quality program for every possible child. so with the unthinkable happened , we have little. you recently seen -- you have likely seen the office of head start reports that over 57,000 fewer children will be served in head start and early head start next year because of the sequestered. and this is not a small number. the creative number crunching thinkers on our team figured out that 57,000 people would fill a football stadium at the university of louisville. it would fill 1900 school buses and create six and a half miles of traffic. and with their arms outstretched the kids could surround the

national mall six and a half times. so while is true that this number is lower than the original projections, a closer look at the detail shows an even more troubling picture. head start programs across the country have the authority to be flexible in implementing these cuts, and that is an opportunity for which an grateful. but this local is a double-edged sword. many more children and families will be affected. here's how. programs cut over 1 million days . bella does this take away a very critical days of early learning. quality affordable child care. more than a quarter programs closed one more of their locations, meaning that parents

lose the community resource and will have to transport the children to new farther away centers provided they still have the spot lucky enough. it's a tough act for them. in addition 15 percentage in the survey reported cutting transportation. that is reducing access for the most isolated and vulnerable families. even before the sequester, only half of the progress of been able to afford to offer transportation. the strategy's for cutting are not sustainable. the program cuts. those will be available to cut next year. any additional cuts will have an even greater impact on access in 2014. the office of headstart also reports that 25,000 staff has even seen the comet -- sellers

cut. the investments, staff education and training. so, if you asked me earlier this year what i would have liked to be talking about an 2013, my answer would not have been sequestration. i have been lucky enough turn my time building as low except in some and policy makers and citizens alike of the critical importance of investing in high-quality early education. today the environment in which we find ourselves could not be more positive. the health researchers have given us better and more concrete data thrill to see the think tanks and washington pay more and more attention to this issue and to find new allies and supporters in congress every week.

i'm surprised and delighted to be speaking in agreement to the military brass. that issue of revenue for the future. a moment and recent history. it took the wind out of the sales. the volunteers and advocates. how could we have misters the support we were building? in the midst of this anxiety president obama announced his plan to propose massive new investment and high quality are learning. we have more data behind this now than ever before.

this stalemate over the budget and a lingering shock that sequestration has not been restored and prevents us from diverting our attention to new initiatives while we're still cutting children from the program. in the and the answer is the same. investments matter greatly. today we come together to talk about the impact of those investments, adding to them slowly over time, smart financial advisers tell us as well as in verse, the detrimental long-term impact of chipping away at our investments in the future to settle money today. as i think about what i fear most, it is the unintended consequences of the cuts. we cannot calculate the loss of morale for our employees and advocates in cannot calculate the loss of hope on a family that has been turned away.

what we can do is continue to sound the alarm that these cuts cannot be sustained. today's panel deeply understands the harm sequestration has caused, and i hope that we find new ammunition to use in our fight to reverse the damage. our community is a passionate one. we disagree all the time, but we'll come back to the same table because we are united in our long standing common goal to extend access to high-quality early childhood experiences to all children. i am, as always, privilege to work with each of you and grateful for your support as reconquer this world today so that we may focus again on a brighter future. and it is my real pleasure now to introduce a true leader, apparent who is a parent representative from region three on the national board. and she is former chair of the

parent council here in washington. she is an accepted -- just recently she and her daughter had given amazing testimony to the budget committee and really made some great impact there. so please join me in welcoming. [applause] >> good morning. thank you for the introduction and the opportunity to join you today. it is really an honor to be here on such an historic day to talk with you all about the importance of headstart and the challenge we parents face. my name is shibani, and i am the proud mother of five.

for years old and lucky enough to be starting again in head start this fall. across the country i know that many are not so lucky. bataan's the parent child center here in washington d.c. i am a former chair of the parent policy council in currently sit on the national historic association board. at the center we were able to avoid cutting children this year on it because we won a grant from the d.c. office of state superintendent of education. that occ grant funded an extra head start classroom that we would have to cut due to the sequestered. but this was of 1-time grant, and i have no idea how they will continue to avoid shutting -- cutting children and classroom.

just because we were able to not cut children this year, don't think that the cuts were not still felt deeply by the staff. i think this is something that many people who don't go to the center every day don't understand. the staff have been incredible to me and other parents, but you can see the extra stress is on the faces every day. several positions have already been eliminated, and even those staff who still have their job are often doing the work of two, three, or even four different people. these of the people who passionately work to make sure they learned a hell of -- are healthy, and get ready for school. they should only have to stress about keeping the children safe, and gauge, and learning, not about their own livelihood. add to really admire them, but it is clear that the sequester

has impacted staff and that unfortunately it rubs off on the children. as i said, we were so lucky, but i have also heard about other parents who have not been so lucky, parents like chris and from kansas to have to travel over an hour each way to a drop-off and pick-up per dollar after their towns program closed and cut all transportation services to nearby programs. worst of all, kelly and maryland who had to quit her job because her son lost his base in head start, and she was not able to find your for quality child care i can't tell you, i am in the same place. it is not like their other programs or affordable places to go if it was not 48. and i'm just talking about those parents who were lucky enough to even get in head start to begin with. i have many friends who will stick to get the children in

head start. upper middle-class folks who probably don't qualify for head start and many other folks to probably do. i see they are jealous of me because they know how effective it is and how they've seen it work. but they either cannot afford a program like it or they're just isn't enough room in a community to wrap up, i have to say that i never wanted or thought that i would find myself in this position. for many parents like me finding a job, succeeding get the job, and raising a young one is stressing in challenging enough. but after losing my job is struggling to find another in this economy, the extra stresses were overwhelming. his stud is help me do it now. and now found a job. even though i have, i am still not making enough to afford quality child care. head start has been the

stability in my life, but that is quickly changing because of the sequestered and the uncertainty that it has brought us. i am proud of what the center has done, but i know most of the folks across the country were not so lucky. it is clear that if the sequestered continues even we will have to cut plastrons and families. nobody seems to care or even want to talk about it. i understand congress and president obama have to make hard decisions, but i don't understand why they should take it out on our children. our children are our future, and we owe it to them to provide every opportunity to succeed. we should be doing more to help our children, but until then i just want people to understand that the sequester hurts and it is our reality and that over some 57,000 stories out there

just like mine and kelly's and%. thank you. [applause] >> you know, somebody did a study of the health of people in child care. the administrators, the directors came out as the most stressed. have a chance now to hear from ms. foster who is the executive director of the head start in new york. she was born in white plains, attended north carolina before beginning her career. for the past six years executive director. a great friend of ours and also the president of the new york head start association. please join me in welcoming her. [applause]

>> good morning. i'm so happy to be here. i think that national head start association and the center for progress for this opportunity. i would like to start off by saying -- i will repeat what yasmina vinci and shavon collier said, but in new york state there has been 3,847 children that have lost their spots in head start to this year. this summer we were unable to serve 300 children for our summer program. these were 4-year-old sioux were ready for school, and we had prepared him through school readiness to be prepared. they are losing all that preparation that we did at head start. we passed through the community we see young children sit in the windows just watching the world go by.

they're not attending a program, and they're not having any kind of opportunity. so we know that these children are at risk. children that have different family situations. they come from low-income families, substandard housing, a lot more. we really need to think about what is going on. the directive in new york wonder what is going on, what happened, why this is happening to head start and to these children and families. head start programs of cut -- they eliminated positions, laid off staff, cut hours of staff, cut staff benefits, transportation has been cut, the number of days of the programs have been reduced. we reduced our days, negotiating with lenders asking them if they can please cut 10%, 5%, wherever

they can do to help us so we can make our budget work. we are also cutting classroom and program supplies. when you talk about the return on investment, we know if you invest $1 now today your return is seven to $9 later. these children are very vulnerable. early childhood has been proven that it reduces the rate of crime, children go on to a college, less likely to be on social welfare programs. so we really need to support head start and all that it does. right now it is the 50th anniversary on the march in washington, and we have to think back and remember what the war on poverty was all about and why it was created, white head start was also started. when you think about it, it is so confusing that at this time head start is being, i say to my

tack and cut. we really need to think about what is going on. .. thank you very much. uploads go thanks so much to chevon and ouida for sharing their personal stories with us. i invite the panel up to join us on the stage. we are thrilled to have some of the best from the head start

program and i i will turn it over to christine turn it over to christine essay mills for education make which will introduce the panelists and moderate the discussion. >> good morning everyone. as carmel mentioned my my name is christina samuels. this is a fascinating time to be covering early education and young children. we have a great panel here to discuss some of these important issues. i would like to give the panelists a brief moment to introduce themselves before we launch into question so if we could turn to my left and you could introduce yourself in a background. >> i have the honor of serving as the executive director for the mississippi head start

association. our offices located in jackson mississippi. i have been with head start since 1988 and i'm excited to be here today to share some of our concerns about sequestration. >> i i am martha coven the associate director for education income maintenance and labor at the office of management and budget which is part of the executive office of the president samba half of the president we ever see the budgets of the number of budgets including education and administration were children and families for the head start program is. >> i am colleen. i'm the director of policy and planning at the office of head start within the department of health and human services and i started my early childhood career 20 years ago in the head start agency in brooklyn so i'm really happy to be here today. >> i am sharon from the center of budget and policy priorities. i'm the vice president of budget policy. this is the second go-round for me at the center budget.

i worked for secretary sebelius at the department of health and human services. >> i michael lind and the managing director here at the center for american progress. >> colleen i was wondering if we could start with you. we have heard the numbers that have been mentioned and the introduction of the over 57,000 slots that have been lost. i wonder if you might be a will to drill down a bit more to that because i know the office of head start has additional information on that and maybe if we know those numbers what we might be seeing if sequestration continues. i'm not sure what information we have. >> let me start by drilling down a little bit on the numbers we do have. 57,265 is our topline numbers of children we know that lost access to head start excess of these cuts. that is about 6000 infants and

toddlers that otherwise would have been an early head start and 51,000, three and 4-year-olds it would have been in head start. about 60% of our programs had to make this cut in the enrollment and then there were other programs that made other choices. it was mentioned at the beginning there was some flexibility about how programs ripple to implement these cuts to operate at a reduced level with the caveat that the standards we have for the quality and health and safety of our programs are nonnegotiable. that is something that programs can't minimize the quality or do anything that would not meet our general standards. we have some flexibility of things we do differently this year so programs also made choices not only to fewer children which is the 50,000 -- 57,000 number but children are receiving head start for fewer days over the school year. atop year. the top limited about theirs across the country there is

1.3 million last days of head start going to children across the country and what that really means is that programs, about 20,000 programs chose to shorten the school year so 87,000 kids are receiving a shorter head start year. on average that's about 15 days shorter so even head start kids that are lucky enough to be at head start are having their school year reduced by close to a month, by more than three weeks. and then the other big numbers that some programs show to have a shorter day so about 11,000 kids are having a shorter head start day about average programs the shortened the days shortened it and turn a half so a child that was getting a six-hour program is now only going to be receiving a 4.5 hour program or a program that was at five hours is down to 3.5. there's a big impact of the kids not receiving it but we also know they are getting less hours and less days of head start.

>> that is a great segue. i wonder in mississippi with the children enrolled in head start and the adults employed by head start. >> we are looking at in mississippi about 1800 enrollment opportunities lost so that is 1800 children who won't have an opportunity for head start or early head start and it's been a significant loss in jobs. we are one of the major employers in the state of mississippi. now that is adversely affected to not only families who won't have access to high-quality care for their children, staff who won't have jobs and then the goods and services that we purchased and fenders in the community, those services won't be available any more.

>> i wanted to go back to call in really quickly to ask, i don't know whether we know at this point what further cuts might be coming down the line if sequestration continues. is that something that is still to be determined? >> we don't know at this point exactly what programs in 2014 but one thing we do know is that some of the changes the programs made in the programs this year aren't sustainable so i think yasmina talked about we may have one had a one time cutting to chance petition and they use that money to keep children enrolled. they want have that option is there a further sequestration cuts in the future. while maybe in the first we were able to say we can operate on a shorter school year we know kids need to have more exposure to head start so those aren't things programs will have the option to do in the future. any future cuts will be compounded by the fact that some

of these one-time fixes this year and available in the future. >> i wanted to try to put this on a larger context because as everyone knows these budget concerns are going unfortunately farther beyond head start. we have the debt ceiling fight brats coming up and continuincontinuin g resolution to fund the government is expiring. martha i wonder if you could talk about what the obama administration is proposing an early childhood and what the administrative's wanting to see and maybe how they are working to get congress to take up these issues to get the funding bills going at this point. >> the one thing to be very clear to cuts in head start and sequestration in general were not the industry since plan and we are very much trying to put ourselves on a path to reverse that and more of our for early education is very much one in investment in head start not only making sure that programs can keep up with the cost of inflation and not make them --

but yasmina and others describe but also to build out a new early head start childcare partnership so some of the best things about head start campy brought to the broader subsidy system and i can raise the quality of early childhood for those infants and toddlers. we have proposed a large investment in home visiting which is in place right now but that money is temporary. it's a fantastic program in 50 states and should be continued and built upon and finally a large investment in preschool for 4-year-olds. many other speakers have said there is solid evidence to show they generate a higher return and the president very much believes we can continue to reduce the deficit in a balanced way while making these investments. that is what the plan is and the hhs or provisions bill crafted by senator harkin and supported by senator mikulski and others request these early childhood investments. that's the path that we had many in congress would like to get on and it's hard to find a member

of congress who will tell you early education is a bad investment. the struggle is how to get to the fiscal dynamic where we can ask and make those investments into the federal government. that is what we are trying to get, to reverse the- >> the interesting thing a talk about about obviously is the investment and how it's tied to economic policy and economic growth and i wondered mike if he might be able to go with that because this is something you recently wrote a report about. >> my role is not so much early childhood educational though i do have a 3-year-old in preschool so it's important. but you know the notion that we need to be cutting anything frankly right now is really missing the boat. three years ago the deficit projections were i think legitimately concerning to a lot of people. the president democrats and republicans and progressive conservatives.

this is not a sustainable path but that is not the path we are on now anymore. we have got a lot of spending cuts to discretiodiscretio nary pro-cams like head start and other discretionary programs like the national institute of health infrastructure scientific research. lots of things have been cut. we have graced a little bit of revenue and a lot of other trends that are happening in the wider economy that will bring the deficit way down. the deficit today has fallen in its fastest rate in the last 50 years. the notion that we need to be cutting anything really is i think the notion that doesn't hold. more importantly i would say even more important yet more important habits say the spending cuts we have done over the last few years have been bad for the economy broadly speaking and we can see it in really specific terms on this panel. when you cut head start teachers those are jobs right away that are gone but think about the ripple effects of that. not only are those jobs not

there but they're not spending spending money in their community. it's even bigger than that. apparently his is a head start spot for their child and they can't work anymore because they don't have childcare. that is economic opportunity lost. it's very hard to go back. imagine that scaled up to hundreds of billions of dollars over the last few years and you can get a sense of why the economy is running as slowly and growing as slowly as it has been for the past two years. it's mind-boggling that we are even talking about this. >> actually i have a question about the federal role in this that you are alluding to. one of the interesting things i found when i was writing stories about early childhood education is that the state level there is not a debate at all about the work among republicans lawmakers and among them a critic lawmakers.

we have seen expansions of early childhood in red states and blue states. i'm wondering if you might sharon, maybe you can talk about this about sort of the federal role and why it's important for the federal role and the federal government to have a role? could this be something we need to states to you no, build on themselves or what is important to read if the engine? >> i will start in others can jump in. the federal government has historically had a significant role in early childhood education. it dates back to the war on property which established the headstarheadstar t program and was one of the early investments federal government made recognizing it's a national priority that children in every state have an opportunity for a solid education and economic opportunity that comes with it. now it's certainly the case that the federal government and the state government are partners in

education and that's true in the early education world and is true in k-12 education and true in other areas but by having a partnership several things happen. first of all the federal government is able to make sure opportunities exist even in states and communities that are more disadvantaged than others and we certainly saw this in head start. the federal role also can help drive higher-quality and their role that head start has played in advancing quality not just in head start programs but in the field of early education writ large is a really important piece of history of the development of early education in this country. without that federal presence and those federal standards and those federal dollars i think we would be at a much lower level in development in early education. i think going forward there's no question that early education

investments will have to be in partnership between the federal and state governments but i don't think either will be able to do it on its own and i think left to doing it on its own we will see bigger disparities be it between states and between cities were disadvantaged communities communities of color at those children will have less opportunity if we didn't have that federal investment that allows us to equalize to some degree opportunity around the country. >> yeah absolutely. >> that is all 100% right in and the other thing is new york has an interest in me came sure that mississippi has highly trained workforce and mississippi has an interest in making sure that california has the best workers in the world because we are one interconnected economy. so it's very important -- we talked a little bit and we should talk about it more about how beneficial investments and

upward pulling through generations. it's a national issue. it's not as if the mississippi economy separate from alabama or any other so that is where the federal have to come in and say we are all pieces of the puzzle. that's like the perfect role. >> i'm wondering what your theory is for lawmakers when you are talking to them about preschool and expanding early childhood to graham's? >> one of the things we share is there a lot of interest in bipartisan interest in it. one of the things that the state level policymakers will acknowledge is their ability to invest in one of the purposes is to become, to jumpstart that investment. especially through the recession a lot of them were disinterested in the federal government one of the things we can do is we are able to be more dynamic in our investment and we don't have the same strict standards that the

states do. we can say this is a smart investment and this will pay off and here's a substantial amount of funds for preschool. get these things up and running and make sure they are high-quality and that's very important. >> the notion the federal government would become a partner is intriguing. we get stuck on this question of financing and rolls. there's a really acknowledge him and that more resources to the state would be beneficial. >> i've heard this from some lawmakers that federal money might come with some strings attached that are not necessarily interested in and how you addressed that. is that something that you have heard? >> that's always something we struggle with. on the one hand no federal taxpayer would want the dollars that we spend to be spent on something that isn't generating the high return and the one for seven return that was cited, that's for high-quality preschool. there's a much much lower return and sometimes no return on quality preschool.

that being said we are not trying to mandate a one-size-fits-all. it needs to have certain standards but let states within those broad parameters design the programs that work or their state in their community. >> just jumping off that quality piece i know that head start is going through process right now where it's asking to reapply for their grants. i wonder how that process is going in is that affected at all by the sequestered like that obviously is it vague undertaking in the quality of the programs. >> we are in a reed where there has been an unprecedented change in head start saying we are only going to be giving renewed funding for those programs that we can demonstrate our providing high-quality services and we are running more and more competition to seeing communities who is the best divider. that is our first big round of the wording for grants came

right around the same time of the sequestration cuts and for programs that are really thinking they absolutely have to be providing the highest quality services both because that is what they want to do and for their children but also because they are under new accountability standards and higher than they have ever been before. it's obviously an extremely difficult time to also figure out how you are going to italy through a year conquer absorb and operate at reduced funding level. we have never seen reductions remotely close to this program at the same time being held to the highest quality and standards. it's incredibly important we have the standards of quality but wore preppy for people that are running these programs at such and incredibly difficult time right now. >> you gave us some information about how this is affecting you in mississippi. i wonder what you are hearing from lawmakers and policymakers?

are people responding about what's going on in the state or our state lawmakers weighing in on that? what is the discussion you are hearing? >> what we are hearing are what all the other panelists have shared. high-quality early childhood education is good and all children deserve it but where the rubber meets the road is and how do we figure out how to pay for it? and what we have been asking the federal government as well as the state government is while you are making these very difficult decisions about where dollars are going to be spent don't balance budgets on the backs of poor children and poor families. it is incredibly important that the federal government set a standard that all citizens of the united states and each state

have you no a basic right to certain sorts of access and families cannot flurry should and they cannot move forward if they don't have a safe place for their children to go and to be trained and educated if they don't feel comfortable leaving their children in an environment where they think they won't grow. in mississippi it's interesting, during this last legislative session for the first time the legislative appropriated money for pre-k and we were all cheering about that and we anticipate about 2000 roman opportunities. then we get the cuts so we lose 1800. so we are looking at a net gain of 200 opportunities and it's heartbreaking. our office gets calls from families where parents are trying to go back to school for sometimes working two jobs and still not making a very high

salary and we have to say we understand her situation. we understand your concerns. we just don't have the opportunity. >> who would fund these things? it's not as if u.s. the federal government is an extremely high tax that is at the limits of what it could be doing. it's just not the case. the u.s. is a low tax country and we have are to cut lot of the programs. it's important to understand that these are choices that congress can make. this is not inevitable. it's not that we don't have the money. we are choosing not to invest the money which is a completely different thing that saying we just don't have the money. that's not the case. if we thought about these things a little bit smarter, if you said when we invest in head start we invest in research and infrastructure or whatever it is

, these things are going to pay off in the future, we are all going to be better off than the line. we don't live in a rational world but if we did that is what we'd be doing right now. we wouldn't be talking about well they can't afford it. we would be saying we can't afford not to. >> this is definitely a reporter type question to ask and then i can open it up to the whole panel. what are the chances that we will see some movement on this? we have talked about the administration and i see the secretary of education out there and talking about the importance here and you hear it reflected back. i think there aren't very many people who would argue like oh early childhood is not that important. so what are we looking at in terms of movement and i guess to go along with that is if congress for whatever reason -- are there things the administration could do want to sound could do on its own to

perhaps promote some of these issues? i'm not sure what kind of leverage for action might- >> i can jump in there. a couple of things. the president has put forward a conference a plan to replace sequestration with the balanced cap to reduce spending and make other reductions in our deficit. that is very achievable and that is what we are trying to do. if that were to be enacted or something like it we would not be facing head start cuts in the future. we should be getting there and i think that's possible and the growing awareness across the country and how harmful sequestration is to local amenities and families of all income levels are feeling the pinch in various ways. then the question is can we build off of that platform? is a mention before we have a pending senate bill that has more than $2 billion in increased investment in early education within the cap established by the utter control act. this is not wild -- wild-eyed new spending. because it's so important as we

said. that's achievable and sitting in a pending senate bill. we have the awareness that we have been sitting in the wrong direction and turning it in the destruction in the fall we could be a few months from now celebrating x. significasignifica nt infusion of resources and early childhood education. when you ask what can the administration do conquer there are-somethings we can do and there are some things we are doing such as proposing important reforms in the childcare program that will increase the quality of care that is provided when a family gets a federally funded childcare voucher. at the end of the day you need to be able to hire a teacher and have a classroom. you need to be able to support those children. we can kid ourselves that there to head start competition is incredibly important in raising the quality of head start but again the dollars have to be behind this. >> i think you know all of

washington and i don't i don't know but the rest of the country that all of washington is watching with baited breath to see what happens when congress returns in the fall and as martha said there is a growing awareness that sequestration cuts are ill-conceived, ill-advised and harming the country and harming the economy. this is an just progressives that are saying about the professional budget office has weighed in about the economic drag on on the economy that sequestration is producing and there is no question given as michael said the improved budget outlook that getting to medium and longer term deficit reduction in stabilizing our debt as a share of the economy is eminently achievable at the same time building in vestments with these kinds of things that have high payouts under absolutely central to economic opportunity. today of all days as we think about what were people marching

for 50 years ago many things but part of it was about opportunity to reach our full potential. it just isn't the case that there is no pathway from here to there. but i will say that i do think there are people on both sides of of the aisle but it denies the harm the cuts are doing. so i do think there's a pathway for replacing sequestration with him out -- more balanced package and what we see in the senate labor hhs appropriations bill it does comply with caps set in the budget control act that actually has spending cuts relative to where we were in 2010. even in that constrained environment we can make good party choices in the best and our kids. i think when people say there is no way to get there, i don't think that's right and i think the more that people engage in the conversation the more that people in the states and communities are sharing their stories, do i think there's a

possibility of getting to a better place over the coming months. it won't be easy and it won't happen miraculously but i think the more the conversation is engaged the more likely it is that we get to a better outcome. >> i have a more pessimistic view. i think what martha and sharon said are right but i think it's also important to note that while there is a growing awareness among some parts of policymakers that sequestration is bad i think at the same time there's a sense among others that it wasn't as bad as we thought it would be and they aren't hearing necessarily from the constituents on a daily basis that these cuts are affecting them. and that worries me quite a lot because i am very worried that members of congress will decide well we kind of lived through 2013.

yeah it was bad but it wasn't as bad as we thought which is well in good for them to say to the 7000 families so we will just live for it and now we are here and sequestration is here. it's a reality and we are just going to live with it. that really worries me and what we have learned over the last few years is to take the path of least least resistance and doing the status quo is typically the path of least resistance and we have to make sure that we understand sequestration is not status quo. it was a disaster and we should not have done it and we should not do it again. so i do think it's very important over the next four weeks for families who have been impacted by the sequester to call their members to make their stories known and why it's so important. ..

we're sorry, there is not an early head start. michael talked about this, taking his three year-old on a bus. there are places in mississippi, no public transportation. there is not a car.

so even if it is there, how you get there? you know, these are real people, real families, real struggles, real pain, real poverty. and when need to look at it. and when you think about it in terms of real people, the numbers take on all new different meaning. >> i can understand, something to get congress out of the inertia that you are referring to. you know, we can take some questions from the audience. i don't know if there are some. let's wait for the microphone and introduce yourself. >> i am the project manager for ready to learn, corporation for public broadcasting. we have been working for head start the last few years and have a wonderful partnership. as a partner we're wondering what we can do at the local level, state level, national level to help support you aside

from writing checks of money that we don't have either and raising awareness, which we're very happy to do. what can we do to help support you to ease the impact of these cuts while we wait for something to change at the federal level? >> i think one thing that is important to do which goes along with raising that awareness is actually dragging bodies to head start programs. there are a lot of people who think they know about head start, and they actually don't. when they actually go into a head start program, they are awestruck at all of the things that are going on. their readiness, health and wellness. head start is just not a child development program but the family development program. once you help to stabilize family there will be growth and movement in communities. that is one thing. getting people, supervisors, commissioners, mayors, and local

legislators to come in and actually see how the dollars being spent and what a great investment it is. the other thing is just trying to help us leverage will resources we have left after those cuts. teachers who can come out and help to improve the quality. the opportunities for parents to have access to more resources, to approve the employment skills or access to employment. just that whole community partnerships, and vesting in families and working together to have proved outcomes. >> are there other questions? the gentleman in the front. >> hi. the committee for education funding. my question is for martha. so when the administration released specific data on the head start cuts, very helpful,

got a lot of press, very concrete from the obviously reliable source. to uc similar data coming out about the impact of sequester on other programs? i know not every program works the same way. sometimes the date is harder to get, but that would obviously be very helpful because that does generate a lot of the press which helps the grassroots. >> one of the unique things about head start, federal to local. the office does something that's extremely helpful to program management as well as public awareness raising which is to ask a few months ago to specifically update their plans and say exactly what they were doing so we could say how many children will be affected. there aren't that many situations like that across government. that being said, we know a lot about what's going on. we know state-by-state with the percentage reduction has been in unemployment benefits. we know how many title $1 flow

through to school districts. and as we have that information and a form that we feel is consistent enough that people will take it as seriously as they shed, where happy to make it available. i do think playing god yet instead of looking a will was there. predicted 70,000 head start kate spivvy only 50,000 or cut. the prediction was done mechanically based on dollars / children. we did not know how many centers which used to reduce the number of hours or days or what have you. there was some flexibility is a dangerous word. but there was the flexibility there. i think the more that we can get that the media can understand that the story is not in an early prediction and the on the ground reality. sometimes that goes the other way. they said it would be this and it was actually that. the more we get out of that game the more the true story can co

. >> just wanted jump in for one minute on this issue to link the cuts in head start to the cuts and other education programs. a think to speak about the compounding effects of cuts, particularly in poor communities , poor communities have a larger share of their public education dollars coming from the federal government. the federal government directs more federal education funding to poor school districts. and that helps equalize. education funding is cut and can make a bigger impact in those less advantaged, more disadvantaged school districts. you have poor families in poor communities losing head start and then having dollars, out of their public education k-12 system. and that is just two programs. some of those same communities

of losing housing assistance. families that are stressed in a variety of ways and now less likely to get help paying rent. child care assistance dollars are often being sequestered. so you can see how for low-income families and low income communities their is a compounding effect. i think it's important for everyone to recognize, we're here talking about head start this morning. of course the cuts are not just about low income programs and families. there's also the cuts in medical research that is really a major driver of our economy and improving health overtime. the ability for the weather service to keep up its satellites and predict the weather accurately. the list goes on and on. i just -- but for those low-income communities and families is a compound in effect . >> i almost wonder -- and this is something i was wondering when the sequester was first put into place and we saw the air

traffic controllers and how congress sort of patched that all. i was wondering whether head start or other programs would be patched in that way and whether there would be sort of a good short-term fix or weathered will be bad because there would be no incentive to address things in a broader perspective. i don't know whether there has been conversations about doing something, going into support head start and let the rest of the sequestered go. i don't know whether that something that any of you heard at all. >> it's really important for people to understand, congress did not approve one dime of additional resources to solve the problem. they allowed the department of transportation to shift cuts to a different part. so they basically shifted immediate effects, cuts that

were going to have an immediate effect to cuts that would have a longer term effect on our infrastructure. no additional dollars, and so ultimately if you want to make sure we're investing in the building blocks of our economy, our kids, medical research this led to breakthroughs that will take for granted today and improve health everyday, it's not about shifting the deck chairs, pulling money here, put a little bit more here in deepening the cover there. it's about recognizing the right now we are underfunded. we are not a poor country that does not have the money to make the investment. but we have to have is the will to have the right budget priorities and be bowing to support those investments. and so i think that over time whenever funding level at the top line is there, we need to make the right priority choices within those funding levels. alternately at the moment we simply are underfunding

investment on the domestic side, and that's where we have to fix and have the right priority discussion at the second level. >> at 100 percent agree with everything sharon just said. if you think about who we really impact, we talked about low-income families, children, the faa a little bit. if you really want to step back and say who are we really affecting with sequestered, is the future. we're cutting the future. work cutting his investments in early childhood which affects our future. for cutting health care research. even the smaller things, other places which are not -- you cannot think of as investments, a lot of ways there dealing with sequester is deferring maintenance. they are making investments in their own infrastructure to make whatever the job is that they're doing better in the future. it's also shortsighted, incredibly shortsighted.

it's mind-boggling. >> other questions. john and in the back. >> sorry. among local educator. you guys have spoken a lot about what a quality preschool education and how that is needed, why it's needed, but i'm curious, what i the aspects of a quality preschool education that you would like to see in every single preschool in the country? >> first of all, head start started making very significant changes as far back as the 80's. staff child ratios, research based curriculum's, being able to us track children's progress.

so all of those things are important, but i think what has made head start sort of stand above is the approach to the whole town, not just the academic and school readiness side which is important, but the health and wellness side. we all know children are well they can learn. if families are not healthy they can't help stabilize their families and move them forward. so i think there has to be an inclusive program which will set school readiness and academic preparedness, but also those other things the shore of families that help them to become productive citizens and move their families forward. >> the same characteristics are very much the building blocks that we look to, the preschool for all initiative.

very much the same kind of elements are important. one that i would add is to be constantly learning, looking at what models are effective, where children learning a with a hard to make sure we are blindly investing but investing smartly for the future. >> so i think that we are at the end of our time. i really appreciate the panel taking the time to have this great conversation and thank you for joining us. [applause] >> today is the 50th anniversary of the march on washington where martin luther king jr. gave his i have a dream speech. to mark the anniversary civil-rights activists, elected officials, and others spoke on the steps of the lincoln memorial. one of the speakers was maryland congressman don edwards. here is a look at her remarks.

>> on behalf of the members of congress i represent, andi maryland's fourth congressional district. as the first african-americanane woman to represent mriaryland in the house of representatives and on behalf of my sisters in my ss congress, i'm proud to stand here with you today on the-- shoulders of women, courageous women. i'm proud to stand on the shoulders of our domestic workers and to be wrapped in thn arms of the girls in a birmingham church, she got ah a teenager on vacation.it is it's a new day 50 years later and a better day, but the day is not over. today's struggle for civiltost rights, social justice, andced c economic opportunity demands our engagement and our voice. to realize fully the dream we must raise our voices and take action.ac we must live to our voices to challenge government and ourchal community and our neighbors to o be better.bett we must lift the voices for

wages that enable families to take -- take care of themselvess health care system that erases disparity, communities and homes for without violence and clean air and water to protect our environment for futureut generations.ju we must lift our voice to the value and have our votes counter votes counted without interference. as we stand here today, dr. king would know, and john lewis certainly knows, that today is not just a commemoration or celebration. it is a call to action for the work remains undone in the communities that remain unchanged. our foremothers and forefathers 50 years ago closed the books on the last century. well, when the book closes on the 21st century and civil- rights, which chapter will you have written? what fight will you have fought in the halls of congress or on the town halls of your community? for men and women, black and white, latino, asian, muslim,

christian, jew, gay, straight, i hope this includes you. the final chapter must include your voice to >> you can see this entire event, including speeches tonight at 8:00 eastern on our companion network, c-span. here on c-span2 at 8:00 eastern, book tv in prime-time with book fairs and festivals. in the harlem book fair, a look at nonfiction books. then from the los angeles times festival books. that is followed by the gaithersburg book festival. book tv in prime-time starts at

8:00 eastern here on c-span2. until then, conversation from "washington journal" about california governor jerry brown. >> host: our weekly spot light. today we turn to the pages of "the atlantic" in which we will find a profile of california governor jerry brown. it's called "the fixer," and it's by james fallows, national correspondent for "the atlantic" he joins us now. >> guest: thank you for having me. >> host: y focus on california governor jerry brown? >> guest: on from southern california. seeing its stock over the span of my life has been interesting. jerry brown, like or dislike him, an interesting character who has the same job in the late 70's that the ad is late 30's. something that's unusual. also, whenever is problematic about american public life, the strength of our private institutions and the problems are public institutions you can see in a more extreme and polarized light.

i try to make it a parable for american governess of large. >> host: you can about this interview, one of -- an instant thing. >> guest: you're always thinking, during the whole process of reporting, going to put this together. a moment came, late on thursday evening had been in california into during people. i come back to my home, got a call on thursday evening saying he can see the governor tomorrow in san francisco. he will have time. i took the first flight from dulles airport, got to san francisco before noon. somebody said, take the 58 east to the 24, just like. it was governor jerry brown. >> host: you had a chance to talk to him. talk a little about jerry brown and now. >> guest: in his 30's, grown

up as the child. when i was a kid in california, sort of the fdr style big state, big ambition. the freeways were built, the universities were built. he positioned himself almost as the polar opposite. he went to the jesuits seminary, a very austere approach to life, and he was often described in those days as governor moonbeam. he was successful in winning two terms and. and throughout the environmental initiative, he went to the senate and did not win. ran for the presidency in did not win. coming back in 2010, it's a whole different stage of his life. >> host: those events and his political career changed. >> guest: and many people say that -- asked about this.

for while he was resistant to talking about jerry brown. he did say that when he was younger, there were things did not know about people, emotional questions and things people take. also, how much they want to here. people don't really want to your from them much. need to ration what you do. the other thing is really different about california in his second coming and also the luster for the u.s. is the california has been a leader and term limits and this constant turnover of sort of systematic amateurish of politics. nobody can stay there very long. the speaker of the california assembly was a freshman. it was a sign. jerry brown, by contrast, is doing the same job he did 30 plus years ago. he grew up as the son of the governor. he spent all the time in between thinking about california

politics. one person in knows everything about how the state runs and the rest of the government's really is not equipped structurally. so it's a rare moment where the structural problems of california are being offset by this unique situation. >> host: a profile, the atlantic magazine. as the topic of a spotlight. if you want to comment and get your thoughts, from california or have experience, use a chance to do so. (202)585-3881. for independents to 025a5382. you can also send us at tweet. if you want, send us an e-mail. it also right about one he took office, he came in after ronald reagan. he took office at 70 plus and

takes office after arnold schwarzenegger. >> guest: two different phases of american politics. certainly coming after ronald reagan, this was during his ascent and the beginning of modern conservatism. the main conservative figure before that had been barry goldwater. and reagan was the face of a different sort of american conservatism. when arnold schwarzenegger was governor, the other republican, i was a sign of the devolution of the california republican party and also of the institution of governor. really the only state level republican is essentially self financed millionaires or arnold schwarzenegger is independently famous. the former governor had been recalled. so similar you have jerry brown falling to four republican

actors. very different phases for the state. >> host: when it comes to the state in the condition of the state, you write this, as were problems, they are america's problems but worse. >> guest: here's my point. as i have had the opportunity to discuss with c-span a number of times over the years, i spent a lot of my recent life living in china. a come back to the u.s., what is so striking is what a strong about the u.s. and the only thing that is weak with the u.s. was strong as our universities, culture, companies, brands, pop culture the regions around the world. the particular problem we have is our institutions of government, which has yet seen the last 24 hours and having trouble functioning. california is both sides of the to a greater extreme. private institutions from apple to facebook to disney leading the world. universities a very strong, but its government is even more

crippled. so that's the tension for the u.s. as a whole and for california in particular. >> host: first call is from california, democratic line. you're wrong. go ahead. >> caller: well, where jerry brown has done for our campaign finance laws. california. >> guest: the short answer is i don't really know. the longer answer is part of the reason i don't know is that there's not that much that individual politicians, including at the state level, can do about that because of the recent supreme court rulings over the last couple of years. so it has not been a main part of governor brown's agenda. thick is partly because is being realistic. that's something that is impressive about him at this stage. there's an idealism and the ruthlessness. take on this oddity of

california politics, the initiative process where you can just amend the constitution almost every time there's an election. that would be very tough. he knows which battles second pick. so i don't know directly. >> host: republican line, good morning. >> caller: thank you for taking the call. the assessment of california's problems. a model for what is going on. just coincidence, primarily democratic state. right now, our presidency is democratic. the government is to bake. the government gets in the way, in california is a perfect example of that. >> the problem of california is an unusual. it will take me a few seconds to explain it.

at the national level, california being a democratic state, that mainly as a result of immigration policy. you recall during the era of ronald reagan, the electoral publican map, senators, governors. very strong. the main thing that happened then was under governor pete wilson, the republican party in california was seen as taking a tough anti-immigrant line that ended up moving latino votes to very strongly democratic. the latina's of just this year overtaken non-hispanic whites as the largest ethnic group. that's the shift in the state's demographic political map. the governing problem is different from that mainly as a result of reforms brought in a century ago by governor which essentially install direct democracy in california. people who go to the polls every

two years, change the constitution away -- in a way the legislature cannot cope with that's why, for example, there will saying two-thirds of an assembly majority to pass a budget. that was recently undone. so it is left the scale of government and california. this order to protect democracy rules were people though to have these very draconian term limits so no one in the assembly has any power because they're always moving in and out. there's a great book called the california crack up which goes into details. >> host: you say that most legislatures -- you could demand that. >> guest: in the other 49 states this the kind of creative tension between direct marker see in the form of initiatives which most dates have. the legislature can decide to adjust this in some ways. in california that's technically possible really difficult.

california constitution is about 20 miles stick because it has all these things which are passed every single time. and also, former california voter, i know each time before the election you get this giant telephone book full of details of proposals and no one can understand the every special interest groups push these things through. >> host: various propositions. one was proposition 13. we have a question. how does governor brown reconcile? the property tax. became law. >> let's answer this governor brown's view. proposition 13 was howard jarvis . the 1970's. this is installed but public vote in a referendum. the proposition as essentially put a permanent ceiling on funding for schools. when i was a kid in southern

california we were usually told that connecticut was the only state that had better school funding. now california is in the mississippi, arkansas bracket. and so this has profound effects, not the only reason for problems than. governor brown decided to approve this when his first installment as governor, but it was in his initiative. i think that was part of his canniness. something else very popular. you decided not to get in the way of it and ultimately endorsed it. alloy's the governor viewed as much the various political positions? >> guest: he's viewed as a category one. an analogy i used would be suppose bill clinton had a chance to come back to the white house. we can talk about governor brown . suppose you're helping is to come back to the white house.

also pill plan had drawn up as lyndon johnson signed. he spent his overly life learning about political scheming and had decades to think about it. but the situation of governor brown, most of the time the most popular figure in the state. people view him as idiosyncratic but essentially the trust and to be careful with the money. really is the only experienced state level figure. been around for a long time. governor brown is the only state politician. i think it is probably over boarding time frame compared to as much more polarized early inclination's. >> host: talking about the situation. >> guest: he made the case to cut the budget and raise taxes. now the budget is in balance, which it is. three years ago, just this hemorrhage on balance.

and leases for it to get out of balance is going to have to the have any news pending proposal to go through him with his veto pen. california governors have line-item vetoes. and so his main fights now i with democrats over prison funding, medical funding, pensions and things like that. >> host: thank you for holding on. >> caller: good morning. as per my whole life out there in california. actually a fan of the author here. but don't always agree with them. he was pretty much taking a hard-line and fighting the release of all these inmates which i found amazing considering his path. also, is the same line as been going on. it was a mess. i'm just wondering, is seen as pragmatic as it was his prior term.

that's the way i perceive ten. he was looking at the best solution not in the short term but also in the long term. i look at this and i know what the solution is. can you fix this? >> host: you mention that. did you ask the governor about prisons in california, that plans to correct the deplorable conditions? >> guest: i ask briefly, and it was something that i was not equipped enough to go into. i think the most heartfelt left side criticism involve the prison. it's a situation where it's an overlap of the legacy of past initiatives, very long mandatory sentences. the prison population this award. several court rulings. under orders to comy with. all the budgetary consequences. the critique of governor brown is as he is not taking seriously the federal rulings about how

prisoners need to be treated there. this is something that i am not equipped related say who is rare wrong about this. i think it's probably the biggest problem we have to deal with. and the practicality, what's interesting is a occupies a position. long-term public investment guy. universities are high-speed rail. >> additional follow-up questions. can you tell us about specifically. >> one of the bankrupt cities as san bernardino about 2 miles away from where i grew up in buried at think this is part of what he's dealing with. the specific action plan, but i know this is part of the general crisis of california. private institutions, robust public institutions and also the

regional divide. coastal california is strong. has a lot of the sort of sub prime. a lot of these bankruptcies. >> host: california unemployment. household income is 62,000. democratic line. >> caller: hello. i would just like to ask, governor brown is still drawing on his training as the jesuits priest. still drawing on his spiritual and religious background. and the reason i would like to ask that is because i have had some spiritual experiences myself that i tried to relate in the form of a book that is on

line. it's free. there is no charge. i would be interested to hear your take on his spiritual standing at the moment. >> guest: that's an excellent question. and i can't say much about governor brown's beliefs. i can say that externally when you talk with them he reveals unintentionally and says explicitly that his training in the seminary has equipped him to live in the question. when he was in the seminary for the first your to the tell you what you're supposed to believe. the rest of the time is teaching you have a question. talking with him as a reporter is really weigh more interesting than talking with most politicians because many, you feel like you're pressing the jukebox in getting some standard answer number. or else people of being cautious. and governor brown gives neither

of those. he's trying out ideas as he goes to my timing about history's. did he know that they be headed sisera -- beheaded cicero and put his head on a pike with a stake through his time. i'm just asking. so he very much gives the impression of having an ongoing questioning approach. indeed this goes over and politics. the suspicious of any big sweeping idea. most sweeping anti as a likely to be wrong. you have to be skeptical. what he thinks of as this interview of his relationship with his creator, i just don't know. the marks of jazz with education in a good sense are all over him . >> host: you relate a story. talking about the current situation. >> guest: talking about the taxes.

less and less. labor union supporting something a seven year imposition of surtaxes on people usually making a lot of money. and so governor brown went to the legislature and is making the case saying there is seven lean years and seven fat years. a seven year tax to store up for the lean years that will surely come. there's a certain maturity and you don't hear from many politicians talking about the lean years of will surely come. >> host: next call, houston, texas. the independent line. go ahead. >> good morning. back in the late 70's, maybe the early 80's, one of governor brown's run for the presidency, he suggested that the number one problem in america was racism. i understand times were

different back then, but do you still think he subscribes to that? >> that did not come up in just that form, and just letting you know. let did not come up. on the other hand, he is presiding over a state which is not only the largest aid but the most populous and also is the most majority minority stake in the country. latino population is much greater than the national average. whites are a smaller share of the california population. to govern that state you have to have some conscious of the diverse origins of the modern american people. what did come up more than that, something was going to extract from a conversation. the main problem for america to my sense of where the trustees

of the public good. people that can say her rushing us into war someplace. maybe this is a bad idea. and not investing for things a going to matter or leaving things behind. that was the main since i got from him, people in can say we need to think about our welfare as a collective people. it's an interesting question. you're right. >> host: you're right about his experiences. >> guest: so, yes. probably learned from several presidential runs that he was a state figure. but being mayor of oakland for eight years i'm sure was crucial to his success as governor. he knows where all the money is. the urban redevelopment agencies. it was a gigantic financial scam in the view of some people. a whole lot of money when from

the state tax coffers to cities where mayors have a question of morale was used. because he had been a mayor and used some of that money he was able to take control. many democratic mayors a big california cities. >> host: the next democrat line. >> caller: wide as to what so much in taxes? why does he support gay education in the public-school system? especially for children your in kaywun as three. >> i have no knowledge on the second point. the reason he was pushing for this was to correct the unbelievably disastrous budget deficit that had come and when he was elected governor. there was a 20 plus billion dollar annual deficit in the california council which is now a small surplus. he presented this as something to put the state's accounts in order for seven years. none known as a big spending

governor. if you looked at the initiatives. >> the current cost projection of a high-speed rail line. >> the case that governor brown makes for why this is important, he views this as a spillover of the interstate highway system during his father's day in the california freeways. the economic models. you see these things in action. japan and europe, you can see the economic activity. so that is the case. i will declare myself and not expert agnostic on this, but the case he makes is that it will have those benefits. >> the atlantic. california governor jerry brown, a profile piece. as it's also known, you can see it online. what did you learn?

>> guest: i guess how much she has come to embrace the joy of being a politician. is what i mean. when he first came to national prominence in his 30's in the 1970's he was very much and anti politician running against his father's legacy, living in up aloft and being above politics. now the way he is succeeding is just by having spent the last 40 years learning how politics works, the way manager would learn the business, the way of veteran sports coach would learn football. i think the fact that he loves what he is doing, also what an amazing human saga of west have somebody who had another chance in his 70's to walk the same path to watch in his 30's. everything he had learned in between and still and health and all the rest buried at think

that human second chance which is so rare was interesting to me >> host: from edison, new jersey, independent line. >> caller: hi. >> host: your on. >> guest: greetings. >> caller: i would like to find out why when it was running for president he was very good, i think, for the country. i feel that he would have changed a lot of things. you know, you would clean out congress and some of the corruption problem. i feel so bad that he never made it. i think it would have done a big, big difference for this country. >> i'm sure he would be glad to hear you say that. that's the case he was making. it's as if he would be -- there

have been a strong record before that of californians come into prominence. the california governors and senators. so he thought that would have been the case to make, but i guess the voters in their wisdom or delusion found that other candidates were more promising. and so he, like most people, we will never know what he would have done. >> host: harry from port charlotte, florida. democratic plan. >> caller: [inaudible question] >> guest: i did not entirely hear your question. what i have a partisan view? >> host: a positive view. californians have a positive view. >> guest: yes. this is the most popular -- most polls show that jerry brown is more popular now with californians than he has ever been in his previous almost 40 years in the state.

and most of the time he has been the most popular public figure. this partly because they're so few other statewide figures. this is for the moment a relatively good. for m. >> host: and he spoke about health issues. >> guest: governor brown turned 75 in april, the day after i had my last of you within. he had treatment for prostate cancer. he had a cancerous growth on his nose removed. he prides himself on being very fate. he does both contests. that is not taken on. he is entirely active. you have a feeling of talking with someone who is in his prime as opposed to someone you have to make allowances for. >> host: marry a years ago. >> guest: widely regarded -- the category of people who are regarded better when you know who their spouses are. people always think better about the -- and then me my wife.

>> host: thank you for waiting. this is why independent one. are you there? >> caller: yes. just a quick statement here. senator mcconnell made a statement the other day. he said in the public sector you can not unionized, but in the private you can. what that tells me is that of these pensions that we are paying these ex governors and people, it's all illegal because they're coming out of taxes of people. if there's only one taxpayer in the united states paying taxes, the governor's compensation, the president's compensation, other people's compensation. when they retire and someone takes the place on paying a pension. the other guy. on pain three checks has won

taxpayer. >> guest: yes. i think -- i did not hear senator mcconnell says comment. all this talk about the general retirement compensation issue. in california the way and was this comes out is public employees, not so much the former governor or senator, but public employees. this has been -- this is maybe the biggest fiscal problem for california, trying to redress that pension imbalance. that's one of the things the governor has. largely as city by city issue including colton. >> host: richard is from ohio, republican line. >> caller: my question is for our -- how is it justifiable for the l.a. unified school district to introduce the affordable health care act and training they used to be messengers?

how is that justifiable to be educational and beneficial to the use? >> guest: i don't myself know that there actually doing that. as a larger matter when policy becomes part of national policy, whether as the national defense education act or whenever it may be, that can affect educational policy nationwide. to the extent this is thenaonale ramifications. >> host: one of the things you mentioned when it comes to the state finances is according to people you interviewed, there are several industries that don't get tax within the state speech to a lot of the wealth is in service industries, not just manufacturing, bus service industries which are the fastest-growing parts of the u.s. economy and the california economy. that is largely untaxed. california tax revenue to us to be highly volatile. very income-tax dependent and state tax dependent and capital

gains tax dependent. when there is a tech industry boom or a movie industry boom, things go way up. when things are in trouble state revenues go way down, more than the national revenues. that has been part of the volatility of california's predicament. again, because of these initiatives systems it's hard to deal. it's one more of the structural issues. >> host: when does the governor projected california will be in a good place financially? >> guest: it has a budget surplus now. his job, he has been announcing with pride over the last few months. his job is to a dark piece of seven fat years of in-store up some sort of war chest. >> host: what is his demeanor? does he have a big entourage, kerry himself that way? >> guest: i describe an episode here in d.c. earlier this year during the national

governors' association conference. you have these -- it's like hollywood entourage. the governors are very modest estates surrounded by security people with your pc's and aids and in the stuff. despite the been watching too much of the west wing. i was waiting for governor brown and his wife. they just kind of drifted over. the two of them. it's like talking to a normal someone adb person. always skipping around asking me if i know what a certain palma's from or what a certain word means. actually, i mentioned the article. the know what minuteman means? and at the moment i didn't.

>> host: colleen is from rutherford, new jersey. republican line. >> caller: good morning. i was a teenager in california. loss of family. and i always, like jerry brown he was my governor when i was a teenager. my big problem was he supported the prison unions spoofs. california needs to wake up. california has the most absurd three strikes law and all the country. the lockup have the youths from 18 to 22. i can't even begin to tell you all the young black males are in prison with the fact that if you as a young male, if you urinate

in public depending on what county and what city, they can charge you with a misdemeanor or felony, and the felony means that you are a registered sex offender. >> guest: i don't know about the law myself. i agree with the general proposition that in almost everything california is america brought to extreme. this also is the case. america is and how wire among developed nations in how many people we incarcerate. i think the mandatory sentences imposed, the way in which the cost has just gone up and up, this is a major, major problem. is not something of will be solved during this term of governor brown or whoever comes after him but is a genuine problem for california and also an elimination on the national version of the same problem. >> host: you're right that jerry brown and his father did

not agree about a political career for him speech to whether his father was saying he had to get into politics. from the time he was a little kid he was actively involved. he just got a good job. the main thing about his father is the grope with no money. his father cannot afford to go to college. pate is way by leading to a boring warrior on the trolley cars. his father had that pre depression mentality of having no money. his own father, governor brown's grandfather ran poker parlors in san francisco. so the idea of being a hardscrabble kid was what governor pat brown, the father from my childhood conveyed to governor jerry brown saying you have to find work. >> host: mike from louisville, kentucky. independent line. >> caller: how're you doing,

gentlemen? >> host: fine. go ahead, sir. >> caller: i have a statement, and i would like this tournament to comment on it. about three years ago there was a show i was watching that had one of those where they do that secret body of. and it was jerry brown. he was speaking to somebody, and on this audio tape he said, when we run for campaigns we don't have any solutions to these problems. we just tell the people what they want to hear so we can get the votes to get into office. these were his words. i know i did. why would you want to support someone like that? this is what the politicians are doing. i would just like to comment on that. thank you very much. >> guest: this is something and have not heard of myself. of check later on.

let's assume for a moment, as you say, maybe for this. i can imagine the first part of the sentence, we don't have the solutions. that is part of his premise. everybody in democratic life is searching for solutions and no one has the big answers. just telling people what they want to hear, i can imagine him saying that as a description of american politics. this is what is going on. i would be surprised. i'm skeptical that don't think that is how we comes across. it comes across as saying what he thinks and not being that a fan. i will look into this. the idea away as in a secret solar jerry brown. skeptical, but a look and find out more. >> host: tom from florida. >> caller: good morning. my question is about the governor's relationship with the

california supreme court. i seem to remember that it was in his early time as governor, the end of his second term, he was cowed into removing the supreme court justice, a big influence. >> guest: justice bird. i know her name. i remember vaguely but not authoritative enough to give you the details of what happened. the one. >> caller: well, what is his relationship these days? and the appointments? what type of people this to look for? that will be the beginning of these republicans calling the democrats and beat them over the head with their tips for the supreme court. anyway, what is his relationship ? >> guest: a lot of the judiciary in california is elected. i will -- i am wary of saying things while i am not as sure of

what i'm saying. i will point out that in all the interviews i had with people about governor brown and his current status and legacy, this did not come up as a big theme. i will take the atlantic website this afternoon. things i did not know. here with the answers. >> guest: did you hear from him about this piece? >> guest: i did not command did not expect to. i heard from a lot of other people in california. the way most people up in positive, the people who don't like governor brown manley don't like him because of the present controversy. even they were saying it's a politician at this stage of his life and the stage of the state's growth. >> host: when this is current term expires? >> guest: is current term expires next year. he would have to run for reelection for a fourth and final time, the current term limit rules.

most people think he will run. most people think he will be reelected. current projections trending he would end up having four turns as governor of california. pretty soon he will pass warren as having spent more time in this job. three terms before you went to the supreme court. >> host: as he expressed an interest in running again? >> guest: he has been -- i think most people assume -- the web put it, most people assume you will run for governor for reelection next year. he says, yes, most people assume that. >> host: piece on governor jerry brown. the atlantic magazine piquancy it online or in print version, the addition of the print version. it is a profile piece. tell us a little bit before we go, one more thing you express

about what about or anything else. >> guest: its really surprisingly as the governor of the nation's largest state and as the most famous politician in that state to my was surprising what sort of a normal life she could have. he's calling his wife to see who's going to pick up the dry cleaning and working at of this third floor loft in oakland. maybe that is the legacy of just having this stage in his life. everyone in california said that's just jerry. at intel was interesting. >> host: thank you for your time. >> guest: my pleasure. >> the next three hours, programs from but festivals around the country, including a forum on science and health from the harlem book fair. after that from the los angeles times festival books, his book

still the best hope. and later in gaithersburg, md., discussing her book about the u.s. just before world war ii. >> one of the most fun times i've ever had, 2006. it looked like democrats are going to take over the house. ..