saturday, september 27th. the festival will feature 12 areas for presentations and panel discussions, topics include more reporting, feminism and self publishing. please let us know about the affairs and festivals in your area and add them to our list, e-mail us at booktv@c-span.org. >> from the 2013 roosevelt reading festival, chistopher o'sullivan discusses his book "fdr and the end of empire: the origins of american power in the middle east". the annual festival is hosted by the franklin roosevelt presidential library museum in new york. this is about 45 minutes. >> good afternoon, welcome to the penultimate session of the roosevelt reading festival. i am bob clarke, supervisory artist at the roosevelt library and we have been doing this for

ten years in this wonderful visitor and education center and one of the things i love about doing this event every year is when you have great researchers like a man you are going to hear in a few minutes like a family reunion that occurs every summer. you get to see your family again when a come back to hyde park. and a cellphone, anything that beep and moans and whistles turn it off so our presentation today isn't interrupted. second, most of you have them but if you have not seen the newly renovated roosevelt library in their new exhibits, if you find me afterwards or one of the other members of the library staff to get one of these buttons you see the exhibits for free and we are open until 6:00 so i encourage you to do that. they are really outstanding and i want to thank our friends at c-span who are broadcasting the reading festival live today, they are great supporters of the

work that we do and our public programs. chistopher o'sullivan is the author of "fdr and the end of empire: the origins of american power in the middle east". he is also the author of colin powell:american power and intervention from vietnam to iraq and some their wells postwar planning and the quest for a new world order. teaches history at the university of san francisco, and a visiting professor at the university of jordan and deliver the keynote address of the united nations 60th anniversary session, he received a b.a. in history from california berkeley, and a ph.d. in history from the university of london, the london school of economics. i give a shout out is 9-year-old father, general o'sullivan who is watching this live from his home in san francisco. thank you for your service.

[applause] >> all of your staff at the presidential library, the archivists and other ancillary staff. and at hyde park, it is without peer the place to do research in the world. you have got the hudson valley peer, all that the hudson valley has to offer. thanks very much and thanks for the redesign. a chance to see the museum, it is really fabulous. i am going to tell you a story. it may sound like the love story at first but there's a jolt at the end. we begin on valentine's day 1945. at the great bitter lake in egypt president roosevelt had just returned from the conference where he was meeting with churchill and stalin, the

president would be dead by april. and he was having a summit meeting with the king of saudi arabia. roosevelt had prepared for this. he was interested in meeting the king of saudi arabia. this was in some ways the culmination of his middle east strategy during the entire war. at the same time it was also an effort to undermine the british empire in the middle east because president roosevelt saw saudi arabia as a kind of model for the relationship the united states would have with other nations and the region. not only about solidifying the new special relationship between saudi arabia and the u.s. but to outmaneuver the british. winston churchill, very savvy, understood that this was the case. churchill was angry and beside himself when he heard roosevelt was going to have this one on one meeting with the king of

saudi arabia. churchill almost like the little brother wanted to be included, was very disappointed that the president was going to do this and churchill was worried the americans might be conspiring behind britain's back in their relations with various middle eastern countries. roosevelt had strong views about empire and colonization and the end of empire during the war. we are 20 years hence from the end of the cold war. a lot of scholarship about president roosevelt and his wartime diplomacy focused on relations with the soviet union, whether or not the embryonic tensions that would later animate the cold war can be found during the second world war period. increasingly we are going to find there were a series of other subterranean conflict. one of them being the conflict between the united states and britain over the fate of the

european colonial empires because remember world war ii was also seen by many, particular american policymakers as an opportunity to end and empire once and for all. president roosevelt had forced this idea upon winston churchill at the atlanta conference in august 1941. roosevelt always made sure when he had an opportunity to commit the british to gradual decolonization or agreements that might lead in the direction of the colonization. fdr believed the end of empire was inevitable. that this was going to certainly be a consequence of the second world war. it might happen in power during the war in certain places perhaps immediately after war in some cases some time after but he did believe that people all over the world were questioning for freedom, that they did not want the second world war to result in the return of all

these european powers to their territories. the president always felt a little alarmed about this. ing anted to be clear that the the second world war to make the world safe for empire, we were not fighting in the pacific for example merely to return the dutch east indies to the dutch, singapore to the british and so on. we know how returning indochina to the french worked with us filling the bridge for the french when the french finally got out of their in 1954. roosevelt also had very strong emerging views about the middle east. in a word to describe the way he saw america's potential relationship with all these middle east countries the word is reciprocity. he believed these countries should receive something in return. it wasn't good enough for the united states to function like a

european colonial power and extract the resources of these countries and those countries receive nothing in return. this was alarming and disturbing to winston churchill and the british because the british had behaved in the middle east in a way that was exclusively extracted without those countries receiving much. occasionally a small number of countries receive something in return but president roosevelt had a more universal idea of reciprocity. look at saudi arabia. in saudi arabia the american oil companies were at that time by and large dividing the proceeds of the oil extraction 50/50. this was not occurring with the oil company in iran or the iraqi petroleum company which was largely dominated by the british in iraq so the british fought the american involvement in the middle east if the americans

were going to use saudi arabia as a model was a real threat to the medium and long-term interests of britain and britain did realize if they were to hope to continue as upgrade power after the war, relatively easy access to petroleum in the middle east, their control of egypt with its strategically located suez canal was absolute the essentials. roosevelt had fairly well developed ideas throughout the war on the colonization, the end of empire and the path of the united states would take in the middle east. there was a general consensus about these ideas. his senior advisers on foreign policy, the secretary of state, sumner welles, his undersecretary of state were by and large in agreement on these big issues about the colonization. some people who were unsung heroes of this story are the lesser known figures, people who

were dispatched out to the region to the minister's, ambassadors to these various countries and egypt, the united states had an ambassador named alexander kirk who felt very strongly that the egyptian should know that the united states was not in league with great britain. we were fighting a world war with them but our political objectives in the middle east had to be perceived as different from what britain was seeking to achieve. and iran, roosevelt had selected along with the state department a man named louis dreyfus, a man of heroic labors to try to bring to the world's attention a terrible famine that broke out in iran during the war which was partly the result of russian, soviet and british sequestering of the iranian wheat crop. so he warned washington about this, set i can hardly see how we can win the hearts and minds

of the iranians when we are starving them to death. we should try to find a way to provide them with food aid during the war. one of the most curious diplomatic appointments was the man he ultimately chose to be america's first full-time minister to saudi arabia. prior to that the prime minister dep to double the in saudi arabia. we didn't send anyone to saudi arabia, colonel william any. this is an interesting story, he was a lieutenant colonel in the marine corps and was elected to the are ministered to saudi arabia because he spoke arabic and we didn't have a lot of arabic speakers in the american government so this was a great opportunity to send an arabic speaker to the middle east, didn't matter if he was a marine corps officer. let me give a shameless promotion to my book one more time, that famous picture of president roosevelt meeting the king of saudi arabia. the interpreter, you see in his

marine corps uniform, we were a little hard pressed to find people who had expertise in middle eastern languages. one of the first places where some of roosevelt's goals were tested was appropriately enough iraq. in iraq in spring of 1941 the british decided to overthrow the iraqi government led by the prime minister rasheed ollie, the charge was that he was proactive and hoping to make iraq an outpost for german or an italian military forces. the american state department was dubious of this charge. the american officials had worried that the british never made a distinction between being pro axis and anti british. these were not one and the same thing, american officials said perfect legitimately anti british in the middle east. the british had been there as a

hegemonic power since the first world war and in egypt, substantially before that. but it didn't necessarily imply you were pro axis. this confrontation which led to the overthrow of prime minister rashid valley in 1941 occurred several months, months before pearl harbor. america was not in the war yet so americans were in a difficult position, very poor leverage to actually press the british about this and we were always torn. americans felt we want to press our political objectives but we shouldn't do anything that jeopardize is the war effort so when the british heard this formula they immediately set basically anything you do will jeopardize the war effort so don't do anything. this sort of hand, the city way. there was a great deal of frustration in washington that we were not able to do anything about iraq, the regent of iraq, the king at that time was a baby. the region and the prime minister were brought back by

the british and put back in power. americans scratch their heads and said this isn't the best way to build legitimacy of the iraqi political class. the next big test came almost exactly a month after pearl harbor. america was now in the war and that was needed daddy did has been in the news a lot in recent years, the arabs spring, overthrow of hosni mubarak -- even this morning news about another massacre in cairo. in 1942 the british government determined to overthrow the king of egypt, they felt that he was an obstacle to britain's political objective in the middle east and in egypt. american officials had a very serious problem with this. they were concerned about perception again of the british overthrowing yet another arab leader. american officials led by the u.s. minister to cairo, alexander kirk, wrote to

washington and said farouk is not pro axis, he is merely anti british. there is a distinction even if the british not willing to make. the americans made it clear to the british that we would be upset if he was overthrown. the british made elaborate plans to get rid of farouk. they want to his overthrow to be so a humiliating and uncomfortable that they sat around in the foreign office speculating what would be the worst place to send a king of egypt? let's exile in to canada. they will send the king of egypt to canada and the americans stood in the way of this. one major obstacle the americans had was the ambassador, british ambassador to egypt was sir miles lambson. you have rarely met as the curious colonial schools victoria officials, he had formerly been the high commissioner in egypt, maybe not

such a good idea to transition your high commissioner as your ambassador, he continues to function as side commissioner, he insisted all egyptian politics, political decisions and parliamentary decisions and cabinet positions and even the sovereign itself to be made in the british embassy. this of course created incredible dismay among the egyptian this. he and the u.s. ambassador, alexander kirk, had terrible relations. kirk fought whamson was shooting himself in the foot, this is the worst thing the british could be doing. like in iran they are not making any allies or friends in the region by bullying them, overthrowing them and using violence. i mentioned roosevelt saw reciprocity as being a kind of approach to the middle east. one reason he came up with this idea was a model the president frequently used for understanding the middle east

was latin america. the good neighbor policy in the 1930s, roosevelt fought a lot of middle eastern countries might be in different stages of development like latin american countries where. his goal was initially to form strong ties of friendship and alliance with major leaders of the region as he had done in latin america. didn't matter to him whether they were democrats or had the consent of the people. the point was to make a strong alliance with these people so he sat how to outmaneuver the british to establish relationships with king farouk of egypt, the new shot of iran, the leadership class in iraq led by the prime minister and the king of saudi arabia. saudi arabia became the centerpiece of this. roosevelt went so far in 1943 to invite two of king sowed's sons, turned out to be many sons, two

of his favorite sons were brought to america on a grand tour during the war. roosevelt told the state department make sure these young men si projects in america, public infrastructure projects that would be applicable to saudi arabia, these two young saudi princes want to go to hollywood. and they're not interested in these projects, but they go to west texas, arizona in the 1940s, parts of new mexico, the arid west, these are dry parts of america, these can be irrigated, roosevelt really did believe parts of the united states could be a model for the

middle east. and whether he is meeting with the shah of iran in december of 43 or king farouk in february '45, he is constantly bringing of four stations. how many trees he planted estimate how many plant in his life, he flew over the middle east when he was leaving the tehran conference, he was surprised power era the middle east was. everyone should be involved in a big civilian conservation corps campaign to plant trees in the middle east to get their topsoil rooted and -- some of these arab leaders, he ruled over 1 paved road, so talk to him about these massive infrastructure projects, the american said we can bring a new deal to the middle east, we can develop the middle east, this will be part of the plan of

reciprocity. here is where they ran into a big problem. the american critique, the british had sided with most of the regionales, they failed to distinguish between the needs and interests of their people versus relationship between britain and thesees. over time as we develop these countries there will emerge a technocratic middle-class, middle class of engineers and technicians and educated people or who will naturally gravitate toward america and you see sort of a colonel of the fulbright program later on, the exchange of expertise and technicians and engineers developing their own country and this is the idea that we don't have to worry about the old discredited upper-class, the british can

have them. we build new relationships with the emerging middle class technocrats and educated people. it didn't really happen that way. part of the problem was the president did see latin america as a model. middle eastern societies, latin america societies are not necessarily the same. there are distinctive differences. american advisers place challenges on the middle east in trying to develop countries and also to develop an emerging middle class who hypothetically might naturally become allies of the united states. iran, the country of iran was a test case for this. we devoted more money and more labor hours to iran than any other country in the region. we had 30,000 troops there during the war and to help keep the road to russia open. we had thousands of technicians there trying to develop hospitals and schools and

infrastructure projects. the president said at one point that iran will stand as a model for what we under the atlantic charter, the idea that self-determination, teaching these countries to develop themselves can achieve. again, there were mixed results. iran had a very rigid social structure that made it very difficult for the americans to work with people other than the same discredited elites. keep in mind also that the middle east had their own sense of agency and reacted to this effectively. all over the region middle east elites just as the british feared said oh the gravy is good over in america. let's deal with in the american, we will cut a pragmatic deal, no longer the old british way of saying 99% for us, 1% view, take-it-or-leave-it, the americans actually would cut pragmatic deal. the saudis loved the way the iranians were attracted to deal with the americans rather than

the british. even the iraqis saw the americans as the coming power in the postwar era. are don't know how many people know this but when president roosevelt died on april 12th, 1945, a delegation of high-level iraqis including the prime minister were in washington waiting for the president's eventual return to meet with him and have their photo of as king saud did of saudi arabia and the shot did and king farouk of egypt. iraq was a country that was more embedded in the british system, british control than any country in the region, they were looking for a new client. the people who were showing up in washington were the same old discredited believes who in a sense did not enjoy the support of their people. with what is happening in egypt right now. it is shelling the echoes of it because american officials, one

problem we have in egypt and gregoire true the rest of the middle east is this. we can develop close relationships with the leaders but if those leaders don't represent their people what have we gained. there is a chasm between the masses of the middle east and the governments of the middle east. many of these governments have been terribly discredited, delegitimized by their close relations with britain and france. this became the presence for us, we want to work collaborative of the leaders of these countries if they don't represent the people what about the relationship to the united states and the people of these countries is something that over the decades we never successfully resolved. in conclusion i would be remiss if i didn't mention to you one of our favorite figures in the roosevelt period, one of roosevelt's chief antagonists who was not a member of the axis

alliance, charles vidal. he created for roosevelt and winston churchill traffic headaches in the middle east. in 1941, the british and the free french decided to jointly invade syria and lebanon and overthrow the regime there and their arab collaborators. when we went in in july '41, the americans said it would be nice to make a pledge prior to this that syria and lebanon will be free. the anglo free french invasion and the french were in the war position, we will give some their independence, their freedom. we who depend on intervening, overflown the first rashad, overthrew the prime minister the british had in iraq in 41, tried to overthrow route, he outsmarted them and invading damascus and beirut. americans said as long as you make a pledge of independence. of course. once this happens, he changed

his mind. now that i am here he actually may make it his headquarters for a while. i kind of like it. i don't think we are going to give them their independence and roosevelt was infuriated and even churchill said you pledged to grant independence to syria and lebanon and he countered by saying why don't you for your colonies? why do we have to free our colonies? why don't you free the positions you have in the middle east and churchill said that is beside the point and that is precisely the point. this wall broke out between the british and french over this issue but then de gaulle is a clever man, came up with the perfect formula to outsmart the british and infuriate the americans further. he decided to create a relationship between france, free france or his committee as roosevelt called them and syria and lebanon along the lines of

the relations britain joined with egypt and iraq, a churchill could hardly protest that so churchill said that was fine and roosevelt said it is not fine with me but that persisted throughout the war. we found ourselves in a strange position throughout the war, that de gaulle said why don't we recognize lebanon and syria as independent countries? they're not independent. is another of these phony independence schemes the british have drawn up for the iraqis and the egyptians. we find ourselves in the strange position of the bridge and fringe recognizes syrian independence during the war and the americans not doing it because we didn't think it was real or legitimate independence. it is fascinating to me. i do think that the past has consequences. the events that occurred in this region during the second world war had tremendous consequences for what is going on there today and what happened in successive decades. there's an element of tragedy

that we did in part because of the cold war abandon the idea that we could try to have relations with people in the middle east that were reciprocal. that they would get something meaningful back. the president did think this through and fought what kind of things would a country like saudi arabia, how can saudi arabia benefit if they have 1 paved road? let me end with an anecdote about roosevelt meeting the king of great bitter lake on that valentine's day in 1945. roosevelt came bearing gifts. a transport plane, i am sure motor vehicles were not much use in saudi arabia at that time. the king admired the president's wheelchair. he said you are lucky to have your handlers and retainers push your around in a chair. i have also rated legs. to his astonishment he gave the king is back up wheelchair. roosevelt had been warned by the

state department briefers be very careful about what gifts you receive in return from the king. the king has been known to offer people a second arab white. mrs. roosevelt might have something to say about this. the manifest for the summit meeting told roosevelt that the king would be bringing ten slave switch him which in the context of the atlantic charter was -- made us all little ambivalent but at least colonel eddie succeeded in convincing the king to leave his traveling harem at home. will allow the king to put his tent on top of the ship, slaughtered ago during the travel, we put on demonstrations of arms and gifts between the crew, the grooming and with the

saudis. when the british that kings out a couple days later the order went out, have no interaction with the arabs out all. very proud people. this told them something about the different approaches of the two countries. .. please if you have questions come on up to the microphone. >> i will sign it but it lowers

the resale value. any questions? yes. sure. >> in that meeting fdr said he would clear up any future decisions in the middle east with him. >> fdr had consistently said throughout the war -- there is a contradiction. fdr was always committed to the jewish homeland in palestine. he became more committed to this as the world went on particularly during the presidential campaign the president issued several public statements saying he was reluctant to either say homeland because more zealous zionists wanted a state that might appear to be radical so he came up with a typical compromise and used the word commonwealth. there would be a jewish commonwealth and, so he was committed to this both roosevelt

and his opponent were competing with each other to lt promise palestine for. the problem is that the president also promised no decision would be named in palestine without consulting the king of saudi arabia first and this is a contradiction here. if you are pledging there's going to be a homeland or common state that you are going to allow the king of saudi arabia -- i don't think it's good to be as far as the veto but he's going to give it number one, roosevelt met with the king in 1945 this issue was raised very briefly. despite the evidence to the contrary and the state department that it wouldn't work that they could cut a deal with saudi arabia. he really has a very talented skilled politician saw the king

as just another state governor or senator. you build a dam in his district and maybe they will end up voting on this legislation. you do believe he could offer a package of inducements that would make the king his point man in the middle east for facilitating the migration of perhaps a million jews after the war into palestine. the state department warned the president throughout the war this is never going to happen. no leader no matter how compliant is going to agree to something like this because it would be the immediate end of the legitimacy so first of all the king would never agree to this and second of all it is a bit iffy geographical stretch to think the king of saudi arabia ten speak for something that's going to happen in palestine. not so much the experts but the american officials made the mistake of thinking. the arabs were more of a cohesive homogeneous nation. that he could speak for things that happened all for about the

middle east. and our middle east experts of the times said this isn't necessarily true. he doesn't speak for the urban masses of the mediterranean. so, we clearly still have a lot to learn about the middle east. >> did eleanor roosevelt enter into any discussions of policy towards the middle east? >> only in the sense that roosevelt was a strong supporter of the possibility of a homeland or state for the jews in palestine. but she didn't get very involved during the war. post war she became a very strong supporter of israel after 1948. but during the war i found no evidence of eleanor roosevelt lobbying her husband on a lease for palestine issues. >> i know in the early cold war

there is concern over soviet intervention in iran. >> one thing i pointed out in my book however is that i have concluded that because of the cold war we focused inordinately on the u.s.-soviet tensions in the iran during the war. i found much less evidence of american and soviet tensions in iran and during the war than for the british tensions in iran and i think a lot of that was obscured by the cold war and was hard for us to conceptualize the british work in many ways a much greater political antagonist within our alliance during the war than the soviets i think that is fair to say in deleterious of the war. roosevelt felt in his lifetime we have lost sight and it changed during the cold war roosevelt felt that the relationship might be more manageable than the relationship

with britain. why? because our interests intersected to a greater extent than they did with the potential soviet empire. during the war he said there are going to be problems as they to be the fate of the baltic states these were not primary interests of the united states. now who controls the middle east and parts of asia? these are primary interests of the united states we are destined to come into conflict with the british empire so something shifted quite radically with the absence of the cold war but when you look as a snapshot on its own terms, the tensions with churchill or fraught with a potential for more problems than the tensions with stalin during the the war. >> i have a question on decolonization keeping with the theme of getting away from the

cold war frame and i don't know whether you will have insight into it or not, but this question of the british and the kind of phony independence from lebanon, syria and the model of egypt and iraq, looking ahead ten years now in history to the ban on the conference, carless is regardless for an american puppet saying you are not an authentic independent nation like we are. what criterium what he had used when he is making these distinctions and how do we want to look looking back the philippines and their home rule or independence in comparison to egypt etc. what are the criteria? >> it's an excellent question because they did as a model worldwide for president roosevelt. throughout the war roosevelt realized that he could point to the philippines as an example of

america's determination to decolonize. there would be a timetable for the filipino independence. this was disrupted somewhat by the war. but we felt that the philippines would stand and that is why we brought them on to washington and we often used him as a kind of photo opportunity hoping to send a message that maybe the british would design for india a similar approach to gradual decolonization. so the philippines was absolutely crucial to this. american officials during the war came to the sophisticated conclusion that there were different varieties, different flavors of empire. there were formal, knees and also informal, knees. because of a massive expansion as a result of the cold war creating its own and formally

and economic empire throughout the world. but there are lots of different levels in the empire. in the least the americans never believed most of these middle eastern countries independent they thought that saudia arabia was a an example of an independent country, but iran was a defacto influence in britain and the soviet union iraq and egypt were not actually independent countries to feed the had been granted nominal independence in 1932 and 1922 respectively sat but this hadn't really amounted to independence because the center of power in both iraq and egypt up until very much after the war and the u.s. knew that. we have ministers in both of those countries who reported to washington and said it doesn't really matter talking to the legislature or the king this in excess of power is the british

embassy and always has been. >> i happen to be in the oil historian and one of the things you haven't mentioned is oil and i can't believe it doesn't play a major role behind all of this political thing that you are talking about. because i know that for instance in 1938 small-company with a very poor assets discovered a major oil discovery in saudi arabia. that company and later became chevron. and then later aramco. so i still have a prejudice that behind all of this is money and oil is a major factor in the middle east. europe didn't have enough oil to get in the 1940's the major producer was a major exporter

that changed in the 70's but you haven't mentioned that at all and i can't imagine in the middle east without considering the oil. >> it is relevant in places like saudi arabia, iran and iraq. not relevant in egypt and jordan and palestine. oil is the driving reason for this special relationship in saudi arabia during the war. prior to the war we didn't have a minister to saudi arabia. the minister doubled in saudi arabia. and getting the war the colonel went there. we have a reciprocal relationship starting in the thirties the americans hope over time that we could duplicate this relationship with iran faugh. we didn't have the degree of

involvement in the ordeal that we would have after 1953 for example. but we were hoping to achieve that and the other iranians were very open to that because they were very savvy and looking for an opportunity. it's one reason why they supported the act of the powers and supported the soviet union and the united states can get a they were trying to get out from under the british and french yolk. so the american consensus on the part of the iranians and they reciprocated that. believe it or not, in my book i have a chapter about iraq. you may find that they were far more involved in trying to obtain a larger portion of the iraqi oil concession that was previously understood. one of our major driving reasons for even being involved in iraq and the second world war was to change the percentage agreement of the iraqi petroleum company. so in iraq, iran and saudi arabia are important. palestine and transjordan, not so much.

there for strategic reasons for the involvement there. >> we have time for one more question. >> it only deals in part with the least but i was impressed with your thought about the political culture in terms of the end of empire decolonization that roosevelt and i assure the state department. but what we see is in southeast asia france and indochina and in iran in 1953 after unsuccessful attempt by the brits to engage the americans in overthrowing, we get involved and the results of both of those have been terrific in terms of 20th century history and 21st century

as far as iran. >> this is where the cold war comes into play a tremendous role and in some ways altering the path we set out upon during the second world war. you mentioned french indochina. american postwar planners and senior officials in the second world war felt that if we return french indochina at the end of the war this would very seriously undermine the principles that we are fighting the war four. this is a problem in the pacific because a lot of americans fought and died and in the pacific what was the pacific war? was it to defeat japan and was the point defeating japan from various asian nations and then returning those nations to the tender mercies of the french or the british afterwards? so we were cognizant of that during the war. it became very difficult for us to have control over that to have a british military officer

in charge of the southeast asian command, which is scac because we understood eventually why they were so concerned. and you mentioned iran as well. i think american relations with iran when you look at once they started from the second world war so much optimism on both sides with both of the american advisers and the iranians what a tragedy over the course of 75 years the we have gotten to this point considering the inception we do see ourselves as a feared force. we aren't going to be like the soviets and the british and seamlessly exploit iran. we wanted to have a relationship that in some ways not only the oil revenues have been invested in the society but we make a significant stake in their development as well. thank you. [applause]