the other plan was that chicago was going to rebuild 40,000 unites of public housing. deal with the latter plan first, it's simple leer, never happened, there was an economic collapse, never built any back. that maybe is an example for the future when you hear about a plan for a city destroying things they need and going to build it up, but you don't know what the economic situation will be, be skeptical about that. to talk about section 8 for a moment, because that comes up a lot in the book, and it's really contested in housing justice circles. section 8 is a federal plan run by hud, and it is, essentially, a way to subsidize people who need help living in the private housing market, so what you, lucky, get a voucher, go around and you don't have to, you know, but landlord can take you, and then hud pays, you know, the federal government pays a lot of

the housing costs. there's many -- there's also location based section 8, for simplicity on the individual section 8 because that was the plan that was for chicago. there's a number of problems with section 8; although, there's also some benefits that the city laws often cite, and i want to be fair to the benefits. the benefits are public housing is not necessarily only a beautiful place to live, nice to talk about public housing, an economic theory, not as nice to live in public housing, but i recognize from having been inside many public housing units doing this book, and so the idea with section 8 is that you have the freedom and the buzz word is "freedom" to choose wherever you want to live. now to the problems. i think it's a program that really should be scrutinized more fully than we do in the country. there's a difference between freedom and access. there's a difference between freedom and reality. the reality, as many people who use section 8 told me, is that

nobody wants to, and nobody is compelled to accept your section 8 voucher. you end up going house to house looking for a place to live with your family in a moment where, frankly, you need it the most, and you are rejected over and over again. another problem is it doesn't help you with the security deposit because it's just a monthly, you know, dream and do you want help with security deposits and other things you need to move into a rental apartment. if anybody recently moved into a rental apartment, the monthly rate doesn't matter, the first month, you may more. if you were evicted from public housing in the united states, you might not have a lot in your pocket or have thousands of dollars for closing costs. the third problem and the one i think is the most important is that when you tear down a public housing complex that's stood for generations, then you scatter the people with these vouchers

in their pockets to just find housing wherever, you break up communities, and you break up the types of ties that people rely on for survival, particularly when you don't have a lot of money in a country that values money above everything else. it's the dispersed -- oh, so sorry -- it's the disspeer sal effect, the idea that the poor in chicago were simply sort of ban ired to the far -- banished to the far corners of the city, and suddenly, there was nobody, when the federal government needs to look out, and there was nobody checking to see what was going on and whether these landlords were predatory and so many of them were because so many of the places where people ended up then fell into foreclosure, and the landlords did not feel compelled to warn their tenants. section 8 with benefits and important that we consider programs to help subsidize housing, especially when we live in a country where minimum wage is not getting you a fair market

rental apartment in any major city in the united states, while it's important to consider programs like section 8, we have to recognize how it rose under the reagan administration, and it rose yet another way to subsidize the private market to have the federal government pay private landlords, and so in some ways, section 8 is simply turning the federal government into one of the largest clients of slum landlords across the country. >> one final question for you. >> in the book, you said in the beginning, you talk a lot about the legacy of private property ownership, and it's developed over natural history, and private property, and so i guess going to our proposal about communal land ownership, home

ownership, i'm wondering what kind of contradiction, ideological contradictions you see surfacing and the idea, to fight over levels, and particularly amongst people of color who have really been restricted from property rights and those attached to it, throughout history. >> i think that's a really good question. i think that we're pretty -- i want -- i don't want to speak for everybody, but recently, in the united states, we like contradiction; right? you need capitalism or socialism, and there's a cold war over it; right? and so, for me, when we talk about more communal structures, it's not necessarily that we want to banish the private housing market, but it's that, in my opinion, we need to open up the responsibility, both literal, legal, and also

imaginative, right, imagining different ways of structuring society and have the ability in one of the most diverse countries in the world to actually entertain some possibilities of diversity economically speaking and structurally speaking. to refer to -- to move back to your question in terms of personhood and dignity, a lot of this does come down to a question of dignity and rights. it comes down to a question, and i think it's really important, particularly, me speaking as a white american, to be willing to listen to people and validate and really hear what they say their experiences are. when i spoke to hundreds of people, particularly, african-americans, who said, we don't have any rights in this country because this country only cares about private property. that's actually something i think we need to listen to. tim wise has a great segment on this to just play at that particular at that

particular time -- blatantly rip the theory from him, but give him a little bit of credit, in every generation, the status quo says, well, we achieved equality now, but back then, things were really bad; right? in the 70s, we achieved quality then, but the 50s, i mean, that sucked, you know? in the 50s, we achieved quality then, but if you went back to the reconstruction period where we blatantly said, as the federal government said, all right, we'll redistribute land, take a lot of gases and redistribute it to the freed slaves, you know, and then, well, we're not going to do that or have that policy or do that, well, that moment sucked, but the 1950s, that's okay. we achievedded racial equality. i think it's important. we're in a moment, in 2013, and, again, we've achieved racial equality, we have a black president, i mean, come on. it's important for all of us, regardless of our race, religion, or anything, to be willing to listen to other people in society and say, if

you don't feel like your right as an american are ensured, well, then we have to do something about it, and we've got to be imaginative about it, and maybe collective ownership is not a possibility. maybe something else is a possibility. we don't necessarily know what it is. in my mind, it's that listening, and it's that ability to recognize the voices of other people, and validate their experiences as true, and then being willing to imagine together how we could be restructuring things such that they would be different. that, to me, is my task, and that is what i try to achieve in this book. >> thank you. [applause]

>> thank you, nina, it's a great pleasure to be here at the hudson institute, but it's enormously influ enissue actor in the washington policy debate, and i'm privileged to be here to talk about the book. now, let me first make an announcement on, and here, they want you to keep your cell phones on. turn them to silent, but tweet as much as you like. [laughter] it's a real privilege, as i said, talking about the book, and i'll say at the outset, i'm a fan, and i think this is an outstanding book. it's a gem of a book.

i want to make four points, and i'll offer a bit of a book review and make four major points, and then we'll discuss them with sam, and then we'll open it up for discussion and debate with all of you. i get first to make observations about this gem of a book. it's not just an insightful and sensitive look at the world of coptic christianity. sam wrote a very brave book. it could easily have been in motherland lost, easily have been a litany of persecution. i say merely with a sense of enormous tragedy because that would have been justified. cop versus rome, muslim, pros

tonight, europe, arab, the list goes on. the legacy of persecution and tragedy on top of persecution and tragedy is so profound that that alone would have merited a deep history by historian like sam, but sam goes forty because he also frames his narrative in terms of copt, a brutally honest portrayal of the internal divisions, lady versus clergy, pope versus bis spots, hermits against church administration, rich versus poor, accommodationists against communalists, ect.. sam bears it all. he bears the external history of tragedy and persecution as well

as the internal attentions at the heart of the story for almost two my millenniums. it is, at some points, a tale of intrigue among popes and metropoll tans, mon -- monastaries, but it's a remarkable story portrayed in all dimensions. it's a courageous story for doing that. sam's book, secondly, is courageous in another way. he takes on the pillars of accepted wisdom about egyptian history, albert, for example, and he skewers them with delicacy and precision and subtlety. the target, first and foremost, is the conventional idea of egypt's liberal age. now, there's a lot of nostalgia

in the study of the modern middle east. one piece, for example, concerns the idea of a golden age, the idea that muslims and jews live together in peace and harmony, and, you know, a millennium ago. as we know, there's more fiction than reality there. the golden age was quite limited in both time and space. it was an outlier in history. although, it's important to note until recently, it was always better to be born a jew in muslim lands than to be a jew in christianland. that's a different story for another event. similarly, there's a narrative about our history concerning a liberal age, especially egypt's liberal age. in the early decade of the 20th century, the time of the constitution, ect., when muslims

and cops had identities to forge a single peoplehood. this remarkably timed book explains in eye-opening fashion how there's more fiction than fact in that idea, idealized idea as well. he explains how that idea came to be, explains how so many cops bought into the idea, and why, therefore, this idea of a liberal age that was never truly liberal persists until today, and that gives rise to some of the historical nature of the egyptian political debate that exists today. that brings me to a third key point because this very thin

tone explains an enigma behind today's headlines, explains an enigma behind today's politics. why is it? here's the enigma. why is it that the secular elite that went into the streets in january and february 2011, to force the ouster of one lone time general, mubarak, today is the same secular elites behind the empowerment of another general, and the crackdown that is now underway against the partisans of the former president and muslim brotherhood more general. how is it that same sec secular elite fought for liberalism and

democracy two years ago, and today supports -- call it what you like, but difficult to say it's a liberal and democratic movement in egypt against the forces of darkness, the muslim brotherhood, all in the name of reform and change. the answer? the answer, as sam masterfully explained, not knowing that the book would be coming out in the middle of this moment, the answer that sam gives is that the process of evolution in egypt was the opposite of what we think is the process of political evolution here in america. for us, the idea of american government, the very idea of government is to limit the power of the states, and our freedoms,

as much as anything else, our freedoms from government, from the abusive power of the state, but sam explains brilliantly that in egypt, freedom, liberalism, independence, actually springs from the state itself. the state is the giver, the fount of education, of opportunity, of rights, of sorts, and perhaps this harkens back to ali, perhaps it harkens back to whatever, but it's a very different source of political day namics than what we are used to here, and if you believe that the state is the source, the giver of rights, the protecter of liberties, then empowering the states and

empowering the strongest arm of the state, namely the military, is sort of the height of what it means to be, in this context, liberal because the state is the source of freedom. it turns on its head the way we understand is it america, but it makes perfect sense the way sam explained the egyptian dynamic. by smort supporting the supremacy of the state against provocateurs and terrorists is in the egyptian political discourse to be liberal, to be free. read this book, and a lightbulb goes off over your head explains, to what to many americans, might be unexplainable, and that is a real gift. forthly, i wanted to just make a

comment about what comes through as a sense of personal tragedy. look, only at the end of the book, first in a footnote, and then just one reference in the text, do we immediate sam himself, as part of the story of a historic exodus of cops. part of a new dynamic that turns on its head 1900 years of history and begins with the cops empowering on something totally new and unknown. , you know, one of the louis' sight of the observations about muslim life in the contemporary era has to do with migration. for 1300-odd years, muslims never voluntarily took themselves from lands of muslim control and migrated to be minorities in lands of

non-muslim control. that changed, professor louis noted, that changed in the middle of the last century with the movement of muslims from turkey into central europe, north africa, into french-speaking europe, and the subcontinent into british held territories. that tend was just 1300 years old. we have one even older that is just now beginning to get underway. the movement of cops after 1900 years from, i mean, to say historic homeland does not begin -- is -- it's a superficial way of saying it because to be cop is to be egyptian, for hundreds of years, i mean, it means egyptian, egyptian means, and cops were a

majority of egypt well into the muslim era, but now as sam notes with regreet, sadness, and a sense of the unknown, now cops have begun the great immigration outward, and there are now 550coptic churches outside egypt. it's a growing church, except it is dying in egypt because of the repression and persecution, combination of state power and islamic extremism. where does this lead? can the church survive without a strong pillar in egypt? can the church survive without much christianity with egypt in the future. it is a tragic question, even to ask, but, sadly, as sam notes, this is not a hypothetical, so

sam, for your courage in addressing all these issues, history, among itself, and with the world around it, taking on pillars of the establishment of middle east historians, for explaning the unexplainable about egyptian politics today and asking the tragic, but urgent question about the future of the world today, thank you. thank you very much. i commend this book without reservation. thanks. [applause] >> while it's very hard to comment on all those kind words and comments about the book, i'm known robert since i came to washington, perhaps in

2009-2010, when i met him for the first time, and perhaps when the horror was beginning, i followed his program from the horror where he would have the guests -- the guests from washington, and to explain washington, basically, to the ash world, and it was a very different program from the things one used to watch in the region, and the region, we have all the narratives about what happens in washington, the conspiracies that take place in washington, and to actually see washington, see the policymakers commence and debate ideas, that's what something different. i think robert has grasped or presented, really, the book. when they first asked me to write the book, it was both for

me a great toy and, in a sense, one that i took with great reluctance. it was a great joy because it's an excellent series of books, and i think through acclaimed authors like charlie hill and bernard louis, but it was also a challenge in the sense that i personally had attempted to stay away from the issue. the issue, my political ideas had taken me far from it to first at the young age, process of liberalism after that; but in all that, i attempted to ignore that aspect of identity. i fell prey to the liberal narrative i attempted to deconstruct, that there was a choice to be made. you can be a cop or egyptian. you couldn't be both at the same time. there was a conflict there that

needed one to choose. writing the book was a fascinating experience, perhaps, a personal journey for me along the way. i discovered things that i didn't know about egyptian history writing it. the basic narrative you talk in egypt about basic history, about the story of the liberal age, and many other things, even the churches' official narrative, is very different from what you see in the stories as you refer to them. there's two dominating narratives in explaning the situation of cops in egypt. the first is naturally that of persecution. cops have always been persecuted, the romans, arabs, internally suffering, declining numbers throughout the century. the other narrative, of course, is that of national unity. the cops have always lived in

perfect eternal harmony in egypt and only evil foreign forces that divide them, wedge the differences between them, but they can live in harmony and have lived in the past. the first narrative, of course, is move agencies, and that's something, i hope, people see in the book. yes, they have been persecuted in egypt, but they have not been only helpless victims, and 234 years of decline in learning, you get a man like the pope, or promountainoused in -- promountainoused in the north, out of nowhere, a pope coming for seven years and builds the first modern school for females in egypt. that is out of nowhere. first female education in egypt is not brought by a modernizing ruler, but by a pope who imports the princing press from europe, the second printing prez in the

country, and part reforming the church as an institution. he starts educating people, five schools, opens modern schools, and when we look at egypt's prime ministers after that, 20-30 years after that, four of egypt's future prime ministers graduate from the main school, so while the narratives of persecution is fair, you also get the story of an endurance of the people, of agency on behalf of people, of people choosing to shape their own futures, shape their own church. when we come to the modern times of a complete decline in the church under the pope, and this is in late 40s, early 50s, of corruption inside the church, the time where any fame person might not choose the life of the church, and you come to a

generation of egypt's -- sad as this, the youngest graduates of the law in egypt's history, and he leaves all that, and admitted how young he is, you need that to choose the life of the desert in a corrupted church, a church facing scandals and destruction and they were a successful pharmacy, leaves the pharmacy, and chooses that to revive the church. when you go through the reviving, the modern movements inside the church, it's a very different story from one of that of persecution. it's, in a sense, the the story has been one of two faces. they are together. yet, it's the story of decline, but it's also one of survival. yes, it's a story of decay, but it's one of endurance as well.

you see that when we remember the moments in history, christianity, it was well fed throughout north africa, and only al exandria stands today. only they remained, and there's something there about endurance of a church and people. the second is a perm story for me, the conventional wisdom about liberalism in egypt. if you're an egyptian liberal, and i use that term loosely here in this case, you naturally believe that egypt was heaven on earth, and they came in 1952 and destroyed help. growing up, the question was, if it was so great, where does this come from in the first place?

.. we get all the movement. doesn't mean there was something wrong there? doesn't it mean there was something there that lead to the emergence of all of those movements? so it's been a personal quest in a sen to find an answer to that. what was it that was wrong with the beginning? where did egypt two wrong?

was it from the beginning, was it in the middle? where did the destructive past -- path we are set on begin? the conventional wisdom there were great liberals napes had important ideas of europe attempted to modernize their country, and then something happened. often historians call the late 19 30s or' 30s in general crisis in orientation. a new generation emergence that trajects not a lot of -- but that trajects this orientation toward europe. the book in 1938 is often given as the turning point in history. he's their warning. -- that egypt did not belong to an

arab or islamic world. it belonged to a mediterranean culture. no one after that talked about the west or the mediterranean culture belonging to it. egypt became islammic for some part of the arab world. that's what was the moment of supposed change. perhaps the only history book ever written about egypt that attempted to challenge these was a book by a historian challenging that and looking at intellectual history. what was going on there? ing something weren't as people were portraying it. different in a sense that a war of -- my intent here was to go even more in-depth than what he had done. to try to look at the early story of liberals and where it

came from. looking at their relationship with the states in a sen explains boom the failure of liberalism in the past and itself current predictment in egypt. the first modernizers, i think that's the best toward describe people like mohammad abdul, and mohammad -- or any of these thinkers they are modernizers and not necessarily liberals. the question for them was how do we catch up? napoleon had come to egypt in 1798, and the it was beginning to crumble. he frames the question brilliantly. what went wrong? why have the europeans advance and we haven't? why is it the men we met that came earlier -- centuries earlier as a crusaders suddenly turned to the modern

frenchman? what is it that happens in the middle that changed all of this? and the beginnings, you see the beginnings of by those thinkers emerging within the state. mold ally begin the process of modernization. the current joke is the egyptian army has a state. that's mohammad ally's state. it was focused on building a large army. he doesn't time for the idea of europe. modernization is simply let's copy the technology they have. do they have a -- let's deport one. do they have modern weapon i are? we'll have some as women. there's a famous story about books being translated. he couldn't write or read. he asked some of the assistants to translate european works to him to read for him at night.

somebody thought about translating mac -- it's translated day by day. every day ten pages or so are listened. and the man listens second, third, fourth day. by the fourth day he sells them to stop. i've listened to you for three days thinking i can learn something. i have no use for this book. i know, so many more tricks than he does. [laughter] that's in a sense is the christy. because in reality historical -- [inaudible] that part grasping the idea behind of there. and his grandson is nice, and tend to copy the outer level of

civilization. they have we have the nice building, we'll do this as well. he stole the european monarch problem assuming the crown giving speech to their people. he asked the assistant to write one and never read beforehand and doesn't tell the assistant anything what he should write. it covers -- hey committed himself to promises that he never knew he wanted to put himself in to action. which forces him to go to a new dispute authority company and take the issue to that poll began. another episode that captures this attitude looking at what the world -- becoming part of the world meant when he was basically all european countries have -- so do we. we should have one as well.

he embarks on it. a complete failure. we use the war. upon the army leaving cairo he looks to some of the european standing and said my country is no longer in africa. it's now part of europe. those attitudes meet the shock of europeans actually come. not three years episodes in the form of the french innovation, but in the form of the british inelevation that occupies the country from 1882 until 1954 when they finally leave. suddenly, the west is not only the question of the other two catch up with. it's also an occupy force. we develop a love-hate relationship with that. we admire many things of that. they are al the people that are occupied. how do we extend that? how do we deal with that?

how do we deal with the question of what went wrong with islam? everything from that point on ward tend to answer that question. mohammad abdul said, well, sure, islam science. in fast most of -- many science was much richer in this world than the middle ages than it was in europe. there's nothing really wrong with it. it's been corrupted throughout for centuries. we need return to a original purer form of that in order advance again. they don't believe the early generations from which the world salafi emerges have an answer for their future. for them, it is about copying europe. how do you deal with the question of islam?

from idea of social darwinism. they get the idea that religion is problematic in public sphere. we can't even attempt to modernize religion, we have seen what happened with abdul when he tried to do that and the battles he faced from traditionalist with the attempt of modernization. islam, in a sense is something better left untouched unless it explodes or it will explode our face. from social darwinism they get the idea the world has to change

in the future. who will talk about those issues anyway fifty years' time? when we look at the debate and the egyptian constitution of 1923 and the history of proportion -- and essential fees allocated to them. you read the arguments lead by egypt's great liberal thinkers and it basically die. people care about it. in twenty year's time no one will think about it. these issues will no longer be on the japped. people will haved a advanced. people will disagree about more important issues. in a sense it was also a reflection. they were completely enchanted. no one talk about an american secular model where by religion can be part of the public

sphere. religion was even to be banished from -- it's only with an understanding articulated it in a special room without saying it publicly, of course. it is only with understanding that that we can understand the muslim brotherhood slogan islam is the solution. it's the direct answer to the other lib ram thinkers formulation. those modernizers had their eye on it. let catch up. catching up is very problematic for any country. no matter how much you try, the others must -- [inaudible] the west is advancing itself. so we import some things from them to advance, they moved another five years ahead. another ten years, how do we capture that?

naturally the an is we can't depend on individual initiative. only the states can manage the complete modernization of the country. only through the means of the state can we actually become like those people that we admire and hate in the west. so the natural attitude is we need the states. if you're one that -- your job is a civil servant, your basic perception of the world is that the states is the one to change it. no one is talking about the limiting the state's power. no one is discussing the price of the individual with the collective and with the state. the rise of the european independent that gives rise to liberalism. that's not there. whatever liberalism exists in the arab world comes from people involves around the state. it's no surprise there are formulations about the future

comes from that. since you believe only the states can modernize egypt can only make it better, that's the only entity you can talk to. why bother addressing those ignorant masses that -- [inaudible] why bother con convincing them be your argument? if all you need to do is talk to the one man. the ruler. the man you dream of the mohammad ali, the man that will manage the modernization, forcing it on reluck assistant population. so a natural tendency of separation from the very country you live in emerges. a tendency to despise the people you live among. when you see the surprise of the liberal institutionist as they lose the first election to one of the fellow who uses a

populist message. and you read their argument. they're not very different from the arguments that today's self-proclaiming liberals are preventing. -- presenting. when you read today people that can't read and write shouldn't be allowed to vote. well, that's not something very different from what fellow thinkers were saying. all of these thinkers. the and frown upon them to only talk to the leader who will enforce change. that's there from the beginning.

we know there are about 2,000 plus or minus catholic churches inside egypt. so we're talking there are today one fifth of the churches of the church is outside of the country where it has built the identity. immigrants or immigration has started from the 1950th. people escape. people escape the idea. and the feeling they no longer had a place in the country. they often portray them the secular ruler. surely he was against it. he had a different conception of what the state nationalist project should be. his era was not that kind.

by the minister of education at the time. it was the original fellow of the team. the changes in a institution was happening from the '50s. had had taken over in religious endowment, the money, but in return to get their official support in the infamous nationalist project. he was willing to provide for religious education we have numbers of students rising from something like 5,000 students in 1952 to 1.9 million students today in the difference whether the university or the three university of the schools.

the pressure in society is going on. and with that, then comes the rise of the islamists. again, then comes the threat to islamists in universities, in daily life. the insurgency later on under mubarak's rule. all of these things are leading cause to lead the country. some seeking a better future. while others it is the question of religious persecution. and that community has only grown since the arab spring. the arab spring might leave it to something better in egypt. i'm a pessimist. it might. there might be a more democratic egypt sometime in the future. but some things that are happening today are very hard to change. once people leave egypt, and go and choose new lives in the

united states, or candidate or australia. there's no going back there. people frame the -- or the loss of in the middle east in general is one of religious freedom. it's a nice thing to this after we've really talked about the national -- big national security issues. it's not just a religious freedom issue. those religious minorities they documented the beginning of the 20th century. the region was about 25% jewish community, egypt, iraq, everywhere. christian communities everywhere

. other -- all of this religious mosaic that tran sended life and survived to modern times. tps. no longer that picture. today the middle east outside of the state of israel is 3% christian. that is 3%. the largest in absolute majority are egypt's. besides them, you have got the lebanese, you have the syrian-christians, and what remains affiliate -- of iraqi-christians. if it leaves we're talking about a demographic shift in the region. the region, the fabric of it is no longer what we used to know. those religious minorities had played an important role. they were the link.

the brich one has to return to the father of lebanon. when one talks about the beginning of arab nationalism one has to go back. all of this might belong. the loss is not just the c.a.t -- catholic church. the challenge is not just for the catholic church. it's also for egypt and the other countries in the region. this loss of challenging from the region is one that will have imply dedication -- implications. people talk about the youth growth in the region. the youth -- sure that's an important demographic change. there's another one happening that people largely don't focus on. for the catholic church, it's the blessing and the challenge.

the church is flour riching outside of egypt's border. it's decline inside the country. i wrote an article in states wall street's journal about the loss of one of the ancient churches in the country. a church from the fourth or fifth century that withstood the test of time. generations have passed to arab dynasties, and today it no longer in egypt. it's a percentage of egypt is perhaps much larger than that of privacy community that kicked out of the country. the country's -- [inaudible] it's natural what happened to the jew of egypt cannot happen. it's the larnlgtest estimate. surely one when we talk about the cost there is no room in the west or anywhere for sick or eight million. surely that will all stay.

i'm not suggesting it would happen in a day or two. if we see a continuation of the current trend of immigration. they are not only going to the places they traditionally went to, united states, canada, australia, but also georgia. when any father told me they were going georgia, my natural reaction was georgia, u.s.a.? no, it's georgia former ussr. there are about 6,000 in georgia. why? because it's cheap. because it's an easier place to go to that than the west. my catholic church here in fairfax, virginia. we had a community of 3,000 before the revolution. we had 1520 families come every month. we're a community of 4,500.

we're opening smaller charges in arlington because of the influx of refugees. this is a challenge to the catholic church that this is perhapses extremely unprepared for. now you deal with the -- denomination? how do you deal with a modern challenge of the modern world of aitd atheism, alcohol, drugs usage. all the problems that are not in the same size in egypt as they are in the immigrant community? what does mean to be -- when egypt is no longer the place you call snow what does it mean to be -- if you're living in minnesota, philadelphia? what does that identity mean for you? what does it actually mean for

the church? twenty years' time, thirty years time, the majority of the followers would be outside of egypt's border. what would it mean for the doctrine of the church? these are all challenges that the church will be facing in the coming years. as i learn from writing the book, we're going see it. it has been the end less story i have seen generation after generation the decline -- the community, the failures but also the survival and others. the revival in others. that's likely to be the stories we continue to see in the future. thank you very much. [applause]

very good. you got a glimpse at depth, scholarship, and insight in his wonderful bock. let open the floor to your comments and questions. please, raise your hand and identify yourself. be brief, recognize you're being taped for posterity. watch what you say. i'll open the floor with you, sir. there's a microphone coming your way. >> my name is arnold. i've been teaching in china the past ten years. this is not an area of expertize for me. but i wondered remarking about the secular elite. why there's been a more visible secular or civilian face that

better? >> i can hear you. repeat the question. go ahead. >> i just wondered you, for example, the departure how how much of secular e supports this coup. >> i'll turn to you. when you look at the secular elite, the liberal elite, whatever term you want to use. how deep is the support for the military intervention as of july 3rd? and then the, you know, crack down from last week? >> i would say it's very deep. let's first define who these people are that we describe as liberals or seculars. it's generally an different groups that only share a rejection of the islamists project or fear of that project. you get the difference community

woo obviously fear what it might be for their businesses. they are naturally afraid of that. the human rights community, the different groups you have in the country. you have the country for example, the revolutionary socialist or the arab nationalist. all of these together. they share different idea. perhaps that's part of the explanation why they fail to build something. they unable to provide any ideological counter part. but support them there is no other option but the military. the only people that have come out against what is going on in egypt have been the reservation and in his article in one of egypt's newspapers.

i think it's overwhelming support. >> what would have to occur to transform this broad support for the military action in to an effective civilian government that may eventually evolve in to -- whether they want to or not. the big question now, of course, you have removed the president from power. does anyone actually think you're going allow them to win the elections any time soon? of course not.

or you're saying you're going lose it the next min. if the muslim brotherhood wins the election, it will naturally mean the general at the politicians who support it. i think we're talking about a system of competitive hypocrisy. call it something like that. where by elections to take place where by part of the population or the ideological fabric of the country is excluded from the political process and -- perhaps the stability in the future. just to pursue this. the new regime say a ban on political parties based on religion. how will that affect the community? the community would be extremely happy. or any time in the future. there's probably some guy who

wants do -- there's no meaningful or -- [inaudible] what is the curriculum like in

egypt in what i have found is the hatred of the hindu, of other miewrnties, including [inaudible] social studies to pakistan studies. the otherness of the minority is there the moment they got -- [inaudible] what cousin it say about it in egypt. i don't think you have something at the same level in places like pakistan or saudi arabia which are familiar with the textbook there and the amount of hatred of the others that exist in their textbooks. in egypt, the minister of education under mubarak for some ten years limiting any hateful

messages and education and curriculum. however, the problem is more the people that if you take the teachers. teaching is not and worse anyone that doesn't get the favor through the corruption or the bureaucracy perhaps the worse

governing in egypt. that's where you get the features that are not well liked in cairo. and thus the message is that are given to students are extremely hateful of the other. it's not just education. i mean, it's quite hard to listen a mosque sermon outside of some well-known -- in the country side, for example.

the priests wear black because partly out of -- [inaudible] one thing that the church hopes they will pronoun the black and the white when they celebrate there is no longer islam dominates the country when egypt is returned like -- and something like that. fast farred to mr. morsi's removement. you get, of course, as i mentioned. they wear white in the mass. you get a picture of the ordaining some new bishop. they are naturally wearing white. it shares it saying, see, this proves that they are happy with the call because now they believe they ended islam in egypt and now they can wear white again. so whatever the education is built on already existing myth that have existed for

generations to say the least. >> hello, on my right then we'll get to the back. [inaudible] thank you both of you very much. i want to ask you question, sam, and for that matter, rob. you spoke before of the contempt that the modernizers had for fellow citizen. concept that was -- the fellow citizen were traditional and pious. and; therefore, they had -- in the present circumstances,

some substantial portion of that population turned against morsi and the brotherhood. in your opinion, is there some new language that the secular elite or the secular whether they're elite or not could now find to language common to them and also the majority of the population. which would limit the future impact of islamism and whatever form it comes back. there's --

the detail of the nationalism are, of course, different in each case. the winning answer they might come up. we see if the beginning of that currently in egypt extreme -- [inaudible] tax on the western world and the portrayal of the egyptian people. will images of the man and the people -- those familiar with -- art, for example, would recognize the images they see in egypt. the marble of the people. that kind of -- [inaudible] so i would say they would have

to -- return the liberal which was that. any liberal idea and truly -- adds a way to defeat islamists. >> i don't think the people who are at the the height of reining egypt today. august 21st. the answer to this question. i don't think they have a plan for the year for now, two years, five years, if i they don't have a plan, i don't know what their plan is. i don't say that because i don't know. i don't really think they know.

>> listening to your -- will being to your summary of the history of the -- it struck me how similar it was to the history of the jew. get the same story of combination of the execution or innovation. i was wondering if this was your take. there are some historic similarities. of course the modern establishment of the state of israel the jews have to survive purely as a community. t still there and there -- [inaudible] so there's something different in the story.

although when you look back at history, and i discuss in my book one of the worst period of persecution of cops in egypt -- were basically decline from the catholic churches from something like 2,048 in the year 1,200 to 112 churches. very similar to what you got forward -- [inaudible] the relationship between the them and the jews i would say is not always perfect. a there has been a historical competition as minority in the region get the job -- [inaudible] ruler allow them to take.

the two community have obviously competed in the middle age under the rule of islam. anti-semitism is a device not exclues i havely to the muslim meaning that share extremely antisemitic -- part is bit on that diggal hatred that church doctrine have from the middle ages. something similar to what was going on in the western christian. and part, of course, an attempt to portray christians adds more loyal to the country than others. once there was a conflict with israel. it was important for the church to appear as extremely national and --

[inaudible] ban it from going jerusalem visiting the performing bill gram age or anything of these things. >> yes. two gentleman over there. two seats away from each other. if you could identify yourself, please. [inaudible] you pointed out the fact there's a huge question of the gipping population -- [inaudible] a transformation of the islamist movement in a region. there's a example in turkey

there's a government which is -- [inaudible] deregulate the other countries have reduced the role of the state and follow something -- [inaudible] do you see it could be a possible -- for creating electabilitible and islamist movement. >> i think that's an sense the most important question about egypt's future. what to the muslim brotherhood and the largest islamist scene. i have no doubt the military will win the round. meaning this this is not the end of the war.

how do the islamists answer then the -- the situation they are in. of the leadership leads to disconsistent gracious with each taking a separate -- i think in a sense there are three routes there in the future in front of islamists. egyptian islam is. the first is that of turkey, obviously. you moderate the -- [inaudible] you provide a more moderate image of the your party. and you win the rule of the game and take it step by step until you transform and change society in ten or fifteen years after. so slower pace than the

brotherhood attempting to do in a matter of month. the second route is naturally that. when yo really can't do it -- ballot boxes and have to go through it. there no other way. we were denied our right for victory. we play by their rule and did -- it's against islam this is a state of -- [inaudible] the basic argument. we can only fight it. through a growth of an islamist insurgency. sinai is perfect place for it to happen. the western dessert is an excellent place.

islamists insurgency theres. i explained the muslim brotherhood you can only do it through my way. it's important to keep in mind here it's an egyptian. he falls in egypt for twenty plus years. this is not some alien country to him. it's place where the whole thing started. he started fighting against the enemy before joining the fight against the external enemy. it's under precious in afghanistan and pakistan. if the brand is no longer appealing as it was ten years ago, what would be better than creating islamist insurgency in the sinai that targets israel, rebrands it, and gains z has support in a safe haven in the

sinai? that is obviously there. the third is perhaps a mixture of islamism with -- something similar thinking -- in iran. something they touched upon in his work in social justice in islam. fighting again the risk db rich and the powerful. i think it's basically three route that are there. they're not all contradictory. meaning the three can largely happen at the same time. the majority mind continue to represent i.t.

they fail to recognize what a steep road it is. it was a half century of strict secular rules. stripping religion from all public life. this is -- egypt is nowhere near that experience. well before the opportunity for, you know, serious electorial competition and you had a couple of military intervention to squeeze out the most radical aspect of the islamic-oriented party after you wind up seventy years. that's what you get after that huge experience. so, you know, i i don't --

egypt is not down that path. haven't begun going down that path. the second observation, in terms of -- i don't think the military leadership would necessarily oppose that. i think this is, you know, if this is what they choose, this is what the military knows to deal with. this was not the, you know, the challenge the challenge that the state was able to cope with in egypt over the last, you know, several decades. yes, they took down it but the state survived and the state, you know, not only survived, but in essence prevailed. it prevailed so much it eventually allowed them to run politically. which may be a bit of a mistake in the view of the state. now it's revenge of the state. so i don't think if that's what the muslim brotherhood chooses,

i don't think that the military would be so fearful of this option, because this is what they know how to deal with. >> and they're certainly framing it as a war against terror. >> yes. this was a gentleman behind you, doug, on your left. yes, sir? >> egypt with its neighborhoods in term -- maintenance of church and the payment of the clergy. question about tax revenue and payment. doug, i'm going ask you to pose your question. >> hi, a senior fellow here at hudson. what i'm wondering about is your view of the egyptian military, and whether the brotherhood has

any possibility by turning out in the street and ensuring large level of violence that of cracking the egyptian military. is there any possibility you could see groups of egyptians mt. military deciding they don't want to kill the people, and they will go over to the muslim brotherhood side trying to roughly on the model of what happened in russia in world war i. do they have a prayer of any kind of help from the element of the egyptian military? lastly, i would like to pose a question you pompled not least by our host an important role in promoting religious freedom. what do they want from america? what would they like to hear from our leaders, our public official? what is the best message we could be sending? what is the most useful message we could be sending? there you, you have four

minutes, three easy brief questions. [laughter] if i understood correctly about -- none of the tax revenue go to churches. meaning that the churches are they donate privately to churches, but the government doesn't get a single -- to churches. it gives money to mosques in egypt. it spends a lot of religious education. it's provide services for, i mean, which they are more than

happy to do so. so the egyptian police has felt extremely humiliated and crushed from the 2011 uprising. losing their dominance on the street. this is paid back time. so the police is very happy to perform this. yet, some army units are helping. mostly it's the police doing the crack down. if the level of violence is to increase and more army units are to take part --

come from egyptian society at large. meaning that these people one year ago were electing islamist in parliament tear election with 17% of the rest of the population. it's not outside of the -- might use to open fire on demonstrators or -- of the army i.t. i doubt would be involved to that level that would create split within the army. what do they want? i don't think they know. part is the they have, as a first largely -- they have not learned to operate in the american system. they continue to protest in

front of the white house. not realizing that policy actually happens inside the building. that's a reflection of the state of the community. i remember we had a couple of events where we brought -- a single answer. no one wants to advocate for a western intervention in their homeland. and any word sent here bishop thomas gave a speech a couple of years ago and -- [inaudible] a fire storm in egypt and forcing to remain out the country for awhile. it's not likely to be a welcoming message when cops ask for things from america. at the same time, it's also a reflection of the predicament.

you are neither geographically concentrated in a single area. by one there's a possibility of a "safe haven" of the system or any of the sort. you're not -- your numbers are significant. because of the egyptian population you're not enough to effect the country's future. your options thrant many. your best hope is an egypt that is inclusive for everyone. the united states would insist on inclusion egypt. with have to go back to have that many churches on the same day. and the muslim brotherhood obviously insights it calling

for those attacks. meaning anyone who actually works on the issue -- the church was attacked in august of 2013. it was attacked in 20072009, 2013. it you claim to be against the extremism of the brotherhood, the first to actually protect the christians which are -- the attack.

thank you. please join me in thanking the hudson institute. [applause] excellent book, please tweet and tell everybody about it. congratulations. [inaudible conversations] sphwhrncht booktv is on facebook. like us to interexact booktv againsts and viewers. facebook.com/booktv. here are some of the books published in 1998. booktv's first year on c-span2 .

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