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you better have more to say after that. but that phrase is still magical. >> and every week "after words." >> my father, already in the diplomatic service, his job had been to be press attache in bell idea. my -- belgrade. my mother wanted me to be born in prague where her mother was, and so i was born in prague, and then we moved back to belgrade. and then my father was recalled in 1938, and he was in czechoslovakia when the nazis marched in on march 15, 1939. >> since 1998, booktv has shown over 40,000 hours of programming, and it's the only national television network devoted exclusively to nonfiction books every weekend. throughout the fall we're marking 15 years of booktv on c-span2. >> samuel tadros talks about the

plight of coptic christians in egypt persecuted under both liberal and conservative governments in the country. in this hour and 20-minute event, mr. tadros also spoke about the situation in syria. >> thank you, nina. it's a great pleasure to be here at the hudson institute which is an enormously influential actor in the washington policy debate, and i'm privileged to be here to talk about sam tadros' book. let me first make an announcement on behalf of nina and hudson. here they want you to keep your cell phones on. turn them to silent, but tweet as much as you like. [laughter] a real privilege, as i was saying, to be here to talk about sam tadros' book. i'll say at the outset i'm a sam tadros fan. i think this is an outstanding book. it's a gem of a book. and i want to make four points,

and what we're going to do in our procedure here is i'm going to offer a bit of a book review and make four major points, and then i'm going to discuss these with sam. and then we're going to open this up for discussion and debate with all of you. but i get, first, to make observations about this gem of a book. it's not just an insightful and sensitive look at the world of coptic christianity. sam has written a very brave book. it could easily have been, in "motherland lost," it could easily have been merely a litany of persecution. i say merely with a sense of enormous tragedy because that would have been justified. copt versus rome, copt versus muslim, copt versus protestant,

copt versus europe, copt versus arab. the list goes on. and the legacy of persecution and tragedy on top of persecution and tragedy is so profound that that alone would have merited a deep history by a historian like sam tadros. but sam goes further than that because he also frames his narrative in terms of copt versus copt, a brutally honest portrayal of the internal divisions, lady versus clergy, pope versus bishops, hermits versus church administration, rich versus poor, accommodationist versus communalist, etc. sam bears it all. he bares the external history of tragedy and persecution as well

as the internal tensions which have been at the heart of the coptic story for almost two millennia. it is, at some points, a tale of intrigue among popes and metropolitans and monasteries and conferences, but it is a story of texture and depth, and it is a remarkable story that sam portrays in all its dimensions. and i think it's really quite a courageous story for doing that. sam's book, secondly, is courageous in another way. he takes on the pillars of accepted wisdom about egyptian history; albert hur ranny, for example, and he skewers them with delicacy and precision and subtlety. the target, first and foremost s the conventional idea of egypt's liberal age. now, there's an awful lot of

nostalgia in the study of the modern middle east. one piece, for example, concerns the idea of a golden age, the idea that muslims and jews lived together in peace and harmony, you know, about a millennia ago. well, as we know, there is more fiction than reality there. the golden age was quite limited in both time and space. and it was really an outlier in arab and muslim history, though it's important to note that until very recently it was always better to be born a jew in muslim lands than to be born a jew in christiandom. but that's a different story for a different event. but similarly, there's a conventional narrative about arab history concerning a liberal age. not a golden age, but a liberal age. especially egypt's liberal age in the early decades of the 20th century, the time of the waft, the constitution, etc., when

muslims and copts banished their sectarian and religious identities to forge a single peoplehood. now, this remarkably-timed book explains in eye-opening fashion how there is more fiction than fact in that idea, that idealized idea as well. he explains how that idea came to be, he explains how so many copts bought into the idea and why, therefore, this idea of a liberal age that was never truly liberal persists until today s. that gives rise to some of the ahistorical nature of the egyptian political debate that exists today. and that bring withs me to a third -- brings me to a third key point, because this very

thin tome explains an enigma behind today's headlines. it explains an enigma behind today's politics. why is it, there's the enigma, why is it that the secular elite that went into the streets in january and february 2011 to force the ouster of one longtime general -- hosni mubarak -- today is the same secular elite behind the empowerment of another general, assisi, and the crackdown that is now underway against the partisans of the former president and the muslim brotherhood more generally. how is it that that same secular elite fought for liberalism and

democracy two years ago and today supports -- you can call it whatever you like, but it's difficult to say it's a liberal and democratic movement many in egypt -- in egypt against the forces of darkness, the forces of the muslim brotherhood all in the name of reform and change. the answer, the answer azzam masterfully -- as sam masterfully explains not knowing this book would be coming out in the middle of this moment, the answer that sam gives is that that the process of political evolution in egypt is almost opposite of what we think is the process of political evolution here in america. for us government, the very idea of government and the american idea, the very idea of government is to limit the power of the state. and our freedoms, as much as

anything else, our freedoms from government, from the abusive power of the state. but sam explains brilliantly that in egypt freedom, liberalism, independence actually springs from the state itself. the state is the giver, the fount of education, of opportunity, of rights. the state is the source. and perhaps this hearkens back to muhammad ali, perhaps this hearkens back to whatever, but it is a very different source of political dynamic than what we are used to here. and if you believe that the state is the source, the giver of rights, the protecter of liberties, then empowering the

state and empowering the strongest arm of the state -- namely the military -- is sort of the height of what it means to be in this context liberal. because the state is the source of freedom. it turns on its head the way we understand it here in america, but it makes perfect sense the way sam has explained the egyptian dynamic. so by supporting the supremacy of the state against provocateurs and terrorists is in the egyptian political discourse to be liberal, to be free. read this book, and and a lightbulb goes off over your head, explaining to what many americans might be unexplainable. and that is a real gift. fourthly, i wanted to just make

a comment about what comes through as a sense of personal tragedy. look, only at the end of the book -- first in a footnote and then just one reference in the text -- do we meet sam tadros himself. as part of the story of an historic exodus of copts, part of a new dynamic that turns on its head 1900 years of history and begins with the copts embarking on something totally new, totally unknown. you know, one of ben hard lewis' insightful observations about muslim life in the contemporary era has to do with migration. for 1300-odd years, muslims never voluntarily took themselves from lands of muslim control and my grated to be minorities -- migrated to be

minorities in lands of nonmuslim control. that changed, professor lewis noted, that changed in the middle of the last century with the movement of muslims from turkey into central europe, north africa into french-speaking europe and the subcontinent into british-held territories. that trend was only 1300 years old. we have one even older that is just now beginning to get underway. the movement of copts after 1900 years from, i mean, to say it's their historic homeland doesn't even begin -- it's a superficial way of saying it because to be copt is to be egyptian. for hundreds of years, i mean, copt means egyptian, egyptian means copts, and they were a

majority of egypt well into the muslim era. but now, azzam notes with -- as sam notes with regret, sadness and a sense of the unknown, now copts have begun the great immigration outward. there are now 550 coptic churches outside egypt. coptic christianity is a growing church, except it is dying in egypt because of the repression and persecution, combination of state power and islamic extremism. where does this lead? can a coptic church survive without a strong pillar in egypt? can a coptic church survive without much coptic christianity in egypt in its future? it is a tragic question each to ask. but sadly, as sam notes, this is

not a hypothetical. so, sam, for your courage in addressing all these issues -- coptic history among itself and with the world around it, taking on the pillars of the establishment of middle east historians, for explaining the unexplainable about egyptian politics today and then asking the tragic but urgent question about the future of copts in the world today -- thank you. thank you very much. ..

perhaps when the war was beginning, i was following his program where you would have to get from the arab world, from washington and explained washington basically to the arab world. it was a very different program from the things that one just to watch in the region. in the region we have all those narratives about what happens in washington that takes place in washington. but actually see washington, see the policymakers commenced and debate ideas, that's what something very different. i think robert has grasped or has presented really what the book is about. it's a complex story.

when they first asked me to write this book, it was both for me a great joy and in a sense one that i took with great very reluctance. it was a great joy because it's an accident series of books, through acclaimed authors such as charlie hill and bernard lewis. but it was also a challenge in the sense that i personally had attempted all my life to stay way from a coptic issue. the coptic issue, my political ideas have taken me far from it the first being a baathist at the young age to the problems of liberalism after that. but in all that i had attempted to deny that aspect of identity. in essence i had fallen prey to the liberal narrative that i now attempted to deconstruct, that there was a choice to be made. you could either be a copt or an egyptian. you couldn't be both at the same

time. there was a conflict of their that needed one to choose one side. bide writing this book was a fascinating experience. perhaps a personal journey for me along the way. i discovered things that i didn't know about egyptian history, writing it. that the basic narratives that you are talking egypt about basic history, about the story of the liberal age and many other things, even the church's official narrative is very different from what you see in those stories as you research them. there are two dominant narratives explained the situation of copts in egypt. the first is naturally that of persecution. copts have always been persecuted. the romans, the byzantines, the arabs, becoming something. the declining numbers throughout the century. the other narrative, of course is that of national unity.

the copts involvement have always lived in perfect personal -- eternal harmony in egypt and it's only those evil foreign forces that attempt to divide them, to wage those differences between them. but copts and muslims can live in harmony and have lived in the past. the first narrative, of course is moved any agency from copts and that something that hope people see in the book. yes, copts have been persecuted in egypt but they have not only been helpless victims. in the years of decline and coptic learning, you get a man like -- suddenly out of nowhere, the pope comes only for seven years and builds the first modern school for females in egypt. out of nowhere. first female education in egypt is not probably a secular modernizing ruler, but by a coptic pope. the imports the printed for

preston your. the second printing press in the country. it is reforming the church as an institution. he starts educating people, five different schools, he opens modern schools. he revised the coptic language. when we look at egypt's prime ministers after that, 20, 30 years after that, for as egypt's future prime ministers graduate from that main coptic school. so while the narrative of persecution is fair, you also get the star of an endurance of its people, a agency on behalf of people, of people choosing to shape their own futures, shape their own church. when we come to the modern times of a complete decline in the coptic church under the pope, and this is in the late '40s and early '50s, a corruption inside the church, a time where any sane person might not choose

the life of the church, and you come to a generation of egypt -- sad as this, the youngest graduates of the law faculty in egypt's history. he first is not admitted to the bar because of how young he is. he leaves all that to choose the life in the desert. in a crowded church and the church facing scandals and destruction eternally, he was a very successful pharmacist. he leaves his pharmacy and chooses that to revive the coptic church. wing you go through the stories of the revivalist, the modern movements inside the church, it's a very different story from one of eternal persecution. it's in the sense that coptic story has been one of two faces. they are together. yes, it's the start of decline but it's also one of survival. yes, it's a story of decay, but it's one of endurance as well.

you see that when we remember in a moment in history, christianity was well sped -- spread throughout north africa. only alexandria stance today. the places where saint augustine walks -- walked no longer understand what christianity is the only alexandria remains. there's something there about the endurance of the church and of a people. that's the first aspect. the second one is also first in the story for me, the conventional wisdom of liberalism in egypt. if you're an egyptian liberal, and i use the term very loosely here in this case, then you naturally believe that egypt was heaven on earth, and then they came in 1952 and destroyed have been. so growing up my basic question was, if it was so great, where

does this come from in the first place? is it such a question is that their conspirators grew up in that liberal age? we notice at the same time another person, a bit younger, started another organization. the muslim brotherhood in 1928. the two main solid the organizations that each, 1913 and 1926, the total fascist movement in egypt, in egypt starts in 1913. this is such a course of its that in this group and this liberal age in egypt we get all those illiterate movements? doesn't that mean there was something wrong there? doesn't mean that there was something there that's left the emergence of all those movements? so it's been a personal quest in essence to find an answer to that. what was it that was wrong with the beginning?

where did he get to go wrong? wasn't from the very beginning? was in the middle? where did this destructive path that we're set on begin? the conventional wisdom has been that there were great liberals. they had imported the ideas of europe, attempted to modernize the country, and then something happened. often, historians call the late-night teen '30s or '30s until the crisis of orientation in egyptian history. a new generation emergence that projects, a lot of reasons why. the book in 1938 about the future of education in egypt has often given as the turning point in history. he is there warning.

egypt did not belong to an arab or an islamic world. it belonged to a mediterranean culture. no one after that ever talks about the west or the mediterranean culture belonging to it. egypt he came islamic for some, part of the arab world. that was the moment of suppose to change. perhaps the only history book ever written about egypt attempted to challenge these was the book by historian who wrote challenging that narrative and explained them looking at the intellectual history of egypt what was going on there, something? very different in the sense the word -- my intent here was to go even more in depth than was -- and what he had done. to try to look at those early stories are liberals and where

they came from, and looking at the relationship with the states in a sense expense both the failure of liberalism in the past and its current predicament in egypt. the first modernizers, and i think that's the best word to describe people like mohammed abdul, mohammad -- or any of these thinkers that they are modernizers and not necessarily liberals. the question for them was, how do we catch up? napoleon had come to egypt in 1798. the old order was beginning to crumble. bernard lewis framed the question brilliantly, what went wrong? why have those europeans advanced and we haven't? why is it that those men that we had met decades earlier, centuries earlier as crusaders

suddenly turned into the modern frenchman? what is it that happened in the middle east that changed all this? and the beginnings can you see the beginnings by the rulers and by those thinkers emerging within the state. they create a massive state. the current joke is the egyptian army as a state, well, that's muhammad ali's state. this was all focus on building a large army. doesn't have time for those ideas of europe. modernization is simply let's copy the technology that they had to give have a printing press? let's import wonder do they have modern weaponry? we have some as well. there's a famous story there about him ordering books to be translated t. demand couldn't read or write. he had some of his assistants to

translate european works for him to read for him at night. and someone thought about translating machiavellians the prints. and muhammad ali, the book is translated by days of everyday 10 pages or so i read to him. and the man listens to the first day, significance or day. by the fourth day he tells the men, stop. i've listened to you for three days thinking that i can learn something. i have no use for this book. i know so many more tricks than he does. [laughter] that's in a sense is the crisis. because in reality, machiavellians was not a book about tricks. makkah valley was a book about modern day. makkah valley was the great traditional wisdom, historical philosophy. that part grasping the ideas behind modern day. his grandson is naïve. attempt to copy the parts of

your county attempts to copy the outer layers of civilization. they have nice opera house but will have a nice opera house as well. they have nice but is can we do as well. achieve an episode, east of european monarchs assuming the crowd to give a speech to the people. so he asked his assistant to write one. and never reach it beforehand. and doesn't have insisted anything what he should write. and this covers, ma he committed himself to promises that he never knew he wanted to commit himself to actually. which forces him then to go into the whole dispute with the suez canal company and then take the issue to napoleon iii of france. another episode that captures this attitude looking at what the world is becoming part of the world meant, was when he was told basically all european countries have in buyers. well, so do we. we should have one as well.

so he embarks on this war with ethiopia, complete failure. we lose the war, but upon the army leaving cairo he looks through some of the europeans stand there and tells them, my no longer in africa. it is now part of europe. those attitudes then leads to the shock of europeans actually come. not three years short episodes in the form of the french invasion, but in the form of the british invasion that occupies the country, states in the country from 1880, intel 1954 when they finally leave. suddenly the west is not only a question of the others to catch up to, it's also an occupying force. the west develops a lot of love-hate relationship. we admire many things of that, but they're also the people that are occupying us. how do we accept that? how do we deal with that

question? how do we do with the question of what went wrong of islam? is islam compatible with modernity or not? everything from that point onward attempts to answer that question. mohammad abdul said, well, sure, islam -- many science was much richer in the islamist war than the middle ages than i was in europe. so there's nothing really wrong with islam of itself. it's been corrupted throughout the centuries. we need to return to the original pure form of that in order to advance against. they don't have time for this. they don't believe that those early generations of salafis have an answer for those future. for them, this is about copying

your. how do deal with the question of islam. the answer for them is simple. partly in a sense they have two sides of them. partly they get them part of the ticket from the lord, the man who's really the founder of on egypt and not muhammad ali. and the other part they get it is enough from darwin and from ideas of social darwinism. they get the idea that religion is problematic in the public sphere. we need to keep it quiet. we can't even attempt to modernize religion. because we see what's happened with optional we tried to do that. so islam is a sense better left untouched and less explosive or else it will explode in our faces. but from social darwinism they get the idea that the world is

going to change in future. who will talk about those issues anymore and 60 years time? we look at the debate and egyptian constitution of 1923, when the issue of proportional representation was projected and debated should copts have specialties allocated to them come and she read the arguments done by egypt's great liberal thinkers cut it was basically dies. now people care about 20 years time. no one will think about christian and muslim. these issues will no longer be on the agenda. people of advance, people will disagree about more important issues touching their lives. but the general attitude was one of islam is the problem that you're less outside of the political sphere, completely. and a sense is also a reflection of french secularism. these men were particularly and chatted with friends. no one talks about an american secular model whereby religion

can be part of the public sphere. religion was an evil to be banished. it is only with an understanding of islam as a problem, articulate and a special row without saying it publicly, of course. it is only with understanding that that we can understand the muslim brotherhood slogan, islam is the solution. it is the direct answer to the liberals and other thinkers formalization. these men, those modernizers, have their eyes only on let's catch up to europe. now, catching up is very problematic for any country. because no matter how much you try, the other is not standing idly. the west is advancing itself. so we import some things from them attracted fans, and they have moved another five years ahead, another 10 years. how do we catch up?

naturally, the answer is we can't depend on individuals initiative. only the state can manage the complete modernization of the country. only through the means of the state can we actually become like those people that we admire and hate in the west. so the natural attitude is, we need the states but if your job is a civil servant, your basic conception of the world is that the state is the one to change it. no one is talking about limiting the state's power. no more is a discussing the prices of the individual with the collective and with the state. the rise of european independent that gives rise to liberalism. that's not there. whatever liberalism exists in the arab world comes from people whose life evolves around the

state. it's no surprise there's formulations about the future coming from that. and then she believed that only the states can modernize egypt can only make it better, well, that's the only entity you can talk to. why bother addressing those ignorant masses that you live amongst? why bother convincing them with your argument? if all you need to do is to talk to the one now? the router, the menu dream of, the muhammad ali, the man who will manage the modernization forcing it on a reluctant population. so a natural tendency of separation from the very country living emerges. ascendance -- when you see the crisis of a liberal constitution, as they lose the first election to one other fellows who uses a populist

message, and she read their argument, they are not very different from the arguments that today's self-proclaimed liberals are presenting. when you read today one of egypt's riders of saying people who can't read and write shouldn't be allowed to vote. the alliteration be allowed to vote. that's not something are different from what they were saying from mohammad. so the attitudes surprised the people and to frown upon them, don't talk to the leader who will enforce that change. that's there from the very beginning. today's coptic church as rob mentioned is growing outside of egypt. when the pope became pope in 1917, copts packed churches in united states. one in l.a. and one in new jersey.

when he died in 2005, copts had t202 churches in the training of america alone. out of 550 coptic churches abroad. we know there are about 2000, plus or minus, coptic churches inside egypt. so we're talking that there are today, one-fifth of the churches of the coptic church is outside of the country where it has built its identity. immigrants or immigration coptic, immigration and started from the 1950s. people escape the idea, and a feeling that they no longer have a place in the country. they were often portrayed as the secular rogue against the others. shirley, he was against the brotherhood. he had a different conception of what the state nationalist project should be. but his era was not that kind. when many copts, for example,

lost their land as part of the land reclamation project, not a single christian received any of the land distributed to the peasants of the country. education was slowly being islamized by the minister of education at the time, who was a fellow member of the original 13 that comprised the movement. the changes, the growth as an institution, what's happening, not so had taken over religious endowments, the money but in return together official report in fighting the islamists and for nationals project, he was willing to provide religious education. we out -- numbers of students rising from something like 5000 students in 1952 the 1.9 million students today and that different from what the university or the free university, the schools. so that growth is going on.

and with that then comes the rise of the islamists. again, then comes the threat to islamists in the universities, in daily life, attacks on churches. the insurgency later on under mubarak's rule. so all of these things are leading copts to leave the country. some are thinking about the future, like their fellow muslims, whil others it is the question of religious persecution that is driving this. and that the community has only grown since the arab spring. the arab spring might lead him to be something better in egypt. i'm accustomed. it just might. it might be a more democratic egypt sometime in the future. but some things that are happening today are very hard to change. once people leave egypt, and

going choose new lies in the united states, or canada or ask of it, there's no going back. no one is going to go to america and in 20 years time go back. we are seeing a humongous demographic change in the middle east. it's one that is hardly noticed by anyone. people frame the question of coptic immigration or the loss of morbidity in the middle east until as one of religious freedom. it's a nice thing to discuss after we've really talked about the big national security issue. well, it's not just the religious freedom issue. those religious minorities, bernard lewis have documented the beginning of the 20th century, the region was about 25%, 33% non-muslim. jewish communities, egypt, iraq,

morocco, everywhere in the region. christian committees everywhere. other religions, all this religious mosaic that had survived into modern times. well, it's no longer that picture. today, the middle east outside of the state of israel is 3% christian. that's 3%, the largest bulk in a, absent majority are egypt copts. besides them, you've got the lebanese, you've got the syrian christians, and what remains of iraqi christians, up to two-thirds of them have left. if the copts of egypt please come we talking about a huge demographic shift in the region. the very region, the fabric of the is no longer what we used to know. those religious minorities have played a very important role. they where the link with the

west, the rich. one has to turn to the work of the father of lebanon. when he talks with the beginning of arab nationalism, one has to go back. when one thinks of the baath, one has to mention -- of egypt's thinkers your all of this might be lost. the loss is not just for the coptic church. the challenge is not just for the coptic church. that challenge is also for egypt and the other countries in the region. this loss of christianity from the region is one that will have implications. people talk about the youth growth in the region, the youth bulge. sure, that's an important demographic change, but there's another one happening that people largely don't focus on.

for the coptic church, it's a blessing and a challenge. the church is flourishing outside of egypt's borders, but it's in decline inside of the country. i wrote an article in today's "wall street journal" about the loss of one of the inch and churches in the country, a church from the fourth or fifth century that had withstood the test of time. generations have passed the byzantine era dynasties, and today it no longer stands in egypt. the coptic% in egypt was perhaps much larger than even that of the previous community that was kicked out of the country. the countries jews. well, what happened to the jews of egypt cannot happen to its copts. the jews were the largest is in constant 80-100,000. shirley won come when we talk about the copts, there is no room in the west or anywhere for

six or 8 million copts. shortly, they will all stay. and naturally this change wouldn't happen or not suggesting it would happen in a day or two. but if we see a continuation of the current trends of immigration where copts are not only going to the places a tradition went to, united states, canada, australia and other parts of the world but also to georgia. when my father told me for the first time that copts from ivillage in egypt were going to georgia, my natural reaction was georgia, u.s.a., right? know. george are former ussr. that are about 6000 copts now in georgia. why? because it's cheap. because it's an easier place to go to than the west. my local coptic church year in virginia, we've had a committee of about 3000 copts before egypt's revolution. we had 15 to 20,000 families --

15 to 20 families come every month. were not a committee of 4500 copts. would opening smaller churches in arlington and other places because of the influx of refugees. this is the challenge to the coptic church, that this is perhaps extremely i'm prepared for. with innocence the church has survived persecution. but how do you do with an open market within christian denomination in the west? how do you deal with the modern challenges of the modern world of atheism, about call, of all the drug uses? all the problems that are not in the same size in egypt as they are in the immigrants community? what does it mean to be a copt when egypt is no longer the place you call home? what does it mean to be a copy of your living in minnesota, in philadelphia? what does that identity mean for you? what does it actually mean for

the church? if it's one point in the future, 20 years, 30 years time that the majority of its followers would be outside of egypt? what would that mean for the very doctrine of the church? these are all challenges that the church will be facing in the coming years. and as i've learned from writing this book, we're going to see this forward. this has been in this story i've seen generation after generation, for the copts. the decline, the dk in the community, the failures, but also the survival and endurance of others. the revival in others. that is likely to be the 20 stories that we continue to see in the future. thank you very much. [applause]

>> very good, sam appeared you just got a glimpse of the depth and the scholarship and the insight that is in sam tadros is wonderful book. let's open the floor to questions and comments. so please raise your hand, identify yourself, be brief. recognize that you're being paid for posterity, so watch what you say. i opened up the floor with you, sir. there's a microphone coming your way. >> my name is arnold and i'm been teaching in china for the past 10 years. this is not an area of expertise for me, but i wonder if you could remark about the secular elite. why there hasn't been a more visible secular or civilian face -- not on?

is that better? i don't know. it doesn't sound like it. can you hear me speak was i can you. go ahead. >> no. i just wondered, for example, the departure, how much of a secular elite supports this? >> i'll turn to you. when you look at the secular elite, deliberately, whatever term you want to use, how deep is the support for the military intervention, as of july 3? and then the crackdown from last week. >> well, i would say it's very deep. let's first define who these people are that we describe as liberals or secularist. is generally an anagram of different groups. they always share a rejection of the islamist project, or fear that project. you get the business community

who obviously fear what the project might mean for their businesses. the copts are naturally afraid of that. the human rights community, the different leftist groups that you have in the country. for example, the revolution socialist. all this, arab nationals, all of these together. so they share different ideas. and perhaps that's part of the explanation of why they failed to something because they're unable to provide any idea that you counterpart to islamism. it for them, there is no other option but military. the only people that have come out against what's going on in egypt have been the previous parliamentarian in his article in one of egypt's newspapers.

outside of that, there's very few voices, if any, that are projected the binary choice between islamism for the brotherhood and the military. so generally speaking i think it's overwhelming support. >> what would have to occur to transform this broad support for the military action into an effective civilian government that may eventually evolve into an elected civilian government? how does that transformation take place? >> well, it depends on whether they want to or not. at the question now, of course you have removed a president from the muslim brotherhood from topic is anyone ask or think you will allow the muslim brotherhood to win any elections any time since? of course not. or else you're basically saying

you're going to lose your head. if the muslim brotherhood wins in the election, this will not mean the heads of those jobs and the politicians who supported it. so i think we are definitely talking about a system of competitive hypocrisy, and we called something like that. whereby elections to take place, but a whereby parts of the population, parts of the ideological fabric of the country is excluded from the political process. creating perhaps the seeds for stability in the future. >> just to pursue this, if under the new regime there is, say, a ban on political parties based on religion, how will that affect the topics -- the copti coptics? >> the coptic community will be extra and happy. there's probably some crazy guy

who wants to do a coptic political party somewhere, but there's no meaningful quote any significant movement into that regard. so the coptic community will death and welcomed that. it would welcome political process where it's great with any means, the most threatening to it is excuses and doesn't have a chance to dominate the political sphere and threaten the coptic community. >> yes, please come in the front. we will try it again with the mic. >> i am from the wilson center. my question to you, sam, is i'm working also focus on farrakhan and look at what's happening with muslim minorities in non-muslim minorities. my question to you is what is the curriculum like in egypt?

because what i have found studying the curriculum is a hatred of anger, of other minorities, including -- [inaudible] is all there from social studies, other studies, the minorities is from the moment they got a solution. what do you say about this in egypt? >> i don't think of something at the same level of which have in places like pakistan or saudi arabia, which i'm similar with the textbooks of their and the amount of hatred of the other that exist in their textbooks. in egypt, the minister of education under mubarak for 10 years took a great, paid a lot of attention to this issue of

limiting any hateful messages in the educational curriculum. however, the problem was much more with people to educate themselves, teachers. teaching is not, doesn't provide one with a very bright future. it's one of the worst things into university. if your gpa is above that or orr grades in high school are not that good, you in that in the teachers department. and also the quality of people is very bad. anyone who doesn't get the paper through the corruption or from the bureaucracy in separate teaching in the areas away from cairo. and the result is it's no surprise that the places where you get the worst extremism is the places were used in the worst teachers. that's the south of fiji. when you go to places that are

impoverished, so perhaps the poorest teachers but that's we get those teachers that are not well liked or well received in cairo. and thus, the message is better given to the students are extremely hateful of the other. and it's not just education. it's quite hard to listen to a mosque sermon outside of some well-known big mosque in cairo. in the countryside, for example. that does not curse the jews and the christians on a daily basis. this all is built on mythology. let me give a fascinating example. coptic christians touched a coptic priest wear black only where why when they're holding mass or participating in mass services. and as a result there's been this consistent -- the coptic

priest were black because part of the sadness. and one day the church hopes to pronounce the black and wear the white when they celebrate, there's no longer islam dominates the country and when egypt is returned like and we will see something like that. so fast forward to mr. moore sees remove it and you get of course us imagine they were white in the massacre to get the picture of the coptic pope ordain some division and their natural language. basic see, this proves that the copts are happy with the coup because now they would have ended islam in egypt and now they can wear white again. so whatever the education and the mass media is built on already existing death that have

existed for generations, to say the least. >> yes. hello, on my right. >> [inaudible] >> thanks both of you very much. i wanted to ask a question, sam, and for that matter, rob, you spoke of the attempt that the modernizers had for their fellow citizens. contempt that was basic centered on the fact that their fellow citizens were traditional and pious, and, therefore, they had relatively little impact on that segment of the population, which is the majority. in the present circumstances,

some substantial portion of that population turned against morsi and the brotherhood. in your opinion, and rob's opinion, is there some new language that the secular elite or whether our elite or not, could now find a language that would be common to them, and also to the majority of the population, which would limit the future impact of islamism in whatever form it comes back? ..

in a sense, that's the winning answer they might come up with. we see the beginning of that currently in egypt. attacks on the western world and its portrayal of the egyptian people as well, images of the man of the people, familiar with taoist art, for example would recognize the images they see in egypt. the masses into rear square and above it the marshal of the

people. so i would say they would have to choose any of the pro-ideas and purely choose populist nationalism as a way to defeat this. >> hillel, i hope it is not a sign of false modesty to suggest i haven't the foggiest idea. i don't think that the people who are at the height of running egypt today, august 21st, know the answer to this question. i don't think they have a plan for a year from now, two years, five years. and if they don't have a plan, i don't know what their plan is. i don't say that because i don't know. i really don't think they do.

>> as i was listening to your brilliant summary of the hiss tree of the copts, it struck me how similar it was to the history of the jewish diaspora. i almost thought if you could say the word, you get basically the same story and recently had and innovation. number two, would have been the relationships between the copts and the jews? >> there are some historical similarities. of course until the modern state, the jews have to now it tvt aspera comic though they are. so there's something different.

the stories. when you look back at history, i discuss in my book one of the worst were basically you have to decline of coptic churches from something like 2048 and the years 1200 to 112 churches. 400 year period, complete eradication. and you see their propaganda, very similar to what you've got tories the jews in eastern europe. the relationship between the copts and the septet has not been always perfect. there has been an historical competition as minorities in the region who get the jobs that the rulers allowed them to take.

so the two communities have obviously in the middle ages under the rule of islam. anti-semitism is a vice that is spread throughout the muslim arab world, not exclusively to its muslim populations, meaning that many christians they are share extremely anti-semitic kj. part of it is built on traditional jew he should have church doctrine still have from the middle ages, something similar to what was going on with western christians. part of it is of course a test to portray christians as more loyal to the country than others. once there has been his conflict with israel, it was very important for the church to appearance extremely naturalists, that supports the

nation and not the trade for stores the country. you can see those decision to ban copts from going through jerusalem and performing the poker match for any of these things. >> yes, two gentlemen of affair. two seats away from each other. if you can identify yourself, please. >> obviously we followed these events in egypt, very closely sharing the heritage, but also the region in which the arab spring is causing so many travels. you pointed out the fact that there's a huge egyptian population which are not so presented at this point, quite possibly the maturity to see away for a transformation of the islamist movement in the region, specifically with various

impeccably islamist government, which has very good credibility. some cases are protected to the traditional world. as far as the ideology of free-market that deregulated the countries have reduced the role of the state, something you've also pointed out. do you see that this could be a possible for creating islamist movement which has served the interest of europe and the united states? >> that is an offense important question that egypt's future, what happens to the larger islamist scene. i have no doubt that the military will win this round. but it is around, meaning that this is not the end of the war. the military will crush the muslim brotherhood. they are willing to kill as many

as it takes. then the situation they are red. whether the muslim brotherhood exists as americanization, the leadership that leads to a disintegration among its members, with each of them take in a trial. there are three rows in the future in front of islamism. the first is that if turkey, and you provide a more moderate image with newer faith is handy when according to the rules of the game and take it step-by-step and tell you transfinite change society 15

years after. so much slower pace than what the brotherhood with the temp dean to do in a matter of months. the second route is naturally that are generations, were egyptian islamists will be affected by the same idea the generations before them were that you really can't do it through the ballot boxes that you have to go through the bullets. there's no other way. we were denied our rights for big hurry. we play by their rules and they didn't accept it. the own explanation is they are against islam and that this is a state of chile. but i -- the basic arguments have been made. the western desert next to the with easy routes there, and jay hottest organizations already in libya. so you have two friends that

night emerge they are. that's the message that some like i meant tahari is making. i told you so. i explain it is not the right one, that you can only do it through my way. it's important to keep in mind that he falls in egypt for 20 plus years. this is not some country. this is a place for the whole thing started, where he started fighting against the internal enemy before joining bin laden. so if al qaeda is under pressure in afghanistan and pakistan, if its brand is no longer as appealing as it was 10 years ago, what would be better than creating islamist and efficiency that reprints the organization is one fight against the zionist

and a safe haven in the sinai. so that is obviously they are. the third is perhaps a mixture of islamism with leftist ideas. something similar to a sugary iced tea was thinking with islamic marxism, something touched upon in his work on social justice in islam, so much more populist islamism, the basic islamist ideas that argument for the poor people fighting against the rich and the powerful. these are basically the three rows that are there and they're not all contradict tree, meaning the three of them can largely have been at same time and the majority may continue to attempt to prevent itself in electoral politics with the significant minority will go on enjoying the sinai and otherwise.

>> of packages out to brief comments. first, the turkish mortal i think people fail -- generally fail to recognize what a steeper of the essays. i mean, it was a half-century abstract, secular rules stripping religion from our public life. i mean come egypt is nowhere near that experience. well before the opportunity for serious electoral competition. even then you have a couple of military intervention to squeeze out the most radical aspects of the islamic oriented party until you finally ended up after 70 years was air duan. that's what she did after that huge experience.

egypt is just not down that path. the second observation in terms of the islamists turning to the radical path, i don't think that the military leadership would necessarily opposed that. i mean, if this is what they choose, this is that the military knows to deal with. this was not the challenge -- this is a challenge that the state was able to cope with in egypt over the last several decades. yes, they took down saddam, but this do you survive in the state not only survived, but in a sense prevailed, prevailed so much that it eventually allowed them to run politically, which may have been a mistake and maybe at the state, but now it's revenge of the state.

i don't think about the muslim brotherhood choosers, i don't think the military would be so fearful of this option because what they know how to deal with. >> and there's a framing for the war against terror. >> yeah. there's a gentleman behind you on your left. [inaudible] >> the tax revenue that supports the payment of the clergy. >> question about tax revenues in payment. doug, i'll ask you to pose your question. >> doug fife come a senior fellow here hudson. what i am wondering about is your view of the egyptian

military and whether the brotherhood has any possibility by turning out in the streets in insuring large levels of violence of cracking the egyptian military. is there any possibility you can see egyptians in the military decided they don't want to kill the people and they will go over to the muslim brotherhood site, kind of roughly on the model of what happened in russia in world war i. do they have a prayer of any kind of help from elements of the egyptian military? >> lasley would like to peruse buick option prompted not least by our house in the important role in promoting religious freedom. what do copts want from america? what would copts like to hear from my leaders, public officials? what is the best message we could be sending?

what is the most useful message we could be sent to? dare come you have four minutes, three easy brief questions. >> if i understood the question correctly about tax revenues, none of the tax revenues go to churches, meaning that the church is our copts donate privately to churches, but the government doesn't get a single penny to churches. it does of course give money to mosques and each have been spent on religious education. it provides services as religious and educational and provides trips for people to reform. very many aspects of many elements egyptians face on muslim religious education and religious sect to these, but none on copts. this is solely based on people donating for the churches.

concerning the military, that's perhaps the brotherhood's that come up to one that failed so far. partly because the army has so far made the police performed the worst crimes, which the police of course is more than happy to do so. so the egyptian police has felt extremely humiliated and crashed from the 2011 uprising, boosting their dominance on the street and this is time. so the police is very happy to perform this, get some army units are helping, but most years the police doing to crack down. if the level of violence is to increase and more army units or to take part, the likelihood of any crack if anything might have been will be on the conscript levels and not on the officers for the act to duty officers.

the conscripts come from egyptian site at large, meaning that these people one year ago where the islamists in parliamentary elections for 70% as well as the rest of the population. so it's not outside of the possible the conscripts that refuse to open fire on them or any of that. that's possible. i doubt they would be involved into the vast level that would create a crisis for them and split within the army. what do copts want? i don't think they know. partly the copts as a first -- largely a first-generation immigrant community of the u.s., they've not really learned how to operate in the american

system. they continue to protest in front of the white house, not realizing that policy actually happens if not for those protesting outside. and that is a sad reflection of the state of the community. i remember we had a couple of the fence for a broad coptic priests and asked them a question, what do you want the americans to do? they don't have an answer. partly because no one with to advocate more western intervention into their homeland. they do realize very well this team a price living inside his egypt in any word said here, i'll miscue the speech you a couple years ago and he caused a

firestorm that force them to remain outside the country for a while. it's not likely to be a welcoming message when copts ask for things in america. at the same time it's a reflection of the coptic predicament. you are neither geographically concentrated in a single area whereby one ponders the safe haven item of the federal system of this sort. their numbers are significant, but i say percentage of the egyptian population come you are not to affect the country's future. so your options are many. your best hope is egypt is inclusive for everyone. so the basic question asked the united states is that the united states would insist on an occlusive v-chip in the attack that is really impressive than it, we have to go back to the year 1321 to have that many churches on the same day.

it obviously unsafe calling for those attacks the level of hate should end incitement of their websites and messages cistern and is an obviously some of the numbers and other islamists are in those attacks. but the egyptian state has also been there, meaning anyone who works on the coptic issue could have easily told to which churches would have been attacked. it's no surprise the church was attacked in august 23rd team. it was attacked in 2009, 2012, july 2013. of course they would be attacked again with something like this takes place. so the failure of the egyptian regime to protect the christian system in the united states has to stress that that regime, that if you claim to be against the extremism of the brotherhood, the easiest step is to protect the christians and most of the

tax for most of the violence. >> thank you. please join me in taking the hudson institute ended again samuel tadros. [applause] excellent book. please tell everybody about it. sam, congratulations. [inaudible conversations] >> one of the most iconic and recognizable symbols, but a lesser-known fact is the first stone to cover this building. when the building is completed in 1779 it is an undersize kubla commode just a cry for architectural problems and leaks in part because it is hit by hurricane the 1770s.

there are lots of modern architecture. in 1785, less than two years after congress with annapolis begins on a new domed statehouse. they of course have to first dismantle the original kubla and it takes them about 12 years to complete it. the construction of next year begins in 1787 andersen completed about built entirely without structural nails and altogether and elaborate iron strapping, which truly is an architectural masterpiece. the 19th century during the war of 1812 come to statehouse dome is used as a lookout. is the tallest winning town has a commanding view of the referenda chesapeake. we have tremendous documentation of william birney condescended marilyn's joshua burnet going to the statehouse dome in using his

class to observe that shirt movements of the way back and forth of the day in september september 1814. >> more as booktv in american history tv look at the history and literary life of annapolis. >> annapolis st. john's college is not to be the first in maryland to be racially degraded with the admission of martin dyer in 1848 and francis scott key, author of the star-spangled banner was a student. petitti visited annapolis with the local partner colchester brigade area's cultural and literary history. >> and the william p. block book realm, the rare book room contains about 2800 volumes. the room is named after to help us renovate in the library

itself is the record study for the state of maryland. all the books in this room are donated to the college. many early books in the first collection they were to be a resource for young people who were interested in the ministry. so this is a collection for the general public. the commissary of maryland and was brought to this country largely collections for the library collections. what we have here is the first collection given to the public library for the purpose, both of paris used and for the reading public. i think because he really wanted the public to become interested

in and to study works that might lead to the ministry. this book here i'll take out and show you says that the leo take a undercover. all of the books have the.net ms volumes that wherein the library of annapolis. this was given to the city of annapolis that constituted 1100 books. here we have the second inscription. this one is built on the third. that is the second indication that this is from the great collection. what i love about these books of course is what you see in the quality of the typeface and color. next we turn to the collection of francis scott key, author of the national anthem is a

graduate of the college from 1796. ms is the coach at a secondary school and went to college and was at the school for 10 years. he did so long before you is 20 years old. one of the pieces that he wrote that it had some influence at the college essay discourse and education delivered at saint ann's church in annapolis after the commencement of st. john's college. i thought maybe i would just read a paragraph or two from that. he is talking about the importance of a liberal education for all, not just for the wealthy. he says there are an ever will be the poor and the rich, banana flavor and a man of leisure and the state which the? either neglect the duty at its

peril for whichever of the? will be not only useless, mischievous for francis scott key was a big speaker and this particular discourse goes on for a few hours. sometime shortly after my presidency and received in the mail the will of francis scott key from one of the defendants. this has been carefully preserved and you'll see very fine handwriting. it's a beautiful document and it's rare. 1837. here's a book that has importance to the college. this is a book given to the college is one of many by alexandra bob and mary. he was the founder of the boston library and also the international book exchange. that takes some imagination and

it's kind of exciting to have a collection of books donated to the concrete around 1850. all religious books by the founder of the international book exchange. this is a book of sacred hymns. once again, so many early books are written in published in latin. their early editions and translations some of these works that we've read at the college for a long, long time. >> up next on booktv, "after words" with clinical activist and radio host joe madison. this week on a craig steven

wilder and his latest book, "ebony & ivy: race, slavery & the troubled history of america's universities." in it, and the m.i.t. history chair discusses how the campuses of many of the universities are not only built by slave labor, but funded by profits are from the practice of slavery. this program is about an hour. >> host: "ebony & ivy," professor wilder, i guess the first question is how did you start down the road? we were laughing before he spent 10 years ago when you first started you had hair. >> guest: not a lot, but i had hair. >> host: what started you down the road to actually put "ebony & ivy" together? >> guest: is actually a long story i can make sure. 'v