final weekend, the huge turnout that suddenly struck with the romney campaign on election day in philadelphia. the obama campaign would say this is an assertion by african-americans a brief pat your back, president obama and we are not going to let anything get in our way of voting. this is part of a debate about election laws, but it's also part of the emotion that goes into how people decide to vote and how motivated they are. >> good evening. her name is james reid. i'm at george washington university. >> how about now? >> i could speak loudly if you guys can hear me. my question is concerned about the obama family and the romney family, their impacts on the

campaign. .. i think always had a very natural quality about it in the determination. she was a fighter. and the fighter on the effort for her husband. i think that both of them were helpful and the families. americans of whatever political

strategy will let each of those families to -- on both sides they had assets. >> thank you. >> and one last question. >> deasy foster, retired educator. given that more fight died lasted member board, do you seek -- this is what the media is saying. d.c. politics in america moving toward the david broder changing of the guard philosophy? demographically you are right. >> their rising part of the population is a minority part of the population. there are two big parts of the population. one is the aging baby boomers. and so the older vote is actually growing, and the other is young voters and particularly young hispanics.

and that inevitably will change our politics, but not just young hispanics. young voters in particular. they're growing up in a world which is different than the one that most of us grew up in. it is a much more diverse world, and much more tolerant world on some social issues. and it is an economically quite challenging world which is affecting people's attitudes as they start to enter the political process and i believe at this point that the democrats believe that that will work for there advantage, but, as i said, these things are organic and just as bill clinton kind of rethought and redefine the democratic party after three consecutive losses during the reagan and first bush presidencies there may be a republican on the horizon there when the national action. it's what keeps people like me

going. and let me -- thank you all very much. [applause] >> every week and book tv offers 48 hours of programming focused on nonfiction authors and books. watch it here on c-span2. >> next, due to recent events and syria book tv has put together the following programs featuring authors talking about there role of serious assad, the recent conflict there, and the influence of the u.s. in the middle east today. we will be hearing from authors. we begin with former cia analyst phil and levirate, author of inheriting syria the trial by fire of bashar al assad. in this clip from 2005 he talks about how president sought was viewed by washington and the bush administration following

9/11 and questions what a post n sought syria would be like?my >> the book from my perspective has two objectives.ve first of all, i want it to provide an actionable analytic portrait of bashar al assad as a national leader. this is something that i think is very much needed is very much needed. if you look at the really outstanding books that have been written on syria in the last 20 years, you would certainly include the political biographies of his father, by steele, but both of books are more than 15 years old. there's been very good writing on the israeli syrian negotiations, roboninovich, and others. the israeli scholar wrote a nice book on the last decade of the presidency, but there's really nothing out there on syrian

politics and policy-making under bashar, so i thought it was time that something tried to fill that void, and i hope "inheriting syria" does that. the second objective of the book though, is to take that actionable, analytic portrait developed in the book and draw the implications for u.s. policy. as you may have deduced, i don't think very much of the way that the bush administration has gone about trying to deal with syria, and achieved u.s. policy objectives toward syria. i think there is a smarter way of going about things. i said i think that there is a pressing need for a more solid analytic assessment of syrian politics and policy-making under bashar. one of the things that strikes me at this critical moment is that there really is a good deal of analytic uncertainty and even

confusion about syria, with a focus on bashar's leadership. in the book, i identify what i think are the three dominant perspectives that tend to govern our discussions of syria. one, i describe bashar as closet reformer. you know, he is the western educated, internet-savvy, younger-generation leader, who recognizes syria's many problems wants to make things better, wants a better relationship with the united states and west generally, but is constrained by a so-called oligarch. a second perspective identifies bashar as the son. in this image, he is really a force for continuity in the system not for change. he is seen as a product of the system his father created, and

he is very much, from this perspective, part of the problem in syria, not in any way part of the solution. and then the third perspective i identify is bashar as neofite, or even in other formulations, bashar as idiot, as in a magazine article, i found the subtitle was, the evil moron who is running syria. in this image, bashar is presented as someone who is too inexperienced, ill prepared, uninformed, etc., to carry out his responsibilities as a national leader. in reality, i think the picture of bashar has to be a more nuanced and mixed picture.

in my view, bashar has genuine reformist impulses. he recognizes that syria has a lot of problems, economically, socially, politically, and he wants things to be different and better, but i would argue that his reformist impulses are attenuating. he doesn't have a full-fledged vision for transforming syria. people talk about his western education, but let's keep in mind what that experience really was. it was a little over a year in london in what we in the united states would describe as an ophthalmology residency program. now, if any of you have had friends who went to medical school that went through that kind of post graduate medical education, you will know that first-year residents don't have

lives. they work, and they get what sleep they can, and that is their life. bashar himself told me when i asked him about his experience in london, he himself said, you know, i got to know very well the route between the hospital where i worked and the flat where i lived. he says, i still don't know london very well. ok. yes, he has some experience in the west in essentially this field, but let's not overstate it. he wasn't doing his ph.d. at major university, so while he has reformist impulses, he doesn't have on his own, i would say a thorough, elaborate vision for transforming his country. he does, indeed, face constraints from the so-called

old guard, but i think here too, there's some kind of caricature at work. when i was able to interview him for this book, i was -- this is certainly a topic i wanted to ask him about, but i thought, i am going to ease into this. i am going to be here for a while before i raise the subject of the old guard. but literally, within the first quarter hour that i was with him he raised the subject, and i said, all right, mr. president, you have raised a very interesting topic. what would you want people in the united states and the west to understand about your relationship with this so-called old guard? and he said, well, a number of things, but the most interesting thing to me was he said, people need to understand that the old guard is not just two or three guys who occupy senior positions at the top of the system. the old guard is literally

thousands of mediocre and fossilized -- those are his words -- mediocre and fossilized bureaucrats, who are throughout the system and who have been entrenched in their positions over years and decades and have no interest in doing anything in a different way. the old guard is also a private sector that the private sector really in name only and exists in a kind of unhealthy symbosis with this entrenched bureaucracy. he said, now, you look at that, that's the old guard. and that is a real obstacle to change here. ok. so he is constrained, but the constraint is not just two or three old guys at the top. it's more systemic than that. bashar is trying to find ways,

in my view, to work around the old guard, both the two or three guys at the top and this more diffuse and entrenched old guard in the bureaucracy, and i document in the book how he is basically setting up his own alternative network of technocrats, people with western advanced degrees in fields like economics, computer science, business, people who have had experience in the private sector outside syria or with international institutions like the world bank, and he is over time building up a network of these people and placing them in for the most part, second-tier positions in the syrian system. occasionally he gets one up into

a ministerial level appointment, and i think he is trying to build up this network over time. another part of that network -- and part of the confirmation for my argument that bashar really does have reformist impulses, is his wife. i am saying this not only because my own wife is here, i think who a man marries says a good deal about him. now, the woman that bashar chose to marry and chose to marry over his mother's objections, which is not insignificant in his cultural setting, that woman is the daughter of expatriate syrian position, world class interventional cardiologist who

made career in the united kingdom. she was born, raised, educated entirely in the u.k., has degree of computer science university of london, went through the investment banking training program at j.p. morgan, and had been admitted to the m.b.a. program at the harvard business school at the tl at thr proposed to her. now, you may question what it says about her judgment that she gave up harvard business school to accept that proposal. but i'm more interested in what that says about bashar's judgment, that the person he selects to be beside him on a daily basis is someone who is going to bring exposure to absolute world-class standards and practices in the globallized economy of the 21st century. i find that a very striking

statement about him. so he's trying to develop this alternative network of technocrat, but i think he still suffers from some pretty serious capacity deficits. he does not have around him the range and depth of technocratic expertise that he needs to craft serious reform initiatives, particularly in the economy. he himself will admit this, acknowledge this. in conversation. that when he has tried to do various sorts of reforms, banking reform, introducing private banking, for example, the process goes unnecessarily slowly and the impact of it is reduced because he doesn't have the kind of expertise he needs to do things in a systematic

way. so inevitably what he does has this kind of ad hoc and inadequate or insufficient quality to it. so if i think about bashar as a national leader, you know, the picture is i think -- i think needs to be more subtle than the perspective that tends to dominate our discussion of syria will allow for. reformist impulses, but they're attenuated. doesn't have a full vision, trying to develop an alternative network of advisors and experts around him, but he still doesn't have the technocratic capacity he needs to move things forward in the way i think he would like. he is constrained by the old guard. i think on the whole he does not want to have a confrontation with the old guard. he would basically prefer to

work around them. and i think he also assumes that biology is on his side. he will turn 40 this year. you know, i think if syrian politics played out its natural course, you know, he's not term limited. i don't think he has to worry about losing an election any time soon. i think the way he sees reform unfolding is over very long period of time. a decade or more. but the real question is, given the strategic challenges that he's facing, does he really have that kind of time? and that brings us back to the notion of this being a very critical moment. i think that the administration is embarked on a course where

the risk of unintended consequences is very high. the risk of unintended consequences is certainly high in terms of what could happen in lebanon, but i will let others talk about that today and we can return to it in questions if you like. but i think it's also unintended in terms of what could happen in syria. i said the administration is inching toward a regime change posture. i don't think we're gearing up to invade syria. don't take me the wrong way at this point. i don't think we're gearing up for that, but i think the administration believes it can achieve regime change on the cheap. as i said, you know, the idea of being if we push syria out of lebanon, the outside regime can't recover from that blow. i actually don't think that's the case. i think this regime is more

resilient than that. and i actually take seriously a scenario in which if four months five or six months down the road it's clear that bashar al-assad can still set the outer limits for lebanese policy on the issues that really matter to syria, i think that bashar could conceivably emerge as a stronger figure. domestically and regionally. if on the other hand, he is seen as someone who has squandered an important strategic resource for syria that could have consequences for him at home. even if we were able to bring down the assad regime on the xhaep, -- on the cheap, it's not really clear to me what

interests of the united states are being served by that. you know, what would follow in a society that is as complicated as syria's, and i would argue that syrian society is at least as complicated as lebanese society or iraqi society. what would follow the collapse of the assad regime would be certainly chaotic, and what my -- what might be likely to emerge from that chaos would be in my view heavily islamist. in character. and i'm not really sure what

>> the typical middle east dictator. a licensed ophthalmologists, not groomed to be president and was only brought back into their grooming process apparatus when his older brother who was being groomed died in a car accident in 1994. bashar al assad was in london been the equivalent of an advanced degree in ophthalmology brought back and raised in the state apparatus. how can president and his father the thought was a very interesting story. he was different from a the typical middle east dictators us study in middle east history. and so 2002i contacted a friend of mine who happens to be the

minister of high education. he was in academia. and when traveling to syria for years on metal lot of academics, being in a bit to have academic myself. and bashar brought a lot of these people into government command that was i guess the good or bad thing. many people felt that the time that bringing academics, maybe he would take the country in a different direction. i contacted this minister of higher education. he contacted bashar. in two years almost to the day later the ambassador to the united states at the time called me up, and he was also a friend and an academic, the dean of computer science at manassas university park to become an ambassador and he said, david, it's on. i had forgotten about this whole thing. i said, what's on? he said, well, the president wants to meet with the. and so i met with him in may and

june of that year extensively command to view his wife and many other syrian officials. >> what was the first me like? >> well, after the pleasantries and after i explained why wanted to do this, i went my first substantive sentence to him was, mr. president, you know i'm not an apologist for syria. i'm writing this book on you, and of going to criticize you in this book. he said, that's fine. i know you will criticize me. i know that i am not perfect. i know that in the past you criticize my father's policies. but you were always fair and objective from their point of view. and then i told him, you know, mr. president, one of the worst things you never did, you that it be known that you like phil collins music.

[laughter] the rock star from england. and he is, -- he had a puzzled look on his face. asking stupid questions. and he said, wind. and i said because in the west this information was disseminated and treated to this profile of him being out modernizing pro-western reformer. he liked western music, an ophthalmologist, he studied in london for two months. he is going to be completely different than his taciturn father. and i said, you know, this created, perhaps, too high an expectation in the west of exactly what he wants to do and is able to do. >> where were your meetings held? >> they were held in various places, usually in what is called the presidential building. a very modest building and the district of damascus. and i mean, very modest. a typical kind of middle-class,

you know, residential apartment building that was transformed into -- they call the presidential palace. it is not at all. that is very mainly works. we also met in what is called the people's palace which was built by his father, this grand structure on the top of this mountain overlooking damascus. his palace and then some, but he hardly ever goes there and only needs dignitaries there. the only reason why i met him there one time as she was meeting with my mood and a job, the iranian president. and i'm at with him just after that. i think in say this now considering the current circumstances, but i asked him, well, mr. president, what do you think of what a dinner chat. he just rolled his eyes and said, no, my god, basically. and he said he makes the decision.

grants. i can say that now. a pro when never going to see him again fortunately or unfortunately. >> explain how that relationship went on. you get to know him better. >> and get to know him very well. from the beginning -- and this is one of the sad things. i actually got to personally like the man. it's very difficult, as you know, when you establish a relationship with someone like that. and you want to get to know the person, but you try to have to remain objective and keep your distance. sometimes that's tough, and i'm not a professional, as you are and have been doing that sort of thing. these are professionals, and it's sometimes difficult. sometimes to maintain access you have to establish this personal relationship. so that's a little difficult. i try to maintain that distance, objectivity, but i think we developed a comfort level to the

point where i got to get snippets of him, the person. he -- when we interviewed these figures like this, especially political figures, presidents, kings, queens, ever, 90 percent of what they tell you is scripted. it will appear in the newspapers next week. it's just stuff that i have heard. goes in one year out the other. not really interesting at all. about ten or 15 percent of what he tells you is really dynamite. that is when the guard is down. i think we developed enough of a relationship, and he was always welcoming and gracious, almost self-deprecating in the beginning with something and saw a change as time went on unfortunately. and to the point where he did let his guard down at times. >> did you meet the wife and kids? >> i did. i meant her several times i

interviewed her. all these interviews at or two or three hours. and it covered a wide range of topics. and she is very cosmopolitan, an impressive person, again, someone who people have high hopes for in the beginning because she was different. the first couple was different than in the past. usually the syrian president's wife stayed in the background, no one ever saw them. she was out front, you know, a champion of women's rights, a champion of trying to up create a civil society organization, although they were tied to the government and not really independent. nothing much was independent. just before the uprising. the rows of the visitors something like that and the desert rose, which they were very embarrassed about in the uprising.

one of the questions was where has that person on in him people had high hopes. where did that person in? and so that is one of the saddest things about that because they really did, you know, develop a level of popularity in the country that was not insignificant. serious the difficult to gauge popularity because sometimes people will come out in support of bashar al assad and the government because they don't want to be seen as not supporting the government. the security services all around. it's really difficult to see how genuine and sincere this popularity is. so in the country quite a bit and gone around all of the country and talked about all sorts of people, i really did cents a genuine popularity. for me personally one of the saddest things about that was he did not leverage that popularity to implement trees change that really needed, particularly at the beginning of the uprising. in my view it as a way.

>> what did he talk about? >> his upbringing. we talked, you know, but many different aspects of his life, his upbringing. fairly normal considering he was the son of the president. one of the things that i did was interview his elementary school teacher. primary and secondary school teachers. they were not afraid which is very telling. was a very good in this particular subject. the parents after share schools because he was being distracted by girls. they sent into an all boys' school. and if you compare that, as i did in the first book in 2005 with saddam hussein's son who basically threatened their teachers to give the maze. never showed up.

if they did not there would kill them and put them in prison, something like that, at least that is the story that we get, and i have no reason to doubt that. so this was one of the things again that contributed to this profile that was helpful. they tried to get normal. a privileged family. you cannot be the son of the president and not have that lifestyle to some degree. anti his friends and a number of different people. and it was not orchestrated. it was pretty genuine. there were telling me this is a pretty normal guy. he liked having friends. he enjoyed music. they like to go out. all these things are contributed to this profile, a fairly normal guy, good family man, all of these things. that is what he tried to recreate. they live in a very modest kind of upper middle class, middle class, upper middle-class apartment building where they live on one floor. the mother lives on one floor.

right next door is a building. it's tough to hold down the shade because people like store can look into the bathroom and suffolk at. they tried to create, they try to recreate a fairly normal, as normal as you can a bringing for their own children. again, all of these things i learned in the beginning. these were impressive to me. and many other people, which is why i think we have had some hope in him that he would augment some real changes. >> when did you start to see him change itself? >> personally in 2007. i think in a dramatic way. i started to see it as early as 2006. tafr u.s.-led invasion which syria opposed, syria was turning a blind eye and helping people across syria into iraq to kill u.s. soldiers and allied

soldiers. they wanted the book dust -- bush stock and to fail. there were doing anything they could to help make this happen. this one high-level official told me later on, of course there were helping and prosperity know what, we wanted you guys to kill them. that is are we want them to go. we don't want them in our country. we wanted to a shove them out and get them through and you guys kill them. and when you survive that, and particularly after the assassination of former lebanese prime minister in february 2005 that was blamed on syria by most of the international community and the pressure just escalated exponentially after that against syria. people were in late 2005, counting the days for the bashar -- assad regimes. syrian expatriates just waiting to move in. he survived that.

and i think that really created in him a sense of triumph and a and survivalism that very much informs his view of the world. and the response to the uprising in march 2011. it instilled in him the sense of destiny and righteousness. he survived the best shot of the west could take him and that he was on the right side of history it really believe that. they have what i call i different conceptual paradigm of the world. it might be skewed. it might be off, but it is completely different and we see it in the united states and the west. based on their own history, experiences. they have a different view of the nature of the threat. it is very paranoid view, a very suspicious view of the outside world. part imagined, part real because there has been just enough, you know, great powers from the

outside over the decade. upon between the british and the french. regional powers, upon between the superpowers during the cold war. so that is their heritage and experience. then we have is really complex. that is how they view the world. we see the you in in many efforts by the u.n. very suspiciously. the arab league as controlled by saudi arabia. so they very much you that the outside world is out to get them. >> next author of business that works in syria talks about the differences between the revolutions in egypt in syria and explains why he thinks the

conflict in syria will not end soon. book tv interviewed professor had died in september 2012. >> the military and syria is not really where the locus of power is. it's actually the service that is come to dominate syria sort of coercive structure. this is where the power and authority lies. of course the military is more than 300,000 strong and powerful but in terms of authority and in terms of ability to act autonomously, even if limited, the regime is very different in that regard from the egyptian regime for instance or by the military does not have the kind of command, independent command and control that will allow the military to come at any given point in tell the president, look, you have to leave. we have to deal with this crisis

through this kind of, you know, arrangement whereby the head of the state leaves and the military restores the regime in some way. this is not possible and syria. those who have power are very close to the presidency and distributed through the secret service branches, more than a dozen of them. and these elements, socially and politically and economically are so organically intertwined with the regime that this kind of option or schism is really not possible. it might be in the future when there is an imminent collapse, but at this point it is completely solid inorganic, not allowing for these kinds of options. that is while lot of outsiders don't understand, did not understand why the regime is likely to hold on to power for quite some time. that is because the schism is not possible. it looks like for a lot of the people inside the regime with is support the top leaders are not, it looks like they know that the

fall of the regime means also their fall. the rational calculation of the entire ship will sink a swim. there is no option for schisms that will allow for an exit. so even as a group of people within the top syrian leaders want to us succeed and make a deal, they would not be considered legitimate because of their communal, very high proximity to the reins of power. whereas whether are not has participated and the brutality of the regime over decades which we actually as a country supported, these guys have some autonomy and were able to actually make an argument that the departure of the head of state is going to be meaningful. in syria the departure of the head of state was under the pressure of these mechanisms, it will be very meaningful.

>> saying that, how the ec the uprising play out over x number of months and years? >> i am hoping it will not be years. 2025 fouls, 45,000. we cannot be sure in either case. it is such a human tragedy that is taking place in syria. every time i want to address the situation, i'm really not able to think about strategy and things of this sort because it is no longer about, you know, an uprising that his democratic and a regime that is dictatorial. sure, it is and has been, but it has become a lot more diluted, infiltrated, and has engaged in practices that the regime used to engage in which is why one of the reasons that there is a stalemate today is because of the opposition or many members of the opposition that and actually lost the system support

for a good number of the cup -- population as well as having included elements from outside syria. kind of like iraqi situation which we have seen, a lot of this is actually an internal but it's also external. the opposition connection as well, saudi arabia, not democratic countries and have no interest in democracy but have their own politics and interest in moving the regime, the same with the united states and your as well as turkey, lot of these countries have had their on problematic human rights records and supporting the opposition for ulterior motives is something that is not also jelling with a lot of people in the region because there is no belief that these countries actually are supportive of democracy because they are not democratic or as with the united states, they actually have been supporting of territory in

reasons for decades and continue to support saudi arabia. so the push for democracy in syria by all these countries is actually not a legitimate bush and not a credible push. >> here in the u.s. we often judge our economy by the unemployment rate, gdp. give us a snapshot of the current syrian economy. >> the current syrian economy cannot be actually access. i mean, the numbers just not there. even from the very beginning the syrian economy was not as transparent as one would have liked, but earlier on the economy was based on a combination of aggro industry, manufacturing, and the modest will sector where about 60, 65 percent of the foreign exchange in syria came from oil sales because of the ability to actually make use of its 300,

500,000 barrels a day or less produced, but it was mainly an economy that rested on these killers and with time after the 1990's an increase in trades, telecom. it is really never reached the point where it has capitalized on anne's early development of industry in the 60's and 70's specially. in other words, a lot of the potential again was held victim to crony networks that were involved in this process, part and parcel of the resume. sometimes the more inefficient, basically secure power and compass -- a country like syria does not exist in the most serene and say it never is in the world. jesus and a very volatile i'll

never of a powerful and aggressive and brew actors including israel, some of the other countries that have depends on the region for decades. you have a dimension that is usually not taken into account because it is in the -- invisible in a way. actually, there are reasons why the syrian regime would invest way too much as military as opposed to and other area. and it is not just to protect the country. it's also to protect itself. it's also important not to discount the regional and international context within which countries like syria exist this is what explains the serious situation. it is really also about china.

i was born to said the soviet union. china and russia on the one hand and the united states and europe on the other. three levels of stalemate, local, regional command international simply because there's so much a stake. a country like syria or regime like syria for the past 14 years have had these calculations. this is not to excuse their regime brutality. this is to understand analytically the outcomes of what the we have been witnessing involving calculations that many of us don't take into account. >> we close with a clip from our afterwards program. in his 2013 book the dispensable nation the dean of the john hopkins school of a vast national studies sense that the obama administration is influence in the middle east is waning. he discussed this topic.

for. >> afghanistan becomes yet another example of a failing policy. and the region argued against that policy. it is too dangerous. and it was dangerous to let things drift away with it did. it was dangerous not to insist immediately on a replacement could be trusted that could hold things together. well we did to my now you go to the region. i go to the region. the question as always, why did you give that away? did you think about that or realize what would happen? and a sense that we gave up the show, we did not stick with him, we have given up and let the iranians takeover. we abandon mubarak. we announce a withdrawal from the cast and. now what are you going to do

next? how much can we trust the united states? i think you're right for different reasons. an overall commitment. of the assurances in the world, they make it difficult because the region is at the time. the surprises facing challenges they have not had to face before internally and what is going on. >> often faulted for mistakes. and afghanistan

military career wrong to decline , at the same time i'm serious about it diplomatic. that would have had much more of a bounce in fact. at think there is something else also having to do with it. that is that there is a sense that the united states is not just withdrawing from afghanistan militarily. it wants to reach -- leave the region entirely. that is particularly hard for our allies in the gulf and jordan and morocco who are basically saying you made mistakes. we start by you. we start by you.

now you can and and you literally pushed, not only 30 years ago, but mubarak out and then did nothing for egypt the day after a lt. it was almost about just pushing him off. no engagement and economic rm and then you find with the ascendance of fundamentalists power across the arab world. and then every time they see american leaders, what i hear in the region, he talks about syria and egypt, they're just not engage in these conversations. the very openly tell leaders in the region as we are pivoting to asia, going to be gone from this region.

and i think that is actually encouraging a sense of gloom and doom in the region or that leaders are beginning to say, well, we have to look for options b. it is not that you have of bundling america. you're not going to have any at all. i think to your points, that is really critical because these are the two most important arab countries. they're going to decide the future of the region. and spectacularly and completely this interested in how this plays out. we could be faulted for making mistakes. but the fact that we don't see any role for us or any sense of urgency as to whether egypt will find a critical economic program with the imf or the fact that syria could be, you know, could be stabilized, a threat to

israel, ultimately spread to the gulf. that is actually quite baffling. i think in my opinion it is a colossal strategic mistake on the part of the united states. this you cannot blame on the military or on the officials. it is a conscious decision is being made to downgrade the middle east as a strategic focus the president goes to the region and does not deem. a constant. neither up nor down. it is not where the real center of the issues are. he went time them are for a six hour visit to reward the ruler for letting him out of jail. he has not been to a single arab

country. and that is heard very loud and clear in the region. in know, washington is just not interested in this region. i think that is a whole new chapter. we may pat ourselves on the back and say, who wants to be mixed up with these people. just because you are not there does not mean the problems are solved and he won't come and fight you at some point. >> you have a much darker view than i do. add don't mean this as an excuse for the demonstration, with the problems are incredibly complicated. now, in no way, the failure here is not an intelligence failure as such, not a military failure. it is a failure to be willing to take on very difficult problems. if you look at egypt as an example, maybe we made a mistake in recognizing -- we have long argued that the muslim brotherhood, we want an open political system.

all groups should be able in a perfect world, a perfect democracy to be able to participate. nothing is wrong with that. we really understand the circumstances. in other words, i don't think that we were prepared to deal with the aftermath, the esso said it that, well, it has always been a republican on much more open society easier to see up flow into a transition and answer the republic that there were first arguing for in the streets in the first days of the demonstrations. that did not last long. people who came out disappeared. we were left with were the remnants of the old regime and the islamists who for the first time could operate in public, great, but also the only organized body to be able to put

together a structure, political parties and know how to move forward and so many of these other countries. i don't think -- we were so far ahead. by saying, you have got to go, but you really were, as they called it on the right side of history. the problem is the egyptians had not really helped us to help them minor. >> i agree with you, and it is difficult to fix problems. we should not assume that we could fix egypt. if we compared america's reaction to a global transformations of this kind, intellectually engaged with trying to have an influence on the outcome of the highest levels of government, we cannot influence the egyptian decision making on the constitution. we could have an influence on the economic decision making.

we could coordinate better if they don't give money to egypt the week before they are supposed to be signing a critical deal with the imf. we could provide better political cover to the egyptian government for economic decisions because engaging the egyptian people to the secretary of state, the white house, more ways, the way we engaged the brazilians, you know, the polish or the germans trying to engage the public in greece. to talk to them. you have to make these hard decisions. first the germans are not exactly a model i would want to follow. >> but the point is that we have a lot at stake here. and also, the other part of it is i think it is expected. the region really worries when we do too much. it is also equally worrying that

when we are not engaged. there are downsides. we leave it to other regional actors to stand for themselves. we don't have an opinion. money goes to the wrong people. the united states has no opinion. it is following -- >> and no ability to control our friends, the saudis and others who are giving money as well as to the brotherhood and getting along with either. >> but it requires us to be in the middle. it requires us to be talking to them about egypt praetor requires saying we have a strategy. tell us if it is wrong or have your input, but this is our vision for what we want egypt to end up. we believe economic reform should come at this level at this stage, and therefore we would like your backing and we

really would like your support. secretary of state would go to cairo 22 times and jerusalem 23 times and then to iman and riyadh. we understood that you have a plan in your head. you go and talk to these leaders, keep embellishing it, create a regional consensus around a particular idea, shop it with the main protagonist and then you try to move the region for work. it would have been possible for the united states to have had serious conversations with regional actors a run economic before the region, around job creation, around constitutional reform. >> you can once the some of the programs of line at booktv.org. >> annapolis has the largest collection of 18th-century architecture in the united states and historic downtown area became the country's first

national historic landmark district. book tv visited the city with the help of our low will -- local cable partner, comcast. >> the name of my store is back creek books. i sell used and rare and out of print books. hopefully books of lasting interest in all fields. my decision to open the store was driven by the economics of selling books online has become such that it is very, very hard to sell a book online. a store like this, on the your inventory is on display and it is there. people can touch and see it. it is is much more visible. all used bookstores are unique, like a new bookstore. the inventory is hand selected by someone, the owner usually. so it reflects that individual's personality, their interest.

a copy of what lincoln was watching. and as most people who are interested in history know little shot in 86 to five in his play was printed. it was the first time that it was printed. the where copyright law work back then, especially if you performed the work performed as a people and then printed it, you were putting into the public demand essentially. so the owner of the play and the actors that was performing that night, she was very careful to never have the plain printed. another interesting thing about that is the she had been a victim of that kind of piracy of that play in the late 1850's.

she did seem performances of our american cousins. and they'd transcribe the play, went to their own theater, putting on performances. and so she sued john sleeper clark. i believe she won the case. that is an interesting connection play to win john wilkes booth, the person who shot lincoln had a performance of the same plight. another interesting volume was seven books i have here is the back for free of washington by john marshall. and just going to the share you, this is on the five regular text