to the start of the war. this is about one hour. >> thank you for that gracious introduction. and thank you all for making it out on a not so pleasant evening. weatherwise at least. i was supposed to be here a couple years ago. i think i had a hip operation and it knocked me out, and i always regretted that i missed it. so i'm back here to sort of make up. i want to talk about a book i have just written, and so this is a thinly disguised propaganda campaign. [laughter] to get you to purchase this undoubtedly magisterial book called "revolutionary summer." but i don't feel totally confident talking my own where

so they'll be the last time actually mentioned the book per se, except to say it's great to be -- it's great beach reading. [laughter] is really short and all the royalties from this book will go directly to the alexander alvis scholarship fund. he is my youngest son still in college. [laughter] i'm trying to tell a very familiar story, a story that virtually every generation of historians has told before, and each generation has added a new interpretive gloss. it's sort of like another layer of wallpaper across the wall. and in some sense one of my path was to try to strip away the wallpaper and get back to the wall itself. so some of the things i have to say that i think are fresh are fresh because they are not really new, they are just so old they have been forgotten.

but given this is one of the more performed plays in the american theatrical repertoire, the plague 1776, i do have something new to say. i think i do, but that is very much up to you. want to talk for 35-40 minutes. i don't want to read to you. i want to talk to you. is that okay? [applause] i've got some notes. i thought about what it want to say but i don't want to bore you. if i was just going to review i would pass it out and we would talk about it later. i began this project with the presumption and with the question. the presumption was this, that no event in american history which looks at the inevitable in retrospect was as improbable and problematic at the time.

and part of my task was to recover for the modern reader the sense of crisis and confusion and improvisation that was occurring in the late spring and summer of 1776. i have trouble because i gave my letters like 1713 instead of 2013. [laughter] so again, it is not easy to write clearly and lucidly about confusion. but that was one of the things i wanted to be able to do, and recover that, that mentality, if you will. and i think you'll see a little bit of what i'm talking about fairly shortly. the question i had i called the

wilkesboro question, after wilkes-barre, pennsylvania. is a but here from wilkesboro? no kidding? unbelievable. unbelievable. there was nobody in wilkes-barre in san francisco last week. i can tell you right now. [laughter] the population of contemporary wilkes-barre is slightly larger than the population of virginia was in 1776. now, if we go out there to wilkes-barre, do you think we could find george washington, thomas jefferson, james madison, george mason, john marshall and patrick henry? we ain't going to find it. now, at some theoretical level

they are there. that is, human beings with the capacity for leadership are there, but the situation doesn't permit that group to rise to the surface. and so the question is, why did the situation exist in 1776? now, there is the point be an answer to this, after arnold toynbee, which is that great leadership only emerges during times of great crisis. and this makes eminent sense. the pressures of the crisis creates. and yet we can all think of examples where there's a great crisis and there's no leadership. like now. [laughter]

[applause] or the coming of world war i in europe. so what was special come you can't say there was something special in the water back there then. you can't say god looked down upon the american colonies and blessed them. supernatural explanations are not admitted. even if you're an evangelical you're not allowed to use those in a historical conversation. i don't know whether i have a good answer to this, but some of it's in the book in an illicit way but i will give you an anecdotal version of a partial answer to the question. it relates to george washington. in may 1775, and toward washington puts on his military

uniform and decides to go to the second continental congress. these the only one that's going to be willing -- the only one it's going to be wearing a military uniform. he's making a statement. he thinks the war has already begun. and it has, we know in retrospect. lexington and concord have happened in april. bunker hill is going to happen in june, which is actually one of the bloodiest battles in the war, but notice, i know the chronology is the last refuge of the feebleminded. but it is the only refuge for historians. notice this, it's underreported, under discussed in history texts. the war starts 50 months before independence is declared. it's going to cause, it's going

to shape things in this explanation that in one offer you. anyway, washington is getting ready to leave mount vernon and he says to his -- what is that? >> [inaudible] >> flood warning, great. here comes -- [laughter] biblical here of. [laughter] somebody give me that line. thank you, sir. washington said to his manager of mount vernon, lund washington, was his second cousin. when the bridge, the potomac, the burnt mount vernon, get out my books, and martha, presumably not in that order -- [laughter] he presumed he was going to lose everything. when jefferson eventually gets

around to writing those famous words, our lives, our fortunes and our sacred on it, they sounded pretty rhetorical. a, they were for real. it was everything. it was all in. you had to be willing to do that. and he was willing. later in 1779, a british frigate comes up the potomac and lund washington says, okay, i'm going to send out this gift with fruit and presence to these the british captain. so he does that, and the british captain says hey, man, i'm just fishing for airing. i have no evil intent. he doesn't even know that this is mount vernon. so lund washington sends a report of this to george, sort of proud that he defended the

homestead. and washington rights back and says, i am extremely distressed at what you have told me. you have sullied by honor. if it happens again, let them burn it to the ground. these are the kind of guys we are talking about, okay? there is a special quality to this particular crisis that generates a level of leadership, not just in virginia, but beyond. by the way, this is not a claim that the founders were all iconic heroes aren't worthy of divinity or anything like this. they are all human beings, flawed. each of them have their own flaws but i try to write about that. they don't solve the slavery problem. they don't solve the native american problems. those are all major problems, but all that said, this is the

greatest generation of political leadership in american history. the revolution is about to be cast. one of the other things that i discovered this is president scholarly literature in some way but not every way. is that this was an unnecessary war. there was a diplomatic solution to the crisis that was visible and known by prominent figures on both sides. on the british side, both william pitt in the house of lords and edmund burke in the house of commons abdicated the solution to ending the continental congress both thomas jefferson and john dickinson crafted a revolution called, what do you call it? it was a resolution appealing to the king on this principle. you let us ask ourselves and our

legislatures, and legislate for ourselves, and we will remain in the empire, recognizing the authority of the king and recognizing our membership in the british empire economically. we are both beneficiaries of that. as i say, both sides, there are people on both sides arguing for this. up through the middle of the spring of 1776. this is the answer that the british will later regret they don't accept, or act on. this will be the biggest blunder in the history of british statecraft. why don't they want to do it? why don't they see that this is the way? three reasons. first of all, william

blackstone, the great jurist, has ruled in 1765, or asserted, that there must be a single source of sovereignty in the empire. and in any government. there cannot be many gods. there must be one god. and a source of sovereignty and the british empire, the british government is parliament were really -- the king in parliament. and the american solution is unacceptable because it creates multiple versions of sovereignty. each call when he will have its own sovereign government. -- each colony will have its own sovereign government. even though they claim to work within the canopy of the british king. we can't have that. since aristotle everybody knows you have a final source of sovereignty. by the way, ma the whole the american constitution is based on that idea -- dispensing of

that idea and have multiple sources of sovereignty. james madison is the major architect. a second reason is an early 18th century version of what we will come to call the domino theory. if we grant the americans this degree of latitude politically, what happens in iowa and? what happens in scotland? what happens in india? we can't send that signal. it's a sign of weakness. it's a sign we are not really an empire. again, if they had acted on this they would've discovered the british commonwealth 100 years early. but they're not ready to act on it. and there's a third reason they are not ready to act. there is no reason to make a diplomatic solution when we have the militarily dominant force.

we can squash this thing. the colonies have never cooperated in any military venture, political venture before, and the british army and british navy, when combined, is the dominant military force on the planet. the prussian army is better. the french army is good, but you put the navy and, british dominance. ask yourself this question. how many wars did great britain lose between 1750-1950? 2. the american revolution and the war against afghanistan. everybody loses in afghanistan. [laughter] graveyard for empires. okay. and in order to implement the

decision, george iii himself, it's really important you hear that, george iii himself, it doesn't come from parliament. it doesn't come from his ministers. it comes from george iii himself who says we will prepare an invasion force larger than any other invasion force to cross the atlantic, 42000 soldiers and sailors, over 400 ships. the largest amphibious force ever to cross the atlantic to the only time it succeeded was in world war i and world war ii. and we are going to squash this rebellion in the cradle. and were going to attack new york, occupy new york as our major headquarters, and spread from there. but a deadly, devastating knockout blow at the very beginning.

what's the situation politically in the american colonies? there's a really good book about the year 1775 it talks about the fact that came out recently that there was a political consensus that had already formed by the time you got the late 75. that's true i would say in new england, because in new england has been occupied but it's not true down as you get into new york, pennsylvania, new jersey and virginia. those colonies, states, are divided. we know there's about 20% of the colonial population, actually 19%, that is loyalists. by the new england they have all been driven out. you don't want to be a loyalist and be living in new england. they will tell you your house down and kill you. -- they will tear your house

down and kill you. that doesn't mean, however, that the other 80% are all whig hatreds. this is very tough. it's like going on cnn during an election watching the red states and the blue states and the purple states come on the screen. and then within those states different counties. my own best judgment is that of the 80%, about 60% were pretty committed to the cause. and they called it the cause but there's another 40% of the 80% that are really and decided or will go ever -- or will go

wherever the nearest army may happen to be. in valley forge the continental army starved and it's the most productive farming area in the american colonies, because the farmers sell their produce to the british army in philadelphia because they get more money for them. some of them are quakers, too, and so they had that that could excuse them. at any rate, up until the middle of the spring, the moderates dominate continental congress and the public opinion in the country at large is divided. the moderate position is most effectively defended by john dickinson, a radical position, independence, by john adams. that's one thing the play 1776 clearly kind of gets right. what changes the chemistry of the local situation is the

realization that we're about to be invaded. people talk about the impact of tom paine's pamphlet, common sense, which comes up formally in late january and it's very, very influential, no question. but one of the reasons it's influential, it's influential at severing the relationship between the colonies and became, not just parliament by the king, is because it's published and read any specific context. and that context is these son of the guns are sending the largest amphibious force with 15,000 prussian troops who are committed to taking no prisoners. they're sending them to get us. how do i know this? why am i confident that what you said is historically supported by the evidence? in may, may 15 of 1776, the

congress sense of resolution. it's written by john adams, requesting each of the colonies to redo their colonial charters as state charters. adams says, for obvious reasons, this is a de facto declaration of independence. give you a state is going to rewrite your charter, it's because you decided to go to independence. they sent these to every governor. the governor sent to the legislature. the legislature senate it to all the counties and towns in each of the colonies. this recently obscure source called american archives added by a guy in 1840s has preserved all the responses. for example, there are 42 towns in massachusetts that respond. they all say the same thing. we cannot imagine having this

conclusion only six months ago, when we still believed in our king and her membership in the british empire. but he has betrayed us. he is no longer our friend. in effect, he has declared his independence of us. and, therefore, we have no choice. and then they used this phrase, and this is where jefferson gets it am a we pledge our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor. it must come from some british poem that i don't know, but i've tried to find it but that's where jefferson gets his praise. that's almost unanimous. there's one town in massachusetts on the cape that says i'm not sure but the british navy is going to bombard us as soon as we say it's. [laughter] anyway, the real reason why there is a political consensus for independence by the early summer of 76 is that they are being invaded. and so in effect, the british

decision to squash the rebellion generates a political will to cement the rebellion. does this begins to sound familiar? the attack is going to be in new york. now, if you look at a map, new york is an arc of a lockout. three islands. staten island, long island, and manhattan. whoever controls the cd controls the battle. and there is no question about who controls the seed. in retrospect, even at the time, new york is indefensible. so why do we side -- why do we decide to defend? this is where the military side of the story and the political side keep interacting. the british fleet lands on jul

july 2, the interim segments of the british fleet, july 2, staten island. that's the day the column is a vote on independence. the resolution from virginia that these colonies all are hand have every right to be independent states. okay, the continental congress says look, how would it look if we just declare independence, and then the army retreats to the mainland? either connecticut or new jersey. well, another question that might've been asked is, how would it look if the army does a retreat in the is annihilated? [laughter] there's a second reason why they defend it, but washington is a believer in civilian control. congress wants to defend new york. he's going to defend new york. there's another reason. washington is an honor driven

man, as my earlier example testifies. almost medieval chivalry. and washington believes that if the enemy, in this case general william howe, presents himself on the field, he is honor bound to meet him in the same way that he is honor bound to answer a summons to dual. this is stupid. [laughter] he needs to get over this. [laughter] he will eventually get over this, but it's going to come at an enormous cost on long island and manhattan. the average experience of a soldier in the continental congress is five and a half months. the average expense of a soldier in the british army is seven and a half years. with any officer classmates even more dramatic. i mean, henry knox, ahead of

artillery, a year earlier was a bookseller, okay? so both in terms of the terrain and in terms of the power of the professional, power of the two armies, this is going to be a debacle. why do they think they had a chance? all the messages from headquarters at this time are part of this republican virtuous rhetoric. soldiers who believe in their cause and fight for their own values and their own country can defeat mercenaries in any field of battle. if you believe, you are a better soldier. at some level this sounds really great, except it doesn't work. and in the battle of long

island, the continental army is routed easily. they suffer over 1500 casualties, and they are trapped on long island. this could be the end of the war. what would happen if the continental army was destroyed and washington and his staff were all killed and captured? but they get off in a miraculo miraculous, everything has to work perfectly, it's a perfect storm of another source. a northeaster has to coming. the current in the river has to flow a certain way. the fog has to commend judges the right time and they get across on the night of august 30 safe. even a more dramatic version of dunkirk. it and so was the most important political campaigns of the war because if it didn't happen i'm not sure the war would have continued. we can't know that.

i mentioned that in a second. but at the end of this defeat in long island, richard how, the ipo, asked for a meeting with the american representatives in the congress, there's all kinds of goings back and forth whether they can diplomatically do that, blah, blah, blah, but eventually they send three people, to meet with richard how in the stonehouse on staten island. on september 11, after the battle. and he says look, we just demonstrated to you that you cannot win. it is a hopeless cause. step back from independence, listen to the terms the team will offer you. they will be generous.

i can tell you he's going to let you govern yourselves as you want to, although i can't guarantee it. and will probably have to hang most of the leaders. [laughter] he doesn't say that, but that's what they mean. and both adams and franklin say something really interesting. adams says, it makes no difference what happens here. if you destroy the continental army, we will raise another army. demographically, there are over 500,000 american males between the ages of 15-50. it's the same thing ho chi minh says to us. so go ahead, but it doesn't make any difference. franklin says something like that, but he's friends with richard howe.

they have been friends in london. they both tried to end the war. the howe brothers really don't think the war is a good idea. and he says sir richard, you tell us that we cannot win. i can tell you, you cannot win. you are not fighting an army. you are fighting a people. you must subjugate the american population. you will never be able to do that unless you raise troops that will never be justified in terms of cost of british public. this will be seen like the crusades, he said. and you will be ignominious. so i advise you to take your fleet and go back now and save as much of your reputation as you possibly can. well, it's really an interesting

question, and it's an unanswerable question, what would happen if the british had destroyed the continental congress on long island and manhattan? they had several chances to do so. and they really didn't want to destroy the continental army. they wanted, as william howe said, rapid up. proportionately demonstrate that they couldn't possibly win, but they didn't want this war to become the kind of war against the irish and scottish, that was a genocidal war. they wanted it to hi to in in ay that they could all come back together. they would value the role as peacemakers rather than generals or admirals. i think that that's a question that, as i said, is unanswerable i have some obligation having

spent four or five years thinking about it, what to say. i think if they had gotten, they could replace the army easier than they could replace washington. i think what would've happened is that each state is reverted to its own state militia as the source of authority and it would become a really war. the british would have still lost. but it would've been a different kind, the course of four would have probably been longer. -- the course of war would have probably been longer. there is a possibility, i would say 20% possibility, that the destruction of the continental army would've destroyed the will of the rebellion because that middle group. that's what i can't know. i mean, it's impossible to answer. i don't think it would have happened. if i was making silver i would've put my odds on american victory in the end.

one of the things that happened as a result of this expense was that washington began to understand a strategic fact that became absolutely central to his success. this is not the way to fight a war. the american army is never going to be competitive with the british army in a man for man situation. let's fight a war of posts. that's what they called it. it's not quite a guerrilla war because it's a conventional army, but it's a war in which you don't fight unless you have superior numbers with superior terrain. you adopt a defensive strategy. and this will work for you for a reason that's really important. we don't have to win. they have to win. as long as we don't lose, we

win. and that's what happens. we never really win the war. they just decided to give up. at the end of the war, there were over 30,000 british troops still in north america, but they just decided to leave. washington learned this lesson in the summer of 1776. there is a thought process that leads to the learning of the lesson that begins at that time. it's hard for him to accept this. but eventually he does. and if you think about it, many of the great generals in world history are losers. hannibal, napoleon, robert e. lee, rommel. washington was not a good general. he lost more battles than he

won, but he was a winner. he was a winner. because of his resilience and insight he had at the strategic level. i think my time is kind of up. i'll end with one, somewhat controversial question, statement. when the war in iraq was ratcheting up, i got a call from the woman that does op-ed at the "l.a. times" who said, she said, i want you to write an op-ed on what washington would've done about iraq. [laughter] what he would do about iraq. so i said, stephanie, washington wouldn't know where iraq was. [laughter] he wouldn't know about weapons of mass destruction, jihad,

whatever. she said, that's right, now right for peace. [laughter] so i wrote this piece in which the main point was, washington would have said we are the british, and i don't understand that. now, if you take a poll amongst american citizens as to whether the united states is an empire, the overwhelming majority of americans say no. if you take a poll of the rest of the world, everybody says y yes. and we have become an imperial power since world war ii, and have a hegemonic power since 45, 46. we've made specific decisions and specific contest, the cold war, more recently iraq, afghanistan. we are facing serious and egypt.

i want to step back from the specifics of those particular context and say, there is the reason we are in empire indiana is because we know that the core values of our republic are incompatible with imperialism. that a republic must depend upon the power of her ideas to succeed voluntarily. and empire depends on the power of its arms to succeed. now, i'm not a path assist, i'm not an isolationist. i supported the korean war, the gulf war, the bosnian war and all that. i don't want to be pigeonholed i think i want to encourage a national conversation about the conflict between our origins and who we are now. we can then say, well, george washington is part of another era. thomas jefferson is in a lost world. we are in a different place, but

if we believe in original intentions and if we believe the core values of our republic were established at that moment, i think we should have a seminar on this. and it will be an interesting conversation in which liberals and conservatives alike might be able to come together. thank you for having me. [applause] >> don't embarrass me by not having any questions, for having once said -- for heaven's sake. spent thank you. that was wonderful. i'm a big fan of yours. and growing up i was a big fan of thomas jefferson. i thought he was the greatest president that there was. i love peas growing up and he'd rupees at monticello. i like one. he went to broker drinking wine.

i just love love him. i thought he was fantastic. and then i read your book. >> there's a book called "american sphinx." >> "american sphinx," a great book. it change my mind on jefferson. so i've got two questions but one of my questions is, in all of your research have you ever changed your mind on any of the people that you've written about? i'm reading your book on adams right now and i love adams. i'm also a yankee so i think, i tend to agree with you more. so that's where my questions is, do you ever change your mind about the people you're writing about? and number two, i know it's difficult to put people in the past into the modern times, but when i read your books i try to figure out where politically jefferson and adams and jefferson and washington and hamilton, where they would be politically on the spectrum. i kind of get the feeling that jefferson would actually be a

tea party guy. aided the government, you know. >> he's a libertarian. >> yeah. so could you just briefly go down a couple of the big guys and say we think they would be down, politically right now? >> what i really said to the "l.a. times" reporter which i don't think i mentioned, maybe i did, tried to bring these guys into the present is like trying to plant cut flowers. [laughter] they won't grow. you can make, what you do need, it's like have to make a translation, almost like a translation from one language into another language, okay? that's a better analogy. i'll stick with the second question first. like, i think that jefferson is the ultimate idealist. he's will sony and in terms of

the 20th century term, making the world safe for democracy. he's a believer in small government. and in some sense with the industrial revolution and the end of the, -- jefferson values become irrelevant. and he would say that. when we study and a grin society, nothing that i believe continues to apply. but, of course, it does because one of the most resonant icons and his monument on the tidal basin is one of the most lovely and most visited. i think jefferson would have gone with the confederacy in 1861. i think jefferson would have opposed the civil rights act of 1965, because he believed blacks were biologically inferior, not just because nurture. adams is the realist.

george kennan, american state department guys like adams. adams is also a contrarian who could never possibly be elected to any government in the 21st century. [laughter] and would be thrilled to be able to tell you that, would be proof of his virtue, you know. now, what was the first question? had to do with -- oh, do i change my mind. once i make up my mind i'm absolutely -- [laughter] i do. it's nuances. i begin with certain convictions that probably don't change at the root, but my first impression of washington was that he was really boring and

flat. and i didn't completely changed -- is the most single impressive of the founders. he is the founding is the father of them all. [laughter] and they all agreed on that, you know? like franklin was the wisest, adams was the best read. madison was the most politically agile. hamilton was probably the brightest. he got the highest grades on the lsat's. [laughter] but they all agreed, washington was the greatest. in his judgment, judgment. that they recognized and respected. again, i don't want to reiterate your this is not to sanctify these guys. one of i think the conspicuous

qualities of most of the scholarly and popular literature on the founders over the last 10 or 15 years, or i must say, i like it because i'm making money off it, is that they are all flawed. you don't have that hagiographic kind of depiction. much of the profession, oppression is moving off in a fundamentally different direction so lots of the best work being done on the founders is being done by people like ron chernow, david -- what's his name? mccullough, for god's sake, yes, give mccullough. stacy schiff, walter isaacson. none of those people are professional historians. i am a professional historian. i have a ph.d from yale university. but most of the people in the profession are moving off in the direction of social history,

race, class, gender, women, native americans, african-americans. we say the studies did white males. i say, that's right. thank you for the question. yes, sir. >> good morning. my impression may be wrong but the patriots, the bulk of the patriots -- >> are we talking the new england patriots now? >> no. they were either out of new england or virginia. the ones we read about and hear about it is like in the army or the political realm? >> political. and i was wondering if you care to talk about the interplay between those two ends of the dumbbell, so to speak? >> the first six presidents of the united states come from massachusetts and virginia. so those are the big states. virginia is the biggest state in the union by far.

but within the continental congress, pennsylvania is really big. it's a big state and it's a moderate state, meaning they are -- that the source of the modern movement that are reluctant to declare revolution. new york is also a moderate state. so that these other middle states play a role, but they don't assume leadership for the revolution. they in effect are resistant to it until the very end. a lot of guys from pennsylvania -- everybody thinks that there's this moment, and this is the thing in 1776 where on july 4 they go and sign the document, right? never happened. never happened. they never signed a document all at once. most of them signed it on august 2. the real vote on independence which adams always thought would be the anniversary of independence is july 2.

but there are some guys signing in october from like philadelphia, or from pennsylvania, new york. like robert morse, he's one of the last ones to sign, antiscience at the very top. [laughter] like he was their first, but it really wasn't true. but the importance of massachusetts and virginia is true, leadership comes from those states, but it doesn't accurately reflect the importance of the middle colonies in shaping political opinions in this crucial period. yes, sir. >> i want to ask about a dead white male that you haven't written about, somewhat neglected, maybe not even exactly a founding father but someone who's career spanned a number of these presence and importance to the making of this nation, every bit as important

as -- >> i can't wait to hear this is. >> you maintain earlier in these virginians that arose in this one of a class of people. we are talking about john marshall. >> john marshall. >> you read about him spinning you don't have to persuade the on this. i would love to write a really great biography of john marshall. the problem is he destroyed all his correspondence with his wife. and you don't have the same level of information that you have -- have all this legalistic information about his cases, and the papers have been published at the college of william and mary which is home to the marshall school of law, but this is a guy who was a real stud. this is a guy who, like a valley forge, was known as, well, he had a high jumper, he won all

the athletic competitions. he was the leader of what was the equivalent of special forces king throughout the war. he had six or seven platoon shot out from under him. and then goes on to become a major figure in virginia politics, and sector a state for brief period of time under ads. than the greatest chief justice in the american judicial history. starting from 1800-1835, 36. i used to tell a story about how, when marshall died he was visiting his daughter up in new york and they carried the body down to hi summon virginia, and when it passed through philadelphia they rang the liberty bell and it cracked. [laughter] it's a great story. it turns out not to be to. [laughter] but everything about him that is written now tends to be from a purely judicial point of view, and although there are a couple of good biographies.

but, and he's a little young -- as if this makes any real difference, you have to have been a prominent leader both in the time of the war for independence and at the time of the constitution and the 1790s, implementation of the constitution, that there are really two founding spirit you had to be present at both been. is a big player in the second one but he's just a soldier in the first one. he's too young. but he is a great man. thank you. yes, ma'am. >> did you see any parallels between the revolution and the arab spring? >> do i see any parallels between the revolution and the arab spring. i see more differences than

parallels. i think that egypt has been governed by autocratic rulers for most of its 20th century history, and there's no tradition of democratic politics on which to build. they have to discover it and make it in the midst of sectarian strife and division's between different ethnic groups, muslims, within the muslim world and within the muslim us and the secular world. and those divisions have been handed down or controlled by our autocratic power, you remove the autocratic power and they can come leaping to the surface just as they did in bosnia and the former yugoslavia. the american colonies had already developed habits of what we've come to call democracy. they knew how to govern themselves. they had their own legislature, their own elected officials. they had been, for 100 years,

adams writes about this in his dissertation, that america has become different in terms of its politics. for the very basic reasons. so there's not as nearly this shock value as, this shock experience and the united states when they move through this revolutionary experience because it's not really revolutionary. is really evolutionary. the secret of the american revolution is it really wasn't a revolution. it was more of an evolution. and the egyptians are going to have a very different time discovering what came naturally to us. this is not a comment on muslim is him, okay? although it's part of the package, but they had no history. they had no history of practicing democratic policy. >> thank you for coming. thank you for being a professional history. the question but how american

revolution is taught. californian just passed legislation saying that all segments of american history now has together a portion do transgender. i'm not sure it fits into jefferson and washington. >> that's another thing they would not understand. [laughter] >> my children who attended woodward academy, they are american revolution was fought between women, african-americans, native americans and seems to be very segmental now. you have an overview, and i see these college students coming in and out of levels of education or knowledge, history is becoming more and more irrelevant unfortunate. want to know what your thoughts are on now the american revolution is being taught today and now legislatures are getting involved in the teaching of history and what that means for us in the future. >> i don't like the involvement of state legislatures deciding out what kind of textbooks and that kind of thing.

i think that the current situation is close to disastrous in terms of the historical illiteracy of this generation and the rising generation. and all the surveys and polls tell you something that is really awful. they don't know what century the civil war happened. all kinds of specific, horrible thing. i think that the emphasis on testing has handicapped good teachers, especially at the middle school and the secondary school level, like forcing them into certain kind of pedagogy that really don't work very

well. i think that the social scientific vocation of secondary school education has made history not really history, but a blend of geography, sociology, a real intellectual stew which is really nothing at all. on the point you made, i understand your concern, that in effect, the native american experience, the applicant american express, the women experience is being given a new emphasis. this is due at the college and graduate school level, too. if you want to go on an early american, he would be a good idea to do a native american stuff because you're going to get a job. this is a compensation for past years of neglect. is it a bit extreme? well, depends on where you stand. i'm here to send they argue that

in effect, the late 18th century shaped by a group of dead white males who were an elite. and you're not supposed to say that but i do believe that's the case. and nobody shot me, so, and so i say let a thousand flowers blo bloom. but the situation at the secondary and middle school level with regard to the teaching of history is, to put it mildly, is pretty desperate. >> thank you for your comments. given the performance of the continental army in 1776, lives in brooklyn, manhattan, driving down new jersey, why did the continental congress continued to have continents in washington -- conference in washington? it was almost rebellion among his close staff. >> you're right about that. if you want to study washington's life and career,

this is the treated when he is at his very worst. both as commander and psychologically. he is clinically depressed throughout the late summer and fall, because he sees the defeat of the arm as a defeat of himself. the army is a projection of his own character. there are a couple of people on his staff better talking to people in the continental congress and saying he's not up to the job. and that he's made some strategic blunders that could have cost us the whole thing. but then the green is not one of them. but there is talk, rumors -- nathanael greene is not one of them. but there is talk, rumors back there. i don't amount to much and 76. they come to some sort of% of the following year there's something called the conway cabal when he is holed up in valley forge and they began, and again, it fails.

adams is behind him and patterns is ahead of the board of ordinance. and whenever some kind of challenge comes, washington says, if anybody wants to do this job -- [laughter] -- you can have it, okay? because he thinks he's not been given sufficient support by the congress, and he's right about that. but i think you can hear rumblings, but while the british changed commanders three times, the americans never changed. and the stability of the leadership in the continental army makes the difference. and washington is the guy that makes mistakes, but learns from them. and that makes a big difference. thank you all for coming tonight. [applause] >> we would like to hear from you. tweet us your feedback,

twitter.com/booktv. >> since 1998, c-span2's booktv has shown over 40,000 hours of programming with top nonfiction authors including bob woodward. >> we're going to do the book after he died, but he preempted that and i was for five, and then i was delighted. >> i always felt that people are really more alike than they are different, and so the artist in me rose to dedication, that if i can create something that is so moving and that permits the kind of distance that you sometimes need from what is painful, then people will understand. and understanding that basically what is fundamental. >> the point is that no argument is given to that effect, none of the relevant facts are considered, and this is regarded as one of the half-dozen cases

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