in terms of primary care, rehab, you know, and that is -- that may prove to be a powerful consolidator of people with shared interests and wanting to do well, coupled with sort of the outcome measures that will

be attended to that. >> why don't we open up to questions from the audience. i believe we have some folks walking around with microphones. i see a hand up in the middle here. if you could please identify yourself, and if you have a particular panelist your addressing a question to, let us know. >> i'm a primary care physician. i volunteer at the arlington free clinic. my question is for the gentleman from cedars-sinai. we heard earlier that cedars-sinai is not going to be part of the network for any of the care plants that are going to be offered on the california exchange. >> right. >> i was wondering how that is for you, and if you're planning to make any changes? >> yeah, i appreciated the shout out earlier in the program. [laughter]

>> but i think the question is a good one. because again, a couple of things. one, it illustrates the point i was making earlier that how the law is being rolled out is going to be different a state-by-state. we need to recognize those kind of dynamics. number two, with regard to the california situation, your observation is correct. it's not just cedars-sinai. annetworks that been put togethr for the california exchange are more limited than the traditional commercial insurance market. and, dinner, i think we should recognize we are embarked on a grand experiment here. and we're also embarked on establishing new markets, and new markets by definition come together over time. and so what has happened here today in the beginning, likely will not be how things will play out over time.

but it also raises i think another important issue with regard to things like narrow networks. and that is the issue of how one determines the issue of efficiency. because efficiency and costs are not necessarily the same thing. you can be a high-cost institution like my own, admittedly. and the question is how efficient are you at what you do. so in the case of my own indication, we provide the most advanced medical care at the hospital in the western united states. we have a significant teaching and research nation. societal good that benefit the entire system. we see more than twice as many medicare patients as almost twice as many as the next largest provider of hospital services in california. we are one of the largest medi-cal providers in the state of california. that collection of facts come together to impact what our cost is.

so i think as we go forward with the implementation of the affordable care act and how this plays out a state-by-state, the question of understanding efficiency versus cost, the question of how are we going to pay for societal good, the question of how are we going to provide access to people who happen to live new these kind of institutions, and other institutions. i'm just using my own as an example because it's what i know, those kind of questions i get to be answered and i hope will get answered as we move forward. >> joe coopersmith. i just recently, the director of medical research program of the va. one thing that everybody agrees upon is that costs have to come down. no matter how that's done, whether it's redistribution or deficiencies or whatnot, it's going to be there's less money in a system for hospitals and other aspects, less people

employed an absurd amount of economic change for both the institutions and the community because hospitals are among the highest earners, or highest employers in many, many communities in the country. i wonder how you see that aspect of it? >> do you want to go first? you're absolutely right. the change that's gone on in the american economy is such, and the growth of the american health care system is such, and communities around the country, hospitals are the major employer or one of the major employers. cedars-sinai is the sixth largest employer in los angeles county, just as an example. but at the same time all of us have to recognize that as organizations will have to be more efficient, have to figure out how to deliver care. there are technologies that are coming along.

whether that's technology in the form of new discoveries around the molecular medicine and other things that will allow the total cost of care. the question is we have to work in asia of total cost of care, not just the unit cost. we have to work on both. keeping in mind what the total cost of care. over time, using the international comparison that think john mentioned earlier, if you look at what are the reasons for that, i think your observations are correct. those who work in health care system, a hospital executive, nurse, physician, pharmacist, those who work in the pharmaceutical industry, the compensation levels in the united states compared of the countries is much higher. so the question will be, as we solve this problem what will the impact on those kinds of things be?

>> i just might add a point to what tom said. if we can get some efficiencies very quickly. a month ago with 35 sponsors but we now have over 135 sponsors of a bill in the senate. we now have good studies showing that if patients with cancer and other chronic diseases get good care, you get better outcomes. it costs less and jump higher quality of life. we need to implement and make the system more things that we already know how to do. if we do that we can get some real results. if you reflect the total cost you're talking about costs that occur at end-of-life. we have to have an adult conversation about that and determine what people really want and we have good evidence on that. they don't necessaril necessario die in intensive care. >> do we have another question?

i'm from the potomac research group. start with pfizer but go down the line. just wondering anything the new law will impact innovation. and it's particularly striking this week in the drug industry that mark, powerhouse and research is cutting back on research but there's some points made up there that suggests there are some incentives for innovation. >> thank you. along really acts as an accelerate. the marketplace has been demanding more value value at ls cost for a while from all of us. and so layoffs in our in the have been happening for a while across the board, most farmers who companies including pfizer have experienced exclusivity loss. the recent event of the merck

left is another good example. there are parts of this law that really encourage innovation. the fact that the health insurance marketplaces are competitive, patients have choice. that's something we so through medicare part d. encourage people to look for value. we believe when you look for value they look for valley in their medicines as well as other services. again quality. quality demands, can demand more value. but measures can also go in a way that is shortsighted and purely cost base. so we believe that it's a measure the system develops an emphasis on quality and value for medicine, that pfizer and other pharmaceutical companies will be well-positioned to deliver and recoup their investment on r&d with the medicines we bring to the market. but it's a challenge and there's pressure. that's across the board.

>> and i actually think innovation will be pushed by our consumers of health care. because it's become more out of pocket for folks, there will be more questions about is this the best thing for me? is it worth it? is a valuable? is there another way to do something? it will push all of us to really look at doing things differently. and probably more efficiently and more effectively because it would be demanded. >> i just want to second what jean just said. what goes along with innovation is a demand for creativity, and the issue of efficiency and improved efficiency in all aspects of the system i think israel and is necessary if we want to solve the problem that we are talking about, especially on the cost side. and i think the research community won't be exempt from

the. and i think there's evidence within the research community already a lot of discussion about how to change the whole clinical trial process, which i think many people find cumbersome for a number of different perspectives. i think there's opportunity within this challenge. >> i think we will see encouraging different kinds of innovations as jean talked about earlier, innovations in the whethewaythat we think about our workforce. and the team approach to delivering care. i think that as more people get coverage there will be more an interest in keeping people healthy. and so we will see innovation in that area. >> so we're going to wrap up there. thank you very much for a very interesting discussion. we have much more ahead. [applause] >> the national business group on health announces the results

of its survey as employee health care benefits. that's on c. span at 10 a.m. eastern. here on c-span2 at 11 a.m. eastern pakistan's prime minister will speak at the u.s. institute of peace. is expected to address u.s.-pakistan relations, regional stability and counterterrorism. >> c-span studentcam video competition ask, what's most important issue congress should consider in 2014? make a document showing varying points of view and they should and could c-span video. the competition is open to all middle and high school students with a grand prize of $5000. this year we have doubled the number of winners and total prizes. entries are due by january 20, 2014. need more information? visit studentcam.org. >> next, look at the priority for the marine corps. major general kenneth mckenzie

is in charge of the review process for the defense department programs held every four years. he spoke at the center for strategic and international studies were about one hour. >> good morning, everybody. thanks so much for making the trek to our new building here at 1616 rhode island. we are very happy to be mostly moved in, and hopefully you will not have any problems breaking construction dust or anything else. but again, we really appreciate that you're stuck with us and made the transition along with us. it's a great honor for me this morning to be here with major general frank mckenzie, the director of the marine corps qdr office, and sort of a general expert in all things pentagon and marine corps. so couldn't be a better leader for that endeavor. i think going to just start off

with a diving right in on some of the changes that the marine corps is considering in response to some of the outside fiscal pressures and strategic changes that you're facing, then we'll try to get the q&a from the audience as quickly as we can get a couple announcements. if people could turn off the ringers on the cell phones, we would appreciate it. also, because general mckenzie's timeline got a little compressed because there's not much going on in the pentagon right now, we're going to try to be efficient without questioning which means you should have gotten cards when you came in. hopefully if you didn't if you could just raise your hand and the interns will bring some cards around. if you could write your questions down on those and we will collect them and get to the end of the remarks buried and then we'll try to consolidate them with our questioners appear. at any point you can raise your hand to get a card, and the

difference in questions, and hold the up and the interns will run around and grabbed them from you. again, general mckenzie, thanks so much for coming and we look forward to your eliminating remarks on the future of the marine corps. >> thanks so much. it's good to be here this morning. busy times back at the pentagon right now. i was out here in the early spring and gave a strategy sort of oriented discussion of qdr. this morning i'm not going to stick at the level. i'm going to dive down a level and talk more about my service, the marine corps and some the specific things that we be as important to us as we go into the quadrennial defense review which is actually well underway. this is the fifth qdr, and i think everyone in the room is well aware they are widely varying opinions about how effective these qdr's have been in the past. in fact, the risk of inflicting something on you give her before, i'll quote anthony

cordesman, a distinguished analyst is a diffuse but talk about working on the qdr, if god really hates you, you may end up working on a quadrennial defense review. the most pointless document. hard to improve on that language. given that daunting assessment from tony, there are some opportunities in these qdr. we faced significant fiscal pressure, which is unparalleled in modern times in a building. that's going to exercise a forcing function. additionally, unlike prior years, we got a jumpstart on thithese qdr through the stratec choices management review. the initiative that secretary hagel launched in the spring that took sort of a 60-90 day look at strategy resources across all aspects of the

defense portfolio. and most of us who were qdr also worked on the skimmer. so that gave us an opportunity sort of get a jumpstart. for the marine corps, we came out of the skimmer feeling that some of our visions or some of our views had been a firm. of talk about that here in just a minute. we will see how that all works out. the downside of the skimmer of course is it a away available time that could have otherwise been used for the qdr. so now it's mid-october. the report is due to congress around the first of february, and i'm not certain there's going to be any slippage of that date. we are in an extremely compressed environment. so that's one of the reasons i'm not going to be able to spend as long as i thought here this

morning at its day-to-day and on the weekends back in the building right now. we do think we're making some progress on that. one of the key things that i want to, sort of you the marine corps has, one of the things that came out of the skimmer was the sense that it was going to be a capability or a capacity choice. a modernization or a modernization choice on one hand, or an existing forces response today on the other. we would argue that showed an interesting way to frame the debate. is probably a useful way. ultimately it's to buying a. you're arguing from two different polls. the ground you're going to find is going to be somewhere in the middle and it will be nuanced across the joint force. some elements may need to emphasize capability as we look to the future. other elements of the joint force many to emphasize capacity. so it's not one brush does not fit all as you look across the joint force. it's going to be a little more

of a nuanced application of those things. let me talk about when the marine corps looks at our future, our product is the marine, a man or woman that's on the battlefield. we are human force so we first measure ourselves in terms of how big is the marine corps, how big is that human force that we deliver to various places around the world that support the united states' interest. today the marine corps active duty end strength is about 194,000 some change, and w we're on our way to 182000. i'll address that in a minute. to 194,000 today coming down from a wartime high of just a few years ago when we were into large land campaigns of 202000. actually since 1950, the marine corps average in strength has been about 196,000 with some big bumps up there, above in vietnm

and about of course for the wars that we are just drawn down. in fact, even if you take out vietnam, the marine corps is in strength has been 189,000. we haven't been below 170,000 since the korean war, since 1950. just some numbers to bear in mind. the last time the marine corps looked at really exhaustively looked at a resource to constrain force structure below 170,000 was in the early 1990s when under the leadership of then comment and karl monday, a force structure planning group run by brigadier general chuck, looked at post-cold war straight numbers for the mentor, directed to take look at a marine corps of 159,000. the commandant of the work, went back to the department, the risks were such that they were

not sustainable. his argument prevailed and we ended up coming out of there within in strength of about 104,000, a number that we've largely stayed around since then. i would note on 9/11 we were at 173,000 change, so right at 174,000. in 2011, directed by secretary gates, we took a look at where we thought the marine corps would be after the end of operations of iraq and larger out of afghanistan, how big do the marine corps think they need to be in order to fulfill its requirements. we call that a strategy driven look. we developed a marine corps of 186,800. a little or the more we in the past but nonetheless a number that we felt was strategy driven and that would allow us to do at a deployment ratio of one to

three, that is your home three times as much is your deployed. so i can we call that the strategy driven force. today as i speak to you, that force remains optimum force. if we could propose a force that is not primary driven by budgetary concerns we would arrive at 186. so unique event in the back of your mind as we go forward, the optimum force is 186-point k. after we did this work for secretary gates, the budget control act gave -- our part was to absorb additional in strength cuts down to 182000. this was not a strategy driven force but we cannot do it by carving elements of the 186-point k. force down except high risk but nonetheless still pretty much the went 86 k. force

with a future reduction. that's most recent is a program in strength for the marine corps. until very recently. where we're going and will be there in another couple of years. in the spring we begin to take a look inside the marine corps. the commandant stood up an examination of a range of to get marine corps' that would be resourced constrained. i was the officer that let that effort, and we look at the marine corps of the future and we took a timeline 2017 because we thought we don't want to take, we want to do something that would be within, that were not be out in future as to be a dream but nonetheless has real and practical utility. so we took as our time horizon 2017. we sat down and looked at the designing the marine corps based on our understanding of the

national security strategy, national merit to it strategy, the strategic defense kinds of january 2012 signed by the president. and from that we developed a new marine corps that fits within a series of resource constrained. if we face sequestration type numbers, this is the marine corps the commandant will pull out, the marine corps we'll build it. the comment at as many of you know has been very active talking about this in the past. i want to dig down into the force and tell you something's about it. the force that we built is a force that's weighted towards crisis response and for deployed presence. that's a key thing to remember because in every design decision that followed, we came back and look at that. what does it mean for our ability to respond to crises that are going to occur this afternoon that we don't know about this morning? we want to optimize our force to be the force of choice for that

requirement. you've got to be forward deployed in order to be that force. if you're not there you cannot react this afternoon. you can't react in six hours, eight hours or even a shorter time for crisis. in doing that we have to take risks. we elected to take risk in major combat operations. the high incapable of the range of military operations. and in long-term stability operations. so when i talk about the range of military operations or the rome over those of your unfortunate in this business, they just, face zero and one actually, faces her and one our deterrence and present. this force is optimized to be deployed forward during this phase is and to bridge the face do when you begin to get into combat operations, and phase three, divisive operations. we don't write ourselves out of any existing warplanes. we don't say we can't fight on the battlefield, but we do think we will be the force that will be the first that will enable

the bridge for the joint force to enter, and then would be able to contribute to a war-fight should that occur. however, we think our principal utility and our value added to the nation is going to be in our ability to deter, to forward present, to all the benefits that you get from forces that are forward deployed. that's really how we sort of see the force at the very basic level. it's important to understand that distinction as we go forward. we look at it and a forces and i'm not going to describe all the ranges of forces that we looked at but we thought the most reasonable level of forces for the marine corps, the best balance operational requirements of steady-state deployment, those men and women that are forward all the time, crisis response activities a potential major combat operations while preserving the institutional health of the marine corps, we felt that number was 174 k. it's important to understand that 174 k., but we looked at it

was not 8000 reduction from 182. numerically it is. philosophically, conceptually, analytically and then design concept it's not a reduction. rather, it represents the lowest wristband of the future look at the marine corps. we think is the best bang for the buck for the nation. we think it fits in a very good space there. also i would note and this is important it's within the range of future marine cores positive by the secretary strategic choice of management review. we got to our number before this number was released. the range for the marine corps into my 50 and 175 k., that's what came out of this commit. our number is 174 but we were looking at that number will before this game are actually came out. we see being at 174 k. in fy 17. so this is not the force that is a long-term out in the future.

we believe we have the ability to get to 174 k. without adopting owner is forced shaving measures, not going have to do any of those things. weeding to do with the authorities we currently have and attain this by the end of fy 17. so let me go down another level and talk more about the force structure were talking about. it's a lighter more agile design in order to get their we will eliminate one of our force headquarters to we have three in number and corporate one of these goes, one on the west coast, one at okinawa. we will stand down the headquarters are located at camp lucier north carolina and we will absorb these functions into the sitting already existing headquarters that's up in virginia. so we will take down one, and they are the were fighting headquarters of the marine corps. you go to a major contingency. you go with a marine headquarters.

it is the largest of our marine air ground task force. we will do away with one of those and absorb those functions into one of headquarters of the norfolk. second point i want to make is this design emphasizes the importance of marine ask but ensuring brigade. today, the marine corps has three marine expeditionary brigade. these mebs today are not fully standalone entities. if we want to push ahead goes out the door would have to take augmentation from the bring expeditionary force staff and move it. that's why we're talking about makes these brigade headquarters, command elements if you will, completely standalone. they our foes and. they can go on very short notice. very short notice. these are command elements. 200 marines plus or minus. they would have the capability to go forward, fall and on an

existing unit or default in on joined forces that are forward deployed because it is our intent to certify these headquarters. they will have the capability and iraq with joint interagency task force world so they can do everything from h. adr to combat operation. they will be able to deploy anti-beasley or through other means as necessary. this is a significant distinction for us as we go forward. another thing i would call out, we've always had mebs picture br than the letter of our articles of task forces. the big war-fight is the meb which is in the middle and will emphasize it more than we have in the past. to this design is going to get to the. i would note as we talk about this, our marine expeditionary minutes, the client of the room today will remain essentially unchanged. we have seven of those in are

structured today. we'll take seven forward. we will tinker with berries command relationships with the marine expeditionary brigades with these meu as we go forward. nothing is fundamental to the design. the last point is the only new thing really in our design structure are special-purpose, as many of you know today special-purpose mag tabs is a tailored marine aircraft task force that is for deployed into the mediterranean. it has remarkable capability mirroring and infantry unit with our tilt rotor aircraft and aerial refused to reach out very quickly across the mediterranean basin to reinforce an ambassador, to do a variety of other tasks. a number of other cocom's have seen this force and are interested in pursuing it. we will provide permanent

structure for two of the entities. we are neutral on what they go because in 2017th requirements could change but we think for example, if we'r we are to keepe capability in the mediterranean basin, by 2017 not only with his headquarters conduct by this response actions, it would also manage our theater security operation activities on the black sea and the north to off the west coast in africa spending across the demands of to combatant commanders that would be forward deployed. right now it's land-based, could be sea-based in the future. we are neutral on that and we'll see how circumstances develop as we go forward. i just want to note that the special-purpose nightcap i'm talking about mitigates the risk of a marine expeditions in it. under all cases you prefer to pay marine expeditionary unit but there of such demand that they're not able to the our places at all time. these special-purpose mag tabs allow you to mitigate that risk and go to places where you can't put as i noted the marine

expeditionary unit. our key point about this force is we want to rotate one to two deployment as well. so marine deploy for seven months, he's over 14 much. he or she is over 14 months and then they deploy again. that is different from the standard for the joint force which other sources largely prefer one to three. the marine corps' assessment is first of all with the youngest force, a pretty significant amount of analysis. we find a young men and women join them in court because they want to deploy and they like to go. this force is designed to take advantage of that. i would tell you in a perfect world we would rather be at one to three. , but given the requirements that we face we need to be a one to two in order to execute the missions that we've been given. that's an important distinction as well.

it's easy on your lance corporals amble if you're in for a four year enlistment, you are deployed twice and you can carry on with the rest of your life. it has greater impact on the career force and we recognize that and that's part of the risk. but again we don't live in a perfect world. we're having to do various things w that we prefer not to o in order to adapt to the financial austerity that we face at this time. another point, if we talk about major combat operations, the marine corps is all in. there's no rotation but if you go to abide we are all going go and is not going to be a one to two, our wonderfully well in that operation. the whole bring core will go and come back when it's over. units will not rotate. it also maintains key

capabilities that came in after 9/11. for example, marine corps special operations component and the marine corps contribution to cyber command both of headquarters level and to conclude. a lot of things have changed for us since 9/11 and this force recognizes those changes. there are a couple of programs that we think are key to us as we go forward into this force. the first is the f-35 brothel. our vertical takeoff jet that eventually want to go to a single airframe for long-term for marine aviation remains a very high priority for us. the second is the amphibious combat vehicles. when i sit amphibious combat vehicle, what i mean is we want to protect the decision space for the commandant to decide what the acc is going to look at it as you know it's designed to be vehicle that transports marines from the sea-based to

sure and carries an inland. we want high water speak for the vehicle, do we not want it? i'm not going to presume a final answer on that right now. we're looking at hard and the comment look at those decisions and the options in the early winter, in fact in the next few months we'll take a look at the. those are a couple of programs we think are actually very important to us as we go forward. so as again, and i'm happy to stop and not take your questions which i think will be actually the most valuable part of this exercise, i want to emphasize again that if we were developing a strategy driven force, we would take a 186-point 8-k force. but it's our view that while forces me grow smaller, recent history tells us the requirements don't have to always compete with that. don't actually agree with that i should say. may have a smaller force that you will continue to do many of the things you've got to do today. that force for us is 174

wednesday that maintains the balance, the rebounds in the pacific and that is a force added on forward presence, crisis response. the commandant has a phrase he uses to describe it. a middleweight force. that's a pretty accurate force. it's a force that is either there or can get there very quickly, yet it has the capability to fight in the effective on the battlefield. having said that apple stop you and and be glad to take questions. >> thanks so much, general. that's a great overview. we appreciate the detailed you provided. if people can start holding the questions up, i'll ask a few. then we will get to the audience questions. if i could back up for a moment, and you talked initially about sort of the fast pace of the qdr but if you could give us a general sense of where things stand in that timeline, and any

insights you have as to the potential direction or how optimistic are you for big decisions, and what kinds of decisions do you see as likely? >> first of all, as i noted, it's a compressed timeline. so we're moving very quickly. i'm the service qdr guy from the marine corps. it is equivalent to me. all the other services have it. the thing to remember is this isn't always the project. it is not a service project or a joint project. the secretary is the official was signed the document that goes over to the congress. we just need to bear that in mind. they have been transparent actually and allowing us to participate. the are a number of working groups. we play at all levels in a. i am actually pleased by the level of transparency and energy that has gone into. i believe we will have a deliverable product on time and i believe it's going to be a product that's going to have to

take into effect potentialities of sequestration, which means as we go forward and around the edges those numbers are tinkered with. we will have to be adapted to change even at the last minute as we go in. we feel that they've made as part of the process which is not always been the case. we very much appreciate that. same with the joint staff and the combatant commanders for that matter. i think we're in a pretty good place. >> let me ask a quick question about the holy covenant of the marine corps, the air, ground and logistics combat elements. at the end of this program i believe the aviation component of that will have been pretty thoroughly modernized, and it's much less true for the ground and logistics pieces that i think will have a lot of old tired equipment. you talked a little bit about the acp but i don't think that's on a timeline to be relevant in the near term.

so how is coming or looking at the risk associate with sort of an imbalance of that triad and how is it going to manage that reality? >> actually, i would say we don't think of it in those ter terms. the triad, the holy trinity, i think that. i'm not certain i would say that the elements are not significantly imbalance. i will say this as an example, the in the 22 which was a long maligned much fun over airplane makes us look pretty good right now. when president kennedy was a sender to we should remember that in the aviation combat element has been aged in the past so you take a slice and say the aviation combat element -- given a single slice, yes. but we tend to think of terms how it all plays together. on the ground side certainly we're looking for a possible

replacement for the humvee going forward. the individual equipment of the marine over the last 10 years has dramatically changed. remains today are caring equivalent that was fun thought of 15 years ago. we don't have some of the flashy programs. i will take speaking as a marine and as a marine infantryman, those are flashy programs that we need, that we had to have that were long overdue. particularly as you look forward, face zero, phase one deterrence operations, the f-35s is really the only airplane the build operate inside the theater ballistic missile defense red envelope off fields and that makes it a very attractive platform. i don't know what i would trade away for the capability going forward. it's going to replace a carrier which is now reaching the end of its service line. just my perspective i would say the madcap as a whole is far

richer. we may spend a lot of money on airplanes is airplanes are expensive. we bought tanks but those are in inventory. the acv will be a very expensive program by the time it comes in the i'm confident it will, whatever the direction will be. >> if i could ask a little bit about changes in this new structure for the reserves and how that fits into the bigger picture. >> we are very lucky in the marine corps in that the reserves are literally a mirror image of the active force. today are reserved structure is i want to say 39.6 k. we are going to trim them down about 1102 number in the range of 38,500. but we will continue to use the reserves as a shock absorbers. we choose, we want to rotate our reserves at a one to five ratio. correction, one to four ratio rn which gives every five years you will get an opportunity to

deploy. we conceded those reserves in either ground or air to relieve stress on active component units come and any major war-fight of course they would be critical players. we are closely aligned with the reserves. the reserves are closely attuned to the active force. it really is a shock absorbers for us. >> jeff is our master questioner. start with some of your questions from the audience. >> so there are a number of questions regarding the future of operations. specifically what the navy's plan is for the number of amphibious vessels and also some critics question the viability of power protection from the sea. can you comment on the marine corps' institutional position on amphibious assault? >> sure. the force structure i described to you maintains a forcible entry capability of two marine

brigades from the sea. really at any level we looked at we have the capability. that reflects our view that the nation needs a joint forcible entry capability, a major portion of which is the ability to enter from the sea. no marine thinks of iwo jima when i think about and amphibious landing. we don't think the ships right up against the beach. we would choose to go places where the enemy is not. we choose to of right and shaping means to gain, to get a shower at an uncontested area but in the final analysis you do have to be able to go across a defended beach. we have a variety of things you can do. first of all, we respond to requirements for into this operation because our existing plans call for a to have that capability. in the long-term the united states probably needs and amphibious operation entry capability that is independent of that. you want to have the capability in the next quiver to impose

your will on someone who might not want you to come ashore. so we think it's are useful to have the capability. i've talked with eric born forces. they do different things perhaps in concert with amphibious operation but as a joint concept is the concept that has proved remarkably durable and capable. history is littered with famous generals and others have said it's dead, only for the next year to see a major amphibious operation executed. we always talk about the end of amphibious operations, yet it's probably still a good thing to have around. that requires us to be close partners with our sister service, the navy. we were pleased with the amphibious force structure that came out of the strategic choices and management review for the amphibious fleet. that's what transports us to the fight. if you're going to go in under far you're going to go in and amphibious warship. so it remains the amphibious warship we talk about forward deployed forces and the things we want to do.

it is a resource intensive environment for the navy. they have been very good to us and we think going forward to october program going forward is going to continue to be good to amphibious capabilities because not only for amphibious entries but also for forward presence, the demand signal for amphibious warships is very high. of all the things in the joint force, amphibious warships are probably right at the top of the list. i've got the criticism of landing on iwo jima. we hope we do not do that again either but there's a lot of ways to do that differently about the marine corps but is a marine corps that will enter through a variety of other means, to gain and maintain an advantage. >> some have suggested, the mentioned low-end estimates for the schema for them in court was 150,000 range. some have suggested this is a viable number. how would that change the picture from the marine corps? how would that influence the

core programs, priority programs that you mentioned earlier, the amphibious ship? >> not knowing what the requirements are it's difficult to know if it's a viable number or not. based on our view of existing requirements today, 100 50k would be a viable number. you would have to change a number of things, but on things, but only number in court but across the joint force to meet not only for presence requirements but also war-fight requirements be sure to go to that level. we've done a great deal of study on it. when i say that it's an unviable number, it's an informed analysis. you may disagree but it's an informed analysis. obviously if you get smaller numbers the program gets smaller and you need less of certain things. the programs i've outlined to you today with all remain calm and perhaps in different forms but i would like to emphasize one of the beauties of the work that we did was we were able to take a look at a range of marine

corps'. we look at a 150 cam are in court and that the dangers of small force. you run into a lot of difficulty training that force. you're not able to meet a lot of obligations that we needed including treaty obligation. so would have a significant impact. we are heartened it's part of the schema process that argument was hurt. >> there's been a great deal of attention on air-sea battle and capability around the very sparse of the world. can you comment on the role of the meb? >> sure. is a very broad range to build his buthosebut i think where wet it in would be -- one example. would be expeditionary basing of fifth generation fighters, the capability to operate the aircraft from a dispersed base structure of come to a potential at this is the ability to track,

to striker high-value a graphic you could do that with advanced naval bases. punish small -- you would be able to replenish those small airfields through the use of npf. we think we are excited about the capability that we would offer the fight by our ability to place within a potential threat rain a fifth generation fighter that is for the first time complicates and adversaries targeting process. you're going to present potentially far more potential location for the aircraft to operate than he could reasonably surveil, gather target acquisition data on and fire at. >> with your focus on mebs and

meu, what does that do to your acquisition requirement going forward? will you be spending less, differently? >> a key point is, no less emphasis on the meb. it remains. three in okinawa is essentially unchanged to force a very little changed as a result of this redesign but you should think of it as a locally employable marine expedition force. one in california is global at employable, but we really don't lessen the emphasis of importance of the mef. rather we accentuate not a gap but a niche we've identified that we can build with a brigade for not high-end war-fight necessary but rather a large,

complex mission or even a small contingency operation where it might be useful to have a flag led jdf capable rapidly deployable headquarters that you could sing into the fight. we don't see the gain of the meb at the cost of the mef at all. it has very little effect on our programs. however, as we go forward we have reduced some artillery going forward and we have reduced some things going forward. just because we're cutting 8000 spaces. we have to look to places where we have to make reductions and we always come back to the first principle i talked about witches we're going to emphasize crisis response and forward deployed status. we had to take we think. we generally took them away from high-end of the fight. >> so on the subject of drawdowns and reduction forces, there is some concern as we draw down to 174,000 by 2017, can you

discuss the marine corps' methodology of the drawdown and specifically the preservation of the supporting structures that would be required to maintain? >> first of all of the go to 174 we're not going to reduce our training structure our base by a single marine. we will maintain the 182 level. so we will be actually very healthy in our training of the infrastructure. we're going to consciously emphasize readiness above all of the characteristics of the force. if the comment that were here he would say whatever number the marine corps is going to be at, it's going to be a ready force. so obviously you're not going to be able to forces that's it for presence crisis response force unless it meets those capabilities. so going to take some risk and long-term infrastructure development building, maintenance inside the marine corps of structures because you can't get everything that you

want to be. we're going to take some risks and consciously apply those resources to near-term readiness, which is to build up forces to be able to deploy an account of the nations that are given. we will sacrifice when it's all said and done, the marine corps sacrifice everything for a ready force. >> can i ask a quick follow ono the? usage are going to protect the training infrastructure and the base operations and protecting special operations cyber, some of the other key investments. at the same time yet to meet 20% headquartered reduction bill. so given everything your protecting, presumably that 20% will fall pretty heavily in certain areas. talk about how you think about that. >> when you have a three-star headquarters you can take a pretty big hit. additionally, we don't have a final decision it can have identified a full 20% cut. >> aand makes between military

civilian? >> no. the requirement was 20% military. there are other initiatives on the way for cutting civilian structure. but when i say 20%, 20% military. we're moving in that direction. we have a good plan to do that. the marine corps starts pretty lame anyway. we are not particularly fast but we have identified those cuts and we make those cuts without prejudice to the things that i just talked about that we're going to reserve. >> you talked about the capabilities of the marine corps. how do you see those evolving? >> the capability today is very robust. we don't see that capability changing. what you will get is the only thing additive would be you're going to get that marine expedition brigade headquarters that's going to go on short notice which na kika the capability to plug-in very quickly at the black level, the department of state structures, ngo structures.

so that gives you at another level of flexibility as you go forward. our units are capable of doing that today but what we have now is the capability join a flat global headquarters out there in a matter of hours debating on location so you could have the ability to plug in and conduct a lateral coordination. we think our capabilities robust today and it will get better as we go forward. [inaudible] >> you reduce the footprint that others can attack the there are variety of compelling tactical reasons to seek energy efficiency and as the department of the navy is doing it, we are pursuing the same thing. we're working on a variety of tactical initiatives which have been used in rc south was, one

example. we will continue to do that because it's useful for all variety of global reasons but it has tactical advantage for the force. >> quick question about growing amphibious capability around the world. many of our partners and some that are not our partners, many are pursuing expanded or new amphibious capabilities. and given the emphasis and the strategy on partner capacity building, how does the marine corps at the utah global expansion? is it an opportunity that you are trying to leverage? are you working we can? >> it's a natural congruent, partners that are developing those capabilities. so we will leverage that as we go forward. a variety of nations have bases there and then it back into a wide variety of things. it's something that we recognize for a long time.

others are seeing the virtue of that. we will continue to press forward with that to the maximum ability possible. >> are there new partnerships that you can undertake in that regard? for example, one of the things we've been thinking about is some of the partners, we have a challenge as some would characterize it as a challenge, whereas i think most people have not made that decision, does that offer some new opportunities for the marine corps? do you look away to try to leverage that particular element of others amphibious force is? >> i would say in the broad sense, yes, but the thing about a national vessel is ultimately it retains the sovereignty of a nation's owner. ultimately, you've got to lose some of the flexibility that is

innate. i think you have a lot of that type of stuff in the pacific as we go forward. >> you spoke with the drawdown we're going to have reduced the while times for the marine. it does have implications for the career force. to get amplified on your views on that? and specifically, what kind of impact could that have on our ability to maintain the best and brightest? and the effects on future effectiveness on the battlefie battlefield. >> sure. we've already pretty well wrung out the idea lanc lance corporal population, the for your population. many of these young men and women, they want to deploy. for those who stay behind, the long-term future of the marine corps, we're still sort of sorting through that but clearly looking at a long-term wanted to dwell is going to have an effect on families, on people as they

look to do a long-term career in the marine corps and we're very much aware that. the fact of the matter is that anybody can deploy at one to two. it's going to vary widely across the force but it's difficult to draw a generalization that everybody is going to be at that depth to dwell ratio. but it is a risk that we know, recognize and that we continue to study right now to see what the long-term effect might be. i don't have any better data for you than that. we recognize it's an issue we need to bring out very thoroughly as we go forward. >> sort of the qdr, we anticipate it will be published sometime next year. do you have any questions or concerns about it and what would keep you up at night if it was published? >> if it were published now, it would be largely unfinished. the stage where at now we are looking at alternatives. it's difficult to say. i would tell you that one of the

key things that the qdr is going to have to look at is it's going to have to examine the existing strategy, the national military strategy as modified by the defense strategic guidance. we will have to make a judgment, is this strategy sustainable, with a much smaller and more constrained budget. we don't have a final answer to that. we're looking at it very hard right now. i think that will be one of the big questions that the qdr answers. for example, are we going to continue with the tenets of the strategic guidance, or are we going to say we need to back off and we need to take a look at a whole new type of strategy? i don't know the answer to the question but we are looking at it hard. i think that would be one of the key fundamental, at the very highest level one of the key fundamental answers that comes out of his qdr. >> with the u.s. marine corps numbers anticipated to drop, how does that one side with our allies obligations? what are the views of our partners on this shift?

you talked about the marines moving to australia. how are we leveraging those relationships to better our -- >> just obviously at the highest level, that's a joint question that for the marine corps, the 174 case i described to you is a force that emphasizes the pacific. ..