must build 60,000 airplanes to protect itself. and all of the auto companies were given projects to build engines and airplane parts. ford motor company was give the b-24 bomber which was a problematic airplane. it was the newest airplane we had. they wanted to mass produce the airplane. ..

it's beyond words. i can't describe the feeling we will all have when the big smiles once we pull this off. we did something here in detroit that was not done anywhere else in the world and it literally saved the world from the axis powers. we did that right here. up next on booktv "after words" with guests host lisa

curtis heritage foundation asian senior fellow study. husain haqqani and his latest book "magnificent delusions" pakistan, the united states and an epic history of misunderstanding. and it's the boston university professor shares his insight of the relationship between the two allies who says viewing each other with mutual distrust and incomprehension. this program lasts about an hour. >> host: delighted to be here with mr. husain haqqani to talk about his book that was just released, "magnificent delusions" pakistan, the united states and an epic history of misunderstanding. just delighted to be here with you today. >> guest: delighted to be with you. >> host: you serve as ambassador to the u.s., pakistan's ambassador to the u.s. from 2008 to 2011. you advised the late benazir bhutto and you are now professor at austin university and the

director of the south and central asia hudson institute. you write extensively for "the new york times," "the wall street journal" and the national tribune to name a few of the publication so you obviously have a very inside view of this relationship and i think just the title is strong of u.s. policy toward pakistan and in your words if i may quote you say the u.s. pakistan relationship, a tale of exaggerated expectations, broken promises and disastrous misunderstandings. i want to delve into what you mean by that a little later in the interview but first i want to ask you a simple question. what motivated you to write this book? >> guest: this book has been on my mind for many years. i was a college student in 1979 when several of my colleagues --

i was in karachi in the south of pakistan but my colleagues as students in islamabad even in burn down the u.s. consulate the holy shrine had been taken over by gunmen. i was somebody who said no, we can't do that. we have to wait. if we burn down the building we won't be able to unburned it the next day if we find out the americans are -- and because of that i was always sort of wondering, why do pakistanis have this knee-jerk anti-americanism? from what i have read about the msi -- united states, what i had known

about the united states was for whatever weaknesses and flaws in foreign policy and even domestic policy, it was saudis in my mind that i would someday try to analyze it. that course i became ambassador to the u.s.. during the course soviet ambassador also and i was always concerned about how both sides, sometimes said things about historic events that were just plain wrong. so as soon as i finish being ambassador and you know the circumstances in which i was pushed out of that position, decided my first priority should he into researching it. as you know i have gone from 1947 the very beginnings of how pakistan and the united states became allies. the thing that has always concerned me is why is this relationship dysfunctional? and why hasn't pakistan benefited from an alliance with the united states like other american allies in the

post-second world war era have. i have been to south korea and japan. japan was devastated in the second before but then i became a close american ally after the second world war and look at where japan is economic way. lee. south korea has prospered. all the station countries have done well. why didn't pakistan do well? what did we do wrong? in the process i discovered he was not just pakistani leaders who have delusions about what they could get from united states and what their place in the sun was. american leaders also were delusional about what to expect from pakistan and hence the title of the book "magnificent delusions." >> host: let's talk a little bit more about those american delusions because i found it very interesting you talked earlier in your book about george kennan, that he was somebody who maybe didn't have such delusions, that he could not see the value of pakistan to the united states and he in fact

wanted to make clear to the pakistanis that they should not panic inflated hopes to the u.s. i think there was some contrast between what he thought and what somebody like john foster dulles when he was secretary of state in them mid-1950s thought and he apparently did think the u.s. had died pakistan's loyalties that the u.s. provide enough military aid to pakistan would develop the same strategic interest is the u.s.. so what do you think accounts for these differences and has anything really changed? do we still have the same debates going on? >> guest: we will get to what has changed and not change in a minute but let's go to the beginning. i came to the states -- kennan came in 1958. he said you have unrealistic expectations. we have no interest in you fighting india.

you have totally unrealistic expectations of what amounts of data you want from the u.s.. the first request for aid was for $2 billion in 1947 a billion with a b and the united states could only give 10 million, a million within m so there is a huge disparagement. we must understand can of course was a foreign-policy realist. he is most known for conceptualizing containment because he understood what the soviets wanted. the genius of kennan was in the long-term what did he say? he said look we need to understand what the soviets, what is russia about and what did the soviets want and how do they think? unfortunately the united states was not that keen on getting involved in pakistan in the beginning and didn't have any pool of experts about pakistan and had few people who knew south asia but most of them were

people who were enamored with gandhi and liked india and they actually found the idea of pakistan rather unrealistic. many of them compared it to pakistan compared to jefferson davis by some people in the american media but once pakistan was about to become a reality but british said to the americans that they should develop diplomatic relations. pakistani as you know they are very hospitable people. pakistan's problems were imminent. pakistan was about one third of british military but only one third of britain's resources. they would not have if vibrant economy and it didn't have the means to pay for its own military and pakistan was unsure about pakistan's own future. they decided they would value the nation together by saying that pakistan is constantlconstantl y under threat from india so that meant

they had to keep the military but who would pay for the military? pakistan's founder said pakistan can -- the soviet union and get assistance from the united states. the caveat was pakistan would not actually get involved in american military plans. from the beginning of it was about getting the assistance on false pretenses. the band started interacting with military leaders and sold themselves to and he said our army will become your army. if europe will give us money and arms. people like dulles has a conversation with walter lippman in which he says we can't fight

communism without them on our side and that is why a signed on pakistan. they are not pakistanis and dulles says if they are not pakistani their least muslim and a course they are not muslim either. there hindu. lippman was a typical ignorant politician who didn't know the details between what he wanted which is allies against the soviet union. he was lining up allies in pakistan was ready to be an ally it that's enabled this relationship but in a few years eisenhower was president, eisenhower said you know what? it's a mistake to seek out allies and armed them with militaries when that military is never going to be available for

us to fight a the enemy for which we are arming them. and it used the arms that provided the ability to fight communism to fight the indians. this is how the mistake was made the assumption that we have equipped it and armed it we will be able to make them change the focus. bolus found out early on and still the thought if we ain't gauged long-term and if we make good relationships between us now your question has anything changed? my fear after serving as ambassador is some of the same thought processes linger. there are people in the u.s.

that think just a little bit more aid and you'll be able to change the country's perception of its national interests. people like me who few pakistanis national interest differently. we think the prime relationship would be to get educate and build a prosperous country and to be a piece with its neighbors but that is not the view of pakistanis military euphemistically called in pakistan the establishment. >> let's talk about of the military establishment has developed its worldview. you talk about an herb of the fact that pakistani leaders instead of basing foreign policy on facts that it's based through this prism islam on nationalist identity. could you talk a little bit about the evolution of this nationalist identity as you refer to it and what the strength of it and what has weakened it over time?

i think you have talked in the beginning stages after pakistan was established the first leader who was referred to in pakistan had a different view. he saw the country anymore realistic light and of course islam would form part of the identity of the nation but it's certainly be a democracy. what changed in those initial years in pakistan? >> guest: the independence of pakistan came rather suddenly. the idea pakistan, the muslims moved to the idea of having a separate country of their own. nobody thought about the details. in fact in all my searches, and i have done another book before this on the relationship between pakistan's military and religious groups and i have called it pakistan between us and military. in all of my research most

people haven't been able to find what was the plan for the country. if you want a new country should have a plan for it. it ended up being a country these pakistan until 1971. it had the majority but the elites came either from amongst migrants from india who moved to pakistan or from the punjab province of pakistan. the military was drawn primarily from the punjab so you have the potential for ethnic disagreement early on. some certain ethnic groups did not believe with the notion. they thought if you no longer want to be a part of indy you should have your own. all these fears plus the potential of india trying to regain pakistan which wasn't a realistic potential. india very early said we don't

want you back. we want to be friends of the few but we only that but the pakistani leaders thought keeping the security around will help overcome the ethnic tensions within the country. and so basically they just chose to make pakistan into morgan subnine state. of course that created another problem. pakistan would have had 23% non-muslim minorities. having 3% of your population that is not muslim does not make it easy to make it into a more religious or islamic state. you have to provide for a quarter of the people who are not. it resulted in a situation which 23% of the population of non-muslim declined to 16 within two years. now there are only 3% non-muslims, a very small minority. first came the muslim is asian and then the islamization and

then pakistan's dysfunction was -- because the military did not have education. it didn't advocate enough to education in there for pakistan's economic development was undermined. of course american aid of $14 billion of aid since 1947, it has helped but it hasn't created the economic base that is needed for a country like pakistan. for example or two or three examples, pakistan's exports as it ascended to gdp are half of what the exports are of other comparable sized emerging market countries. pakistan's taxes as a percentage of gdp are one third of the amount of taxes that are collected in other countries. foreign investment in pakistan is one third of what it is in other comparable countries of

pakistan just didn't have any common focus and early on there were the political shall we say, political vacuum after the death of the founder and khan who was assassinated was the other big leader. they there were too many politicians squabbling and then the military stepped in. the military stepped in and the military usually thinks in straight lines. they are not good for political thinking so the military then decided let's just settle. let's not have an interminable interminable -- about pakistani nationalism. let's decide what it is and teach it in the schools. they are teaching islamonationalist and pakistani schools. they taught that they could teach people something but not have consequences. eventually what happened was the leaders that were emerging have

been more and more islamist than the founding fathers. >> host: that brings us to the point that not only is there this islamonationalist foreign-policy, there is also very high levels of anti-american sentiment within the population. what your book points out in what is so interesting is that a lot of this is actually inspired by pakistan's leadership in order to get -- convince or scare the americanamerican s into supporting them. in other words they may allow for fuel demonstrations that they can then argue that oh you have to support us otherwise we won't be able to control these anti-american impulses as a society. this is something that is extremely frustrating. i think we saw you know the obama administration when

hillary clinton was secretary of state can you fight about this, that she confronts the pakistanis on this and says to the senior leadership behind closed door meetings that, why are you putting articles in the newspaper? we know that you are fueling this anti-american sentiment and she was particularly miffed because her efforts to push forward to carry the berman bill providing $7 billion in u.s. civilian assistance to pakistan over at period for which was a huge deal getting a bill like that pass through congress. as soon as it was passed, you had a great deal of criticism that seemed to be coming from the pakistani military isi circles because they weren't happy that the military aide was going to be conditioned. so what is this?

>> guest: here's the thing. that is why the word misunderstanding in the title of my book. i call it "magnificent delusions" pakistan, the united states and an epic history of misunderstanding. the reason why i say that is the americans to too many things at face value. if there's a demonstration they say there might be people who are turning against us. there are many revelations in my book in which people find revelations and i delve into the declassified papers at the state department and the former presidential libraries, the eisenhower nixon libraries to find material. >> host: you were in a lot of these meetings. >> guest: towards the end when i was ambassador i was in a lot of the meetings and the reason i went towards these factoids was in these meetings our officials would say things which the american official would say no they are not true so both sides

had a different ideas so then i decided i needed to investigate. pakistan would say pakistanis are against united states because of the drone strikes. the drone strikes had been there only for a few years but the truth is the american embassy was burned down in 1979. the earliest the most rations were in 1948 which was seven or eight months after the creation of pakistan so what is the truth? i have found actually the first time american officials complained to pakistan is because pakistan did not exist at that time was in 1946. when the muslim league was still demanding the creation of pakistan and the assemblies to throw slurs at america and say the americans are becoming becoming the worlds new superpower superpower after the second world war but they don't really care about the third

world etc. etc. etc. so a an invest at the gate at the whole chain all the way to that first complaint. if fact of the matter is early on pakistan's problem was getting attention. people in america did not know about this land and so, anti-american demonstrations were away at getting attention. this country's emerging and its leaders want to be our allies but his people are potentially hostile. pakistan didn't have a strong communist party. there was no serious communist party so how do we attract american attention? america at that time remember was focused solely on the cold war. if you look into the u.s. and saved by the way we have a conflict of india and we need your help to fight them, the answer was what can i give? we can't help you. we had to find people with whom we had some shared interest and the way to attract that attention was as a muslim

country that could possibly end up being the leader of the muslim world and there were implications for the middle east and have implications for the far east malaysia and indonesia, you need to take it seriously and you want to take it seriously and you need to take it seriously in a military sense not just in terms of providing aid or technical assistance. unfortunately, the wait has been done has created a dysfunction. sometimes the hostility that has been generated in public opinion as a means of leveraging a relationship actually that hostility comes in the way of whatever relationship you want to have. we have seen that on many occasions, that you try to get more demonstrators out on the streets to help in the negotiating posture. musharraf often used to say i am pro-american but my people are not. so therefore there are limits to

what i can do for the u.s.. but in the process, what he ended up doing was, he ended up doing less and less for the alliance. from the american point of view the problem in my opinion has been very few american officials are willing to talk straight. i mean look, many people in the state department are my friends. you served in the state department at one time but a lot of times diplomats basically hold -- they don't want to confront leaders of other countries which is why i praise hillary clinton for going to pakistan and saying things which needed to be said like asking questions. if you remember one of her comments that drew the greatest criticism in pakistan was a comment that i can understand why nobody of pakistan knows --

and lo and behold it was founded pakistan so what she was trying to do was trying to bring out into the open but difficult discussions we were having in private. my view is that for this relationship defines some kind of a healthy way forward, more of that needs to happen. pakistanis need to talk openly about their complaints as well but it needs to be based on real perceptions especially crafted to perceptions. >> host: yeah i think you were right. hillary clinton had this unique ability to talk in a very straightforward fashion in pakistan but she was still very much liked by average pakistanis and respected. >> guest: she was. she was respected. my point is it was three days after three and 65 and the year

and maybe several 100 days and you can't can have just the secretary of state. the average american diplomat would be willing to sometimes say excuse me but that is not how it happened. these facts are incorrect because time after time pakistan officials come to america and say america and pakistan -- and turns around and says you know what you also let us down. we asked you for troops in korea and asked you for troops for laos and asked you not to build a loot nuclear weapon. when we asked you to not support jihadi groups after the afghanistan war so yes we have done a few things. we have cut you which we probably won't be able to do. a more candid discussion would have created solutions.

it would have created less confusion and there would have been less misunderstanding if people were honest with one another. >> host: like you say in your book, it's only sometimes at the end of their 10 years that u.s. officials finally let loose with what they really think. >> guest: those who read the book will find the book is chronologically written. i go through my years of ambassador but is very interesting. eisenhower becomes president in 1953 and gets reelected in 1956. he sends the editor of a small-town newspaper the concord new hampshire newspaper called the monetary think it was called , and the editor is james langley. he gives him the ambassador to to -- ambassadorship of pakistan as support. then he writes something a bit

like a telegram saying what are we doing? nobody in this military wants to fight the soviets. there is no mood in this country to be part of any anti-communist activities. so all that will happen is our arms wound up being used against india this was in 1957. nobody takes note, nobody but towards the end of his tenure as president by 1959 eisenhower starts saying we have made a huge mistake of seeking out an ally and building it up without realizing that allies primary objectives are not the same as us. that is eisenhower. lyndon johnson when he becomes president, he actually steers away from john f. kennedy's policy of becoming closer to you and you and distancing from pakistan.

he says no, we have the cia in pakistan and pakistan is important. he tries to be as kind to pakistan as possible. if pakistan cuts off aid he says okay we will try to get american aid. and then in 1968 he finally says you know, i thank my decision to support pakistan, i think i made mistakes. nixon is the only one who is unabashedly pro-pakistan in the infamous 1971 war against opinion based on the assumption that pakistan is america's highly and that the soviet ally wins then america, despite american help india did win and america was accused of supporting pakistan's genocide

of benghazi. fast-forward, president reagan gets involved with the jihad in afghanistan and that's a project that started long before americans support came. it wasn't an american project and it was a pakistani project supported by the u.s.. the cia provided the arms but the isi that pakistani intelligence ran the operation. but towards the end come when george herbert walker bush becomes president he realizes that some of the jihadi groups that were trained primarily in afghanistan have been diverted to kashmir and he threatens pakistan with the potential of accusing it of being a state sponsor of terrorism and president george w. bush in 2008 basically writes in its memoirs,

i realize musharraf ever for failed his promises and his obsession with india should have warned me earlier that he wasn't going to devote all his energies to fighting terrorism. >> host: you are talking a lot about the u.s. presence but we could also talk about admiral mullen. he was somebody who met with general kayani 26 times in four years and you know he thought by developing this personal relationship the more he could get to know kayani and build trust the greater the chances that pakistan would do the things the u.s. was demanding like crack down on the haqqani network and the lashkar-e-taiba. at the end of his tenure in september 2011, pakistan had not changed. it was still supporting these groups and they think what really angered him and made him say the statements in congressional testimony the end

of september 2011 when he said basic to the haqqani network is arming the isi -- >> guest: the viewer should know that the haqqani network is nothing to do with me. it's just a coincidence of names. >> host: we are talking about the haqqani who is in afghan mujahideen. yes the deadly network now working out of north waziristan but back and forth between afghanistan and pakistan and committed some of the most deadly attacks. >> guest: the attack on the u.s. consul in benghazi. i have full details in relation to that attack and might book because i was part of that is ambassador. lisa, as i see it it wasn't just admiral mullen. there has been a presumption that somehow if we can find just

the right leader especially in the military, he would he able to turn around the state of pakistan. it's an erroneous conclusion. sometimes you have to combat and narrative with a nrda. if the narrative is its a muslim country and an islamic country of a special place in the world and therefore some of the global roots don't apply to us nuclear weapons we tell the americans we are not making nukes and they kept getting eight but in the end the nukes we said we were not making maybe we did something, it if nothing else we broke a promise. that can only be combated but this view if we develop a personal relationship it will help us is not new. he was not the first ahead of

the pakistani army. the chairman of joint chiefs who is mentioned in my book and that was under president eisenhower. again that was the same phenomenon meeting with the pakistani leader. admiral mullen worked very hard and had 26 meetings. he thought haqqani who was the pakistani was really committed to eliminating terrorism. he just wanted to find that tipping point where general haqqani's desire to eliminate tariffs and his desire to maintain military balance with india, he could find that tipping point where instead of india pakistan's military would

focus more on terrorism as a problem. but interestingly throughout this period he didn't notice that part of the pakistani attitude in relation to india is what another secretary of state had told another president, richard nixon, that the pakistani issues with india if they were substantive issues we could find a reason. don't have so many troops along the border. don't do this and don't be that. he said that pakistani feared india is psychopolitical. psychological. you can't do anything about it. for example when kennedy insisted india and pakistan discussed the future of kashmir meetings were held and offered pakistan they substantial amount

of kashmiri territory. pakistan's ended up with nothing. even though pakistan says it fears afghanistan will fall under the influence but india's influence in afghanistan comes primarily from economic influence. pakistan's economy is smaller. what pakistan really needs is to address its own dysfunction to have a holistic and big picture and then army chief however friendly he might be cannot change the psyche of an institution or a nation. eventually he did say all that he felt after four years of trying. he publicly had to say that

pakistan has been using terrorism as a means of offsetting the dash that it has in size. as a pakistani i'm concerned about pakistan. i always want pakistan to overcome its dysfunction for pakistan's state. want a good relation with united states but not just out of love for the united states but out of love for pakistan. pakistan has to understand and realize as a nation that no other nation can stretch you and make your size bigger than your neighbor. india's size is his an advantage india. pakistan needs to get over one thing and be happy with security as long as there is no attack from india. pakistan has nuclear weapons has nuclear weapons and india's nuclear weapon. now pakistan needs to trade with everybody in the neighborhood address its economic dysfunction and put 40% of its india

children who don't go to school in school and make sure pakistan's population doesn't continue to rise at the base that is much faster than the pace of its economic growth. none of those things can be addressed just by building relations between the american military personality in the pakistani personality. >> host: i think that's absolutely true and you know if we fast-forward and look at relations over the past few years i think we definitely have seen a decline in the relationship and some real tensions particularly over the the -- and what's interesting is i find you have some interesting information about the meeting that took place in 1998. this is when the clinton administration was planning to do attacks on al qaeda camps in afghanistan for retaliation for

al qaeda's bombing of two u.s. embassies in africa. the u.s. administration was in a quandary because they did not want to inform pakistan ahead of time about the tax because they thought they pakistani isi would take tipoffs up, -- tipped off al qaeda but at the same time they knew the missiles would be flying through pakistani airspace and they didn't want pakistan to think india was attacking so in order to resolve this ,-com,-com ma the clinton administration sent a very trusted u.s. counterpart to the pakistanis to have dinner with the pakistani leader. >> guest: i believe it was someone other that was sent. >> host: anyway i just thought thought -- so he could be there so he could tell them by the way.

>> guest: in about 10 minutes some will fly through your airspace. >> host: let me ask you. given that this was done in that time period, would it make sense that the obama administration did the same kind of alerting to the pakistani military leadership during her right before? do you think this is possible? >> guest: from the point of view of optics and the point of view of the normal practice between allies it would have been prudent to have some kind of an arrangement whereby the pakistanis were told that we are conducting an operation in our territory but here is the problem. the obama administration by 2011 had reached a conclusion that made an effort and ambassador richard holbrooke tried to make an effort to get what he called the grand bargain, a big deal. pakistan's problems and address

some kind of an arrangement where pakistan -- the jihadi game. that hadn't worked and the suspicion that the pakistani military and intelligence services in the pakistani jihadi were so high that it was a question of weighing the risks. even in 1998, even when they did it, they didn't get any frame from the al qaeda leader. so there were at least some people who contracted it was a coincidence. it could have been the what if while the american general was having dinner somebody from the dinner table went and used his cell phone in the bathroom. what if? there is no evidence that it happened in no reason to believe it happened but what if that is the reason why everybody left?

no one who is significant in the al qaeda was inaudmacinaudmac k so because of that background president obama decided not to inform pakistan beforehand. another option would tend to do it jointly. but then again it was a question of how do we make sure. the problem that has emerged in the case of pakistan lisa and i would say my own personal saga being removed from ambassadorship and allegations of treason towards pakistan etc. , that points in that direction, the whole overall atmosphere has become so poisoned. this is actually a toxic relationship and so, what if the military operation had been conducted jointly and then in the end they had found osama bin laden and his children. then could president obama have

lifted if? it would have been difficult for him to provide to the american public. the other thing the obama's administration considered in the fine details of that in the book and i hope people who are watching this will buy the book and read it, is the kind of simplicity offered to the pakistanis was look we did it alone but do you know what? we can tell the world that we did it jointly. so don't object who are having violated your sovereignty and we will not get into you know, how we did it without -- there were people in pakistani leadership leadership who are action attempted to do that but within two or three days what i call the sort of narrative machine of pakistan got into the act and people started asking the question why was osama bin laden in our question which was the more relevant question and

started asking the question how dare the americans, and violate our sovereignty. my point is in most nations peoples perceptions are actually the result of what they are told. ..

>> this had been taken at the highest level in the military sequence. obviously, the important thing here is that i should be teaching how this works and i should be understanding and helping others understand islam. not those in washington dc. but if you think about whether what not it is someone like malala, as she stood up for going to school. or anyone else that has a very few like that. anyone who has the virtue that is different than it is lammas pakistan, everybody has a false start. that narrative makes it impossible for cooperation between pakistan and the united states, especially in the united

states. and you haven't asked the question. >> this includes pakistan's nuclear designs. and in fact, they have enabled pakistan to have a nuclear weapon and all of these dysfunctions are aspects of pakistan and they make it very difficult for the american president to say that i am not going to take out this unless i have full pakistani cooperation and that makes perfect sense. >> host: one wonders how long this narrative can be sustained. especially this idea that pakistan, that the view that pakistanis have with their own country, it is so diverse and from the way that the rest of the world sees pakistan. i think it is partly because of this narrative that the military

is driving in the confusion that is so about who is the enemy and what is the terrorist threat. you can look at the differences between the reactions of the terror strikes that happened in nairobi, kenya. we're 10 days ago, the kenyan leadership was very clear, that else about this part of al qaeda. and they wanted to cooperate with the u.s. in counterterrorism efforts. in pakistan you had this dual pakistani bombing of the church. killing 85 people. and there was confusion that reigned. the fact that it was implicated and it actually is, you know, like an arm of al qaeda. >> one of the pakistani politicians went to the extent

of insinuating that the bombing is essentially some kind of a false flag operation to try to persuade the people of pakistan not to go ahead with a proposal to have talks with them. the conspiracy plays. i'm not sure of your familiar with what is going on. but he is a physicist and he has a phd and even came to the united states on a full bard once. he has written a book on 9/11. he says that he is an individual that actually the world is run by bankers and this is american and british bank as and he also had anti-somatic reasons and then he says that to conclude that this could be existing in the brains of people and my point is that he is the head of

the university. the president of the prime minister of the country says this is a kind of conspiracy with a state-run university. so that is a state of denial. you asked at the very outset. why did i feel compelled to write this and the truth is the same reason i was compelled to write earlier that somebody has to put out a historical correct neches and my previous book had hundreds of those protesting. the pakistani people were protesting. and at one time, the population was still part of the media and duly hydrated. the poisons, he is critical of the pakistani portions. i am not critical of them, i am trying to connect the chorus and as a citizen i should have that right. that first book talked about how pakistan's military and the

groups had worked together for much longer than people understood and believed in their life. this book is a magnificent horror of what happened and that includes here in the united states and an epic history of misunderstanding. this is meant to set the record right and i have no -- i don't get any free pass to the americans. mistakes that were made in an attempt to be nice to pakistan and a mistake that was made through the cynicism of individuals. and this includes citations and nothing is manufactured and that is why i say that sometimes it lasts me in washington what do you think would set things back. and i say narrative change. let people please face the truth. pakistan is not economically back world because the world is

denying it the right to be a nuclear reference. oh, no, pakistan has actually missed out on the opportunities of the economic front to become a nuclear weapons front. >> host: then you have to ask the question if this narrative is stuck there and it doesn't matter what the u.s. does and pakistan is not going to give in in terms of its policies supporting some terrorist groups. and, you know, we will continue to have confusion among the pakistani people about the real threat of terrorism to country and would the u.s. be better off and pakistan rather than continuing to try to work with the country that is in denial? >> i don't know. >> you get to the point where how does the u.s., you know, they have tried everything in the book. at 40 billion.

they've tried threats. they tried but pakistan under this and the other set in the early '90s. iraqi dcn account of that come you will find that they show what is credible. and here's the point. >> there's a lot of options between ignoring it and embracing it. embracing it between shooting someone in taking them out for dinner. in the united states needs to expose up the first step would be -- as to it has to be good for pakistan and the united states. in order to get over this video of the other as being the bad guy. and the alliance that is presupposing a shared enemy that the enemy is for most people, part of the military and the establishment. it is india. and not the terrorists. and in fact, in many cases, that

there our potential allies. similarly, for the united states. and the enemy was part of that communism or expanding communism and after that, it has been terrorism. in neither case has pakistan been part of this. they shouldn't be a part part of this. they should avoid that. but they need to have a more reality-based discourse. and get rid of these assumptions. the pakistani assumption that we are so geographically located in such a area geographically and america needs us and look, if the united states could supply us, they can deal with afghanistan with what is

necessary. reinforcing the delusion and the economy, the american system, what is significant. but that pakistan assembly needs to collect taxes. pakistan needs to reform its economy. so maybe it's a good idea to tell the pakistanis reform first the mega-billions of dollars of american investment because the businessmen go wherever they go. there are billions of dollars of american situations in korea. have you ever heard of them saying that this is significant? you have heard of them, samsung is a korean brand. so why not? intimation of 100 million people, we can be very productive people together. but if you don't educate our

people, if the university leaders feed them conspiracy theories rather than how the world works, then well, you know, like you can't need to be, you can't deem to be part of this, the microchip is planted in your head, it is not going to grow up to be the ambition of being a leading member of the information technology business in silicon valley and all of that needs to change. but the change can only come and we are not buying this narrative. another same time. we keep pointing out what is not in america's interest and we are not allowing the pakistanis with their interest. >> i think that that is a great point. that the u.s. is simply stops the narrative. but, you know, some people talk

about him holding a gun to their head and i will shoot myself we don't provide this aid -- and this and that like taking hostages. so, if the u.s. can just stop listening to the pakistani lines which have been the same for 50 and 60 years now, to read your book, i think it should be a sort of a textbook for any u.s. policymaker dealing with pakistan so that they can go into the relationship and knowing what they are going to hear and then like, get past that. because it's not only understanding the limits to what pakistan is capable of, but also understanding the dire armageddon scenarios that if you don't do that, pakistan is going to implode. you know,. >> you have to understand that this will hurt the people of pakistan that much.

so leaders use that as a bargaining token for foreign policy leverage. and they should be concerned about this for pakistan's sake. have you ever talked about why it is possible? white as possible for similar people to be used and i have an explanation for that. >> yes, i think the u.s. that in your book. i think the were called the prime minister. >> yes, that is correct. and he turned around and he said, americans never look at history. they just want the image. the funds we can satisfy them. >> and he said that there is always somebody. >> yes, there is always someone to defend. >> yes, there is always someone to defend. especially in washington dc will be given to lobby for us if you

agree with us and to support us. it is all about finding the right people and that was, i mean, that was so impaired that. at a lot of those people talking about things at me. not only on the u.s. and pakistan relationships, but it has made me understand some of the weaknesses in america's foreign policy and how decisions are made and i often say that americans are the people that say that limits history, what you really mean is that it's relevant, but in other nations in that case, it is not relevant. and history illustrates a part of this for the future. >> let's hope that people will read this, especially people will understand how to deal with pakistan, and this is a great book for anybody who would like

to know more about the history of the u.s. and pakistan relationship. i cannot think of a better person to be able to tell that history, it's so important. someone who has served as ambassador here is very poor front and center and i thank you very much for discussing your book. it's a wonderful book and i recommend it to anybody would like to learn more about pakistan. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> that was "after words." the signature program of booktv. authors are interviewed by policymakers and legislators and others familiar with their material. "after words" errors every weekend at 10:00 p.m. on saturday, 12 and 9:00 p.m. on sunday, in 12:00 a.m. on monday. you can watch afterwards online at booktv.org and you can click on afterwards