>> there is a question over here. >> hello, looking at the long game, we have been talking about a lot of folks that point to the

gop, the more or less dominance is of the gubernatorial slot. what happens with the redistricting and can the democrats make it, or is that lock-in for 20 or 30 more years? >> please let me give an impressionistic answer and then let david give what will be a more thorough answer. when you have the first election after the districting, that is the baseline. over the course of the decade there are population trends and some get more democratic and others get more republican. so the precision of redistricted can come undone gradually over a decade. you can argue about how much

that happens where a district can be are off. probably not that much, but some why. and this includes two dozen 18, two dozen 20, it could be somewhat different than the partisan orientation. but that is just my impression over the years. >> the democrats cannot could not pick a worse year than 2010. because it really is a vicious cycle. if republicans when and we draw the line, then they are in great shape for 2021. perhaps jennifer can talk about this. >> is interesting because i think that the year will be interesting is 2010, 25 open gubernatorial seats, republicans

won a lot of votes, putting us up for a reelection in 2014, by 2018, the 24 or 25 open seats again. and this will be better when they draw this. you know, they need to be thinking about that cycle of the governors races. >> 83% will be on the ballot next year. so in terms of who will be around in two 2021, it will be impacted by several between now and then. >> could you please comment on the implementation of the affordable care act?

>> go ahead. we will let jennifer talk about it. >> it. >> okay, i'd like to tell you that last october i knew that we were not going to be able to keep the health care insurance that we like and what i found out ways with the district exchange that i remember calling to broker the next day saying, how could you let that happen. but anyway i think that there are a lot of problems here, not just the website itself and the rollout, which draws a public relations failure, but i think that there's a huge confidence problem for the millions of people canceling their policies and a lot of these people end up

with these policies and i think their problem is really trust. but the way to watch this, i have been watching this through the lens of a democratic incumbent, mary landrieu and others because since the beginning of the cycle i have wondered what blood pact they all signed to support it and mark prior is on tape is saying that this is the best thing to happen arkansas. but now they are all searching for a lifeboat. including calling for an investigation. and it took him weeks to sign-up, he finally managed to

do that very landrieu has introduced a bill to let some of these people keep their policies and if they are not seeing it, they are hearing it from their constituents. my feeling is that a fixed website won't solve the problems and as we get into 2014 through 2015, there will be some new problems like access. because they are putting lots of people in the system that but they have not yet increased the capacity. and i think this will be a problem in urban areas. it's not going away anytime soon. >> with the winners obviously been people that have no insurance today or awful policies that will get something

better, what is your impression -- your impression is that there could be a significant number of people with employer supplies of health insurance who may end up with policies that may be less generous or exchanges than what they had before? >> exactly. if you had a particularly rich plan, if you want to keep that plan, it will be tough if you don't want to pay for it anymore. in the exchange does not let me shop and i'm not willing to do that quite yet. but what i have been told is that what we have we are not going to have next year. and it's either going to cost us more about the same, and i said

what we have and it's most likely going to be hard with higher co-pays with less access to physicians and that will be part of the system. and we have a plan right now and the other thing is that i have been talking to people who work for large employers who have had their insurance changed as a result or who have had choices of lands or put into one plan. so i think that this has greater ripples and people appreciate and people who thought they were going to be affected at all are finding impact. >> okay, there's one over here.

>> okay, let's try to get a couple of more questions unless they were serving decaf over here. [laughter] >> hello, i'm wondering if you could talk to the impact of other government shutdowns and what lessons can we learn? >> it will be under a john boehner's dead body. [laughter]

>> many knew that this was a mistake. they just knew it. the leadership knew it, the experienced once knew it. many of those with skills to look at math knew it, and how many suits that the democrats have in the senate, they knew that and this includes those house members who didn't realize that. the question is how many of them see things differently than they did pre-shutdown. and just from those statements, i'm not sure that that is that much more clued in than they were before and we will have to see. but for people saying why didn't the republican leadership.bat, it's because they couldn't. i would argue that speaker john

boehner had brought to the floor , he would've been tossed out as the speaker and he basically had to wait until there was an equilibrium in terms of the number of people who set a shutdown was an awful idea where we are more worried about the impact on the economy than those that were more worried about a more conservative challenger and there's a lot more concerned about that than there was for those that fear the result of a shutdown. and it wasn't until it reached that i think that speaker boehner could call for a vote. so speaker john boehner, kevin mccarthy, those guys on it.

and some of the more exotic members -- i don't know if they've learned the lesson here in there is not out of some of them to suggest that they also have it. >> okay. >> hi, i am from the feminist majority and i would like you to speak to the gender gap and the negative growing impact on the republican party and members in congress and in the states as they continue to push issues that really react negatively to women. >> okay, i think that the term gender gap was remembered back from president reagan's first term and initially i thought

that it was sort of a half empty and half full -- it was that kind of thing. democrats have a problem with male voters? >> yes. >> however, two things have come to my attention. the first is that women live longer than the men do. and as a result they make up 53% of the electorate to 47% for men. both obama and congressional democrats won by bigger margins among women than romney or congressional republicans said. and romney won by seven and

obama won by 11. support republicans are talking about a smaller slice of the pie. so it just doesn't work for republicans. but i think that there will always be something of a gender gap because i think that if you were -- worried about stumbling into stereotypes, i think it was chris matthews who used to say that we have two parties in this country, a mom party and a dad party and the mom party is very caring and nurturing. this includes education and nutrition and many said that fiscal responsibility -- and these gross stereotypes? of course they are. but the thing about it is if you're going to design a party

specifically for the white male voters, it looks a lot like the republican party and if you were designing a party to look at -- looking after other voters, it would look like the democratic party. and so some of this is inherent and will be there no matter what. and i have to think that if republicans -- i don't think we need to liberal parties in this country, but if they deemphasized and toned down and turn the volume down and lower the emphasis a little bed on the culture issues, i think they would have a chance to do a lot better. particularly as the millennial generation comes more in line.

but they are on economic issues and they are very skeptical about the effectiveness of government. they are not pro-government like liberals, but in their life experience, government has not worked very well. they are more open to private sector solutions and other things than older voters. so you could look about at that and say that maybe republicans have a shot with these voters, which would be true except for one thing. but the generation is also far more libertarian and libertarian -- those are the things that are keeping republicans from doing better among that millennial generation. some of it is a messaging in emphasis and volume.

>> i don't disagree with anything he said. i just like to add that democrats have been very good at playing this card, reaching out to the women voters and looking at virginia, 16% of all have mentioned the word abortion. it probably doesn't sound like a lot, but it was over 5000 and there was a lot of radio. it's a effective strategy for democrats in the swing states. it doesn't work so well in arkansas and louisiana. but you also see that republicans have a problem with women and especially with unmarried women.

the other interesting thing is underperforming mitt romney among women. and that was one, democrats have really learned how to do this effectively motivate the vote and i expect to see more of a. >> one quick statistic is that there is a place in virginia where i can guarantee that can occasionally one over 90% of women and that contains where kendra tonelli at 91.9% of the vote. and that set the precinct of ways is exactly the republicans problem as well.

>> i believe there were several for terry mcauliffe. >> there is a surge for those 20, that's my guess. [laughter] >> last question. >> okay, there is one more back here. >> i am just curious. >> okay, go ahead. >> a big picture, you've seen a lot of parties collapsed. now, do you think that maybe we're looking at a reasonable prospect that republicans are headed into collapse? >> i don't believe there is a real risk were either party

collapsing. and whenever one party does really badly, it is inevitable that the other will overreach. they will get complacent and screw up and get taken back down a notch and it really is, there is a self correcting mechanism that is there. it takes some time for it to self correct. and to me the challenge is and i'm really enjoying about chris christie running. i think he's kind of fun to watch. but the thing is tell me how a party that is seriously considered, michele bachmann, herman cain. newt gingrich, they move all the way over to chris christie in

one single presidential election. and the only way -- whether it is chris christie or someone that's like a chris christie nominee, it would only be as if there is a crash and burn election in between for republicans where they get us out of their system and a moveon, and yet i think the odds of this being a crash and burn is pretty low because the democratic numbers are so bad. i don't see that happening. but there is a history of 1964, he absolutely decimated and pops back up and democrats win four years later with jimmy carter.

>> well, i wasn't going to use the year 1988. but 1972, george mcgovern, crash and burn, before goldwater, 68 nixon, 72 mcgovern and carter. in both cases there was a crash and burn election and the party went the opposite way and even if david said, losing the presidency twice in a row in the democratic party shifting towards the middle. i think these things turn around and is a one term or two term -- i mean, it's inevitable that it happens because both parties have some terrific self-destructive tendencies.

it will self-destruct although they can bounce back on the other side. >> on behalf of the three of us, we would like to thank you. we have had such a fun time today. >> thank you. we also want to thank you for making this event possible and thank you to our audience for joining us today. if you could please take a moment, have a wonderful day. >> okay, let's get going. >> coming up on c-span2, the need for strengthening military alliances followed by a preview of the 2014 nato summit in great britain and a look at the size and scope of the federal

contractor workforce. on the next "washington journal" we will talk with republican congressman on his take of the house budget conference and this includes people being allowed to keep their insurance coverage and a measured taken to laminate discrimination. and then ben cardin discusses the health care law and health care.gov and as part of our spotlight in transvaal icon magazine series, about whether more campaign cash translate into more votes. the "washington journal" is live at seven eastern on c-span. >> meeting on wednesday to hear

from the congressional budget office at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. >> this weekend booktv is looking back at the 50th anniversary of the assassination of john kennedy. beginning with robert dallek and authors panel. it all as part of booktv on c-span2. don't forget the book club for november want to know what books you are reading. >> torch will give an update on the dod relief efforts to the people of the philippines. you can see the final briefing

before he steps down and other briefings from the pentagon at c-span.org. here is a look. >> hello. first, thank you for helping us. >> you're welcome. it's my pleasure. [laughter] >> he talked about the response to the philippines and the budget, can you talk about the cost and we have been hearing so much about how the military won't be able to do this because of the budget cutback. how much is this costing and it is this something that we won't be able to do in the future we won't be able to do currently because of budget limitations.

>> this is a fast-moving train and we want to assist people in coming to the philippines. it carries costs. we are committed as a department and a government to supporting the this in the asia department world. this includes secretary panetta's troubles to this region and has been a focus elsewhere. and we know it is increasing concern and also it is critical that we help build everything in an allied eyeliner capacity. that is one of our main capacity as well and helping each other

through these kinds of crises. especially in areas like the philippines and i don't have that 40 today, but we will have this as time goes on. >> it took a couple of days for them to get this underway. was there a reason for that for a reason as we wait for a request by max. >> with respect of the premise, we started moving personnel and this has been tragically developing as a situation and it takes a little bit of time as this is required. but make no mistake that we have moved out in the wake of this terrible storm. >> okay, so general kennedy says

that he need that capability as soon as possible? >> they could be required to support the philippine allies and the nearest one is in japan right now. i am not ruling this out that they could be moved there at a certain point but we have a significant array of assets to bring it to bear and to assist. and that is what we will continue to do. >> general kennedy says you should someone banged that none of the others do and that is the ability to deploy track vehicles to help research and move supplies over to debris stricken areas and you say that at a certain point he means that capability marty not setting a? >> we are working hard to give general kennedy whatever he

needs. to support support relief efforts in the philippines in consultation with the state in the philippine government. and we want to do this well and the right way and find us through the command to make sure that he has the full support of this department. >> can you talk about unique capabilities and what are you thinking they're using us for? >> it is a key part of any max and they have the capabilities to go on quickly. i don't have a precise operation to announce today.

>> does this include the landscape there and the destruction and their landing capabilities? >> i don't know the precise reasons, but they are definitely a terrific aircraft that could be used in the a situation and we will get you more and information as we find out more. >> can you go into detail about the examples about the special operations task force what they can provide? i know they do a lot of these smaller things in their own area, but is there any role that they are playing? >> i don't have the specifics on a roll that they will be playing, but i would note that it is very tough for me to get into the specifics. and this is a very fluid

situation and disaster relief is not something you can necessarily work in a linear fashion as they come up and we need to work closely with the philippine government and it is not always sequential. and i think it is important to bear that in mind. the key principle is that we are going to do everything we can to support efforts in the parameters of the consultations and our capabilities and we do have significant capabilities to bring to bear with personnel on the ground or other assets as well. >> is intended to help 10,000 families, how will they get to the philippines and when will they get their? >> the emergency shelter and hygiene supplies are being ordered by usaid.

i would prefer them together for the precise timing. >> i would assume that we would look at that request closely if we can but i don't have any further information at this time. >> can you tell us what the status is with consideration been giving to the point of both of those? >> we will keep you updated if we learn more. >> what about the reports that the european government have asked many times, to have any information about how long they have sought military assistance? >> we can try to find that out for you, but the key point is

that our relationship has only improved over time and we have worked closely with them to include this and this is a key relationship in a region that we will continue to nourish and that it's very important we do everything we can in this terrible kind of situation. >> ambassador to nato ivo daalder talks about what makes up the nato organization. his comments were part of the 2014 summit in great britain and this is one hour. >> good afternoon, everyone, let me welcome you back. my name is damon was on and i'm here at the atlantic council and we are delighted to welcome ambassador for his speech for

challenges for the future and we are so pleased to have him here because today will be his first speech since he stepped down as the permanent representative since last summer and he is giving a speech is a new board director, which will be so important. he is so thoughtful and frank and we have the opportunity to hear from him, unencumbered by any government position. after four years as serving tomato, we will have an opportunity to hear from him with what he learned during his time at the alliance and the lessons for the future not just for next year post 2014 afghanistan, but that as well. and that is where he served in the united states for four years from may of 2,092,013.

during a tumultuous and significant time and he was an intellectual driver behind the development to help define the role of the alliance. and he pressed the north atlantic council not to just discuss operations but to delve into issues and make it a forum for political debate among allies and he served as a leading voice on disarmament and i think that we can see his fingerprints not only on the posture but on the agenda among the allies in afghanistan and championing a new alliance in the operation in the country of libya. he has also been one of the only u.s. ambassadors to serve as a permanent host of the nato alliance and the united states

hosted it for the summit in chicago. i think it is probably something that he and his family fell in love with, the windy city and he comes to us from chicago where he serves on global affairs where he is leading the charge to put chicago on the map not just as an international economic city but as foreign policy and national security and born in the netherlands, he embodies the language that we have talked about, including transatlantic security and with landmark books on kosovo as well as the national security council and before heading out to nato he served at brookings and the national security council staff during the clinton administration during difficult times dealing with the balkans as well and with that, let me welcome you to the podium where we are looking forward to your

reflections today. [applause] [applause] >> thank you for that kind introduction. it is good to be here. i heard that you said you were hoping for a provocative and frank speech. and since this is off the record, i will hopefully oblige. it is so fitting to have the opportunity to talk about my four years at nato and what the future looks like over the many years to support the transatlantic relations and nato in my own work when i was in brussels, including the run-up to and during the nato summit in

chicago when they worked hand-in-hand with global affairs to bring people to the united states and among undermine them how important is alliance really is. that is most especially what i like to talk about. next year is the 61st anniversary of nato. in most countries that means you retire. so the real question is is it time for nato to retire and my answer is that i surely hope not. i think it's healthy to continue working after you are 65 years old, and more importantly it is the fact that i would argue that the united states, we need nato more than ever and the real question is not whether nato needs to retire but whether they will still be there for us when

we need it. that's really what i like to talk about today. because if there is a challenge and it is the question of whether the alliance will be there when we need it the most. and i hope that nato can show what has shown before that it can adapt to new times and meet new challenges and that is what has made this great alliance and will the question be about the allocation of this in the future very clearly in the 65 years, nato has evolved and it was there to protect after a devastating two decades of war. europe was rebuilt and became prosperous and the cold war itself was one without firing a

shot in the european union and european prosperity was made possible by the united states that the united states was committed through the organization of nato and it was an extraordinary success of american commitment to the defense of europe. the question then is what is nato going to do and many questions exist as to whether or not nato had a role and it turns out that they do have a role and it became a post-cold war alliance which sought to do for central and eastern europe would be alliance has done for many years before. enlargement of its membership hand-in-hand helps to solve disputes among and within central and eastern europe and

civil control of the military and throughout central and eastern europe. and that was an extraordinary success of leadership by the transatlantic alliance. when i came to nato in 2009, the question was not to be succeeded in winning the cold war and making post-cold war europe this stable and peaceful and as free as possible as we have been able to do, with nato, it needed to be updated again and this could be attributed to what we call nato 3.0. and it is something that i would

summarize that the purpose was to provide for collective defense and cooperative security by having these structures based on common values it has been some time, i think they're usually talking about how do you maintain a collective defense and new age when the threats are cyberterrorism and missiles and the percolation of mass destruction. this includes what is likely to be less and less relevant for the future and as important as its commitment to security device not only on what the 28 members of nato can do, but what nato does let the partners that it has around the world not only

concerned about defense, but disarmament and arms control and that is as essential in some sense at least as essential as the commitment to correct the defense and what makes it unique and what we have really seen in the last two years is having this common command what makes nato more than just a collection of states and a coalition of the willing is larger and more important and better the component part. and then it finally unites in a single alliance a set of countries that share a commitment to common values and the values of democracy and the rule of law and those are now

enshrined in the nato strategic concept and made us one that we could endure in the strategic situation and it allowed us to become the first time and operational alliance. in the last two years it became alliance of operations and in 2011 nato was involved in six operations on three continents with more than 150,000 men and women and we had a counterterrorism operation in a very significant deployment of troops in the balkans, but also partners from switzerland and austria and morocco and there are 200 moroccan troops in

cozumel. and this includes the gulf of aden to support our efforts in counterterrorism and operation ocean shield. also to countries like china, it india, indonesia, russia, in order to provide for security. we had a policing operation in the baltics as well as over iceland and in the future the participation of non-nato members and we also have operations in afghanistan and libya. he spent time with the lessons that we learned for nato and afghanistan is a unique operation that involves 50 nations that deploy the troops,

a third of which came from european nato members. we found one that was a mess and it was a place where our mission was failing and we had a strategy that was unfocused and a probability of success that was waning and that is the situation as we found it in 2009 and we adopted a new strategy in the alliance with many partners and that means a match that is narrowed to the mission up to this point in the mission was to make this part of the next jeffersonian democracy and that women would have the same rights as men in the same rights as

women have in the nordic countries and a large unattainable mission and made the focus of the mission rail, which is to make sure that afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for terrorists and and that is why were there in the first place and we have to be the reason why do until we were there in last place. we adopted our means for the afghan national security forces to be able to take care of check your security not only with certain troops, but allied troops in large numbers and to set a deadline of the end of 2014 at which the security would lie in the hands of the forces.

we can debate if we are succeeding and i'm happy to do so in the q&a. i would argue that the situation today in terms of what is happening in afghanistan and the capacity of the forces to provide is a lot better than it would've been with a failed strategy in 2001. clearly there are huge problems remaining in the country that remains after all the third poorest in america, but the people, the people are better off and more secure than they would've been otherwise. and libya was the six operations and a new challenge in many ways a real test for this new strategic concept that started off saying that nato is a source of stability in an unpredictable

world. the leaders signed off upon that statement, not a single one of them realized that they would in fact be engaged in a military operation over libya. it took three years for them to get involved and one week for them to decide to get involved in libya this was a unique mission that involved, for the first time, real and fundamental things that americans have been calling for for the last 57 years. in fact, probably 65 years. providing the bulk of the forces and capability in the united states contributed what it had been this provided about 75% of

reconnaissance that make this necessary. they could go after particular targets and sensitive moments including 100% of the capacity and that would be the contribution but the allies talked about in all of them stepped up in this, and the vast of those didn't participate because they didn't have the advanced air forces or the navy to patrol the embargo. and so united states struck 90% of the targets in the united states struck 10% of the targets and that is the kind of shine

from the u.s. perspective we would like to see. france and the united kingdom provided the bombing and striking missions for about 40% of the cases. denmark and norway struck as many targets as possible. in this includes conducting this operation and participating in the bombing operation as well. other countries participated in this was the kind of operation that nato is suited for and demonstrated that it could be relevant to the world of today and that is the good news. the bad news is that in five years from now nato could do this operation again.

again, i say that this operation was relatively small to the kind of bombing operations we have conducted in the past and it was about one fifth the size in terms of airplanes participating and if you look at the issue of syria, we were contemplating the possible use of force and it was clear and not only because some didn't want to participate. >> many have that kind of threat.

that is real but declining. it's not where it needs to be for the united states to have the partner that it needs to have. but the consequences are coming home to roost. and this includes the european governments moving the euros and other currencies and they wanted to make sure that they can meet the needs that were there.

and the long-term investment has suffered. but we have also seen a continuing allocation of resources. it includes 50% of the defense budget as opposed to a third of the united states and that is a significant difference translates into real capability problems down the road and the investment of less than 20% of the european countries. and they spend three times as much on equipment and four times as much to the nato allies abroad. and we have seen a decade of defense spending and in 2000, the non-us nato individual spent 2% of gdp on defense and this

includes financial crisis and they spent 1.5% of the gdp. and that is a one third cut since 2000. you cannot really have a strong military when you are under investing in the future. today only three allies meet the 2% goal aside from the united states, uk and counting these expenses. in afghanistan and greece while we appreciate this is not going to be the backbone of this

alliance. including 2%. and it is something that -- it just needs to be recognized. but overall the european allies are not spending enough on defense and the consequences are very real. so our biggest allies are the ones where problems are likely to be the worst down the line. in the united kingdom, we have seen progressive cuts in the military capabilities and by 2020, some estimates will have 19 surface combatants in the royal navy. and this will account for 35% over the next 10 years. effectively meaning in this

includes having spending health at 0% growth and we can see this when france was able to deploy forces in malley by having a significant contribution not only by the united states but by many key allies to make sure they have an operation like that to succeed in its stuck at 1.4% part of the rising gdp. but the cost is also affecting its ability to translate this into a real defense spending. in this includes asia spending more than defense on era.

>> this includes the overall spending in nato and while the u.s. is covering its defense spending. including the allies that will decline especially what was seen in the united states was willing to provide assistance and would also like to get paid for it. and this is unsustainable. and it's not just me who is saying that, including what secretary panetta says when he left of october of 2012 and this includes what secretary clinton said, it is not sustainable for an alliance to see this kind of

continuance. and so the answer that you hear is pooling and sharing and there's a lot that it can do. and this includes a master of putting this together and they that kind of thing that we would like to see and it's not always very useful when you want to fight. ..

to give up control over the national defense industry. that makes collaboration more difficult. there is issue the sovereignty when it comes to defense. it's the thash comes home. it may be okay for the danes to give the cush marine fleet to say they rely on the u.k. or the dutch. it may be okay for the dutch to get out of the mechanized army business. it's not okay for the france,

u.k. or germany. the real problem that i see with the proposal tabled just a few weeks ago by the government german government to have it based on the key strong allies is that those allies may not be willing to pool and share their capabilities. so if i have a national industry in the way we have, if we have sovereignty views in the way we have, i see a bleak future on this unless something changes. it's a future that frankly hurts the united. it's not in america's interest to have a weak europe. it's fundamentally -- to have the strongest and most capable we can. we need to find way, ultimately, for this alliance to prosper by having more resources devoted to defense. that means as economies rebound,

there is a need to increase spending on defense. that means that as economies rebound, more of the spending needs to go to investment. that mean that there needs to be the extent question find a way to more increases deference cooperation. let me wednesday perhaps -- anybody that knows me know that believed are spending on nuclear weapons. probably isn't the smartest spending we can think about when it comes to the future of this alliance. these are weapons that are not likely to have any role in anything we do in 99.999% of the time or perhaps even 100% of the time.

i'm happy to take your questions. [applause] >> thank you very much. that was just fantastic. if it remains focus on collective dissent for irrelevant for the future. you laid out the stark numbers about defense capabilities on defense and laid out the importance there's a lot to get in to here. i want to pick up a couple. i know, there's a lot of interested in the audience.

let me start where you ended on the nuclear point. our next conversation on cartwright and others, former undersecretary, will in to nuclear missile defense alliance for the alliance. correct me if i'm wrong if you say it might be as important commitment for the alliance and the future. while you served as ambassador at nato, you went through the deterrence and defense posture review. or within the alliance. you have the commitment about that put constraint on what the alliance, perhaps might do with it own. and the nuclear weapons and the absence on russia's part. what is the way forward here given it was a strong message you ended on? >> well, i would argue that i

spent a lot of time on this. >> first, let me -- anybody who knows me, i've been arguing about this since 1988 including to the need to get rid of nuclear weapons in europe. it's not a surprise it's my view. nor was it to anybody in the administration even though not everybody agreed with them. we work very hard in the deterrence and defense posture review. frankly we work hard in the commitment. to make clear that it is possible under the right circumstances not only to produce our alliance but eliminate our alliance on nuclear weapons in europe. there's nothing in these documents that prohibits the possibility of getting there. we do talk about russian reciprocity. it doesn't talk about russian agreements. we talk about the need to work together within the alliance. but it doesn't talk about the fact that russia can have a have

a tone what we do. i will argue over the last four years we have substantially addressed the key deterrence issues of our time. we have found ways to bolster deterrence. across the board, and i know this will be an issue discussed in the next panel but the deployment of missile deafens is not just a promise. it's a real fip exists today. it's part of a commitment that the administration has made to nato to take the u.s. deployment of u.s. missile defenses to defend the u.s. from europe in to deployment of nato missile defense to nato to defend nato. that was the fundamental shift that occurred in september of 2009. to take system that was able deploy against possibly ten incoming missiles and put in place a nato system under nato

command and control put the deference of nato countries. that is the kind of commitment to deterrence that we put in place. we put in place contingency plan to make sure that every nation that is a member of nato has a plan to be defended. that was an important contribution to deterrence. we just completed this month -- this week, last week. the first major article r5 last exercise. the alliance was conducted in the last ten years. many of the country nas participated in the exercise had never participated in an article five exercise and we just completed that. those are the kinds of steps that matter for collective desks. far more than the nuclear weapons you have. particularly when the cost of

modernizing the nuclear weapons runs in to ten plus billion. when the cost of modernizing your aircraft to be able to carry those nuclear weapons run to the many hundreds of millions of dollars. it is those kinds of strengthening of deterrence i think ought to be the focus of our effort and using arms control disarmament and cooperative security more broadly as a means to enhance nato's deterrence and defense posture. it lead to a lot of concern, ask debate, discussion, certainly among nato it doesn't seem to

have the impact or help turn the tide on some of these issues given the reality of the politics in the country's -- what is the path forward to knock the natural con continuation of the decline you outlined so articulately in the defense spending? >> thing is the message i'm here to repeat. i don't think this is a time for agonizing reappraisals. frankly, there wasn't a time in 18954 forking a -- this isn't one either. the message we need europe. europe is our most important strategic partner.

and the mess thaj says, frankly, if you can't be on our side because you'll act the capability, then that's bad for us but certainly not good for you. is the message i heard secretary gates, secretary panetta, secretary clinton deliver over and over again. the reality is it means we have will have to make choices. it when it comes to when and how to intervene and what place and purposes whether he make choices. libya was a choice. we could have taken on the entire libya campaign by ourselves. we decided the interest most at stake were not ours. they were countries in the mediterranean earlier talking about the importance of the threat from the south. and the understanding that these are threats to to the entire alliance. libya was a response to that. but it shouldn't be surprising. in fact, it should be welcomed

nap countries in the mediterranean that were nato members took on the responsibility for taking on libya. and that's how it should be. it is right that the basis we flew our planes from were italy and greece rather than poll land. not only because it takes longer to get from poll land and libya than from italy. because our interests are at stake. it means there are other conflicts that come down the pike. our interests are not as much directly as they are from other countries. the question comes are those question -- countries as they were in libya able to do what is necessary or lost the capability to do so? that's when we really will see what is important and what matters. and those are the kinds of decisions that, frankly, i don't see countries in europe debating. i hope i'm wrong. i hope that the european counsel meeting at the end in december the first one in many years to

talk about defense will take a very serious look about what it means to be serious about defense. because, frankly, right now it doesn't look like europe is sufficiently serious about the defense that it needs to have not only to serve its own interest, but frankly, those of the alliance at home. >> you put a lot of issues on the table. i want to bring in the audience in that is knowledgeable about nato issues. i'll call on you. wait for a mic. i'll remind you, we're on the record. the #is futurenato. you'll see the ambassador's handle on the agenda as well. ilet me start in the front here. if we have a mic here and come back here. >> the atlantic counsel. thank you for your comments. will nato be around when we need or need ?its as you know one of

the things nato has not done well is provide a strong message to the domestic public as to why it's important. perhaps we won't have the same christmas that he may have when he said the reason was to keep the russians out and the germans down. why do you think nato had a tough time coming up with a good e message for the domestic public? what would you put as the core of the message realizing i think definitely spending almost every circumstanced will go down substantially not up? >>ic it's a fair and important good question. i think we have gone through a period, frankly, since the end of the cold war. where we believe that we're in sort of a new nirvana. a place in which conflict doesn't occur. if it occurs it's economic. not military.

it's not enough to be economically strong. over the last five years doesn't look that good. to have civic power. that's important. but you also need good old fashioned hard military power. how far it has penetrated at the elite level isn't clear to me. certainly hasn't penetrated enough in the parliament tear level. we need to do a better job explaining why it is important

that nations who like to be taken seriously in the world require military capabilities to be partners in the larger endeavors that confront us. let's be clear. it's not clear in this country it is definitely clare there's no support or knowledge for nato . much of the parliament -- the congressman and senators don't know much about nato. most would be surprised it continues to run the mission but between a third and half of the troops there being from european countries. we have done not a particularly good job of explaining the importance of nato to our own security to our own -- what it is that europe and nato contributes to what we do day in and day out. we, before we start lecturing

our european friends about how important it is they go out and tell their parliament how central nato is and defense spending is. we have a job to do here ourselves. >> the common message we're taking to heart here to think about how effectively to engage on capitol hill to capture the narrative. let me have two more questions. the woman here and the gentleman in the back. >> thank you. i'm from the -- [inaudible] i wish had been said by the program or defense -- posture review what is going on.

there was little said to push the europeans in the direction you outlined. i can say this. i'm a european. i think without the americans taking the lead lecturing the europeans on issue like this. there's not going to be a movement on the nuclear front. there are so many holy cows buried in the nuclear issue that will prevent the alliance from taking that, i think, is necessary. and using euphemisms -- [inaudible]

those listens start talking clearly to what is would be good for the to be able to move forward. thank you. >> everything you have said is true times 10%. very important -- perhaps none has been more important to the success of the alliance than the u.s.-german relationship. which today seems to be undergoing a few stresses and challenges.

i wonder if you would comment on how we get this relationship back on track. how badly off track you think it is. and what the implications might for the future of the alliance. >> thank you. on the nuclear issue, i would say that it's much easier to have an individual than a collective opinion. more importantly when you are daling in an alliance you need the agreement of 28 countries. and let me assure you that nothing i said today will become of news to any of colleagues in brussels or in the u.s. government. there were many times when the kinds of arguments you heard today were right -- being mentioned and pushed inside. but ultimately a nato document and a document that gets signed off by 28 countries. and if one country says no, it

doesn't get done. i learned a lot about consensus building in my four years. it means sometimes you don't get all that you want. i would argue with the deterrence and defense review, we got a lot. and i think it's important document that needs to be read not only for what is in it, but much more importantly for what is not in it. if you compare this to any other statement on the nuclear weapons in the past, you'll see what i mean. scott, on -- >> if you want to comment on the point particular, fred? first, i hope you agree with me 110% when you say times 10 percent. [laughter] that means you disagree with 90% of i had to say. soily take this as -- full agreement with what i said, which i appreciate much of whey learned about industry i learned from you. when it comes to europe. that's good.

i think the understoodment tal relationship we within nato must be with germany and germany being a strong and critical player. that makes the last few weeks, last few months a very difficult time nor all the reasons that we know. germany's disagreic interest life as germt any has decided since 1949, really since it became a member in 1952 of nato to be at the center of nato. it has gone through difficult issues i.t. at least in the decisions with respect to libya. it is now going through some difficult issues with regard to the relationship between the united states. i think the administration and

the cube to be new government will work out on the issue. increasingly on the strategic and political side. within europe and indeed, within nato. i think that the united states needs that strong leadership from germany a willingness to stand up and be part of not only a collective but indeed a leader of that collective.

within nato and within the european union and broadly. speaking in order to ensure that the united states will have this partner. not only in we are lib -- berlin but indeed europe we need. germany is the big kid on the block. it is militarily the big kid on the block. it doesn't have the expenditure on nuclear weapons that others have. it is transforming its military in to a force that is quite able to conduct the military operations. it's efforts in afghanistan are underappreciated. they are -- they have been a leader in the north. a true leader. they are the first and only countries so far to have stepped up and said they will be there not only other countries but the first country to say they will be there post 2014. that's the kind of leadership we

want broadly speaking throughout germany throughout our operations in nato. >> if i could, quick. the praise you had for the smaller allies. the red flags you put up related to the united nations with particular to france and germany. a little bit of a different take. what is happening within the alliance. how do you see through the core ally of the u.s. important defense and bilateral relationship we've had with france, united nations, germany. are you saying the u.k. is stepping back and germany might step forward? how does the french reintergracious affect this? >> i think it has been extraordinarily important. it has made france given it a sense of responsibility for what happens in the alliance. and made the alliance stronger. no, our relationship with the strong allies. and those that are willing and able to provide military

capability is going to be key. a strong u.s.-est stone began alliance is great. it's important to the estonian and the united states. it's not going to -- can't be the be all and end all. our relationship with the u.k. our relationship with france, our relationship with germany. our relationship with italy, which has stood up every time when we rang the bell they opened the door. which is always welcome. and step through it with real capabilities. those are important relationships. and those countries will have to take the lead in providing the capabilities that are necessary for nato to be partners. it's not going to be done by the smaller allies even though those -- there are small in number, even those that are willing and able to step up to the plate. it will have to rely on the u.k. it will have to rely on france. it will have to rely on

germany. my point on germany is that it is under performing on the strategic level in a way that isn't good for the united. i'll leave it up to the europeans and germany whether it's good for germany. >> terrific. let me come to a last round and take couple of questions for fred. >> thank you for doing this. at the chicago -- during the chicago summit, one of the more significant moments aside from your rendition of "take me out to the ball game" during the seventh inning stretch of the cub/white sox game was the 13 global partner. now it doesn't seem if moved ahead too far. is it time when you talk about political capability something much more dramatic with the global partner. i'm not sure what it is. what should be done. if you can give your view on

turkey and where is turkey going within the alliance? terrific. good question.. right here. conflicting rule of engagement and caveated forces. i think that's a complex issue that i don't get to hear enough about. >> just on that, i mean, every operation has -- every country that operates within a coalition perspective will have its own specific issues of concern. we have a caveat. the issue is whether they affect the operational force. at least i was involved in this

operation since 2009 answer is no. that most of the caveat that really did have an operational impact were removed. or dropped one way or another. it is -- it's a nate somehow there's some countries that caveats and others don't. it's not quite how it works. the issue is can these forces cooperate in a way and fulfill the mission in the best possible way without causing problems from country to the next. and the answer today is absolutely. i'm now a cub fan, by the way. so it allows me to be -- but nobody remembers the fact i

sang. which is good idea. >> i think it's on youtube. [laughter] if anything is on youtube it's not it. there are pictures. [laughter] ting a great question. on the 13 global partners. that was supposed to be the big thing. it's something that the president personally felt strongly about. that it's important for the 28 members of the alliance to recognize the contributions being made with a wide variety of countries that are not members. some will want to become members. others won't. or can't. and yet in the 21st century it's not enough to think that 28 countries can do everything. in every single operation that

we are involved in. we have nonmember countries centrally involved in what we're trying to do. and these 13 countries in particular were recognized for that reality. and it is unfortunate that this view that is not necessarily shared by every member. there is not just the turkey issue. this is an issue about the european union. it's an issue that goes across the alliance in one way or another. our view of nato as a central hub for security around the globe is one not shared by every country. and we will continue to work. this issue as best we can. we strongly believe i believe the president believes it. i think our entire

administration believed it. and there were a couple of key other allies who believe that having nato that the core and bringing in these other partners from as far away from australia to as close by of sweden is critical for the success of the our operations and the success of our ability to conduct operations that go beyond article five. just what was the difference between libya and syria? it remains the fact that the arab league not only acted to ask for intervention, which allowed thetown move. but then key members participated in the operation. as they do in afghanistan. that provides a legitimacy twhab provides a capacity to act that the 28 members of nato themselves provide in the lesser extent. so for us it's critical.

it's not an issue that people agree on. >> thank you very much. i think that you couldn't have been clearer if saying the alliance is focus order the defense. it's headed for an irrelevant future. with frank crammer and others. much work to be done? >> just to underscore, i'm not saying the collective defense is unimportant. i just -- collective defense is the core. but it can't be the sole core. you need to have the cooperative security element to it. i think that's what the new nato is all about. >> absolutely. thank you very much for your time. thank you for coming to give your -- after stepping down as ambassador out there. thank you for the sft to our country. please join me in thanking him. [applause]

we're going to take a quick transition to the next panel and move straight to the final lineup. this is 90 minutes. [inaudible conversations] can you hear me mow? those in the back come up closer. i'm a senior fellow here at the atlantic counsel. and i have the privilege of serving as your moderator for our afternoon panel.

nato posture nuclear, convention, and missile defense. let me start by thanking our partners in crime here at the nor -- it's been a great relationship and the sponsorship they provided for the conference in the series. we started this morning with a focus on threats. our panel in the morning talked about cyberterrorism, energy, and space. they talked about a post -- world. and over lunch they were drifted back to the contemporary operations and provocative at the same time -- statement on a more traditional long standing tradition. that, of course, will be one of the focus of the panel. i would argue nonetheless relevance set of deterrence challenges. i have 0 to remind myself it looks so new but actually dates

back to the 1950 when we started, you know, first testing and deploying missile defense intercepters. these capabilities have been in the past, and many argue been the backbone of the deterrence capacity. indeed the alliance on statements stated ally confidence in the element is critical to alliance cohesion. so it's only prudent particularly in a dynamic environment, a dynamic strategic environment to check the stools -- tools and update them. the posture and doctrine. it concluded, quote, the ashrines existing mix of capability and the plan for the development are sound.

these reviews may actually be needed to done more frequently. many changing dynamic we are facing. increasing change. there are four that capture my mind. one, evil talked a lot about which is europe's declining military capability. a process ongoing. second, is a wrawl from the capability over the last several years. third, is a rising instability. we talked about this along the -- most notably the crisis in syria underscores threat that are immediate to some.

compare that to 2013, which took place in october. that involved 70,000 troops strategic bombers, maritime landings,. it's larger. i'm not say it signals a new con reason confrontation. but it give credence to those given out of consideration to those contingency on the eastern frontier that -- fast breaking crisis that can precipitate a limited by russia.

current and form policy makers and commanders. that capacity she in the office oversee policy development weapons of mass destruction, u.s. nuclear forces, and missile defense but also the department of defense activity in cyber and space. she also might add share the high level group nato high level group on nuclear issues. what i like best as a former hill staffer she bringing ten years of experience in which must was de facto staff director of the subcommittee on strategic forces.

welcome to. to my immediate right. secretary of atlantic counsel. but day job is senior counsel for kaplan law firm. he served as undersecretary of defense of policy under president clinton. since then he's been involved in many numerous senior commissions. including the commission on intelligence capability united states regarding weapons of mass destruction. he recently sat on the congregation nayly mandated making since of missile defense. to his right general james cartwright. you look so young. but a four-decade career in the marine. he was an aviator in the marine corps. which is unique in his marine career, i believe is the only marine who served as a commander

at the u.s. strategic command. noted for the innovation in the at the end we have kurt volcker. he's the executive directer at the mccain substitute for international leadership. i had brings 23 years of service to our country in the foreign service with a number of senior nato positions. nato-related positions on the last and his career was u.s. criminal representative to nato or ambassador to nato. also served as undernational security staff. senior director for europe. you served in the nato headquarter as deputy chief of

staff. on both sides of the atlantic. he is not just brawn but a lot of brains. he taught -- he's a senior degree in physic, taught physic at the united military academy. and missile defense realm. he lead the programs that have produced -- energy programs that patriot pack three, gbi. the ground base and mid course program. the experience in missile deference. we're welcome to have you here. i'm going to start off with -- and work through our panelists and then we'll have a moderated discussion. madeline. last june in berlin.

the president rolled out -- delivered a major speech. dramatic reductions in u.s. and russian tactical nuclear weapons. it's now time further the process -- further involve the nuclear posture? if so, how should the evolution be related to effort to manage other more acementic threats? >> well, -- [inaudible] reflect on a lot of work that is certainly going on in parallel between nato and also the u.s. so in june the culmination of the so much longer 90 day study is resulted in the issuance of

new presidential decision guidens on nuclear deployment policy. and that guidance really was the result of a very long and exhaustive process that allowed the u.s. to come to the conclusion that we could safely in conjunction with russia go to a few nuclear systems. at the same time, since nato put out the ddpr. nato and specifically the hlg which mentioned i have the privilege of chairing. and having done a lot of work with my colleague from norway in the front row. but the hlg has done a tremendous amount of the hlg provided a new political guidance for nato which was then

recently followed some implementing guidance for both military staff and shape. set the place and strategy for what are more the 21st century threat. the evolving threat. the ballistic missile threat from the shorter and medium range system. looking how you maintain a strong deterrent. incredible deterrent at the same time setting the condition for future reduction. all is going on in both nato and the u.s. so it's important to have russia as part of this -- part of this effort on both sides. neither will be successful

without. to be frank, we're not making much progress on the front. we continue to try. >> do you see a more radical change. a need for link between the posture and conventional deterrence? i think it's important the united states modernize the strategic force. on what pace it needs to be. it's also true of the british

and french forces. both of which are committed to be modernized. there will be debates at least in britain on the scale. if we got to a -- which the alliance wanted to use nuclear weapons. given a choice between invisual submarine with an essential or other systems within the essentially 1% assurance of reaching the target and very high precision would we reject them in favor of dropping gravity bomb.

on the assumption that the russians or somebody else -- it's hard imagine, targets other than the russians is irrelevant in the context. the russians would be pass fied by the fact the airplane came from european basis and not from american british and french platform. woe never forget the horrible consequences of the nuclear weapons on any scale. but for some europeans, the

commitment of american nuclear weapons in europe for reasons that you can argue whether they ever made since. you can argue whether they make sense now. definitely are seen as a fundamental symbol of american commitment. there are a lot of europe,s in the room. i apologize for saying this. the europeans tend to operate in two modes and they can -- like angels, can move from one the other in time without passing through the intervening space. one is that the americans are about to embroil them in stupid conflict which is they have no interest. and the other is that the americans are about to abandon them and leave them open to the enemy. to some degree, things like the presence of u.s. nuclear weapons in europe help with that.

i have come to the conclusion -- it's no secret that the united states air force wanted to get rid of these things for years and years. they have stayed. so i think that is a fight about

the issue is not worth it. i think, however, there are thing we should be doing to prepare -- neighbor to prepare for an eventual reduction. if russians were willing to agree. there was -- the politic of the issue change. it's a form in military terms is more relevant. it's not the existing arrangement today, we should ask seriously why not. second, i'm glad that madelyn is

the chair of the hlg. i'm sure it's a very important instrument at the kind of -- i was always pleased that level was called the working level. [laughter] implied there are other kinds level of the alliance. the nato planning group; however, which was very important at one point. at least in my experience it was late in the meeting. everybody wanted lunch or europeans a cigarette. the briefing went up. it was warmly received as a sign of how much the americans were consulting the europeans. i think one of the things which ought to be done to educate at least the nato community about some of the realities of nuclear weapons is to revive and make more serious the nuclear planning group. and really to involve

europeans. let's hope we'll stop lecturing the europeans about how lazy their security is. you can't tell them things you can get out of the newspapers. much more openness about some of the realities of nuclear weapons. i think the core issue for nuclear -- it's up understood and broadly understood understand the alliance. i'm not sure that despite all the excellent work being done by specialized people that is, in fact, the case. as far as linking nato's nuclear forces to conventional forces. i'm not sure i understand the question. but one of the real divisions within the alliance on nuclear policy is do we regard them as almost if not exclusively almost

exclusively if not exclusively for the deterrence of nuclear attack. is there some connection to conventional forces. i have to say inspite of the problems about declining capabilities, it is hard for my to imagine a situation? which nato as a whole would no have the conventional capability that deal with any circumstance would arise for article 5 deference and therefore the question of using nuclear weapons in the response of conventional aggression. if you torp make a formal --

-- those nuclear weapons. what are the contingency regarding conventional threat. how do you link them to nuclear deterrence and the deternes of these new threats we discussed earlier this morning and this afternoon? >> i find myself on an uncomfortable position in that i so strongly agree withive vow and maaed lynn. i'm having a hard time coming up with a good argument of why they are wrong. [laughter] the one thing i would point out, and we don't need to get no to russia bashing here. but it is very clear in the

correct the russians are far ahead of us in the compliance. and so while we're saying we're not going to do something without consultation, et. cetera. russians are far ahead of us in compliance with the current treaties. it i had invested in the united states. i want to make that, you know, known. the question from this morning of should we rename deterrence? there a lot of terms that have baggage in the definition definitional genre that leave us having a difficult conversation and talking past each other. extended deternes, deterrence, strategic. all of these have with them a

set of meetings that you immediately -- and the question is in the reality the world we live in. i know we want to kind of like all normal humans live in denial to some extent. what is really being said in the u.s. and in nato and europe and other places in the world it's not matched up. we can't afford, as the united states, the standing army that we currently have to keep them standing forever. we have to come to an understanding collectively about what thes aspirations are and what they are realizable.

and that's been a difficult discussion. there's another piece here that from a conventional stand point we in the united have been a global power forward-based, forward operating. more and more countries mostly all countries do not want large american armies on their soil. that is a reality. the cost to have those forces replaced in the world on mobile platform is unaffordable. we have a disqengt in aspiration and in the reality of the resources that we have. that is just, you know, we can live in denial of that. but we're also living in the reality of it day-to-day. when you look at the redubs and forces going on. the good news if you go back to the world wars note nato but europe, we fought those as armies. we put together armies and we fought against our foes.

if you come forward to the cold war, we fought as divisions. that's how we fought about the cold war. that's how we constructed forces, et. cetera. you come forward to the current conflict. we are fighting them as brigade. the mobility, the capabilities of the forces today are substantially better than they have been in the past. ..