the response from local authorities undoubtably saves lives, the government has for unobstructed minutes at a time like this and that's a long time. with 150 rounds, that's a long time. it's extraordinary that more lives were not taken and we thank god that do not have been that day. .. havoc. several questions coming to mind. our emergency response times at airports adequate? does tsa have appropriate plans and means to community with law enforcement in the event a checkpoint is evacuated? lax did exercise, and i commend

john pistole, just weeks before this event. i am pleased that the tsa is undertaking a review to see what lessons to be learned from lac and i look forward to the results. i encourage them to bring in stakeholders. they have a significant role to play. and in addition to the hearing is an opportunity to also exam some of the findings in gao's report on screening passengers by technique program. referred to as spot. i had the opportunity of observing this on 9-11. i am a fan of the program. i have seen it work firsthand.

i have been a strong advocate of this. but the studies have shown less than favorable and show they limit the funding until an accurate study is included and use behavioral indicators to identify behavior. it will be three years before we can begin measuring the effecti effectiveness of spot. i look forward to hearing the argument and the argument that spot is risk-based. i think that is a good premise. i would like to hear the explanation used to support this. i am disappointed with the findings because i believe there is value in associating the behavior. there are century old techniques

including israel. many people point to israel as a model. that allows individuals to assess behavior. but if this program isn't working we need to find something that will more effectively. i am concerned that the tsa will continue to so-call spin wits wheels with this program instead of developing a more effective approach. i hope i am wrong on that. i look forward to discussing the recommendations for this program and also if there are better ways of integrating behavior analysis. perhaps by reinforcing law enforcement and other pre approaches. where we need to do all we can to protect.

>> and to close by again to jump so i admire what you are doing. it isn't easy representing n agency that comes under scrutiny and i think you are doing a good job making that face a better face and more passenger-friendly and targeted toward the terrorist. i don't believe as some say -- i got asked if i favor scrapping the program and i don't. i think detecting behavior is important. but i believe it could be more effective and efficient for the taxpayer and that is what we are here to do. thank you for induend indulging.

>> mr. thompson is no recogniw recognized >> i would like to join my colleagues in expressing sympathy to officer hernandez wife, children, friends and family and all of the employees of the transportation administration. i am joining the chairman and congresswoman waters in introducing a resolution to condemn the shooting at lax. it appears that the majority leaders protocol will not afford for the resolution to be considered on the house floor. to administrative pistole please note and take back to the

workforce that this committee stands with the agency in this trying time. the shooting that took place at lax was a tragic act of violence. all evidence points to a shooter with extreme anti-government views and exclusively targeted tsa employees. these are some of the federal officers for protecting the nation against terrorist attacks. i hope it will result in less rhetoric about deeming transportation officers. and it is my hope that tsa takes a look at how such an incident can be presented and mitigated in the future. i applaud administrator pistole of announcing he is going to conduct a review and for conducting outreach to a wide

variety of people. this review should serve as an opportunity to examine the partn partnership and their programs and policies that affect checkpoint operations. from the shooting at lax we will examine reports issues by the accountability office and the department of homeland security office of inspector general regarding the tsa screening of passengers by observation technique program commonly referred to as spot. goa's report pulls no punches when it comes to this behavior program that cost taxpayers more than $220 million. recommending that congress consider the lack of scientist

evidence when making the funding decisions. the report released in may concluded that tsa couldn't provide evidence of the cost effectiveness of the program. given the limited theres available for transportation security we don't have the luxury of spending hundreds of millions per year on programs for which they can not prove the effectiveness of. since 2007 tsa has spend nearly $1 billion on this program. they admit it will be years before the agency may be able to display the effectiveness of the program. and that means hundreds of million more would need to be spent just to find out whether the program is effective. it is no secret i have been a critic of the spot program since

it inception and expansion prior to be validated. in june i offered an amendment to prohibit tsa from using spot funds. even if i were the most vocal supporter i would not be able to justify after the report that would be examined today. to be clear, i have no doubt the men and women on the front line a are performing liberties

are not a part of the protocol. so you can do behavior detection in countries where civil rights are not part of the protocol. i want to thank each witness appearing before the

subcommittee and i look forward to your testimony and response to toe to questions. and i would like to thank the others on the side to give their opinion. >> opening statements maybe considered for the railroad -- record -- mr. duncan would like to open up for the record. we are pleased to have a panel and the witnesses full written statement appear in the hearing record. john pistole is the first witness. he is administrator at the department of homeland security

since 2010. he oversees 60,000 employees and 450 airports and security for highways, ports, mass transit systems. you have a big job and i commend you for the job you are doing. the chair recognizes mr. pistole to testify. >> thank you the members of the committee. let me start off by expressing by deep appreciation to you chairman and others who have expressed sympathy for hernandez and his family and the two other officers who were shot and wounded on november 1st. there was great outpouring at the memorial service held by the city of los angeles and the

local police. law enforcement community pulling together and demonstr e demonstrating support for officer hernandez family and the two other officers and family. so thank you for that. the bottom line is these are challenging time for members of tsa employees especially those that lax who have been affected by this and lost a wellli-liked and well-respected colleague. i want to commend the action of those at the checkpoint for their action in helping move passenger away from the point of danger. the two officers who were injured were wounded because they probably stayed too long helping an elderly gentlemen

away from the checkpoint and they were shot as the shooter went to the upper level. the question is what is the response to the trammigic incid. i will outline five things we have done. during the shooting i convened a crisis action team by senior leadership at tsa to assess what was going on even during the lockdown after the shooting. and challenged the senior leadership team come up with what can be done to protect the officers at the checkpoints around the koucountry. we worked to deploy uniform officers in and around

checkpoints in the hours and following that's. that is continuing. third we redeployed a number of viper teams for that response to and just the notion of having additional security officers protected with this show of force. we have communicated with the workforce regarding the events because the absence of information is a concern. and we have listened to their concerns particularly at lax where i have visited twice in the last ten days to hear concerns and provide counselors who hundreds of tsa have used the services. and fifth last thursday there was a meeting with stakeholders from the aviation sector and law

enforcement agencies and representatives from 30 agencies to listen and hear their views on what may happen or be some of the solutions as we look forward. that review is ongoing and i look forward to updating the committee and getting input on possible steps we can take. second, the other issue we are here for today is on the behavioral detection program, spot as it is referred to. over the last several years both from this subcommittee, full committee and american people, there has been call for tsa to use common sense in doing things and being less invasive. fewer pat downs and imaging machines. and we have done hose things and that is what risked-base security is about. 15 steps including the

pre-check. a known crew member for pilots. and expanding the partnership to allow dod members to go through expedited screenings. these are to bring common sense and less invasiveness in the program. and management inclusion and our behavioral detection officers serve a key function and for example on monday this week we had 80,000 passenger around the country go to expedited screening because of the behaviors not observing anything suspigs -- suspicious -- we have increased our gel goal and met

it. they have done several studies on the program and the 2010 review was very helpful to us. it was helpful so we can take the strength to the program. we recognize the work they have done. we disagree with conclusions but recognize the valid points. we can and will strengthen the program. this initiative is the one that looks at intent and motivation rather than a prohibited item. that is important to look at that. so defunding the program isn't the answer. and i would say if we did that i would envision viewer passenger going through expedited screening, increased pat downs

and more complaints by the public. >> thank you, administrator pisole. >> daniel gerstein gained experience experience in sectors while serving in positions of civilian government. before joining dhs he served in the office of the secretary of defense. i am disappointed you failed to comply with the committee rules for not submitting a written testimony for the letter. i believe it is the first appearance as acting secretary for snt. i am willing to wave this requirement rather than barring you from giving oral presentation but please note we

are making an exception and failure to submit impedes the oversight and prevents our audibili ability to prepare. so i ask for you to cooperate in the future. but at this point the chair does recognize you to testify, sur. >> thank you, mr. chairman. sorry for that. good morning members of the committee. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you with administrator pistole to discuss the collaboration. this collaboration occurs across the broad range of programs. all of our efforts are designed to support tsa and their efforts to improve security effecti

effectiveness and passenger experience. i am develop three overarching themes. the spot program is part of a layered security system. it doesn't exist in isolation and must be considered in terms of the contribution to improving the overall detection of people that knowingly try to defeat the security process. relying on any single process isn't an acceptable strategy. this layered program consist of several opportunities. behavioral detection officers check for threatening materials and carry items and check bags are screened as well before allowed. there are unpredictable protocol

on planes to identify and mitigate threats. the focus is to increase the probability of a person trying to defeat the security process. second, they are based on research and represent the best practices. they have become accepted based on years of experience in these fields in attempting to identify persons that should receive additional scrutiny. what the spot process does that hasn't been done previous is identify and assess a broad range of characteristics and provide a scoring system. as part of the spot effort in 2009, snt initiated a research

program and they contact traed ari one of the largest non-profit organizations that design and assess independent research. the spot identified high risk travelers nine times more often. it is worth noting a number of other governments have developed and deployed behavior detection protocols. i have toured the facilities and received briefings in australia and israel. we recognize the results of the study must be considered in the context of the limitations

described. we believe the sampling and measurement errors that are sited are due to limitations and they are minimal given the large sample and multiple outcomes around important population parameter essence. snt does agree with the primary studies design and recommendations for further research. further more additional research could be conducted to include a more extensive review of the conduct and reliable study and empirical comparison of spot with other screening programs. some of the efforts are ongoing although snt isn't involved in those study efforts. my third and final point is

collaboration between tsa and snt. our relationship has never been stronger. in physical year 2013, rnd supported 19 projects and $108 million. we work with them on examining checkpoint operations to determine how business process refo reform and others can be employed to enhance checkpoints over the next 3-5 year period. it could boost effective ness and boost the experience for the customer. we look forward to work wilderness generation the committee on the program and improving performance of

existing and emerging operations. i thank you for the opportunity to present before you and present oral remarks. >> stephen lord is the managing direct of the team at the government accountable officer. he oversees forensic evidence and abuse. the chairman recognizes you to testify. >> thank you, chairman hudson and others. i am happy to be here to discuss the new report released yesterday. the recent events remind us of the role tsa plays in providing support at the airport. i do agree with mr. pist elpist

that it is important that focus on highest need and potential and focus on screening for bad apples and moving away from screening for prohibited items or objects. the question i am hoping today's hearing can answer is what is the best way to do that. tsa spent $900 million since 07 on the spot report. i would like to highlight things. research supporting the behavior indicators to identify threats. and whether tsa has the data necessary to assess their effeceffec effectiveness of the program. the research doesn't show whether behavior indicators can

be used to identify threats and deception or mal-intent. hundreds of studies so the ability of humans to identify deception based on behaviors is same or roughly especially the same as chance. slightly greater than chance. 54 percent. and dhs's validation study of the program, we view it as an important initial step, had design limitations so you have to be cautious about the findings. the study made 13 recommend azs. the study relied on the database that we found was unreliable for conducting the analysis of

behaviors and outcome. the database only allowed them to enter concern number of behaviors even though you know the behavior detection officers are trained to identify 94 accept -- separate -- indicators. they agree some of the indicators are subjective. we found the passenger referral rate, the rate they are pulled out of line, ranged from 0-26 a month. and the average base was 1.6 per month. so this raised questions about the usefulness of the

indicators. and they have limited information to evaluate the prapra program. they are taking steps to help craft better americmeasures and plan to develop 40 measures and that will help them gain insight and on the performance of individuals and ensure they are consiste consistently playing them. they will need three mere more years to this and in closing it doesn't appear to talk to the behavior indicators to be used in the individuals who might pose a threat to aviation. it is is still in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of

the program it is important to note this started in 2007. usually you validate first and then deploy. and tsa chose to deploy at the same time they were validating. and this is why we recommend they limit future funding until they can show evidence these indicators could be used effectively. the members are worker hard to make it work, but it should be based on sound evidence and not hope and faith alone. this concludes my remarks. >> charles edward is the

inspector general of homeland security. he has over 20 years in experience with the government. the share recognizes mr. edwards to testify. >> good morning members of the subcommittee. thank you for inviting me to testify today. i would like to take a moment to express my sympathy for the tsa officer gerardo hernandez was killed and other officials were wounded one of who is a behavior detection officer. $870 million has been spent on the screening of passenger by observation technique program commonly called spot. it is operating in 176 airports and more than 2,800 behavior

detection officers. they are not started a plan to assess or ensure the program's success. my testimony is addressing the need for improvement in two areas. first measure. ment of the effective ness and training for bdo's. they don't have a plan that will identify goals and missions needed to check performance measure. their purpose is to identify high-risk individuals but they have not given performance measure for the program. instead they collect data, such

as the number of passenger referred, but that doesn't provide measures of effecti effectiveness. they document items and undeclared aliens but this program doesn't do that. additionally our testing showed that data collected wasn't complete or accurate always. tsa hasn't developed a training strategy for the goals of the program. video training isn't consistently provided and there is no process to evaluate video instructors. acknowledging the skills are

parishible they didn't start it until five years after the start of the program. of the 88 eligible we contacted 65 or 74 percent had not received the refresher training. they might be operating at vary levels of proficiency. and there is no program to provide training to instructors to assure they have the knowledge to instruct the classes. in response to the report and recommendations officials have taken numerous steps to addressing these issues. officials have provided verification that measures are being used to collect the data and there is a plan for current

training for video instructors and refresher training for the video workforce. and the ones that have completed the video plan that contains tools designed to help the program office gauge selection, allocation and performance. without the spot plan that contains appropriate measures tsa cannot evaluate the performance of the program to ensure that passenger at the airport are screened in an objective manner are showed it is cost effective and justifies the expansion. >> thank you, mr. edwards. we appreciate you being here. i recognize myself for five question to ask questions.

administrat administrator pistole i was pleased to learn that tsa trained for an active shooter situation recently and that helped the response to the actually shooting situation that led to saving lives. they knew what to do exactly and certainly saved lives as a result. as chairman mccall indicated the communication between the police and tsa when shots were fired broke down and could have been connected better. do you agree communication is one area you need to review? >> yes. >> thank you. during the time of the shooting at lax were there any bdo's in terminal 3 when the shooting took place? did they witness the behavior of the shooter before the incident took place? >> they were deployed in terminal 3. the area the shooting took place

was on a lower level before the actual checkpoint so the initial officer hernandez that the shooter encountered that was seconds after the shooter entered the terminal so there are none there at that level. but they are stations and one was up there after the shooting took place. >> can you explain the protocol they follow when they refer to local enforcement? >> they work in pairs so it isn't isolated. if one makes an observation they confer with their partner to see if that is what they observe. depending on what the behavior is they may engage the passenger themselves most likely to get a sense of that person and who

they are. if it warrants a law enforcement response because it is something that is beyond the norm or if they have been refer today second screening and there is an issue there that is when the law enforcement officers are called in to help with the situation >> are they able to contact local law enforcement through radio communication or how does that take place? >> 450 airports and depending on what the airport is and what the communication apparatus is. they have radios they can call into a command post which is staffed, or a coordination system depending on where you are, that is staffed by tsa employees or airport police if they are onsite.

depends on the airport. a lot do have an officer at the podium check-in. >> and is the local law enforcement required to responds? if so, how quickly are they required to be present to respond to that? >> generally there is about 330 there is a law enforcement reimbursement agreement where we help pay for the cost of the officers to be present in those airports under the security aviation program there is an agreed upon response time and that is typically five minutes. but in smaller ones it might be

10-15. it is typically five minutes and that is an agreement between the tsa and police. >> do you think the response time is efficient? >> that was designed with the idea you may find somebody not causing intent to do harm in the sense of having a gun or prohibited item. gi given a shooting we are evaluating that. and even though the police responded and stopped the target within four minutes. there are dozens of passenger he could have shot and walked past. there are people at his feet and he goes back to shoot officer hernandez the second time passenger are laying on the

floor right by him. so clearly five minutes was too long in this case and that is something we are looking at as part of the review. our time is expired and we recognize mr. richmond for questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

it's difficult to measure whether it consistently honing in on the same behavior will -- in fact, that is why you see a great der ration. we aw anavge of >> we saw an average of 0 to 26 refevers across the screeners. >> and, first of all, thank you for your service. let me ask you, do any of the referrals by our offices result

in the arrests that indicated a terrorist plot or something of that nature? they were for otherl oarch -- ovens. whether it's drug trafficking, money trafficking, being in the country illegally. to my knowledge, just for context, there's not been a single attempted terrorist to enter a u.s. airport, aircraft since 9/11. >> any human trafficking? >> yes. there was an instan, for example, last year in miami where there were two men -- young women and the situation and intercededded in arrest of the two individuals. and then whether rescued that woman from human trafficking or what? at least for the immediate time. >> let me ask you another question. before i ask a question, i want to say thank you for your leadership, and when i talk

about leadership, it's sometimes the leadership is when you go down a path and you realize it's not working. that it may not have been the best decision to reverse it. that's the hard part of leadership. so thank you for your decision with denies and all of those things. my question would be, can you find a place within your agency to better spend $200 plus million a year than on this spot program? >> thank you. i have given that question a lot of thought. given the concerns it's been raised both by gao and the i think. we are smaller agency today than a year ago. i believe that trend will continue primarily through attrition. it's not that we are letting people off. my concern with that is that if we remove one whole layer of

security, that being the who are the least invasive and looking for intent rather than item. it gives us an exposure to potential terrorists that we don't currently have. the risk reward equation is difficult at gao and ig have pointed out given my experience in law enforcement and national security, i know how it works, and so i'm a strong advocate because i don't want to take away a security that may identify the next punitive terrorists who may decide they want to get to an airport in the u.s. to do something bad. >> well, i would love to have at least a statement or analysis on our return of investment on the $200 plus million. let me just say this, in my final few minutes. because -- few seconds. because i know that we've made a lot of statements about the

incident at la x and you and i talked on the phone. when we talk about response time and when we talk about what could have been done to do things circhtly -- differently and prevent loss of life. i think the other side, my colleague on the other side, all the time remind us we can't be everything to everybody. we don't have the money to pay for it. it's unfortune this happened at the check point. it happened within the airport. but if we just take a moment to think if it happened in the parking garage, we wouldn't be there. if it happened curb side, we may be there. so at some point, we have to thank the people that put their lives on the line and do it knowing they're putting their lives on the line. but also, that we just don't have the capability, and we don't have the resources to make

sure we're on every street corner, every parking garage, and every place else. with that in mind, thank you for being very thoughtful and meth call where we place people. there are lessons to be learned from this incident and communications and all the things we need to do better. but we have to look at other things besides what happens when somebody is holding a gun to prevent them from having it in the first place or that rage to to do things. thank you for what you do. it's not a shot at my colleagues on the other side. but, we as society, have to work more on the underlying factors. because we just can't be everywhere. thank you. >> i thank the gentleman. the chair recognizes the averaging minority member from the full committee from mississippi, mr. thompson, for any questions he may have. >> thank you very much. administrator, can tso and la x

communicate with the los angeles police department? -- and airport by radio? >> yes. >> so there is communication? >> yes. >> i want to -- at some point, provide you information that says that is not the case. and i want to make sure that we are on the same wavelength for that. by communicate -- i talk about radio not telephone, not panic button. >> yes. >> but radio. >> yes. let me go through the court nation center for tsa with the police as pot-friendly -- a opposed to an officer around the corner they direct contact to. maybe we can clarify that.

do tso have radio? >> the macker, yes. was there a supervisor or manager on duty? >> yes. >> did the supervisor or manager call on the radio? >> no. the supervisor picked up the dedicated line as lirmly red phone to call in, and as they were getting ready to speak. in watching the video she drops the phone and runs because the shooter is coming up the escalator having fired additional rounds and so she didn't stay. >> the radio was not -- >> no. >> okay. doctor, this validation report -- you referenced. are you comfortable with the result of that contract --

>> we looked at the validation of study. we believe the findings are nine times greater the detection is important. when i say nine time it is means 900% better. that is an important statistic. >> you standby the validation report? was your analysis -- >> unfortunately i'll have to respectfully disagree. and the fact, i think it's important to look at the report itself. it was couched as an initial first step that made several recommendations going forward to improve validity, reliability, and the technical advisory committee report that was associated with it raised some similar concerns. it was useful. we provided some insight.

we don't think it should be used to -- if i can give an example. the indicators even though we had concerns about the reliability of the data. but replicated the results. we found some negative associations. it means they are honing on some more behavior associated with low-risk passengers. we were concerned that was included in the report. so it appeared they perhaps were highlighting the positive and not accentuating the negative. >> in essence, as you said, you disagree with this report? >> yeah. i don't think it can be used to conclude. it's nines more effective than random. >> mr. edwards, can you speak about how training and evaluation of b -- o is

important, and i have a concern that we have a number of people who are bdo who never made a single refeferl. i would assume they are considered successful employees. can you explain how people don't do referrals or anything for the committee? >> well, thank you, sir. they have taken a number of steps including collective reliable data. -- five years after the program came in to existence, you know, they started it. and out of the folks that we had interviewed, you know, out of the 88 people that we interviewed. a number of them are 713 out of the 2800 were ready for the training in two years. and the other problem is, this training held in a classroom and

the bdo are not able to practice what they learn in class until they come back to the airport. and not having this consistent training az cro the board -- not everybody is referring what they need to refer. because the varying level of training one has gotten and not gotten. >> thank you. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. comp thompson. the chairman recognize other members for the committee they may wish to ask the witness in accordance with the committee rule and practice. at this time, the chair will recognize the gentlelady from indiana for any questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for holding this hearing in such a timely way. i want to just speak to administrator pete and offer my condolences to your officer and to those who were injured and to

the entire work force. and i applaud the fact you reminded us since nieflt we haven't had an incident -- a terrorist incident at an airport or on any of our aircraft in large part not there haven't been attempts occasionally on-air craft. but tsa has been doing what it was founded to do. i was u.s. attorney at the time, tsa was started. and i want to talk with you and a couple of panelists about behavior detection, which is the heart of law enforcement. whether you're a local law enforcement officer, or whether you are -- had which is tsa is about. is it not about behavior detection. whether they are coming through check point, whether they are informing airport police officers. and with your fbi background prior to tsa, can you talk a bit

more about behavior detection and its importance not only for bdo but what are the tsa officer and the supervisorrers, you know, if we were to -- it's i believe it's hard to study because i believe it's something -- the heart of what these officers and are trained to do. and, you know, -- but yet how officers learn over time. and based on the time they are there, can you just talk about behavior dpe -- detections specifically in law enforcement and in the role of tsa which are not specifically law enforcement. >> thank you, congresswoman brooks. and thank you your kind words.. sure. some is frankly common sense that it's just human nature.

what people do every day and assaying others. i ask given a number of about dote. just the notion that we have taken that basic training, looked at what the israelis did continue to do in term of their assessment of people through behavioral detection officers and say how with we apply it in the airport environment and trained, again within our budget to say here's is what we do to equip our officers on those frontlines for making that

noninvasive, nonintrusive assessment that can either help identify somebody who may be high-risk such as human traffickers. not that they're terrorists. but what we're doing now under risk-based security is making the other side of the equation -- identifying low-risk individuals. so where i mentioned earlier 80,000 passengers on monday alone went through expedited screening that's because behavior detection officers did not detect suspicious behavior. how do you quantify that? a return on investment. you ask the people i appreciate the bdo making a judgment about me. but i got through expedited. basically tsa precheck. it's one of the things and didn't have a chance to address that. because that is a new -- that's an evolution of our -- different manifestation. it really is one of those key enablers for us as we trants suggestion from one size fits all to and how can we employ all

the tools available for so the concern is if you think of a measure web or something why will we take one of those layers of security off wouldn't it allow possible terrorists to get through if they have either an underwear bomb or, you know, there's been dozen in the past about surgically u implanted devices that technology probably won't pick up. we rely on the bdo to make assessment about people who may manifest on suspicious behavior. utilize involved in assistanting those agencies with developing their behavior detection tools and techniques? >> we have a number of ongoing initiatives with both it and primarily custom and border. none of them, to any knowledge,

are directly related to the behavioral -- we are -- we go where we're asked by our partners and so it's that is an area we want to get in. we assist with that. >> time expired. and the entire community and to thank the law enforcement community of that area for the most passionate and dignified tribute to him. and enormously heart warming to see the law enforcement community both at the airport

and the surrounding area come together. i hope it concludes any comment that tso are not first responder or dealing with the security of the nation and put to rest the qualified privatization as a substitute for a professional federal work force. so let me thank you again for that. hopefully it was a productive meeting and you continue to do so vigorously. i am toward the continental airport and secret police and other law enforcement walking through our airport after this tragic incident and looking at the tsa areas security areas and

at least for our terminal there. we'll continue the dialogue with them. one of the issues that is important to the chairman is the idea or concept of reimbursement for added security in the perimeter area. as a frequent traveler, i view the perimeter area in meeting the external and ticketing areas as a concern leading up to the secured area where our tso are. my question to you is, what proposition could you put before with respect to funding on reimbursement to both law enforcement or enhanced security that many of the tso --

all of them -- have a chance to speak to have suggested should occur? >> well, thank you, first, congresswoman, for your gesture of condolence and your call for appreciate that and pass that on, obviously, to mrs. hernandez. what you address is one of the things the working group we establish internally and in discussing with the aviation security advisory counsel and the broader community what would those cost look like. i don't have it right now. if we, for example, reduce the response time from five minutes to three minutes. or how much additional it would cost? how much should be born by the federal government in term of leo reimbursement agreement. and how much would be worn by the local airport.

how can we buy down the risk? and part of the discussion we had last week armed officers at and through check point that may be doing other things. there's a number of things i have to get back with you on that. >> let me make formal request the inquiry be made. but put in place. it's no doubt that the presence and the quicker response of armed law enforcement is part of the solution. certainly the slowings is not armed tso officers in the small area they have to deal with innocent traveling passengers. let me quickly ask gao did you detect any racial profiling in the work of the bdo? and -- improve it? are you suggesting there should

be other improvement and are you also suggesting that the program should be slimmed down? i think he makes a point onleyering. but i would be aplayed and in great opposition if there was racial profiling. i think one of the issue of the bdo the overall impact is not immediately detectable because it is sort of a floating -- floating issue, if you will. of whether or not there's safety. so could you answer that? then the enhanced training, would that have an improvement -- i would be willing to look at enhanced training, slimming down the program to get where gao thinks it needs to be to be able to have it as a complimentary layering of security at airports . >> happen to let her answer that. even though her time is expired. >> i thank the chair for the generosity.

the allegations involving boston and found in the study there was no evidence racial profiling. they believed they interviewed all the behavior detection officers on site. although, they did note, which was is one interesting thing, they did note that some cases there was what they termed appearance profiling. i'm not sure to what extent that overlaps with racial profiling or define it. it was one notable finding, perhaps, mr. edwards can respond. in term of limiting funding and our recommendation. we obviously, as i said in my opening remarking, i believe there is value and focusing resources on screening for potential bad actor at the airport for behavioral detection technique. the question is how do you go about it? and i think as part of the review a spot we believe is very complicated scoring process. we believe it could be

streamlined, simplified, perhaps focus more on passengers deemed high-risk. some passengers come to the airport are already preselectived for secondary screening and the tsa is developing on the new risk methodologies to supplement them. perhaps it might be a way to do it rather than trying to do it on the has standoff surveillance basis which is very difficult. as a report notes each passenger on average is screened for 30 second or less. that's difficult to do that to every single person coming in to the airport without interacting with them. so we think there is a way to make it more interactive. more risk-based and more simplified and that's essentially what we're referring to in our report. thank you. >> i thank the gentleman and the gentlelady for the question. the chair recognize the gentleman from south carolina for any questions you may have. >> yes, sir.

i appreciate the testimony of each of you. gordon, the retired general, wrote a book a long time entitled "hope was not -- it seems to me when i look at the fundamental of the spot program it seems to be a cart out before the horse. indeed you have it before validation of effectivenesses. and the whole idea of spending a billion dollar and having 3,000 folks employed in the endeavor from a statistical standpoint the results are 50/50 seem to be a good use of taxpayer money. but i want to zero in on what my associate was touching on a moment ago. thing is a real with the component to what is going on here. i tell my boys all the time, guys, have the wisdom to know what you don't know. and mr. ridgeman was touching on

the notion of how do you get inside somebody's head. a moment ago. indicate stress, fear, or deception. i would ask you, mr. pistol, you know, if you were a young kid the baby got off the track at the earlier age you served some time. but you paid your price to society. but you have a criminal record. would you believe you exhibit stress or fear? >> it depends on the individual, yes, sir, probablily. >> what if you were a staunch right-wing spiritter with strong anti-government leaning. you forecast things you probably weren't supposed to post on the internet. now you have law enforcement probing asking you questions. would you exhibit stress or fear? >> again, it depend on the

individual. potentially, sure. >> if you're an immigrant whose dad and mom come here illegally. would you exhibit stress or fear if asking -- >> it's situational, again. >> say you're a wife whose husband has been beaten and try to get on an airplane and get out of town. would you exhibit stress or fear if somebody was doing entire gracious? >> situational. >> i think raises question that the report has broughten and testified, which is again, entirely situation but the question is. in this instance, the different with a front line officer who is there on the street you fowm a car you don't know what they got in the car. you don't know who they are. you have to nothing to -- you better be give those are the

tests that have been made with regard to, you know, this person is, do you, in addition, have to go through a screening process based on somebody's interpretation of what they think might be inside your brain? >> yeah. i mean, you raise good point, congressman. let me address a couple of things. i would love to have the -- in the airport and christmas day in 2009 to see how the 24-year-old with the underwear bomb would have appeared. we don't have it on cc tv. and most notably. >> what if it was a cool customer and -- that is exactly. you wouldn't know. and that's -- but it gives us another opportunity. there's no perfect size or article -- >> to your point how many underwear bombs have been detected with these 3,000 officers? >> store row. -- zero.

they deserved as a deterrent. i know, we have classified briefing next week we can talk detail. what we do in the u.s. >> we have to look at cost-effectiveness. we have screened by observation over 4 billion passenger it comes out to less than 50. in some sense 25 cent per passenger is a cost for bdo is reserved. >> my time is coming to an end. and i think we can could argue that point. i think there is a bigger civil liberty point, which is whether there has ore hasn't been deterrence. a flip of a coin. on the opposite side of the

equation in addition to possible redeployment of the 3,000 folks and the taxpayer costs associated with that. there's a big civil liberty question to get on an airport. does it require more than in essence undressing and having all of your equipment checked but now a second level of screening based on somebody's interpretation of what they think ised in your head? >> gentleman's time is expired. it you want to briefly respond. >> thank you, chairman. so there's only a small percentage of people who are referred by additional screening. that's one point. another is that the whole impetus of the risk-based security. dod, 12 and under. all of those are designed to address the concerns about the invasiveness and intrusiveness of the one-size-fit-all-approach. how can we work collaboratively to have multiple layer of security and expedite and have greater confidence. the notion about profiling.

i agree strongly with the ranking men. we will not tolerate if we find any person or employee profiling or race, ethnicity. or any of the things will take appropriate action. >> i have run out of time. i think he raise the question of type of profiling that does occur. and the guy in the business suit generally isn't going to be the most suspicious looking guy. >> we'll do a second round of questions. but i would like to move on to other members. at this point i recognize the gentleman from nevada. >> thank you very much, chairman. and to the ranking member, mr. richmond. the ranking member of the full committee. for alog me to participate in this hearing today. thank you to our panelist. i just want to associate my self-with the comments of the ranking members and the other panelists who talked about the need to both protect our national security while preserving americans' right to

privates in our civil liberty. and the prior representative who asked you know what is the return on investment for a billion dollars and to somehow suggest from the gao report there is not profiling. i think it deserves some more analysis. and review. administrator, i also want to extend my personal condolences to the tsa officer, mr. hernandez, and to his family for giving his life in the protection of the american public. the tsa form the front line of our nation's aviation, security and their work is not only critical but also appreciated. and i think in light of the recent tragic events at the los

angeles airport, airport security is once again in the -- and based on the review that we've received on your agency conducted. it's my understanding the shooter entered through the exit lane of that airport. and so i'm concerned that the actions and policies adopt bid the tsa may have some unintended consequences particularly because they are being made without the input of stakeholders who may have particular expertise on the topic. i recently offered an amendment to ranking member thompson participates act which will form the aviation security advisory committee and my amendment out of the issue of exit lane security to the scope of the advisory committee's responsibility. and this was done prior to the tragic events at the los angeles

airport. so administrator, isn't it true your plan to transfer responsibility of exit lane from the tsa to local airport authorities has been met with near universal resist tens from local airports? >> first, congressman, thank you for your kind word earlier. so the context for the exit lane are that airport current flit u.s. provide exit lane staffing in two-thirds of all the airports in the u.s. or tsa has presence. we're only talking about one-third of the airport. there's 155 approximately u airport that tsa provides some type of staffing. we do it as it relates to screening of law enforcement officer, no crewmembers, pilots, flight attendant. we'll do the screening function. the issue with the exit lanes is on access control which access control is just the exit lane is

one of dozens of access control point around the airport that tsa doesn't provide an airport functioning. in shifting this responsibility, i understand the concerns that airports have expressed because of the cost associated with this. on the security screening functions as opposed to access control. >> yeah. and i respect that. however, it can't be done in a vacuum. we have to do it with the input of your stakeholders and congress, which signed legislation putting the responsibility under the tsa. we haven't changed that from policy standpoint and to have the tsa take this up without direction from congress i also think may be inappropriate from a regulatory standpoint.

one of the other issues i have with the tsa procurement procedure for vendor and airport. they assume tremendous risk when they begin the process of adopting new technologies the airport closest to my district recently won approval for tsa for tk solution to the problem of exit lane monitoring for which i'm very excited. but my question is how does tsa expect airports to take the risk of designing, purchasing, and installing these technologies within the time frame presented and without tsa preapriewfl of that technology. >> gentleman's time is expired. ly allow the administrator to respond, if he would like. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we're not dictating how they do the exit lane security. if they want to staff somebody. put a person there as tsa has. that's fine. we ask the airport authority to

work with the local security directer to have the solution. from a technology solution. that's great. we ask we be given insight to what it is. we will view and presumably approve if it meets standards. but we're not in the business of dictating saying this is what we will do. we are out of the business. >> can i just -- clarify. can you approve and preapproved qualified vendor list. so once they are selected they know that the project can go through u -- >> we have not taken that approach for various reasons. which i can get in more detail later. we have not done that. >> we will do a second round if the committee so chooses or desires. now recognize the gentleman from california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and welcome to our witnesses and administrator, i first want to thank you for engaging with me

and members on this committee during the knives on planes discussion. i appreciate you working with the asac on that and continuing to engage with me. i appreciate the policy revisions that were made. i also want to express to you administrator, how deeply sorry i am about the shooting at la x. i want to pass along my donl enses to the family -- i am to the son of a police officer and the brother of a retired -- son of retired police officer and brother of a police officer who serves today on a wish well the transportation security officers who were shot. expwreams and tony as well as passenger -- and as far as the federal workers go. the tao in the federal work force -- security officers they are some of the newest employees we have

in our federal agencies. and, you know, they have been around now since right after 9/11. i think it's easy to forget they are relatively new compared to how many federal employees we have. and still learning their job and growing in their job. we shouldn't take that for granted. they are among the last line of defense between a person who wishes to coharm and passengers and crew on an airport. and many ways mr. hernandez and others are shocked her res but not too often on some. unfortunately i think too many people and i have seen this in this congress continually attack and denigrate the work at the tsa. recently in 2012, the republican national republican committee platform called for federalizing -- or defederallizing the tsa and privatizing the tsa.

i think we need take a step back in our comments about the tsa and just a tax in general on the federal work force. these folks are doing a public service. they're doing oftentimes at much less money than they received in the private sector. again, they are the last line of defense. and i don't think our comments are well served. ic they can create a culture of hate toward people working in a stressful environment dealing with passengers. myself included not always on our best behavior as we are rushed trying to make our plane. it's a difficult job. and i hope we can be mindful of the job. and in light of that, the administrator, i want to talk about ranking member thompson have some concerns with his questioning about radio communication capability between tso and law enforcement personnel particularly armed law enforcement.

my question to clarify at la x and most of the airports across the country, is there radio communication can that can take place between tso and law enforcement personnel is it only phone communication that can take place? >> yes. thank you for your kind comments, congressman. so airport by airport. out of 450 airport. i don't have the figure in front of me. which i will get. most of the communication would be with between the tsa employees and a coordination center which may be jointly staffed and which airport between tsa and the airport police or tsa or the coordination center. i'm not aware of ones where the direct link in to a radio contact in to the police, but i'm sure there's some i'm not aware of. >> do you think that could have helped with what happened to la x and future scenario you could

in-- envision or train. do you think it would be better if we had it where the police and tsa were on the same channel. >> as aware at you were at la x and called 9-1-1. it doesn't go to the -- >> right. >> so that goes elsewhere. you have to dial 7-9-1-1 to get to the airport police. there's some quirks in there that go beyond tsa and law enforcement. it comes down airport by airport. >> okay. thank you. and also, as far as behavioral -- behavior detection. what have you learned from what happened at lax and, you know, the behavior detection officers. is there anything that they could have detected? i know you're still investigating. but, you know, clearly this was a situation that happened and unfolded rapidly and behavior detection officer was one of the

officers that was shot is it something you believe under priefm circumstance that behavior detection team scrolled detected their person earlier? >> the time is expired. i'll let the witness to answer. >> thank you. possibly given the configuration at lax with the document checker on the lower level and layers up to where the check point is. there are two tsa employees there. and so there are no bdo that observe with the shooter, again, from the time dropped off to the curb to the time he walked literally. i walked walked in tuesday walked a few steps and took out assault rifle and opened fire. it's adjust matter of second. it's possible that a bdo obviously would have seen something. you actually see on the video an airport employee pointing at the gunman. you don't see the gunman in the video. but you see the person pointing

and then the shots are fired. so somebody could have and somebody did given the con configuration there are no present at the point. >> thank you. i yield back my time. thank you for the extra time. >> the gentleman from new jersey for any questions. >> i first like to acknowledge our donl enses to your organization. and just want to bring that right a few things i'm sure being last i'm possibly going to ask something that is already been asked. but i feel it's important, you know, the gao report released yesterday cite an incident where

bdo manager and north liberty international airport, which is my home -- regarding profiling of passengers and made racial comments. it's my understanding that bdo has been fired. it's also been brought to my attention that the bdo have been promoted based on the number of referral they have made, which have encouraged bdo to racially profile to increase their referral rate. so what degree of confidence do you have that other bdo managers are encouraging or directing racial profiling through the spot program? >> thank you, congressman. so our clear instruction -- one of the lessons learned from these multiple review that have been done we could have done a better job inerm it of training and retraining and ensuring that there's no notion of profiling

taking place. in fact, it's part of our retraining we have done since the report have been done is to require every to take a pledge against profiling. which i have chair with the subcommittee. to ensure every bdo and those out on extended leave or something have taken that pledge to ensure they understand that it has no place in bdo's work. it's not good law enforcement. it's not good security work from our perspective. and it's unconstitutional. so anybody who has founded -- the profiling will be investigated and dealt with appropriately. i put the message out clearly. i can talk about the newark situation in detail, if you would like. that being said, any time there's an allegation. that's what happened in boston last year. the allegationses came in to us. i take them very seriously. i asked the inspector general to conduct investigation rather than tsa because this was

national "new york times." they conducted the review and heard from mr. edwards in term of the finding. there was no discrimination found or profiling. we take it very seriously. i know, from my background that it's unacceptable. and so any violation of somebody's civil rights or civil liberty is a significant, significant issue for us. being from a state where my uncle is the author of the racial profiling bill in new jersey, we've had many instances where this problem is just out of proportion. so to sigh this here, it harkins back to issue we have been dealing with in new jersey.

now this at newark airport is troubling. to his point, you know, there needs to maybe be more analysis of whether or not this is going on. what steps has tsa taken to begin collecting racial information on passengers in order to be able to measure quantityively whether racial profiling has occurred. >> thank you. that's been a challenging issue for us. we collected the information does it then promote the actual or appearance of profiling? that's not necessarily passed back to us. so that is part of our challenge. is it the appearance of somebody? of course that's imperfect art of defining somebody. those are some of the challenges

we work for or working through. i'm sensitive to the point you're making. >> yeah. and, you know, the point of bdo being promoted on based on number of referral. >> yes. i went a school with the population was changing and people were resist toant it. they had somebody that worked for the board of education that go to homes to make sure people actually live there had and subsequently i found out years later is that every person prove didn't live there he was paid by so, you know, these referrals kind of harkin to that type of thing. so i'm very concerned about that. >> gentleman's time is expired. >> chairman, may i respond? >> sure. >> from the standpoint i think there's a perception among some bdo. i believe the inspector general found this in the review of

boston that bdo may be promoted more readily if they made higher number of referral. it's not the case but there are perceptions. we have gone back to retrain and clarify it's not the case. so we don't want people referring -- we don't want bdo referring because they think they will be more readily promoted. >> thank you for that answer. at this point. we'll start a second round. i have one question. i'm not taking my entire five minutes. maybe we can get through the round quickly. i appreciate the the indulgence of the witnesses here. my question is for mr. -- in my testimony -- protection programs. in fact i've visited the airport myself and seen firsthand how they implement that program. my question to both of you are or anyone wants to respond is there a body of scientific studies that support effectness of some of these foreign

programs and if so, how can the information be better lerchled and used as we exam what we do here? >> i guess i can start. typically here in the israeli operate as similar system. ic it's important to know there's as many dissimilarity and similarity in the system. first you are allowed racial profile in the system as mr. pistol explained as prohinted under our system. and they also the system is much smaller in scale. and, you know, one major international hub number of aircraft that is less than 100 international fleet. and they essential will take the time and interview ere single passenger getting on an aircraft. we can't do it under the system of 1.8 million passenger a day. the -- screeching to a halt. i think you have to be careful about drawing parallel with the valleys. also in our report we cited another country report.

we're not allowed to disclose the name of the country. it's considered sensitive security information. but the phase one of the study found some error in the use of behavior indicators. but they did another followup study same country same process faced there was no changed the conclusion and concluded there was not really effective use of the resources. so there is other countries studies throughout. i think you have to be careful about citing them as evidence to support to use of behavior tenth annual -- bedetection. i would agree with respect to israel. they rely ton heavily. t a difference in scale. certainly not something we want to engage in here. on the other hand, when i went us central ya. i thought their program was robust. we walked what i call the last 200 meters, if you will, from the time somebody goes through passport and then goes through

and gets the luggage and checks out. they have a robust system. the one thing i did not see in comparing it to ours was the same sort of checklist scoring of the indicators. but but, you know, they rely ton heavily. they think it works. i would like to say that evidence that many indicators we have within the tsa methodologies on spot have been validated through department of defense work, for example, person born ied. and they looked at it and came up in one of the studies that 24 indicators have been identified in tsa overlap with what was in this department of defense sponsor study. and like wise, there was a recent workshop, well, some

reason 2011 with federal local law enforcement the d.o.e. private sector in which they found 32 of the indicators were overlapping. there's work ongoing to try to better understand the questions that surround behavioral science and try to get better tat. and the one thing about the program i think is really interesting is that even most of what we do when we talk screening is based on capabilities. in other words can i x-ray it and determine is there an explosive or do i put somebody to a mag mom territorial-type or the aig machine? spotters is really the premiere program for trying to get at this question of behavioral issues and can you identify people who are in stressful situations and therefore should be brought aside for secondary screening. and i would add that's a low risk outcome. that be secondarily screened.

thank you. >> i appreciate that. >> at this point i recognize the gentleman from california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. administrator, yesterday the committee received a letter from a behavior detection officer -- actually officers at boston's logan airport expressing concerns about retaliation for exposing profiling to followup on the gentleman from new jersey's question. can you assure our committee that employees who come forward and report any wrongdoing suspicious of wrongdoing in the behavior detection program whether it's profiling or otherwise they would be protected against retaliation. >> absolutely. >> great. thank you. >> and i yield back. >> would the gentleman yield? >> i yield to -- if it's okay. the gentleman from nevada. >> without objection. >> thank you. >> i'll defer to the gentlelady -- i just had some additional

questions. but -- >> i'm happy to get to the gentleman in order. the gentlelady is next. i'm happy to recognize you for five minutes. >> that's fine. >> i recognize the gentlelady from texas. >> thank you. i thank the gentleman from nevada for his courtesy. i want to pursue the line of questioning that goes to whether we keep or do not keep the spot program. so let me first go to this issue on the floor that you indicated in your past report -- ly not tholed as the final answer. you saw no racial profiling that we've just heard of concerns from boston. but you saw the idea of attire. i guess what do you mean by that and how is that not effectively racial profiling as someone wearing a head res, someone

reading braids or hair natural. how does that not fall in to the category of profiling? >> thank you, ma'am. look at the logan international airport and part of the investigation he asked he to look in to. and be interviewed and interviewed bdo supervisor being interviewed. some passengers not to go on a fishing expedition but we interviewed some passengers as well. and what we found there was not racial profiling, but in the interviews, some of the bdo allege -- >> right. my question is you found what does if mean and how do we fix that? how do we improve that? i think it's connected. >> so in general terms, appearance profiling, you know,

exhibiting certain type of characteristic that may be different general population. i can comment a nonpublic setting and explain to you my understanding of what this appearance profiling is. just uncomfortable elaborating in the public setting. >> all right. you find any form of discriminate assessment being made by -- >> first of all. we started our review. we coordinate with the ig since they were lookinged at these racial profiling allegations in boston we deferred to them on this issue. but as part of our work we since we started the work. we interviewed 25 behavior detection officers across four airports. 20 of the 25 said that i had not personally witnessed any racial profiling.

that's a small number over 3,000 behavior detection officers. we try to substantiate it looking at dat. how we do our work. and at the time, the tsa didn't have the data system that i would allow us substantiate that. as he noted have a pilot of feasibility study underway. >> thank you. >> think about better ways to do that. >> thank you. let me conclude with you, please. there have been several, i think, point being made at the hearing. would you go back and look at this program, this service as it may be better refined through streamlining through looking at the at risk concept i think you adhere to. through the -- i even looked the idea because of the la x tragedy expanding in the outer area in an area

surrounding the parameter. so as passengers enter might be an appropriate executive fix. are you willing to go back and look at the program constructively? >> yes. congresswoman. that's part of our review. clearly we want to make sure we are deploying bbdo and the highest risk. most return on investment places, time, and situations. so that's clearly what we're doing as part of the bdo program. we look at refining the number of indicators. it is a confusing. how can we streamline to your point. how can we simplify the whole process to get the greatest return on invest glment if i may put a question on the record. thank you for the hearing. i would offer a thought based upon mr. edwards' comment and more poignant questions i would like to ask we have a classified briefing on the bdo pursuant to

or in light of lax and a lot of our concerns about the exdoor your -- when i say exterror your there's people driving up. t one issue. i'm talking about the lead up to the tsa area. the ticketing area people walking up which is where the gentleman. so he had to walk somewhere. and the question was was there some air force other than law enforcement who deals with the activity of violence or activity but someone watching that area? so den, no determinations here. no commitments here prefer not in open setting. but i would like to have the opportunity, if we could, to have that discussion. >> i'm happy to work with you on that. >> thank you. mr. chairman. thank you. thank you very much for your service. thank the gentleman from nevada. >> i will recognize the gentleman from nevada for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like that ask the administrator if he could go ahead and answer the question

about the tsa not being able to have it preapproved venn or it list. what the challenges are to implementing a process. well, we looked in to a qualified product list to say we would recommend or we would accept if you bought these particular pieces of technology from these manufacturing. but we're trying to be open to all -- all venders and providers. it's not like we are preselecting you must go through this. they have contact with an offender who has one solution. lax may have contact with another vendor with a different solution. we try not to be prescriptive in that the regard. we try to be completely open to whatever vendor and solutions they provide. so what we've done is provide a template to say here are some recommended solutions and then if you work within those

parameters just make sure you coordinate with the local federal security director. more likely than not would be approved opposed to say from a qualified product list. here is the exact product so you to use. >>. >> i would like to ask if i can followup with you and someone your office to make sure the process is clear to the local airport. >> sure. >> directors. thank you. also, administrator, in fiscal year 2014, tsa reduced the number of airports for where the spot program operates from 176 airport down to 121. reduction of 55 airports. so that the agency did this despite your own analysis that said you needed to increase the number of behavior detection officers. so first my question are the airports with the spot program has been removed less secure today because they don't have the bdo and if not why not?

>> yeah. it goes back to actually a x ao a 2010 report that recommended we assess our deployment of bdo across the risk landscape. my words. and so under a risk-based security approach. what we have done is look at the 175 and made a judgment that our return on investment in term of being able to see and observe the number ever passengers in the highest airport would be better suited byes be simplifiedest airport around the country. we will observe over 90% of all passengers so we gate better and

sew there is aningment to be made that those airports have less security. but as you know the budget -- i have to make a risk-based decision based on our budget response that's why we with the recommendation. so on that exit lane issue, which i raised earlier with you and your point was you can't afford it. you shift that burden to local airports. local airports have budget constraints too. again, all i would ask is that you not make the decisions in a vacuum. you involve the local stakeholders so they can help you inform how to best maintain security. we can't make the federal budget problems local and state problems -- i was a former state senator before coming to congress, and so shifting the burden down isn't a solution either. so i would just ask that you

don't get their input. can i ask one financial question? maybe mr. edwards -- is there any data of the passengers who have been screened of their race, ethnicity, religious -- any information like that captured? >> yeah, there is some, but it wasn't systemic or sufficient for us to do a good analysis. for example, and make the law remple that ultimately goes to the law enforcement officer. the law enforcement community does -- in some cases keep that deep graphic but variesly airport. it's spotty but there is some data. >> that's something we need to follow up on. it's done more effective willly in law enforcement outside of airport and if we're going to

continue to have these type of profiling strategies we need make sure that it is not disproportionately impacting, you know, based on race, ethnicity. you don't know it unless you select the data. >> they are sensitive to that. they have a project underway to help answer that question. >> i thank the gentleman and the witnesses for their testimony. and the member's questions today. and member of the subcommittee may have additional questions they want to submit in writing. we ask the witnesses you respond to these. without objection, subcommittee stand adjourned.

mr. portman: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from ohio. mr. portman: i think it is great we have the opportunity to come to the ploor to tal floor t what you are constituents are telling us. last night i had a telehall meeting. each meeting we do a poll. every single time it's been jobs and the economy, until last night. last night it was health care. that's because most of the questions i got were about health care coverage and people concerned about losing it. let me read a letter from one of citizens units, and it is indicative of what i am hearing all around the state. this is from dean. he lives in sandusky, ohio. "ever since i lost my job in 2009, i have been purchasing my own health care insurance. last month i received a letter from the mail stating that my plan is being canceled due to the a.c.a. i was told to look at plans on the exchange, which i did, and i found a comparable plan that is

over twice the cost of what i have now. in addition, this is over half of my monthly pension. i simply can't afford this. i've always been a responsible, hardworking, self-dependent person. now due to the actions of our government, for the first time in my life, i have not have any health insurance coverage. i am 59 years old and i need this coverage. i'm outraged to say the least how can our government do this to us? i will remember this come election time. please get rid of this insane law. this is unacceptable." well, to dean and my other constituents, i agree wuvment it is unacceptable. we should repeal the law. it doesn't make sense and then replace it with reforms that actually reduce the cost of health care and keep the promise the president made, which is that people can keep the health care that they have.

mr. coats: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from indiana. mr. coats: mr. president, the president has publicly promised all americans, if you like your plan, you can keep it. if you like jur your doctor, yon keep your doctor. the only chaij chaij a see areg costs. well, senior citizens are not supposed to be affected by this obamacare. she received a letter telling that she and her husband no longer could keep their medicare advantage plan. it was terminated. so they found another plan, much higher cost, much higher premium, much higher deductible. cynthia from la fee yet, indiana, i' i am i am-employed d purchase health care separately. i am a single parent with a child in high school. i was given -- my plan was canceled and i was given an estimate for a replacement plan almost double of what i'm paying

today. mr. president, you have not kept your promises for seniors. you have not kept your promise to single working mothers. you have not kept your promise to families. you've not kept your promise to the people that i represent. how can americans trust that this government takeover will work if you can't keep your promises to the american people? a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from north dakota. h.o.v. in north dakotmr. hoevena we've got a lot of farmers and ranchers. thethey run a small business and they're being hit very hard by obamacare, like other small businesses across this country. a rancher contacted us. his name is wayne, and he ranches there. it is an area where we have a lot of cowboys, a tremendous rodeo. they compete nationally and they have great livestock herds

there. but he writes, and he says, quks i'm not one to get too upset about things but this really has my mad. we go to a letter a few weeks ago that said they were dropping our policy. i i have paid my own insurance for years and years. when i got that letter, it just hit me because somebody in washington decided i was too stupid to figure it out if my policy was right for me or not. i don't pay a lot of attention to politics, but usually what gets decided in washington doesn't slap you in the face like this law has with me," he says. l "i've gone on healthcare.gov and used the estimators they direct you to. i could be going from a $2,500 deductible to something like $10,000 and $12,000 the way it looks to me.

this is going to cost me a lot more for something i don't even want." i'd like to read another short story from a couple in grand forks that got a notice on a marriage penalty that obamacare creates. she writes in "my husband and i met with the primary health insurance carrier in tornlg norh dakota and were told that our current coverage under the guidelines of the affordable care act will cost us at least another $400 a more a month and our deductible will increase from $2,000 to $12,000. and because we're married, we cannot choose individual plans, which would be a lower deductible. in essence, we're being punished for being married. we are looking at paying more than $1,500 a month