preparing for for the future. to get us into this conversation, we have four terrific panelists. barry pavel is the vice president and director of the scope center. barry will update you on the work we have done and laying out a new concept for the alliance. he joined the atlantic council after a long career in the pentagon also having served as a special assistant to the president for defense policy and strategy at the white house. and played a heavy role in strategy issues at the pentagon. to his left is the newest atlantic council senior fellow. welcome. it's a delight to have you with us today. he also holds positions with vice president of the gruch. but he's on this panel discussion because he served not only as diplomatic adviser to president of italy, but as a representative to nato. he's also served diplomatic

service in washington, moscow and the united nations. to his right, the policy director for the norwegian ministry of defense. he served as director general or security policy director for the norwegian defense since 1995 and in that capacity really became known as the father of nato security policy. it's a delight to have you with us. he also served at nato headquarters and is one of the architects of this project that we're working on. and the director here at the atlanta council who will speak about the terms in the cyber realm. he served as a policy director at the white house, as executive director at goldman sachs asia and u.s. air force intelligence officer in the recently published a fierce domain, terrific history of prior conflict in cyberspace. so with that let me come back to you to kick off this discussion given the world that fred laid

out what is the relevance of the meaning of deterrence as we look into the future? >> thank you for the easy questions that you have posed to me and to the norwegian partners that have been wonderful to work with and it is a pleasure to be addressing these critical issues at this critical time. i thought that fred did a fantastic job of summarizing -- not just because he is my job -- but summarizing the essence of the june 5 conference that started this effort sort of where the world is headed in the medium and long-term entities major changes that are underway and a sort of our job is how do we help posture nato to be as ready as possible for the surprises that will come for the contingencies that may be likely and for sort of the deterrence approaches that are reasonable and effective in light of the budget constraints that we all face. the types of issues that we address in particular and one

that i would add is this rights of individual power and look likely focus in asia by the disruptive technologies that are giving individuals and groups i think for the first time the ability to take strategic action in a major way with biotechnology, three d. printing, other technology i think it's clear we are going to have to spend time in the future as planners looking at the individual level of challenges and opportunities as well as the state level which we are much more comfortable dealing with whatever institutions including nato. so, i will start my suggestions for the new deterrence approaches with sort of two contradictory principles. one is waiting for deterrence, the first question is always for me to food to do what.

what deters one leader that one action may be different because acting in a different context and from taking a different type of action. but the second principle is we are terrible at predicting future threats and contingenci contingencies. time antime and again we get sud and we can go through the long list and i'm sure most of you know it s it's so it's hard to specify with precision what military contingency will be the next one i'm sure in december of 2010 if someone said that they would be operating in the air campaign they would have been sent to an asylum and that is what happened in the following year as you know over libya they create some publications and it's important to think after 2014 what could nato priority

missions be. but what should really be the focus area and i want to pose three as suggested and would love to hear from you in the discussions. in no particular order nato is going to have to engage in some form or fashion or the greater middle east. this is an area that is going to be unstable for generations to come. and i don't think that we can have the entire year underside of eurasia in turmoil. this will be a priority, perhaps the top priority whether we wish it to be or not. heading to asia would be wonderful. don't think the middle east is going to accommodate so i think there are potential roles i will get into in a little bit on a steady basis for nato or nato members and certainly also in the crisis which i think unfortunately will demand nato's

attention. second, i think that russia looms at least as importantly and i think here nato has to think about the hedge against russian futures and the russian future that i worry most about is the declining russia and this is in part due to the shale gas revolution which is dropping the price of energy which i think evanescence is going to bankrupt the state business model and there are daunting demographic factors that are going to i think really create some new challenges for russia. and i worry about a russian leader trying to distract a very unhappy domestic population by launching some sort of a coercion or aggression in the area. that's the sort of russia but i worry about and there are things that can be detoured in those scenarios. third, he perhaps for the third mission is preparing for the unexpected. this one is tough.

this is the one that is most likely as we've proven. and so i think what this means is that we need to take a portfolio approach. i will go through each of these through the specific deterrence issues that i think are important. it's due to political constraints for the nato planning for contingencies in the middle east but we know that threats from this region can directly affect some member nations such as turkey and we know that potentially broader challenges loom despite president rouhani's term offensive and i do think it is an important opportunity for our negotiations with iran. those negotiations may ultimately not bear fruit as happened with north korea in the 1990s north korea now has roughly a dozen nuclear weapons and we cannot rule that out although it would be a really

very, very challenging and consequential future we cannot rule that out. if that happens we heard saudi arabia may acquire a nuclear weapon and this is a major equilibrium right next-door to the alliance that the need to members would have to be attended to. we also can't rule out an unstable pakistan which would have very significant implications and getting a hold of the dangerous weapons and using them in ways that it would be very dangerous for us. those are a couple jobs in the middle east. in terms of russia i think we also have some constraints on our deterrence and certainly the russian challenges felt much more by northern members in nato and by others in the alliance including the united states government which i would state rather clearly places russia as a defense problem in a pretty low level of priority challenges

may come in more sophisticated forms then we saw during the call for. we talk about energy coercion and cyber which we will hear about and covert operations into the arctic contingencies about soft things of russia in the baltic nations. so i think that these are questions that we should parse through. the type of security issues and then in terms of sort of preparing for the unexpected, there are other obvious difficulties in this area but here we take a portfolio approach. asia is very large. this is where the defense budgets across asia are rising very rapidly and we can talk about some statistics but

there's also challenges associated with nonstate actors. as i said come individuals and groups, and they worry in particular that bioterrorism these days the very significant expansion of the proliferation of centers of biological expertise. unfortunately, i think it is much more likely that we will see the bioterrorism and i think that nato public could be better informed and made resilient to these types of threats there are elements of the deterrence and assurance approaches even dealing with nonstate actors which we can talk about more and even in asia there are nato members that have territory on the pacific ocean. that is an article five contingency. we should talk about sort of what that means for nato and nato planning and responses. but i don't think that there is any getting around that essential fact.

in terms of the tools because i want to address the tools before i passed it by other panelists we can use to underwrite the deterrence approach is that i just talked about. the first category as traditional areas we will hear about some of them later today and i think you all know that list pretty well. there's also some emerging areas and i would cyber in the space still in the emerging areas. let me focus on space. i think it is an area that is surely behind. russia's doctrine is talking about the access to critical space assets in the early days or even hours of any contact our contingency. and the approach is while i'm not sure if anyone here knows when the approach is that it seems to not really address it for a couple reasons some of us know. it's important in the areas that we should turn these efforts and

where there is demand and the challenges that might be associated with these domains space may be the one where supplies just doesn't come close to demand. and i think it's important to note that the weakness and the deterrence can undermine general deterrence because nato and the u.s. in particular are the most reliant on the space assets for our military operations. there was good stuff in the study in terms of how to address the space deterrence. international norms, enhancing collective space security capabilities, enhancing the resilience of space architecture which involved sort of redundancy and potentially using new technologies such as cubes which we don't have these very expensive satellites that have everything in them. we can put up a constellation and more of a network approach. and i also think we need to have a deterrence policy, declaratory policy for states that people actually understand and that adversaries and allies alike understand that includes

concepts of proportionate escalation that are not just limited to space. third, new areas that i think are worth considering as the world is changing so quickly for deterrence tools. one is energy. it's possible we will see a crisis in the future in the pacific may be in the european area where there is some sort of blockade or some sort of energy coercion and with the new shale gas revolution and with other new energy developments, it think it's possible we could use energy supply as a tool for reassurance and potentially also deterrence and secondly, the new book out called treasury's work which looks of finance instruments. i think they can be better integrated into deterrence approach. at the atlantic council here we are talking about a lot of the tools and how to better integrate them into turns in

asia and in this conversation to deterrence in europe. everything has applications for the artfully approach that we need to take you to differentiate the partnership in the middle east and asia are quite obvious in terms of what's going on in the world. number two, the alliance of technology advantage is in danger of being robbed there is competitive activities underway. in china and russia among individuals and i think it takes a much more concerted and focused effort for the alliance to begi meeting its technology advantages in key areas. looking more at the longer-term trends but coming back to the present and saying what do all these things mean for the current planning, for that contingency planning and the strategic concept, for the

capabilities, discussions, etc. this is a new but important element. last a lot of nonstate actors need to be brought into the efforts b-day energy companies, financial companies, technological companies. but then i need to much more strongly leverage the assets knowledge and capabilities of such companies can bring to the approach. they will call out of the cross approach which is for the deterrence i think it needs to be cross domain. it needs to be cross regional entities to be cross actor. >> thank you for taking the time to lay out that concept. i want to pivot from the

american perspective and come to scientists before picking up j. stefano. in the alliance thinking about an engagement for the greater middle east, a term that you will get into as well. preparing for the unexpected into talking about the bioterrorism and space energy, these new tools coming in to get in our conversations in our last event, there was a sense among some of our european participants that were weary of a decade plus of battle in afghanistan and elyria future commitments and where you saw commitment as in libya the effort to try to minimize the engagement of the alliance. so, i want to turn to you to find this impetus among some that we here in the european colleagues that have hunkered down is the crisis and its capability because it is a crisis in defense spending. how do you reconcile what has been laid out how the european defense planner think about

where the alliance is going in where it needs to come tv. >> thank you for the atlantic council for the interesting people in the u.s. it was very impressive to have all of these high-ranking americans present. >> what he se said about preparg for the unexpected is very much what i will talk about and as you said it is to some extent returning to the basics, but i think it is a very timely

initiative because the operation is coming to an end. what did you see in order to implement the strategic concept from 2010? nato has been quite good in creating new slogans and programs but we failed to a large extent to implement it in my view. note that the state of the structure in a toe is not always what we want it to be. and i bb that for the correct on some of these things is absolutely the best thing that we can do to prepare for the unexpected. i will try to be a little bit more concrete.

as we approach the next summit we need to make sure that nato remains relevant as you said and effective. next year we have an opportunity because we are going to update the political guidance, and that is the document in which you said that the priorities and the programs are what we need to do is make a defense capabilities and defense structures, and that is the most important document in addition to the strategic concept. i think we need to take a hard look at that one. another suggests in order to be brief only six points that i think we should look at their, one we should change the level of ambition that we should only be able to conduct two measures and have that ambition for a long time and sends we started

with that ambition of other resources have decreased tremendously and we are in a totally different situation today. i will describe it in a totally different way. for example, saying that we need to deal to deter and defend the countries and we need to be able to deploy capability to do crisis management to a certain distance and hedge against cyber attacks, space attacks. second, we need to incorporate the cyber operations in the planning. we talk about cyber but it is to me almost inconceivable that there will be a future conflict in which it doesn't play a

prominent role and i don't think that we have incorporated that into the planning mechanism. the third point is we should establish a general framework for the contingency planning in nato so that national defense plans can be attached to and links to the operational planning. i am sorry to say that there is no kind of policy for the opportunity or operation of planning in nato. after that we had some aspects of the contingency planning but we don't have a general policy and we really do need something to attach it to. one of the unique features is its combined command structure

and we all be leave at least as much belief that in case of a serious crisis, we would ask nato to take the lead and take the command of operations. it isn't capable and ready to take such tasks. what is the conflict in libya? in order to take on that task to do the quick targeting business and i think we cannot afford to have such a big command structure as we had steak 20 years ago. so the best way to fix this is to create a pool of qualified personnel in the member states so that they can be deployed and support the operational commands if the conflict is rising. this is the chief way to reinforce the credibility and in

the command structure. one thing that is also relative to this accord is to establish an educational program for officers and jobs. we have 28 nations and very different structures. it could be very useful job in training and qualifying officers and for that matter civilians to take on the jobs. we should establish a policy for training and exercising to ensure ability to participate in the joint and combined operations.

the categories for example for how nato is structured. if we can create a common policy for training and exercises that would incredible and unique mak

machinery. it has a permanent command structure. there's a common force planning and a common operational planning. this builds the credibility, the cohesion of the alliance and the terms. often says that nato is changing from deployed to prepared, and you posed a question, prepared for what? in my view, we must be prepared for collective defense and for international crisis management, both of them. and i fully agree with what you said about the middle east. we need to also have a situational surveillance, which has been lacking to a large extent in nato. one of our initiatives point directly at the situational awareness and as the norwegian air force was planning to participate in libya, we have to

admit we didn't know very much about libya or the surrounding areas. later, we got quite a bit of information from italy and france, but nato as such had also very little knowledge. and definitely nato needs to have a situational awareness for the mediterranean, for the middle east, so that it can make recommendations to the political level if nato can use its forces and policies in a relevant way to solve crises in that region, and the same goes for eastern europe. i think i'll stop there, because i think i used my time. >> terrific, svein, let me ask you one quick follow up. to dramatically change the ambition of the alliance and for many out there it may sound like a technical issue, but it's an incredibly inordinately political issue, as well. for many it's the alliance looking at itself and saying we

are incapable of doing what we said we'd do, we need to ratchet back our ambition and expectations of what the alliance can deliver. how do you navigate the shoals? i'm going to turn to an ambassador who had to deal with the politics of this next, but let me ask you real quick, how do you deal with the criticism that this would be an admission of defeat for the alliance in some respect? >> frankly speaking, i think it was never realistic that nato should do six plus two operations almost at the same time. and i don't think many would be very disappointed if that level of ambition was changed a little bit, because we are not going to do two plus six operations at the same time anyway. it's not credible, and it's undermining our credibility. that's my short answer. >> all right, thank you, svein. let me turn to your left. i'll come back to you, jay, to wrap up with cyber, but let me turn to ambassador stefano, who

unlike norway, who had to find its way information about italy, intimately familiar with your neighbors to the south and the instability the alliance is facing from that region. from your perspective, italy is a stalwart member of the alliance but also trying to balance the financial challenges that we've been seeing throughout the euro zone, combined with the reality of instability to your south, something that's quite palpable, obviously, for your country. how does it sound when you're hearing about the concept that barry's laid out, hedging against russia while still planning for greater ambition in the middle east, preparing for the unprepared, when you have deal with the constraints of budgets and what your populations will support? give us the perspective from the south. >> thank you, damon.

it's good to be here. and it's good to be next to norway. i must say, surprisingly, norway being one of the countries i worked the most closely in my time at nato. one from the north, one from the south, and together we sort of match the perspective of, say, european nato. before i get into answering your question, let me just touch on something which was i tried to focus for this panel, which is the relationship between deterrence and collective defense. and i have come to mediterranean, obviously, close to my heart. i was feeling a bit rusty, you know, five months after leaving foreign service, three years, i left nato immediately after that. completely affirmative in december 2010, we had no clue, no idea that there might be operation, to a point, i was

asked, because some might may remember, qaddafi just made a state visit in italy that august. and the agreement with libya could be somewhat, and was, at odds with our nato commitment. but when the question we asked ourselves at the time, could that be a problem? and the answer was, why should ever nato have anything to do with libya? that was just eight months before the operations. so that shows that that kind of unpredictability that you outline. so feeling a bit rusty, i need some help, i found some help in a young diplomat, who took my seat in the audience,

aleczandro. he has a nato-ized embassy here with the former secretary general, who's actually ambassador claudio sitting in the first row. but alexander's help wasn't enough, so i went a bit further in dealing with new tools and new challenges. i got a bit of old wisdom in order, and i found what i think is one of the best definition of deterrence in a phrase from mackiavelli. >> i might just say, he walked in today, i appreciate the pin you have on your lapel, and indeed, it is a pin of mackiavelli. i thought it might fit into your remarks. >> mackavelli says fear preserves you by a punishment which never fears.

that's deterrence. there are guys which there's no punishment. they don't fear a punishment. two sub categories, if you wish. either because they think they will not be caught, that's the case possibility cyber defense, or because they -- the punishment doesn't -- typical, the terrorist is not being punishable. so i think the issue is whether or not the new challenges there's also new tools, there's a bit less so and issues whether or not deterrence is part of this new tools. i think it is, but it has to be a combination that you it cannot be on the military deterrence as to use political,

diplomatic and economic means. the engagement when it is an engagement is very much with russia. you pointed out about the issue of hedging against russia where you said the main concern is about the declining russia which is not going to be detoured purely by the military head but what sort of an a ray of means and on the one hand a sort of

credible clear-cut capability. on the other hand, a political outreach to russia. even at the present moment the circumstances are not the most favorable. my take. it should be deterred when we can, when we cannot detour with the collective defense but the point is this defense has to be collective. nato has been defined by values and common goods.

the challenge. so in that respect we have to be able to interpret. the concept, the point has been made about military warfare being possibly wade which is a clear case for considering this as a part of nato responsibility it may well be that some of them require nato to work with other organizations. they have to be present in nato.

the bottom line about where we can be torn and we cannot be sure is with the international environment. the most authoritarian dictatorship to some extent shares the same language. they don't share the same values but they share the same objective. when we talk about terrorists, the captain and the hijacker do not speak the same language.

the move is very well done that makes you understand, so when we face this problem, mainly when our interlocutor doesn't have a physical control of the territory, which i guess is my point, we cannot beat deutsch her defeat of but we can address at least some of the root causes say not always political that created the political threat. and we are going to at least one

intermediate cause which is a failed state to the extent that we can state a certain limited for the possibility of the as a matter of rats in afghanistan and somalia and now it's moved very much to northern africa. while the u.s. may or may not have added that. they see for reason because the arab awakening has created a situation where there is a potential for a large part of land not controlled buy any

state authority so the question about the mediterranean i certainly think that nato has to think about that as a possible source of new threats. and a threat that isn't simply a threat to nato is a threat that affect the entire atlantic area there might be reason to think about because when with all of their great middle east, they have some different dynamics and

there could be some more for the association with nato. i think on that point, the way that you cue that up, ambassador , is how do you create the fear. as we heard it's inconceivable we could face a conflict where cyber wouldn't be among the front. we have heard of the concern about the future that it can be caught in that deterrence and how that applies here. we also heard for those in the audience that the potential need

to update thinking about what an armed attack means if you read the washington treaty, article 5 which says an attack on one will be considered an attack on all it actually says an armed attack. so what does this mean, what does the cyber domain meen in the court of the defense of the deterrent of the future. yesterday was veterans day, remembrance day. to think about such a terrible war and the nobel peace prize went to the wrong organization but thanks to nato and we can prevent that from ever happening again such a pickup on cyber everyone says cyber because that is what you're supposed to do it is this new challenging area. and i want to help put some of that to bed i hope and the

traditional strengths and areas that were strong and will serve as much better and cyber than we have really been led to believe. i made general cartwright's fibrils got together and that means i might be in trouble later. so, when we talk about cyber, the main thing that people are going to talk about and say cyber deterrence is practically impossible because it is such an easy keep the devotee to kids in their basement can constitute strategic capability we will never know who is responsible for it. you can't know who did it and therefore you can't detour it or it happens at the speed of light and you can't warrant so the

main thinking of cyber deterrence but all of those are over here on the technical side. it's looking what happens at the level of talk to -- tactical combat and to say that it is the whole of the conflict. and we don't have to do that. it's like saying that what happens at the level of the missile defense and how fast an engagement could go or the level of the aerial combat because the dog fight happen so quickly that therefore you could never detour an adversary for sending their bombers that could go nearly the speed of sound what happens at the tactical message in the domain, we have just said that therefore it is completely impossible and that tends to be the strong guest.

it's called the fierce domain and what we saw when we look at what are cyber problems not just as this is fred telling me to stop pitching my book and fred is the last person to tell you not to pitch a book. [laughter] this may have been a cyberattack >> and when we look at what has happened in cyber not just as crime and as a collection of individual cyber attacks, but actual conflict and how else should nato look we find that all of these technical things at the speed of light you never know who was responsible to constitute a strategic capability, none of that. it's true that the technical level but it's not true at the level of conflict because what we found when you look at it as a conflict is that it overwhelmingly takes place

within existing conflict or an ongoing conflict between existing national rivals which means that all of these technical truths fallaway because you are genuinely going to know who is responsible because it is going to be the country that you are involved with in an existing conflict about. anyone that was confused in 2007, people would say it traces back to 178 different countries. we can't possibly tell who is responsible for this cyber assault on estonia to they are looking over here at the technical level. if you want to see past that to the political truth behind that, it does not have to be difficult. nato might make it difficult, but that is a different from the dynamics in the underlying conflict. likewise, the cyberattack for easy to warn about or more easy to warn about and have been told because you don't have to

stare-down why you're looking for the evil ones and you can look at the overall dynamics in the context and the geopolitical realities and the geopolitical realities are that cyberattack and conflict tend to follow physical conflict and physical attacks. if you see a protest at the world bank you can extract their sprint p.m. on liesman the protest if you see an ongoing conflict at the east china sea and south china sea over natural gas deliveries from russia thursday to be a cyber conflict was lighter component about as well you don't have to treat it as some new dark mythic thing that is different from cyber conflict that has come before. so what we found, and this is incredibly important for nato is that the more strategically

significant the conflict, the more some other it is in the air land and sea. the more strategically significant conflict, the more similar it is called the conflict in the air land and sea. one of the reasons that it seems so or why cyber seems so tough now is that we are looking at the collection of individual incidences' racking our brains out to deter these. the individual incidents that are probably not getting into nato typical lanes we work with. i will summarize that point when we get to the end. i would contend to close out the main point that cyber deterrence is obviously working people say that it is difficult or impossible are focusing on the technical or focusing on these day in and day out incidences'. maybe they are focusing on espionage. but for a destructive attacks, especially the most strategic

cyber conflict on what content of the fact shows the history shows here's where i called the book of history shows line 99 on amazon, the history shows that cyber deterrent is clearly working. because we've been talking about a cyber perlo herber since 1991. over 20 years for the actual pearl arbor. clearly there is a different dynamic going on. so, what we see is a country willing to spy on one another, they are willing to have proxies' that connect to conduct attacks on others. they have low levels labor attacks on one another but we haven't seen a big nation use real destructive cyber

capabilities since another big nation. we haven't seen big nations use outside of an existing conflict it's not out of the blue. it's taking place during existing tensions. as we have to call that restraint that we are not willing to go through a threshold to find a called restraint but what we are seeing is the nation's are acting extremely similarly in this place than they do to others. they are not willing to do big destructive attacks on one another because they fear getting caught and punishments and they fear that the attribution might prove a very thin veil once people start to die. so i would say nato going forward gets three separate areas and this gets to various

.4 do it what are we trying to deter. first we have today's issues. the proxy's by some countries. to these problems tend to be hostile will the level with cyber conflict and how nato was when to be getting involved in that area. and that i think can be tractable and nato is doing a good job of improving their own defenses in the rest. we get into an area where we someday have a cyber conflict. i would guess it would not.

that happens to escalate in some cyber fashion that terrie or we have dead bodies which we've never had from a cyberattack that i can find. so it's going to look and feel like a normal article 5 and last my closing point that my colleagues and senior fellow makes a lot especially in the united states we always tend to think that we are going to be the ones doing the deterrent. paul can we make sure that we won't be the one before from getting into a conflict.

for the first strike from the adversary this doesn't happen at the speed of light. cyber conflicts tend to take place over weeks, months or years. we are democracies and we tend not to be good out of the box. it takes a while to warm up. we need to avoid something like a six day war. for the first goal. thank you david.

here at the atlantic council we've got out and recruit the initiative we are hearing from many of our allies and partners and a concern about the disconnect between the potentially how fast and how far away the united states was going and where the closest allies were in terms of the capabilities. in sync with where we are going and we have been working a lot on. we are here having this conversation in the wake of yet another round of headlines and thus weeks as a source of tension in the atlantic how we make sure that what we are doing first of all you talked about

national versus need to keep a devotees have you need them to incorporate cyber in the defense planning and making it a source of strength for the alliance projecting outward rather than another source of tension and division for external actors to play the dow and conquer if you will. i think a couple of maybe three solid areas. i think within the dod just getting to accept that nato has a strong role to play in this and actual article 5. the cyber officials even at nato defense down playing the role of nato.

china was behind the espionage and the president so he's diplomatic about that. second, i think that we can deal with or classification schemes we are so highly classified between the united states and it completely limits our ability to have a debate even within our own country. and an especially makes it difficult working with our allies. the department of defense in the computer will devotee has to get patched. we wouldn't even share those with our nato allies for a while. it took months and months to get this approved and then for official use only. it's just the wrong way of

thinking about. we are going to continue to clamp down ever further on that. third, is we are coming out with some additional ideas let me focus on one and it's really frank kramer's idea and he said that nato has been in this place before looking at the nuclear planning group. looking at the offensive capability looking at the allies but it gives everyone a voice and a stake in this discussion to have that on the offensive side of the allies that have offensive capability can come together and talk about how that might be used. if we come out with another out of very operation, we might need something like that. so that we can talk about it, we can think about how to bring these national capabilities.

sharing defensively, i think that the things the alliance has been up to an increasing the capabilities and the insert of having the the emerging security challenges. i want to remind the audience that we are welcoming and encouraging your tweeting. we are using the hash tag future nato and the handle that each of our speakers as well. to kick off the conversation i'm going to turn to karlan who caught my eye first. part of that i want to hear to take questions. we've heard about the strategic

level given where we are financially as well as politically. if you can catch my eye we will get a microphone to you if you could introduce yourself and ask a question, please. >> i'm karlan with the atlantic council. first, many thanks to the panel for an excellent discussion, and i particularly associate myself with the remarks i think that you are absolutely right. .. for a second chance. my question really is a provocation. i would assert that deterrence is a concept of the 20th century and really isn't relevant to the 21st, and i think the panel by what they said or didn't say may support that contention. now, the question is, what would take its place? i would also observe that perhaps the two most important things that nato can do and can

arise from the coming summit have not been mentioned, one, support t-tip, and, two, support some kind of argument to rally domestic support, because the most crucial issue, in my judgment, is that we're lacking domestic support. i just came back from yet again another trip to nato, and this is really missing in action. so, it seems to me to follow on what svein said, and this is extremely difficult, because nato remains, whenever what we say about it, a military alliance. should the issue not be collective security and not collective defense, and if we could make that switch without too much language to go along with it, it seems to me that that would be ambiguous enough to bring into play all these other issues that are so important, but which individual members have some difficulty in deals with. so, should we not be looking at collective security, rather than collective defense? >> got it, thank you. i'm going to pick up a couple of comments, i've seen a lot of hands.

let me come up to the front here. lisa, then come to these two here, as well. >> thanks. i'm lisa aaronson, i'm at the council, visiting fellow from rucy london. all the presentations mentioned the importance of credibility to deterrence, but nobody mentioned afghanistan. i'd like to just ask, i think this is understandable, damon's mentioned several times we want this next summit to be the first one looking forward and not necessarily a focus on afghanistan, but i'd like to ask the panelists to reflect on how to integrate efforts on big questions from afghanistan, whether that's spending commitments, mechanisms for managing cash flow, stainability of the ansf, or status of forces agreement, integrating partners into the post-2014 afghan mission. these are all very sensitive issues, and it's important for nato's credibility, especially given the risks of ungoverned space in afghanistan, or even

possibly a terrorist attack being planned there from the future. so how do we look forward for deterrence purposes, but also keep enough attention on isaf? thanks. >> i'm going to make a point to add to lisa's question, because she's being polite in some respects, if the best recipe of deterrence is success and credibility and the afghan mission is not seen as that, it's seen perhaps as a failure by many of our publics, isn't that at the heart of how getting that right, isn't that at the heart of how you sustain deterrence going forward, or how do you fix that conundrum? and we'll take two questions right here and come back to the panel, please. yes, both of you. >> thank you very much. for such an educated discussion. i'm with the american league. the world is going through a constant transition.

and my friend, barry pavel, mentioned about russia because of the system and then virtually nonexistence of democracy and then which is a member of nato. my question is that nato had been doing a lot of fighting in many area of the world. does nato have the capacity to act unilaterally without leadership of usa to prevent low-intensity conflict and

resolve them? and turkey is a member of the nato. could somebody educate me on this? what were the glitches that we could not become a member of your union at the same time? thank you. >> thank you, sir. that last question is the topic of a whole other conference we've got running as well. just to his left and we'll take the last question and come back to the panel. >> thank you. my name is dr. lydia gastopolis. i oversee our mission in europe. more specifically in the mediterranean. as we deal with cyber issues, i've been engaging the communities there with cyber. i have a question regarding austerity and our cyber allies and helping them out in the era of snowden leaks. what i found is many government officials, military officials have said they look up to the u.s. and the way we do things. they respect our strategy and

our efficiency and effectiveness. however, when it comes to cyber security now, many people are standing up their commands. this is a sensitive national security issue. seeing some of our nato allies are standing up their commands, how can we help them in a way that would not infringe on the sensitivity standing up to cyber command considering the snowden situation? >> terrific. let me start with you. is deterrence not a cold war concept? how do we talk about nato's future if we bury under the carpet the issue of afghanistan? >> i don't think deterrence is an outdated concept. i wish it were. absence of deterrence is trying to threaten harm on those who might think to do you harm in the international system. unfortunately, the world has proven over the last, we can take a couple of examples from the last couple of years, be

they state actors or nonstate actors, russia invaded georgia and terrorists are still committing acts. i think terrorists can be deterred and have written about it in an article with nonresident senior fellow matt kronich there are ways to deter terrorists if you focus your efforts, as well. unfortunately the nature of the world is such deterrence is central. we've always had a lot of other activities going on next to and complementing and hopefully reenforcing deterrent, including security cooperation and various other forms of engagement. i think deterrence by itself would be one hand clapping, but it's never been that case. i think it's a different form of deterrence. it's required for a much more complex world. on the question of afghanistan, i have two basic answers and i

think it's an important question. those who understand what's going on in afghanistan better than i say it's going much better than the press, which tends to follow negative stories, i've heard, more than positive stories. that doesn't change the perspective question. nato's activities in libya proved it's adaptable. my general answer to nato and its credibility, et cetera, it's the best we've got. it's adapted multiple times as damon said. it's entering its fifth chapter of major adaptation. the key answers and the key questions at this conference is what will be the defining parameters of that fifth chapter of adaptation? i think afghanistan is -- my short answer, probably going better than we are led to believe. even that said, there is a broad enough record of that adaptation

credibility isn't quite at an issue we need to work at it. as i said in my remarks, the challenges and circumstances that nato faces going forward over the next five to ten years are very different than the challenges that nato is comfortable dealing with from its history. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> i've been doing a lot of thinking. there would be a lot of thinking about nato of afghanistan. the lesson learned, we'll know more about them after we've gone out and when while be able to engage afghanistan. i agree with barry and go

further. with nato bee lead in afghanistan much better than found. afghanistan has been given a chance which they didn't have before. there is another element which i think, from the nato point of view that afghanistan proves in solidarity which we may never expect. >> say that one more time? >> stamina in solidarity would have guessed we, after ten years. all of us suffered fairly high losses, not to mention the cost, financial cost that we would still be there and we would actually -- in together, out together is a reality. it proves a certain political

solidarity, political core of nato which is probably higher than we expected, especially in 2003, 2004. when we go into afghanistan. always lessons to be learned in terms of deterrence. deterrence has worked. just imagine four years the taliban back in power in kabul. would they do the same they did before giving safe haven to al qaeda and risk again distraction? probably not. in that respect, what happened is a lesson in deterrence.

where we've not been able to be effective is in the region of powers surrounding. pakistan was mentioned before. >> i asked you to repeat that because we are often up on the hill hearing about the alliance and many concerns about the question harlan raised, political will, political support. when you make the argument we've been fighting a war in the middle of asia for more than a decade with tens of thousands of european forces by our side, a scenario we could little imagine. and at the height of the strain on the alliance military forces, exacerbated by one of the worst economic crisis on the continent, the political will was still mustered to launch operation in libya and we sustained or force necessary kosovo. there are ways to look at this.

that was an important point you made. i wanted to draw that out. please pick up on a few of these elements. we'll come to jay on cyber and i'll come back to the audience. >> i would say that is a very old concept from machavellia. when we talk to russia, for example, deterrence and the military policy is accompanied by a set of cooperative programs. cooperation and military readiness doesn't exude each other. i think in total this makes a policy which is sustainable and good. fully agree we need to work much more on rallying domestic support for nato and defense in general. and the problem is that people don't really realize, i believe, what the risk of not doing that

is. so we need to -- we are working actively in norway on that. we have very good support. on afghanistan, i fully agree that the ambassador here and when we decided already in 2001 in the autumn to send special forces to afghanistan, full support from all political parties, i think the credibility of nato as an organization and bilateral transatlantic relationship, it was not nato who did the first operations there. i think it proved quite effective, but of course, the truth is also that there is a limitation as to what you can do with military forces. we have seen that in afghanistan and even in libya. we have to be very clear. we can't just throw military forces at the problem.

we need to think, to create a strategy by military component is only a part of it. comprehensive approach, if you like. i think that we have done now a tremendous effort in afghanistan for 12 years or so. 50 countries are engaged there now. i do not think this will undermine nato's credibility. >> thank you. jay, wrap-up here. >> thank you. first to harlan's point on the -- i like the collective defense. i keep trying to make the point at least on cyber we don't have to think about this as differently as we've been led to expect. and that the cyber conflicts are not that fundamentally different

from other kinds of conflicts. i would like to see as little change as possible. because i think we make it more confusing the more we try to think of it as different. for csfi, it's a great point. united states has created the perception right now that we're an export of insecurity into the internet than an exporter of security. i can imagine it would be very difficult if you are any other country and you are going to have american experts come in to help you set up a cyber command or set up your cyber systems. i think it would be reasonable for many countries to be doubtful about inviting us in. hey, we are going to bring in the nsa cyber experts to configure these systems. a year ago might have made a lot of sense. now would be much more difficult. this is going to hurt us in a lot of ways. there are three things we can do. one is to continue to encourage

regional groupings. i heard a lot of great things happening among nordic countries that have now set up, they can share classified information between the cyber defenders in each of the countries. things like that i think will be very useful. we can see that in other countries. there is much more we could do on pooling and sharing. i suspect that amongst the ally nations we have 28 separate contracts with microsoft. 28 separate training houses to teach the same underlying standards and how to run microsoft desktops and cisco routers. we are using the same gear, the same standards, the same software. i suspect we could do a lot more pooling and sharing. look at monitoring. right now i bet every country

monitors their own military networks. you could find great ways to say what countries can we just share and we'll just have one monitoring center for several different countries. yes, it could be difficult. we've got ally nations sharing navies. the real capability for defense, in all of our countries, even the united states, is not the military, it's the private sector. it's going to be the ones that are going to be winning or losing. they are the ones that have the bulk of the capability to defend. a lot of the issues that we worry about, sharing threat data, vulnerability data, you don't have to spend two years to come up with an agreement to the united states on that. take your credit card and go to

symantec and mcafee. we can buy the ability we need rather than creating an alliance with the national militaries. >> let me pick up another round of questions. i saw a hand in the back early on. >> i am a student ambassador. i would like to thank all the panelists for your excellent remarks and very good discussion. perhaps i'm supposed to react on two words, cyber and russia. i will react on the word cyber. it was extremely good to hear that almost all panelists in one form or another mentioned cyber. my comment is that first of all, we have cyber center excellence

that could be used in much better way than it is used today. it's good. it's efficient. it could be used even better. another thing my government is proposing, very concrete facilities for cyber exercises and cyber training that we also need to do in the context of nato. and my question to the panelists is, taking into account that the next summit 2014 will be ten years after expansion of nato, what we consider a successful expansion, what should be the message in 2014 to those countries who are either waiting for full membership what should be the question for nato? >> the far back then come up here.

>> thank you. i'm looking at an article in today's "guardian" of london, about young men from turkey going to syria to fight. hundreds are thought to have been recruited by units affiliated to al qaeda. a father of one of these young men goes there to get his son back and he is confronted by one of these commanders. they are here to be martyred, he's told. they will be rewarded in paradise. a few days ago, maybe a couple of weeks ago now, turkish president said afghanistan may be coming to the mediterranean, referring to syria. this is happening in turkey, a nato member. we have been discussing deterrence. how do you deter people who want to be martyred? >> good question. come up here to isabel.

>> thank you. senior fellow at the council across center. my question is more directed to svein. it has to do with level of ambition. we have to look at this level of ambition for credibility sake if nothing else. my question to you is if you rein down, lower the level of ambition, how do you maintain the effort and the push that has been our guidance for so long on capabilities? would you expect that nations will continue to make that effort if nato's level of ambition goes down? thank you. >> good question. let me pick you right here on the aisle, please.

thank you. >> i'm from the atlantic, transatlantic academy, sorry. usually at the danish institute for national studies. i would agree deterrence is not an outdated concept, but i think in nato there is a tendency to think about deterrence in outdated ways. perhaps the clearest example of that is the, to put it bluntly, the retardation nato has to think and speak sensibly about deterrence and defense outside the box. i think that was especially clear during the deterrence review that was closed so surruptitiously and closed. as nato moves towards this infection point, it is

imperative nato is able to think out of the box and to talk openly out of the box about how to approach deterrence in a new security environment. but my question is, there are so many people here that have direct input into nato, how do we overcome those political obstacles to make nato an organization that can talk about these issues in a sensible way that actually can lead to the change that is necessary? thank you. >> terrific. thank you. i take it you were disappointed in the ambition of the defense and deterrence posture review. >> very much. >> let me come back to the panel. we've got a medley of questions, if you would, from open door to the use of cyber center of excellence to the deterrence of an afghanistan on the mediterranean to the depr. maybe i start with you on this. if you want to pick up the freefalling capabilities? >> i will try to answer that. i think that the level of

ambition needs to be changed. not necessarily reduced. there are other ways of formulating it. if you maintain the guidance you have six plus two operations. you also asked for tremendous command and control apparatus. sometimes i wonder whether we have too much focus on that and too little focus on the actual forces to go into it. we have seven corps commands in nato, multinational corps commands, none of which are u.s., by the way. of course, if you go into a serious operation, we would certainly like the u.s. to be there at the top. that's just one example of what i'm alluded to. i think the planning that needs to be totally changed in my view because we have to take into account there are national requirements, too. we have national requirements. we cannot put all of our

resources to the nato level of ambition and nato requirements. we need to focus nato's force planning on critical shortages and to create that. what we see in practice, a lot of countries are keeping big structures out of their forces without any competition whatsoever. this is not a process by optimized contributions from all countries to feel that level of ambition. i'm not sure i answered your question. i think we can formulate a better way without need for countries to continue. >> this year in particular you pick up on what you like. in particular, how do you deter those going now to syria to be martyred. you have afghanistan on the mediterranean. how does this fit into the concept of deterrence we've been talking about? >> i think we have to be honest

with ourselves in the sense that there are things we cannot possibly -- we are not going to deter would-be martyrs. there are things that can be done on this specific point. young middle-aged people who go from europe to wherever to fight with al qaeda, possibly more could be done in terms of homeland security. just an example. there is a track record of british, of pakistani origin but with british nationality going to pakistan and afghanistan. pakistan requires visa for

noncitizen noncitizens. they do not recognize nationalities. they need a visa to travel to pakistan. that can be monitored. there are many, many examples like that. we enter in an era which is more homeland security than purely military. that goes back to the point which i made. i certainly agree that deterrence needs to be updated. that's why i said it cannot be military only. it has to be, it has to involve intelligence, economic, political and homeland security. all of the above. since nato cannot do everything they would require nato to work closely with nations and other organizations in such a way that each one does its own job but there is coordination. i think in the u.s. you face

domestically the same problem, intelligence coordination as homeland security. >> let me bring you in on this. i think you and matt perhaps did a piece, as you mentioned, on deterring individuals in these circumstances. pick on that as well as concern from our danish colleague about lack of creativity in nato's work on deterrence and defense posture within the alliance structures right now if they are capable of taking the next step. >> i'll take the easier one, deterring terrorists. as i said we wrote a piece in "the washington quarterly" deterring terrorists that can be easily looked up. there was a chapter about this work when i was in the government called "counterstrike" which gives you some of the more juicier back room details. the essence of deterrence is to hold something at risk that the person or that the organization or the leadership values.

you do that through two things. you threaten some sort of retaliation and response and you try to raise the costs or raise the defenses. no terrorist organization wants to suffer a failed attempt. it will dissuade them from trying or raise the cost to a point that they're not willing to try it, but even a martyr, and this is obviously a level of difficulty that we're not as nuanced as a government or alliance yet, but even a martyr values something. some martyrs value how they die. if they die in a bus or with certain food stuffs not considered helpful for them getting to heaven, they are not going to do it. saudis would go to the families of would-be terrorists and say if you don't stop this activity being prepared, we will and we'll take it out on the family. some terrorists value their families. there are different types of

actors in a terrorist network. there are the foot soldiers and the martyrs, but also financiers, logistics, command and control and others. they all value different types of things and they are not all committed at the risk of their lives. so another way to deter terrorist networks is to continue to press legal proceedings against sponsors, against state sponsors of terrorist activities, as is still going on with the 9/11 hijackers. that's the essence of the framework used in the pentagon and government to make progress against al qaeda. it is not only a military effort, it's a broad-based effort that requires various arms of government. on the question of syria in particular, we ultimately need to try to dry up the sources of

disaffection and alienation. we are creating more terrorists by the policy we are choosing which is let it burn and try to stay away and try to stay disengaged. i'm being very frank here because i think it is an extremely serious problem. i was told by a senior intelligence official within the last couple of months that syria now is jihadi destination number one and the flows of jihadis into syria is much greater than the peak of jihadis going into iraq. i believe that was in 2007. so we are really creating more terrorists by our policy of relative disengagement in syria that we're following. it's a very, very important question we should be attentive to. >> thank you, barry. jay, do you want to pick up at all on the center of excellence's role? >> without a doubt we can use

ccdcod better. it's done fantastic work but hasn't been fantastic work the alliance has recognized or embraced. i would be hopeful that in coming out of 2014 the members could fund some of the things that are more useful to central debates going on. the next ccd is going to be on active defense. there are a lot of things that can be interesting. nato is years and years away from anything relating to active defense, i think. i think we can do better to make that connection and it's up to members. we can tie this into the ambition question. which i think is central. i'll tell you, i'm pretty happy with the lack of ambition with nato on cyber issues and almost ecstatic about it. the opportunities to get it

wrong in a flashy and expensive way that sends money down the drain so that we can cut ribbons or call a success is the much larger danger i'm worried about. that we are not going to make progress and we are going to waste a lot of really limited resources. my main ambition is we stop thinking about the cyber as a technological issue. great. techies have a lot to worry about. we should let that happen. let's separate that away from the warfare issues. there are a couple of things we can do going in for the 2014 summit. first, as you can guess, i am very happy with the status quo. if we come out of the uk submit and just say iing let's stay wi our commitment and worry about nato defenses and have that as the primary thing we keep our focus on, that's a win.

some of the other countries would not be happy with that. there are a few other things we could do. a focus on article 5. having a military staff or having think tanks get together to say what kind of things get us into article 5 and more importantly what we do once we are there. it's difficult to imagine how we get there because we are in a fog. things are gray right now. it's been my advice to the department of defense also. imagine in a world as a thought experience we are in a real cyber war. take it just as a thought experiment. smoking holes in the ground, many people dead. neither side willing to escalate to kinetic weapons yet. what would nato be doing in that place for article 5? forget about orts and things we are doing now. we are in a place with dead people and know which country is responsible. what are we going to do at that

point? this is difficult at the political level to do. better to do a military planning staff or think tanks. think through that. then see how far down that clarity goes. how far down the spectrum of conflict that clarity can expend. right now a lot of the warning we do out of the nato technical capability or escd is focused on zeros. we should be looking at the cyber aspects of the real geo political conflicts that might get us to an article five. i think pooling and sharing we can do under a modest level of ambition that will be really helpful. i will be the first one to propose that the nato monitoring center for military members to come together, for member nations to come together should be in tartu.

last, i think there are a lot of things we can do under a modest ambition to say what we do beyond rapid reaction teams. we'll deploy a handful of techies to go to the country. that's mostly a political show. there is a lot more we can do. someone who had to run incident i was running this for the finance sector all together. sometimes you just needed a major or senior nco to help take notes or be a product manager. sometimes you need technical capability or satellite phones. there is a long list of things you need beyond a handful for people that can help you with forensics. there's a lot more we can do getting beyond rots at a very modest level and ambition. >> thank you, jay. you may have folks that might

want to challenge your ambitions for cyber. you mentioned open door. we aren't drilling down on that today but looking towards the anniversary is next april. we have a whole line of programming we'll talk to you about as the eu is headed toward its eastern partnership and thinking about the next challenges in european integration. that narrative, that story has to have a place as the alliance plays out, as well, that summit next year. let me pick up the final round with my eye on the clock. try to keep them tight. we'll come back to the panel to wrap up. >> a new nonresident senior fellow at the atlantic council. which question is for jason healy. you made an interesting point the fact there hasn't been a cyber attack by one great power against another great power p is there is some restraint. it's an interesting point but gets to the classic problem assessing the effectiveness of deterrence.

if an attack doesn't occur is the adversary deterred or did he not have the intent to conduct an attack in the first place. why do you think it's deterrence and not just great powers haven't had the reason to attack and the attack might be right around the corner? >> thank you. >> thank you. >> i would like to thank estonian ambassador about the question of nato and its open door policy. my question is on cyber aspect of future conflicts. i fully share your opinion that the source of the conflict is cyber or correct yag. what should be the correlation between, let's say the size and

the scope of the response and also the asymmetry of the response. why responding to the cyber attack those who are attackers in most of the case are not vulnerable toward this reciprocal cyber attack? what are potentially considered as boundaries of the asymmetry of this response? >> thank you. last two questions right here. if you could be brief, i would appreciate that. >> for 25 years i worked in nato and first at the schafe helping support the nuclear planning group and staff group in the hlg which some of you are familiar with. i noted since i had both feet -- one foot in the computer world and one foot in the consultation

world, that in terms of the nuclear planning group, that group over time with the consultation mechanisms they set up created a mechanism for diplomats to understand military planning considerations and for the military planners to understand diplomatic considerations. i see with the two groups i work with, computer folks and diplomats, that there is sort of a gorge between the two that's not been filled. the technicians don't understand the consultation considerations and the diplomats don't always understand the other side. last year i think nato had a little bit of cyber play. how can we work this going forward so we get to the same level of co-understanding that we have in the military world? >> thank you. >> sorry i've been so long.

>> final question. >> steve shapiro atlantic council member. i want to push back a little on jason's comment that it's the techies on one side and war fighting on the other side and use that to get to barry's point which is probably from my perspective the major point of the day, of the panel. in a meeting i had in the end of '11 with the latvian presidential cyber team, it was disclosed to my group that the major cyber problem latvia faced was not war fighting problems but most every operating simoned by civilians throughout the country was purchased on the black market. the black market, of course, was produced in the east. as a result, it was estimated in december of '11 that 80% of personal computers in latvia were affected with bot-nets controlled by some mysterious

third party. the idea in the techies in the war fighting are separate in this regard need to be blended. because latvia viewed that as a major national security threat including one of the presidential team's own pc as he bought his system on the black market. it was an expense issue. shortly after our visit word got back to microsoft and suddenly windows' price dropped. that implicates the out of the box thinking, what is defense, what is an attack, and barry's comments about attacks or threats to security including everything from political funding to real estate attacks to demographic attacks, et cetera. i sadly didn't hear the europeans pick up on those as their versions of threats to security. that's my comment. >> thank you, steve. with that onslaught, let me start with you. if others would like to comment on that, we will. we'll use this to wrap up this

session as the clock is running. >> great question. i'm trying to get us to ask the right question. a lot of times we just jump to this theoretical or technical facts saying deterrence is this, that or the other. i want us to zoom in and explain this question. if countries had capabilities to affect one another for over 20 years and we've been vulnerable for at least 20 years, what explains this fact? let's start this from our traditional international security theories to take this fact. i'm tired of hearing people say this is anonymous, you can never trace it back, deterrence is impossible which is ivory tower theory combined with technical looking at the ones in zeros. i want to start with that point to. me it's clear i'm waiting for someone to explain this vulnerability and capability and take it from that part.

two, on the asymmetry, it's a great question. because a lot of the cyber people, those of us that do cyber defense, we want to terrorize political leadership because of how bad things are today. things are so bad right now you have to be really, really scared we confused a lot of the issue how bad things could actually become in future. again, that's why i want to separate these things that could be clearly article 5. then the issues bothering us day-to-day. for estonia, to me we are well away from article 5 on that. if i had been at the white house during that point, i would have told the president ignore all the other countries, some of the attacks are coming from the u.s. stop those, but russia's the country responsible here. pick up the phone and call mr. putin, tell him here is what we are going to do. we are going to tell cyber

command to start military plan ing for counterstrikes and start making similar calls. all sorts of stuff you can do that can start putting on military diplomatic pressure that stays within these asymmetries. cancelling visas. we've got so many other elements of state power we can use if we can get ourselves out of this technical bit. cyber exercises help encourage this view of worries about the technical bit. so many exercises seem to get us into this you can't tell who it is, it's happening speed of light aspect that make it more difficult. i think we tend to always jump

to those difficult scenarios. i would love that we exercise simple scenarios. we know who it is. it's part of, we've got warning about this and we start solving the simple issues. then start solving the most difficult issues and using the exercises for that. last, a couple of years ago i asked to write about nonstate's role and cyber conflict. when we talk about nonstates, we almost all tend to say, yes, isn't it terrible how much capability that they have to do harm? getting to our work with global trends 2030, superpower individuals, defusion of power, it's terrible how these nonstates can do bad, bat things. that jumps on the worst part of it. nonstates can be there for the defense. they can also be there to help solve the problems. frankly, they're the ones the agility, the flexibility, they have their hands deep in cyber

space to fix those problems. that's going to be difficult for governments to do. >> i like that took you from advocating the status quo. >> when we played in crisis management exercise in nato, we had the problem we didn't have a catalog of options that we could present to the politicians because the politicians need also to explain what are the implications of the different causes of actions. now we have done that. that gives us a tool. >> i'm going to wrap up the interest of time. how do you adapt concepts of deterrence to the new reality this historic inflection point we began the conversation with today? in many respects, nato is

premised on deterrence and members collective defense, but as recent history taught the alliance to defend itself, to deter that it actually means it has to operate far from europe in many cases, i think part of what we are trying to get at today and started effectively on this panel is exploring how these new global shifts, new actors, disruptive technology, how they adapt concepts and tools to ensure its deterrence and collective how the alliance adapts its concepts and its tools to ensure its deterrence and collect the defense going forward. that do not comply with the health care law. the final tally was 261-157 with

39 democrats supporting the republican bill and for gop members voting no. the "washington post" writes the proposal quote would allow more americans to keep their current health plans while significantly weakening part of the affordable care act. obama's traumas of allowing americans to continue with current health coverage if they wish. that's from the "washington post." you can see the debate from today's house session tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span.

[applause] >> thank you jody jody and wow what a wonderful room here and thank you for gracing us with your presence and gracing us with your flags, the flags of your proud nations. my favorite corridor to walk down at the department of the interior is the indian affairs corridor because it is lined with the flags of the nation. it is really and truly a pleasure and a privilege to host you at the department of the interior. this is my first. it is perhaps the fifth for all of you and certainly the fifth for my boss the president of the united states who is so committed to indian country at every turn and his jody mentioned it's a historic day

with 13 of my cabinet colleagues participating. they are leaders just as you are. they are people just as you are and they want to hear from you and they want to get to know you and understand your issue so i hope you are open with them today and make sure that you share what is important to you as you get a chance to interact with him. i did grow up in the pacific northwest and the pacific northwest is a recent of our country where tribal presence is very strong but i will tell you that one of the most influential moments of my young life when i was nearly graduating from high school, there was a critical decision that came out of the state of washington that was around tribal fishing rights and treaty obligations and your friend allie frank and my friend billy frank along with other tribal leaders in the northwest tip it all the way to the supreme court within the state of washington a desire to have

the state and the federal government of troll -- uphold treaty rights. there is an important landmark decision and i saw first-hand just how hard it was for tribes that hold their rights and how important it was to them and how the community reacted. i'm not a stranger to indian country as a business person. i was a banker for 19 years with that bank in the northwest called regnier tank which subsequently got bought and sold multiple times that through that transition i did have an opportunity to do business in alaska with the native corporation in northwest alaska and understood some of the critical things that were important to that region that businesses like jade mining and oil and gas activities on the slope. and how shareholder employment was so important along with maintaining cultural identity.

as a banker sometimes behind-the-scenes i give many loan applications for indian tribes the caldwell tried expanding resources unlike roosevelt which later as i had children had an opportunity to rent from them and happen to be one of my best family vacations and also the bank that i worked for a loan for a heritage center in the early 90s so i appreciate how important economic development is but also how different tribes are from one another. so you have less be in so many ways in my seven months and one day doing this job. my first job as a came in and not only met with me but bestowed blessings upon me which meant a great deal to me. i had an opportunity to address the enzi ai in june which was great. it really gave me a sense of the power of your leadership working

collectively together and then in august when i was in alaska i was welcomed by the alaska federation of natives to a meeting along with visits to tribal lands. the alaska and the lower 48 and i hope to do more of that over the course of my time in this job. the president of the united states and you will hear from him later on today is committed to making real and meaningful process in indian country and i'm so happy to be part of his cabinet. timing is everything and i came in at an interesting time as far as the budget is concerned. i look back over my predecessors and some of the things that don't think it's u.s. leaders in your tribal communities and me as secretary of -- we think long-term and the future of the cultures that you represent and the lands you represent and we think about generations forward as do i. and yet we are all faced with a

crazy budget situation. continuing resolutions and no regular budget is 2012 sometimes only months at a time so you don't know how long you are going to be funded for it. sequestration which has hit india in country as hard or harder than any other part of the federal government through the sequestration period we have been enduring over the course of the last well pretty much since i started in this job seven months ago. and then just last month, 16 days of the completely wasteful government shutdown so we have to get back to regular order in the budget. i know when i speak to individual members of congress that they care about indian country and your voices to them are really important that when it comes down to actually getting a budget done they aren't delivering 70 to hold them accountable to that and we certainly will be partners in that effort. the president's top priorities in my top-rated search to strengthen the nation to nash and relationships that we have together. we respect the inherent sovereignty of tribal nations

and we will work with you on the northstar's of self governments and self-determination knowing that you have a better idea of what decisions you need to make to strengthen your tribal communities than we do and we want to be partners in that. i will also say that i am not alone in this effort. i have a fantastic team, team that was assembled largely by my predecessor and my friend ken salazar. can i think will be making an appearance at a reception later on today and i hope to give him a big hug and let them know how much we appreciated the work he did while he was in his chair. i appreciate everything he did and the team that he left me with. starting with kevin washburn the assistant secretary for indian affairs from the chickasaw nation in oklahoma who was ably assisted by larry roberts who was deputy assistant secretary of indian affairs oneida and sarah harrison chief of staff of indian affairs who is mohican. mike lack the director of the

bureau of indian affairs and terrific resource for you. marty russell step up as acting director of the bureau of indian education himself uneducated -- educator from the navajo nation and the office of indian water rights and deputy secretaries corridor and has done a terrific job on that in so many other areas read hillary tom and who i think may be out there someplace. hillary is on maternity leave. she is goofing off with a new little baby but solicitor for the interior department and she is from the navajo nation and does a terrific job for us in the challenging work of solicitor. mike connor who i hope any of you know. mike is an expert in indian water rights and has been for years. he is commissioner of the bureau of reclamation but more importantly he is one little step away from becoming deputy secretary of the department of interior. if we can just get the senate to vote on him.

he is out of committee. he is just waiting for a float and he is serving all of you and the american people well. laura davis's chief of staff to me and my right arm in so many ways and a real proponent of the issues of indian country and a real resource for me as i get up to speed on this job and then slogan. fence was nominated more than a year ago now to serve as the office -- to lead the office of special trustee. we hope the senate will take up this nomination so he can get them over the fence line to serve you. you heard from jody senior policy advisor for native american affairs for the domestic policy counsel in the white house. she is from ogallala and the first person that greeted me as i was walking to my first days in my confirmation process welcoming me and helping me understand the importance of

indian country to this administration. last but certainly not least charlie galbraith associate director of the white house office of governmental affairs from the navajo nation. this is a group that represents you supports me and all of the administration. could we just give them a quick round of applause? [applause] thanks. so we have been doing a lot and i just want to kind of run through a handful of things where we have made real progress since the last time you met one year ago. first is the president of the united states listened to you and he created an executive order the middle of this year to stand up and asked me to chair as judy mentioned. this is an opportunity for us to work all year long not just in preparation for this to make progress and to make sure this complicated federal family with these large silos that we all share as members of the cabinet work together to support indian country in an efficient and

effective way. this afternoon he will meet a number of members of the council ended number of them will be standing at the podium talking to you and they are going to be listening to your input on critical areas that you have said are important to you. second, next to the white house counsel we have been restoring tribal homelands. great progress on the trust process. the pair of indian affairs has processed over 1400 individual lands in the trust application since 2009 and that is added more than 230,000 acres into the trust. two years prior to taking over 250,000 acres of land taken into the trust. [applause] our goal in three years of the obama administration is to get that to over a half-million acres to more than double that number so we are committed to doing that. [applause]