>> up next on booktv, guest host leader curtis, heritage foundation asian studies center senior fellow. ..

>> host: i am delighted to be with husain haqqani today. his book is "magnificent delusions: pakistan, the united states, and an epic history of misunderstanding." he served as ambassador to pakistan from 2000 wait until 2011. we advise the late prime minister at boston university and you write extensively for "the new york times" and wall street journal just to name a few. and you obviously have a very inside view of this relationship and i think just the title is a strong indictment towards the u.s. and pakistan. you say that the relationship, entail of exaggerated expectations and broken promises and disastrous misunderstandings, i would like to delve into what you mean by

that little later in the interview. at first i'm asking you a simple question. what motivated you to write this book? >> guest: this book has been on my mind for so many years. i was a college student in 1979. several of my colleagues, as in students, burned it down the u.s. embassy and people also wanted to go down to the u.s. consulate in berlin that done as well. all of this had taken place when the holiest mosque and shrine of government had been taken down. so people just went berserk. and i was someone who said no, we can't do this, we have to wait. we burned down the building, we won't be able to on verdict on the next day. if we wait, we could find out

that the americans are not involved. because of that come i was always wondering why the pakistanis have this knee-jerk anti-americanism. because what i had read, and i had never visited the united states until then, but what i have heard is that there are weaknesses and flaws and american foreign policy and even domestic form policy, americans are not the great satan. then, of course, i served as pakistan's ambassador to the u.s. and i was always concerned about how both sides, sometimes they said things that were just plain wrong. so as soon as i finished being ambassador, i decided that my first priority should be writing this book and researching it and i have gone from 1947 at the very beginnings of how pakistan and the united states became

allies. the thing that will always concerned me is why is this relationship dysfunctional and why hasn't pakistan benefited from an alliance like the united states like other american allies in the post-second world war, i visited south korea, japan, japan was devastated, but then it became a close american ally after the second world war and you look at where they have prospered and all eastern countries have done well. why did pakistan not do well? what did we do wrong? in the process i have discovered that it's not just pakistani leaders that had delusions about what they could get from the united states. but american leaders also were delusional about what to expect from pakistan. and hence, the title of the book, "magnificent delusions: pakistan, the united states, and an epic history of

misunderstanding." >> host: let's talk a little bit more about those delusions. because i found it very interesting that we talked early in your book about george kennan. he was somebody who maybe didn't have such delusions and he could not see the value of pakistan to the united states and he, in fact, want to make clear to the pakistanis that they should not pay an inflated hopes to the u.s. and i think that there was some contrast between what he thought of what somebody else like john foster dulles, when he was secretary of state in the 1950s thought. and he did think that the u.s. could sort of by pakistan and their loyalties. and if they just provided military aid, that they would just develop the same strategic interests in the u.s. sorties into the counselor and these differences that has anything really changed? >> we come to the subject of change and what has not changed.

so when they came to the united states in 1950, he said, you know what? you have realistic expectations and you really want military assessment and we have no interest in fighting and that's not what we want. you have a totally realistic expectation of aid from the u.s. and this includes eight for $2 billion in 1947. billion with a be. and so there was a huge disparity. and we must understand that he was a foreign-policy realist and he is known for containment because he understands what they wanted. the genius was that what did he say? he just said that we need to understand what is russia about and what did the soviets want.

but unfortunately, the united states was not that keen and they didn't have a pool of experts about pakistan. but most of them were people who were enamored in light india and actually found the idea of pakistan rather unrealistic. many compared it to being compared to jefferson davis is. but once pakistan was about to become a reality, the british suggested that they should develop this kind of relationship. in pakistan, as you know, is full of very hospitable people. pakistan is about to get one third of the british ministry, but only 17% of british resources. they were not going to have a vibrant economy.

and their leaders were unsure about the future of pakistan. so they decided that the value of the nation together will be by saying that pakistan is under pressure. but who would pay for the military? pakistan's founder said that pakistan can leverage extra traffic locations. and get the approval of the united states. in so doing, they would not actually get involved in the american military plans or anything. so from the beginning, it was it was about getting the assistance under more or less false pretenses. and then they started interacting and sold themselves

and they said that miami will become your army if you will give us money and arms. there's a new portion of the book were dallas has a conversation with walter lippman and he says to him that we can't fight communism without the good guys on our side and that is why i have signed on pakistan. and then if they are not a pakistani, they are at least moslems and of course, whitman points out that they are not muslims either, they are hindus. so they sort of typical american politician who didn't know the details between what he wanted was what comes to being an ally of the united states and pakistan was willing to be an ally and india was not. so that had an ability in this

relationship. but within a few years, the secretary of state said it was a mistake to seek out allies and arnon and then i will not give us an ability to fight for which we are alarming them. they never gave troops for korea or for the country of laos when the americans asked them. so this is how the mistake was made. the assumption that once we have equipped the army and armed it, we will be able to make them change the focus and we found out early on that the focus is india and not the soviet union. but if we engaged long-term and make good relationships, has

anything changed? my fear after serving as ambassador is that some of the same processes linger and there are people who think that we need just a little bit more financially than we can change this country's perception and there are people like me who view pakistan's national interest very differently and that the primary interest should be to educate the people and build a more prosperous country, but that is not their real intelligence it is the establishment. >> let's talk about how the military establishment has developed its moral view. you have talked about this in your book, the fact that pakistani leaders, instead of basing foreign policy on facts, that it is based through this

prison. so could you talk a little bit about the evolution and as he referred to it? as you strengthen it, and to weaken it, over time i think you talk about the beginning stages after pakistan was established. and he had a different view and he saw the country in a more peerless deck light and his mom was part of the identity of the nation. it was certainly democracy. so what changed? >> the independence came down suddenly. the idea of pakistan was wounded. they were moved by the idea of having a separate country of their own. no one talked about the details and in all my searches that have

done another book before this, the relationship between the mosque and military and in all my research, most people haven't been able to understand what the new plan for the country. it ended up being two things in east pakistan through 1971. it had a majority in the american majority would've been either from amongst the migrants or from the province of pakistan. so you ended up having the potential for interethnic disagreement early on. certain ethnic groups do not agree with that.

and all of these theories blasted the potential which was not a realistic potential because they said we want to be friends with you, but the pakistani leaders talked about keeping this insecurity around will result in hate and the tensions within the country. so they just chose to make pakistan slam the national estate and of course there were riots that created to another problem. they would've had 22% among the minorities. it does not really make it easy. but it resulted in a situation with a population of muslims

declined 16% within two years and then over the years there are only 3%, a very small minority. then came the islamization and then i look at it that the military did not have the resources to allocate and therefore pakistan and economic development got undermined. it has helped so much. but it hasn't cleared the economic base and pakistan's exports as a percentage of gdp are half of what the exports are of other comparable size energy market countries.

the taxes are one third of the amount of taxes are collected in other countries and the foreign investment is one third compared to other countries. so pakistan just doesn't have a lot of diplomatic focus. they were the political, shall we say, one individual was assassinated and he was the other big leader. there were too many politicians squabbling to bring stability. in the military can usually send streetlights. so the military then decided let's not have been in the terminal argument, let's decide what it is and teach it in schools and they have been teaching this in schools and they themselves are secular and

the thought that they could teach people something to not have consequences in that position isn't a erroneous position. so the next generation has been more and more islamist and the founding fathers. >> host: that brings us to the point that not only is there the islamist national foreign policy, but there's also high levels of anti-american sentiment within the population. but what your book points out is very interesting is that a lot of this is actually inspired by pakistan and the leadership in order to convince the americans to be scared into supporting him. and in other words they may allow fewer demonstrations that they can argue that you have to support us, otherwise we won't

be able to control these anti-american impulses of the society and this is something that is extremely frustrating. the obama administration, when hillary clinton was secretary of state, you write about this. but she confronts the pakistanis on this and says to the senior leadership in this behind closed door meeting that why would you put articles in the newspaper and she was particularly miffed. because her efforts to push forward and carry this bill provided 7 billion in u.s. civilian systems to pakistan over a period of five years, which is a huge deal getting abe been like this password as soon as it was passed past time you had a great deal of criticism

that seem to be coming from the pakistani military circles because they were unhappy when military aid was one of the condition and so they were criticizing the whole package. so it's counterintuitive. >> yes, here is the thing. that is why the misunderstanding is so easy to come across. the reason i say that is the americans took it at face value. if there is a demonstration permit so yes, there could be people coming against us. there are many revelations in my book and i've really delved into this declassified as they got to the formal presidential libraries, in order to find material. >> any been a part of these meetings.

>> yes in these meetings which the americans officially would say they are not true, both sides had a different narrative. so then i decided that i needed to investigate. and then they would save because of the drum strikes and may have been there for only a few years. but the truth is that the american embassy was burned down in 1979 and the earliest anti-american demonstrations was as early as 1948, and so what is the truth? i have found the first time american officials complained about this because pakistan did not exist at that time was in 1946 in the muslim league was still demanding the creation of

pakistan and east always throw slurs at america and say that the americans sort of are becoming the world's new superpower but they don't really care about this and et cetera. so i investigated this all the way to the first complaint and the fact of the matter is that early on, pakistan's problem was getting attention. people in america do not know about this at that time. and so there were a lot of anti-american demonstrations as the country was emerging, its people are potentially hostile. so how do we attract american attention in america, remember, was focused on the cold war. as they would've said, by the

way, we need your help to fight in the answer was what can i get it. you know? we can help you. so we had to find people with whom you had a solution in the way to attract that was in regards to the implications for the middle east, authorities, you need to take it seriously and you need to take it seriously in a military sense, not just in providing technical assistance or food aid. unfortunately it has created a dysfunction and now sometimes the hostility that we have generated as a means of leveraging the relationship actually out of hostility with what kind of relationship you want to have.

and you see that as we try to get this out in the streets to help initiate posture and that's often to say that i'm pro-american, but my people are not, and therefore there are limits as to what i can do for the u.s. but in the process, we ended up doing was he could do less and less for the alliance and from the american point of view, the problem in my opinion has been there are very few american officials that are beginning to talk straight and i have dealt with the state department, many people in the state department. they don't want to confront leaders of other countries, which is why actually praise him for going to pakistan and seeing

things and saying things that needed to be said. one of her commenters to the greatest criticism, but no one in pakistan knows where bin laden is. but lo and behold, he is found in pakistan. what she was trying to do was trying to bring out into the open a lot of the difficult discussions and we were having a private. in my view is that ford this relationship to be followed, more that needs to be part of the complaints and it could be based upon these perceptions, especially crafted and contrite perceptions. >> i think you are right. i think that hillary clinton had this unique ability to talk in a straightforward fashion in

pakistan and she was so very much liked by the average pakistani. >> yes, she wants. and you know, you can't have justice for the average american diplomat would also be willing to sometimes say, excuse me, but that's not how it happened. be factually correct. because time after time, pakistani officials say that america let pakistan down the many have said, you also let us down we ask you for troops in korea and troops in laos when we asked you to assist in the afghanistan war. so yes, we have done a few

things and what kind of discussion would have created less delusions? it would have created less confusion and there would've been less misunderstanding with people willing to be more honest with one another. >> host: is it the end of your book that sometimes u.s. officials find, at least with what they really think. >> yes, it's a very interesting situation in the book. but it's very interesting. eisenhower becomes president in 1953 and gets reelected in 1956 and he sends the editor of a small-town newspaper called

monitor and the editor is james linguine and he offers a support and goes on for six months and he writes that what we doing? allowing this military, nobody in this military wants to fight the soviets and there's no one to be part of this and the anti-communist activity. in their arms will end up being used against them and this in this as 1927. nobody takes note. but eisenhower starts to say that having a huge mistake by seeking out an ally and building it up without realizing that that allies primary objectives are not the same as us?

and that is eisenhower and lyndon johnson. when he becomes president he actually steers away from john f. kennedy's policy and distancing it from pakistan. and he said it is important to be as kind to pakistan as possible. and he says, okay, we will try to get you to be part of the current country. and then in 1968 as he is leaving, he finally says to his team that i think my decision to support pakistan, i believe i went overboard and made mistakes. and nixon is the only one who is pro-pakistan throughout the infamous 1971 roll based on the assumption that pakistan is

america's ally and despite american help, india did when in america was accused of supporting the genocide and then we fast-forward with president reagan who gets involved with afghanistan in my book points out how the project started long before. it was a pakistani project supported by the u.s. and they ran the operation. but towards the end, george herbert walker bush becomes president and realizes that some of those are now being diverted and he threatens pakistan with

accusing it of being a state sponsor of terrorism. basically he writes this in his memoirs that he realizes that we should have been warned earlier that he wasn't going to devote all the energies to fighting terrorists. >> you're talking about u.s. presidents. but we can also talk about admiral mullen as well. he is someone who met with the general 26 times in four years, and i think that, you know, you thought that by developing a personal relationship, the more that he could get to know him and build trust, the greater that pakistan would do the things that the u.s. was demanding, like cracking down on the upcoming network. but when you found at the end of

september 2011, that pakistan had not changed and it was still supporting the groups and i think that what really angered him and save these statements when he said the network is a veritable arm of the isi. >> guest: yes, it's just a coincidence at times. >> host: we talked about how but how connie network -- haqqani network has a deadly attack against u.s. forces. >> just come in at a deadly attack on the u.s. embassy in cabo. >> yes, that happened maybe a week before admiral mullen testified in a helpful detail of that conversation between a and the u.s. government in

relationship to that attack and my book because i was part of that as the ambassador. as i see it wasn't just admiral mullen. there has been a perception that if we can find just the right leader, especially in the military, he will be able to turn on the state of pakistan and it is a erroneous conclusion. sometimes you have to combat a narrative with the narrative. if the narrative is, you know, that we have a special place in the world and therefore some of the global rules don't apply to us, we told the americans that we are not making this and we keep getting their aid, but then in the end we tested the nukes that we said we were not making, maybe we did something -- and if nothing else we broke a promise

and that can only be combated by a narrative. his view that we develop a personal relationship will help us. admiral mullen was not the first in their others who are duly mentioned in my book. and again, there was a phenomenon going on repeatedly meeting with the pakistani leader in building relations and admiral mullen worked very hard, 26 meetings with anyone, that's a lot of meetings. and he thought that the chairman was really committed to eliminating terrorism. and he wanted to find that tipping point in his desire to

maintain military balance with india and he could find that tipping point and they could focus more on terrorism is a problem. >> he didn't notice that part of the attitude in relation to india is what another secretary of state had told the president that the pakistani issues, if they were extensive, we could find a solution. don't have so many troops along the border, but the fear of india is essentially psychological, psychopolitical, you can't do anything about it.

when kennedy insisted that they discussed his future, the meetings were held and the indians offered pakistan a substantial amount and said that we made that adjustment in pakistan's position was all or nothing. and even now, pakistan says that it feels that afghanistan has fallen under the influence. but india's influence comes from economic influence to spend $2 billion which pakistan cannot match because it's smaller and it's not going fast enough. so what pakistan really needs is to address its own dysfunction and have a holistic big picture. ..

kids make your thighs bigger than your neighbor. so it is an advantage to the indiana. pakistanis to get one thing with india and everything. pakistan has weapons that can be

achieved. not pakistanis to trade with everybody in the neighborhood, address its economic sanctions, but the 40% of the children who don't go to school in school and make sure pakistan's operation doesn't continue to rise at a pace that none of those things can be addressed league-leading relations between american military personality. >> host: to fast-forward look at relations to the past two years, we have definitely seen in a relationship zone particularly over the rate they have interesting information about a meeting that took place

in 1998, when the clinton administration was planning to do attacks on al qaeda camps in afghanistan in retaliation for al qaeda's bombing two u.s. embassies in africa. the u.s. administration was in a quandary because they did not want to inform pakistan had a ton about these attacks because they thought the pakistani isi would tip off al qaeda and other militants about the attacks. at the same time, the missiles will be fine to airspace. in order to resolve this, the clinton administration sent a very trusted u.s. counterpart for the pakistanis with the senior pakistani -- >> guest: somebody out there was sent --

[inaudible] >> host: but anyway, i just thought -- so that he could be they are and tell them both, by the way -- >> guest: the missiles fly to your airspace towards afghanistan. >> host: let me ask you, given that this was done at that time period, wouldn't it make sense that the obama administration did the same kind of alerting to the pakistani military leadership during or right before the raid? do think this is possible? >> guest: i think the point of view of optics, but normal practice between allies would have been prudent to have some kind of an arrangement whereby the pakistanis were told that we are conducting an operation in the territory. but here's the problem. the obama administration had

reached the conclusion they made an effort. ambassador richard holbrooke made what he called the grand argument they deal. problems addressed in an arrangement whereby pakistan just got out of of the jihad became. that hadn't worked in their opinion. the suspicion of the packet in a military and intelligence services in the packet and e.g. hiding out for were so high that is the question of the risks. even in 1998, even when they did it, all the senior leaders had left the place. you know, so there were some people who can object to what it could have been. what if why the american generals have been someone from the dinner table when sanusi

cell phone in their bathroom and alerted, what if? there's no evidence it had been. there's a reason to believe it happened. that is the reason why everybody left. nobody significant and al qaeda listed in the the 1980s strike. so because of that background, president obama decided not to inform pakistan before hand. another option would have been to do it jointly. but then again, there's the question of how do we make sure? because the problem emerged in the case of an amen i was bit by a personal saga, been removed from the ambassador's allegations of treason stores pakistan, et cetera that the order has become so poisoned comb and it is toxic relationship. and so, what if the military

operation has been conducted in the end they had found osama bin laden's children is not osama bin laden? then, could president obama have lived with that? would've been a very difficult thing for him to the american public. the third thing the obama administration considered any fine details in the book and i hope people who are watching this will buy the book and read it is the kind of implicitly offered to assist, we did it alone. but you know what, we can both tell the world that we did it jointly. so don't object to are having violated your sovereignty and we will not get into, you know, how we did it without publicly. there are people who actually attempted to do that. but then within two to three days, and what i call this sort

of narrative machine and pakistan got into the act and people stop asking the question, why was osama bin laden in our country, which was the more relevant question and started asking the question, how dare the americans come and violate our sovereignty? my point is that in most nations, peoples perceptions are actually the result of what they are doing. in the case of pakistan, the pakistani media has even been controlled. veracity now, it's in terms of the media. the narrative in the media is controlled by either the intelligence service or the military. we've seen one of the things they spoke out against was the death of a pakistani aroma time he was stepping down as chairman of joint chiefs the pakistani journalist said, without going

into detail but americans had intelligence that the decision to eliminate this had been taken from hyundai one packet and. now, if that is the alignment, obviously the belief in the views of the nations are being adopted. i mean, there is a reason. i should be teaching the university of karachi, not boston university. i should be running a think tank in karachi or islamabad, not be at the institute in washington d.c. but if you think about whether hawala are cause for girls or rather as myself who calls for a review of pakistan's foreign policy or whether it was before she returned, anyone whose worldview is different to the islamist nationalist pakistani attempt to you, is forced out.

and that narrative makes it impossible for cooperation between pakistan and the united states, especially counterterrorism because the narrative continues to be sympathetic. you haven't asked the question. the world nuclear has not been featured in our conversations. pakistan's nuclear designs to countries. if it had happened in any other country, he would he considered a criminal. and pakistan county continues to be seen as a hero for enabling a nuclear weapon. all of these dysfunctional aspects of pakistan's life make it very difficult for an american president to say, you know what, i'm not going to take out osama bin laden if i do not have pakistani cooperation. be not well, one wonders how long this narrative can be sustained in this idea that

pakistan -- the view that pakistanis have of their own country is so divergent from the way the rest of the world sees pakistan. i believe it is partly because of this narrative that the military and the isi is striving in the confusion about who is the enemy? what is the terrorist threat? you can look at the differences between the reactions, the terrorist strikes that have been in nairobi, kenya, where the kenyan leadership was very clear that al-shabaab was part of al qaeda, that they wanted to cooperate with the u.s. and counterterrorism efforts. where is impacted and, you had this dual suicide bombing of a church, killing over 85 people. but really, confusion reigned. there was no mention of al qaeda, the fact that the two rekey television, which implicates the bombing actually is like an arm of al qaeda.

>> one of the pakistani politicians, imran hohn, even to the extent of insinuating that the bombing was essentially some kind of a force like operation to try and do the people of packet and not to go ahead with the proposal to have talks with the ttp. i mean, i don't know if you're familiar with what the vice national when jeb universe and pakistan come he's a physicist. he even came to the united states on a fulbright. he's written a book on 9/11 in which basically he says -- [inaudible] he says that actually the world is run by bankers, american and british bankers. he also insinuated coming in now, he also has anti-semitic rules there.

and then he says he controlled the world by planting microchips in the brains of people. so my point is, this guy is the vice chancellor, head of the university and they don't say hey, the university. so that is a state of denial. and you asked at the very outset, why did i feel compelled to write this book? the truth is the same reason i was compelled to read my earlier book. somebody has to put out and historically correct narrative. the previous book had hundreds of pakistan armies at one time protesting. when i was ambassador, there was that one time copies of the book circulated to the media highlighting his critical of the pakistani military. i'm not criticizing the pakistani military to harm it. i'm trying to correct its

course. as a citizen, i should have that right. the book pointed out how pakistan's military impacts and radical groups had worked together for much longer than he blunders and in belief and realized. this book, "magnificent delusions: pakistan, the united states, and an epic history of misunderstanding", this is meant again to set the record rate. i don't give any free pass to the americans for all dems takes. both the mistakes that were made in an attempt to be nice to pakistan and mistakes that were made through the cynicism of individuals. but again, hundreds of citations and references on the nothingness manufactured. that is why say sometimes people ask me in washington, what do you think would set things right between packets and in the

united states? eisai narrative change. my people face the truth. pakistan is not economically backward because the world is denying that the right to be nuclear reference. now, pakistan has actually missed opportunities on the economic front. >> host: then you have to ask the question, if this is just stuck there and it doesn't matter what the u.s. does and pakistan is not going to give them in terms of its policy of supporting some terrorist groups and, you know, continue the confusion among the packet any people about the real threat of terrorism in the country, with the u.s. be better off ignoring pakistan rather than continuing to try to work with a country that is in denial? you get to the point where, you know, how does the u.s. -- if it

has tried everything in the, 40 billion in aid, trade and pakistan on the list of state-sponsored terrorism as he said in the early 90s. >> guest: if you see that whole episode in my book, you'll find the pakistanis never thought it was credible. and here's the point. you see, there's a lot of options between ignoring and embracing common between shooting someone in taking them out for dinner. the united states needs to explore those. but the first step would be good for pakistan. it can make it for the united states to get over this view of the other is the bad ally. the truth is there no alliance. the enemy for most people in

pakistan's military intelligence services and the establishment of india, not the terrorists. in fact, in many cases the terrorists or potential allies. and similarly, fourth united states, during the cold war, the enemy was expansionary communism are expanding communism. after that, it is in terrorism. in neither case has pakistan been the ally of the americans. my view is that pakistan and the united states don't need to become adversaries. they shouldn't. they should avoid that. but they need to have a more honest, more reality-based discourse and get away with these assumptions, the pakistani assumption that we are so geographically -- the relocated in such an important area geographically that america needs us more. they can't do anything in afghanistan without us.

look, if the united states could supply berlin, it surely can do with afghanistan if it feels it is necessary. seeing things that we can't do without pakistan, we saw with the american leaders to reinforces the dilution on the american side, if pakistan keeps the economy, the assistance is significant. pakistan at some point is to collect access. pakistan at some point means to reform its own economy. so it a be a good idea for someone to tell the pakistanis to reform fares to give billions of dollars of american investment because it is meant go, there's billions of dollars of american investment in taiwan, south korea. have you ever heard of the pakistani brand that is significant? wynonna? at the nation of hundred

80 million people are in can be a very project is people. but if you do not educate our people, if the university leaders feepaying conspiracies rather than how the world really works, if you deal with the europeans are the americans look at the microchip planted in your head that was making not a good islam, that is not going to go up to have the ambition of being the leading member of the information to allergy business example in silicon valley. so that leads to change. but that change can only come for america's space. you know what, we are not eyeing the narrative. and we're not going to become the of it. and at the same time, they keep pointing out what is and is not in america's interests, while allowing the packet and is to host their interests.

postcode now i think that is the great point. if the u.s. simply stops buying into the narrative, you know, some people talk about pakistan holding a gun to its head. i'll shoot myself if you don't provide this aid or you don't do this. it's like taking hostages. so if the u.s. can just stop listening to the pakistani line, which apparently has been the same for 50, 60 years now. to read your book, i think you should be asserted a textbook for any u.s. policymaker dealing with pakistan so they can go into the relationship come in knowing what they are going to hear and get past that because it's not only understanding the limits to what pakistan is capable of, but also understanding the dire armageddon scenarios that if you don't do this, pakistan is going to implode, you know, not

believing those as well. >> guest: and implosion in pakistan will harm and hurt the people of pakistan the most. so if pakistanis is that as a bargaining token for a foreign policy leverage, that's not a very smart thing. they should be concerned about the implosion for pakistan state. but to talk about why this post will were similar narratives to be used repeatedly with separated different admin is ration. i have an explanation for that. >> guest: yeah, you said in your book that i think erasure reeve you are quoting when sharif was prime minister. >> guest: he turned around and said americans now look at his early. they just want damage and as long as we can set aside on the immediate concern, they're not going to look too deep. >> host: he says there is always somebody to define --

>> guest: you can always find somebody in washington d.c. who will be waiting to lobby for us, to agree with us, to support us. it's all about finding the right price and the right people. that was -- you know, i have minutes of those meetings, et cetera that i've cited. it's interesting because it gives not only the u.s.-pakistan relationship. i sometimes think that working with the u.s.-pakistan relationship has also made me understand some of the weaknesses in america's foreign policy, how decisions are made. i often say americans are the only in the world where when you say that's history, what you really mean is that the relevant. but in other nations in their case, it is not irrelevant. history matters in history actually illustrates the path for the future. >> host: well, let's hope

people read this. especially people in the administration will learn how to deal with pakistan and of course this is a great book for anybody who wants to know more about the history of the u.s.-pakistan relationship. i can't do a better person to be able to tell that history is somebody who has served as the ambassador here. and so, thank you very much for discussing her book. it's a wonderful book. i highly recommend it to anybody who'd like to learn more about pakistan. thank you. >> does "after words," booktv signature program on which authors are enacted by policymakers, legislators and others familiar with the

material. "after words" airs at the beacon on booktv at 10:00 p.m. on saturday, 12:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on sunday to 12:00 a.m. on monday. you can also watch "after words" online. go to look tv.org and click on "after words" in the booktv series and topics list on the upper right side of the page. >> on wednesday november 20, booktv will be live from the 64 in a national book awards on c-span2 and booktv.org. coming up, we present the five finalists for nonfiction. in this blogcamellia from new yorker staff writer george packer, author of the unwinding. his account of the last 30 years in the united states. then, harvard university professor, joe lepore, author of the cages examines the life of benjamin franklin's sister, jane franklin. this is followed by alan taylor, author of the internal enemy, who recounts the impact of slaves in virginia hunt on the war of 1812.

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