africa and -- africom has the governmental outreach in the region and as it is fitting that you would all be here. i want to begin with a question. you've each organized your questions virtually around the reports on the four countries individually, talking about the united states bilateral activities that protect to each. there's dory, you mentioned the efforts to promote their cooperatiocooperationand i woulo address what is going on regionally, what do you do regionally that tries to link any or all of these countries together and possibly beginning with scotians of the current status of the trans- sahara counterterrorism partnership, but it does seem like there are some regional opportunities executive of the regional cooperation that is the current status with can we do more to promote it?

>> mr. chairman, let me start with a few general comments. as i think you indicated in your remarks and i think that all of us have underscored the region as a whole has a great importance and a lot to offer in terms of security and u.s. interests. so one of our challenges has been to ensure through our diplomatic and other engagements that we can work with the governments of all four countries in ways that support each other. and clearly as i was underscoring in my remarks i think that rocco and algeria -- morocco and algeria can be helpful to libya so one of the issues the colleague can address is to try to use those strengths to security support throughout the region. likewise, in terms of economic development, unfortunately it is a region in which it isn't sufficient economic integration that drives down the economic prospects of the region. so one of our efforts come and

again some of the lines of activity that we are seeking to try to break down the barriers and encourage that kind of joint economic effort. the countries of the region do provide a love of value. morocco comes to mind and is the center of a moderate islam center which is looked to throughout the region as a place to try to help operate some of the extremists and to try to have that kind of influence broad beyond its borders and we try to work with them to leverage that in the maghreb and the sahill. >> other comments on the regional cooperation? >> pardon me, yes, one of the very specific things we are doing is also under the g-8 member bella and specifically to have launched the transition

fund where this is actually a multilateral partnership that is intended to provide the assistance that bolsters reform efforts across the middle east and north africa but also for some economic collaboration coordination and some economic growth. through the fund of the u.s. is helping to marshal this international resource to advance the economic reforms. the fund is administered by the world bank and proposals crafted by the government in part or ships with the international financial institution. premier league provides technical assistance to support these economic reforms and opportunities for trade and a tries to build institutions define reform and strengthen government policies. so, that is one of a very significant fund that is designed to actually bring the region together. it specifically is limited to countries in the partnership which is jordan, tunisia, egypt, and libya.

>> can you talk about the trans- sahara -- trans-sahara and how successful that effort has been? >> senator, i would be glad to. i thought it was important to emphasize the regional dynamics that are so critical when you are looking at the transnational threats and transnational flows across the borders. one of the challenges that we face as the u.s. government is in terms of our implementation area we typically implement on a bilateral basis through our embassies. but tstcp is a place for close to a decade at this point that really seeks to have broad effects in the way they are aligned whether they are usaid resources, dod or state department resources. so, i think that we have had success aligning ourselves to consider the regional side of

the coin and how do our african partners present themselves. when you look across the continent of africa, the regional institutions or at different stages of development and each part of the continent, and even the part that we are focused on duty and north africa that union for example is the relevant entity and its less institutionally developed than some of the other regional organizations in west africa for example has a very strong economic component to it as well as a security component. so, i think that we continually look for opportunities to strengthen the existing regional institutions and event to work in regional ways when we can. a very concrete example for the department of defense would be when we are working with governments to host the literary exercises and we seek to involve participants from multiple other countries beyond the actual post

nation where the exercise is to be conducted. >> thank you. a couple questions for morocco is sp10 if i can start with you. you referenced a project that is good to be announced between the united states and morocco in connection with the kings visit. can you elaborate on that a little bit? >> yes. it's actually a five-year newly revised strategic country development plan that we do, and we try to do it every five years where we actually focus on the kind of -- whether we need to shift our programming and business and we worked closely with the moroccan government. in this particular five-year strategy that we will be addressing this afternoon, we are focusing on continuing to build strong civil society organizations so that they can participate in the political process. we are also focusing on our continued support for education, improving the education system because at this point there are

significant issues related to the early dropout and underachievement. and then we are also in line with shifting a little sore focus across the region is to focus on a charge of development and job programs. and how do we actually help the young people in morocco and in the region to have the job skills and leadership skills to get jobs that are relevant to the private sector that is looking for employment. >> if i could ask you to talk little bit about -- first before i ask the question to the point that was made about morocco along with algeria is the capacity to be an example for the other nations, tunisia and libya. it's better to have an example here at home than to have to point out an example far away. morocco's history into som and f

the advances and opportunities for women and the commercial and the civic sphere are strong examples i think we should be highlighting. so a couple of questions if you would. i know a continued challenge i referenced has been the status of the western sahara and that is a challenge that is in the province right now and is a source of tension between morocco and algeria and if the borders are one of the challenges in the region, disputed territory, suggests to me a potential vulnerability. i'm sure it's a natural born ability as well. the situation has been in kind of a diplomatic state for some time, but can you talk about the current status and with the u.s. policy is with respect to a resolution? >> i would be happy too and you were correct to point out that this is a long-standing source of tension and unfortunately among the countries in the

region as well to the issue is solved. our position is that we fully support the efforts and are very fortunate to have a very able diplomatic ambassador chris roth as the envoy to continue to resolve this issue and he's been out there numerous times recently to talk to the various parties. there have been some viable proposals need to come and we certainly want, and ultimately we think there should be and could be a peaceful and agreed solution, but the party will be the ones that ultimately have to make that resolution. we continue to put our support behind the secretary general and ambassador chris roth to try to move the issue forward. for the time that you would foresee i know it has been an open-ended issue now year after

year. >> it's hard to speculate but one might hope the current dynamics where there is change underway i think just thinking underway with ambassador ross's engagement in the diplomatic skills and the international community, one can certainly hope that we will begin to see a new way forward that might bring this to a resolution. >> what is your assessment of the reform efforts taken by king mohammed since the era -- arab awakening? >> he began to make reforms that were well received and we were supportive of those reforms. that effort has continue as i've pointed out under the new constitution. they have now had elections into the islamist led government and we have seen the changes so it is a dynamic government situation which i think it's han very well received by the

people. at the same time i also think that they are speaking more and more to bring in the kind of values and principles that we have long since promoted. i think you reference to the fact that women and youth and various minorities now really do enjoy an improved situation and more opportunities. so, we just want to continue. i think the kings visit will give the opportunity to continue to work with the moroccans as they seek to move further down the path that kind of [the arab awakening. >> and the exception to the political power of the islamist led government to disturb the relationship of the united states that is generally gone n. a continuous way with the industry of good relations. >> it's a little bit different than perhaps the other context but absolutely the fact that this resulted from the constitutional changes that clearly understood to be free and fair elections and that is

the government. that's been a positive example from the progressive change. >> if you can talk specifically about how the moroccan military has been as a partner dealing with the aqim threat. we've had a very strong relationship over many years. the training activities that we do in terms of the exercises that we do. focus on al qaeda and the affiliate is central into the type of conversations at the moroccan military. we've been very encouraged even though morocco is not a neighbor with the event and in the past two years and the consideration

of the work they are doing to support and the source that is iof thatis in place of the multl peace force and they provided a field hospital to that and they are in the process of providing training that will be religious training. to help with the dimensions of the violent extremism. so even well beyond their borders morocco has had a history of participation in the peacekeeping operations and continues to be quite engaged in the region. in hosting the border security ministerial in the last couple of weeks but was attended by its neighbors in north africa of the leadership well beyond the borders. >> what we ask a question to

begin observation i may be right or may be wrong and tell me if i'm wrong if i'm wrong. algeria from outside review seem to have some challenges. for examples youth unemployment and disaffected youth and though it also seems from outside review that it hasn't been set with significant civil unrest. is that correct and how do you interpret that absence of civil unrest is a notable thing in the region, and i would kind of like to get your opinion about that. >> i would be happy to offer our review. algeria was a considerable resource and therefore a certain amount of wealth. the resources match the population they try to provide opportunities with the large

cohort in terms of the marketing free-market development and those kind of things. the government has been fairly successful in directing its resources in ways that have supported the people and as a result they've maintained a certain level of stability. the algerian military has had its own experience sadly. that has enabled them to be very battled hardened in a significant security part or. you describe that relationship. kind of along the lines that they offer assistance to other nations and other actual or kind of by example or technical training based on the experiences that they have had. >> senator come as you reference, they have had an experience i internally dealing with aqim and of a

counterterrorism force at this point. they have been working to focus on securing their borders in the past year and a half or so with all of the events, and i think that is well known. but what is less known and we have encouraged them to speak more about it is the support of the provided to some of their neighbors in the sahill when it comes to training and equipment assistance into the counterterrorism operating force and their own borders they are facing their expertise as with other partners. and in terms of the relationship with the u.s. we have a growing relationship with the algerians particularly in recent times where we are having additional dialogues as it pertains to counterterrorism and we are sharing information. they are very interested for example with improvised

explosive devices and some of the tactics and techniques and procedures that the united states has developed in the course of operations in afghanistan and iraq. and this is something within the algerian context where aqim to these kind of continued evolution on their part there is a growing threat forming the basis of some of the collaborations that we have at this point both in terms of again information sharing as well as looking at equipment that we would be able to share. >> is romanowski, maybe i'm wrong on this, but usaid doesn't currently have the programs in algeria we have been launching with our combating terrorist extremist program, but the

program we continue to do with morocco in a mission we have had for a long time. >> is the status of only limited activity weekly to change in terms of the planning and the foreseeable future? >> i don't see anything on the horizon that would enable us to do that. but when we have opportunities, particularly with respect to the regional programs, we will take every opportunity we can. >> on tunisia, and this may be a question for all of you if you care to, but starting with mr. schmierer. a number of things have gone well, but the two political assassinations obviously have led to significant unrest, some of them probably productive civil unrest that see this as in the direction we want to go but if you could talk about how that

factors into the ongoing dialogue. >> as you noted, tunisia is the birthplace of the arab spring and the ongoing awakening. and so, i think that everybody is looking to try to help tunisia get through what is turning out to be a difficult challenge. the political assassinations of earlier this year have led to a call for a national dialogue and a transitional government. the steps that are needed to be taken first is the parties need to select an independent figure to be the leader of the caretaker government. and right now, the parties are regrouping to try to get to that point. once that has been agreed to, then once the legislature approves that, then there will be the legislator will see the nine-member electoral monitoring board and then they will develop a new electoral law and set the date for new elections and adopt a new constitution.

that is the procedure that will happen in a national buy a lot effort. >> do each of the countries have their own peculiarities and one in tunisia i find fascinating is the trade union federation. if you can kind of describe a ds a part of the national dialogue the role that the trade union federation plays and is it likely to continue to play that kind of role going forward or will that likely alter the national by a lot? >> as you pointed out it is a very strong institution and has been for sometime and so clearly all of the parties involved will be in shoring that they work with and coordinates with the trade union. it will be hard to predict i will anticipate that will continue because it has been an institution of long-standing. but there are dynamics at play where potentially you could see other powers emerge because they

are still kind of getting into that new period following the revolution but i think one would anticipate a strong role by the trade union conference to read. >> and then ms. dory, you talk about the role of the aqim affiliates and other groups if you could. >> tunisia has focused on the political process as it needed to, but there's been a growing realization in particular with ansar al-sharia recognizing that was outside of the boundaries of a political entity within their political process. the tunisian military has faced recent challenges in terms of attacks against then military in

their positioning among the algerian border and are in the process of undertaking a connecticut series of engagements against ansar al-sharia and other extremist organizations in their country. so that is something that we need to continue. the possibility that they flow through tunisia given the challenges associated with the borders with libya. >> overshadowed by the benhazi attack is that it was also attacked within a few days thereafter. thank goodness not in such a serious way and that is one of the reasons it was overshadowed what have we done what we need to do to learn the lessons from that attack as well and provide additional security as is needed to our diplomatic personnel?

>> i would say very strongly yes as you are aware of her top priority is the security of our people, of our facilities and of americans abroad. and as you suggest, that was a very unfortunate incident, but one which has caused us to redouble our assessment and our efforts in terms of security. i know the ambassador has been very active on both the physical security of the procedural measures to ensure that our embassy in tunisia is secure and has what it needs to ensure its security. >> one last question before libya. there does appear that the united states i has a very comprehensive approach to tunisia for security assistance, economic assistance and millennium challenge corporation threshold programs and potential support for an eventual free-trade agreement. are we getting good cooperation from other international partners in trying to devote

this comprehensive approach to, you know, increasing stability and then eventually prosperity in tunisia? >> on the political front, absolutely. we are in close contact with allies and with other countries in the region that also share our goals of stabilizing and helping tunisia moved forward and that is true throughout the region of all of these transitioning countries. and so that is one great success story is a common commitment on the part of us and like-minded nations of europeans or others to support these countries is particularly here in tunisia in making a successful transition. >> moving to a few questions before we move onto the second panel, ms. dory you talked about the distraction of chemical weapons and i don't want that to be lost for all of the significant challenges that remain the distraction of a chemicathechemical weapon stocko something that is very, you

know, important to note and to praise our efforts. did you indicate a date on which we believe that libyan stockpile will be completely eliminated? >> the current projection is by the end of the year. >> can you describe the volume of the chemical weapon stockpiles that we have been dealing with in trying to do the destruction? >> i can. we have been working to destroy in the first instance a series of munitions that included artillery shells, hundreds of artillery shells, bombs and other munitions cartridges. so they significant stockpile of munitions and there were other materials that will need to be destroyed as well from the production of those munitions. >> if we could let talk about the militia. some have called for an international effort of international peacekeeping force to try to begin an engagement surrounding a massive disarmament efforts among the

militia. is that a realistic proposal or kind of described with her that is a good idea and what we should be doing to advance it if it is a good idea? >> that is not the approach that we are supporting as i mentioned. right out, italy and the uk we are all committed to helping standup this general-purpose force and the dod colleagues will be central implementors on that. as the means of copin coping wiu establish the internal security which is currently not their so we think that will be the way to address the internal security issues in libya. >> mr. schmierer you indicated that the training of the general-purpose would be at a level of about 5,000 people that would be trained. >> our commitment coming out was five to 8,000 innocents that time of the italians into the ae british have also indicated a commitment of 2,000 each. those numbers will then be somewhere between five to

10,000. the libyan government is the sponsor and the founder of the effort but obviously with our cooperation we would certainly be coming to the congress for their input and their support for that effort. >> is that general purpose size to be the core and larger force how would that advance the ultimate goal of having a significant and appropriate sized security apparatus? >> i would have to defer to my colleagues debate on the level it would be between five to 10,000 very well trained in the general-purpose for the country of 6 million. so, i singled directly that would really just be a good first start. and then they would institutionalize and go forward and train the trainers kind of effort. >> what is the current status of functioning in the local governments in libya, local

elections, sort of local governments and is the sort of a positive to the national government or is it seen at all as sort of a threat or competition? >> it's kind of a combination because of the local level you do have functioning communities do you have the government alerting services which are operating in support of the people and at the same time, you also have security militias and other instability so that isn't preventing the local governments from doing the basic work that they would be doing. but ultimately that isn't an effective way for them to continue functioning. so yes, basically one of those governments are functioning but it is a very important to get the security part fixed. so they can continue in a positive way. >> they are involved in nato and libya. we continue to have partners in training the general-purpose force but you've indicated in

the united states satisfied with the degree of international participation across the range of the activities that we currently engage in and are there enough partners at the table to help us get a make a difference? >> absolutely. and as we have looked at other elements of the capacity building on the government side, we have very strong commitment from a number of other allies to try to help libyans stand up so to speak of what needs to be developed in the country. so i think the international community has done a good job of both standing up and of coordinating their support. there are a number of planning processes where the idea would be to try to help. what they are lacking is the ability to execute the functions of government area so they have

resources, but they've really don't even have good budgetary execution capabilities. so having the resource hasn't allowed them to address the kind of issues that they face. but we are working with the libyans and with allies and friends to try to conceptualize and then develop and launch an effort to identify and help the libyans stand up and use their resources effectively to address the government challenges that they face. speeone ..

>> dr. william lawrence is currenta visiting professor, political science and international affairs at george washington. from 2011-2013 he was director of the north africa project and prior to that served in a number of positions at the u.s. state department including service at the usmc in tripoli. he spent 12 years in north africa and served with chris stevens in the peace corps in no morocco. frederic wehrey's research has focused on political reform and security issues in the arab gulf states and u.s. policy in the

middle east more broadly. he flew back from libya just yesterday. thank you for accepting our invite when you're so jet lagged where he's been working on and studying the various libyan militias, and, obviously, we look forward to hearing about your most recent experiences. and thomas joscelyn is senior editor of the longmore journal, a publy i case dealing with -- publication dealing with counterterrorism. much of his research focuses on how al-qaeda and its affiliates operate around the world. he was the senior counterterrorism adviser to mayor giuliani and has testified often before congress. if i could begin with dr. lawrence, have each of you do opening statements, we'll get into questions. we are expecting votes to be called sometime between 3:45 and 4, and we'll engage in vigorous questioning until we have to run over to the floor. but, dr. lawrence, welcome and please begin. >> thank you, chairman kaine and

thank you all those who helped organize the panel. as you mentioned, i just spent two years in the region witnessing all this from up close, and a although i'll only be able to cover so much in five minutes, i'm happy to answer questions you have about individual countries and any of the questions you asked the first panel insofar as it doesn't get into the nitty-gritty of u.s. programs. we're still living in what historians call a world historical moment where change happens fast and profound but cacophonous ways. history accelerates, and we often miss most of which is going on and get distracted by things over here and miss what's going on over there. apt comparisons have been made to 1989 and eastern europe and to 1945, but i think the best comparison is to 1848 in which the authoritarians play themselves, the liberals play themselves, the street plays itself, and the marxist spoiler

is replaced by islamist spoilers. even though one country had a regime change in 1848, about 20 countries were profoundly affected, and this began the process of the growth of democracies in europe. of the 18 countries that rose up in 2011, the north african nations played a much larger role than the nations to the east. they incubated over quite a long period. they provided much of the political culture, the slogans, the rap lyrics, the hybriddic ideologies, and north africa continues to be the place where most of the change is taking place in the be arab spring's aftermath. in a lecture i gave entitled days of rage, dreams of trespass, you can hear a lot of this analysis i'm talking about. but suffice to say that today the roots of rage and the dreams of trespass have not subsided in this region. and we can't rely on the media. the media's too underfunded. just take the example of bloody

friday, last friday in tripoli where we had a massacre of civilians in a civilian uprising against militias and very poor media coverage. and this could be a major turning point in the politics of libya and tripoli, and the civilian uprising was much like that after chris stevens' death in benghazi, and yet it gets lost in this environment of big change. that also raises an important quick point i'll make about libya which is that libya's not one big mess, libya's a bunch of little messes that are not very related. so the string of political assassinations in benghazi is very different from the political game involving militias and their gnc allies in tripoli which is different from what's going on at the borders, different from smuggling and trafficking routes in the south, different from ethnic conflicts in other communities. and we tend to conflate this because there's no military, no police. and we do a great disservice to ourselves to not understand all

the different dynamicsing in these different libyan -- dynamics in these different libyan localities. across the north african region, we're talking about major changes every month with national, regional and global causes and effects, and we do ourselves a disservice by focusing on nation-state level changes and ignoring the subnational and international. there are also dozens of ways the information coming from the region gets distorted as it flows through various filters coming to washington. when egypt's going well, the region's going well. and when egypt's doing badly, everyone else is suffering from whatever malady egypt has. whereas tunisia is very much on its own trajectory, it shouldn't be viewed through that egyptian lens. that said, there are regional dimensions to all this, and what we often miss is what is regional. for example, i venture to say that egypt isn't the big problem in north africa right now, syria's the big problem. we have thousands of fighters streaming to syria, hundreds of deaths already of north africans

in syria, and we have blowback effects already starting not unlike the young fighters coming back from afghanistan that had a direct impact on the 1990s happening in algeria. so we do ourself a great disservice by not understanding that by putting the syria conflict on hold, it doesn't contain itself, it rocks the north african region in very profound ways. and take, for example, the flows of jihadists and the flows of weapons, right? we were mostly concerned in 2011 about flows to the west and to the south. now that's not the concern, it's the flows back into libya because the libyan militia's oversold into the black markets, and it increasingly flows to the north and east of libya towards the conflicts that you mentioned. it's also not correct to see the change that happened in north africa as nonviolent. and it's also incorrect to see stability as needing to be our number one goal in the region.

stability for stability's sake as we've learned has destabilizing effects on the region. democratic transitions are unstable. 300 tunisians died in their revolution, and the vast majority of the deaths were pro-revolution libyans fighting and now continuing that fight in syria as i mentioned earlier because they want change in their countries. the other martyrs often get overlooked. assiz si was the first of 400 self-immolations across the region. the majority in algeria. and the majority of these self-immow laters worked in the informal sector. and the international community and the national communities have continued the same economic policies toward the inform lal sectors which don't work. so we continue to exclude from the foreign economies because not enough jobing are being created and from the informal economies and have the this continuing cycle. even this month we've had several new self-immowlations because of despair.

50 percent of the people in these countries work in the informal sector, 30 percent of the economies on average, and we're not doing a good job in terms of job creation and making the informal sector into an engine of growth rather than a problem that needs to be eradicated. north african young people made these revolutions, and they continue to be successful in keeping change happening. but we also shouldn't see them as those kids over there. in many ways it was our investments in vaccinations, our investments in mother-child health care, our investments in education, our investments in the any number of areas that created the youth belt in the first place which is created by mortality p dropping twice as quickly asker if felt's -- fertility's dropping in the region. and many of the revolutionaries studied in american

universities. they are our classmate, our students, and as things continue to unfold, they're wondering why we're not there more. so in many ways, the chickens of successful development policy have come home to roost, and we haven't sufficiently adjusted our assistance policies to take into now account these new realities where big investments in health and education and women and youth on the old models create as many problems as i mentioned earlier as they solve, where the real action right now is the ten million jobs that need to be created for this youth bulge that largess and goodwill created in the first place. i've interviewed over 5,000 young people in the region over many years, and if i've learned anything from these interviews, these are very pragmatic young people who have rejected the old ideologies; nationalist ideologies, socialist ideologies, feminist ideologies, islamist ideologies. and the vast majority are seeking to build reconciled

political spaces where everyone has a seat at the metaphorical dinner table. i remember when youth activists there an islamic group in morocco were crushed when their group left the february 20th movement because they wanted to build a morocco where everyone had a seat at that table, where everyone worked together. so we have populations with higher expectations because of the arab spring and states to quote the new book on security in the region which are managers of violence, to whatever degree these states are to blame for that violence or are simply victims of that violence varies from state to state. but there's no question that all four states need help quelling the increased violence in some of it in the name of democratization and rights, some in the name of jobs and keeping price subsidies and some of the more nefarious forces we've been talking about. but let's not get on the wrong side of democratic change. as we did in some of the cases in the arab spring and always

ask. >> our assistance and in our partnerships how does this policy affect the young people that are trying to emulate our system with their efforts to make political change? as we engage with the governments, we don't often think that way. in security, and i was one of the people that worked at, the tctp, it was a good idea, it hasn't been implemented in as holistic a manner or as it could have. we need to do a lot more on human mights as the head of africom said, we also need to do a lot more on the economic and political reform sides. >> if i could ask you to start to summarize, doctor. >> yes, i'm right at the end. so we need to increase levels of cooperation with all of these countries. i'm very concerned about our light footprint in libya and even in tunisia and algeria where diplomats are very much hunkered down. they do get out with their escorts, but they're very few in number. we don't have enough out there.

we need to get more out to the embassies, in my opinion. i'm optimistic for the long term of the maghreb even though my prediction for the podium term is more mixed. -- medium term is more mixed. they need our hard and soft power and our smart power. thank you. >> thank you, dr. lawrence. doctor wehrey. >> thank you for the opportunity to speak about libya's worsening security crisis and the next steps for u.s. policy in building libya's army. i join you today having flown back last night from a two week trip to tripoli and men gaz is si where i met with a wide range of libyans including parliamentarians, tribal chiefs and islamists about options to improve security. these voices were nearly unanimous is identifying the unifying threat of much of libya's instability in of these disparate conflicts to the power and autonomy of the country's roughly 300 militias. many of which the libyan government has tried to bring under its control by putting them on its payroll.

now, by all accounts this has been a disastrous bargain that has actually given predator militias even greater freedom and even greater latitude. this past weekend i witnessed a remarkable trump of event -- turn of events in tripoli that suggests patience has reached a tipping point to. peaceful protesters marched on a compound demanding that they leave. 46 of these protesters died at the hands of militiamen wielding heavy caliber weapons. the outrage was immediate. civil strikes shut down the city and protests erupted across libya. the message in all of this activism was uniform and clear: we want the militias dismantled, and we want a legitimate army and police to take their place. now, echoing these popular demands, the united states -- as we've heard -- along with italy and britain is considering a land to train and equip a new libyan national army denoted in military terms as a general purpose force.

in theory, the concept is sound. bolster the army to protect elected officials and institutions and compel the militias to disarm. but the plan also carries several risks. unanswered questions about the force's mission, its oversight and its inclusiveness could further polarize an already fractured country. to prevent this from happening, the following five issues and questions regarding the general purpose force need to be resolved. first, its exact role and mission needs to be clarified, and based on by last visit, it's not clear that the libyans have the capacity to determine this at this point. as its name implies, it is meant to be a conventional infantry force that is focused on guarding installations and officials, but what libya really needs is a more specialized gendarmely to tackle narcotics and weapons and low-level insurgency. second, an effective civilian oversight of this force must be in place.

libya does not need to follow a model where armies' self-entitlement and insularity have been fatal for democracy. the libyan revolution was not launched to replace one colonel with another. third, the general purpose force many must act and be perceived as nonpartisan and professional. to prevent it from becoming the private militia of a particular tribe or region or the pa torian guard for a political faction, its recruits must draw from a broad spectrum of libyan society and must be integrated into mixed units. forty, the u.s -- fourth, the u.s. and libyan authorities must properly vet recruits for aptitude, human rights violation and criminal history. recent failures bear this out. an effort to train libyan police last year in jordan collapsed when poorly-screened recruits mutinied against what they perceived as poor conditions. fifth and perhaps most important, the training effort must be accompanied by a parallel program to demobilize

and reintegrate the young men in the militias back into society. these young men must be given economic and social incentives to leave and enter the work force, pursue schooling or join the regular police and army. doing so would deprive militia bosses and cynical politicians of the manpower to obstruct libya's democratic transition. mr. chairman, in the light of the stunning display of public activism and government will that i witnessed this weekend, the u.s. and libya's friends have a window of opportunity to help improve libya's security. but the u.s. needs to proceed cautiously and deliberately. true, establishing an army is an important first step in restoring security. but the militia problem cannot be solved solely by the state's monopolization of force. the militias draw from a wellspring of deep political and economic grievances by libya's long-neglected towns and regions. and better training and equipment alone will not confer

legit has si on the new army -- legitimacy on the new army or compel militias to surrender arms. that will only be obtained through broad political reck reconciliation such as a constitution and a representative government that is able to deliver services across the country. thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. >> thank you, dr. wehrey. mr. joscelyn. >> chairman kaine, thank you very much for having me here to talk about the threat environment in north africa. just by way of quick background be, i come from a little bit different perspective as i'm basically a nerd who studied al-qaeda granularly n. the first panel you heard about what we're doing in north africa, i want to talk about what our enemies are doing. >> good. >> and i'm going to tailor my comments, basically talk about some of the issues you raised in the first panel. the first one is you raised the issue of what we're doing regionally as opposed to the bilateral agreements with individual countries. i think that's exactly the right way to think about it.

our enemies are organized regionally. in fact, al-qaeda in the islamic maghreb is the emirates of a terrorist network. it's set up to set up an islamic state. this is seen throughout much of its history as a pipe dream that had little success until really itself takeover of two-thirds of mali. however, aqim has accelerated operations in a variety of ways. dr. lawrence talked about network effects to syria and elsewhere throughout the middle east, and that's exactly right. basically, you know, this is not just a security problem for north africa, but it affects things throughout the region is and even globally. in october, in fact, the state department and then the u.n. designated a top egyptian terrorist named mohamed jamal ca schiff who was reporting directly to ayman al-zawahiri, some of his trainees took part in the benghazi terrorist attack next year. he's a good example of how this network effect works because he was working with al-qaeda in

the islamic maghreb, he established training camps in the sinai, eastern libya and was even dispatch l fighters to mali. so that's one of many examples i can give you about how this sort of works as a network regionally. the second thing i want to talk about, obviously, al-qaeda's just part of the picture. there's a broad spectrum of issues here which the other witnesses can better speak to than i can. however, one of the things i'd like to talk about is we continually underestimate, i think, what al-qaeda's clandestine plans are for various regions. we've seen in this iraq, we've seen it in yemen and syria where they've taken over a large portion of territory. aqim having taken over mali and been kicked out by the french showed that it had the capacity to do more than just smuggling and kidnaps, that sort of thing. in early october a top operative was captured in tripoli. what's interesting is most of

the press coverage focused on his historical acts on behalf of al-qaeda including the embassy bombings. what i was more interested in was what a report prepared by the library of congress this conjunction with an arm of the defense department concluded bilal libby's role all the way back in august of 2012, and they concluded -- the authors of that report -- that, in fact, he was the clandestine builder of al-qaeda in the wake of the revolution, and he had a series of steps he was following under guidance from senior leadership to build up al-qaeda's presence in libya including working with various militias to sort of ingrain al-qaeda's ideology locally within libya. and that brings me to the third point. there's often times a distinction that's been made, i think a false one, that al-qaeda is sort of this global jihadist threat, and it's not really connected to local endeavors, not really a local jihadist organization as well. that's fundamentally wrong. in fact, al-qaeda throughout its entire existence has spent

most of its resources on local endeavors. and what we're seeing in tunisia or libya and elsewhere is how it's actually moving forward with those designs. and you raised the issue of ansar al-sharia in due news bra and -- tunisia, you also mentioned the two assassinations earlier this year. well, the tunisian government has blamed ansar al-sharia for all of that, they were responsible for the assassinations, and the state department has recognized they were responsible for the attacks on our embassy. there are strong ties between that branch and the branch in libya. the reason why i connect the dots on this a little bit is that ansar al-sharia tunisia, and i could go on with a lot more evidence, i think is firmly part of the al-qaeda network in north africa. and there's a lot of data that i've been compiling. these are groups i follow every day online, groups i've been tracking very closely. why is that important? >> well, it shows al-qaeda's

designs and the al-qaeda network's designs are, you know, they do have local interests. and this raises the whole point that you're getting at in terms of our partnerships with these various countries. part of the thing we have to emphasize here is that our interests are very much the same as tunisia's in combating these terrorists as in libya and elsewhere where these local interests al-qaeda had, they also can manifest against us as we saw with the attack on the embassy in tunis just three days after benghazi. i'll just leaf it there. >> thank you. boy, that raises a lot of questions. let me just start with the regional point. mr. joscelyn, you addressed that. and just we can talk about these nations individually, and i have questions about them individually, but the first panel suggested that there are some, you know, there is at least the regional partnership through the trans-sahara counterterrorism partnership, you indicated that hasn't really been implemented fully or, you know, had more work to do.

and second, the assertion was made by our state department witness that there is some possibility for, you know, using the more functioning civil societies in algeria and morocco as sort of, you know, models or examples that can help in tunisia or libya. talk to me about sort of regional prospects before we get into some of the specific countries, specific issues that you raised. >> well, you know, this is where it gets difficult because there are different situations in each country, obviously. you have a different environment in each country. and i agree with what the panel was saying about tunisia being one of the better hopes for democracy in the region and being along those lines. but i think the fundamental point i have as an al-qaeda guy, a guy who studies al-qaeda is they don't think in things -- about things in terms of state to state. they have regional designs. so they're basically going to try and exploit whatever or vacuums they can to push forward their agenda. and unless we are having a strong hand, i think

dr. lawrence mentioned the light footprint in libya and tunisia which i agree with. unless we're having a strong hand in terms of etch sizing that, i -- emphasizing that, i think that's something that's going to be lost in terms of strategies inside north africa. >> other thoughts? yeah, dr. lawrence. >> a couple thoughts. first of all, in terms of tactics and strategy, there was a difference for a while in that for a while tunisia and libya got a pass from the worst terrorists in most ways because the success of the revolutions was seen as giving a space for the possibility of islamist governments. in the has also helped a little bit in no to rock coe. so the degree to which the terrorists view the state as a western-backed secular state, there was a reduction in terrorism as we normally know it. and it also head to, and i have a paper on it that i'm amendment to submit, the rise of jihadi -- [inaudible] which is much more mainstream of

the discourse within the cities of people who are living, you know, among regular and still espousing that same rhetoric, but doing things more like targeted actions against embassies or against intellectuals, writers, that sort of thing. so we've seen some pretty major changes because of the arab spring. algerian government never got a pass in ways, and that's one of the reasons it incubated in algeria. in terms of regional cooperation, these countries don't want to cooperate with each other much. there are a lot of debates about forcing it. we tend to want to see the region as a region which is why we want it to be an economic region, because it helps us to have big markets and big regions cooperating. but these guys don't want to cooperate with each other in part because of big distrust. look at algeria's recent announcement they're going to be crossing the rib ya and tunisian border without permission to go after bad guys which is a

violation of their longstanding principle of noninterference of either outsiders in the algerian states or neighboring states. so we're seeing algeria playing more of a regional role but not necessarily in a way that makes us all warm and fuzzy about what's going to be the outcome of algeria reaching out regionally that way. in terms of the whole civil society thing, you asked a question about whether the civil societies were better functioning in one country or another, and i would say all the countries have big destabilizing influences which is why i focused on that in my introductory remarks. algeria has over 11,000 deployments of riot police per year. the reason why we didn't have a regime change in algeria gets back to what the previous panel said about economic strength of the algerian state but also because of war weariness, that neither the security forces, nor the population want to push these local grievances into that

kind of a ferocious combat like they saw in the '90s. there are other dynamics in morocco and tunisia and libya, but to think that the acquiescence has anything to do with popular satisfaction with the governments, we're not seeing that. the number two vote getter in the moroccan elections was spoiled ballots. you have similar statistics in algeria. you have a deep, an increasing suspicion of all forces in the tunisian state, and, of course, in libya we have this fragmented reality that we're talking about. in fact, i increasingly think that young people are wondering what types of new institutions they need to build from scratch, because there's no faith in existing political parties among the masses of young people and little faith in civil society which has long been controlled by governments in this part of the world. >> thank you. doctor wehrey, do you want to say a word about the regional

efforts? then i want to come back and ask you a question about militias. >> well, with regard to libya's cooperation, it's very problematic given the informal security sector. i mean, the militias are controlling so much of the country and the borders, this impacts, for instance, algeria's willingness to cooperate on border security. the algerians are convinced that the libyan government is pen traited by islamists who they fear, and they're really loathe to cooperate. regarding libyan/egyptian relations, there's intense distrust in libya regarding egypt's supposed sponsorship of gadhafi loyalists in the country. and with the cc government, there are sensitivities among many islamists about that government. libya has had better, i think, cooperation with some of the countries to the south, for instance, chad. but when we're talking about regional cooperation, we're talking about interactions between states, state institutions. and libya just doesn't have those institutions in place. >> let's go to the militia

testimony that you gave earlier. first, just help me understand when we hear 300 militias, it's a little hard for us to get our head around, you know, i haven't traveled to libya as you have spent so much time doing. are these militias primarily sort of gee graphical and town and community-based. >> are they ethnic based? how would you describe kind of their formation? >> the majority of them are based on town or region. they range from anywhere or from 200 to really no more than perhaps 2,000 men. many of them arose during the revolution. they were the fighting units that overthrew gadhafi. but others arose after the revolution, and in some cases, they're more opportunistic gangs. they've gotten into criminal enterprise. so there are ones that have allied themselves for political reasons with politicians in the parliament, there are those that are effectively sort of neighborhood watch programs do -- >> right. >> -- for towns where there is no municipal police, no government forces providing

security. in the east, for instance, the militias are demanding federalism, they're demanding a greater share of the oil revenues, they've shut down oil production. so as we've heard, i mean, each of libya's regions, the pill shahs fulfill -- militias fulfill a different role. in the far south and among some of these ethnic communities, the militias do have an ethnic component there. >> and do you agree with dr. lawrence's earlier testimony that, you know, it's not right to look at libyan instability as sort of a single kind of instability, but there's all kinds of reasons for instabilities that you might see? >> absolutely. there are many different microconflicts going on this libya right now that reflect the legacy of gadhafi's rule. he pitted communities against one another, he played them off, and we're seeing these manifest themselves. you know, and, for instance, in the east in benghazi what's happening there, these assassinations is a shadowy mix of islamists and criminals,

vendettas against the old regime. the militia problem there is really qualitatively different than what's happening in tripoli where with you have two power centers in misrata that are essentially laying siege to the capital demanding the spoils of the revolution. they're claiming ministries, kicking out the army. and we've seen over the weekend some of these militias pull back. but whether that really represents a dismantlement of the militias remains to be seen. >> and just using the tripoli example that each i don't of yod about in your testimony, it was 46 individuals who were protesting who were killed, but even after that there was additional civilian protests to really continue to amplify the message that we want the militias out? and has that continued? >> absolutely. there were civil strikes. i mean, the city was shut down. shops were closed. there were more protests. and what you did see was the deployment of the army into tripoli, and people were wondering, you know, where has

the army been all this time? so you did see the government finally deploy the army. you had negotiations where militias have pulled out of the capital, outside the capital. but does this really represent a diminishment of militia strength, i think, remains to be seen. the army, i mean, this was a show of force, but can the army really sustain itself? it does not match the militias in terms of manpower or firepower. >> you had a five-point plan, and i think the final point was to, basically, de-emphasize the militias and reintegrate militia members back into civilian life. >> right. >> and i gather that you put that fifth because it might be the hardest thing to do, and you could probably only do it if you did the other four steps first, i mean, is that -- do i read that right? >> it is the most difficult. i mean, this is an entrenched economic and social problem. the libyan government has developed a program to try to identify young men in the militias and to register them to get them into jobs and scholarships. but this program has fallen

victim to political in-fighting, to lack of funding. but it's a good first step. and as i understand it, multiple u.s. agencies are supporting this effort to really get at the roots of this problem and to show these young men that, you know, you fought in the revolution, but now is the time to move on and build a country and relinquish your arms. >> i'm going to ask a similar question to you, mr. joscelyn and dr. lawrence, kind of each in your own spheres. so with respect to your focus on al-qaeda, you know, based on your experience, would it be your recommendation that our policy should be to do new things or to do more of the things that we're currently doing? i mean, do we need to look at a different strategy other than the current counterterrorism partnership, or do we just need to make heavier investments in the activities that we are currently doing in order to counter the extremist influence? >> well, i think my big warning is that, you know, i find these groups do have plans for what they're doing. and my beginning point is to

figure out what that plan so then our plan is to basically dismantle it. so we talk about militias, for example, there's good evidence that this was part of al-qaeda's plan for inside libya was to co-opt or work with certain militias. these militias are not going to reintegrate into a, you know, more national force. identifying and isolating and trying to contain those militias should be part of any strategy for anything we're doing inside libya. in fact, i warned in april purchase about some of these militias as having already been co-opted, and some of them went on to take part in the benghazi terrorist attack. so to that extent, i mean, to play off something that dr. lawrence said a few minutes ago too, it's exactly right. when i said that they do and don't view it regionally, they have a whole comprehensive strategy for the region, our enemies do. but how they operate in any different country can vary, absolutely. so that's part of how we have to adjust our tactics is corresponding to what they're

doing. for example, in tunisia for a long time they liked to talk about ansar al-sharia was basically doing charity events. i was very concerned about this because three haven't to accelerate acts of terrorism, but they're building up their cadre which can be used for those types of acts in the future, and now we've seen that, in fact, they had a clandestine apparatus that was planning and plotting all along including the ransacking of our embassy. >> and, dr. lawrence, your focus is really on -- i mean, i think a refreshing way to focus on young people and what we need to do. so i gather your answer to my question is not that we need to do more of what we're doing, but we kind of need to do different things and have a different focus that really is looking at the youth in the region. >> yes. and the youth are everybody. i mean, basically -- >> yep. >> because of the youth bulge, you're talking about the entirety of these populations. the median age in tunisia, which has turned the demographic corner, is 30. in morocco and algeria, it's 27, and in libya it's 24.

so the latter three suffer more from that structural youth bulge problem. of in tunisia it's more about unemployed university graduates that's the destabilizing factor demographically. four very quick, four very quick points. the revolution, during the revolution in libya almost every community liberated itself, and that's why the militias are community-based. except tripoli which 80% liberated itself this 24 hours in august -- in 24 hours in ahing 2011, and then the citizens of misrata finished off with the help of nato and never left. so one of the things that's unique about tripoli is you had foreign militias that never left. so kicking the misrattans out is progress, but it doesn't solve any other problem except that civilians across libya insofar as they have other problems with militias will see this as an example.

but this was the only problem of militias from somewhere else. a second point is that there was some work done by small arms survey in cooperation with crisis group, and we sort of did a taxonomy of the militias, and be i agree with everything fred said but just to give you a little data point. about 80% of the militias were revolutionary militias that then -- now work for the governments, and they're getting in trouble with the government all the time because they're not getting paid or because of some political policy they don't like, so they'll storm parliament, or they'll hold a minister hostage. but these are the pro-revolutionary militias. and in our coverage we conflate the pro-revolutionary militias that are causing a lot of the ruckus with everybody else. it's different militias. about 10% of the militias are these post-revolutionary militias who tended to be from the more pro-gaffety if areas -- pro-gadhafi areas, and they have other issues. and 5% are unaffiliated either way, and they're basically kids with arms doing something.

and then the other 5% are terroristic and criminal gangs. some of which predated the revolution and which continue to cause all the types of problems that mr. joscelyn's talking about. but you have to think about these sort of four different types of militias. the third point is the gpf is a great idea, and i subscribe to everything that fred said. but the metaphor i use for libya both before and after the revolution because i've worked on libya since the early 2000s is that you don't want to put all your eggs in the gpf basket. and the metaphor is a train station. we have a gpf train that hasn't left yet, and we think always passengers should get on that train, and we don't know whether it'll make it to -- and with libya, since there's so much dysfunctionalty and lack of capacity in government, you have to have several different plans, and you don't know which one is going to move forward at a particular time. and the last point is to underscore stuff that fred be said. the militias are not going to give up their weapons in libya,

even the very pro-government ones, until we have a political, a situation that's working. we have a constitution, we have further elections, and we have a system that seems less corrupt in which the money starts to flow. and that gets to sort of an economic point which is right now oil production's down to 10% of peak capacity because of the problems with the militias who weren't getting paid. and, you know, there's certain enlightened people like the head of the tripoli brigades who was trying to spin off fighters with micro loans to start businesses and that sort of thing. but there's almost no capacity in the government to create economic opportunities for militiamen, and right now one of the best paid jobs for a young person is to be if a militia, getting paid eventually by the government when they pay you. so a lot of overlapping problems here. and just kicking the militias out from somewhere isn't going to solve them. >> let me just physical up on that because one of the -- i don't think it was stated just

so unequivocally in the first panel, but to some degree they did, there's sort of an assumption that libya doesn't need financial assistance because it has natural resources. is that your view as well or, you know, does the diminished oil production and other sort of economic challenges in militiamen not getting paid, is there a reason for us to contemplate financial assistance? >> on this score it's the same in libya before the revolution as after the revolution. poor governmental capacity and a big mistrust of foreigners coming in with a plan for libya. and so the way in which you do successful cooperation with libya is you pilot stuff. >> pilot. >> and to pilot things, you have to have resources. and i was often flummoxed when i worked at the state department and i talked to congress and others back when i worked for the government that they would say, okay, and you hear this from international organizations, libya has money, so we don't need money. the problem is in order to get libya to take out its checkbook and pay for things -- and right

now the bank balance is very low because of the crisis in oil sales -- you need to demonstrate to the libyans, you know, what works and who the good people are to work with. and to do that, the u.n., the e.u., the united states and other states and friends and partners of libya have to spend a little money to pilot things. and if things are successful on the pilot level, then the libyans will start paying for things. same with algeria which has 120 billion in the bank and isn't spending it, you know? so you have a very rich country with very low spending in the areas that it needs to be spending, and it meets inter-- it needs international cooperation to help point the way. nomorocco and tunisia's a different dynamic. >> let me just ask one last question for dr. joscelyn and doctor wehrey. mr. joscelyn and dr. wehrey. dr. lawrence talked about the backlash from syria, and, mr. joscelyn, you just alluded to it briefly.

i would like you to each talk about how you see instability in syria or other regional instabilities kind of washing back into the maghreb. >> well, one of the things that happened with al-qaeda in the islamic maghreb is that its operations accelerated during the iraq war because they were sending off a lot of recruits to fight in iraq. now, currently during the syrian war, basically, we've seen the same facilitation networks are bringing recruits from north africa to syria to fight and, obviously, can bring them back to north africa where they can create problems in their home cunnings. one of the -- countries. one of the branches in tunisia and libya appear to be sending recruits to libya. they see it -- i see it in social media and various indications. so these are groups that are actively sending off recruits to fight in syria and elsewhere. the reason why that's important is because it shows you that, again, to the whole idea there's a network, there's a network in

lay of individuals across this region and even into the middle east that's capable of sort of orchestrating terrorism. and it's not just about the insurgency in syria that these guys are fighting, but it can also be used in other ways that manifest itself, you know, it's having effects in iraq, it could potentially in the turkey or throughout the middle east and elsewhere. >> dr. wehrey. >> well, i certainly agree. there is activity by some of these radical islamist groups, ansar al-sharia, these individuals are participating with al-qaeda-affiliated units in syria, but there's also a broader movement, i think, in libya of sending volunteers out of sort of islamist nationalism that is not really al-qaeda. they're fighting with the free syrian army. i mean, these are the people that they did go be to afghanistan and iraq, and they see an impulse to help suffering muslims in syria, but they're not al-qaeda. and i don't think there's going to be a threat from them coming back. and i do think it's important to distinguish in libya right now

when you look at the islamist spectrum, that the al-qaeda affiliates or sympathizers is a very small minority. many of these islamists, they did fight in afghanistan, they did fight against u.s. forces in iraq, but they've come back, and they've integrated into the political system. i mean, they have offices, they're in the cabinet, they're in parliament, and i think it's a good thing. and you hear this narrative, i think, in libya by many politicians to try to tar all islamists as either brotherhood or al-qaeda, and i think that's very, very dangerous, and we need to distinguish it. >> well, i want to thank you all for your m testimony. it was great to hear the first panel which was all, you know, state department, dod, aid talking about what we're doing. your value is having an expertise and an independent to kind of not just talk about what we're doing, but assess what's working, what's not. it was helpful to have you today, and i appreciate it. with that, the hearing is adjourned.

[inaudible conversations] >> and later today president obama continuing his west coast fundraising trip with several stops in california including one at the home of hall of fame basketball player magic johnson. before that the president is going to be visiting a rec center where he'll be speaking about immigration, continuing his call for the house to pass a comprehensive immigration plan. we'll have his remarks at 2:5 p.m. eastern over on our companion network, c-span, 2:35 eastern. [background sounds]

♪ ♪ [gunfire] >> on november 25, 1963, approximately one million people lined the route of president kennedy's funeral procession from the u.s. capitol to arlington national cemetery. millions more watched the live television coverage. starting tonight at 8:30 on c-span2, watch nbc's coverage of president kennedy's state funeral. >> during the president's historic trip to china, mrs. nixon accompanied him. one person noticed how mrs. nixon was looking at a package of cigarettes. these cigarettes have pan pandas

on them, and can package, she was admiring that. he said i understand you also admired the pandas at the zoo. she seas, yes, aren't they darling? he said, well, we will make sure you have pandas to go home with. it was important for her to uphold and support her husband. just her being there would bring so much goodwill, and there was always evidence at the end of the trips where the news reports would come out, you know, they would talk about the president the this way, but they would always say what a wonderful job pat nixon did. >> first lady pat nixon live tonight at 9 eastern on c-span and c-span3, also on c-span radio and c-span.org. >> if you're a middle or high school student, c-span's student cam video competition wants to foe what's the most important issue congress should address next year. make a 5-7 minute video and be sure to include c-span programming for your chance to win the grand prize of $5,000 with $100,000 in total prizes.

the deadline is january 20th. get more info at student cam.org. >> georgetown university law center hosted a discussion last week on changes proposed by congress to nsa surveillance and foreign intelligence gattering. house judiciary subcommittee chairman jim sensenbrenner of wisconsin spoke, one of the lead authors of the 2001 usa patriot act. other panelists including robert litt, general counsel for the office of the director of national intelligence, and matthew olsen, the director of the national counterterrorism center. this is two hours and 20 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. i'm will trainer, and it's my pleasure to welcome you to georgetown university law center. today marks the second discussion of the law school's

three-part series on the past, present and future of surveillance and foreign intelligence gathering in the united states. >> we're being monitored. [laughter] >> in october we convened former members and key staffers from the church committee hearings and looked at the origins of the foreign intelligence surveil answer act -- surveillance act. of today we're going to be focused on current intelligence-gathering practices. we'll be considering bills currently before congress that would reform the foreign intelligence surveillance court and alterations to the foreign intelligence surveillance act as well as cases currently working their way through the court. our purpose in convening the program today is to move the conversation forward and to think about what framework and principles should guide us as we look to the future. and we're now, i think, as all of us recognize at a critical juncture. technology is rapidly evolving, it promises tremendous benefits.

it makes us more efficient, it creates the opportunity for growth and new discoveries. it offers new waysover connecting people -- of connecting people, groups, societies and nations, and it's also ripe for abuse. it creates the opportunity for exploitation in this the name of organized -- in the name of organized crime, terrorism and open warfare. so how will we mitigate threats, control technology, reap the benefits and remain true to our founding principles? this is one of the defining issues of our age. and it's one of the aims of georgetown law and the center for national security and the law to bring together individuals who have thought long and hard about difficult questions of law and policy. and through open dialogue, to move the conversation forward. today 21 bills sit before congress, 31.

21. some bills call for bans on certain types of bulk collection, some bills address the legal standard to overcome for accessing collected information. many address the makeup of the fifc from its ability to bring in experts to advise the court to the selection of judges for the court. nearly all impose new reporting disclosure requirements to congress, the public or both. so the question is, how should congress proceed? 21 bills, nearly a dozen cases are making their way through the courts. how should the courts rule? what should the be the shape of the future? as we tib these issues -- think about these issues, today it's our great pleasure to welcome some of the most respected individuals in the field to georgetown law to discuss these critical issues. now, our panel will be moderated by professor laura k. donahue, a

full professor here at the law school and the director of georgetown's center for national security and the law. hers has been an extraordinarily important voice in this conversation. professor donahue has written extensively on national security and counterterrorism law in the united states and the united kingdom. she's held fellowships at stanford's laws center for constitutional law, stanford's university center for international security and cooperation and harvard university's john f. kennedy school of government where she was a fellow in the international security program as well as the executive session for domestic preparedness. in 2008 to 2009, she clerked for judge john noonan of the ninth circuit court of appeals. she's a life member of the council on foreign relations, an advisory member of the standing committee on law and national security. she obtained her ab in philosophy with honors from dartmouth, her ma from the university of -- [inaudible] in northern ireland, and her ph.d. in history from the

university of cambridge, england. and thank you very much for both moderating and doing so much to make this series possible. it's really, it's an extraordinarily important discussion. so thank you, laura. i also want the thank our panelists. professor donahue will be giving you some background on each of them, but we're joined by georgia meal -- [inaudible] director of the center for democracy at the american civil liberties union, robert litt, matthew olsen, director of the national counterterrorism center and mark rotten berg, president and executive director of the electronic privacy information center. so it's an extraordinary group, and it's going to be a remarkable discussion. but before we turn to the panel, we're truly honored to have with us representative jim sensenbrenner who's been one of the most vocal and important voices in the united states house of representatives with regard to the foreign intelligence surveillance act and current proposals for its

reform. congressman sensenbrenner represents the fifth congressional district of wisconsin which includes milwaukee, dodge and all of washington and jefferson counties. he was born in chicago and later moved to wisconsin with his family. he graduated from the pill waukee country day school and did his undergraduate work at stanford where he majored in political science. he then earned his law degree at the university of wisconsin, madison, 1968. after serving ten years in the wisconsin state legislature, he ran for a united states house seat and was elected november, 1978. and he's been reelected since then. his current committee assignments include the service on the committee on science and technology, the committee on -- and the committee on the judiciary. he's chair of the crime, terrorism, homeland security and oversight subcommittee. he's also a member of the subcommittee on courts, intellectual property and the internet and the subcommittees on environment and oversight. be he's a former chair of the

judiciary committee and a long-serving committee member. he's established a strong record on crime, on intellectual property and on constitutional issues. congressman sensenbrenner also served as chair of the house committee on science where he solidified his reputation as an independent leader on science issues as well as oversight. throughout his public life, congressman sensenbrenner has been on the forefront of efforts to preserve the sanctity of life, eliminate wasteful government spending and protect the interests of american taxpayers. he's regularly been cited by the national taxpayers' union as one of the most fiscally responsible house members and is well known for completing his financial disclosure forms down to the penny. anybody who's ever completed a financial disclosure form really knows that that's an extraordinary achievement. he's proud of all of the legislative achievements that have helped improve the lives of many during his tenure in congress.

shortly after the attacks on september 11th, he introduced the patriot act in the house as a method to help keep america safe by enhancing the tools our law enforcement officials could use to thwart another terrorist attack. and he was proud to watch president bush sign the act into law. he was instrumental in the passing of the child abduction prevention act which president bush signed into law in 2003. this law enhappensed the am been -- enhanced the amber alert system, strengthened penalties against kidnappers and aids law enforcement in protecting children. he's also introduced the adam walsh child protection safety act. this act, which is now law, expanded collection of the registry, forces states to comply with strict requirements to keep the information of sex offenders current. to insure that the gains paid by minorities during the civil rights movement were not jeopardized, he introduced legislation to extend the voting rights act for 25 years which was later signed into law. he's a major voice on the issues

that we're thinking about today, and it really is a great honor to present to you congressman sensenbrenner. >> thank you. [applause] thank you, dean, and it certainly is a pleasure to be here today to talk about an issue that i think is really on the front burner particularly in light of all of the revelations that have come out about what the nsa has been doing in the last several months. so let me say that once i am done with this issue, my next project is to try to constitutionalize those parts of the voting rights act that were struck down by the supreme court at the end of its term last june. because the voting rights act, i think, is the one that has been the most effective of all of the important civil rights laws that were passed during the '50s and the '60s and have been brought up-to-date since then. so even though i'm not a full committee chair, i am keeping my

hands in the pie and attempting to deal with issues that i think are important not only to the security and safety of this country, but to improving the quality of life for all of the people in the united states of america. i would like to thank georgetown law for inviting me here today. following september 11th, as chairman of the house judiciary committee, i was the primary author of the usa patriot act. our goal was to insure that our intelligence community have the proper tools to combat terror in the post-9/11 world. i stand by the original intelligent of the law, but it -- intent of the law, but it has been misinterpreted by both the bush and obama administrations. congressional oversight has also fallen short, and the balance between civil liberties and national security which we felt we had struck has been tainted. senate judiciary committee chairman patrick leahy, whom i

understand spoke at the first one of these sessions and, and i have introduced the usa freedom act to rein in the abuse and to put an end to spying on innocent americans while maintaining the necessary tools to enhance and insure our securitiment the patriot act had 17 provisions. i insisted that all 17 be sunset so that they would expire automatically if they were not reauthorized. after having hearings on each of these 17 provisions in 2005, congress determined that 14 of the provisions were noncontroversial and made them permanent law. ..