one process. because of that move which the iranians substantially spurned the united states was then able to give foundational u.n. security council resolutions that have been the premise for everything in the last seven years. resolutions which at the beginning of 2006 everyone told us we could not get. and then the building framework for the global coalition that by the way is an astonishing bipartisan diplomatic achievement. carried forward with great effect by the obama administration includes the stuart levy treasury and other officials at treasury, including the global coalition that crippled the iranian economy and the geopolitical significance of the coalition and the fed coalition created and has endured for seven years to reach the present moment, that is an extraordinary bipartisan accomplishment that has received

very little notice and many of the critics today were the critics of the initial move in the spring of 2006 and therefore worth while to remember how much bipartisan work and work by professional bureaucrats has been involved in erecting the coalition we have today as we contemplate what we need to sustain it and sustain the momentum behind it. >> let me ask you what you make of the criticism today from democrats in congress, chuck schumer, others, and what do you think are the prospects for up long-term deal? >> i will start, michelle can help me understand these folks in washington. i am a professor in charlottesville, va.. these things in washington often befuddle me. from the point of view of the

israeli and saudi government, the israeli government, why should the israeli government praise the steel? what is -- why should they say anything good about it at all? i can't think of a reason why even if they think it was a good deal, why should they say so? i don't see anything in is for them for saying so. they have both sides of this deal. they can denounce the deal, the united states still has important military relationships with the state of israel that are effectively in my view unperturbed by this public froth that will continue, including undertakings and understandings about what the united states will do to protect our common security interests that might be threatened by iran that are unaffected by israeli denunciation of the diplomacy which helps them at home and hedges against things that might go wrong in that diplomacy. and i notice a lot of other

people who are concerned about and negative about iran making statements that say i don't trust iran in effect and who does? but again, i studied the politics of this and percentages and different plays and have some empathy. i noticed carefully when people saying they support new sanctions the sanctions would be held in advance or made conditional on ways to see whether we get a final deal end the sanctions might then be put on suspense so they would only go into effect after the efforts to get a final deal have failed. if you study what is involved in the interim measures you see how much of iran's faith as testified by all the activities that will be put in play under interim measures. i understand the current debate. i view it philosophically. i think the real rift

geopolitically between the united states government and others is here. on this point. which is the united states is currently demonstrating in syria that if it's wm d concerns can be settled effectively that the united states will take military intervention in the conflict off the table. syria is becoming a test case for the proposition watched closely by everyone in the middle east including iran. in effect the same message is being communicated on iran. if you take the wm d concerns settled, taken off the table and do so in a trust worthy way we are prepared to actually let you come back into the international community and drop sanctions confident that your own internal handicaps will limit your

effectiveness. on that geopolitical point there may be disagreements with our friends in israel and saudi arabia because they regarded world in which the nuclear threat is removed but iran is reintegrating the international community and free from crippling sanctions as a world they find highly disturbing. the world they would prefer ideally would be one in which iran is indefinitely crippled by sanctions and the nuclear threat is held in abeyance. a key variable in that expectation is the sanctions regime is extremely stable and could be relied upon to remained durable regardless of what happens in the diplomacy. i do not share that optimism. i believe that the obama administration spurned a deal like the one they accepted it would be difficult to hold the sanctions regime together and as the sanction regime begins to collapse options will narrow and we will find ourselves off half in which the option of war

becomes increasingly evident and by the way i think some of the others involved in this debate have perfect well analyzed this dynamic and have come to their positions accordingly. >> let me just add, what has been agreed in geneva is a first step and a first step boldly. it is not the comprehensive deal landed should not be judged as such. the real purpose of what has been agreed in geneva is to ensure that while we try to negotiate a more comprehensive, permanent agreement with iran to prevent its acquisition of nuclear weapons and get it back in compliance, while we are doing that negotiations they are not continuing to make progress in the nuclear program, they are not charging ahead and amassing more enriched material building a plutonium reactor and so forth. this is designed to halt and in

some areas like the 20% enriched uranium and rolled back the program and put some time on the clock. it is also as phelps said, taking the first step and being willing to negotiate is absolutely essential to maintaining the unity of the international community to uphold sanctions and keep the pressure on. if the united states appeared unwilling to take the diplomatic route seriously, it is a fantasy to think we could maintain the sanctions regime we so carefully and successfully constructed. so in my view whether or not we get a good deal is something that is still possible but unknown because we will see over the next six months what i anticipate will be tough

negotiations and those negotiations will be helped in my view by the continued threat of making the sanctions regime even more punishing if negotiations fail and by keeping all options including military options on the table. that threat of coercive measures needs to be clearly in iran's mind to continue to get them to be serious at the negotiating table. the minimal relief provided, $6 billion to $7 billion of access to frozen assets is not breaking the sanctions regime, the financial sanctions, the oil sanctions that have brought the iranian economy to where it is today, will remain in place.

people have to understand that. i do think there is concern in the region about u.s./airtran dealer, that would sort of relieved the pressure on iran in exchange for nuclear compliance without giving enough attention to iran's destabilizing behavior throughout the region and support for terrorist groups from hamas to hezbollah and so forth. that is a concern. the administration is aware of the concern and i think they will continue to take, to focus on and take action against iran's support for terrorism as well as its nuclear activities. >> moving on to another conflict area, china's announcement of

the east china identification zone. does this increase a conflict, possibility of conflict between china and japan over the islands and as i was arriving, i saw that it was from -- b-52 bombers flown over the disputed islands in the show of force shall i ask about that. >> my understanding is the b-52 flights were part of a plan to exercise in the u.s. and made clear it was not going to comply with the new rules and regulations china had inserted with regard to the unilaterally declared a zone. i do think it is another example of provocative behavior. my own concern is that it does risk, raises the risk of miscalculation to the extent we have had any real danger of

miscalculation in recent years with regard to military activities in and around china. it has been in the air when the u.s. has been patrolling international airways. there were times when chinese air defense fighters have scrambled to and in some cases operated in a very aggressive manner that increase the risk of accident. my worry is if you now have chinese fighters scrambling and consistently intercepting japanese or korean or other aircraft in any kind of aggressive or assertive way you are by definition increasing the risk of someone being too much of a hot dog, not being saved, taking a risk, at the tactical level that becomes a strategic crisis, another peer 3 incident

or something like that. i think this is an unnecessary provocation. what really needs to happen is some serious negotiations among the parties that make claims to these islands and steps to ratchet back the tensions, not be escalating them in this manner. >> let me move on to the last question and open to the audience, the defense strategy in the middle east and in asia. should united states slowly decrease its commitments in the middle east as people have suggested and at the same time enhance or increase its commitment in asia's part of the so-called pivot? >> i am a firm believer that in the rebalance, meaning as we

have relatively more bandwidth available coming out of two long ground wars in the middle east and south asia we need to pay more attention to the asia-pacific because it is the region that will most affect our prosperity and security long-term but that does not mean we take our eye off the ball in the middle east. it does not mean we abandon our partners and allies. the united states has long been a power that was able to walk into government at the same time. we have vital interests in the middle east even as our own energy picture at home changes. we need to maintain our forces there for deterrence, crisis response, building capacity of our partners and friends. the rebalance was never cast as up to the hallway from middle east to asia. it was a relative increase in our attention to asia and the

fundamental changes happening, adapting our posture to those changes while we still stay engaged in a key region like the middle east. obviously as we came out of iraq, we are reducing our posture in afghanistan as we come ward's 2014 the number of ground forces in the region will be changing but the air and naval presence, engagement with our partners and allies, commitments to those key countries should not and i don't believe they will not change in my expectation. >> it is worth digging into a little bit, what are the conflict scenarios in the middle east for east asia, and what is the relation of american defense posture to those scenarios? in the middle east and east asia for instance, i have concluded i do not believe the united states

needs to prepare itself to conquer, occupy and hold large land areas on the eurasian land mass. that does not mean it may not need to have european capabilities but the notion that the united states would prepare for a land invasion of china and holding a large territory in china as a serious military scenario, nor do i believe the united states need plan to conquer, occupy and holds north korea even in the event of a korean war. that drives the force posture you begin to think about in the middle east. i do not think the united states needs to plan to be able to say cocker, occupy and hold all or much of the country of iran even in the event of a war with iran. i know it seems kerri to even talk about these contingencies but decisions involving many billions of dollars will come

from talking about contingencies so you have to think about what we want to do and don't need to be able to do at least not quickly. what do we need to do quickly in the middle east or in east asia? need to have formidable military capability principally the sea and air that can deters and defeat rapidly any potential opponent largely with forces on hand were available within hours, at most a couple of days. those were fairly demanding readiness requirements and give you examine a our forces, very small fractions of our total forces are able to meet those readiness requirements in the navy or the air force in the middle east and east asia. in a way we have a base structure that is overwhelmingly centered on the united states when we need a base structure that is more projected outward. yet that can allow us to get more affect from a smaller

overall force structure. when you rely on one or two bases in a whole region you create instability and temptation to an adversary. for example wing japan was contemplating its warplanes in 1941 they looked around and said if we want war against the american british such alliance we need to hit only three spots. we need to hit pearl harbor, the island of luzon in the philippines and singapore. knock out those three and you have knockdown effective military opposition in the asia-pacific region. pearl harbor was a a stretch, they pulled that off. when you narrow it down to that, when you are basing structure an overseas presence is remarkably slender, concentrating on one or two key assets, that is actually not a stable position for conflict in which maximum readiness is ever more at a

premium. >> okay. great. put your name tag sideways and i will start over here. guy swan. >> retired u.s. army. it would appear in today's paper that we are reliving the lessons of iraq as we try to negotiate a withdrawal and follow-on force in afghanistan, some of us participated in some of that with the malaki government. would is your advice to the administration with the hamid karzai government as we go forward in 2014? >> patients. patience. this is maddening. the important thing is to focus on what is in the u.s. strategic

interest. i think long-term strategic partnership that supports the afghan state and that can institutions like the armed forces the independence is in our interest. that can be done at a reasonable level investment and i do believe and i share the view that if we are going to have americans on the ground in afghanistan, we have to have a security agreement that ensures that we fall under u.s. legal protections, not subject to afghan law. that has always been a red line and it is an appropriate red line. i also think we heard from the

afghan people that the afghan people and most of afghan's leadership including just about if not every presidential candidate that is running for election early next year wants the u.s. and international community to stay. i would hope even if hamid karzai persists in his very frustrating tactic of delay in or saying he is not going to sign the b s a despite the results of his own process, that we will proceed, you have to plan for the worst case of total withdrawal, we would seek to maintain some flexibility to work with the new government, quickly put framework in place to allow what is in the strategic interests of both countries which is of modest continued presence for assistance to allow that to happen.

[inaudible conversations] >> thank you. i am from spain. the strategies going to be more focused on the pacific. the question is about nato. the pacific and asian countries, on the other hand, atlantic countries. do you think that nato needs to be informed, when i say informed, deeply transformed in 2014 once the conflict in afghanistan is going to be done? if that is the case, what should be from the point of view the role of the united states

beating a know? >> i think na ? >> i think nato remained extremely important and relevant, it is the first place we turn to allies and partners anywhere in the world. my biggest concern is that declining investment in nato in defense of national security capabilities and i do think the alliance needs to think about how we will sustain a reasonable level of investment in our capabilities in the future at a time when it is not popular for many polities inside europe and how do we get more bang for the buck or more bang for the euro that we do invest in terms of greater co development, sharing, a pooling of resources to

develop the capabilities that we need. if each nation of nato, each member cuts, reshapes its defense forces under budget pressure, simply along national lines, you will sub optimize what the alliance as all hole has available. we have got to have a more coherent picture of the capabilities the alliance needs across the board and how do we invest together to ensure we have those even though not every nation may be able to afford every capability? >> nato is a creature of its member governments. it is not merely a vessel because it both ads enabling capabilities and synergies beyond what any of them could do alone or without prior planning. i agree with michele's

observation but fundamentally what did the member governments care about? if they don't care about asia, if they don't care what is happening in a lot of these other countries, meetings in brussels are not going to make them care. has to do with the role of the countries like spain and others in nato see for themselves in the world and the way they think the world ought to organize itself for, and security. for example we talk about, in my paper i talked-about defense is fast and slow. there are areas of high readiness capabilities where nato member states may think they can make a contribution to defense purpose that they share. you try to notice those and analyze those including the european mediterranean region or the persian gulf but also

capabilities that need together slowly. nato has unfocused on afghanistan. i think we are still very early in drawing the lessons from afghanistan that we can use in, in nigeria, in yemen, in somalia. countries of a mix of national contingents involved by not just the united states and very quite a lot. common operational concepts and, learning about how do we give advice and support, a lot in areas that involve security and not uniformed military forces. frankly i think we are very slow in learning the lessons of the last weeks in years of bitter experience in afghanistan and iraq in thinking about the advise and assist capabilities we need for the future, we made more headway in learning the lessons from experience in latin america and places like colombia that are not as well digested.

>> michael hirsch. >> this question is for michele. it was set at the beginning of the second term that chuck hegel was selected as defense secretary and you were not, in part at least because there was this view of the president and the administration that they want to move away from more about military type of foreign policy and the diplomatic one, was described to me at the time we went to demilitarize foreign-policy and you have a forward leaning point of view has received wes chuck hegel was seen as a of a different view. is this assessment at all accurate? and second what has happened in the ensuing months in terms of where they have gone on policies from iran to afghanistan discussing, does that reflect

this far more diplomatic and less military approach? >> i don't have bought window into the president's decision soon but making. your explanation does not ring true to my years. i think chuck hegel has been a close associate of president obama since their time in the senate. he serves on the president's intelligence advisory board. there was a lot of discussion in the first term about finding a place for chuck a goal in the president's cabinet and i think that discussion was naturally renewed when there was an opportunity to bring new people into the cabinet in the second term. the president's friendship and respect for chuck hegel drove the decision more than anything else at least i am not aware of

any other factors. >> if i could quickly follow up. the posture of this administration in terms of demilitarization of foreign policy concern you at all? >> just to be clear in my own views i am not a big proponent of the militarization of u.s. foreign policy. i am a proponent of having a strong military instrument to support our foreign policy goals. i think during a period of war, because you have tens of thousands of americans in harm's way on the ground, the voice of the department of defense in foreign policy decisionmaking naturally becomes louder relative to times of peace when you don't have many, many americans in uniform in harm's

way and that is appropriate, important that that voice be heard when so much is at risk and at stake in human terms. but i think even those senior military leaders in uniform would agree that the military should not dominate those circles. it needs to be heard, needs to be informing the debate. in my experience in the three years i served with president obama, this is a president who has no problem hearing dissenting views. in fact will be to the person who is calling in the back row. you will be called on and asked if you have a dissenting view. if you look like you have one. this is a president who seeks out the full range of views because he believes he makes better decisions that way. i think that dod has an

important voice in those deliberations. i don't know anyone who believes it should be the dominant voice under any circumstances including theme . >> a two part question to follow-up on your deck about expanding, not contracting the global structure, the strategic logic to that is very compelling. talk about the politics and policy dimensions of that. africa does not have a headquarters because it is hard to find a stable democratic government to host that headquarters. our policy towards bahrain is obviously influenced by the presence of the fifth week. other than the expansion of military presence in australia, how would you work the global

politics of that? a second question would be how do you describe the strategic environment of the next 10 to 20 years? we have gone through a bipolar cold war to a unipolar, are we back to what samuel hynes described as you needmultipolar environment that will be in the era of the current cycle of defense and national security planning? .. driven question areas where you think you need -- those are principally the middle east and east asia. so then you want to look very hard at all of your basing options in those two regions. without going country by country

and island by island. what i can say is this. you look at do people in your region want your help? do they think it is in your interest to have powerful, highly capable forces nearby in order to provide them with the measure of security they think they need in partnership with you. if the an to that is yes, opportunities begin to arise. for all kinds of discussions that then can evolve over time and different configurations and different ways. again, the united is not going to be helping to provide additional security in regions where no one want america's help. but i don't think that's the case for the two regions i mentioned for if the second part of your question, actually has much to do with the concept what does it mean when you talk about defense slowing. i think the dominant problems, actually, the dominant issue in

this phase of world history are increasingly transnational in characteristic rather than international. that is defined less by blogs of power as they were over much of the lass three and a half centuries. and define more by issues that actually cut as cross societies and are not easily categorized as either foreign or domestic or present a domestic face to the people in the countries. against many of the kinds of problems. transnational crime whether it's cross-border crime that is killing thousands in mexico. or transnational terrorism that is killing hundreds in afghanistan. those sort of trans-- that can be generated slowly and patiently over time. it's a different kind of structure with different kinds of needs for overseas presence and political relationships.

rebalancing within asia are being concentrated in the northeast is covering through the southeast asia. it is things like agreed access agreements. use of joint facilities, planned bilateral and multilateral exercise increasing the tempo of our interaction, our partner capacity building and so forth. the only measure should not be permanent basis. it's really the work that we're doing and the rotational base of forces that are, you know,

passing through a region bolstering deterrence, reassuring allies and so forth. >> we have about ten minute left. what i'm going do is take the next -- get everybody in i have groups of questions. let me hear from gourden adams. thank you. i think a fundamental one is increasingly curious about the budgets in planning and planning in budgets. i'm wondering if where with are is taking both of these fully no to account in a context of a new world. what, i mean, is specifically to what we've been talking about. whether a safer -- i would like phil to talk about

a safer and more secure wonder for the united states that he describes is consistent with what seems to be a relatively agrassive forward-leadings. ture -- aggressive forward-leading posture. i'm curious about language in terms of planning general national security planning. it's not collar how rueful it is either in providing a guideline for policy and budgets or whether it's a realistic capacity that the united states has via the other region of the world and the new world.

readiness for what? they slightly address and like to ask michelle. [inaudible] yesterday i was a meeting in csis and one of the comments made was when we have a state department plan and defense department plan, how do we gate national plan. that's sort of the first question. i want to build on what gordon said about language. i was talking about a month ago about a retired navy admiral and asked how you would change it and he said language matters. in the navy we man the ships. you start with a ships and then you figure out what you might do with them. i'm passing that on.

>> yes. my question is spes thinkty on some of the comments you have opened with. michelle, how do you avoid a hollow force? what major program you don't need a long range strategic bomber or only need two leg of the nuclear tripod or go you avoid the hollow force and make the necessary -- i hate to use the word -- where i came from a reduction in planned future increasing in spending is not a -- [inaudible] and then, philip, aside from reading between the lines it seems you want to abolish the army. could you be a little bit more specific how you get from here to there. the changes other than the basing and the two different

type of readiness. what does it mean in term of the structure? what role is there for the army and the kind of rapid response force projection scenario? >> if i can -- to make sure you keep your answers -- we have four more people in five minutes. [laughter] thanks. otherwise the agencies ron their own. i'm siting and i never saw a better model than to do national planning cobbling together from the different 's. i learned at his knee when i was just out of brichs to adams readiness for what. the united states record in predicting where and what wars it will fight five or even ten years and sometimes even one year ahead of time is terrible.

nearly zero. you to have a certain flexibility in what you're preparing for. that said, not all regions of the world are of equal concern. then the safer world and the reason that's consistent with the kind of budget approach i'm talking about i'm imagining, of course, there's more reassuring because it's readier though the overall structure is small. insed of having to generate ten times the force so one tenth is available on station. i'm also imagining a world in which you invest in your strategy while times are safe so you are readier and have a more useful structure when times are not safe.

uttered by secretary of deference literally standing in the very throbbing beating heart of the u.s. army the united states military academied at west point in 2011. and if you go through my paper, i make some arguments about in effect the logical implications of gate's. >> it means all things to all people. most important element are deterring adversary from mischief or atbretion. reassuring allies to our commitment to them. and working with allies and partners to build their capacity to contribute to regional and international security. i agree with a lot of phil's

comments for readiness for what. we can't predict specific but i think the mission of the military has been consistent. on down the list. that's just a sampling. his point about again i agree with the importance of thinking whole of government or from a national strategic basis when we plan, i think the one practical wrench i'll throw in the work you have gross resource imbalances between agencies. a colleague of mine used to say you have a defense department on steroids. at least it used to be. defense department on steroids and state and aide on life support. you get the -- you may have a beautifully inte dwraited plan at conception. when it goes up the hill to be resourced and you get a third of the resources you asked for on

the civilian side and 110% of the resources on the military side. it doesn't look so integrated or coherent anymore. on a hallow force, i think there's a lot that kneads to -- needs to be done in the defense reform domain. taking down the 20% of infrastructure that our military leaders don't think they need anymore. .. that same force because of unsustainable personnel costs cost twice as much as it did 10 years ago. we cannot stay on that trajectory. so that's the first place i

would go to battle a hollow force. >> a lightning round. we have bill, ambassador and marvin kalb. in that order. >> just quickly. philip, i wanted to pursue your historical analogy. you mentioned the '20s and '50s as positive elements. analy you can find negative ones astid well in the late '40s, korea, the drawdown after vietnam with a hollow army. where i would go is i would broaden your conclusions thatarr what you come to is the mistakes and the drawdown are higher.ou budget scarcity forces choicesty and that in budget scarcity it' critically important to get thea right. is critically important to get it right. if you agree with that, this

is the question assertion assertion, is the most important step we can take no is to get some sort of budget deal that we talked about at the beginning, not just the sequestered because there is a crazy year way to do budgeting, i am not aware but we need definitions in terms of budget planning. not just so the dod can plan before some hard choices because without the definition people will always think relief is over the next budget deal and the institution will be unwilling to make his choices. >> can i first say with that comment on afghanistan you are absolutely right to say that with beyond the frustrations to see what are the strategic interest.

then breathed deeply and lower the shoulders. [laughter] then i think it will work. a -- i was in the nato foreign ministers' meeting when the soviets never turned up then the soviet ambassador says i have been important announcement that the soviet union no longer exist. we will continue to be surprised to prepare the unexpected is tremendously difficult to go to congress or parliament to ask for money when you don't know what your asking for. we see this over and over. there is of some the meeting

scheduled that we will just be coming out from afghanistan most of us with troops remaining and the u.s. at that time was ready to play a leadership role in trying to shape what is next. i don't think the europeans can do that. , so the comment on that is interesting and finally much talk about the middle east and asia for very reason. there was a speech made about the arctic strategy the other day. it would be interesting to hear your comments. thank you. >> john? >> i would like to bring the united nations in to do this. when i was ambassador to the

un and predawn the situation of sierra leone it was a total basket case the only controls one small century in the middle of the country's capital and criminals of all kind controlled the rest of the country. within several years time u.s. long dash two and peacekeeping force reestablish control of the entire country. there are other good examples of effected united nations actions liberia among others. then recently we hear about this intervention of the eastern kondo which is a force that that is more than a peacekeeping mandate but peace enforcing. and always with the court -- bush 43 of ministration there is condescension to the capability in utility of the u.n. although i noted that mr. rumsfeld as he

thought how do we get out of this heavy stuff may be capacitate un peacekeeping forces may not be a bad thing. that cost a fraction of what it cost to deploy a u.s. force we pay $0.26 on the dollar not to mention the differential between the cost of fielding the un force and the american force it is in order of magnitude at least if not more. my question would be how much time do we or should we spend to try to factor in and institutions like the united nations into our defense posture? or how much do we think about outsourcing? >> the last question. >> it seems if we discuss the future of american defense we would give

thought to the future of the american relationship with china. i am wondering if you see china as a potential ally with cooperation becomes normal zero or as a rival against whom the u.s. has a position one way or another? >> i will not try to comment on everything that was said or just agree with bill and what he noted i know very little about secretary hegel's strategy. [laughter] but i simply want to endorse john negroponte each basic thrust which is will get your institutional repertory and think of them as assets with the construction of a defense strategy especially the slow side of the defense strategy. but forced posture are much

more complicated than that territorial concept that many people have in their head. these institutions of many kinds are proving invaluable. we can think of two or three others that are doing some good work including the organization that right now that has the task to scoop nerve gas out of syria. but i did want to take a moment to comment on the geopolitical question about the defense towards china. to me, my answer is into simple parts. since the chinese leadership themselves don't know how their country will involve how could i possibly? [laughter] day argue among themselves as to what kind of country they ought to have or what foreign policy they ought to

have a and what attitude to the outside world they should have been that is the unsettled argument inside china. that is point number one. point number two, since the united states does care of little bit how that argument comes out so the question is if you care, then what are the policies that are most likely to produce victory for the sites you find more sympathetic? that seems to be an approach that says we want to welcome china into sharing global responsibilities not containing or excluding. this has been the view that others have articulated for some time. there for the argument is by giving them the chance to participate, by giving them a sense to be a stakeholder you don't ensure that china will not become something dangerous in you have to do

things that hedge against the danger but you reduced the likelihood and promote that likelihood and the factions that favor a different kind of approach as they themselves were struggling to come to grips with a very new world horizon than what they grew up with. >> i would just add it is the most important strategic question we will face in the coming decade. there are currently cooperative than competitive elements and we need to try not only to support china becoming more of a stakeholder globally but incentivize them so whenever there is a choice between a more cooperative path they see it in their self-interest to do that whether economic or their standing in the world their ability to influence.

that said i do think we have to have a head in the strategy against the possibility that china may choose to compete or use military force to pursue its interests in the future to make sure we have a military that can operate effectively in the face of that. we want to do that in the a way that does not feel the more competitive dimension and that is tough line nine and the essence of the strategy that has to be done. i wholeheartedly share your thoughts u.s. will come to this summit in 2014 with leadership vision where the alliance needs to go post 2014. i think this challenge ...

our days is broader than to as we think about how do we insure this is a period of innovation and strategic repositioning for in particular as opposed to a time of complying demands that we really sort of opened, broaden our days and in some ways change the way we are operating to kind of incentivize extreme edition, innovation thinking new, thinking differently than the sort of very well-worn path we've been on in the last decade. and i could go on about the u.n. but i will keep it short and stop. >> thank you all very much. a great discussion. only 10 minutes over, so thanks. [applause] [background sounds]

[background sounds] ♪ ♪ [background sounds] >> on november 25, 1963, approximately 1 million people lined the route of president kerry's funeral procession from the u.s. capitol to arlington national cemetery. millions watched the live television coverage. beginning at 1 p.m. on thanksgiving day on c-span2 watch nbc's coverage of president kennedy's state funeral.

>> this is the pat nixon rose garden and was a very special place for both of the nixon. in particular because mrs. nixon was instrumental in designing it for the grand opening of the nixon library. she loved gardening, had a special affinity for roses. mrs. nixon was instrumental in opening up the white house or garden tours in the spring which is a tradition that has continued to this day. this is the pat nixon rose which was developed in 1972 by french designer when mix is nixon was first lady. it is the only rose that will continually grow at the white house. this is a final resting place of both president and mrs. nixon only steps away from the president humble 1910 farmhouse. there's a great story behind the epitaph on the mrs. nixon's memorial site which she tells herself. she wanted to meet the people that were affected by this devastating earthquake.

one of the reporters have said to her, mrs. nixon, what good will any of the stupid the people who you're speaking to can't understand what you're saying? she replied, even when people can speak your language, they can tell if you have love in your heart. >> watcher program on pat nixon at a website c-span.org/firstladies or see a saturday on c-span at 7 p.m. eastern. our series continues live monday as we look at first lady betty ford. >> now, former intelligence officials talk about the threat of a so-called lone wolf attack. that's a a terrorist strike. the potomac institute hosted this event.

>> ladies and gentlemen, my name is michael swetnam. we focus on the issues of science and technology and how science and technology is changing our society. for almost 17 years now, we been the host and home for the international center for terrorism studies, headed by professor yonah alexander. and i think most people here will agree and understand that the center that yonah heads is one of the most foremost academic institutions and consortium of institutions in the world focusing on all aspects of terrorism. professor alexander's group has looked at, studied, and published documents on every conceivable realm and aspect of

terrorism for many, many years. you personally as an author of over 100 books on the subject. we are proud here at the potomac institute to be the home of his academic efforts. we are also privileged to have partnered with the international law institute and professor donald wallace is here represented as he always has, the chairman of international institute, and for well over a decade we've partnered with aisle i am professor wallace to put, to bring to you these seminars and these discussions on terrorism. today we are focusing on going to be very i hope very spirited discussion, presentatpresentat ions followed by question and answer discussion with the audience. one of the most insidious and hard to defend parts of terrorism, that associate with the lone wolf, where we have built up tremendous body of policy and procedure for dealing

with terror groups and state-sponsored terrorism. the lone wolf, the individual who puts together a plot often in sympathy with a group is often hard to find beforehand. finding and dealing with lone wolves will continue to be may be one of the most challenging aspects to society going forward to how we use technology to help us do that, and that we figure out how to use technology to do that while protecting our civil liberties will be one of the key questions of our time. so it is with great privilege that i di get to introduce the session today on lone wolf terrorism, and with that i'll once again try and introduce the person who is impossible to introduce, that's professor yonah alexander who is i think the world's foremost expert on terrorism. professor.

>> thank you very much, mike, for your always generous introduction. i'd like to talk about technology. i would appreciate if you kindly turn -- we are being taped. now, mike mentioned the collaboration with our academic partners, the international law institute, and, in fact, the latest publication with professor donald wallace and our colleagues is -- the next one is going to be available next week on hezbollah, and the next one is on iran, which i guess many

people are concerned about. now, today we do have a very distinguished panel to discuss what mike indicated one of the most insidious challenges, and we are really delighted to have the perspectives, and let me introduce at this point members of the panel. spike bowman, former deputy general counsel, national security of the fbi, currently distinguished fellow the senate on national security law, university of virginia school of law. and this is the other partner that we collaborate with.

then professor amit kumar at the school of foreign service at georgetown university. and then kyle olson who is the president of the olsen group, and professor don wallace. i'm going to say a few words later on in terms of introductions before they speak. now, usually what we try to do is keep in mind terrorism is only one of the many challenges in terms of man-made and natural disasters. and, therefore, we always try to remember, never forget those who were victimized by both mother nature and man-made disasters.

and this opportunity, i would like to express sympathy for the victims in latvian, those who were killed in a supermarket, those who were killed in a typhoon in the philippines and, of course, those were victimized by service to fix in -- to kenya. and i'm going, syria, iraq, afghanistan, pakistan and elsewhere. so that's one aspect to express our solidarity and sympathy with the victims. and then, of course, on the other side we have to honor those who serve those who save lives, those who protect lives all the way from the first responders to the police, the

military, and those who serve governments, those who serve the civil society to combat terrorism. now, president obama, he made a statement at the end the use of years ago, and he said most brightly snare and i quote him, that we would have to guard against what he calls the lone wolf operation rather than a large, well coordinated terrorist attack, unquote. obviously, he put the lone wolf on the agenda, but today, obviously, the security concern is the iran nuclear campaign and the geneva deal, and we will have to obviously focus attention on this issue as well. and the question arises as to

whether there is a link, a connection between the lone wolf and the weapon of mass destruction, and we're going to discuss it also today. now, again, academically as mike indicated, many of the issues which relate also to the lone wolf. now, today it happens that this is the 50th anniversary of the assassination of jfk. and, in fact, exactly 50 years ago the state funeral took place. and i mention this because even the assassination of jfk is a big question mark in terms of the involvement of -- after all, we're dealing with a lone wolf

are maybe a member of some sort of conspiracy. let me also mention that today, the month of november, we have to remember some other a facts which relate -- affects which relate to the lone wolf. whether the attack at fort hood, but prior to that in 1950, we do remember the attempted assassination of president truman by puerto rican terrorists. and the question is, what is the definition of the lone wolf? again, there are many examples in recent history that focuses attention on the lone wolf, for

example, in 1985. 18 years ago, when an individual assassinated the prime minister yitzhak rabin come and this can be regarded also as a lone wolf operation. now, again, history has recorded many instances of the lone wolf. but before we go into specifically the lone wolf examination, i would like to suggest a context to our discussion in terms of -- [inaudible] by that i mean what are really the challenges that we are facing on the holistic level, the security agenda.

in other words, the challenges all the way from organized crime in the linkage that's been organized around terrorism, trafficking, whether we're discussing drugs trafficking or human trafficking, and so on, the financial threats around the world, then maritime security concerns, transportation security concerns, the infrastructure security, cybersecurity, and environmental security. i just returned from a nato meeting in angara turkey. we discuss the threats to north africa to the maghreb, in west africa and so on. the threats, the instability all the way from the atlantic to the red sea and beyond.

so what is the bottom line? i think the bottom line might indicated, clearly the issue of the civil liberties, the technology. i will submit that we have three questions that we have to ask again and again. number one, after 9/11, is the worst yet to come? secondly, we'll civilization survive? and now we are dealing with the iranian challenge. and thirdly, to come back to mike's i think concern, whether counterterrorism strategies and democracy can coexist. now, if we look at the various assassinations related to terrorism, we couldn't even agree universally after the terrorism, and let alone, what does this mean the lone wolf. i will submit that we are facing

basically three sides of challenges by the perpetrators. one, that we call them the lone wolf but we can call them also the individuals who are involved. secondly, i think we have to look at the groups, some more organized groups, more sophisticated, less sophisticated, and other states sponsor of terrorism. so we can of individuals, some of them are mentally deranged. some of them wave the flag as to say they are martyrs with single issue politics extremism with ideologically-based groups come with ethnic, religious and

separate actors and then we mention the criminal and the individual. in the united states again, we see all this variety, all the way from what we call the hate crime, for example, the white supremacists for example. those who are loyal to different kind of ideologies or to the religious base ideologies. so in terms of what's happening in the united states itself, whether we call them leaderless resistance groups, we find two thugs. one or the nonpolitical terrorist, for example, we have the navy yard shooting, again in

september, or this month at the los angeles airport. and then, of course, we have the lone wolves are going all the way back if you will in 1968 when sirhan sirhan, a palestinian decided to assassinate bob kennedy because he was motivated by anti-israel sentiments at the time. also, all of us remember the unabomber who conducted the campaign for many, many years. it was radicalized with technological society at the time. and then, of course, we all remember what happened in oklahoma city in 1995, the

attack on the federal building when 168 people were killed, and 800 other people were wounded. and then, of course, the fort hood shooting that nidal hasan perpetrated at the time. so again, i think when we talk about the lone wolf, of the individual acting on -- incidentally, we do have an increasing number of women who are also involved. we can look at the nonpolitical motivations and then we can look at the political motivations. so ultimately i think what we will discuss today i basically the two sides that we have to

consider, but mostly the political side. and we can spend a semester at least to discuss -- i'm not going to do it now, but i think it would be useful in terms of some context to discuss this phenomenon which is not very well understood, but we have to keep always in mind that terrorists are not born. they are created by various political, social, economic environments. in other words, the lone wolf terrorist don't appear from outer space. they are a part of our societies, and the subject of the article and social and economic ideologies, and their environment. in other words, many of them

shared values through technology, through the website, and so forth. some operate on one basis of a single act, and some operate on multiple series of attacks. there are a number of studies that were developed over the years. we are trying to follow it on a daily basis. and i think it requires a great deal of interest in terms of radicalization. and the international society try to understand what are some other root causes and what can be done to deal with that. so hopefully, today's discussion will provide i think the initial context for our discussion. and the first speaker, as i

mentioned, is the spike bowman, who has a very rich background in the government, and the military, diplomatic activity and academic community. in fact, he's teaching one course now at gw and one of our interns is right there, and he is a student in his class. so you will prepare for the class of tomorrow. i think as spike has a very broad experience in the government and international counter intelligence. and also in various other senior positions in the fbi, and as i indicated, he has a very rich academic background. so we are looking forward to his remarks.

and then we're going to follow-up by our other panelists. and hopefully then we will develop a discussion with the audience. spike, would you mind coming up. >> okay. i'll let you get by. >> okay. >> thank you, thank you. i first became, start think about lone wolf terrorism right after 9/11. at the time i was the deputy general counsel for national security affairs at the fbi. and we really didn't know an awful lot about al qaeda at that point in time. but we began to look into it very quickly.

and among the things that we learned worth it for a number of training camps being run by al qaeda in afghanistan. and the more we look at it, the more we realize that while al qaeda was trained in the camps in afghanistan, an awful lot of other people had gone through there, too, not necessary affiliate with al qaeda, not necessarily intended to go out and immediately do something on a terrorist plane. but perhaps going there for training to do something later on. and so we began to think about what would happen if one of those people began to decide to do something unattached, unaffiliated. and the reason that made a big difference is because the way we look for terrorists and spies and so forth, was largely through the foreign intelligence surveillance act. which is operated by a secret

court. it has a secret warrants for wiretaps and physical searches. but the predicate for a fisa warrant is that the target is either a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. and if you have a person who is acting on own, it's pretty hard to talk that person into the agency of a foreign power. so one of the things that i did fairly soon after 9/11 is i suggested that perhaps we could have an amendment to the foreign intelligence surveillance act to look at this single person, which caused a lot of consternation because it did change the way we have thought about the act from the start. we eventually did get an amendment to the act for the purpose. but we also begin to realize some other things that might happen, too. one of the things that started

are thinking along a slightly different line was soon after 9/11, a dutch foreign intelligence produced three studies about radicals in their part of the world. one of the really startling things that came out of that was that they did not find a lot of ideologues. they found a lot of people who seemed to have an affinity for violence. just want to do something violently. and as a consequence they started looking at those individuals and actually did disrupt not only in the netherlands but in other countries as well, some things that were beginning to happen or were being planned to happen. simply because they were focused on these individuals. well, we began to look at that, and then another thing happened. in 2005, we had the british underground bombings. and we began to look at that point and think, well, you know,

we've got people in the country that maybe this intends to. something we have not focused on all that much past the committee may face. so now we're starting to think, well, we might of people who are not affiliated with al qaeda or something similar. we might of people in our own communities who want to do violence. and so we began to think more and more that there might be some other thing to do about this. when i testified in 2002, congress, the asked for the foreign intelligence surveillance act to be amended, i have to say that congress was very skeptical. they were not really ready to accept the fact that we might have these other types of individuals in the united states, and it really took some creative time for congress to come around. they eventually did. but the one thing, the other

thing that has happened through the years is that we have fairly well decimated the ability of al qaeda and al qaeda type affiliates to carry out a large complex type of operation 9/11 represented. could it happen again? yes, but what's more likely lacks and here i'm going to give you a prediction. in the united states, and probably in most other western countries as well, future terrorist acts are more likely to be less well organized than we saw with 9/11. there are likely to be less complex. they are less likely to succeed. they are less likely to be as lethal if they do succeed. they are going to be more numerous. and in all likelihood i believe that they will be mostly conducted i citizens or long-term residents of the united states.

now, why do i say that? first of all, i think that's what the sequence of events that i have just laid out sort of points us towards. but secondly, if we stop and take a look at what has happened in the united states since 9/11, we have had over 50 terrorist -- according to fbi reporting -- over 50 terrorist attempts defeated. we've also had a number of terrorist associated persons arrested. and of those were associated with all who have had some link to al qaeda or al qaeda type philosophy, more than half of them were united states citizens. 35% of them were born in the united states. 60% of them had a college degree. and then 50% of them, were either working or in school.

these were not the people that we're looking at right after 9/11. these were not the discontented arabs who were going to the camps in afghanistan to try and learn how to make an explosive to try and learn, you know, tactics or maybe to learn to shoot a gun, who knows. but that's basically we are looking at i think today an entirely different cadre of people than we thought about been many years ago. and what bothers me about it is i don't think we're looking at it hard enough. i don't think that we are focused as much on the lone wolf, the single individual who might have no affiliation with anybody who might not even be an ideologue, who might just want to go blow something up because he's a discontent. again, you think back to the example of timothy mcveigh. but we've seen others in the

united states who are like this as well. and i think that's what the future holds for us. i will leave it there. >> obviously, i think the way you described it, there is no doubt about your analysis on the basis of what already happened, and not only u.s. citizens or permanent residents, but also those who come here to study on a visa, or italy goes as well. but it is also characterized in the european countries as well. as we've seen with the terrible tragedy in norway, in the name

of some secular ideologies or so i think this is the way of the future. now, we are going to have another perspective to discuss the issue with treachery, who i introduced earlier -- dr. kumar. and he is teaching also georgetown, the school of foreign service. and he specializes on the financial aspect as well as on south asia in the case study in that particular region. so i asked him to bring in some of his findings and perspectives, and then we're going to have a third speaker to focus more on the weapons of mass destruction. dr. kumar, could you kindly come

up here? >> many thanks to thank you and mike for having me here. it's about to be here for the second time, and with such a distinguished panel, and i think the previous speaker, spike, for an excellent presentation. essentially i'm going to run through some important aspects of lone wolf terrorist. in corporate in some south asian examples as well as others. basically when we talk about what is lone wolf terrorism, most people conflate it with the fact that one person who planted executes it. and finances it. the reality is, especially in the text of what yonah called political terrorism, the radicalization process. a single individual may perpetrate the act at the in stage but in terms of radicalization he may more likely than not be radicalized

through either a group over the internet or through some army experience, or what have you. so that is a distinction one has to be very clear about. and a knee-jerk response is just because it's a single individual, he must be kind of a global terrorist but he may not be a terrorist at all but he may be a terrorist as well. and he may be a member either covert or overt of a terrorist organization. some previous interface with a terse our decision, the radicalization process through the some previous travel in terrorist camps. like, for example, if you look at the boston bomber, one of them had traveled to central asia. so it's hard to really call the person who travels a lone wolf terrorist really because he was indoctrinated, along with the internet of course. secondly, it's been alluded to by yonah and spike as well, one of the types of lone wolf terrorists could be secular,

like timothy mcveigh, could be religious, they could be single issue, ted kaczynski, unabomber could be criminal as well and could be idiosyncratic. when you see criminal, the could be for example, the anthrax attacker in 2001. bruce ivins had passed away in 2000. he had a criminal intent. and it's hard to -- that's one of the other. it could be a mishmash of all the five categories or one or more. what factors contribute along with terrorism? it could be social and political grievances. it could be documented psychological disorders as we discovered in many including the boston bomber and others. the affinity with membership of terrorist organizations, are then you could be a broadcasting of terrorist intentions. for example, in norway, under his had broadcast what is going to do so there are some telltale

signals that the wood below will attacker will be doing something attack your. then there is the role of enablers and radicalization for example, the internet our previous expense but then there are agents in the process. could be personal and political triggering events. for example, timothy mcveigh went to radicalization after his experience in the first gulf war and after that. he developed a loathing for the federal government. you have all these basketcase folks who may be radicalized in one or many ways. then you are what we call stochastic terrorism, which are basically folks like bin laden and others exhorting their al

qaeda presence to engage in lone wolf attacks. that would be what we call a really stochastic process where the perpetrator of the act, what some call missiles actually. want to terrorist organizations achieve using lone wolf care? i'm going to focus on little more from here on now on terrorist organizations and how they may use or utilize lone wolf attackers. want to terrorist organizations achieve using lone wolf terrorism? they are low cost, greater impact, require the planning. it difficult to predict and protect and they take counterterrorist measures against. but is this aspect of plausible deniability. it a look at the mumbai bombings, initially in 2008, this is topical because were celebrate the fifth anniversary of the heinous attacks in mumbai, exactly on november 26, 2008, when the 60 hour carnage begin. initially been news reports said

it's the mugging. then we discovered -- it's an offshoot of it. and then there could be threats of the indian mujahideen or a local criminal again in india. this happen before because last car -- surveillance of the mumbai targets in 2007. is a lone wolf terrorist or is he kind of said there to act as a lone wolf terrorist to make you believe that this is an individual was preparing attacks on his own? there's the case of the men involved in the plot to survey the financial institutions in new york and new jersey. and in washington. and then there is this need, the

requirement on the part of the lone wolf terrorist to committee with other members of the group. end this with a terrorist organization -- that's the individual. i told this individual we are involved. last but not least, what these lone wolf attacks as far as terrorist organizations go, they show would be terrorists or would be lone wolves, here's one guy who is committed this act, all of you can go and do the same thing. that's what al qaeda said this of timber, exhorting would be al qaeda sympathizers and radicals to lone wolf care. importantly enough, what kind of strategies, counter terrorist studies can be used? there could be communities were civilians would be involved, easier said than done but i think this, this washington metro bus, you know, say

something if you see something, that's a very typical example of what could be done because the lone wolf terrorist at least i would consider a global terrorist as someone who executes and finances and plans the attack, but is radicalized by an external agent. i.e., the terse organization. whatever and neighbors there might be, internet, military, previous travel, previous contract, hard of a sleeper cell or what have you. then there is the need for federal, state and local kind of coordination and information sharing in this. trying to nip all these would be attacks in the budget. then there is marching internet usage and that brings in a very important civil liberties issue. with what powers can the government monitor the internet? it can and should because whatever is taking place still is brewing over the internet. what kind of messaging, checking out how does a would be lone wolf terrorist finance his

terrorist plots. what kind of interactions does he have? then there is this question of rapid response. for example, it i in the regionf the recent respond after the first attack the anders breivik, again, it's difficult to predict what he is going to do, but if they had only responded to that, he may not have perpetrated the second attack which was a more heinous one with larger casualties actually. then there is the question of investigating not just lone wolf terrorist attacks but the botched plots as well. there's so much more one can learn from a failed plot. the underwear bomber. there's so much more one can learn in terms of a plot that's been foiled or botched. what kind of implications does lone wolf terrorism have for counterterrorism measures?

it's difficult to detect, and, therefore, unorthodox strategies are called for, including some of the ones i mentioned community policing. the strategies need to be designed and to prepare for, respond and prevent the terrorist attacks. and it's difficult to make out when we're doing is whether the attack is by a criminal or by a secular terrorist or a group of terrorist. so it's difficult to really tailor make the strategy to kind of address the potential plot, or potential perpetration of terrorist attacks. the are obviously issues of whether lone wolf terrorist attacks are more possible in developed societies versus developing society. in the context of south asian nations, particularly their information sharing methods, their monitoring measures are not as good as ours.

or other allies in the developed world. so there is a thinking amongst intelligence and law enforcement circles that it's hard to perpetrate or plan a lone wolf terrorist plot in a place like india or any other country in south asia and is in the developed world. that is an opportunity to study what's going on in terms of the lack of global terrorist attacks and other developing societies. the real possibility is we've seen time in and timeout of terrorist attacks here. lastly, i just want, going to talk about radicalization. i want all of us to look at carefully, what does radicalization and dale? and what does al qaeda, when we say bin laden is gone, al qaeda is essentially damaged your we are kind of little bit obsessed with the organization of al qaeda. the organizational structure of the country. it is the al qaeda ideology of course which we haven't been

able to do much about. deradicalization in prisons, are important strategies to employ. then there is the al qaeda movement which is still intact. if you look at the ideology or the movement of al qaeda to grab local separatists and then in the kashmir region or the rebellion and mali are in other parts of the world. or the separatists cause in south asia, i.e. the taliban. that coupled with the fact there's increased interaction amongst affiliates of al qaeda points to the would be or potential lone wolf terrorist part of this movement. there is some connection either ideological or in person or both. so it's difficult again to really spring to a judgment that

okay, if you have a single individual, then it's on an individual act. i would reckon that radicalization in some strange sense is a kind of material support as well. most people wouldn't recognize it. we've got to go beyond the obvious, what appears on the surface may not be true or entirely too. it's good to dig deep and look at more important crucial aspects of radicalization and a lot more can be done in terms of engagement with the imprisoned individual, for example. or to prevent someone who's been in prison for a criminal activity, not to become a terrorist, through education means or kind of work on their employment, future employment outside prison. because a lot of literature deals with recidivists and folks have been left out of guantánamo bay and are perpetrating attacks in aqap or in other outfits either in syria or yemen or

elsewhere. well, that's it for now. thank you. >> our next speaker is kyle olson. has very rich experience as well, consulting, advising governments and industry and the academic community. particularly related to the nature of the threat, and i remember very vividly after the attack in tokyo which was mass destruction, that you were kept quite busy to make sense of that. and i really think that with your very wide experience, is to share with us your thinking

about various scenarios and possibilities, the use of what we call some sort of weapon of mass destruction, whether the chemicals, sarin, anthrax, some cases that we have seen in the united states and abroad related to deaths potential. so, kyle, if you will please come up here. >> thank you. the lone wolf terrorist, he is obviously a subject of great interest, great concern. you through several questions about right at the beginning, you know. you asked whether or not the

future for terrorism, the lone wolf terrorist and probably looking at something worse than 9/11? an event on that scale to you asked a question of whether society can survive and you asked also whether or not democracy and our freedoms can survive in that environment. first of all, just at going a couple of themes which are already voiced. the lone wolf represents a unique problem. i think we sometimes throw the label terrorism around or terrorist around rather too expensive a fashion. sometimes it's simply a person who is out for revenge, in other cases it might be a criminal activity. throwing the terrorism word seems to put in a comfortable basket for many of us. ..

eason i get there is the lone wolf or someone with a very small group, certainly has the potential for accessing weapons we would run into the weapon of mass destruction category. the classic hierarchy, the chemical, biological, radiological hierarchy is one that we can look at and say many of these are within reach of an

individual. to find some way to introduce toxic chemicals into a setting doesn't need to be at mass kill off, doesn't need to be the instant that produces body count in the hundreds but for example the introduction of a toxic chemical into a school building, the access to cylinders of chlorine for example or some other material certainly has the potential to create toxic event. 9/11 scale probably not but the threat is there and there are materials available out there that are accessible beyond getting discrete quantities, whether we are talking about capturing, disrupting, diverting trucks, truckloads of material or even an attack on production or storage facility. the collateral effects are significant, are real and could be meaningful in that regard. certainly within the capacity,

the capability of someone with rudimentary understanding of the fact that if there's a label on the side it is bad for you and probably bad for somebody else as well. on the other hand chemical weapons attack like the one we saw in the tokyo subway attack in the 90s was an event that required a robust investment on the part of a group of individuals. we are talking about investments on the score of tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars and a commitment to work on the problem over a period of time. that is maybe something that distinguishes that kind of a threat. that pushes it out of the classic lone wolf pattern. i don't ignore the fact the unabomber had a campaign over a number of years but his work was the small package bombs we had developed a knack for processing and producing. chemical weapons probably in a meaningful way little outside the scope of the individual,

maybe not outside the scope of a small group. biological weapons, we often hear about the poor man's nuclear weapons, the poor man's atom bomb but it is a legitimate threat, the biological weapon can be self replicating in the environment. we don't need an environmental base to produce one if you have access to appropriate stocks of front, infectious disease is an infectious disease and as anyone who survived flu season will tell you the little kid next door is a delivery device for a biological weapon of some sort. the biological threat is also one that can be an example of a talented dabbler working in his own laboratory, diverting research facilities in a university or hospital setting. the technology is certainly you there. biological weapons, the reference was made to the

anthrax attacks earlier in this decade. anthrax technology is essential in 1950s level technology. the other biological agents have been used as a weapon either with great conscious thought in advance or as a collateral effect going back hundreds of years. an individual could certainly find a way to apply a biological weapon in a selective attack. are we talking society killer or city killer? probably not. on the other hand, the lone wolf has, this is true for all weapons of mass destruction scenarios or alpha mass killing scenarios, the lone wolf terrorist operates essentially in a vacuum in terms of provision, restrictions, limitations, any kind of filter on what is or isn't acceptable.

polk through lone wolf terrorist isthe through lone wolf terrori is only answerable to himself. any deterrent tactics short of actually identifying or capturing the would the attacker are essentials in not going to have much impact. he operates without committees or going before an appropriation board of any kind. he does what he does to his timetable. high explosives, that goes without saying. the one that is probably most significant concern in terms of its real footprint is the radiological threat. for the last 10, 15 years, one

of the recurring questions on the part of security planners everywhere is why haven't we been hit with a dirty gone? dirty banzai the easiest weapons probably in that whole panoply of shall leases to make. the easiest weapon to assemble, the easiest weapon to use. obtain a specific quantity of radiological material, doesn't have to be high grade, wraparound conventional explosives which we know you can access and detonate it. if the effects don't even have to be lethal, the sociological, economic, political, cultural impact of detonating a radiological device in a major urban area, the monumental core of the city of washington would be substantial. because the all clear notice is one of the almost impossible things to obtain from any government agency. good 30 bomb went off down the street but we determined you are

safe, go ahead. all so let's not leave out the notion of the cyberattack. we could argue the recent actions by anonymous as well as the release of the nsa files constitutes an act of terrorism, have been dramatic and political in nature but also certainly had impact's far beyond what you expect to find on the fund drive and that is certainly an example of an intelligent individual, an arrogant individual and a dissociative individual feeling free to carry out what he or she felt to be a legitimate exercise of his self-imposed authority. going back to the question, 9/11, redo on that, for the loan will fly argue that a 9/11

spectacular with that body count is probably beyond their reach, probably. you could have the perfect storm, you could argue 9/11 was the perfect storm. exceeded the expectations of al qaeda. will society survive? yes, society will survive because we are more resilient than one individual or small group of individuals. we are a society of free fifteen million with a larger society of six billion. society will survive but at the end of the day you ask question about democracy and our values and rights and privileges. the lone wolf operates without the constraints of organization. the lone wolf gets up and feels like killing you, he will kill

you. now to our discussion. >> obviously i thank you for a profound issue and questions and i hope we can develop a discussion among the panelists as well as the audience. that is why i think we have to, in our analysis, make a distinction, very clear distinction between the individual terrorist and the group, organized group as well as state-sponsored terrorism. by the way, but criticism, whether it is a historic or not,

concerns of some members of congress and others that in the package, there was no indication related to state-sponsored of iran, their involvement in syria and so forth. the bottom line is the nature, intensity of the threat on the part of states, of groups like al qaeda and the individual. what is absolutely correct on what you mentioned in terms of the impact, the number of attacks according to our studies, maybe 2% of all the effects of terrorism. we are talking about thousands related to the individuals.

but one attack can have a very significant impact. the prime minister -- incidentally, focus our seminars and so forth by individuals, undermines the peace process for many years. not only the number but the impact. i think one of the areas we still have to consider, not only the political or not political, how many affects we had in the united states, one of the most recent sweaters with the anthrax or some other life that was sent to president obama and new york

city mayor bloomberg was really related to that particular issue. so again in, we have to look at the picture, the issue of radicalization. it is true what you said about an individual. let's not look at some approval by his peers or colleagues, no constraints whatsoever. but that individual does not exist in a vacuum in terms of radicalization and amit kumar also mentioned social media for example, the internet and so forth. the inspiration that they had. so what i propose that we can discuss again his the whole

issue, in general the terrorists are not born but are created and we can condemn them, we can be against the evil doers but must understand the mind of the evildoer. we cannot understand the mind of the lone wolf. you want to respond to some of the comments, amit kumar? >> i sort of agree about the radicalization. much as these programs could take care of the behavior, they in no way can have an impact on

the ideology. the symptoms could be taken care of in terms of behavior in a subtle measure but in terms of the ideology which is so profound whatever the agents may be could be triggering events, folks like ayman al-zawahiri or osama bin laden, exporting these loose affiliated members or so members or potential lone wolf attackers. there is a lot that can be done as far as ideology is concerned because we don't really understand why they have this ideology of anti despot, that is one feature, another is the behavior towards the u.s. israel and its allies and thirdly, the moment of global islamic caliphate. this is what they stand for and why there are foot soldiers and

their foot soldiers with because, they may not have the kind of terrorist leaders as part of an organizational network of the finance years but they -- ideology is something they import from the outside dance to the extent of this interact with their mental dilapidation or their mental -- other personal or political grievances. difficult to fathom what to do about it. this was mentioned earlier as well. these guys could be criminals who are radicalized, could be just criminals, could be folks who are idiosyncratic, have funny behavior patterns. difficult to come out with measures per say and i would look at the ideology, as you mentioned. as i more important object study, ver