[applause] [applause] [applause] [inaudible conversations] booktv is on facebook.>>v like us to interact with booktv guests and viewers. itert watch videos and get up-to-date information on events. facebook.com/booktv. o next eri hotta.

this is about an hour. good evening, thank you veryanke much for coming. it's always as somewhat an artificial situation of two people who know each other we well. husband and wanifed, i suppose. fall to the category to do an interview in public like this. ould i ask a question ibreakfasa ask over the breakfast table.an on the other hand, one doesn'tr normally discuss japanese naval strategy over the breakfast subl y to discuss it a little bit further. and one of the things that i find most interesting about the book, and revealing and possibly for many readers in this country also is that it tackles a myth about pearl harbor. and one of the myths is which was, of course, very much encouraged in the postwar period

not only the japanese themselves but the american administration is that japan had been hijacked by the militarist and the civilians really were not to blame for what happened. it it was a kind of militarist cue, and the japanese people ab and the emperor himself were really sort of duped by the militarist embarking this reckless adventure. what would you say to that particular myth? it was a very easy and convenient myth. it disengaged quite a few people who were actually responsible in reality and of course for the japanese nation as well to think that the war could have been averted was too painful a question to ask, i think. and that was sort of

self-perpetuating myth. that the japanese themselves took to after the war. >> in your book, you also describe why it's wrong to think of it in term of the civilians being duped. because some of the civilians politicians, not least the prime minister so much of the time -- was actually foe a large extent responsible for what happened. even though he thought it would lead to a disaster. can you say something about that? >> right. the fact decision making responsibility was shared between civilians and the military is hard to sort of imagine. because people take it for granted that the military took over. but it was no the the case. because the leaders actually met

over 70 times in the one year up to the pacific war and discussed the alternatives and different steps to be taken, and those conferences were called liaison conferences. and it was not for anything that was called because it was function was to civilian and military strategies and policies and create sort of a unified voice. so civilian poll additions can't say they didn't really have any say. they did have equal say in the conferences. >> so they got along with it even though they had a great -- >> i think it happened other a course of period which they gradually -- them in to thinking we can say this much. there's some kind of diplomatic breakthrough will happen and we'll sort of notify all the

steps they were taking. and it's going on. i think the military leaders have to put up a old front to preserve their face and to appease younger -- who are strategizing and thinking always about expanding this fear of influence and there was also an rivalry. the navy and the army were always fighting with each other for, you know, bigger budget. and i think the navy and army within themselves were very much guided in to different sympathies. so you can't really talk about the military voice as one. that's another -- >> which is that there's always tremendous consensus on the one hand, on the surface, there's consensus. but actually behind the scenes

there was tremendous rival i are. >> it was power bargaining. i was trying to escapes me. there's a japanese expression for the top guys being driven by the middle-ranking people who were more radical. >> [inaudible conversations] >> yes. could you explain? >> i think the translation would be something like retainers -- does that make sense? does that sound? >> okay. >> relatively the lord complete authority and principle but actually weak and sort of driven in to a more radical position by hot heads who were in the middle. >> it justifies our power as well by indicting leaders as ineffective basically. so i think throughout the '30s especially in the beginning of this --

[inaudible] up to february, 1963, i think they were driven by a desire to innovate the japanese poetry. and also to strengthen the system. everything was done in the name of salvaging -- influences that japan under tremendous economic strain and economic cannot be separated in this period. like any other part of the world. so i think there were a hot-blooded soldiers ready to mobilize perceived bit leaders who had to be appeased. there was also a state of fear about what could happen to them as well. >> which is also, again, rather destroy the other myth of japan

as a sort of society which on the one hand has some truth. and the other hand the authorities were often not really in control. and you mentioned the 1936 may not meaning to clear to everybody.

the admiral and the general and so on were sympathetic to the young -- for the more conservative members of the establishment including the imperial household. they went too far. they didn't disagree with necessarily but didn't like the means. and so this was a clear case of young people in the middle rajivs -- ranks driving people in authority in to positions they may not wanted to be. >> right. i think the fact that the emperor saw effective by the experience of the failed coup which nearly toppled him is important too.

the kind in 1936 i didn't say anything. but it also speaks for the fact that he thought that -- [inaudible] which is in the constitution as clear as he claims. >> the idea -- [inaudible] they could have made a case if he was badly advise z and would have replaced him with his -- >> one of the brothers. >> one of the brothers who was -- >> younger brothers. which was much more radical. >> yes. popular he was an army officer. >> what about the other which is the japanese --

duped by the militarist is the sort of main stream. the right-wing nationalist, which is still here is that trapped in to sort of forced in to attacking pearl harbor. they were surrounded by western colonial powers. the a, b, c, d, my country we're involved in this. the americans forced their hand

by the famous. >> right. the abc -- [inaudible] a somewhat classic explanation for many of the more origins there. i think -- world war i complaib -- complained about it very much. i think it was very much on the japanese mind adds -- as well. the fact that the wartime government made use of that narrative -- gave a speech on the day of the pearl harbor attack that japan was reduck -- reluctantly. >> who was a prime minister. >> prime minister. japan entered the war. reluctantly despite all the nation's past efforts of trying to achieve peace in east asia. it went hand and hand the cause of the japan nieces were taken by the sort of the -- effect abused.

but was quite useful at the time as well. and useful to make them believe themselves they were fight forking the right cause too. i think the marriage was quite strong. who would really want to die for the war? you want to believe that and, if you were ordinary citizens with our much -- [inaudible] information about the china role or about japanese imperialism, i don't think it's hard to imagine how apeopling that narrative might have been. >> it had a kernel of truth to it. it's true, unlike nazi germany, japan was fighting the war against other imperial power. and george was one person who actually criticized the u.s. diplomacy in retrospect and said they should have recognized japanese interests more than

they did it was a little late in the game, and but you cannot -- one sort of can understand why it was felt they had their rights and empire just as the europeans had their empire. ..

>> and so we are not trer or not even medium-term causes of war. the causes for the war have more to do with japanese ambitions in east asia, rivalries for the control of china with competing against the united states as well and the idea that the fact that they have been quite lucky in their past wars probably affected their military. perhaps this reckless war two could be somehow one.

>> the past wars of course have been applauded by some of the western powers. teddy roosevelt when the japanese beat the russians in their russo-japanese war of 1985 talked about the plucky japanese and so did the british and the attack on the russian fleet's. it could reseen as kind of a pearl harbor of that time and it succeeded outwardly. >> americans being attacked. the fact that the operation was a surprise attack as well but the soviets don't seem to make as much of a myth about the surprise and the sneaky and stealth nature. i think it has to do with the fact that it's so dramatic and the fact that america was

attacked on its soil and it was a very heavily japanese populated island. i think it just became part of the american psyche and collective historical narrative and became a symbol and sort of departed from its real significance perhaps. >> so was ruled a set play in american myths. john dower amongst others. he didn't necessarily condone the attack on pearl harbor. in fact he said he didn't but his analysis is that one of the reasons the americans were so shocked by this event in so outraged at the idea of infamy and so on was that it played into -- you see it in so many western movies of the treacherous indians who are always attacking without warning from nowhere the brave pioneers and suddenly these redskins screeching war cries.

i think in his analysis, i think is a war without risk, i can't remember. it's one explanation why it's still such a strong myth in america, that it's exactly that, that it's this treacherous attack. it wasn't meant to be treacherous. it wasn't a screwup. >> there is a huge debate about who's responsible for the delay in communicating the termination of diplomacy to the white house and so on. but the fact that the delayed document didn't really specify that there were you know, it was not the declaration of war so you can't really argue. the stealth of the attack would have remained and the sort of treacherous nature would not have been affect did anyway in roosevelt's mind. the fact that he had this

oratorical genius and could mobilize a nation, of course it had something to do with the enormity of that but i think there's something to be said about the comparison to india and native americans. >> in movies. we use it at the breakfast table. >> it just speaks for the disproportionate asymmetrical nature of the warfare that was being fought and that is why i think after 9/11 it was so compelling and tempting for people to use that analogy, the attack being much like pearl harbor and that theory underresourced power could overtake a giant however momentarily. >> there is another, i mean to

perhaps carrion slightly from what we were talking about before, another analysis that is it -- at japanese intellectual who is no longer with us who started as a communist i think and ended up as him ultranationalists? his phrase was the 100 year war and the pearl harbor was part of a war that actually started in the 1860s when japan opened up by commodore perry and his gunships and ever sense even though there were periods of peace and truces ever since japan had been fighting back against western dominance. is there some truth to that? >> yes, if you look at the whole history in terms of cultural civilizational clash, that is

just very tempting and so fast i'll do explain the political events that took place in the meantime and reduce everything to these worldviews almost. of course these things affect one's thinking and they act as furniture of the mind but you can't really say japan went to war because of the racism. of course you can describe individual beliefs and how people might have reacted to certain situations differently or certain leaders might have held onto certain beliefs more strongly than others just doesn't explain the whole picture sufficiently in my eyes. i can see how it would he tempting. >> my role here is to be the japanese nationalists. why did they do it? what was the hope?

the mastermind of the attack on pearl harbor and naoto who had been at harvard, who had been in the u.s. embassy in washington and the japanese embassy in washington knew that the -- the west very well and a very sophisticated man who warned the government on several occasions that it was a very reckless thing to do but he did it nonetheless. he was probably vain enough to think he was the man to do it if anyone. what did it help to get out of it? >> it really was a gamble at the time they felt they had been cornered into the situation they justified it to this slim possibility that something diplomatic could be worked out after inflict thing a great deal of damage on the pacific fleet in the united states.

even though war was being declared in the name of failure of diplomacy they expected america to approach japan with diplomatic solution so japan itself didn't have any exit plan >> short of war. >> short of war, right. the fact that the russo-japanese war -- japan also didn't have an exit plan either and it was because of theodore roosevelt's intervention and peacemaking efforts that japan just got away winning it. it was not straightforward. >> roosevelt, the japanese eyes went bankrupt in the russo-japanese war. they were bailed out by the banker jacob schiff who escaped the anti-semitic grounds in russia. white russian officers were then

taken prisoner by the japanese introduced the japanese to the protocols of zionism. the japanese put two and two together and said we have to keep the jewish on our side was the conclusion which is why the japanese term seems to handle for the jews to the nazis when they requested it from shanghai. but i think we are getting close to question time. the last question perhaps, i think i'm right in saying that in america pearl harbor has become a sort of a mythical occasion which is used over and over and not used after 9/11 and so on. in japan we think of world war ii. pearl harbor is not the first. >> no, i think atomic bombing of

hiroshima and not the sake would be the first things that come to mind but also bombings of every major city tends to be forgotten or not discussed in the narrative. i think that sperry and died hard but then it's been almost 70 years, nearly 70 years since that collective experience. i can't really say e. been that they have this strong attachment to any of the -- aside for the fact that they are taught in school much more effectively than they are taught about japan. >> there may be another that we haven't really discussed which is why so many japanese intellectuals, people who are not fascists or militarists applauded the attack on pearl harbor in december 1941 partly

because it came as an enormous relief. they have been fighting china even though the official propaganda was that japan was liberating asia so they had been fighting china and getting deeper and deeper into what we know is a quagmire. many people felt spare us -- to embarrass to think about it and even now when it's probably true to say more people know if they think about world war ii at all in japan know more about the atrocities committed in japan that i know about pearl harbor. a lot of intellectuals felt at last we are fighting the proper enemy. this is in the war we should have been fighting to begin with >> and i agree. some of them had studied and had first-hand experience in the matters so that is why the inferiority complexes were much

deeper than others. >> those are always the worst nationalists. >> yes, they tend to be. >> this is not against scholarships for people to study abroad and so on. [laughter] it's a bit like what's his name, daniel ortega who picked up his anti-american rhetoric before then. but i think is close and perhaps we could help in it up to questions. i will field the questions. shall i do it? >> actually i will. we have microphones set up on either side so i would just ask one i call on you that you proceed to the microphone and please identify yourself and we can address eri or ian with your question. we can start over here. go ahead with your question. >> hi. i am noaa smith and the worst

dressed person here. so actually i had a couple of questions but one of my questions is one thing you guys didn't discuss is a 1939 japan tried attacking the soviet union and it was a lot bigger operation than most people realized and they were soundly defeated by a bunch of tanks and basically they just scream them. did news of that not get out? i mean i know that experience deeply shipped a lot of the brightest people so did and that sort of give them pause or was that all hushed up and nobody really knew it? >> it was hushed up in the public. the newspapers and reporters it in full detail but the army leadership was of course shaken and that is why they decided they couldn't fight the soviet

union after june 22, 1941. that was very much on their mind. we couldn't afford to fight the soviet union. we will just keep things quiet and keep fighting china and going into china so they can sustain that luring position in china for the time being. >> it's like let's attack another giant. >> there's also the rivalry between the navy and the army. you have the so-called strike north faction which was largely army who wanted to go for the soviet union and strike the south sanction which was the naval because they needed the resources to keep going, who wanted to fight the war in southeast asia and the debacle in mongolia where these battles

were flawed against zoo cough. the debacle basically meant the end of the strike of the north faction. >> can i get a second question? >> we can come back to you but since you are standing -- >> all right. i'm also kind of interested in to what extent was he sort of trying to move japan toward being more centralized and less perfectionist system? >> i'm sorry? >> what the will i have read about him kind of indicated that he was sort of trying to beam -- japan was this factionalized place so to what extent was he trying to set change that? was he a centralizer? >> he was into efficiency because he was a naval aircraft. so sorry? >> and able bureaucrat.

>> yes, a very able eurocrat who kept individual notes about people he dealt with every day of his life and held a grudge against certain people and he would punish them. but i think he did try to centralize and also i think his primary motive was to help because he was a very devoted server of the institution. when he was appointed prime minister not sober, mid-october 1941 the first thing he tried to do was to avert the rule, try to discuss alternative scenarios against this idea of being openly bellicose and uncompromising which is not true. he was a bit more complex, simpleminded and i think his position was a little bit more complex.

>> jeff llorente. you had mentioned the china quagmire at the very end of your dialogue and i wonder if you could explore for us a bit to what extent in 1941 was china and the china quagmire itself perhaps the main driver of japanese war and diplomatic policy. was the attack on the u.s. in a sense, if you have a problem you can't solve make it bigger and then maybe you'll be able to find new opportunities and to what extent were they talking about either peace feelers are some kind of a combination, or was that entirely off the table for china? what was the warning to china at that point and if you could paint an even larger picture, to what extent were the partners in the tripartite pact in their actions in europe it on the invasion of the soviet union if

anything an inducement that we can do more and we can think more boldly and the germans are at the gates of moscow. to what extent were they looking to their axis partners in europe as a model as further incitement to thinking. >> okay. i think the china war was central and we they did discuss it was essential for them to end the china war somehow. to end it meant to exit in nixon's words. maybe come up with peace terms that were favorable. they had set up this public regime that the japanese occupiers and they wanted the americans to recognize that regime as well and have two nationalist regimes in china which didn't make sense for the americans. the americans had no inkling to recognize the regime in the first place.

in the negotiations in washington between the japanese ambassador the mullah and roosevelt since april 1941, china was always there. the china issue was always there and the conference in tokyo was always discussed and it became really the sticking point of the negotiations, that the military especially the army couldn't openly say that we are willing to withdraw if the u.s. lifted sanctions or some kind of -- they couldn't really open -- openly discuss these things so the militarist and japan were depending on civilian leaders to reach it diplomatic breakthrough. he thought that he could pull off diplomatic resolution if he met roosevelt and person.

if he promised too much at home to the military he could prepare in the meantime because you never know but you have to allow me to see roosevelt and say hawaii or alaska. he thought and the military thought that would happen until quite late, until september, mid-september, even early on sober. and then they sort of noticed the americans were not going to come to the table. that is when he panicked and left. so china was central. your second question was about tripartite. [inaudible] >> they were mesmerized by the german excesses. not that they understood the legal aspects are nazi ideology or embraced it because the japanese were really

second-class citizens. the japanese themselves wanted to be the people who -- the original german didn't know the truth of hitler's predicament. that was not so much embracing the ideology but as martial aspects of the nazi success and also the fact that the shock factor in europe especially after barbarossa, the people were just, japanese casually thought okay southeast asia is right for plucking because nobody's looking at it and if we could push the regime to hand it over peaceably with the threat of force, the western powers are not going to quibble because it's so far away. a big mistake i think.

that is what triggered the total embargo and that the fact of total embargo of petroleum. and the freezing of japanese assets. >> to just add to that, didn't they also see operation are boroughs of as an opportunity to attack and southeast asia because they thought with the russians out of the way europe would go. >> the hardest call of the military is the general staff did toy with that idea. that was not the mainstream because they were not thinking in terms of war at that point in july 1941 at all. they were more concerned about power struggles at home. the eccentric foreign minister who was becoming a person on greta was saying jet show the

gesture to the ally germany and they will attack the soviet union quickly so we can claim to have participated in their war and maybe take some soviet possessions. everyone including the army who had traditionally seen the soviet union as their hypothetical enemy post-it. it was partly because the experience that told them otherwise but it was also to undermine the position that he was taking and especially wanted him to leave his cabinet without him having to do with his own hands. >> that the relation with the axis power was a very old one because they didn't really trust one another. the question, the issue of

wanting to have the jews other side is one demonstration but on the underhand -- the other hand was taken out for a drunken evening by japanese colleagues who then thought it would please their west german colleagues enormously if they took their steins of the year and which was not the thing to do to ingratiate themselves. they wouldn't have admitted it. >> george pearlstein. i'm afraid part of the question has been taken up. i was interested in whether germany was to ensure mentally urging japan to enter the war and i was curious, did they know that the japanese were going to attack or oriented the details of that? after the attack america declared war but not against germany.

there was a period for five days or so when it wasn't clear what was going to happen and there was even some thought that it might be beneficial to not declare war and see what happened. that didn't happen but do you know the details of those few days? did the germans urged japan to do this? >> not as far as i know. and i doubt if they knew. one of the mysteries of world war ii deciding to declare war on the united states which it actually didn't have to do but maybe hitler was an honorable man. and thank goodness he did because that made it very easy for roosevelt to get into the european war. when churchill was given the news of i think a late-night he said he wasn't the first night

he slept very well but he slept very well. >> to add to that i think what germans were asking for the germans to do in the middle of 1941 is to attack singapore so they could help the war cause in the soviet union and hitler was obsessed with this idea of conquering britain. so i think he probably thought the japanese could be used that way more effectively by attacking. >> there was actually very little communication in the german war between the axes of power. >> don simmons is my name. a different topic. for several decades after the

second world war both germany and japan did all they could to sort of reintroduce themselves or ingratiate themselves with the rest of the world to subdue military policy particularly in the case of japan. and generally trying to be -- to contribute as much of the common good as they could. germany within 20 or 25 years their relations with their neighbors including very much occupy countries were range somewhere from cordial to warm. that didn't happen in japan and it still hasn't happened and there is quite a difference. if you could say something about that. >> you have written a book about that so maybe -- [laughter] >> well there is a very long answer to that and a short one. one is that they worked very different neighbors. germany was in the middle of europe and its neighbors to the

west were western democracies who were tied to west german military alliances in unifying europe. that was a very different proposition to being -- japan's immediate neighbors were communist china and south korea which was an ally and the north korea. there was an east asian alliance that was in any way comparable to the european committee or nato. that's one reason. i think the other reason is also one mustn't overstate the warmth of the relations between germany and its immediate neighbors. certainly i remember in 1974, 1988 when my own country the netherlands beat germany at the european soccer championship. more people went into the streets to celebrate than in may 5, 1945 at the end of the war.

[laughter] having said that they worked very different wars. there were two germanys. there was west germany and east germany and they were very different invasions to the outside world. as far as west germany is concerned when people talk about coming to terms with the past, people really are not talking about the invasion of norway. they are talking about the holocaust. that is a very specific crime committed by a criminal regime. japan didn't really have a criminal regime. they were the same people who were in power and had been in power before the war. it wasn't an equivalent to the holocaust in the sense of ideological war to exterminate particular people because they didn't have a right to exist. for all these reasons i think relations with the outside world, and i mean there are other reasons to do with the constitution and the fact that the wartime history became a

very political issue in japan and a very polarized one unlike the history of the third reich in germany which is not a particularly polarizing issue. so i think a large number of reasons. none of them have much to do with some kind of essential aspect of the japanese character of that kind. >> harry did you wish to add something to that? >> okay, over here. >> i have a very -- >> could you introduce yourself? >> matthew wilson. i have a question which you have raised and i will start with her question. i have read about violence and especially the neighborhood of indonesia where entire populations were wiped out.

i have never forgotten my reading of -- so when you talk about the difference between what the nazis were doing and understand it was pretty awful and what the japanese were doing, i'm not clear there's a difference because they were both wiping out populations. a hard question. second question if you can, starting with grade school when i started reading history, they talked about the warm relations between the united states after the opening of japan and that warm relation was supposed to have continued until the start of the japanese russo piece brokered by roosevelt and the explanation that i was given and i have never read a contradiction of this sense, was that that was the beginning of the end with the japanese u.s.

friendship because the japanese resented the fact that they didn't get more out of the peace than they thought they should have gotten and they thought the united states cheated us. i am perfectly open to the hypothesis being questioned or denied that but this is my first opportunity to ask someone knowledgeable in the subject. thank you. >> do you want to take the second question i will take the first one? >> i had not heard that narrative before because i think in japan they concentrate on the failure of the diplomats and the negotiators who didn't get russian indemnities in terms of peace and there was a riot after the war. it was more perceived in japan is a failure of diplomacy which sort of explains the popularity

of very strong, hard-nosed diplomats like signing the tripartite pact. he has this very clearheaded diplomat who could stand up for japanese interests. he was incidentally the one who walked out of the league of nations after the manchurian crisis erupted. so i think it's more perceived, the russo-japanese war is perceived in terms of the failure of the japanese diplomacy more than american designs. i have never heard it blamed on the american side. if anything it's sort of perpetuating the idea that america, a great power could afford to be generous and be at peace broker, that sort of thing so that when the china war is

not really going anywhere from a japanese perspective, the japanese kept asking americans to be the mediator between chiang kai-shek and the japanese. so i think that built-in perhaps unfair japanese expectations of the united states as being some kind of benevolent policemen standing up for japanese interests more than anything else which is self-serving of course. >> on the atrocities of course it makes very little difference if someone is torturing you or let alone shooting you. it doesn't really make any difference who is doing it or for what reason. there isn't a difference between military atrocities, and they were indeed terrible not just in china but in other places, which cannot be excused. they should be faced.

they are horrifying but there is a slight difference to military atrocities and we can talk about why they happened. and the government that has programmed to exterminate people for ideological reasons because they do not have a right to exist. there is never such a thing in the japanese war. in the japanese were there were many military atrocities and if you like, to get provocative about it the psychology of nan jing is like the library of -- in that a lot of soldiers in hostile territory who often couldn't see the difference between civilians and guerrilla fighters and so on, they were undisciplined brutalized by their own officers and often found themselves in a position

where the safest thing to do was to shoot everybody. that can quickly escalate to of violence. again what we were talking about earlier with the senior officers not really an proper control of the middle ranking ones i think played a role as well. even though the image of the japanese army were entirely correct when it came to the russo-japanese war when they treated the p.o.w.s very well so that discipline often left a lot to be desired in the second world war. so you did have these enormous massacres and raping and looting on a vast scale and so on but it's not quite the same thing. to be a victim of this is equally oppressive but it's not the same as guessing people are shooting people because they don't have a right to live.

>> could you come down here please? thank you. >> hi. i'm richard cas. i am sort of fascinated by the degree of misperception in both tokyo and washington of the other. i've had conversations with people who were descendents of some of the japanese leaders at the time, who thought that they really believed the united states would -- plan b that he would accept the document that ratify japanese control over china. of course which they did not do. the fact that they really thought the u.s. might do this is an incredible in my mind misperception of everything to a certain degree.

on the american side from what i could see there were two groups in the leadership and they were very well-informed people. on one hand you have one that knows japan very well who would insist that japan would never go to war with united states because they knew they would get smashed. some diplomats in the embassy said by sheer desperation they would do it and he said when does a nation afraid to attack out of sheer desperation? let's take take a hardline and that will force the japanese to back down and they will never attack us. then you have joseph grew again very informed ambassador of japan had kept talking about these mythological moderates and peace mates in tokyo that would dare not undermined by being too soft and take a very soft lines of the moderates could move forward. it seems to me that besides all the issues of interest and clashes or whatever, the astonishing degree of

misperception by at least on the american side of people who were informed with information from the japanese side, if you could discuss was with his self-delusion or what was going on that created this incredible degree of people lying to themselves about the other side? >> you are talking about japan and not iraq? [laughter] >> well you see that's the second question. anyway, go ahead. >> see i think the u.s. perception of japan could be described as underestimation or over desperation or whatever that the japanese themselves, most leaders couldn't have conceived of this plan of attack had it not been for me at no zero coso was an outlandish

thing to do and to pull off anyway. i think roosevelt was perhaps expecting some minor attack even as they, december 1 and attack on thailand or wherever because he saw the troops mobilizing around taiwan. he couldn't have conceived of this attack on pearl harbor which really was a dramatic turn of events. and the japanese themselves for surprised by that tin so i think there was an underestimation of what he could do on both sides almost. that's my feeling about it and military leaders someone like -- when he looked at the plan in late october he said no way. we are not going to do it. it's too risky. we are not going going to win this war anyway so why risk so