integrationist when he walked out. he saw the riot dignity of the demonstrators against kind of the mob-mentality of his friends and neighbors. he realized that segregation was no longer -- it's a powerful story. >> you also mentioned medgar everies. how much did you get in the investigation? >> we start the book with his story. and we kind of paint a picture of what mississippi was like at that time. what of it like for somebody for him to come back for the war where he fought for freedom for his country and not be able to experience it himself. and so his story is really woven throughout, and then of course with the assassination which is part of the book. it tells the story of what happened and what happened to the movement after his removal.

thank you very much for your time. ..

>> broken promises and disastrous misunderstanding, and i would like to delegate to you, what you mean by that by the interview and first i want to ask you a simple question. what motivated you to write this but? >> guest: this book has been on my mind. i was a college student in 1979. and i was in the south of pakistan. and i actually remember when they wanted to go and burn down the conflict. and all of this have to do with an incident that took place and it had been taken over by a

gunman. because people just went berserk. and i was someone who said no, we can't do this. we won't be able to on burn it the next day we find out that the americans are a part of that. and because of that, i was wondering why the pakistanis have this knee-jerk anti-american sentiment. because from what i had read about the united states, and even with foreign or american domestic policy, it is not the greatest. and how this sometimes talks

about the historic influence that just keeps on. so as soon as i finished being the ambassador, and you know that certain country in certain circumstances in which i was present at that position, i decided that researching this book was my priority. i wanted to talk about how the u.s. and pakistan became allies. so i and what makes this relationship function. and why hasn't pakistan benefited from a relationship with the united states. i've been to japan, but other cities. but then they became apolitical american ally after the same war was fought on opposing sides, during world war ii. and what did we do wrong and pakistan.

and this includes what their place under the sun was an american leaders were delusional about this. >> host: let's talk a little bit more about those american delusions. because i found it very interesting to talk about this and earlier in your book you talk about kennedy, and he was someone who didn't have such delusions. but he could not see the value of pakistan to the united states, and in fact he wanted to make clear to the pakistani people that they should not an inflated hopes to the u.s., and i think that there was some contrast between what he thought and what somebody like john foster dulles thought. and he apparently did think that the u.s. could sort of by pakistan and its loyalties, that

the u.s. provided enough military aid to pakistan was developed the same strategic interests as the u.s. and so what do you think it accounts for, these differences. and has anything really changed? and we still have the same debates going on? >> we come to the subject of change and what has not changed, so let's go to the beginning. so when he came to the united states, he said you have no realistic expectations and you really want military assistance to confront india and we have no interest in new fighting india. and you have a total on the list the expectation of this and pakistan's first request was for $2 billion in 1947 in the united states could only give a certain

amount and it was a big delusion. he was most known for devising or conceptualizing things because he understood what the soviets wanted. and that is part of them getting in bold and having a pool of experts. but they didn't have very many. and most of them were people who were enamored of gandhian who like india and this includes jefferson davis and some other people. and this is something that the british suggested about the

pakistani leaders. and they are, as you know, they are very hospitable people. and they we're were not going to have a vibrant economy. and then they decided this would be part of it and they were going to help to keep the military. and he had assistance from the united states. and in so doing, pakistan would not actually get involved in the american military plans or

anything and he came to pakistan and said that our army will become your army and he says to him, we can't fight communism without the good guys on our side, and that is why have signed on pakistan. the good guys are not pakistanis and then dulles as if they are not than they are the least muslims. and of course, they were hindus.

and so was atypical in nine american politician who didn't know the difference about what he wanted including allies against the soviet union and he was lining up allies in pakistan was willing to be an ally in india wanted to be nonaligned. so that was part of this relationship. but in a few years, eisenhower said that it is a mistake to seek out allies and then that military will never be for which we are arming them. they never gave troops to korea or others and the views were provided to fight communism to fight the indians. and so this was how the mistake was made. the assumption that, you know,

once we have on that, we will be able to make the focus and pakistan's focus was india. not the solution and that means good relationships between our gender. and some of the languorous, just a little bit more aid than they would've been able to change that perception. and they are people like me who view this very differently in this includes what i think, building a more prosperous country and that is not the view of their military.

>> host: based on this prison system and the islamist national identity, can you talk about the evolution of this identity as you have referred to it? what has strengthened and one that has weakened it? and we have talked about it and when it was established. and it had been part of this. so had they seen this as a pluralistic type of situation, in that light, it was certainly

democracy. what changed in those initial years and this is part of the situation. >> guest: most people haven't been able to find what was the plan for the new country, you should have a plan and it ended up being a couple of things and it had a majority and anything from amongst the migrants who

moved to pakistan from the provinces of pakistan. and so you ended up having the potential disagreement early on. certain ethnic groups did not agree with that notion either in this includes trying to regain pakistan and they said that we don't want you back. and this is security around and so basically they just chose to make pakistan into more of an islam national state. of course there were riots, which create another problem and

pakistan would've had 23% non-muslim minorities. but having 20% of the population that is not muslim does not make it be to make it into a more religious type of place. the riots resulted in a situation from 22% and within two years. but it's come down only 3% cents. a very small minority. first came the muslim position and then islam and then it's been mighty damage now. and the military did not have this because it didn't develop this and pakistan's economic development got under way. and it has helped, but it hasn't

created an economic base and there are two or three examples. pakistan has a percentage of gdp and its half of the other comparable size emerging-market countries. the taxes of pakistan are one third of the amount of taxes that are collected in other countries and foreign investment is one third of what it is to other countries. [inaudible] and then after the death of the individual who was assassinated,

and let's not have an internal argument and let's just talk about this. and they need to be taught something and eventually what happened was the leadership was emerging and this has been more islamist and the founding fathers. >> not only is there the islamist national foreign policy, but there's also very high levels of anti-american sentiment within the population.

but what you are pointing out in your book is that a lot of this was inspired by pakistan's leadership to convince or scare the americans into supporting them. in other words, they may allow were fueled demonstrations that they can argue an otherwise they won't be able to control these anti-american impulses of the society, and this is something that is extremely frustrating and she confronts the pakistanis on this end says to these leadership and why were you putting articles in the newspaper, and you knew you were fueling this anti-american sentiment and i think that she

was particularly miffed because her efforts to push forward provided so much in the u.s. civilian assistance over a period it. micah five years, which was a huge deal, getting this passed in as soon as it was passed, you had a great deal of criticism that seem to be coming from the pakistani military and the circles because they weren't happy that the military was going to be conditioned and they were criticizing this whole aid package. so what is this? it's counterintuitive statement does, it is counterintuitive and not the thing. that is why there is a lot of confusion about the title of my book, "magnificent delusions." it's an epic misunderstanding. because the americans took it at face value.

and there are many revolutions in my book and we've really dove into this, with the state department, we've gone to the former presidential library, eisenhower and nixon libraries to find the material. and then towards the end i went after these factors because officials would say things in the american officials would say, no, and both side had a different narrative and then i decided that it was too much. and then they would say that the drone strikes were part of it. but the truth is the american embassy was burned down in 1979. in the earliest anti-american demonstration was in 1948, which

is like barely 70 months. so what is the truth? and i have found that actually the first time the american officials complained was in 1946 and they were still demanding the creation of this and the newspaper talked about this. saying that the americans were becoming the new superpower and they don't really care about this or et cetera. so i investigated this all the way back and the fact of the matter is that very early on pakistan's problem with getting attention. people in america did not know about it at this time. and so anti-american demonstrations were very much getting attention.

the people are potentially hostile. and so there is no situation is like this. america at that time, if you remember, they were focused on the cold war. if you would've said that we have a conflict with india, we need your help to fight this and we can help you. so you had to find people with whom you had shared interests. and they will possibly end up being the leader of the muslim world and they have implications for the far eastern malaysia and you need to take it seriously and you need to do so in a military sense not just in providing food aid or technical

assistance. it has created a disruption. sometimes the hostility that we have generated as a means of leveraging the relationship including the constitutionality of what they want to go with. and they try to get more demonstrators out to initiate a posture and i am pro-american, but many are not. therefore there are limits what i can do. and he ended up finding this more and more. in many american officials are

willing to talk straight. and i have dealt with many of the people in the state department and a lot of times the american diplomats basically hold the punches and they don't want to confront the leaders of other countries, which is why actually praise hillary clinton for going there and saying things which needed to be said. i mean, one of her comments to this criticism and was a comment that i cannot understand and lo and behold, it would she was trying to do was bring out a difficult discussion. my view is that for this relationship to find some kind of a healthy weight forward,

more that needs to be part of this as well. and it can be based on unreal perceptions. >> host: i think you're right. hillary clinton had a unique ability to talk in a very straightforward fashion in pakistan, but she was still very much liked by the average pakistani people. >> guest: yes, she is very respected. and i wish that the average american diplomat would be willing to sometimes say, excuse me, but that is not how it happens. be factually correct. because time after time

pakistani officials say that they let pakistan down. and they say, you know what? you also let us down. and we asked you for troops and when we asked not to build a nuclear weapon. when we asked you to assist in not support jihad groups in that way. so yes, we have done a few things and we have not supported juergens india and what kind of discussion which would have created less pollutions and less confusion and there would have been less misunderstanding of the people as they would've been honest with one another. >> host: what you say in your book. sometimes it's the only way that u.s. officials let loose. >> guest: those who read the

book will find none. and it's very interesting. eisenhower becomes president and he's elected in 1952 he gets reelected in 1956. and he sends the editor of a small town newspaper and the editor, he gives the ambassadorship for the two campaigns and then he rides something a bit like that, saying what are we doing. and no one wants to fight the soviets. there is no part of this to be part of an anti-communists were of activity.

and so all arms wind up being used in this is 1927. and nobody takes note. but towards the end of this, eisenhower starts asking if we have made a huge mistake by seeking out an ally and building up without realizing that i lyse primary situation is not the same as us. and that's eisenhower and lyndon johnson and he becomes president. he stays away from john f. kennedy's policy of becoming closer to india. and distancing himself from pakistan. but he says we have a post in pakistan and because we have this, we try to be as kind as possible. and he's very helpful. and then in 1968 he finally says

that, you know, i think i made a mistake. you know? nixon is the only one who is unabashedly pro-pakistan and the infamous rule against global opinion based on the assumption and despite american help, america was accused of supporting the genocide in this way. and in this way, president reagan talks about jihad in afghanistan and it's a project that had long before the americans working. this is a project supported by the u.s.

the interservice intelligence ran this operation. and george herbert walker bush becomes president. and some of them are now being diverted and he threatens pakistan with the potential of accusing him of being a state sponsor of terrorism and president george w. bush in 2008 -- he writes in his memoirs that he realizes that he never fulfilled his promises and he should've won me earlier that he was going to devote all his energies. >> host: we are talking of u.s.

presidents, but we could talk about admiral mullen. he met with them 26 times in four years and i think that he thought that by developing this personal relationship, the more he could get to know and build trust, the greater the chances that pakistan would do, like crackdown on the icon in network and what he found at the end of this tenure in september 2011 was that pakistan had not changed and i think that what really made him say these statements in the congressional testimony, he said that the economy network was a veritable army of the isi. and we are talking about one who has a very deadly network, very

much moving back and forth and conducting some of these deadly attacks and yes, that happened a few days or maybe a week before admiral mullen testified before congress just might have a full detail about that between pakistan and the u.s. government in my book because i was part of them. and as i see it, there has been a presumption that somehow if we could find just the right leader, especially in the military, he would be able to turn on and it's an erroneous conclusion. and sometimes we have to combat a narrative with a narrative. if the narrative is that this is

a special place in the world and some of this doesn't apply to us. but then in the end, tested the nukes that we said we were not making and maybe we did something, if nothing else, we broke a promise and there should be -- that can only be combated in this way. but in this view we develop a personal relationship. and the individual in my book, that was under president eisenhower. and there was this same phenomenon and the army chief

was really committed to eliminating terrorism. and he just wanted to find that people want to eliminate the terrorists and the desire to maintain military balance with india and they could find that tipping point, instead of india, the military would focus on terrorism as a focus. but interestingly throughout this time he didn't notice that part of the pakistani attitude is one another secretary of state had told another

president. and psychological you can't do anything about it. and the meetings were held and frankly they offered pakistan a substantive amount and said that we will make that adjustment. but it's all or nothing. and even now they say that they have fallen into this influence.

and the economy is much smaller and it's not growing any faster. and so what they really need is a big picture and however firmly, it cannot change the psyche of an institution or nation. eventually saying that after four years of trying, pakistan has been using terrorism as a means of offsetting the disadvantage that it has in size and i'm concerned about that. and i always want pakistan to be part of pakistan for pakistan's

state. and pakistan has to understand and realize that no other nation can stretch you and make this bigger than your neighbor. and so pakistan needs to get over this and be happy with security, as long as there is no attack and that security has been achieved. now they are trading with everyone in the neighborhood and addressing this economic dysfunction and making sure that it doesn't continue to rise at a pace that is much faster than the economic group and none of those things can be addressed.

between the military and pakistan as well. >> host: i think that's absolutely true. if we look at the nations over the past two years, and we had definitely been able to see a decline in the relationship and very big tensions over the situation. and what is interesting, i find that you have interesting information about a meeting that took place in 1998. and this is where the clinton administration was claiming to do attacks on al qaeda in retaliation for the bombing of two of you smes and africa. and the u.s. administration was in a quandary because of this, they did not want to inform pakistan ahead of time because they thought that the isi would take off al qaeda and tip them

off. another same time they knew that the missiles would be thrown through the pakistani airspace and they didn't want pakistan and india with attacking. in the clinton administration sent the clinton administration to have dinner with the senior pakistani military individual. >> guest: it was the tunnel and then it ended up being someone else. >> host: okay, i just thought it was fascinating so that we could be there and he could tell them, oh, by the way -- >> guest: in about 10 minutes, missiles will flatter your space. i understand. >> host: if you think it was on during this time. not, do you think it would be making sense of the obama administration would be part of

his leadership during or right before this? do you think this is part of a? >> guest: i think from the point of view of normal practice between allies, it would have been prudent to have an arrangement with the pakistanis and we are told that we are conducting this operation in the territory. but by 2011 at art the party reached a conclusion and they made this to try to -- they tried to make an effort of a grand bargain in a big deal. pakistan's problems with india and afghanistan being addressed. some kind of an arrangement and backed was part of this. the military and intelligence services were so high, it was a

question of this. even in 1998. all the leaders had left this place. so there are some people -- wasn't just a coincidence? well, it could've been. but when it was high and someone went dinner and then use their cell phone from the bathroom and there's no reason to be tapping, but what if that is the reason why nobody left? nobody was significant was hit in the 1998 strike. so because of that, president obama decided not to inform pakistan. and it was a question of how do

we make sure. and so because of that, and i would say that my own personal saga and the allegations of treason points in that direction. but the atmosphere has become so poisoned. and this is actually a toxic relationship. and so what if the military operation had been conducted and they had found osama bin laden's children and could you live without? it would have been a very difficult thing for him to testify to the american public. and the third thing to consider in the fine details of that will be a part of it. it's the kind of simplicity

offered him a thing that you did it alone, but you know what? don't object to our having violated your sovereignty. at least publicly as to how we did it. there were people with this leadership attempted to do that. but then within two to three days in narrative got into the act and people stopped asking the questions why would we allow osama bin laden in our country, which was a relevant question. including how dare the americans come and violate our sovereignty. my point is that in most nations peoples perceptions are actually the result of what we are told. most of the media are controlled

or as it is now in terms of ownership of the media, they are not fully owned by the government anymore. and we have seen this. and americans have intelligence in this includes the military surplus. if that is the environment, then obviously the beliefs and the views of the nation have been doctored. there's a reason why i am sitting here and i should be

running a think tank and not about the hudson institute in washington dc. and that includes a policy and anyone who has a worldview that is different to the narrow interpretation, everyone is forced all. and that narrative makes it absolutely impossible for cooperation between pakistan and the united states. because the narrative continues to be sympathetic. the word nuclear has not even featured in that. and this includes nuclear designs to third countries. they have many rows, it would be considered nuclear. and pakistan continues to be

seen as having a nuclear weapon. this includes being willing to take this out if i do not have free pakistani cooperation. >> one wonders how long this narrative can be sustained. and this idea that the view that they have of their own country is so divergent from the way the rest of the world sees pakistan. and this includes the terror strikes that happened in nairobi, kenya, where the

leadership was very is very clear, i'll chabot was part of al qaeda, they wanted to cooperate with the u.s. whereas in pakistan, you have this dual suicide bombing of a church. killing 85 people and really confusion was a part of it. and it was implicated in it actually is like an arm of al qaeda. >> guest: one of the former politicians, he went to the extent of insinuating that the bombing was essentially some kind of false flag operation to try and persuade the people not to go ahead with the proposal and, i mean, the conspiracy conspiracy theory is like --

it's one of the largest universities in pakistan. he is a phd and even came to the united states on a fulbright and has written a book on 9/11 image basically he says that it actually the world is run by a cabal of bankers -- american and british bankers and he also has anti-semitic views and then he says they want to control the world by planting microchips in the brains of people. and he's the head of the university and it's like, hey, nobody has fired him. so there is a state of denial for sure. and you asked at the outset what i feel compelled to write this book and the truth is the same

reason that i felt compelled to write the earlier book. someone has to put out the historically correct narrative in my previous book protested this. copies of the book circulated and highlighted these portions and said he's critical of the pakistani military. i'm trying to direct its course and as a citizen i should have that right. and that first book pointed out how the radical groups have worked together for much longer than people understood in their lives and this book, pakistan and the united states and others, a history of misunderstanding, this is meant to set the record right. and i have no -- i don't give a

free pass to be americans. both were mistakes that were made in an attempt to be nice to pakistan and through the cynicism of individuals. but again, hundreds of citations and nothing is manufactured. and that is why i see this. and so what do you think things would happen and i say narrative change, let people face the truth. pakistan is not economically backward because the world is denying it the right to be a nuclear weapons power. pakistan has actually missed out on opportunities to become a nuclear weapons power. >> host: and then you have to ask the question if this narrative is stuck there and

pakistan is not going to give this in terms of the policy supporting terrorist groups and, you know, continuing to have confusion among the real threat of the terrorism to the country. and with u.s. be better off ignoring pakistan rather than continuing to try to work with a country that is in denial? and how does the u.s., you know, if they have tried everything in the book, the 40 billion in aid, it's tried putting pakistan on this, as he said, in the early '90s. >> abc that episode in my book, you will find that they have never been credible. and here is the point, there's a lot of options [inaudible]

between shooting someone in taking them out for dinner. in the united states needs to understand that. but the first step would be a could be good for pakistan or the united states to get over this view of the bad allies. and there is no alliance and an alliance presupposes this and this is most people with military intelligence and not terrorists. and in fact, many cases, terrorists are seen as potential allies in some cases. and similarly for the united states as well. the cold war the enemy was communism and after that it has been terrorism. and in neither case has it been pakistan as part of this.

they don't need to become adversities. they should avoid that. but they need to have an honest and reality-based discourse that way so that they understand that we are so geographically located such an important area, they can't do anything without us. and if the united states could provide this, it surely could be part of this if it feels that it is necessary. like yes, we can't do without that, in reinforcing the delusion in the pakistani economy. it is seen as significant. and they need to at some point collect taxes.

and so maybe it may be a good idea for some of them to tell the pakistanis to get billions of dollars of investment and there are billions of dollars in south korea and other areas and have you ever heard of a pakistani grand? ifor besancon. but why not a pakistani grand? we can be a very productive people. if we don't educate our people, and if they are fed conspiracy theories, the europeans, the americans, you get a microchip will make your not a good muslim, they will not have the

leading member of the technology business, for example and so all of that needs to change. but that can only come from this and you know, we are not buying this narrative. and of the same time, we keep pointing out what is not in america's interest. >> i think that's a great point. but the u.s. to simply stops buying into the narrative. some people talk about this, if you don't provide this aid or do this or do that. so the u.s. can just stop listening to these wines. which apparently have been the

same for 50 or 60 years now. and to read your book i think it should be a textbook for any u.s. policymaker said that they could go into the relationship knowing that they are going to hear and then get past that. not only what pakistan is capable of, but understanding the dyer armageddon severity and not believing those as well. >> guest: it can harm and hurt them the most. so they use that as a bargaining token for foreign policy leverage, that's not a very smart thing.

and i have an explanation for that and as previously he said americans never look at history. and as long as we can satisfy this, they won't look too deep. >> guest: and there's always someone to defend us. it is all about us and and i have this and what i have cited and it's interesting because it's not only the u.s. and pakistani relationship.

and it has also made me understand the weaknesses in america's foreign policy. including this in the world, where that's history, what it really means is that it is irrelevant. but in some areas it is not irrelevant. history illustrates his part for the future. >> guest: let's hope that people will read this. especially people who would like to talk about this. for anyone who wants to know more about the history of u.s. and pakistani relationship. i cannot think of a better person to tell that history and someone who has served as the ambassador here. and so i thank you very much for discussing this. it's a wonderful book and i heartily recommend it to anyone.

>> host: thank you. >> guest: thank you. >> authors of the latest nonfiction books are interviewed by legislators and politicians and other similar with their material. it airs every weekend at 10:00 p.m. on saturday. ..