what they were expected, with the whole they were expected to pay before a public benefit would kick in. it would give insurance companies come and i was interested to see recently general has been talking -- >> you would know in advance what the waiting period would be for the public program, and you would have to buy the first few years of it and you would know that. >> right, and people who have not earned much would have a shorter waiting period. and people who had earned a lot would have a longer waiting period. so he would be adjusted income. and jen were this will get something like this because the insurance companies and insurance industries have the biggest problem and when it out on actually of frontier, with the tail, the biggest expenditure. so they're essentially you're giving them some protection at the backend. i think that is something to explore. i think it's very important as

we export options, there's another option which is that you give a limited benefit up front that everybody gets it. but at least the tail for the insurance industry to cover, and that may be less comfortable for them. but i think we need to look at these options and see what is it that the public sector can do in d&d that creates some space for private sector innovation. that's where i'd like to see us explode. >> the last thing i'll ask, and it's a question for the record, if any of the witnesses have information are on what you believe the government's present exposure to long-term care of the liability is right now, as we speak. if you have any way to quantify what the cost is of that, that will our discussion in terms of being able to try to work with people to figure out, and income

is going to pay for this to a degree anyway and there's a smarter way to do it, i would like to have that conversation, bearing in mind what the experts say we are going to pay for this anyway. >> i seem to recall that cms at one point did a present value calculation, sort of a mini trustees report for that number. i don't know if they continue to do it spent that's what they made it a question for the record. i yield back, tragedy and thinking and wonderful ranking member for all their leadership on these issues. >> well, it's not clear to me where we go. we've had two different opinions expressed. dr. feder argues that a public benefit is the answer. dr. warshawsky, why don't you

give us an opinion by setting aside the financial and political difficulties? why wouldn't a public benefit help? >> well, those are -- >> i understand, particularly in these times. >> i think people need to be given choices. i think they need to design things as best fits their situation, and to be given the support they need in a prudent way. so certainly there is a role for government, but i think they need to be provided as much in the way of choices and opportunities as they can. and that provides the right incentives. because we certainly do want people who can afford, and i think many can, to finance these

costs. and to ensure these costs, that they do so. and that it's not a burden, not an unfair burden on others for that to happen. and furthermore, i think that it is a strong possibility, a strong likelihood that the private sector with the right structure would design different options and different policy designs or a that would appeal to come in, different situations and different needs, which i think is really impossible for a public program to do. public programs, in order for all to be efficient and able to be administered, and we are seeing this right now in the aca, have to be very simple and have to be very straightforward. that's why social security works. if in fact you give people choices to a public program, it's just administrative it extremely difficult.

>> and herein lies the dilemma. because it is another public program that we would be creating. but i can tell you from my experience, before i came to the senate i was the elected insurance commissioner of florida. the behavior of humans with regard to buying insurance, unless they think they also need it, they're not going to buy it. and this is almost out of sight out of mind. if you want to spread that base by giving the young as was the old into it, it's going to be very, very hard to get people to buy this insurance. what do you think, dr. feder? >> i agree with you, senator nelson. and we have a lot of experience with that, and i'm always interested when we talk about

private insurance and long-term care, that we look at -- we are at the same time looking at our experience with the nongroup, the individual insurance market for health care. and we know that that is a market that is riddled with problems, because in part of a desire of insurers to avoid people with preexisting conditions and to limit the risks. and that's what you see, english of everybody participating. -- unless you see everybody participating. i hope we will all consider in the future, is that i think that there is based on the view that we can better educate and help people prepare and help an industry respond, if we do, as has been said, bruce said it, set up a structure that creates

some clarity about how you can prepare. so it's a public program takes on the tail risk in some ways and tells people based on the resource of what they have to prepare for, you can better educate around participation and preparation. but that back in federal program is one, as anne has emphasized, that everybody is participating in, whether through taxes or premiums or whatever we are calling them. it needs to be a shared risk in order to work. >> dr. chernof, i can't help but smile thinking about how you could get people to buy this insurance well ahead of time. you could have an individual mandate, and if that sounds familiar, we just had a quite a -- a debate about that. and it was declared

constitutional by the supreme court. but it is not easy. let me ask you on a completely different kind of subject. and we've really had problems in florida with assisted living facilities, basically taking advantage of seniors. nursing homes. do you have any suggestions? i mean, we've got people that are starting these things up that are unlicensed. obviously, they are breaking the law, and we are talking about the care and nurturing of our seniors. did your commission suggest anything that we ought to be doing? >> you raise a really important

question, senator nelson. and actually, as a commission, this is not an area that we had a lot of focus on directly. i think indirectly we had a real concern that we don't really understand how to think about or measure quality in this space. this is a space that has a lot of resources that are paid for privately, or come out of, or voluntary services. and so it lives in a different place than the rest of health care lives. and that kind of our rubric been for both regulatory oversight, quality control and integration needs a lot more work. but the commission itself, to answer your question directly, didn't specifically going to great detail about these sort of alternative forms of community-based support, their

oversight and regulation. >> actually, i think we had more testimony on that and you're remembering, bruce. i think that we had a lot of discussion about -- had we had it on the workforce site, and we had a great deal of discussion and concern about -- and we also actually infect with testimony as to problems, quality problems in nursing homes as those assisted living facilities. over the years there's been a lot of policy efforts to try to mitigate those, particularly on the nursing home side but they persist, inadequate in standards and poorly trained staff. and because assisted medicaid doesn't cover, doesn't finance assisted living facilities, there's a real concern about an absence of standard, as you say. so i believe that we heard a lot of testimony, and and and/or in the alternative, our our -- our

alternative report -- the training site. there's been an exposé recently of a particular assisted living facility of grossly inadequate training for staff while claiming to be offering specialized care for alzheimer's patients. or residents. it was both embarrassing and appalling when you saw on national tv, and it is not a lone example. we did hear testimony, not only about the need for, but examples of, training programs. i believe the one we heard from was in the state of washington, both better standards and training for workers who, better for the patient whom they served and also creates better jobs. it accompanied by better pay for the workers who were relying on to care for our families spent but i would say, and the

commission made many recommendations on workforce, your specific question was about the oversight and great elation and management of these new delivery entities. what we did hear a little bit of testimony in the space, that is not a place where the commission made any recommendations. and the workforce pieces only a part of what he needs to operate to bring different kinds of environment. the health care perspective, people are only one piece of it and the oversight of things like assisted-living organizations, and other kinds of residential care options that are sort of multiplying in front of our eyes, that's a completely different question. the workforce is an important but only one piece of that discussion. so the question you raised merit a lot of careful thought, and the commission itself didn't get that far into the issue. >> do you want to comment with regard to long-term care for seniors who also disabilities? does the system work?

>> that's a great question, senator nelson to let me backup us to let me back up a step to the system we have now doesn't work well for hardly anybody. i don't think it works well for older individuals with serious chronic illness or functional limitations or cognitive impairment. it is a very fractured, very provider centric system. and give these individuals and their families to do the care coordination, it is basically missing from most models and systems of care. we heard about some models that were better, and there are the sort of paths to better processes of care. the commission lays out whole cities of recommendations of things that could be better. so to your question i think it is even harder for younger individuals. many of the systems that serve them were actually not built for them. they may have been built for older people orville for different population, anything

for younger individuals with this functional limitation or cognitive impairment, they have a whole lives ahead of them and they have a different, they are in a different place in their life trajectory than an older person is and have different desires and family work. and so i do think we have a long way to go, and it is a particularly long way to go for younger folks with serious nee needs. >> suppose we enacted a plan for private insurance. then the question comes who's going to regulate? would we turn over to the state insurance commissioners? or the state health regulatory agencies? ms. tumlinson? >> that's a good question. so, i think if we move in the direction of creating more incentives for people to purchase private long-term care

insurance or reform the marketplace to the demand and supply and all of those things, we would continue to regulate it at the state level the way it always has been, but there has been more of a federal -- there has to be more of a federal role, setting the bare bones standards, and i guess you could call it parameters around which some of these policies would be designed and how they would work. fundamentally the marketplace is not working so we need some actual marketplace reforms. and i think those had to come from the federal level. issues around -- regulations around the insurance pools and that kind of thing could continue to operate at the state level. >> senator nelson, i'll just point out in the current setup, records were set up, obviously the states have the main regulatory responsibility as part of tax issues, the federal government has already done some role in terms of design and,

design of long-term care insurance policies. one would imagine that if there were additional tax incentives provided, just naturally it would go that there would be an increased responsibility. i will also note that one of the reasons for the increases in premiums is related to federal policy. and that's the policy of the federal reserve board. with very low interest rates. those policies were priced, assuming 6% interest rate, which clearly we are nowhere knitted. so there is an interesting mix of federal and state issues at hand. >> commission recommended that you remove the requirement that a patient must stay in the hospital for three days before they can receive services in a skilled nursing facility. now, there are a few of us up here that agree with that. can you tell us why you ended up recommending that?

>> sure. i think that there was a sense that that rule was created in a different time and place. i would say that the commission felt that what it needs to be is revisited. it does need to be replaced but it needs to be revisited in sort of a model of care. we thought through because the reality of length of stay has come down over time, that we want passion of the goal should be to get people to the right care by the right provider. so by having this three-day length of stay requirement or a people who maybe could step down to a lower level of care center that are not able to access that level of care. and/or are put a higher level of care because i level are a different level of care, for example, state a cute rehab, which is actually more expensive than the nursing facility might be, so i think our call was for there to be an opportunity to revisit and remove the three-day length of stay and replace it

with an approach that is more sensible and consistent with current care practices. again, being mindful that was put there for reasons which is really a cost control mechanism more than anything else. taking it away creates new opportunities, but we do think in the current environment it isn't serving that cost control goal that was originally put in place to try to achieve. >> i will only add that that was the consensus of the commission. and another element of it was that there's been a trend of patients being in hospitals, thinking they were admitted to never actually being admitted. and, therefore, that does not count even if they're in the hospital for five days. that struck us as just plain wrong. but it does raise a question of what is the mechanism that does control that next phase as bruce indicated. and we didn't have enough time to sort of figure out the

replacement, but the three-day rule struck us as not the right one. >> we are going to include in the record an article by bloomberg news that illustrates how difficult it is for seniors to be able to afford long-term care. and this is our last hearing of the year, save for some unusual thing that we might be in session on new year's eve like we were last year spent will he bring the champagne if we are? [laughter] spent as a matter of fact, you remember, new year's eve we were all on the floor, and i spotted one of my dear friends in his tuxedo sitting in the gallery. and i went over to him and i said, charlie, what in the world are you doing here? he said, jackie and i went out to dinner. and we decided this was the best

entertainment in town. [laughter] >> except perhaps for the performers. >> well, you all have been great, thank you. it's a tough issue. and so thank you for helping us get into it and start to peel back the onion. we appreciate it. happy holidays, merry christmas, happy new year. the meeting is adjourned. [inaudible conversations] >> we now have secular norm, theological norm that governed our acceptance or rejection of the ways in which a god or gods or goddesses can speak to people and what impact that has. for instance, the branch davidian. david was saying had a special

insight in the bible at that these insights help other members of the community understand the bible, better and allows them to understand their living in the in times when most of our best and most of us accept the that by itself doesn't seem to be a problem. but when it leads to other elements, that trigger those law enforcement concerns as well as the popular press concern, then so that his idea of somebody listening to god and having his followers -- that's dangerous. and that needs to be policed and controlled. >> western university religion professor peter gottschalk argues that religious persecution in america has a prevalence since the mid-1800s even committed by the very government that is supposed to protect us from persecution. sunday night at nine on "after

words," part of the booktv this weekend on c-span2. >> our holiday week presentation of booktv in prime time continues tonight starting at 8 p.m. eastern. >> next, a look at u.s. relations with saudi arabia and the effect of a possible nuclear deal with iran and syria's civil war. from the hudson institute, this is 90 minutes. >> good morning, thank you for being here. we are going to go for about an hour and a half.

we're going to speak for about 45 minutes to one hour and then we'll open it up for questions and answers. so thank you again for coming hudson and thank you to our c-span audience, and thank you for this wonderful panel with elliott abrams and brian. elliott was a definite security advisor for global democracy strategy during the george w. bush administration. is currently senior fellow for middle eastern studies at the council on foreign relations and the author most recently of tested by scion come bush administration and the israeli-palestinian conflict. bryant is a senior fellow at the center for american progress where he focuses on the middle east and north africa. is co-author of the prosperity agenda, with the world wants for america and what we need in return. there are also a couple of articles by brian katulis over there on the site, i think they're still available, and about brian's recent work on saudi arabia, which he will fill

us in a bit but in the meantime i want mr. abrams to make a few comments at first and then brian will and then we will have a discussion. thanks. >> thank you. thank you all for being here today. i wanted to start by saying that some of the discussion of u.s.-saudi relations i think is overdone of the sense of a hopeless crisis that will result in any curable differences. this is an old relationship, roughly 75 years old, a ramco was founded in 1944 and there've been a lot of ups and downs. whatever the challenge is today, think of 1973. the arab oil embargo which was called an act of war, or think of 2001, so the relationship has

been through crises. and survived them. and another positive point, the relationship is more supple, thicker today than in many years in the past but that is compared been times i think when relationship was team-president. that's about it. you now have an institutionalized relationship. it is a mil-to-mil relationship. there is the cia, saudi intel relationship. fbi. there's a treasury, ministry of finance relationship. it doesn't just depend on one or two individuals. obviously relationship is based to very large degree on oil but even there, i think once you

expand a little, there was an alliance during the cold war against the soviet union. it was an alliance after 1979 against iran. it was also an american appreciation over the last decade of what i would call professional, reliable saudi handling of oil, as the world's oil supply, and of money by the saudi treasury and investment authorities. it has been an alliance of two very, very different societies. and that can be hidden, i mean, if you're an american official, you know, dealing with foreign minister saud, who is a graduate of princeton, you don't have essential even with someone who cannot navigate your culture. but still, these are two very

different societies. when it comes to matters like religious freedom, political freedom, treatment of women. i think it's going to be a growing problem. it wasn't a big problem for many decades. we have a lot of allies that were very different societies that were in some cases pretty unattractive dictatorships, starting with joseph stalin in world war ii. and we went through a long period of cold war when the internal situation in a friendly country didn't matter to us. it matters more and more now as human rights values get -- hate this word, but globalized. and as america pays overtime showing more attention to those questions. we no longer just a well, that's a differen difficult to get andk that's going to be more important, because what has been missing over the decades has

been the saudi end of that. that is, we heard from the royal family. we didn't hear from the people of saudi arabia. it was no visible civil society in saudi arabia. there is no. part because of technology, as twitter, blog post. now the saudi people are heard, this will become as active. that's got to increase it seems to me. and that will increase over years when saudi oil is less important to us because of all these trends towards north american energy independence. one would have to assume the saudi influence in washington will decline rather than growing. there's obviously a crisis of confidence in syria, over egypt, and particularly over iran. i think the saudis have relied on us since 1979 to be in a confrontation with iran, and we have been. they are very worried i think that now that china may decide

may not be a confrontation with iran. and, of course, our views of the rent are fundamentally different than theirs. their problem is this is a powerful persian shia can get to our problem is with the islamic republic, and if it weren't the islamic republic, if it were a democratic iran, our problems would largely disappear, it's not at all clear the saudis problems would disappear. we can go back to that. i would just add one other thing. the crisis that we are having in relations now, the difficulty in relations, the lack of good communication in which i think can partly be blamed on the administration, but, of course, several of the top people in saudi arabia are very old and sick, and having the kind of relationship we had, let's say 10 years ago, 15 years ago would be far more difficult today. saudi arabia made in the next

few years into a succession crisis. the king is over 90 and not in good health. the crowned prince is apparently in worse health. you look at the statistics, we make it a succession crisis during the obama administration. never, i think it's fair to say, since the establishment of this government by saud have we not know who is next. ..

>> thank you, lee. and, first, at the outset, i want to say happy holidays to you all, especially those watching on c-span and the rebroadcast as they often do -- [laughter] because if you're watching this, you should be watching "it's a wonderful life." that's what i'll be doing. and second, thank you, lee and elliot. thanks to the hudson institute and for all the work that you do. i'm, obviously, from a center-left think tank, but i -- and don't agree with a lot of what you write in the weekly standard. elliot and i have been on panels -- >> i agree with everything. [laughter] >> i'm enriched by it. and you're thinking, i hope the dialogue here today. and all of the work, yesterday i was reading the latest edition of current trends in islamic ideology, published by hudson. [inaudible conversations] again, even if i don't agree with it, it helps enliven my

thinking, and i think it's very good. what i wanted to do at the outset was maybe make three overall points just to get the discussion going. one, a snapshot on u.s./saudi relations based on the statements from saudi leaders. second, a brief assessment of what i see saudi strategy and how they're doing, and, third, a comment on u.s. star, to structure -- u.s. strategy, to structure it that way. first, just to show you how bad things had become be in the u.s./saudi relations. three quotes. one, a letter from abdullah to the president of the united states. at a time when peoples and nations part, we are at a crossroads. it is time for the united states and saudi arabia to look at tear separate interests -- their separate interests. second, a saudi official here in washington saying that abdullah, quote, doesn't mince words like the president. if the u.s. doesn't do more to reduce the violence, and here he was talking in the west bank and

gaza, there will be grave consequences for u.s. interests. and then, third, from a diplomatic cable, a u.s. diplomat writing about abdullah, talking about a visit he had with a u.s. diplomat. u.s. policy has now given iraq to iran as a gift on a golden platter. this diplomat wrote king abdullah was upset and somewhat emotional while not specific, even appeared to be questioning the bone fee december of u.s. policy. i highlight these statements because they come from 2001, 2002, and 2005. and i think there's been a lot of chatter about the most recent statements. and quite, you know, visible protestations about u.s. policy. but to demonstrate that there has been a certain consistency of criticism -- and, elliot, i'm sure, experienced this in the bush administration -- copping

from -- coming from saudi arabia. for those of you who speak arabic, when i read the recent comments and also these past comments, a phrase -- [inaudible] [speaking in native tongue] came to mind in terms of empty talk. talk that i think in some ways doesn'ts inly reflect -- doesn't necessarily reflect the core interest which i think there's still strong interest. and i fundamentally agree well yacht that there's a values -- with elliot that there's a values disconnect, and i hope we talk about that. but i think, ultimately, we've heard through the years a lot of talk and i think overanalysis as u.s. policy has shifted whether it was last decade or currently trying to adjust to the complicated currents in the middle east. saudis have often talked a lot. but when you look at what they do, it's actually sometimes quite different. second point i wanted to make was about the saudi strategy. i asked lee if he wouldn't mind handing out a paper i did two

years ago, and i think some of it is still relevant, but also an article about u.s./saudi relationships. quite often we as analysts here in america look at things from our lens and, quite naturally, what do we get out of this relationship. but it was interesting for me to interview people not only in the government, but outside of the government in the sector that elliot has talked about. the ngo to sector. my main conclusion there was that saudi arabia punches far below its weight given its t considerable resources, both oil resources, given its conventional military power, something that successive american administrations have had something to do with, and given its unique status in the islamic world. if you neutrally try to assess what its stated objectives especially over the last ten years, it has not done a good job advancing its own stated self-interest.

i hope we talk about radicals because it's a complicated picture and a very dangerous one. but quite simply, over the last ten years the saudi cans have said they don't want iranian influence to spread through the region. what they have seen in iraq, in lebanon, in the palestinian territories, is the spread of iranian influence. the saudis have also said they'd like to advance the arab peace initiative, but if you go to them and ask what's your actual strategy, what's your tactic connected to that strategy to get that done, again, grumbles and complaint, but not a clear strategy. and finally despite its considerable wealth if you look at the situation inside, which is troubling -- and i as a progressive am troubled by that -- when you look at how wealthy the country should be and you look at the economic inequalities and the substantial internal challenges they will have and already have when it comes to dealing with energy

subsidies, dealing with a very young population, protests in a certain part of saudi arabia right now, they've been able to keep a lid on this through repression, through using their considerable resources. but if you look at sort the long-term trends as a clinical analyst, it's hard for me to see how this all hangs together and this is cot pat bl -- compatible to elliot's point. finally, the haas point on u.s. policy. the last point on u.s. policy. and, again, i would highlight, and i think elliot may disagree with me, many in the room, but i would highlight over the last ten years aye seen a remarkable -- i've seen a remarkable continuity the in term os -- in terms of the the broad policy in the region. i think what's changed quite a lot is the overall strategic context. and elliot has talked about this. you know, from 1933 til 2003 it was quite easier to define and

discern what was the relationship. and i'll quibble with sort of the title even of this session because it's technically not an alliance. we have alliances with european partners. israel is a major non-nato ally. saudi arabia has been a marriage of interests at certain points. oil was at the core. oil and security was at the core of that bargain. but for decades the u.s. viewed saudi arabia as an important partner to check soviet inflewses. for decades saudi arabia viewed the u.s. as a country when it faced challenges from nasser, and then post-1979 to contain the iranian influence. now, whatever you think about the dual containment strategy of the united states in the 1990s, containing iran and iraq, when the iraq war happened in 2003 -- and i know there's a lot of criticisms of it, but my deepest concern was that it changed the strategic paradigm in the region for the united states that this policy has

created for the last ten years, i think, a situation of strategic drift. and one where there's opinion a lot of tactical, reactive crisis management. and here i'm not assessing this from the level of presidential speeches where it be president bush or president obama, but in terms of actual u.s. policy, it's been quite a muddle and quite tactical in terms of not certain what it wants to achieve. but back to the u.s./saudi relationship. i think in this period of competition for influence within the region, saudi arabia is one of the many actors trying to throw its weight around. there are sill the some mainstays, and and elliot mentioned them. that, i think, we could talk for the whole session about this. the weapons relationship, the military relationship is quite strong if you noticed earlier this month, another sizable anti-tank missile delivery from the united states from raytheon. the differences we'll get into. iran, quite clearly, i think why

they've been stating publicly their concerns and various saudi royals. but again, you ask them if they've accepted this interim agreement and whether they've accepted secretary hagel's recent visit to the region, i think strip away all the rhetoric, you'll see there's a pragmatism that's there. syria, big divide. and i hope we talk a lot about that. egypt, again, serious differences. but i think can be halve gated which is where i'll close. i think despite sort of the tensions, i think there's common interests. i think a divergence of values, which i agree well yacht here, we need to talk about here. but if i had one advice for this current administration, what i hear quite a lot when i'm in the region is that there's nobody they perceive inside the obama white house or the administration as their go-to person. somebody that they can talk to. again, not because we love them and share their values, but in terms of effectively advancing our policy interests, that would

be one recommendation of they want somebody that that they can talk to and listen to. and i think in some ways their public statements are a reflection of their own self-frustration with the ineffectiveness of their own strategy to advance their own goals. but also the sense of, well, maybe the u.s. doesn't like us anymore and the sense of uncertainty. and i would submit that's not a bad thing for u.s. policy. maybe a potential for leverage it's if it's exercised in some sort of way. but again, going back to this broader point that i don't think we know what we want writ large in the region. and i think this is a problem not only of the obama administration, but its predecessor because-a lot of confused, mixed messages there. so i think we're at a complicated point, but i don't see a major break coming, and i think it definitely needs to be definitely managed. >> thanks, brian, that's terrific. and thanks, elliott. there's a lot to go on with those two statements. i want to say, brian, hearing you speak, one of the things i think the three of us agree on when you talk about the

different problems with, certain he, coming up in saudi society and elliot spoke about this too, i think the three of us agree it would actually be a good thing, a positive thing, if united states, if american policymakers had an active role in helping to steer sawty society this a positive text rather than a dangerous direction. >> you know what? in the old days, and there were very many of them, we had unrivaled is the access to the white house. you know, the british and french ambassador would call up on monday and say do you think there's any possibility i could see the president in the next week or two? and he would call up and say i used to come -- i need to come over at four. and it used to annoy me a lot. why should they have this access? actually president bush once say, you know, he's not influencing me, i'm influencing him.

this is how, you know, keep him close. this is how i get a message in an hour to the king. this is how i get a reply from the king. and it was, actually -- it worked. it worked. you know, a little bit of discounting because you knew that, you know, some piece of the message was bandar, not the king. you had to figure out was it 1%, 20. basically, it worked. i think tom donilon was for a while the point man for the saudis. and the system has not yet been fixed so that there's somebody whom they and we view as the key intermediary. and that's very unfortunate, because we do want to influence them. even punching under their weight, they obviously have a lot of influence in, for example, syria with. they have an active syria policy. they have a very active bahrain policy. and we want to maximize our own influence, and we're probably not doing it right now. >> yeah.

and i think to respond to the u.s. having an active role in steering the saudi direction, i completely agree with the instinct, but the devil is in the details of how you implement this in the middle east. quite clearly, in the first year of the arab uprisings, 2011 into 2012, the saudis felt like they were on their heels. they lost partners as they saw it. they thought that the united states and president obama had thrown mubarak under the bus. my personal view is ma mubarak had thrown himself under the bus because of the lack of a credible economic and democratic reform. and you just can only contain popular antipathy so much. on yemen they actually played an interesting and continue a constructive role. a curious thick that a monarchy is actually playing a role in sort of mediating a pathway towards what i think could have some potential for continued openness in their political system. yemen clearly has a lot of terrorism problems and other things. the gcc but mostly saudi arabia

playing that role. where i think, again, they've really punched far below their weight is this issue of trying to contain iran. quite clearly, their response to the situation in bahrain, they perceive it through a certain lens. their reaction to that, if it's fair to call it, similar to the brezhnev doctrine that we're not going to allow. and, again, i come back to iraq and their perceptions about iraq and the shift inside of iraq which i think is, remains a huge challenge, and it's, obviously, connected to syria. and i think hen they saw the u.s -- when they saw the u.s. administration in september this particular walk away from what they thought would be even targeted, limited strikes, you know, they were already in a process of trying to place be bets on a number of different actors. and be now based on my most recent trip to eastern turkey, they and others are all in. it's, i think, presenting -- >> regarding syria. >> yeah. and with some very dangerous groups perhaps.

perhaps less so with saudi arabia and other gcc state, but i think by 2014 -- it's already coming out in the press, but i think this administration even is recognizing that perhaps the threats from these jihadists in northern be syria are starting to rival some of the other security threats that the united states faces in the middle east. >> i'm just sitting here trying to think of whether i agree that they're punching below their weight. i don't know. and the reason i'm thinking, you know, the comparison that would make that point best is saudi arabia/qatar, right? qatar's a very interesting place in the sense that it has no citizens. i think it's about 275,000 now, everybody else is an expat. all there is is money, and there has been extremely effective use of that money and of qatari diplomacy. and if you compare sort of the last ten years of qatari --

al-jazeera -- qatari use of money with the saudis, you would absolutely conclude they punch below their weight. but if you compare to iran, you know, iran has roughly three times the population of saudi arabia, and the percentage of the population that is, in a sense, involved in the life of the country; that is, for example, has a decent education, are professionals, women who are active in some way in the economy, iran is a much more, much more modern country than saudi arabia. and it isn't surprising in a way that the saw days -- saudis would have a very hard time taking on a country with three times the population and that is much more modern. sort of striking thing to say about the ayatollah's iran. but i think it's true. so i wonlder if -- i wonder if really if you look at the country each with its wealth, the amazing achievement maybe one could say is the qataris. but if you take them out of the

equation, i don't know if saudi arabia's really punching below its weight. in the days when it was punching way above its weight, that was when it was spending all this money to spread extremist ideology around the world. >> yeah. >> so that, you know, you had wahhabi imams in wahhabi mosques and wahhabi schools growing up in indonesia -- >> still have that. >> yeah. and so that was not a good thing. >> yeah. no, and i'm not casting a judgment value on it. i'm just saying in terms of, again, and i think the point of the article was that if you measure -- if you had those resources and you were in saudi arabia and you shared those goals -- >> would you do better? >> yeah. then you certainly could do better. again, i'm saying -- i'm not saying that would be good for u.s. interests, certainly. i'm just trying to clinically analyze it which i think is important to try to do in the region right now. i think an important point, you know, last thing i'd say here is that i think especially twins 2011, but i think it preceded

this, the region had slipped into this multidimensional, multipolar competition for power. you just talked about saudi arabia versus qatar. that's just one feature of it. >> when uh-huh. >> and you look at sort of turkey's role and it purported role and how it, i think in many wayses, did not punch above its weight and quite below its weight -- >> yep. >> we're in a transformation when i say multidimensional, it's not simply who's backing whose armed forces, it's ruing money in the way we saw in egypt after morsi's ouster quite visibly staking a bet on -- and if there's an overall trend in the middle east. it's a little simplistic, but i think it's true, those countries who are a little bit less economic strong, you know, they lack the wealth, but also divided politically are quite often sort of these mini cold wars of the region are played out in places like yemen. lebanon we've known in this for years, but with it continues to

go on and then syria, i think right now, the most dangerous place. >> let's talk about syria. i guess in some ways looking at it, trying to look at it from the saudi perspective, what's the real issue? is it the issue that the united states appears to want to rebalance the region as the former national security adviser thomas done lin said or the saudis have a case saying, wait a second, our problem is not being rebalanced,our problem is with the islamic republic of iran, that's the issue. and i guess in some ways if you look at syria, i think syria might be more accurate picture of what's happening around the region, right? like what the iranians are fighting for and how the iranians are fighting. so, yeah, if i could just get your thoughts on syria -- >> from the saudi point of view i think it's pretty clear that king abdullah of georgia used the phrase the shia crescent.

from the saudi point of view, you handed them iraq -- this is a quote that brian read -- and they still have that view. and you're not doing anything about hezbollah in lebanon. and now you've got hezbollah troops and iranian irc troops in syria fighting. this is a matter of the shia becoming the dominant force in the region, and what are you americans doing about it? nothing. you don't even recognize it. and all you want to do is negotiate with them. i think that's the fundamental saudi view. they're fighting to win, and you guys don't even seem to recognize that this is a fight with the she that. -- shia. and that is not the american view. >> if they were to really put it that baldly, it's not like -- the problem is not the shia, it's they're a revolutionary regime or thai really that up front about -- >> no, i think the, i think these are not the speeches, obviously, that officials make. but i think that in addition to the problem for the saudis of

iran under any management, you know, there's a deep religious conflict here. rivalry, z i was going to say, but i think conflict nowadays a were the word. and there we have, obviously, an american/saudi gap. um, our problem, as i said, is with the islamic republic and its nefarious foreign policy. our problem is not with shia or persians. >> yeah. well, i would say on the syria case, i mean, again, another example in my view of how saudi arabia has a stated goal. they would like to see assad go. it's actually an alignment with u.s. policy. i happen to believe that u.s. policy actually is not in alignment with that stated goal. i think that's an obvious point. [laughter] if you look at 2013, any serious sort of neutral analyst will say this has been a very good year

for the assad regime in terms of its ability to stay in power. a horrible year, a horrific year for the syrian people and even for many people who are part of sort of the -- who were sympathetic to the assad regime because the conflict continues. but in terms of the state of play especially since the spring, the wind is a little bit more at the assad regime's sails. so i would, again, go back to what the stated ambitions are and from what i've seen on the ground and i've heard from the analysts that i think are credible and go in and out of northern syria and other places is the absence of any strategy to advance their goal. and -- >> the saudis. >> yeah, the saudi strategy. it's quite similar to the u.s., but i think you get it in the terms of not only the obama administration's posture, but much of sort of republican and democrats in congress, this reticence to go into -- so, in fact, you can evaluate it and say we don't have a strategy that will meet our goals. but the saudis are doing things. they're doing things in ways

that, actually, i think won't -- maybe not -- topple the assad regime, but almost certainly is creating this security problem that could quite rival if not already the challenges we've seen in yemen or in northwest pakistan and other places. and that's what i think is the thing that everybody's starting to become aware of. but in i fear in 2014 the situation could slip pretty rapidly. >> why? why do you think -- >> well, look, in some of the recent visits i've had there, and it's out there in the press, and brookings has a really good, you know, monograph out yesterday talking about gcc private support to some of these militant groups. be the recent sort of trends with ma drees leaving and things like this, this is not an encouraging sign. and, again, you can criticize u.s. policy, and i'm happy to do that because i think there's a gap between the stated goals and what the actual policy is doing on the ground. but i think that gap is even greater given saudis' sort of stated self-interest, and as elliot described it, they're not

being terribly effective, i think, with undermining the regime. >> but i agree with that -- >> yeah. >> but, pardon me, but i think if i were a sawty spokesman -- saudi spokesman, what i would say to you is, right, but that's the fault of the americans. >> right. >> that is, you know, you guys have had a feckless policy since the beginning. what can we do? we're trying to fight. we're doing what we can with some help from others in the region. very hard to do with you americans on the sideline. but we've kept assad from winning we've kept the rebellion alive. now, it's true that let's call them the non-jihadi elements of the opposition are declining versus the jihadi elements, and that's your fault, you americans. had you come in with us in the beginning, we wouldn't have had this power vacuum that has led

this to be a magnet. we're not prepared to see assad win because that means hezbollah has won in an arab country. we're not prepared to see that. you handed them iraq. but at least in the sense as a majority shia country, this is a country that's 74 percent sunni. we're not prepared to see the shia take it over, and you're not helping. i think it's actually a very powerful argument. >> well, i'll ask you both, i mean, at what point do the saudis have a real point when they differ with american policy, and at what point is it just when brian challenged the title of the panel. alliance, no, i think it makes seasons. it's not alliance in that way. it's relationship, right? and it seems to be in lots of ways a problematic relationship insofar as elliot was describing it a lot of it does have to do

with oil for security. and historically it's been a lot of times the saudi cans are screaming at the americans from the side do this, do that. and as elliot was saying before about bandar and bush, it's best to lead them, guide them, influence them. but at what point when the saudis are saying this, as elliot was describing, at what point are they right when they're talking about syria, when they're talking about iran? tsa either we need you as the superpower leading, or you're wrong on syria, you're wrong on iran. so how do we distinguish the noise from when they're correct? >> look, i mean, you could argue -- and they would certainly argue -- they're already right in this regard. and i would just respond this terms of, again, back to u.s. strategyingic interests and how, again, having a clear plan of how does this end and where does this go. if you wanted to go to an all-in strategy in a way that, again, i don't think -- it won't happen. i can almost say for certain just based on my own assessment.

from the u.s. side. yeah. look, you look at sort of the fallout from what would have been a failed vote in congress, i think, on very limited strikes. so selling this case to the american public will require a fundamental change in something that happens on the ground of -- not on the order of 9/11, but something sort of -- >> the administration will also have to, i mean, the administration, the president has been undermining the policy of doing anything more active in syria for two and a half years. >> right. >> so they're going to have to change as well. >> yeah, yeah. but what i'm suggesting here is i don't think they'll have that wake-up call unless there's something that's seen to directly affect our interests. something on that order will require -- again, it's the administration primarily, but i would say, also, the united states to wake up, to say, look, the middle east after 10 or 12 years where i everied in

congress at the end of september, early october on an issue related to the middle east, and i got it from both sides saying why should we care? and for those of us who care about the region, i think we need to outline what is a practical case. and when it comes to syria, i think a practical case for engagement if i were advising the administration in a clear way on syria, it would be, you know -- and i think they're doing this to some extent -- assess what these actors are doing right now, saudi arabia, kuwait, qatar and others. i would focus a little bit more on the ground game and who's doing what on the ground. right now a lot of the emphasis is on geneva ii, and that's going to convene. and god bless them them. i wish all the best. but to me, diplomacy does not have much of a chance of impact unless it's linked to power dynamics on the the ground. and to me, and i've written a little bit about this, fine for secretary kerry to talk to

lavrov and brahimi. what's missing is some contact group, difficult though it may be. elliot may be skeptical, but the bush administration when iraq was at its darkest moment took part in regional diplomacy conferences. i think turkey took the heed on it. and, again, maybe it didn't do much practically, but perhaps it was one of those pieces in addition to a military surge that led to a more pragmatic dialogue of how do you actually, you know, at least get to an end to some of the worst behaviors that are leading to the fragmentation of syria. if that makes sense. there's no regional strategy, as far as i can tell, to shape the actors who are now engaged in syria. >> where i'm in complete agreement is things have got to go bottom up, not top down. if you can negotiate a deal that doesn't reflect reality on the ground, if you want to do the deal, you do have to have a negotiation, but you've also got to change the reality on the ground. >> yes. >> and we're not doing that. >> i'm thinking the more and be more i'm hearing you speak, brian, that even though you

distinguished yourself from -- [inaudible] [laughter] i think we're agreeing on a number of different things here. i hope you're not getting uncomfortable. >> no, i think the point where i might disagree in terms of specificity policy, because i think it's easy enough to say, okay, here's what you would do to map out a case to change the balance of power on the ground. but as i think people like secretary kerry might tell you, when they made a modest decision in the spring be of this year to arm some parts of the rebels, i think there was a delay in doing that, and there's still a slowness in that, and part of it was a low appetite amongst those in congress. i mean, i'm not blaming them, but there's just no appetite overall. if, post-9/11 -- and i think heading into the iraq war -- there was, and, you know, great appetite and power to actually shape what the u.s. could do in this part of the world. unfortunately, i fear it was squandered. and i think it's continued, my personal view, to be squandered in part because we believe sort

of this, you know, we made some mistakes, certainly. i've criticized the previous administration. but then we believe we can't do anything, and i think collectively, what i'm saying -- this is not just in the mind of president obama or others, but across the political spectrum that there's very little that we can do, and that's what worries me the most. as somebody who i hope continues to work on this for the next 20 or 30 years, this sense of we don't have the power to do anything which we talk a lot about on egypt, the u.s. policy on egypt evinces this. it clearly demonstrates they think they don't have much influence, and i think it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy, main point. >> i would add one point about -- i don't know if this is the saudis punch. ing under their weight or if it's just a fact of life and they don't have the weight. but they're very much opposed to u.s. policy be, very critical of u.s. policy. but they're completely unable to do anything about it. it's striking. i mean, that is they don't have the influence within the

administration, and they certainly don't have the influence in the u.s. with the public. they can't move public opinion. now, maybe that's asking too much of a foreign government, although at times the british have been able to do it, at times the israelis maybe have been able to do it. the saudis, though they spend a ton of money on pr firms in washington, can't do it. so they're left kind of fuming ineffectively but haven't moved the needle. >> well, one of the interesting things i did want to come to this is when people have been saying if the americans are out of the picture or if it seems the saudis will look for other options, we keep hearing about, again, i'm not sure exactly what that looks like, but one of the things we have heard about is excellent coordination, secret but excellent be coordination between the israelis and the saudis. and one of the things that struck me over the last couple

weeks, the criticism of the interim deal with iran as many people are, many of the people including myself used to writing critical apprisals of this administration will not just write and it's not good for our allies in israel, but it's also not good for our allies in saudi arabia. so to yolk these two things together, this is kind of different. so in some ways i think the saudis might be benefiting from the fact that they and the israelis are in line at least on, at least on iran policy. >> but i would suggest, you know, some have suggested this could then more ebbs pansively, you know -- expansively lead to something else, and i think there are inherent limits to whatever tactical cooperate there could be on iran. i think the biggest issue for the saudis will be, again, the israeli/palestinian conflict that the you look at those statements back in 2002, 2003 and your administration was on the receiving end of that, it's still an important, core issue.

now, again, the other place i might push back here a little bit is that i think when people talk about the u.s. not being present in the region and we're less of a force, i think that's highly inaccurate. if you go, as i did this fall be, and you see what our footprint is like in the gcc state, if you read secretary hagel's speech in bahrain -- and we can all have problems with how he said that and what he said -- it's quite clear that there's no other military force that will rival -- and if you look at the planning of the pentagon even at a time of budget cuts, they're -- i see no sign of retreat of u.s. in the region. separately, and maybe this is the way to segway into iran, also on the interim deal there's been a lot of talk about a major shift here as well potentially. the u.s. and tom donilon hinted at this. i would say this is probably more modest than has been portrayed when you look at not only the fact that the security threats that iran presents to

u.s. core strategic interests, their support for terrorist groups and other things, the fact that we've been will for decades in the region, i don't want actually see us retreating in any way. if we were going to do that, we might have done that in bahrain or other places if we really wanted to make that a, um, a clear issue. but even if, and i was talking to people in the administration dealing with the sanctions on iran, they made an interesting point said even if on the slim chance that we can get to a final agreement, and i don't think there's any naivete about that, the set of sanctions that will still remain in place because of iran's support for terror organizations, this is a country we have a significant problem with. and i think just from a cool calculus, i don't think -- again, i think it's portrayed differently in the media debate about the interim agreement, but i don't think this yet represents anything but sort of an attempt at diplomacy that might succeed ultimately.

>> and what is the purpose of the interrim agreement we spoke about before? >> you know, i think if you go back to 2009, the president comes to office wishing to engage with a theory that, you know, part of -- or a large part of the problem with countries like syria and iran was the bush administration. bush policy. and now we will engage. and that he could not do because of the events in iran in june 2009, the uprising, the way it was crushed. you couldn't then engage with the government of iran. and remember, the engagement is not with iran, it's not with the people of iran. the engagement is with the regime in rapp as it was with the -- in iran as it was with the assad regime. okay, so in 2009 you can't do that. flash forward, now it looks as if there's a possibility. after all, there is for the first time official engagement, there are foreign minister to secretary of state negotiations.

so i, you know, as i look at it, i think people in the region who are scared of 24 and say, uh-oh, we have lived in a world where there's an iranian-american confrontation. and if the americans no longer want that confrontation, believe they can end it almost single-handedly, believe that iran has changed enough so that there needn't be a confrontational attitude, they're going to get scared. and, in fact, they are scared because from their point of view, you know, look, the israelis are concerned about one thing which is nukes. but for the saudis, emirates, bahrainis and others, there's just one issue. and it may not even be the top issue. there's terrorism, there's processioner, there's -- perversion, there's the old desire for hegemony over what is either the persian gulf or the arabian gulf. so i can understand why even in the context of having an

agreement with israel -- let's say not an agreement, common interests about the iranian nuclear program -- they see that the united states, europeans, israel have a very different or perhaps have a very different fundamental position with respect to iran. >> i was going to say this is why i think syria's an important test case in many ways. because when people talk about the iranians, it's not an expansive power, they never really fight themselves. i think if you were talking to the saudis, i think if you were talking to the emirates and kuwaitis, it's we have had problems with them here at home, but if you need more evidence, look at what they've done in syria. i mean, as you said before, it's an expeditionary force. and no matter what happens to assad; it seems that the iranians stand to profit, stand to profit in the meantime. so saudi concerns there certainly make sense. >> and i think they would echo those concerns about iraq. we made this point before. but again, i think it's an important one to pick, is that a

lot of -- we didn't cause sort of the chaos in the region, but our actions do have an impact. and i think this shift from a strategic paradigm of dual containment of both iran and iraq, which was probably not a good long-term, sustainable strategy in and of itself, but it had consequences. and it had consequences when you talk to people in saudi arabia, inside of iraq. i saw prime minister maliki recently when he was here on his visit, and what i'm suggesting is that the whole sort of region is in this period of competition for influence. it's changing. i think it often is thrown in these labels of shia rester us sign -- versus sunni, and i think it's accurate to some extent, and elliot and i have debated this as well, but i think the fracturing inside the middle east because of the sunni aspect, and we debated in the as well, is itself fractured. and i think when i go to places where our most reliable partners and allies like israel and jordan, when they look at the regional conception, and the israelis say we used to fear

arab strength and coherence, now what we fear is weakness really. and i think, again, this paints a muddled picture. but i think that's what it is, it is a muddled picture in midde east. and i think for me someone who's often critical of the lack of a u.s. strategy as an honest analyst from the outside, it's easier for me to sort of sit there and write papers, but then when you're true -- trying to deal with these -- >> well, this is good, because i do want to open it up for some questions, but let me ask you both, brian, since you've mentioned this a few times, what would -- if you think that the strategic, strategic vision has fallen apart or it's muddled, what do you think is a clear and farsighted strategic vision in the middle east, and what role does saudi arabia play for the foreseeable future? i mean, the saudi -- i'll just leaf it that at -- leave it at

that. what role do the saudis play in a clearsighted american strategy? >> i would say if we're talking long term, i would start with it depends on what kind of saudi arabia we're talking about, and the issues we've glided over and not talked about much, but the shaping of saudi future, things like this. because, to me, the most reliable partners to the united states in the middle east are countries like israel, and enthis i i think -- and then i think jordan has its own challenges. but you want societies who have a fabric of more inclusivety and openness. people like to malign the freedom agenda. before it was a gleam in george w. bush's eye, i was in the middle east working on democratic promotion, and i fundamentally believe that. so i think one thing is how do you elevate that pragmatically in our interests recognizing that we're not the ones that are going to steer the change, but it's going to be part of the dialogue. i know with the u.s./saudi arabia, there was a strategic dialogue, and if i recall, there was at least nominally a working

group on human rights and democracy. i don't know if it did anything. >> it made us feel better. >> yeah, yeah. so more crisp ply. i mean, i think what strikes me, and this is, i think, a problem that cuts across many administrations is quite often we stove pipe sort of our interests and our values. and when you go -- and the discussion you have in cent come or in our mill care -- centcom is quite different than what some people in the state department, and maybe i'm unrealistic. but i think there could be a much more practical blending of these issues. the one point i would just say is this sort of mix in the middle east, to me the fundamental that seems to be undergirding all of this is these societies are at the start of a change in transformation. and being more adept at trying to guide that. and when i look at how flaccid and weak the state department's structures are, when you look at the g8 and the lack of -- when you measure that up against what these other states have done in places like egypt, so i think the main point would be what can

we do in terms of the lessons learned, because there's been a lot of that, criticism of the bush administration's freedom agenda, but what are the actual lessons learned? how do we elevate democracy and reform while also being pragmatic, while also attending to our day-to-day interests? i think that's easier said than done, but i don't know if elliot has a reaction to that general statement. >> you know, you could rephrase your question. >> okay. >> what would herman khan say if he were here today? [laughter] here at hudson. i think it depends if you're looking at 10 years, 50 years. if we're talking let's say 10, 20, 25 year, a period in which american dependence on middle eastern oil will decline, decline, decline, decline, i agree, first of all, that one of the key variables here is, you know, tell me what's going on in those societies. we didn't predict the turmoil in

so many arab countries that we've seen since 2011. what will saudi arabia be like five, ten years from now? will it be a generally calm society? will it be a revolutionary society? will it -- i think, you know, some of the issues the sawties face are -- saudis face are the internal issues that, as brian said, we haven't talked very much about. i used to work for senator moynihan, and he once said that the most disruptive thing in any society, any society including the united states is unemployed young men. unemployed young men are dangerous. the saudis have a very, very large number of unemployed young men. and they're not, you could even say they have a very large number of unemployable young men whose education is such that the idea that they're going to find a job next year, hard to believe. so that's a very big variable.

how will -- look, you know, we're in the final years, statistically speaking, of the rule of king abdullah. who's the next king? what kind of a king will he be? what kind of reforms will there be in saudi arabia to address issues like the mismatch between their educational system and the be needs of the coming decade? a big with variable. the other one i would throw in is, look, it's the islamic republic. that's the security issue in the region. someday, i believe, the islamic republic will fall, and the people of iran will get what they want which is a decent, just, democratic society. it may take five years, it may take thirty-five years, who knows? it seems to me the strategy of the united states has got to be to be the main bulwark against the extremism, the subversion, the terrorism, the adepression

of -- aggression of the islamic republic. because our friends in the region can't do it without us. and i think this administration is, has an, at west, -- at best, an unclear policy which has made all of our friends nervous. >> this is where i'll disagree a little bit because i think, again, there's more continuity in that policy. if you look at u.s. policy since 1979 and the islamic revolution, one fundamental has been containing the iranian influence. under the bush administration, i think in the last two years in particular, there was a different strategy that began of both contain and continue to con tape and then amp up sort of the containment through global economic sanctions while also engaging through this p5+1. and when i talked about continuity, i think that's there. that's the paradigm in terms of testing what the possibilities are. but i think the overall architecture of both our security posture, how our intelligence agencies view iran, that has not fundamentally

changed. and i think we are, you know, that's where we'll probably disagree a little bit because i think people overread sort of even these diplomatic ebb gaugement -- engagements and these attempts at diplomacy. to me, the fundamental architecture is quite consistent. and then the second point i'd raise up is this whole issue of containment, the bar gains that we met. the not alliances, the partnerships that we built, the pause teen -- like saudi arabia, the subject of our talk today s the thing we should question. what were the costs and benefits of that cooperation strategically and tactically. to me, and that's where i think, you know, this issue of long-term -- how these societies treat their own people, a sense of decency and standards is terribly important now for the region itself because these regimes understand that themselves, that they can't turn back this tide. so, again, all of the criticisms of the attempts at reform in the region and what i think, you

know, my main criticism is that, you know, too much of it became militarized or securitized from the u.s. standpoint. our engagement in the region post-iraq, unfortunately, and the analysis has been that. but there has been an underanalysis of what could be done with our economic policies, what could be done with our diplomacy to actually foster better change. and maybe we just want to give up and go home, but i think, you know, the real downside to this whole paradigm of containing iran is we built these alliances with regimes themselves that are built on sand that i think live in bubbles themselves that i don't see sustaining themselves over the long term. >> let me just agree on one point about continuitiment you had this -- continuity. you had this extraordinary event of iran plotting to blow up the saudi ambassador in georgetown. and the american reaction to that was nothing. that's continue knewty. continuity. the iranians have been killing americans and plotting to kill americans for decades under several presidents of both

parties, and the american reaction almost always is nothing. we've seen it in afghanistan, we've seen it in iraq, we've seen it in beirut, saudi arabia. and we never actually reply. >> uh-huh. >> so that, i mean, from my point of view, unfortunately, proves your point. the rain grabs have paid -- iranians have paid almost no price for this under administration after administration. which, unfortunately i think, 'em boddens them -- emboldens them and leads them. you'd like to think there was a debate in iran about whether it was wise to blow up a restaurant in georgetown. some saying, are you crazy and others saying, nah, they won't do anything. >> or there may not have been any debate at all. the americans aren't going to do anything. >> maybe. >> why don't we open it up for a few questions. we have a gentleman in the front. if you would, i believe we have a microphone, so i'm going to ask you to wait until the microphone arrives and then

introduce yourself and, please, try to keep it brief so we can get to an answer to your question. pardon me? >> [inaudible] >> a minute? >> one variable that none of you talked about, the economic impact of the relationship with saudi arabia in terms of jobs. if you look at the relationship and you quantify it, e benefit -- we men benefit from job creation by arms, by selling goods and services, by having over 30,000 americans work many saudi arabia, and it's quite substantive. now on the question of whether the saudis think we're leaving or not, brian and i were in bahrain, and i went to qatar, and i was in saudi arabia. no one believes that we're going to leave. what they're concerned about, that we're not using our power to change the status quo in syria. but they know we're there. and they need us there.

finally, brian mentioned the fact that there's no close coordination. when you talk to the saudis, they talk about bush 41. and they'll tell you we had a great relationship. we don't, we didn't always agree, but they consulted with us. we were aware of what was going on. and now, for example, they'll tell you about the negotiations with iran. and the prince in turkey and also in france said we should be concluded in the negotiations about the iranian nuclear weapon because we're impacted by it. [inaudible] >> i'm sorry, can you phrase that as a question now? what's the -- [laughter] okay. >> well, look, just to respond and, quite only, those linkages we did not explore, the economic linkages between the u.s. and saudi arabia. they're vital, they're important. what i would say is also -- and, again, we always think about the relationships north to the west. what struck me and strikes me on my visits to the region is also those growing linkages.

not only to china with energy, but the whole gulf, but also saudi arabia. the fact that remittances and i've looked quite a lot at india and pakistan in some of my work, those linkages are quite with important as well. and we often have that stove pipe discussion about sort of our policies, but they view this as very important. you know, and i don't -- you know, i agree with the rest of your comments. i sympathize a lot with them. i don't know if you have any other reactions to -- >> hilel, i see him in the back. i guess there's a microphone coming back there. does that mic work okay? i think we had a little trouble -- gentleman in the audience was signaling we had trouble. >> does this work? i want to thank everyone for the discussion and also for the accommodation of the current trends. i guess my question really is for brian. i guess it starts from your

dissatisfaction, it seems to me, with our syria policy at the moment. and, but the president has now said that syria is someone else's civil war. so i wonder what you think is the argument for why it is something else that would be persuasive within the administration or, for that matter, to the american public? it would seem to me anyway that the argument would be it's not merely a civil war, it's -- or not be syria's civil war, but it's a regional civil war, a shia/sunni war, and that we have a concern about that. and that, as elliot i think suggested, iran, that side, is winning. how -- so that would be, it seems to me, the issue that would have to be raised. but i wonder how you make that argument when we're also embracing iran at the same time.

>> yeah. i mean, i agree with you. i think i would add to the fact that the spillover that you're seeing already in terms of security threats in lebanon, in turkey, it seems fairly contained in jordan, but then iraq, the regional implications, they're rolling out as we speak. i think probably the thing that would only move -- and here i'm talking about the american public, because i think i see our political leaders from president obama, but then especially the members of congress, they're reactive in a sense. especially after ten years of what i think, again, erroneously was seen as like, you know, bad engagement on the part of the u.s. yes, we made mistakes, but that engagement, had we stuck with it this in some ways, could have lasting impact. i think the only thing that would sort of be a wake-up call, unfortunately, would be a major terrorist event. not like what we saw in turkey, but something emanating from northern syria. i guess what i'm suggesting is that it's not inconceivable that

this happens. in the way that i think the bombing, the attempted jet liner bombing in december of 2009 on christmas day was a wake-up call about aqap, my fear -- it's not my hope, it's my fear -- is that something similar to this, because that provoked a response from the administration. and people can agree or disagree with it, but it was a brutal response, it was effective, it had -- >> you have me a little concerned that c-span viewers might take matter into their own hands. [laughter] i want to make sure that's not a recommendation. >> no, no, it's a worry given the when you look at even sort of the news accounts of who's showing up and the types of weapons they have and the plots that they might have and the backing that they might have, right now it seems internally focused, focused on the assad regime. that, hilel, i think -- less so than the regional argument. i think a regional argument flies over the heads of many

congressmen. i mentioned my experience testifying recently. but the american public be, especially those who served maybe in some of these places in iraq and others, people are, i think, in a cool, calculus they're looking at what did we actually achieve? was the juice worth the squeeze? and i think that's unfortunately. but i think it's -- i'm not calling for it again, but i fear that that's what will produce a wake-up call given we're going into a midterm election, given that we're so still internally focused and given just the hyperdysfunction that we see in our own political system. >> elliot, do you want to -- >> i would just say i think i agree that in congress, and we know from the hidden pulse, the public there was remarkably little support. i think that had the president done it and then gone on tv and done one of these last night and said to the american people we do not want to leave to our children a world this which chemical weapons are back. chemical weapons are used. chemical weapons are part of the

everyday arsenal. we can't allow that. and so i have done the following. it's other. it happened last night -- it's over. i think, actually, he could have gotten an essential amount of support. we'll never know. >> but in reality then if you look at where things are going with the deal that was struck, you still would have had the question of the weapons are not secured. now their on a pathway -- i'm arguing, i don't think this was a well thought out strategy, it was a lucky strategy, but had they done that, and i wrote a piece, you know, i generally was supportive of the proposal as limited as it was, but the main point of my piece was that there were inherent risks at that time. the assumption, for instance, that it would have deterrent value on the assad regime, i think, was one that needed to be questioned by the analysts. because if assad used it not only once as we know from the u.n. report recently, many more than once, this could have produced much more of an incentive. so i would say for all of the sort of zigzagging, and it was quite a confusing and messy period, the united states,

israel -- and, again, i was in israel in november -- if everybody's happy that these weapons are now on what seems to be and, again, seems to be a pathway for elimination and secure. and that is a major, you know, if anything, you know, the conflict is still raging, assad seems stronger, but the securing of the chemical weapons we should not undermine sort of what an important accomplishment that was. >> let me undermine that accomplishment. [laughter] i have two reasons. one, i don't think that assad is giving up his chemical weapons. i think he's giving up a portion of his chemical weapons. i don't know whether it's 10%, 50%, i don't know. it is not sensible from the assad point of view to give up 100, nor do you have to do it. the weapons that we are taking and destroying are the weapons that the regime has identified. ..

okay. i'm with the iraqi embassy. so good to see a discussion on saudi arabia on this. i want to pick on a couple of things you mentioned,

mr. abrams. one is this strong saudi argument that 70% of the population, not a good idea to have them ruled by 30% maybe an equally strong argument they're sending troops to maintain such a minority. bahrainis are 70% and also iraqis, saudis and more than anybody else to bring back 17% of minority rule. by the two counter arguments it can be also made the opposite way to the iranians. minority rule as such, oppressive regimes being equal is not such a bad idea depend on whose minority it is. the other ones i want to pick on what you said which i think is more consequential is the idea is, the saudi problem is more of a shia strong state in iran rather than american problem which is islamic republic that

is a non-friendly regime. even if iran were to change this conflict between the iranians and the saudis will remain for a long time. from the perspective of countries who live in the shadow of this conflict that has been destructive whether lebanon, syria, iraq and the list goes on any single crisis that has been happening is also one dimension after saudi-iranian conflict, if that is a such fatalism they will always be having this problem whether from the iranian side or the saudi side where would this take the stability of the region i would like to have you answer and also, brian, your work is well-known for iraq and maybe i will save -- >> just a quick answer. on the minorities i agree with you. seems to me the situation in bahrain is quite unstable. just as the situation in syria

was unstable where you have, you know you can debate the numbers somewhat but clearly a minority ruling majority and, the minority doesn't like it, doesn't want it. won't put up with it anymore. so the problem is in different ways both governments have not responded by saying, well, let's negotiate a better dispensation. i agree with the second part also. that the saudi problem is a shia strong state in iran. that is not the american problem. you know in the long run i think, let me try to cheer you up. once upon a time the united states had a strong alliance with the kingdom of saudi arabia and a strong alliance with iran under the shaw and we were able to kind of mediate -- shah. if the islamic republic falls, which i hope and pray, we will have a good relationship with the follow-on government, presumably with a democratic

regime. maybe we go back to the day, '60s, '70s, where the united states was able as the strongest military power in the region to be a buffer between saudi arabia and iran and try to help manuever the relationship between them. it was the nixon doctrine to a certain extent appointed the shah as the sheriff in the region. i'm not talking about that. >> [inaudible] >> okay. they had a different kind of start. i think the united states could be in a position to do that. once we achieve a decent relationship with iran and that can not happen i think as long as the islamic republic survives. >> if i could just a make a comment and direct it on iraq because i think we haven't talked as much about it and my own view which if you have read my papers through the years is quite clear. there is where elliot and i strongly disagree many in the

audience. i thought the iraq war was a big mistake. i wasn't a big fan of saddam hussein and all the mistakes after. you recall in 2005, 6, 7, i wrote papers some would say shaped where weave gone. i was in favor of strategic redeployment and those arguments. if you look at those papers carefully, especially the 2007 one, it talked about the need for a continued, robust engagement with iraq and that, what i think, and i thought it was understandable that the iraqi government at the end of the bush administration demanded a hard deadline because there was assertion of sovereignty. i find it interesting the foreign minister of iraq is going to afghanistan and giving advice to their government there but i understood it and my clinical analysis again looking at trend inside of iraq this doesn't seem tenable. but the other agreement, the strategic framework agreement, which again seems bureaucratic

but i think cuts to this issue of the question, what would u.s. strategy do. these things, strategic agreement had security cooperation, had, should not talk past tense it is as least aliving document at least on paper, it full length of cultural, diplomatic, economic cooperation. the absence of follow-through, this is in part because of inattention at the top i think, in administrations but also because of these fundamental bureaucratic problems in some of these agencies in following up. also because of problems inside of iraq. i stated in this context of iran as a discussion because again i was against the iraq war but i'm a pragmatist. i worked with ndi on the ground there. you do what you can with what you've got. i think to this day it is missed opportunity. i think iraq has the potential, as big of a problems they face with terrorists and internal

divisions they can serve as bridge in the region, a constructive bridge. i criticize for the iraqi government for not following up on tools of bilateral engagement. i think say the u.s. is at fault. this is a opportunity to take a sad song and make it better for u.s. policy. >> there is a gentleman in the fourth row in the dark shift and we'll come to the gentleman in the second row. >> i'm a student. basically u.s., saudi arabia, and my question is, would there be a way that these, that tension between these two could be eased given iran as it is right now and saudi arabia, situation we don't know about as it is right now as well? is there a way this tension could be eased and if so what will the u.s. have to play? >> i mean look, if i could just say, i think the only way they can be eased in the long run is

if there's fundamental change, which i think the conditions are present for in both societies at the societal level. if you look at strategic paradigm of iranian leaders and saudi leaders there looks to be or seems to be a fundamental incapacity ability. at times they have productive, diplomatic meetings. at societal level there is nothing inherent that shouldn't lead to -- this is soft especially after 10 years after freedom agenda and incomplete and nobody can do anything about it but i think these societies will evolve and talk to ordinary iranians or ordinary saudis there is nothing inherently that should make them at odds. that's why i think right now it doesn't seem like -- here a little bit i think elliot mentioned, we tend to lump u.a.e. and qatar and the gcc states together, there is serious divergence with oman is made obvious but emiratis have a

quite different view than the saudis when it comes to iran. they have their own security problems. it is not just about the nuclear agreement but they have business interests that were quite considerable and that were cut off bit sanctions that the bush administration and obama administration continue to work through the p5-plus-one. my main point, your general question leads to somewhat of a general answer. in the short run i don't see sort of clear opportunities for cooperation but i think in the long run if these societies evolve in the way i think it is difficult to predict but in trajectory, more open, inclusive views in their own societies there are is more room for them to cooperate. presently? no. >> agree. >> gentleman in the second row. >> my name is stuart brofman. i'm just an ordinary citizen who has keenly observed that the media and analysts have characterized this administration's policy as being

muddled, reactive, anything but positive. so my question to you is, if you could wave a magic wand and establish u.s. policy in the region what would that policy be, and, how would you execute it? >> in 25 words or less. >> yeah. >> actually, we have been trying to focus on precise issues especially regarding saudi arabia. maybe does it make sense to, well, people in the region, this is a big generalization but i think it is fair. people in the region see the united states as a declining power in the region. some like it. some hate it. but i think it characterizes most people in the region, race little, arab, iranian and to me the fundamental change that needed in american policy today is to change that.

that is, to make it clear that not only do we retain the basis but that we're going to use our power. that is very hard to do that without changing policy toward syria, because that is the place where the struggle is most direct right now but that would be the largest change that i would make in the short run. in the long run there's a very deep question here about how the united states relates to changing societies and governments in, particularly the arab world. i share brian's view that the saudi, for that matter israeli criticism of president obama for throwing mubarak under the bus is completely wrong, completely unjustified but there is a very big question of how do we relate to societies that on the spectrum are pretty far over toward the un-free? though they may be friendly to

the united states. we'll have to work that out over the next 25 or 50 years but right now, 2014, you want to try to prove to people in the region that the united states is not a power that is receding, you can't do that without having a different syria policy. >> let me answer it because i, you know, as an outside analyst i see my first job to be a constructive critic of what present policy is. i think in my discussions here i let my criticisms get ahead of what are actually some decent policies from the obama administration and start from there and then say this is what i would do differently. look, i would first say, i would characterize it as pragmatic given sort of realities of the complexity of the situation. to my taste it leans back the overall position a little bit too much and we should lean in a little bit more. i think the fundamentals i think what you could say is a strategy, the two number one

priorities quite clearly from secretary kerry's tile in office but the president is solidly backing him, are attempting some sort of deal with iran on the nuclear issue while being clear-eyed about it secondly while attempting to advance the israeli-palestinian negotiations which is something successive administration has done. whether they will succeed or not everyone is clear-eyed what the odds are given challenges and israeli's understandable positions about their security concerns. those are two pillars. you can criticize whether that is important strategy. i happen to believe those priorities are important. add to it a third which is a strand that is consistent with the bush administration, a sharp focus on counterterrorism in places like yemen and around the world. again, i would highlight, this is one place where we need to think more clearly. the syria crisis, libya as well, which has fallen off the map is emerging as a potential

challenge in north africa. but overarching thing that has been missing and missing from u.s. policy not only in administration, i would say the bush administration and clinton administration and backwards is this broader focus how do we actually use tools of not only our diplomacy but economic statecraft. our military is strong and let's be clear and footprint. we may disagree whether the u.s. is leaving or not. i don't see it in the region. how do we help ourselves in terms of building partnerships with these countries that that have this jobs crisis, these fundamental issues. i wrote a book called the prosperity agenda. it talks about and dabbles the space in the smart power and used in the first administration. i believe we tend to undervalue of those components of u.s. power and we actually don't know how to bring them to bear. back to my point on iraq and what i was trying to say on the strategic framework agreement, all those tools, remarkable

power, no matter what china's rise looks like in india and you look at it we are still very strong as people look to us as a place to invest and also to get investment from. those tools are just underutilized in the middle east. much of our relationships. that i think is a big space, if combined and interlinked with the need for governance reform, democracy and things like this to the broader point after 30 years of the u.s. investing so much and so much in terms of a security footprint. lou: i'm glad we did that. the region seems fraught with all these problems. we build alliances with systems themselves that were not economically or politically sustainable or responsive to the demographic social and political trend. so that is the thing that i would, but you last thing i would say, seems like an academic case now after the last decade of u.s. engagement in the middle east the pessimism that exists amongst democrats and

republicans politically, amongst the american public educating them if we can't have at money for a marshall plan, we can do a marshalling plan to work with other partners. what i fear nobody cares. what i fear elliot and lee and i get paid to write on the stuff, we're a smaller community in terms of who is paying attention. that we squandered that opportunity a bit after 9/11. i hope we can build it back because i actually think our leadership could be important if we built those tools up more. >> i'm going to ask the final question and if you can both keep answer to about four minutes left, even a little less. we spoke before how the saudis are concerned they no longer have a go-to guy in washington. i would ask that you guys imagine you're the saudi's go-to guy in washington. what do tell them they need to do and what do you tell them

that you believe the united states needs to do to cement a relationship, might not be an alliance but to make this relationship healthier and to make it more functional as it may or may not be right now? so actually, brian, i ask you to start and elliot, for you to conclude. >> i would have three top items on the agenda. number one, obviously iran and if we're going into next year the request for a p 5 plus 2, that includes the gcc. i don't think are practical but must be ways to read them in, buy them in, this is what we're trying to do. you take a cool, hard look where the u.s. and p5 plus 1 position is and where iran is it seems very difficult to bridge. informing them what i saw on recent trips to the gulf as hyperbolic concerns about, even getting some questions of where's the secret annex about dividing bahrain and syria and

it is easy enough i think through a process of not getting to know all the details but saying on iran front, we're trying this but we're still here with the security footprint. that is what secretary hagel was trying to do. second, syria, assessing who is doing what on the ground. not only planning for geneva ii, but i'm skeptical it will succeed but you need a connection to the ground game for the balanced powers on the ground. third i would not leave egypt off the map. egypt is the largest country in the middle east, my most recent report with michael hannah on this, and again elliot and i worked on egypt quite a lot. we may still have tactical differences the fight and struggle for egypt is moving in direction that is very worrisome and the saudis have a role. he keep them on the agenda to be more constructive. i say on all fronts and again taking some lessons learned from last 10 years of attempts to get

the saudis to recognize that simply continuing the subsidies regime on energy that you have for our own population, continuing to throw little bones in terms of political reform are not likely to sustain your own position. that some sort of pragmatic opening up, the elevation of the democracy of human rights agenda in a way that is not counterproductive. i would have as part of that discussion probably more private, but, maybe in most egregious cases very public, calling them out. but calling them out in a way that says it in their self-interest. we believe it is in our own self-interest. we want to build a partnership because we had a partnership for a while. to me again the main point i would say is the most solid partnerships that we have are not only with those country that is we share strategic interests but also with a greater, sort of overlap of values as well. i do think that the potential in saudi arabia. i think it is there but need a considerable amount of work.

>> i don't disagree with any of that. i think that is very wise. i would add that i think we should be talking to the saudis more, more effectively if we could about this question of support for extremism. this is very dangerous and it is going to be very dangerous for them and they should have learned that lesson already. to some extent the government has, i think it is more careful in asia for example, and to some extent in africa the way government money is spent but there is really no, at least i don't see any serious effort to control the vast amounts of private money that are going into some of the worst groups in the world. so i would, i would want to have that conversation with them. then we come back to something that brian said and we're in agreement. that is the nature of saudi society and challenges they face. what you can look at from the human rights.of view, or you can

look at it from, point of view may be more palatable to the royal family which this will be increasingly unstable situation and they have not effectively dealt with it. for example, the educational system. you've got one or two experiments like king of abdullah, university of science and technology which is great for people who go there but has very limited impact on the rest and thing that worries me we want to have this conversation but we're doing to go back something i said at the beginning. we're doing it at a time of potential instability over the succession in saudi arabia. so i don't know, that probably limits our ability even now to have this influence is something we should have been trying to do over the last decades and it may be we're not going to have another good chance to do it until this succession is over and until you have someone as

king who might be king for 10 or 20 more years. that's a very, that's a worrisome diagnosis but i think it may be unfortunately true. >> thank you. i believe that will conclude the panel. i want to thank brian and elliot. thank you very kindly. and thanks to hudson institute and thank you very much for coming. happy holidays. >> that was fun. >> i think radio is the longest and best form of media that's left. what we're doing right now, is hour-long conversation

unprecedented. only c-span does long form conversation anymore. you and charlie rose are the guys that read books the way i read books to talk to the author seriously. it is tremendously revealing when the author has their book read. they don't get many people read their books and talking about with page notes it is so rewarding of them i get great satisfaction with author says to me, highest compliment. that is the best interview i got on the book tour. got it from charles krauthamer, i love interview on things that matter, collection of his essays which are old but autobiographical. i like radio. three hours is abundance of time and i can do so many different things. >> more with radio talk show host hugh hewitt sunday night on c-span's q&a.

>> next, a group of women veterans of the iraq and afghanistan wars share their experiences. they talk about their personal decisions for entering the military, some of the dangers they encountered in war zones, how they used their skills during their deployments and their transition from military to civilian life. the event was hosted by the new york public library as part of its new york veteran history series. it is about an hour and 40 minutes.

>> so i'd like to thank thank t. everyone for coming out today, pearl harbor today, for a very important discussion with some truly incredible veterans. my name is alex and doctor kelly and i work with outrage services at nypl on veterans programing and this is the third and final panel discussion we hosted here as part of our new york public library new york veteran history series. we're truly honored to have incredible individuals to share their stories on this stage. so this discussion, like our other discussions, really seeks to celebrate the complete story. as veterans tell their own stories both civilians and other veterans can learn from them and begin to engage in more meaningful dialogue that more realistically reflects the experience of our country's veterans. in your program, your blue program, you'll see more information about our veterans oral history projects which is

truly the backdrop or the backbone of these panel discussions and our other public programs we've hosted at the library. the oral history itself is really an opportunity for anyone to share their story in exactly the way they want to share it. i'm looking forward to listening to more interviews with veterans for this project. as we collaborate with the library of congress to make sure that these stories are well-preserved for future generations. if you would like to interview somebody for this project let me know. my contact information is on the back of your program. i see many familiar faces in the audience for people that have been interviewed for this project and interviewed others for this project. i like to thank juan and families network for hosting this event with us this evening and providing incredible resources and programs for veterans and their families.

juan, could you stand up for a moment? where are you? she is back there. i would encourage you all after today's discussion to talk to wan and ask her about the resources she has for veterans around the city. she is really amazing to work with. the so now i would like to introduce you to m guesstimate, our moderator this afternoon. meg and i work to make sure this panel was colab a tougher. asking all of the veterans on our panel what questions do you want us to ask, and what questions would you like us to stay away from? which questions have you been asked quite often and which questions have you wanted to be asked but rarely ever are. meg is an independent filmmaker and cultural an though apologist based in new york city. her recent film, lioness tells story of woman sent to direct combat in iraq as part of

unofficial army program. the film won the center for documentary studies filmmaker award as full frame documentary film festival and was broadcast on the pbs series, "independent lens" in 2008. mclaughlin rights about media, architectures of activism in documentary form and mows recently coedited sensible politics. the visual culture of non-governmental activism published by zone books in 2012. we're truly honored to have her moderate the panel. i would like meg to give us a few opening remarks. thank you. >> hi, everybody. i would like to start by thanking alex kelly and the new york public library for inviting me to moderate today. it is a real honor to be on the same stage with people who have served in these post-9/11 conflicts in iraq and afghanistan. my connection as alex said to this issue is as a filmmaker.

dari summers and i made a film which we started working on in 2005, finished in 2008 about a group of army women who served in the sunni triangle and were sent out with all-male infantry and artillery units to help deal with some of the tensions arising when they were going into homes and encountering iraqi women and children, civilians. we saw the american women who were doing this work as important historical actors in an ongoing transformation of the armed services. the transformation to fully gender integration and at this time when we were making the film very little information was available about what was going on in iraq and in terms of what the women were doing and, so the story that is the women told us were of primary sources of

information about the new way that women were being used in iraq and the defacto combat integration that was taking place. and since then of course a new generation of women combat veterans has emerged. they have come home from these conflicts and this generation. lou: including the women on the panel today, have gotten organized and are changing the narrative about, and policies about, that affect military women and women veterans. they're raising critical issues that the military needs to address including sexual harrassment and rape and are expressing themselves in their writing. lou: their memoirs, poetry, their artwork and are visible on radio, television and in film. so with that i'd like to get started and have us, have the opportunity to hear some of