>> now a discussion on u.s. saudi relations and how the relationship has effected by the series of awards and iran's nuclear program. will you from academics who study the middle east and a former deputy national security adviser to george w. bush. from the hudson institute, this is an hour and a half. >> we are going to go for about a hour and a half year. we are going to speak for about 45 minutes to an hour and then we'll open it at the end for questions and answers. thank you again for coming to

have been and thank you to her c-span nokia and thank you for this wonderful panel with seleka and brent katulis. elliott abrams was adviser for democracy strategy during the george w. bush administration. he's currently a senior fellow for middle eastern studies at the one foreign relations and the author most recently attested by psion: the bush administration and israeli post any conflict. brian katulis is that the process where he focuses on the middle east and north africa. his co-author the prosperity agenda, with the world wants from america and what we need in return. there's also a couple articles by brian katulis on the side still available about brian's recent work on saudi arabia, which will fill us in a little bit. in the meantime, i wanted mr. abrams to make a few comments and then brian and then we will have a discussion.

thanks. >> thank you. thank you all for being here today. i wanted to start by saying that some of the discussion at u.s. saudi relations is over done, the sense of a hopeless crisis in incurable differences. this is an old relationship, roughly 75 years old. ramco was founded in 1944. there's been a lot of ups and downs. whatever the challenges today, think of 19th avenue three. the arab oil embargo, which is an act of an act of war by the saudis in the united states or think of 2001. the relationship has been through crises. and survived them.

and another positive point, the relationship is more supple, occurred today than in many years in the past. there have been times when the relationship was king pressman. that's about it. you now have an institutionalized relationship. there is no relationship. there is a cia saudi relationship. there is a treasury ministry of finance relationship. it doesn't just depend on one or two individuals. obviously, the relationship is based to a very large degree on oil. even there, one should expand a little. there was an alliance during the cold war against the soviet union. there was an alliance after 1979

against iran. there is also an american appreciation over the last decades of what i would call professional, reliable, saudi handling of oil as the worldspan oil supplier and money by the saudi treasury and investment authorities. it has been an alliance of two very, very different societies. that can be hidden. i mean, if you are an american official, you know, dealing with foreign ministers who would come a graduate of his country and princeton come you don't have a sense that you're dealing with someone who cannot navigate your culture. these are two very different societies when it comes to matters like religious freedom, political freedom, treatment of

women. it isn't a problem for many decades. we have a lot of allies that were in some cases pretty unattractive dictatorships are not just as dawn of world war ii. the internal situation in a friendly country didn't matter to us. it matters more and more now as human rights values hate to say this sort, globalized, as erika pays generally more attention to those questions. we no longer say that's a different culture. that's more important because what has been missing for over three decades has been the saudi end of that. we heard from the royal families. we didn't hear from the people of saudi arabia. there was no visible society

saudi arabia. there is now. partly because technology. now the saudi people appear, just a little bit of factors. that's got to increase, it seems to me. that will increase over years when saudi oil is less important to because of all these trends towards north american energy independence. one would assume the saudi influence in washington will decline rather than growing. there's obviously a crisis of confidence here today over syria, over egypt and particularly over uranium. the saudis have relied on acid 1979 to be in a confrontation with iran. we have been. they are very worried the united states may decide not to be in a confrontation with iran. of course, our views are fundamentally different from theirs. their problem is this is a

powerful persian shia country. our problem is the islamic republic. if it weren't the islamic republic, if it were a democratic iran, our problems would largely disappear, but it's not at all clear. we can come back to that. i would just add one other thing. the crisis that were having in relations now the difficulties and relations, the lack of good communication, which can partly be blamed on the administration. but of course, several of the top people in saudi arabia are very old and sick and having a relationship 10 years ago, 15 years ago would be far more difficult than today. saudi arabia may enter a crisis. the king is over 90 and not in good health.

you look at the statistics. we make it a succession crisis during the obama administration. never, i think it is fair to say, since the establishment of this government, have we not known who's next. it's clear the crown prince can take over. you have that succession problem anytime in the saudi's are reaching the end of the brothers in how to confront the question of going to the next generation. i have been said a moment when tension with the united states is as high as it has been, certainly since 2001. our influence at the top in saudi arabia is that mall as it has been in a long time. that's an unfortunate combination of events. i should stop there and turn the mic back.

>> great comic thank you. first idea that, happy holidays to especially those of you who may be watching on c-span that rebroadcast as they often do over the weekend. if you're watching this coming should be watching and it's a wonderful life. that's what i'll be doing. we hope you have a good discussion here. second, thank you. thanks to the hudson institute for all the work you do. i'm obviously from a centerleft ink tank, but i don't agree with the weekly standard. eliot and i have been on panels. i'm enriched by it. i hope the dialect you today. yesterday was the latest edition of current trends and islamist ideology, which is a great publication. again, it even if i don't agree with that, it helps enlighten my thinking and is very good. but i want to do at the outset is maybe make three overall point just to get the discussion

going. one, a snapshot on u.s. saudi relations commit based on the statements are saudi leaders. second, a brief assessment of how they're doing and a comment tenuous strategy structured that way. first, just or not to show you how bad things have become in the u.s. saudi relations, three quotes. one, a letter from bob dole a to the president of the united states at a time when nations apart we are apart we are at a crossroads. it is time for the united states and saudi arabia to look at a pretentious. sakic, saudi officials here saint abdulla does not like words like the president. if the u.s. doesn't do more to reduce the violence, and kerry was stuck in the west bank and gaza, there'll be grave consequences for u.s. interests. third, from a diplomatic cable,

a u.s. diplomat writing about a dollar, a visit he had with the u.s. diplomat. u.s. policy has now given iraq to iran as a gift on a gold platter. this diplomat wrote king abdullah was upset in some but that specific can appear to be questioned bona fides of policy. i highlight these statements because they come from 2001, 2002 and 2005. there has been a lot of chatter about the most recent statements. quite visible protestations about u.s. policy. but to demonstrate that there has been a certain consistency of criticism and elliot ensure experienced this in the bush administration, coming from saudi arabia. for those of you who speak arabic, when i've read the recent comments and also these

past comments, the phrase hakki both see came to mind in terms of open talk that doesn't necessarily reflect the core interest, which there is still strong interest and i fundamentally agree with eliot that there is a values disconnect between our two nations and i hope we talk about that. ultimately, we have heard through the years a talk and overanalysis as u.s. policy has shifted from the weather was last decade are currently trying to adjust to the complicated currents in the middle east. saudis have talked a lot. when you look at what they do, it actually sounds quite different. the second point is about the saudi strategy. i asked lee if he would hand out a paper he did two years ago. some of it is relevant. but then an article about u.s. saudi relations. the paper was an interesting

exercise to look at saudi arabia and self defined national security interests. quite often with analysts look at things from our lands and quite naturally it was interesting for me to interview people not only in the governments, but outside the government in the sector are elliot is talked about. my main conclusion, you can disagree with this, but my main conclusion the saudi arabia patch is far its weight given considerable resources, something that successive u.s. administrations have had some entity with. given its unique status in the islamic world, if you initially tried to assess what it stated project is over the last 10 years, it is not in a good job in advancing its own stated self-interest. we talk about the islamist ideology and support for radicals. it's a complicated picture, an important one and dangerous one.

quite simply, the saudi says that they don't want to rein in influence to spread through the region. what they've seen in iraq, lebanon and the palestinian territories is the reigning influence. we can talk about why that's the case. saudis have said that they too advanced for a decade the arab peace initiative. but if you go ask what is your strategy, what is your type take to get that done again grumbles and complains, but not a clear strategy. finally, despite considerable oil wealth, if you look at the situation not in terms of governance and human rights and i say progressive and troubled by that. when you look at how wealthy the country should be and economic inequalities and the substantial internal challenges that are to have and will have when it comes to energy subsidies, dealing with the young population, a lost everyday you see the arabic news today. protest a certain part of saudi

arabia right now have been able to keep a lid on this with repression come in threes and. if you look at long-term trends, it is hard to see other things together and is compatible and complementary to elliot's point. finally, sorry for going on here. the last point on u.s. policy. again, i would highlight and i think elliot may disagree with me, many in the room may disagree. i would highlight over the last 10 years i've seen a remarkable hot annuity of the broad strokes of u.s. policy and not only u.s. saudi policy, but in the region. what has changed quite a lot is the overall strategic context. elliott is talked about from 1833 until 2003, it was quite easy to define and discern the relationship and no quibble with the title because it is

technically not an alliance. we have alliances with european partners. israel is a major non-nato ally. saudi arabia has been a marriage of interest at certain points. oil was at the core. oil and security was at the core of the bargain. for decades, for decades saudi arabia could turn to facing challenges of arab nationalism and post-1979 to contain the reigning influence. whatever you think about the dual containment strategy in the 1990s between a rant and iraq, when the rat were happen in 2003, i know there's a lot of criticisms, but my deepest was concern is it has created for the last 10 years a situation of strategic drift and one where there has been a lot of talk overreactive crisis management.

i'm not discussing this this to the level of presidential speeches, whether the president assured president obama, but actual u.s. policy has been quite a muddle and quite tactical in terms of what it wants to achieve. back to the u.s. saudi relationship, in this. if competition for influence in the region, saudi arabia is one of many actors try to throw its weight around. there is still some mainstays. the counterterrorism is strong on some levels, but worrisome when you talk about syria and other things. we could talk for the whole session about this. the military relationship is quite strong. earlier this month, another side from the united states are different is relocating to. iran quite clearly, why they've been stating concerns.

again, you ask them if they've accepted the agreement and whether they've accepted secretary haeckel's visit to the region's truck would have been better. you see a pragmatism that is there. syria, big today. i hope we talk about that. egypt again, serious differences, that can be navigated. despite the tensions, there's common interests. of urgency values. if i had one device for the current administration, what i hear quite a lot in the region of france and saudi arabia is there's nobody they perceive inside the obama white house or the administration has cir. 2%, somebody they can talk to. again, not because we love them and share values, but effectively advancing our policy interests would be one recommendation that they want somebody they can talk to and listen to.

in some ways, public statement and the effectiveness of their strategies, but also the sense of maybe the u.s. doesn't like us anymore. i submit to you that is not a bad thing for u.s. policy. maybe a potential for leverage if exercised in some sort of play. going back to i don't think we know what we want to barge in the region. this is a problem of the predecessor because of confused mixed messages. i don't see a major break coming. it definitely needs to be managed. >> thanks, elliot. there's a lot to go on but those two statements. one of the things with the different problems with coming up in the saudi society and elliot spoke about this, too.

but three of us agree it would be a good thing, a positive thing if the united states and american policymakers had an active role in helping to steer saudi society in a positive direction rather than dangerous direction. >> there are very many of them. you know, the british ambassador would call up on monday and say, do you think there's any possibility i can see the president in a week or two. i need to come over for a clock. he used to annoy me a lot. why should they have this kind of access? president bush said he's not influencing me. i'm influence in him. this is how this is how i get a reply from the king.

it worked. discounting because you know some piece of the message was not the king. i fully agree that tom donaldson was for a while further saturdays. the system has not yet been fixed so that there is somebody who today and we view as the key intermediary. that is unfortunate because we do want to influence them. even punching under their way, they have a lot of influence in syria. they have an active syrian policy. they have a very active bahrain policy and we want to maximize their own influence and were probably not doing it right now. >> to respond to the u.s. have been an role in steering the saudi direction, i completely agree with the instinct, but the

devil is in the details of how you implement that. but i played it over in my opening statement. clearly in the first year of the arab uprisings, 2011 in 22012, saudi salt lake they were on their heels. they thought the united states and president obama had throughout mubarak under the bus. my view is mubarak had thrown him under the bus because of the lack of incredible economic and democratic reforms. you just can only contain popular empathy so much. i'm the admin, they actually played an interesting and continue to play a constructive role. a curious thing that a monarchy is playing a role in mediating a pathway towards what i think could have potential for continued openness. yemen clearly have terrorism problems and other things. the gcc is playing that role. they've really punished far below their weight in the issue

in trying to contain iran. quite clearly the response they perceive through certain lands their reaction to that. if it's fair to call to the president doctrine. so they contend that they are. the biggest gap in a come back to iraq and perceptions, which remains a huge challenge and is obviously just area. when they saw the u.s. administration in september in particular walkaway from what they thought would be targeted and limited strikes, they were already in a process of trying to place bets on actors and are based on my most recent trip to eastern turkey, they and others are only. it is presenting a very dangerous -- it's a very dangerous groups and perhaps saudi arabia and other gcc states. it's already coming out in the

press. the administration is recognizing perhaps the threat from these words of syria are starting to rival some of the other security threats the united states faces in the middle east. >> i'm sitting here trying to figure out whether they are punching below their way. the comparison that would make that point as to saudi arabia qatar. qatar is an interesting place in the sense it has no citizens, right? is about 275,000 now. while there is his money and there has been extremely effect of the use of that money and diplomacy. if you compare the last 10 years of cautery diplomacy, you would absolutely include the raid.

the percentage of the population that is in a sense involved in the life of the country, for example, has a decent education, women who are at it in some way in the economy. herein is a much more modern country. it isn't surprising in a way the saudis would have a hard time taking on a country with three times the population and is much more modern. the striking to say about ayatollah in iran but that it true. i wonder really if you look at the country, even with its wealth, and the amazing achievement, maybe one could say is the qataris. if you take them out of the equation, at about saudi arabia is punching the lowest rate.

in the base is punching above its readers when it was spending all the money to spread extremist ideology so you had wahhabi imams and mosques and wahhabi schools growing up in indonesia. so that was not a good name. >> i'm not casting a judgment value. the point of the article was if you have those resources and words saudi arabia and share those goals, you certainly could do better. again, i'm not saying that what he and the u.s. interest certainly. i'm trying to clinically analyze it. an important point is that i think especially since 2011, but i think it preceded this, the region had looked into the multidimensional polar competition for power.

he talked about saudi arabia versus qatar. that's one feature of it. you look at turkey's role and how it in many ways did not punch quite the lowest rate. we are in a period of transformation. when i say multidimensional, it's not backing whose military forces. it's the use of media, using the money after marcy's ouster in a coup quite visibly made it at. if there's an overall trend, it's a little simplistic. it's true those countries that are a little bit less economic strong, lack of love, but divided politically or quite often the many cold was that the region are played out in places like yemen. it continues to go on. serious is the most dangerous place. >> let's talk about syria for a second. i guess in some ways, looking at

it from the saudi perspective, what is the issue? just that the united states appears to want to rebalance the region as the former national security advisor thomas donnellan said, basically rebalance and the saudi and iranian top of each other. order the saudis have advocates saying our problem is not rebalance. our problem is that the islamic republic of iran. that's the issue. in some ways, if elected area come in syria might the more accurate picture of what's happening around the region, what the ukrainians are fighting for and how they are fighting. if i could just get your thoughts on syria. >> from the saudi point of view, is clicking an ella uses the phrase the shia crescent. you americans handed them iraq and they still have that view.

you're not doing anything about hezbollah and lebanon. now you've got hezbollah troops and iranian i rgc groups and expeditionary force in syria fighting. this is a matter of the shia becoming the dominant force in the region. what are you americans doing? you don't even recognize it. i think that's the fundamental saudi view. they are fighting to win. you guys don't even seem to recognize this is a fight with the shia. that is not the american view. >> it's not that she has. their revolutionary regime for their really upfront. >> now, i think these are not the speech is obviously that officials make, i think in addition to the problem for the saudi's have you ran under any management, you know, there is a

deep religious conflict here. .. of the ability to stay in power. a horrible year, a horrific year for the syrian people, and even

for many people who are part of, sort, the sympathetic to the assad regime because the conflict continues. but in term of the state of players specialtly since the spring, the wind is a little more at the assad regime's sails. what i have seen on the ground and have heard from the analysts that i'm -- ic are credible and go in and out of northern syria and other places is the absence of any strategy to advance their goal. and maybe it is . >> the saudi strategy. >> it's similar to the u.s., but i think you get it in terms of not only the obama administration's posture, but much of sort of republican and democracies in congress this red sense -- red sense to go in to. you can evaluate it and say we don't have a strategy that will meet our goals. but the saudis are doing things. they are doing things in ways, actually, i think, maybe not topple assad regime but almost certainly creating a security problem that could not rivel, if

not already, the challenges we have seen in yemen or northwest pakistan and other places. that's what i think is the thing that everybody is starting to become aware of whey fear in 2014, the situation could slip pretty rapidly. >> well look, in some of the recent visits i've had. brookings had a good monograph out yesterday talking about gcc private support to some of the militant groups. the recent sort of trends with leaving and things like this. this is not an encouraging sign. and again, you can criticize u.s. policy. i'm happy to do that, because i think there's a gap between the stated goals and what the actual policy is doing on the ground. i think that gap is even greater. given saudi sort of stated self-interest and as elliot described they are not being terribly, effective, i think with undermining are the e sheem. >> i agree with that.

but -- pardon me. i think if i were a saudi spokesman, what i would say to you is; right. but that's false of the -- >> right. >> you know, if you guys have to set the policy from the beginning. what can we do? the iranians are in there to win, we're trying to fight. we're doing what we can with some help from other in the region. very hard to do with you americans on the sideline. but we've kept assad from winning. he have kept the rebellion alive. now it's true that the -- let's call them the nonjihadi element of the opposition are declining versus the jihadi elements. that's your fault. you americans. you come in the beginning. we wouldn't have had a power vacuum that lead if to be a mag -- magnet for jihadi all over the world. we're not prepared to assad

win. we're not prepared to see that. you handed them iraq. iraq, after all, at least senses a majority shia country. this is a country that 74% sunni. we're not prepared to see the shia take it over. you're not helping. i think it's a powerful argument. >> i'm asking you -- [inaudible] at what point do -- at what point do the saudis have a real point when they differ with american policy? and at what point does it just -- when bryan challenged the title of the panel. i think it makes sense. it's not alliance in that way. it's relationship; right. and it seems to be in lots of way a problematic proprietorship. insofar as as elliot was describing. a lot has to do with oil for security and historically it's been a lot of times the saudis saudis are scream agent the americans from the side, do this, do that.

as elliot was saying before about bush it's best to lead them, guide them, influence them. but at what point when the saudis are saying -- as elliot was describing. at what point are they right. when they're talking about syria and iran. we need you at superpower leading you're wrong on syria and wrong on iran. how do we distinguish the noise from they're correct. >> look, you could argue argue, and they already argue they're already right in the regard. i would respond, again, in back to u.s. strategic interests and how, again, having a clear plan how does it end and where does it go? if you you wanted to go to ab all-in strategy. again, in the -- it won't happen. you can almost say for certain. just based on my own assessment. from the u.s. side. >> yeah. >> you look at the fallout from what would have been a failed vote in congress, i think, on very limited strikes.

so selling this case to the american public will require a fundamental change in something that happens on the ground of -- it's not on the order of 9/11, but something sort of the -- >> the administration will also have to. the president has been undermining the policy of doing anything more active in syria for two and a half years. so -- >> right. >> they have to change as well. >> yeah, yeah. what i'm suggesting here i don't think they have the wake-up call unless there is seen something perceived to directly affect u.s. interests. so something like the teetering and collapse of jordan, which is one of our closest and most steadfast partner and if not allies. something on the order will require -- again, it's the administration primarily, but i would say also the united states to wake up to say, look, the middle east after ten or 12 years -- i testified in congress at the end of september, early october, on an issue related to the middle east. i got from both sides. saying why should we care? and for those of us who care

about the region, i think what we need to do is outline what is a practical case. when it comes to syria. i think a practical case for engagement, if i were advising the administration in a clear way on syria, it would be, you know, and i think they're doing it to some extend assess what the actors are doing right now. saudi arabia, qatar, kuwait. i would focus a little bit more on the ground game and who is doing what on the ground. a lot of emphasis is on geneva 2. it's going convene. god bless them. i wish them the best. to me, diplomacy, doesn't have much of a chance of an impact unless it's linked to power dynamic on the ground. the lack for secretary kerry to talk with lavrov a lot. what is missing regional contact group difficult, though it may be. elliot may be skeptical. the bush administration, when iraq was at the darkest most --

moment took part in regional diplomacy conferences. i think turkey took the lead. maybe it didn't do much practically. a perhaps it was one of the pieces in in addition to the military sthawrnlg lead to a more pragmatic dialogue. how do you get an end to some of the worst behaviors leading to the fragmentation of syria. there's no regional strategy, as far as i can tell, to shape the actors who are engaged in syria now. >> we have great ideas. [inaudible] bottom up, top down. if you can negotiate a deal that doesn't reflect reality on the ground, if you want to do the deal you have to have an negotiation. you also have to change the reality on the ground. >> question. -- yes. >> we're not doing that. >> i'm thinking more and measure dr [inaudible] -- [inaudible] [laughter] [inaudible] >> agreeing on a number of different things here. >> i hope you're not getting uncomfortable. >> no. i think the point i might

disagree if we carried it through in term of specificity policy. i think it's easy enough to say here is what we do to map out a case to change balance of the power on the ground. secretary kerry may tell you when they made an modest decision in the spring this year to arm some part of the rebel i think there was a delay in doing that. and part of that was a low appetite amongst those in congress. i mean, i'm not blaming them. there's no appetite overall if post 9/11, and i think heading to the iraq war, there was and, you know, a great appetite in power actually shape what the u.s. could do in this part of the world. unfortunately, i fear it was squandered. i think it's continued -- my personal view, to be squandered in part, because we believe sort of this, we made some mistakes essential. i criticize the privacy administration. then we believe we can't do

anything. i think collectively. it's not just in the mind of president obama or others. but across the political spectrum there's very little we can do. that's what worries me the most. somebody i hope to don't work on this for the next 20 to 30 years. the sense of we don't have power to do anything, which we talk about quite a lot a lot on egypt, i think, the u.s. policy on egypt convinces us. it's clearly demonstrates that they think they don't have much influence, and i think it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy at the point. >> i would add one point about -- i don't know if this is a -- [inaudible] under their weight or just a fact of life, and they don't have a weight. but they're very much opposed to u.s. policy. very critical of u.s. policy. but they're completely unable to do anything about it. it's striking. i mean, they don't have the influence within the administration, and they certainly don't have the influence in the u.s. with the public. they can't move public

opinions. now maybe that's asking too much of the foreign government. although at times the british have been able do it. at times the israelis maybe have been able to go it. the saudis, though they spend a ton of money on pr firms in washington, can't do. it so they're left, kind of, -- [inaudible] in effectively but haven't moved the neelgtdz -- needle. >> one of the interesting things when i come to this. people saying the americans out of picture or seem that way to the saudis the saudis will look for other options. we keep hearing about, again, i'm not sure what it looks like. one of the things we have heard about is excellent coordination secret, but client coordination between the israeli and saudis. one of the things that struck me over the last couple of weeks, the criticism of the interim deal with iran, as many people are -- many of the people including myself used to writing critical

-- of this administration will not just write and it's not good for our allies in israel, but also not good for the allies in saudi arabia. so to yolk them together, it's kind of different. so in some ways, i think the saudis might benefiting from the fact they and the israelis in line, at least on iran policy. >> but i would suggest, you know, some suggested this could then more expansively lead to something else. i think there inherit limits to whatever tact cat operations there could be on iran. i think the biggest finish for the saudis, again, already the arab/israeli conflict. the israeli/palestinian conflict. if you look at the statements in 2003 and 2002 and the administration on the receiving end of that, it still is an important core issue. now again, the other place i might push back a little bit, i think that when people talk about the u.s. not being present in the region and were less of a

-- i think that's highly inaccurate, you go, as i did, this fall, and you see what our footprints is like in the gcc states, if you read secretary hagel's speech in bay rain -- bahrain, we can have problems what we said and how he said it. it's clear there's no other military force that will rifm, if you look at the plans of the pentagon, even at the time of budget cuts, there -- i see no sign of retreat of u.s. in the region. separately, and maybe this is a way to segue to iran, also on the interim deal there's a lot of talk about a major shift here as well, potentially the u.s. and tom don lane hinted that the. i would say that this is probably more modest than has been portrayed when you look at, not only the fact that the security threats that iran presents to u.s. -- the support for terrorist groups and other things. the fact we have been there for decades in region,er don't actually see us retreating in

any way, if we were going do that, we might have done that in bahrain or other places, if we really want the to make that a clear issue. but even if, i was talking to people in the administration, dealing with the sanctions on iran, they made an interesting point said even if on the slim chance that we can get to a final agreement, and i don't think there's any nigh yaift about that. the set of sections that remain in place because of iran's missiles program, its support for terror organizations. this is a country we with have significant problem with. i think just from a cool calculus -- i don't think that yet represents anything but sort of an attempt at diplomacy. that may not succeed. >> what is the purpose of the interim agreement. we spoke about it before. >> i think if you go baseball to

-- if you go back to 2009. the president comes to office wishing to engage. the theory that, you know, part -- a large part of the problem with countries like syria and iran was the bush administration. the bush policy. and now we will engage. and that -- he could not do because the events in iran in june of 2009. the uprising in the way it was crushed. you couldn't then engage with the government of iran. remember, the engagement is not with iran. it's not the people of iran. the engagement is with the regime in iran as it was with the assad regime. okay. so in 2009 you can't do that. flash forward. now it looks as if there's a possibility. after all, there is for the first time official engadgetment. there are foreign ministers, secretary of state negotiations response i, you know, as i look tat,ic people in the region who are scared of this, and say, oh, we have lived in a world where

there's an iranian/american confrontation. if the americans no longer want it and believe they can end it almost single handedly. believe iran changed enough so there needn't be it. they are going to get scared. they are scared. from their point of view, you know, the israellys are -- israelis are one thing. which is nuke. it for the saudis and iranis, bahrain and others that's just one issue. it may not even be the top issue. there's terrorism, there's subversion, there's the eastern province of saudi arabia. there's the shy ya majority in bahrain. the old desire -- ifn in the context of having an agreement with israel not an agreement but common interest in the nuclear iranian program. they see that --

the united states, europeans, israel have a very different or perhaps have a very different fundamental position with respect. >> and i was going to say thing is why syria is an important test case. when people talk about the iranian it's not an expansive power. they never really fight themselves. i think if you were talking to the saudis, i think you were talking to the ement ratties -- emiratis. we have problem with them at home. look at what they have done in syria, if you need more more evidence. it's a expedition their force. no matter what happens, if seems that the iranians stoned profit, stoned profit in the meantime. they make sense. >> i think they would ecokoa those concerns about iraq. again, i think it's important one to make is that a lot of -- they didn't cause sort of the chaos in the region but our actions have an impact. i think the shift from a strategic paradigm of dual

containment of iran and iraq which was probably not a good long-term sustainable strategy of itself. but it had consequences. i'm suggesting the whole region is in a period of competition for influence. it's changing. i think often thrown in the label of shy ya versus sunny. i think it's accurate to some extend. i think the frackerring inside the middle east. the sunny access, so to speak, is itself fracture. go to places our most reliable partners and allies like israel and jordan. we used to fear arab -- and coherence now what we fear is weakness. and really, and i think, again, this paints a muddled picture.

i think that's what it is. it is a muddled picture in the middle east. for me, as somebody who is often crit can -- critical of the bush administration or obama administration -- from the outside it's easier for me to sort of sit there and write papers when you deal with the -- >> the interest and values. >> easier said than done. >> it's good. let me ask you both then. i want to open it up for questions. let me ask you both, bryan, since you mentioned this a few times, what would -- if you think that the strategic vision has fallen apart or muddled, what do you think is a clear and far-sided strategic vision in the middle east. what role does saudi arabia play for the foreseeable future. the -- i'll leave at that. what role did the pseudoi-- saudis play? >> i would say if we're talking long-term.

i would start -- it depends on what saudi arabia we're talking about. and thishes glided over are were not talked about much. the shapes of the future. to me the most reliable partner in the middle are countries like israel and i think jordan has the own challenges with political inclusion and economic development. you want society to have a fabric of more -- inclunessivity and openness. people like to align the freedom agenda. before it was a glean in -- i was in the middle east working on democratic promotion. i believe that. so i think one thing is how do you elevate that pragmatically in our interest. recognizing that we're not the ones that are going to steer the change, but it's going to be part of the dialogue. i know, with u.s./saudi arabia there was a strategic dialogue in the bush muring's. -- administration. if i recall there was a human rights group. i don't know if it if anything. >> and made us feel better. >> yeah. so more crisply.

what strikes me, i think it's a problem that cuts across many administrations, is quite aifn we stove pipe sort of our interests and values. when you go and the discussion you have in -- or in our military or intelligence agencies, is quite different than what some people in the state department and maybe i'm unrealistic. i think there could be a more practical blending of the issues. the one point i would say is in this sort of mix in the middle east to be me the fundment tal that seems to be undergirding all of this. the societies are at the start in the transformation. and being more adept at guiding that. you look at how flaccid and weak the state department structure are. when you look at the g8 and the partnership and the a -- when you measure it against what the other states have done in places like egypt, so i think the main point would be what can we do in terms of lessons learned. there's a lot of criticism in the bush administration's freedom agenda. what are the real lessons learn.

how do we elevate democracy promotion and reform. but while also being pragmatic. while also attending to our data-to-day interests. i think that's easier said than done. i don't know if elliot has a reaction. >> you know, you could rephrase your question. >> okay. what would herman say? [laughter] >> yeah. you're at hudson. i think it depends partly ten years and 50 years. if we're talking let's say 10, 20, 25 years. the feared in which american dependents on middle eastern oil will decline, decline, decline. i agree, first of all, that one of the key variables here is, you know, tell me what is going on in those societies. we didn't predict the turmoil in so many arab countries that we've seen since 2011. what will saudi arabia be like five, ten years from now? will it be a generally calm

society? will it be a revolutionary society? will it -- i think, you know, the some of the issues saudis face are the interissues -- internal issues, that bryan said we haven't talked much about. the -- i used to work for center month han. he once said that the most disruptive thing in any society, any society, including the united states, is unemployed young men. unemployed young men are dangerous. saudis have a very, very large number of unemployed young men. and not -- you can say that have a large number of unemployable young men. whose education is such the idea they find a job next year is hard believe. so that is a very big variable. how will -- look, you know, we're in the final years statistically speaking, of the rule of --

who is the next king? what kind of king will he be. what kind of reform will there, in saudi arabia to address issues like the mismash between the educational system and the needs of the coming decade. a big variable. the other is the islamic republic. someday, i believe, the -- slammic republic will fall. they will get what they. the. may take five years or 35 years. who knows. until the day comes, it seems to me, the strategy of the united states has got to be the main bull horn against the extremism, the subversion, the terrorism, the aggression of the islamic republic. i think this administration has,

at best, an unclear policy in the respect. which has made all of our friends nervous. >> is where i disagree a little bit. i think there's more continuity in the policy. if you look at policy since 1979 and contain the islamic revolution, one fundamental has been containing the iranian influence. under the bush administration, i think, in the last two years in particular there was different strategy that began of both contained and continued to contain and amp up sort of the containment through global economic sanctions. while also engaging through the p5+1. when i talked about continue newty, i think that's there. it's the paradigm in term of testing what the possibilities. i think the overall architecture, our security posture, our intelligence agency through iran. that has not fundamentally changed. and i think we are, you know, that's where we'll probably disagree a little bit. because i think people overread sort of the diplomatic engage

and the attempt at diplomacy. to me the fundamental ark checkture is consistent. where it goes is a big question. the second point i would raise up the issue of containment, the bar ghan we met. it's not alliance. the partnership that we built. the par began, if you will with some of the actors. i think the issue of long-term. how the societies treat their own people. the sense of decency and standards is terribly important now for the region itself because these regime understand that themselves. they can't turn back the time. so, again, all the criticism of the attempt at reform in the region and what i think, you know, my main criticism is too much became militarized or securetized from the u.s. standpoint. our engagement in the region

post iraq. unfortunately and the analysis has been that. it's an underanalysis what can be done with the economic policy and the diplomacy to actual foster better change. and maybe we want to give up and go home. i think that the, you know, the real downside to this whole paradigm of ish we built the alliances with regimes themselves that are built on sand. i think live in bubbles themselves that i don't see sustaining themselves over the long-term. >> let me agree on one point about continue newty. you have an extraordinary event of iran plotting to blow up saudi ambassador. and the american reaction to that was nothing. and the american reaction is almost always nothing. we have teen it in afghanistan,

iraq, bay root. we never actually apply. from my point of view, unfortunately, proves your point. some people say you crazy. it's an act of war. the people who said the latter were unfortunately right. the americans won't do anything. the gentleman in the front. we have a microphone. i'm going ask do you wait. introduce yourself and please try to keep it brief so we can get to an answer to your

question. pardon me? a minute. okay. >> one very -- [inaudible] i don't know if you talked about it the economic impact of the relationship with saudi arabia in terms of jobs, -- [inaudible] you look at the relationship and quantify it we benefit from job creation by selling -- [inaudible] they need us there. finally, bryan mentioned the fact that there's no close coordination when you talk to the -- [inaudible] they talk about bush xiv and

tell you they had a great relationship. they don't always agree but they consulted. we were aware of what was going on. for now, for example, they'll tell you about the goishes -- negotiations with iron and turkey and bahrain and also in france said we should be included in the negotiations among the iranian nuclear weapon. we are impacted by it. >> can you phrase it as a question now? what is the . >> okay. >> look, i mean, just to respond and quite obviously. those linkages we did not explore. the economic linkage. i would say -- we often think about the middle east just sort of saudi arabia and the relationships north to the west but struck me and strikes me on the visit to the region is the growing linkages not only china with energy, but the whole gulf but saudi arabia. the fact that remit --

remittance and indian -- those linkages are quite important as well. we often have that stove pipe discussion about sort of our policies but they they view it as very important. you know, a don't, you know, i agree with the rest of your comments. i sympathize a lot with them. i don't know if you have any other reactions to it. >> hello. in the back. i guess there's a microphone coming back there. does the mic work okay? it seems like we a little trouble. gent -- gentleman in the audience was signaling. >> it is working. [inaudible] hudson institute i want to thank everyone for the discussion and also for the accommodation of the current trends. i guess my question really is for bryan. i guess it starts from the -- your satisfaction -- it seems to me, with our syria policy at the moment. and -- but the president has now said

that syria is someone else's civil war. so i wonder what you think is the argument for why it is something else that would be persuasive within the administration or for that matter, to the american public. it would seem to me, anyway, that the argument would be it's not really a civil war, it's -- not syria's civil war but a regional civil war. the sunni shia war. as elliot suggested, iran, that side is winning. so that would be -- it seems to me, the issue that would to be raised, but i wonder how you make that argument. i wonder also edge -- embracing iran at the same time. >> yeah, i mean, i agree with you. i think i would add to the fact that the spillover that you're seeing already in term of

security threats in lebanon, in turkey. it seems fairly contained in jordan but then iraq, the regional implications. they are rolling out as we speak. i think the probably the thing that only move -- here i'm talking about the american public. i think -- i see our political leaders from president obama, but then especially the members of congress, they are reactive in a sense. especially after ten years of what, i think, again, erroneously seen as, you know, bad engagement on the part of the u.s. yes, we made mistakes. had we stuck with it in some ways could have lasting impact i think the only thing that would be a wake-up call, unfortunately would be a major terrorist event. not like what we saw in turkey, but something emanating from northern syria, and i guess what i'm suggesting it's not inconceivable that it happens. in the way that i think the bombing -- the attempted jet liner bombing

in december of 2009 on christmas day was a wake-up call about aqap. it's my hope, my fear, something similar to this. it provoked a response from the administration. people can disagree or agree with it. it was a brutal response. it was effective. it had -- >> it had me a little concerned that c-span viewers might take matters to their own hands. [laughter] >> it's not a recommendations. >> no. >> no it's a worry given the when you look at even just sort of the news account of who is showing up, and the types of weapons they have and the plotses they might have in the backing they might have. right now, seems internally focused. focus order the ashad regime. that, i think, less so than the regional argument. i think a regional argument flies over the heads of many congressman. i mentioned my experience testifying recently. but the american public. especially those who served, maybe, in some of the places in iraq and others. people are i think, just, in a

cool calculus looking at what ask we actually achieve. was the juice worth the squeeze? i think that's unfortunate. i think it's -- i'm not calling for it again, but i fear that's what will produce a wake-up call give we're going a midterm election. give we're so still internally focused and given just the hyperdysfunction we see in our own political system. >> let me just add, i think i agree in congress and [inaudible] public there was a remarkably little support. i think that had the president done and gone on tv and done one of these last night, and said to the american people we do not want to leave to our children a world in which chemical weapons are back. chemical weapons are used, chemical weapons are part of the everyday arsenal. we can't allow that. so i have done the following. it's over. it happened last night. i think actually he scrolled --

gotten a substantial amount of support. >> if you look at where things are going with the deal that was struck. you have the open question of the weapons are not secured. now they're on a -- i'm arguing. i don't think it was a well-thought out strategy. it was a lucky strategy. they had they done that. i wrote a piece, i generally was supportive of the proposal, as limited as it was. the main point of my piece there are inherit risks at that time. the assumption, for instance, it would have deterred value on the assad regime. i think one needed to be questioned by the analysts. it assad used it not only once, as we know from the u.n. report recently, many more than once it could have produced more of an incentive. i would say for all of the zig zag and it was quite a confusing and messy period, the united states, israel, again, israel in november i was there. everybody is happy that the weapons are now on, what seems -- again, seems to be a pathway for

elimination and secure. that is a major, you know, if anything, you know, the conflict is still raging. assad seems stronger, but the securing of the chemical weapons we should not undermine what an important accomplishment it was. >> let me undermine that accomplishment. [laughter] >> one, i don't think that assad is giving up the chemical weapons. i think he's beginning up a portion of the chemical weapons. i don't know whether it's 10%, 50%, 70% -- i don't know. it's not sensibility from the assad point of view to give up 100% nor do you have to do fire department weapons we are making destroying are the weapons that the regime has identified. so first. secondly, what a price we paid. we used to have a policy of getting assad. he seems to be the partner now. you don't hear anybody saying anymore. assad must go.

which hear is most of the administration doing 0 built saying well, you know, assad may not be as bad as the alternative. ryan, for example, distinguished diplomat did wrong on syria. >> okay. >> no, i mean, i would just amend that you said we a policy of getting rid of assad. i would -- we a stated policy. >> i agree. [laughter] >> over here. >> and the third row. >> thank you very much for putting together this. -- [inaudible] i'm too tal. okay. -- [inaudible] the iraqi embassy. it's so good to see a discussion on saudi arabia like this. but i want to -- [inaudible] a couple of things you mentioned. one of them is, of course, the strong saudi argument that 70% of the population -- [inaudible] by 30%.

maybe make believe strong argument that, you know, the they are sending troops to maintain such a minority. the bahrain -- also the iran key -- [inaudible] more than anybody else to bring back 17% of minority rules. by the way, these two accounts are arguments. it can be also be made to the opposite way to the iranians. [inaudible] is the idea that the saudi problem is more of a shia strong statement in iran rather than an american problem, which is the islamic republic.

the perspective from the countries who live in the shadow of the conflict [inaudible] whether it's lebanon, syria, iraq, and the list goes on. any single crisis that -- it's almost one dimension a function of a saudi/iranian conflict. they will always be having the problem with the -- [inaudible] or the saudi side. where would this take the civility of the region? i would like to have you answer -- also, bryan, your work is well-known on iran. [inaudible] [laughter] >> just a quick answer. on the minority i agree with you. i mean, it seems to me the situation in bahrain is quite unstable. just as a situation in syria was unstable. where you have, you know, you can debate the numbers somewhat, but clearly a minority ruling

majority and they won't put up with it anymore. the problem is in different ways the government has not responded by saying let's negotiate a better -- [inaudible] i agree with the second part also that the saudi problem is a shia strong state in iran. that is not the american problem. you know, in the long run, i think -- let me try to cheer you up. once upon a time, the united states had a strong alliance that the kingdom of saudi arabia and a strong alliance with iran under the shaw. and we were ability to mediate if the islamic republic falls, which i hope and pray, then we will have a good relationship with the follow on government. presumably with a dplik regime. maybe we can go back to the days, '60s, '70s where the united states was able as the strongest military power in the region to be buffer between

between saudi arabia and iran and try help maneuver the relationship between them. no, the nixon dock rein who said appointed the shaw as the sheriff in the region, i'm not talking about that. okay. they had a different kind of stardom. i think the united states could be in a position to do that. once we achieve a decent relationship with iran. that cannot happen, i think, as long as the islamic republic survives. >> if i can make a comment and direct it on iraq. i think we haven't talked as much about it. in my own view, if you read my papers through the years, it is quite clear. and of this -- we probably strongly disagree in the audience. i thought the iraq war was a mistake. i wasn't a fan of saddam hussein but also, you know, all the mistakes after. if you recall in 2005, 2006, 2007, i wrote papers that some

would say shaped sort of where we have gone. i was in favor of a strategic redeployment in the arguments. if you look at the papers, carefully, especially flit 2007 one, it talked about the need for the continued robust engagement with iraq, and that -- what, i think, you know, and i thought it was understandable that the iraqi government at the end of the bush administration demanded a hard deadline. because there was a assertion. and i find it interesting that the foreign minister of iraq is going to afghanistan and giving advice to their government there. [laughter] but i understood it any my clinical analysis, again, was that looking at trends inside of iraq, this doesn't seem tenable. but the other agreement, the strategic framework agreement, which, again, seems bureaucratic. but cuts to the issue of the question of the what would u.s. strategy do. these things, the strategic freedom government -- has not had we shouldn't talk

about it in past tense. it's still alive living document, at least on paper. it had the full length of sort of cultural, diplomatic, economic. the absence of follow through. it's in part because of inattention at the top, i think, in administrations but also because of these fundamental bureaucratic problems in some of the agencies and following up also because of problems inside of iraq. i stated in context of iran as a discussion. again, i was against the iraq war. but then i'm a praguetist. i went in and worked on ndi on the ground far bit there. do you what you can. but what you've got. and i think to this day, it's a missed opportunity. i think iraq as a potential. as big a problem we face with terrorism and internal division to serve in the future as a bridge in the region. a constructive bridge, but i think i would criticism the iraqi government for not following up sufficiently on these tools of bilateral engagement but i would also say

the u.s. is a great deal at fault here. it's a missed opportunity take a sad song and make it better for u.s. policy. [laughter] .. >> if i could just say i think the only way it can be used in the long run is if there is fundamental change which i think the conditions are present for

both societies at the society level. if you look at the strategic paradigm of the iranian leaders and the saudi leaders there looks to be or seems to be a fundamental incompatibility. at times they can cooperate and have diplomatic meetings but if you look at the societal level there's nothing actually inherent and this again seems soft or especially 10 years after the freedom agenda incomplete and nobody can do anything about it but the societies they think are going to evolve when you talk to ordinary iranians or ordinary saudi's. there's nothing inherently that should make them at odds and that is why think right now it doesn't seem like, and here a little bit elliott mentioned and we tend to found the aie and clump this ecc states together but there's a serious diversions especially with amman and even the emirates have a quite different view than the saudi's when it comes to iran.

they have their own security problems but they also have business interests that are quite considerable and that were cut off by the sanctions that the bush administration and the obama administration continue to work through the p5+1 so my main point and your general question leads to somewhat of a general answer that in the short-run i don't see the clear opportunities for cooperation but i think in the long run if the societies evolve in a way i think it's difficult to project but a more progressive, open and inclusive view in their own societies there's more opportunity than for them to cooperate. presently? no. >> the gentleman in the second row. >> my name is stuart rosman and i'm just an ordinary citizen who has keenly observed that the media and the analysts have characterized this administration's policy as a mottled, reactive anything but

positive so my question to you is if you could wave a magic wand and establish u.s. policy in the region what would that policy be and how would you execute it? >> in 25 words or less. actually we have been trying to focus on the precise issue especially regarding saudi arabia. i mean maybe it doesn't make sense. >> well, people in the region -- this is a big generalization but i think it's fair. people in the region see the united states is a declining power in the region. some like it, some hate it that i think it characterizes most people in the region region. israeli, arab, iranian. and to me the fundamental changes needed in american policy today is to change that. that is to make it clear that

not only do we retain the basis but that we are going to use our power. i think that's very hard to do by the way without changing policy in syria because that's the place where the struggle is the most direct right now. but that would be the largest change that i would make in the short-run. in the long run there's there is a very deep question here about how the united states relates to changing societies and governments and particularly the arab world. i share brian's view that the saudi and israeli criticism of president obama throwing barack under the bus is completely unjustified but there's a very big question of how do we relate to societies that in spectrum are pretty far over toward the unfree though they may be friendly to the united states. we are going to have to work that out over the next 25 or 50

years but right now, 2014, if you want to try to prove to people in the region that the united states is not a power that is receding, you can't do that without having a different syria policy. >> well be answered because as an outside analyst i see my first job to be a constructive critic of the policy and i think in my discussions here my criticisms get ahead of what i think are actually some decent policies from the obama administration and start from there but then saying this is what i would do differently. i would first say, i would characterize it as pragmatic to be given the realities and the complexities of the situation. to my taste it leads back to the overall position a little bit too much and we should lean and a little bit more. i think the fundamentals of what i think you could say it's a strategy are the two number one priorities from secretary kerry's time in office but the

president is solidly backing him are attempting some sort of deal with obama on the nuclear issue while being clear-eyed about it and second attempting to advance the israeli-palestinian negotiations which is something successive administrations -- whether they will succeed or not i think everyone is clear-eyed about what the odds are given the challenges and the palestinians and the israelis understandable decision about security concerns. those are two pillars and you can criticize whether that's an important strategy. i happen to believe those priorities are important. and add to it a sharp focus on counterterrorism in places like yemen and around the world. again i would highlight this is one place where we need to think more clearly. the syria crisis and libya as well which has fallen off the map is emerging as a potential challenge in north africa. the overarching thing that i think has been missing from u.s.

policy not only in this administration but the bush of administration and i would say the clinton administration and that are just as broader of how do we actually use the tools of our not only diplomacy but economic statecraft because our military is strong. let's be clear in our footprint. we may disagree about whether the u.s. is leading or not. how do we actually help ourselves in terms of building partnerships with these countries that have this jobs crisis. i wrote a book and if you read it talks about in it and it dabbles in the space of soft power but i happen to believe we tend to undervalue those components of u.s. power and we actually don't know how to bring them to bear. again back to my point on iraq and what i was trying to say on the strategic remark agreement the remarkable power no matter what china and india looks like, we are we are still very strong

and people look to us as a place to invest and also to get investment. those tools are just underutilized in the middle east. that i think is a very big space is combined and interlinked with the need for governance reform and democracy in things like this. to the broader point after 30 years of the u.s. investing so much and so much in terms of the security footprint and i was glad we did that it still seemed incomplete. the region still seems fraught with all these problems and in part for the reasons i was saying we build alliances with systems themselves that were not economic or politically sustainable or responsive to the demographic social and political trends. that's the thing but the last thing i would say it seems like an academic case now that after the last decade of u.s. engagement in the middle east the pessimism that exists amongst democrats and republicans and amongst the american public, educating them

if we can't have the money for a marshall plan we can do a marshaling plan and work with other partners. what i fear is nobody cares. those of us who get paid to write on this stuff we are a smaller community. we squander that opportunity at that after 9/11 and i hope we can build it back because i think our leadership could hold up more. >> i'm going to ask a final question and you can both answer. we have four minutes left or a little less. we spoke before about how the saudi's are concerned that no longer would have -- and wishing him and i would ask both of you to imagine what do you tell them? what do you tell them that they need to do and what do you tell them that you believe also that the united states needs to do to cement a relationship?

it might not be an alliance but to make this relationship healthier and to make it more functional as it may or may not be right now. i will ask you to start in elliott. >> i would have three top items on the agenda and number one obviously iran. these requests for a p5+2 includes the gcc i don't think our practical but there must be ways to buy them in to say this is what we are trying to do because again i think you take a cool hard look at where the u.s. p5+1 position is where iran is it seems very difficult to bridge. informing them so what i saw on recent trips to the gulf as hyperbolic concerns and even getting some questions of where's the secret annex about dividing bahrain and syria. it's easy enough i think her

process of not getting the details but saying on the iraq front we are trying this but we are still dealing with the security footprint and that is what secretary hagel did. second assessing who is doing what on the ground. not only planning for geneva ii and again i'm skeptical but you need a sense of the ground game and a connection to the powers on the ground, the balance of power in the ground. third i would not leave egypt off the map. egypt is the largest country in the middle east is the most recent report by michael hanna. elliott and i have worked with egypt and we have slight tactical difference differences but the fight in the struggle for egypt is moving in a direction that is very worrisome. i would keep that on the agenda and having been more constructive the last thing i would say in all fronts and lessons learned from the last 10 years getting the saudi's to recognize that simply continuing the subsidies regime, continuing

to throw little boats in terms of political reform are not likely to sustain your own position. some sort of pragmatic opening up of the elevation of democracy and human rights agenda in a way that's not counterproductive i would have as part of that discussion. probably more privately but maybe in the most egregious cases very public calling them out but calling them out and away it says in your self-interest we believe it's in your self-interest that we want to build a partnershpartnersh ip because we have had a partnership for a while but the main point i would say is that the most solid partnerships we have for not only with those countries that should we share strategic interest but also have a greater overlap of values as well. i do think that's a potential in saudi arabia and i think that's fair but it means a considerable amount of work. >> i don't disagree with any of that.

i would add that i think we should be talking to the southeast more effectively if we could about this question of support. this is very dangerous and it will be very dangerous to them and they should have learned that lesson already. to some extent the government has and i think it's egypt for example and to some extent in africa in the way government money is spent but there's really no at least i don't see any serious effort to control the vast amounts of private money that are going to some of the worst groups in the world. so i would want to have that conversation with them. and then we come back to something that brian said that we are in agreement and that is the nature of saudi society in the challenges they face which we look at from the human rights point of view or you could look at it from the point of view of it may be more palatable to the

family that this will be an increasingly unsustainable situation and they have not effectively dealt with it. for example the educational system. we have one or two experiments like king abdulah and the university of scientology which is great for the people that go there but has a limited impact on the rest. the thing that worries me is we want to have this conversation but we are doing it to go back to something i said at the beginning, we are doing it at a time when potential instability over it the succession of saudi arabia. so i don't know, that probably limits our ability even now to have this influence and something we should have tried to do over the last decades and it may be we are not going to have another good chance to do it until the succession is over and until you have someone as king who might be king for 10 or

20 more years. that's a worrisome diagnosis but i think it may be unfortunately true. >> thank you. i believe that will conclude the panel. i want to thank ryan and elliott and thanks to the hudson institute and thank you very much for coming. happy holidays.