everything; reading, writing, school engagement, just in general, classroom comportment. we have pretty good research that shows even -- i don't blame the teachers for this, but teachers have a bias against unruly students. it's understandable. but these students can be 5 or 6 years old. so i don't know if it's something we want to blame the boys for or punish them for. i think we want to find a way to make the classroom a happy place for them and room for their personalities and their high spiritedness. so i just feel that we haven't done a good enough job with that. ..

does the president have the power to fundamentally transform america? of course not. end while you wants to fundamentally transform america? that means you do not like it very much, it to you? and ms. adelle like private property rights very much. it means you get like our constitutional system very much. when you keep hearing this fundamental transformation it, change is hard, you need to understand, this is a direct attack on our constitutional system. that is a we are talking about. >> next sunday, best-selling author, lawyer, reagan administration official in a radio personality marked with and will take your questions live for three hours starting in noon eastern. book tv with the first sunday of every month on c-span2 next on book tv a barrel of dignitaries

discuss the life and career of former national security adviser. this is about two hours. [applause] >> my fellow panelists are getting ceded to made is my great pleasure and honor to be able sarah leave this discussion one of my college professors used to speak about the great chain of being, medieval idea. i a always like to think about a great chain of being in foreign policy and strategic thinking about foreign policy, and that really begins with the person that we are honoring today amen whose career has always been -- but the other links in the chain

are seated in front of you. and it is fascinating to read american history and the cut of the hideous with strategies to the challenges were passed from person to person, there is american story of foreign-policy decisions. so in that spirit we're going to try to talk in the brief time that we have in the spirit about someday add the is that we would do justice by. i want to start by asking each member of the panel there would briefly share with this audience the first time you remember meeting. >> happy, and glad to be with my colleagues and you and everybody. there is connection. added my first word of graduate work, and then moved to new york , and i transferred to

columbia. and there i took a course on comparative, the. now, that wellesley and also at sites i have been trained on the soviet bloc. and then to be with the who was able to discuss something that no one talked about in 1963, compared of communism, he has said this capability of really analyzing the world as a devolved better than anyone i know. >> secretary. >> the first time i met was when i interviewed for a job. [laughter] >> the spring of 1977, and since i don't go way back now was just tell you one of my most memorable early experience that i was recounting to him earlier. in the carter white house the president has an energy-saving measure and and all of the thermostats -- and so it was very warm in the summertime.

but his office was always cool. i realize this a couple of weeks after a starter wort firm compared to -- it was the coolest place in the entire white house. i finally realized 40 done. we're right to talk to a strategic brilliance. this was tactical brilliance. he had moved a lantern under the thermostat. [laughter] the temperature police never come on. >> i've been hirable i've been hired as a navy ensign. bella called vacation than i had was an active security clearance. on the basis of that they brought me over and i was assigned a wonderful project and arms control project which had s

and named an anachronism, an acronym, lost to history, the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. and, boy, i knew everything. and i was asked at what point to prepare a memorandum to the national security adviser describing the marbled. it when on separate pages. i think it is true that the new national security advisor shared that he did not at all. but he did was say, you are going to work with sam huntington and develop a top-down strategy for national-security for this country. and having been communal coming into the details it was like the world that opened up a moreno is going to be a "relic of the world. i think it was officially traumatizing to me that within three months i decided that a really got to go practice law

says. went back down in some other issues. but it was a great the opportunity. it has been wonderful but to follow the career ever since. >> i first met in 1953. i know precisely when it was because i was a new instructor at west point, and he was an instructor at harvard. let's put was having a student conference. and we were assisting philip moseley, the famous soviet public in this one panel. philip had the lead before the conference was over. so we quoted the last day, and as i recall we disagree on everything. but then i have to send "zbig"

replaced me. he was a busy guy. so with that. >> wanted turn to asking each of the panelists to think with all of us about some of the big ideas that -- wrote about, thought about, and i want to start with secretary madeleine albright, and ask you to reflect on something that is in the last several of the books by "zbig," the idea that a fundamental thing is happening and the world that his son immediately deductible is something he calls the global political awakening. it is something you see in the arab world most vividly, but do this every world, china, russia, something that certainly you were seeing with your secretary. fascinating and buts about how this is playing of, what it means for america, how we should

respond. >> a cue, and let me say, as i said earlier, i think the brilliance of "zbig" is that he had the capability of analyzing the world as it is at the time and be able to think for and have larger thought. and i do think those of those that are raised in a different situation where you had two blocks looking at each other in the u.s.-soviet relationship an understanding of the changes that have come about not only with the fall of the wall but just generally a capability of analyzing. i have to say i've had the privilege of sitting in taking notes most of my life. it is easy to follow his thoughts. i think that what has happened is obviously a complete disintegration of radio systems

that we operated with. there are many, many more force of there, the one that i think is captured people's imagination is what has been happening in the arab world. i was involved in red dress and discussion, and it was the winter. and so i said, we cannot call it the arabs bring any more. recalling the arab awakening. he was furious. so would you call it? arab trouble, what about arab opportunity? so just enough, you see the different approaches to what is actually happened. after the fall low wall thinking that it was a similar story in the arab laureled. it is completely different, i believe, and basically there is heck political awakening. bernanke's there was a desire to

be european that is now was going on. and so recede in the air world many marquez use of a plane rolls. we talked about the regional imbalance. i think that there are more and just one regional influential there. and they want to be listened to. what has happened also is awakening. and unless they that they to thing that is entirely different is the role of race and technology. what it has done is awaken -- and so everybody -- people are talking to their governments on 21st century technology. the government's a listening in 20th-century technology.

responding to an 19th century ideas. different to quarrel in the voice is our desire gated, and so is saudi get from terriers to government. then there's the of a sudden have permission to an elegy ridges that one could say we didn't know was going on there or two. now we know everything changes the approach. awakening a set of ideas. we don't know of the infrastructure works, where the organizations that will grow with the functional. one last thing is we are all used to re nation's state system. they continue to be nation states, but the non state actors are playing a large role in this elegant, and league don't know

at what stage we bring along the decisionmaking process. they're not just terrorists but use corporations, ngos that are of the control of the government and therefore the tools that governments need to use to influence the general work. people and territory and people they're trying to project. >> secretary gates, something that hasn't of every moment of his career and, indeed through his boyhood in poland is the reality of russia and the russian power. that is also the subject of your of your doctoral paper on. so much remember where known fascinating moment in which the united states is seeking to work with russia i want to say again after a.

that reminded us of a cold war in terms of the emptiness and difficulties of dealing with vladimir prudent. do you think of russia can be ag and effective partners the united states and this time? first in the syrian chemical weapons dismantling program, second in some working to change the political fabric in syria, and is more broadly as a partner in this very messy world. >> in that sense i would say that it was always the russian president and the answer is no. i believe that i actually had a time of hope for russia. i felt he understood the problems, and as to the need for foreign investment, and the stability to strengthen the ties

to the west, understood the need for your greater openness and freedom in russia itself. his lust for power in taking a second term away and giving himself elected. past glory, passed the bar, lost some bark a loss clarita, lost power. then i think that it's not an entirely one-sided picture follow through president of ball it abstained fifth will -- so is not a black-and-white picture, but i would say that on the

whole he is constantly on the search to either tweak the united states or create problems for us and to diminish as, believing that in any way you can diminish yes he elevates russia. as many different opinions in the room as there are people, his maneuver with respect cereal was very quick because of the sun decks of what he is done is to ensure that he stays in power. know the figure that we're dealing with on chemical weapons. so it is no in everyone's interest, europe, hours compare everybody else's to keep it in power so that the move and chemical weapons can take place. it completely throws into a path whenever the west was saying.

the need for a change in government. he played this a way that he is insured survival in power for at least some amount of time. russia's friend. in terms of whether this works are not, i don't know. some of you may remember how hard it's time we had finding nuclear power plants in eastern syria in 2006-7. we did not really know was a nuclear power plant until the israelis solis. u.s. intelligence this was merely did and picks up like that. if he had dozens of chemical weapons storage places, confidence that there will get the weapons, that they can stop

cereal from producing the weapons even as they give up weapons or that there not passing them to hizbollah or to kaytoo and a great deal of skepticism on the black after giving credit that the president behind the ball go monday as this be turned the ball away insured that a side stayed in power and brought a greater prestige to a proven himself. so all that said, there are some areas where we can work with russia, but by and large i believe that as long as prudent as president, a cooperative, mutually beneficial relations it with the russians is going to prove a challenge. if we identified richard nixon and henry kissinger as people

who open engagement with china, the china now. that "zbig" consolidated that opening avatar was less celebrated but probably no less important i want to pick "the chinese and saying from the new president's, they're seeking a new form of great power relationships with the united states. and now you're been in china thinking about that. the shearson talks? >> the growth of asian generally with the red china's growth. a charge of the next problem

decades. they've carried the relationship. the u.s. china relations, and i worry about where our country will be over the next 20 years. acting that this statement to buy she's in paying about the new bottle -- knew model is a real opportunity for us. i would hope that there would help the united states and china to crack the concept of the new model. it just of this appalling. a lot of the elements of great power competition that characterizes great power relations in the past from a territorial frictions, coral complexions and aspirations are of presence it's when the united states and china.

secondly and another thing that is not present is the united states is not trying to keep china down. a number of chinese do not believe that, but if you look at the level of investment, the level of trade, our sponsorship of china and international organizations, what every president the last 40 years has said, it is in our interest for a strong, prosperous, and secure china does not hold water. the average into the is to focus the relationship not on the bilateral tensions, which need to be addressed, but on the fact that there are a series of multinational challenges that we all know about, adequate energy, food and water, dealing with terrorism, proliferation, fixing our global financial system, keeping the economy growing, all things that are global challenges that we all face that neither china or the united states can solve themselves and

that both the bosnian solved. if either of us are going to achieve our own aspirations for a better life. in is that prospect of cooperating as people on equal terms cooperating to lead the global community to resolve problems, i think it gives you the opportunity of really defining the different kind of relationship. it is going to be difficult to define. it is going to be heartstopper rationalize in terms of concrete cooperation. it is going to be hard for our two peoples to understand it because the pressure for competition in zero some thinking is present in both of societies and it will be important we manage our military

operations is that it -- that is where it can become tough. it is an opportunity, and i think in some sense, you know, they can do us and our country a service if they can help define this kind of model of relationships that can help carious to the next decades at. >> general, i think is fair to say that no country, the iranian revolution that he had to contend with, help formulate policy about. we are now on a moment that offers the promise the first i rise since 1979 in the revolution of something different. and like to think of what the big turn in the room that is visible. it does not.

the u.s. relationship. that would be interested in your thoughts, both the opportunities the ec for finally making that turnbull the difficulties in the process. >> they have always said with each other, strongly good cholesterol in bed. when the british be on their overseas positions, especially in the middle east low we sort of is that was under the next administration are central point for stability and they played that role. and then the fall of the shaw.

the proponents of him and a seizing the american embassy. that was someone space what are really bad moment. and that established the time that going from there are our favorite people to hated people. and then a few years later the shutdowns an iranian airliner the other with buzzers a mistake . that kid on the iranian side the kind of bitterness that really should use its relationship with the hostility that we really

have. and now we are seeking to see whether there's a way out. the specific focus is on the clearance, but it's a broader issue. my own guess this the fewer still live been my be in a very similar place 01 it will weapons given the role and the position in the region, with that is not the major point. the question is, can we reach an understanding in their eyes whizzers the middle with the protection it from going one step further and to.

and that don't think we know the answer. we've been talking. to me the real danger of a nuclear ron is not that they have half a dozen, but if they do this by the saudis are likely to feel compelled to follow. then you have a region in terms of capacity for destruction that it is noble. the questions of a can we reach an understanding of it is difficult. one of our close allies to feel strongly of the clear weapons.

add a chance to talk inbound back with the president with terror in new york office. and he a splendid. he said all the right words, but in the meeting that i attended a year some cautionary. he said nuclear technology is in our virginity for a world. an aide to the will to exploit nuclear technology like everyone else. rebel one nuclear-weapons, but you're telling is that we cannot commend you have no right to do about all of a country south. that is sort of the nature of the probable.

so is the questions what is their way that they can to farceur they have and it we're power reactor right no fuel with russian uranium. of a lease basis, not ownership. can we solve this problem? i think we may be able to. we have up until now. in the last number the ones who really run the country said absolutely not. now, interestingly enough the way is going around talking somewhat more optimistic we. is it possible to carve this up with a way with the conduce and things like limited enrichment

to a three-year said for the reactor under iaea supervision or give it all up. they have several other kinds, but i think it is possible that will take both sides getting over this distasteful of decades that have really care of bitterness to the race. >> who is representing of the 25th anniversary. we were there with them. the iranian delegation reached

double in the woods of a meeting >> this is after the iranian revolution. >> this is eight months after. this is the first senior level u.s. official contact. so the first engagement but. a win as the note taker. they brought with them some of the best pistachios and agreed. asset into dialogue. real work and even so you weapons of a contract because we have a common interest.

above all is the soviets in. and they said give us the sharp. this dialogue, if you can call it that all of back-and-forth for about an hour, and that the end, and of never forgotten, used of the offensive for us to return the shah to you would be incompatible. that ended the meeting. three days later the embassy was seized. two weeks where of those officials are of their job, and that began the process and by no more than 30 your research for the elusive iranian moderates who read a say it's important to realize where the u.s. started in this relationship and tears of the first senior contact with senior leaders of the government

maybe this will workout of navy our strategy of putting the squeeze on these guys in a meaningful way. think it has worked to the point of leading to the change in tone , whether to ensure the change in policy about think anyone of. >> it's interesting. you are not through various phases. was in the white house at the time. but also during the clinton demonstrations there was a moment where we thought something had happened, trying to figure out the various lessons from that. i have to set a we read of this event is rick as it did not know anything to the people were.

at that there was a meeting that had been set up in the un and it was my understanding we're reading with the foreign minister. we walked in. i felt you look different. that said, is next in the fourth rib becomes prime minister. nothing. as in the great. a turn to the entire bench and said it is this could drive and they said, we don't know. turns out that he was the deputy foreign minister. the issues are we lost our knowledge of what was going on

what direction is something the need to launch the sanctions are there lift the sanctions that that when needed their recess it the emerging class. they actually have a great sense of humor. when i got out of office they sent me a road. >> and the additional publications, who you deal with. they have a very unusual state structure. they have a government.

the law passed by that government is subject to confirmation by the religious that was spent who really are the governing authority be. >> if there's a reason to the this is because there were

efforts see so that he could deliver. we then had the face and will probably the best thing you could give us where because he was a very objectionable figure. there was a dysfunction. there are a number innocences oread negotiations going. for a time when the war and the deal a minute to file would kill it. and then in the end menu is kinder except to do the supreme later took it. this election may have resolved a disruption in the area insist

so that you know ever-present who is on the same page as supreme leader, and a supreme leader who is at least ruin to let him negotiate. the continuing retain the option to accept or reject. maybe an improved political system is tested and sooner we can get. >> we have a lot of months left when of the extended time. perhaps i might take a few questions. right now we bundle 34. anyone who would like to ask questions of please find a microphone runner. >> you can raise your hand.

>> we had a cover over here. stand up against the name and affiliation. >> i am a second year strategic studies. this question, the availability of the information. do you think it one of the consequences of the availability of formation, is there greater pressure for the u.s. to respond to a larger number of events given that the bill is so much higher, and have you see that affecting the u.s. strategy, of would strategic distraction, filtered through formation as to what we really want to look at? >> a great question.

tear of the people who would like to speak. >> of a student here. if you were a student you're right no will would you focus on studying? >> this question can any mention their pleasing 20th century technology. how do we get to its way for century idea? and other brick question. also -- >> a question in the front. >> antoine. i was wondering, how much to you think we knew she of gas of nine and a u.s. free back to sleep around the world changes in negotiating leverage of the u.s.

states and the release? and how much will it chanceries? >> one last lumber. >> on his current research assistant. one of the articles i've found most interesting was the comparison and the discussion of how and international affairs establish has evolved. wondering how you seen in american foreign policy establish involved to. >> a wonderful question. apologies. a yard return the secretary all right. piqua resurrected a you.

>> and just have to make a comment. his research assistant. we then had to go for conference . they want to know what my title was. he said car yourself empress of research. let me say that i think that the questions about information technology has changed everything because it's interesting to go back and refer to president carter and what was said at the time. human rights. in the determination was its international interest. so when in fact there was a decision not to return, that is part of our humanitarian approach.

the question is what happens when we know that people are killing each other for no good reason. what happens is there is pressure. the same time we're tired of questionable wars. the bottom line is how the react. i have been involved with the concept of the responsibility to protect. if this is going on when the question is, who carries it out. we don't know the answer yet another said the american people are the most humanitarian and generous people in the world. the bottom line is how do we deal with this because the information is coming in very prickly. americans don't like the word

love to literalism. the whole partnership aspect is would comes out. >> first. this actually is not as new as you may think. this started with cnn. our rocking of the north trial of the white house. silent young reporter. she said such and such is going on be one of the danube and

latin is discipline one. so in terms of shooting in mao's of whom. there's a lack of discipline incitement the executive branch in terms of refusing to be pushed by the media and by visuals coming out as opposed to taking -- looking at things and they considered way and taking your time to make the right decision. as i told president bush and he was talking about when the make his speech on the search is said : take your time be beaten in a new been and nine.

left her government at the end of jim two dozen of the serb of publicans and democrats. we have of their use to be more of a cadre who came up through the ranks and became senior officials who serve both public and some democrats since and have increasingly been themselves of one of the other weather on the hill or the executive branch. when they got a power they a to university or think tank. i would just say the lack of

people who they are respected on both sides of the album is something deeply more than this capital city. >> of the brief. i agree with the first part of his answer. but i think it's largely and much harder to do what he said. the take a page of something brand scowcroft said matane's. there was one big thing. any point hon. small crises manage. we knew what the strategy was the we disagreed and fought over tactics. but if you're a national security adviser no jeff picking of natural burnished of its

burger as a pot and its plot has as baronet. tend to go from pop to pot stern and to keep them from -- there is a limited bandit in white gowns. by the time they got so white house intends to be one of question. by the time it's become a crisis a lot of your deductions and got stuck. the options economic and diplomatic activities, its front loaded the typical too quickly. need to figure out. the world would continue look like this to farmhand to add to

the issue of the flow of formation will we're living in a new-age, not only as he says, the cold war was over. we had to worry about tactics. strategy was a given. in addition, there were forces a work better changing the character of the world from the old 20th-century donations to system the overall instinctively aware of. it is now people and never before where part of the society you're born dislike your father. your children would be in the same job you had. there was -- know they look at modern technology and say, is not the way at all.

and so people in never were participants in national life now are. the air spring is a good example it is people, everybody nobel. and it is not simply we tend to think anybody who rises against the dictator is a democrat. not necessarily democracy. its dignity. its dignity. is being treated like a human being. [speaking in native tongue] cattle. and the gossip world is really hard to get around. >> i would say that the level of this conversation surely has been that are very as mentor and friend would want. as did we all of your students. i speak for everybody up here in the room. thank you so much.

[applause] [applause] [inaudible conversations] them. [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] >> what into the second panel. i've been told a we will discuss questions. i would like to thank the co-authors here today. warren cowan, robert hunter, david ignatius, jim thompson and patrick von. i deeply regret that professor nancy tucker is no longer with us. she was the co-author of the chapter with warned :. to satisfy your curiosity, he knew about the project, but he did not read the book until after he read the page proofs.

the details are to be discussed over drinks later on. i passed all of the office to be respectful, but not uncritical, and that is basically it. i would also like to thank incredibly competent editors and publicists at johns hopkins university press, especially suzanne and robert noonan you're also here with us today. for this time i am the warm-up act. the panel features. you know and respect them, and therefore will not waste your time with introductions. we will take a few minutes, however, introduce the book itself. we have three objectives the air

-- a key policy advocate. our second goal with -- of how you manage sick combine political loyalty within to look -- intellectual integrity, not something very common in washington these days buried and less obviously prolong this chapter in the book, chapter one, deals with the important role that he played in making room at the top for immigrants as well as women, blacks, and jews.

what is no longer unknown is when an immigrant or a woman become secretary of state. they occupy them foreign relations. of course they encountered -- am referring here particularly to reasons. illustration from burke when 1974 he learned that a member of the old establishment did not think that someone named burs and skeet shoot barkeeper are a high foreign policy post so he wrote of feisty little letter which i am about to read. since you are a black man let me say quite bluntly that i don't feel that henry kissinger's plan to buy back are called by some to deal with the middle east and north to i think that your background prevents you from doing intelligently with the

soviet communists. [laughter] yours sincerely. [laughter] i hasten to add that they say unreconciled. [laughter] also well our first goal was to evaluate our career in the second to place it in perspective, our third goal that i tried to emphasize was to publish a book that is readable. ..

the pope said come back soon. he replied i can't do if so often. it's a privilege. the pope said, laughing, you elected me. you have to come and see me. [laughter] the second story -- that's funny more sentimental much to my liking. the second story takes him to boston where i had became a u.s. citizens. in the book's last chapter, which is a conversation between him and myself. i raise the question of why he didn't change his impossibly difficult name at that time. i did change my first name --

not my last name, when i became a citizen a few years after that. four years after him. he said he was confident that in america people can become american without marvegging their ethnic identity. america is the only country where someone named can make a name for himself without changing his name. this concludes my warmup act. it's time for the panel to take up a few serious issues this his distinguished career. ambassador hunter, you go first. [inaudible] >> honor to work for the doctor for all four years, lest two hours and 20 minutes. one morning in 1980, i went to see him, and i say, my fiancè and i are going to the district court at noon to get married. he said, congratulations, and take the rest of the day off.

so i did that. let me just say before closing a question to him. a few items about him and i'll let you decide which are the most important. number one, he was never too busy to be concerned about the problems of people who worked for him. big, small, human problems, never too busy. number two, he went out and looked for talent, spent years reporting it. brought in the talent, kept a small staff so everybody had to work hard and work directly for him. number three, while he gave you a hard time as you presented your argument. you wonder had i made a dent at all, but the next day you find if your arguments were any good. he would play them back to you. and very important, something very few people in government get. he never shot the messager. he was prepared powerful himself to speak to power. if you have never seen an official go -- the president of the united he's

wrong, you've got to see that and see it with somebody. jimmy carter respected that. just as big respected it in people who worked for him. number four, he was a person who always had a strategic perspective. which is something very rare. today i think is maybe less evident than the past. things always had to fit in something else, or he would come up with a different perspective, and look at things as they changed. in effect, -- [inaudible] which enabled us to have a greater coherence even in a time of turbulence than otherwise might have had. something jimmy carter, i remember, recognizedded at one point when he was asked about -- after he left office, about another member of the information. why did you show preference for

the doctor over the unnamed person? because the other unnamed person i would get an idea once a month. from him i get and night. very important to keep things going. and also, one very important thing one tends not look at. there was a before, during, and after in power. before he helped to shape the strategic and intellectual environment in policy environment going to the carter administration. during, he played the key strategic role in the way forward. and after wards, even today, nobody can hold a candle to him when it comes to thinking about the future. and i don't know anybody who can do that. now the question for doctor brie as in 1973 and 1974 you were called in by somebody thinking

about running for president. either he or she would say to you, i hope to be president in two or three years' time. what should i be thinking about, what should i be reading, who should i be talking to, how do i prepare myself, how do i look forward to being commander in chief? they turn to you and you have a short period of time. what would you say to him or her getting ready to be president in national security? [inaudible] >> that's really, a really tough one, actually. [laughter] >> well, you did it before. do it again. [laughter] >> well, first of all, let me say in general without talking individually to particular friend and parts of my past here i'm profoundly moved by this occasion and very, very grateful to everyone who was part of it. to you for initiating it and during the book to your associates here who had the idea first. and to you, who have spoken who

have both proceeded and followed me in the government service, and who give me added confidence about the future when i hear all of you speak the way you do. to my closest colleagues with whom i work so closely day in and day out. i always considered them to be colleagues even though i was responsible for the show, so to speak. you contributed so much the great understanding in america of foreign affairs. i feel fortune, to be in a way, part of undertaking here today. whatever i have done so far hasn't done 5% justice owed to each of you individually. let me say this because i feel i should acknowledge what has been transpiring and what is transpiring. as to this question, you know, how do you prepare someone to be president? i would think that in an essential aspect of it has to be

an opportunity. at some point in that person's career, prior to the assumption of such an ambitious undertaking to really become familiar with the complexity of today's world. i think there is a real risk that we may be have in candidates running for office whose knowledge of international affairs is either very limited or very primitive. and i think, if you look at the different combinations of candidates in recent elections, that has tended to be the case, in at least half of the two nominees chevre way might have been a different -- [inaudible] and, you know, it's not exactly partisan statement. i think, for example, president bush, number one, really understood a great deal about the world when he came to

office. i was very struck by how much obama had thought about world affairs prior to coming to office and focused particularly on what is new in our age. that's what attracted me. but having said that, fairly obvious statement, there's a further thing that has to be mentioned. namely, they have to be aware of the presidential of opportunity. because it is a relatively brief and highly condensed calendar. you're not sure you're going to get a second term. and therefore, it's essentially going to be dealing among other things with foreign affairs which is what i was talking to a candidate about. prioritize, and think early as to which acts and undertaking are essential. not only to your future success as a historic figure but particularly to the more immediate american interest thought in a large time

framework. you will not have too much time to achieve it. and it is probably accurate to say that, for example, president obama had a clear understanding of the big challenges that he was facing and the speeches he gave on the subject indicated profound knowledge. but there was not an intense and determined followup on most of the substantiative ideas articulated in a speech. in part because of domestic diversions, in part perhaps because of the assumption there would be another term, but the result is in some key issues that the momentum that he brought to power with him and the opportunity that seemed to be created and which much of the world expected did not come to pass. so this is one lesson i think a new candidate should think

about. >> thank you. [inaudible] >> let me start by thanking you and jessica. i think this book is a great contribution for every student in the room, for any of us who thinks about international affairs, and say, also, anybody who hasn't read it yet. it's a great read! but i think it was a great -- >> can you reneat again? [laughter] >> i think it was a wonderful contribution, and i thank you and congratulate you. i oles can't resist. i was reminded of this inside the first panel remembering my first reaction this big was also job interview, and i came in and sat down, i was 30 years old my background was in bio chemistry. i was even younger in term of knowing much.

and he said how would you solve the arab/israeli conflict. luckily i just had read his article. which may have been the purpose of the question, i don't know. what struck me reading of the book, one of the things, was the contrast between gig and many people serving in government. not our first panel, notably, but many, whose views of the world get frozen in the -- no matter how much they -- what strikes you how gib has stayed at the cutting edge of international affairs and international thinking through an extraordinarily long period of time. and one of the things that has

changed, i think the first panel may be glanced off but didn't really hit head on. i would like to ask you about. in that very long period of time is we have gone from at the very beginning a time when politics and -- to the period of the cold war when there were deep divisions between democrats and republicans. but where the potential and reality of the agreement was real. and was taken as the goal and achievable goal to today when foreign policy is politics by another name. where there is no expectations

that almost anything a president can do will not be met by automatic opposition from the other parties. i wondered, zbig, whether you would sort of share your thoughts on this evolution. if you were starting your career now, how would you think about framing execution, institutional basis for making foreign politician as this environment. is it even possible to think about strategic and steady foreign policy making given this current reality of our policy? >> i don't think there is a choice. one has to think about external reality in a strategic fashion. because whether one likes it or not, however complicated it becomes, it's going impinge on our immediate future.

on our longer term prospects. so strategic thought has to be responsive to the i did limb ma. it has to be driven by the realization that we have come to a prolonged -- we have come to the end of the prolonged era in world affairs. in which struggle for -- was the dominant reality. and indeed, struggle for global -- was during a realty for almost 200 years. global i had gem any, became at least the dream and perhaps the expectations top level political leadership at the turn of the -- the beginning of the 19th century. roughly the time of the area. and that poll began was the

first political leader who seriously thought that -- would mean in effect demmization of the world, in that context. he fashioned ambition plans for not only going east of suez to india but incorporating russia in the european system which he would dominate from france. now, that set in motion a chain of events which continued for the next 200 years. in the last big and encounter involving the possibility of a global conference was the cold war. which at one moment almost came to militarization. and in the end, to a dramatic end of a rival because of the sustained pressures that that rival confronted in the course of waging the cold war, pressures that we also confronted proved for that rival too much to hajtdz. but today we live in a world in

which global hegemony is no longer a tail of anyone. it would have to be a dramatic transformation for global conditions in any single power all of a sudden to entertain the notion of global hegemony em. we talked earlier about the russians and the others and the syrian problem. well, one of the,s why the russians are playing that game is while they stoned lose something, if we come out entirely on top, they also realize we stand to lose a great deal the situation flounders and becomes explosive. and therefore, some accommodation may be possible between their partial interest and ours. the same is true of the. chinese, who are beginning to enter the picture. and indeed they're also beginning to enter the process of syria negotiating with the iranians. because of the limitations

inherit in the possibility of an explosion that would be damaging so much. as a consequence, we are leading with a world in which we have to choose much more carefully where we're going to be engaged. and sometimes have to make hard decisions not to be engaged even if there are justifiable moral impartives in play. because the consequences that become over engage can be disastrous. all of that, i think, means that strategizing now is much more complex and has to account of things that mention such as global political awakening. which unleashes political forces that no major power can be easily contained, controlled. it is a striking fact that since winning world war ii in the coalition in which one of our coalition ally did more than we did, actually to be win it. the united states as the global

-- most important and most powerful power hasn't won a single war. except one, the '91 war. we didn't win in korea. we didn't win in vietnam. we haven't won yet in afghanistan. we certainly did not win in iraq if you look what is happening. [inaudible] >> exactly. fortunately a limitation in the war with the satisfaction in the outcome. with the absence of any real war. i think today prioritizing national goals. trying to create coalitions, learning how to deal with rivals, reaching a judgments regarding the scale of the threat wish us ill. but the own powers are limitmented and the vulnerabilities may be also

rising at the same time is more complex process. but the decision making process of a strategic time has to come from a systemic effort of course within some institution like the nfc. but much more conscious of the need for deliberate political sense tiff planning for action that need to be undertaken. and by and large we have not achieved that.

there are stats at long-term political strategic planning in different branches of government. and we have something in the state department that does it. but it doesn't have the change of responsibilities and the kind of capacity for advocacy of decisions that is inherit in the complex and dangers circumstances of which i speak. so something more to the white house. something more strategic i thinkly focused. meaning, first of all, people who think strategically. but second portions of the bureaucracy themselves preoccupied with comprehensive national strategic planning in an era of change. we don't do that. the white house systemically. it's on only partially being done in the state department. the defense didn't nationally focuses on warfare as the ultimate option and intelligence community and learning more about those who may wish us ill. that is not good system.

i think the president's responsibility is so demanding that he has to have really close to him people deliberately chosen with the qualities in mind and with a mechanisms assisting them in the center of the government. and that means that the secretary of state has to be his chosen agent for seeking strategic solutions with a outcome. and full support. but not be responsible for the overall strategy. because the overall strategy has to have all the element in it as well. of course, that's an unpalatable conclusion for the people in the responsibility of heading the departments. but it's not avoidable. i think those presidents themselves provided some of that or who have some people next to them thought in that fashion tended to be more effective as presidential leaders in an area

of foreign policy in recent years than those who haven't. >> i'm start with the first time i met zbig. i was 22 years old. i was an aid to a congressman named steve -- who passed a wonderful guy. deeply interested in foreign policy. i had just joined his staff, and he an act of great charity, he thought, invited me to join him for a meeting with the national security adviser in the white house. i had never been to the white house. i had never met a national security adviser, and it was one of the most terrifying experiences of my life. [laughter] because zbig, as you can see here is brilliant but a little twinkly right now. he's kind of charming and el fin. [laughter] and, you know, when i met him in the white house, hef just as intimidating human being as you could possibly be.

and i felt ill at ease for the whole meeting. having said that, i also then -- they were talking about an issue, i think the issue had to do with north korean gun boats. some kind of issue around that. he peels away strategic layer after strategic layer and began with the incident then with the north koreans then with the situation an the korean peninsula, then with the chinese, and then with the russians, and then with our interests. it was clear that behind this there was a world view. and i found this very intimidating and ended up spending a lot of my life, probably because of the scars from that meeting, -- [laughter] studying the national security council. and, you know, i agree with your assertion here that you need to have the strategic capacity within the white house, and the best of the people who have occupied the national security adviser chair have tried to do

it. i talked to brad about efforts to do it and how to, you know, inevitably are overtaken by events. sandy talks about the phenomena in washington where the urgent always overtakes the important. and all sorts of solutions come up. typically they involve adding staff at the national security council. i think when henry was running the nfc and it reached the biggest. it was 40 people or something like that. and today we're nearing 400 people on the national security staff. but it doesn't seem anymore strategic to me. you know, i don't think just making it bigger is creating the synthesis. and for awhile, perhaps occur the cold war, there was a kind of moto. there was a bipolar war as indicated in the earlier panel. there was a strategy. at the center of it, but it seems to me over the course of the past couple of years, we've really been floundering.

looking far model. and one thing that strikes me is that over the arc of your career, at the beginning there was a lot of talk about balance of power. henry kissinger wrote his doctoral dissertation about balance of power of the world. it was in the early '50s. we went to bipolarity and what we thought was unit polarity and after 9/11 we decided decide equate the enemy that emerged then with our cold warren mys so that we would be in a few pseudobipolarity. at the end of the cycle, we seem to be coming back to balance of power. it actually requires understanding all the the players.

people like brett or steve or any of the panel on -- people on the panel wake up and want to know what great people like this have for breakfast. it's my imprigs what they have for breakfast is the world. you know, they sort of wake up and say what is going on? how do these pieces fit together? how does this affect my world view? but there seem to be fewer and fewer people who are looking strategically. you have a group of young people in an institution trying to train people to do that. i'm wondering what kind of advice you might give to sort of guide people in the direction of not looking at the headline or not looking at the regional issue or today's issue. but connecting dots.

>> first of all, i want to say that there's no shortage of brain power in this country, and there's no shortage in the final analysis of individuals with a capacity to do what is needed. ic we have an example of that by the panelists that have appeared before in the stage and up here on the stage right now. the question is whether power central can be organized in such a way that the strategic definition of the challenges that we face can be pursued in the systemic fashion with some degree of prioritization, and there's a president who understands that he has a narrow window of opportunity for the fulfillment of specified objectives, and who is able to mobilize public opinion on behalf of it. this is the dimension which i want to stress for a second.

in most of the conflicts, it was the united states that has been engaged in since it became a major international power. it was easy to confide to the public a simple truth we're threatened. they're threatening us. our cause is good. nay are bad. we are a democracy. they're not a democracy. or they don't know how to create a democracy or in some cases they don't deserve democracy. today it is so much more complicated. and the pressure of events is so intense. and our public given this context of everything moving in on us information being so available staggeringly uninvolved. and therefore, formulating a policy that the public in

support and understand goes beyond the capacity of a single individual no matter how reor it rick or skillful he is as president. we need to think very seriously about the issue of what really informs our public. in those continuously complex -- in which the leadership faces threats to our national security day in and day out. it's rare there's going to be an overriding and simple threat. china is not going to attack us. somehow or another. now conceivably, at some point, in the next twenty years, if china were to develop unprecedented capacities in cyber warfare and so forth, conceivably we could be over defeated in one day without knowing we're defeat. but that is still fiewcht. much more likely the conflict which the public doesn't understand and basis for which

has not been laid systemic education, training, and information. we don't have -- five major newspapers in this country that give international news on their reliable basis. on a data basis. we have minimum of really serious world news on the network. have an hour about world maybe for 45 seconds. world news something important happens. some calamity. most is human interest stories. increasing the medical information because that's the kind of national obsession and probably something sensational involving some major figure in entertainment business and so forth. who provides information about the world to the american public that otherwise watches television the way people used

to pray in the past. >> the con clues you're coming to is foreign policy magazine. >> that was my punchline. you have taken it away! [laughter] but the point is, all right. on television it's and increasingly available to us for networks. pbc, not bad at all. nod bad france 24 and increasingly good and increasing access about al al jamaican zero ya which does a good job of conveying repeatly 30 minutes of world news.

after 9/11 terrorism became enemy number one. here there was a curious interaction between the publics' ignorance and their sense of -- dem we immediately declared a war on jihadist terror without considering what the combination of words means. we have to create in the public an atmosphere of fear that has a -- i'm appal bid offices have the people sitting on the ground

floor dressed in some suit or uniform, which is written prominently on the shoulder, security. and they invite you to tell them who you want to see on a what floor then you're asked to sign a document indicating your name and show your idea. i was so tired of this that the number of indications has to be wrote out up are summed up in latin. i've never been stopped. [laughter] but shows how public become so obsessed at different moments with dramatic challenges. which in some cases don't even warrant that judgment. it becomes difficult for us spend money intently on national security or intelligence. a military force that also in gaining national influence with other key players who are not as powerful as we. but cumulative and make it difficult for us to exercise the

kind of hegemony we enjoyed for roughly 13 years after 1990. for 13 years after 1990 we were supreme in the world. we were the supreme soul global superpower. everybody knew it and resigned to it. many have hated it. but prepared to respect it. we have proceeded dramatically. in the oobility of our society to generate a public that will -- intelligent leadership prepared to accept the reality of having to share responsibility for the world. secretary clinton was a great

sector for global affair. she made some progress in that respect. this has to be continued as a long-term commitment and at the same time be faced with a necessity for having people who respond strategic challenges. in a way, i wish we had both her as secretary of state for global affairs, and secretary kerry for strategic challenges. serving at the same time. we need brother approach which is given hopefully of generating public support. >> thank you very much. i'm going follow. excellent example and call on students preferably in the back, who have time. three questions, please. >> we have some students in the back. i'm going back. hold on. >> hi. thank you so much for coming out tonight. i'm hilary.

i'm a first-year student here. >> we can barely hear you up here. >> hi, thank you very much for coming. my name is hilary. i'm a first-year student. i was wondering for you can comment on how you think that the increasing use of drone technology and small scale kind of tactical strikes will change strategic calculations on the national security council and in the white house? thank you. >> thank you. >> next question, please. >> i have another student in the back. hold on. >> okay. >> hi, my name is bill. i'm a first-year -- [inaudible] brought up the world view that underpin the approach to foreign policy. i'm curious how you strike a balance between the world view and a local understanding of the issues. if you talk about how area studies and help able to manage conflict. >> yeah i'm not sure i

understand the question. the summary of the relationship between area studies and -- >> and managing conflict in different regions. one of the topics today that doctor brie design ski brought up the number of wars united states lost since world world war ii. >> did not win. >> yes. [laughter] and -- the lack of understanding in the area. i was wondering how we strike a balance between the world view and a local understanding. >> i have one more student question right here. >> i'm a second-year student here. i was wondering what advice you would give to us for cultivating the kind of strategic thinking you embrace and endorse. >> okay. and one more.

how the huhs the periods of dreams -- u.s. had the period in the sun and been a popular argument in for that the u.s. is now on the decline. and my sort of question is you is how do you view the u.s.' future in the international system, and do you think that the u.s.' decline somehow indicative of a problem. if it is, how should respond. yeah, that's my question. thank you. >> all right. >> on the drones. first of all, as a weapon, it's clearly quite effective. the question is how to use it and what circumstance. i can fully understand the need for techniques, which can strike across borders and therefore by avoiding a necessity of some

sort of military involvement entanglement, enlargement of warfare. so -- precision, and so forth are obviously assets that terrorism imposes on us and need to respond. in that sense, i defend them. what bothers me is the absence, at least to my satisfaction of the mechanism, first of all, within the department of defense itself and ultimately in the white house that carefully reviews this scope of the likely -- which will be afflicted by the drones and monitors carefully cases in which obviously associated damage collateral damage took place on a scale. of which is political as well as morally unacceptable. and i don't think we have yet worked out such arrangements for processing that capacity in

manner which makes a response to terrorism effective but without creating political as well as moral consequences which are adverse to our interest. i think this is something that is to be worked out. i feel the same way about -- convert assassination. it seems to me it's something to be engaged in only in most exceptional circumstances and with some semitraditional spread your in the executive branch. preferably the white house to make certain that all acts of prudence accompany -- [inaudible] managing conflicts. i would put it simply negativively. i think we have to be realize we have going to be living in a conflicted world. we are beginning to live in an increasingly conflicted world. the global awakening is going to produce more conflict rather than fewer. because it sets loose sup pressed action as well as

ignorance and a sense of distant now repressed in to immediate collision. all that have is going to make the world much more, i think, artistic. and for that reason, we have to be very careful and very pry decial in our choices as to when do we become militarily involved. and i think syria is a good example of that. there is no simple military solution to syria. without running the risk of the problem become not just national but regional. thing is why other states such as russia and china have to somehow extend step in realizing that is f there is a regional explosion they will be victims perhaps no to the same extend that we. but nonetheless the vital interests would be affected.

so restraint and then collective response is perhaps the best way to respond. i wasn't sure what the third question was, really. >> it had to do with cultivating -- >> well, you in a way, but a example of it what bev been talking about but also a sense of history and changing history and historic how it is interpreted differently in different contexts culturally and nationally ethnically. religiously. because history provides a fundamental motivation for a great deal of what is happening in the world. real or alleged sense of unfairness, of discrimination,

of repression are all of a sudden awakened in a context in which power can be exirsed for the use of force by outraged masses or by highly motivated terrorist groups. for that reason, i have to be deeply conscious of the fact that others operate on the basis of historical motivations, which we do not either understand or do not share. and our own historical motivations are very subjective. and the product of very specific conditions. which created -- which create conditions more difficult for others to understand or to accept our motivations as sincere and constructive. this is a new global mosaic that hasn't existed until very recent times. and the processes intensifying because global political awakening is spreading. it's spreading from the middle

east further eastward and north ward in central asia, it is spreading west ward across africa. there are real possibilities of the indian native problem becoming serious in latin america in too long. and as a result we're going to be dealing with more challenges of the kind that have surfaced in the last decade and a half. finally, u.s. future in -- what? >> a decline. that's a most difficult question to an. i think the answer has to be the next one. we're certain not in the dominant position we were in twenty years ago. we're unlikely to recover it probably in the course of the lifespan of everybody in this room that is to say we're not going to be as only omnipotent

considerable degree of our influence and catch to act and maximize its capacity to act intelligently. it, in the meantime, other countries make previous errors on the international scene. i do not see right now any leading candidate for that kind of role of international affair. the iranians, who have been engaging in extraordinary provocative behavior in recent years seem to be veeding and moderate. the chinese who are rivals to us are not ideological enemies anymore. but the notion they are building communism hard ily ever enters the minds of those sitting in the leadership of the communist party. even in the party at large is growing cynicism regarding objectives. i once spoke at&t the party

school for leadership party school. and after answering their question. i asked them a question. i said understand your current president. there was a few years ago, has a great idea of three represents that was the way he phrased it. and involved three sort of desirable social political conditions in the country. and asked him what does it mean? and then the entire room burst out laughing. they thought it was a funny question. assuming i was obviously making fun of the president and in some ways they issue sharing my sense of ironical detachment for that kind of stuff. i think the fact is that we're probably going living in a setting in which conduct by a different states is going to be inherently ambiguous. even our own understanding of them. and there's -- in their understanding of us.

and that makes it inevitable that a condition of this order and uncertainty is going to be an enduring reality. of course, the more we can learn about others. the more a sense of strategy we have. the more we can gain partners. not quite ally but countries which share some of our interests basic interests and fundamental economic and social stability can coalesce. this is why i talk about american relationship that becomes increasingly close with europe is relevant. without excluding china is timely. these are the time of things i think -- in this next phase of 20, 30, 40, 50 years that we require. it's more complex than anything

anyone was studying about world affair even as recently as 30 or 40 years ago when i was student. >> well, before we proceed to the reception and book signing, i would like to call on the doctor to make a few concluding remarks here. but to -- i would like to mention while everybody knows he's a strategies man who can look ahead beyond today's headlines. it's been said several times today. what you may not know, him with his wife, who is with us here, they plan strategically to shape even their family future. you didn't know that. you're learning here for the first time. their oldest son, who is also here with us, is a republican. they're youngest son, mark, or ambassador to sweden, is a testimony. and wait, their daughter the

well-known tv anchor is an independent. [laughter] now i have to ask you, can you think of any better way to be a strategies about the future? [laughter] i'm going ask him to say a few more words before we go to the reception and book signing. >> german shepard means there was a tea party. [laughter] [laughter] ak you meant call family. i don't think i want to engage any final word. i wanted to express my appreciation, again, to everyone here for participating in this. particularly to my colleagues in government right there in the front row who have made outstanding contributions to america's well-being. and all of which illustrates also no one is indispensable.

there are no special geniuses in charge. and we have top-notch elite capable of moving from generation to generation. what we have to do as a country; however, be is be alert to the fact the world has become more complex about our values and ease the asupervisions about not american exceptionalism but americans universalism are at lee historically premature and probably not attainable in the lifespan of anyone this this room. this is going to be an more complex potentially more dangerous world in which common sense a sense of responsibility, deliberate planning, will prepare elite and far more informed public about the world of the -- of america's intelligent conduct. look, to take a very specific