conservative jew is brought up to challenge god, do everything, challenge authority, versus my catholic friends who were accepting of authority, and i'm wondering, you haven't mentioned the religious factor yet, and i'm wondering if it's significant at all. >> the last third of my book is all about religious faith. the last two chapters in particular, and the civil rights chapter is about the consequences -- in part the consequences of deep religious commitment, what that gives you, and the last two chapters are about extraordinary things that faith makes possible. and i think it's -- i end it on that note because i came to understand and appreciate in writing the book, that the most significant weapon in the arsenal of underdogs are the --

lovely phrase -- the weapons of the spirit. the power you get from your belief in god. and at the end of the day, nothing can beat that. i tell a story bat -- about a william who on the strength of her faith forgives the murderer of heir daughter. the last story in the book is about a village in the mountains of france, a protestant village, that openly takes in jews during the second world war in complete defiance of the nazis. and there's no mystery why. two sets of people who have no external material advantage. they have no formal power. they had no money. they had nothing. but what they have is something in their hearts that says, i am empowered by god to do the right thing. and that's enough.

and it's very both uplifting and also kind of -- i was very -- writing this book moved me in a way that writing my previous books did not for that very fact. just by the end i was -- to sit in the backyard of a woman's -- a little bungalow in winnipeg and talk to a woman whose daughter was murdered brutally by a sexual predator, and who stood up on the day that her tortured daughter's body was found, stood up in front of a press conference of 100 people, you know, waving microphones in her face and said, without even knowing who the murderer was, whoever he is, i am on the path to forgiving him.

that was -- to hear her say that, just the more -- it floored me then and floors me still, and you cannot but have awe for the power of that kind of thing. if you hear it first hand. thank you all. [applause] >> next on the booktv, charles gati, editor of "zbig" and a panel dignitaries talk about the life and career of former national security advisor zbigniew brzezinski. this is about two hours. [applause] >> so while my fellow panelists are getting seated, it's my

great pleasure and honor to be able to lead this discussion. one of my college professors used to speak about the great chain of being, medieval idea about interconnectedness. i always like to think about a great chain of being in foreign policy and strategic thinking about foreign policy. in that chain sort of begins with the person that we're honoring today in our modern history with trinity and henry kissinger, the man with whom his career has always been linked. but the other links in that chain are seated in front of you. it's fasting to read american history and think about how the ideas, strategies, challenges are passed from person to person in this amazing american story of foreign policy, decision and discovery. so in that spirit were going to try to talk in the brief time that we have come in the spirit

of zbigniew brzezinski and a great chain about the big ideas that wouldn't do justice if we talk about little ones. but i want to start by asking, remember, the panelists will briefly share with the audience the first time you remember meeting zbigniew brzezinski. madeleine. >> happy and very glad to be with my colleagues and everybody. there is a connection to science, because what happened was i did my first year of graduate school insides and then we moved to new york and i transferred to columbia. and i took a course from zbigniew brzezinski on compared of comity. now, at wellesley and also at sites, i've been trained on the soviet bloc, and then to be with zbig it was able to discuss something that nobody talked about in 1953 which was impaired of communism. he has had this capability of

really analyzing the world as it evolved better than anybody that i know. >> secretary gates? >> the first time i met zbig was when interviewed for a job in the spring of 1977. and since i don't go way back i'll just tell you one of my most memorable early experiences with zbig that i was recounting to him earlier. in the carter white house, the president as an energy-saving they shed all the thermostats -- [laughter] and so it was very warm in the summer time. but zbig's office was always cool. i realized this a couple of weeks after the start to work for him, it was the coolest place in the entire white house. and i finally realized what he had done. we're going to talk about strategic brilliance but this was tactical brilliance. he had moved a lamp under the

thermostats. [laughter] and the temperature police never caught on. [laughter] >> well, i met him because i was at the staff when he arrived. i had been hired by brent scowcroft as a navy ensign, and esso farsighted to build location i have for the job was i had an active security clearance. on the basis of that they brought me over and i was assigned a wonderful project, and arms control project which had a name an anachronism which was an acronym, lost in history called the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in europe. and, boy, i knew everything about it and i was asked at one point to repair a memorandum to national security advisor. describing the marble that was

transport negotiation. it went on separate pages and i think it is true that the new national security advisor showed great discretion and did not read the memo at all. when he was he said to me, you are going to work with sam huntington and she will try to develop a cowtown strategy for national security for the country. and having been in the details of mbfr it was like the world had opened up and i was going to be -- i think was sufficiently traumatizing to me that within three months i decided that i really ought to go practice law where i went back down in other issues. but it was a great opportunity, and it has been wonderful to follow your career and followed it ever since. >> i first met zbig, and congratulations, in 1953. i know precisely when it was

because i was a new instructor at west point and he was a new instructor at harvard. west point was having a student conference, and we were assisting a famous soviet at cologne university in this one panel. he had to leave the day before the caucus was over, so zbig and i co-chaired the last day and as i recall we disagreed on everything. but then i have to say, zbig replaced me as national security advisor. i know what kind of problems i left but he was a busy guy. >> so with that introduction, i want to turn to asking each of the panelists to think with all of us about some of the big ideas that zbigniew brzezinski has written about, thought about. and want to start with secretary

albright and ask you to reflect on something that is in the last several of zbig's books, and that's the idea that a fundamental thing that's happening in the world that isn't immediately detectable in the daily news is something he calls the global political awakening. something that you see in the arab world most vividly, but it's everywhere, it's in china, and russia. it's something that certainly you were seeing at the beginning when you were secretary. i'd be fascinated in your thoughts about how this is playing out, what it means for america, how we should respond. >> and to come and let me say as i said earlier, i think zbig's brilliance is that he had the capability of analyzing the world as it is at a time and be able to think forward and have larger thoughts about it. i do think for those of us that were raised in a different situation of where you had two blocks looking at each other,

and the u.s.-soviet relationship and understand all of a sudden all the changes that have come about not only with the fall of the wall, but just generally, i think zbig has had a capability of analyzing. i have to say i've had the privilege of sitting and taking notes from zbig most of my life. in class and then following him around when he was national security advisor and then helping to do research for his books. he speaks in perfect paragraphs and so it is easy to follow his thoughts. i think that what has happened is obviously a complete disintegration of a variety of systems that we operated with. there are many, many more forces out there. the one that i think has captured people's imagination is what's been happening in the arab world. i was involved in a very interesting discussion with an arab and it was the winter, and so i said, we can't call it the arab spring anymore so we called

it the arab awakening. he was furious. he said this is outrageous. the arabs haven't been asleep all the time. i said what would you call a? he said arab troubles. i said what about arab opportunities? so you see the different approaches to what is actually happening. i think that what we've seen come in many of us have drawn lessons from what happened in central and eastern europe after the fall of the wall, thinking that it was a similar story in the arab world, is completely different i believe, and that basically there is a political awakening but it is not -- in central and eastern europe there was a desire to be european and be part of the european system. that is not what is going on. we see in the arab world and we can unpack that at some point. we also see there are many more countries that are playing roles. went zbig was at the nsc we talked about the regional influence. i think there are more than just one regional influential.

that are countries that are playing the roles and they want to be listened to. what is happening also is awakening in an inter- your way. and here i must say that i think the thing that is entirely different is the role of information technology. and what it has done is awakened within country -- i'm chairman of the board of the national democratic institute. what we've seen is that this aggregation of political voices. and so everybody, people talking to the government on 21st century technology. the governments are listening and 20th century technology. and responding to it in 19th century ideas. so there is a disconnect and political parties are difficult to form when the voices are disaggregated. so it's kind of id get from tahrir square to governance? then there's the other side of information technology which is that one could say i don't think

zbig or i would be among those, that we didn't know was going on during world war ii. now we know everything that's going on everywhere. and, therefore, it is change people's approaches as to what needs to be done, and that awakening has awakened a set of ideas in terms of how to respond to it throughout the world but i think it's a huge new issue. we don't infrastructure works, whether the organizations that we all grew up with our functional. and did one last thing that has happened is we're all used to a nation state system. there continues to be nationstates but the nonstate actors now are playing a large role in this awakening. we don't know at what stage we bring them into the decision-making process, and nonstate actors are not just terrorists. nonstate actors are also huge corporations and ngos that are not under the control of any government and, therefore, tools that governments need to use to influence them don't work because those tools work against

people that have territory and people that they're trying to protect. >> secretary gates, something that zbigniew brzezinski has thought about every moment of his career and, indeed, through his boyhood in poland is the reality of russia and russian power. that's also the subject that you wrote your doctoral dissertation on if i remember. and so i want to ask you, we are not in a fascinating moment in which the united states is seeking to work with russia, i want to say again, after a period of that reminded many of us of the cold war in terms of the emptiness and difficulties of dealing with vladimir putin. do you think that russia can be a genuine and an effective partner for the united states in this period? first industry and chemical weapons dismantling program?

second and somehow working to change the political fabric of syria? and just more broadly as a partner in this very messy world? >> in a sentence i would say as long as vladimir putin is president of russia, the answer to your question is no. i believe that -- i had a beautiful for russia when medvedev was present. i felt he understood the problems, understood the need for foreign investment, understood the need to strengthen the ties of the west. understood the need for greater openness and freedom in russia itself. putin's lust for power and taking a second term away from medvedev and getting himself elected and putin could remain president and russia until 2024 if he is allowed to.

i think putin is all about the past, past glory, past empire, lost in our, lost glory, lost power. and i think that it's not an entirely one-sided picture. the reality is that he promised president bush and follow through with president obama that he would not send as 300 service terror missiles to iran. they did abstain on some of the international -- so it's not a black and white picture, but i'd say that on the whole putin is constantly on the search to either tweak the united states or to create problems for us. and two diminish us, believing that in any way he can diminish as he elevates russia. my own -- as many different

opinions in the room as there are people, my own opinion is that this maneuver with respect to syria was very clever because one of the side effects of what he has done is to ensure that i thought that stays in power. assad is now the figure we are dealing with on chemical weapons. so it's now in everybody's interest. europe, hours, everybody else is to keep assad in power so that this move on chemical weapons can take place. so it completely throws into a path whatever the west was saying about getting rid of assad, or the need for a change of government and so on, putin has played this in a way that he is insured the survival in power for at least some period of time of russia's friend. in terms of whether this works or not, i don't know.

some of you may remember how hard a time we had finding a nuclear power plant in eastern syria in 2006-2007. we didn't really know it was a nuclear power plant until the israelis told us u.s. intelligence is supposed to be really good at big stuff like that and find it in the middle of a desert. so if you dozens of chemical weapons storage places, my confidence that they're going to get all the weapons, that they can stop the syrians from producing new weapons even as they give up weapons, or that they're not passing them to hezbollah or to iran, i just don't know. i have a great deal of skepticism on that but i've got to give him the credit for a very clever maneuver that put the president 98 ball, put the united states behind the eight

ball, insured assad's staying in power and brought greater prestige to putin himself. to all that said, again, i think there are some areas were we can probably work with russia. but by and large i believe as long as putin as president as i said at the outset, i think finding a longer-term cooperative mutually beneficial relationship with the russians is going to prove a challenge. >> steve hadley, if we identify richard nixon and henry kissinger as the people who opened engagement with china, with china now, i think it's fair to say thank you was the person who consolidated that opening with deng xiaoping in a period of less celebrated, probably no less important. and i want to ask you to think

about come with us but with the chinese have been saying through the new president, xi jinping, that they are seeking a new form of great power relationship with the united states. i know you just have been in china, thinking about china and please share some thoughts with us. >> one of the things, china is really the growth of asia generally in terms of its economic power. and within china's growth is going to be a real opportunity but also a challenge or the united states over the next couple of decades. one of the things i worry about quite frankly is that doctor brzezinski and print and henry kissinger in many ways have carried the u.s.-china relationship. and madeleine and others have done, have been treated in office, but they have really been for 40 years the face, u.s.-based to u.s.-china

relations. and i worry about where our country will be over the next 20 years. i think the statement by xi jinping about the new model of great power relations is a real opportunity for us. i would hope that they would help the united states and china to craft a new model. it just is the following, that a lot of the elements of great power competition that characterize great power relations in the past, territorial frictions, colonial, conflicting colonial aspirations, are not present between the united states and china. and secondly another thing that is not present is the united states is not trying to keep china down. there are a number of chinese who don't believe that but if you look at the level of investment, the level of trade, our sponsorship of china in the international organizations, what every president for the last 40 said that it's in our

interest for a strong, prosperous and secure china, it doesn't hold water. the opportunity is to focus the relationship not on bilateral tensions which need to be addressed, but on the fact there are a series of multinational challenges that we all know about. adequate energy, adequate food and water, dealing with terrorism, dealing with proliferation, fixing a global financial system, keeping the economy growing. all things that are global challenges that we all face that neither china and the united states can solve themselves, and that both of us need to solve. if either of us are going to achieve our own aspirations for a better life or people for the next 10 or 20 years. and it is that prospect of china and the united states cooperating together and providing global leadership, not as some kind of g2 condominium

dictator, but as people on equal terms cooperating to leave the global community to solve some of those problems, that i think did you the opportunity that really defines a different kind of relationship between great powers. it's going to be difficult to define. it's going to be hard to operationalize in terms of concrete cooperation. it's going to be hard for our two peoples to understand it because the pressure for competition and the zero-sum thinking is present in both of our societies. and it's going to be important that we manage our military relations because i think that's where we really come across. so it will be tough work, but i think it is an opportunity. and i think in some sense, you know, zbig, brent and ask in your country a service if they can help define this kind of new model of relationship that can help carry us through the next

decades. >> general scowcroft, i think it's fair to say that no country the next trying to win his national security advisor more than iran. and the iranian revolution that he had to contend with, help formulate policy about. we are not at the moment that offers the promise for the first time really since 1979 and the revolution of something different. i'd be very interested in your thoughts, both the opportunity you see for finally making that turn and the cautions that you would have about the difficulties and the process. >> the u.s. and iran have always

had a strong relationship with each other. strongly good, strongly bad. when the british started to pull back from the overseas positions, especially in the middle east, we sort of established under the nixon administration iran as our central point for stability in the region. and they played that role, and then the shah fell. and the proponents of the shah and the shah's regime sees the american embassy and put the people in hostage. that was zbig's really bad

moment. and that establish a period of going from they are our favorite people do they are our hated people. and we harbored that, rightly so, for a long time. then a few years later we shot down an iranian airliner loaded with passengers, by mistake. that gave on the iranian side the kind of bitterness that really suffused this relationship for the hostility that we rarely had with other countries. and now we are seeking to see whether there is a way out. the specific focus is on nuclear weapons, but it's a broader issue. my own guess is on the nuclear weapons issue is, if the shah

were still around he might be in a very similar place. on wanting nuclear weapons, given the role in the position of iran and the region. but that's not the major point. question is, can we reach an understanding with iran, which in their eyes is not discriminating against them, and yet preserves the middle east or protects it from going one step farther into a nuclear competition. and i don't think we know the answer to that. and i think we have been fine. we been talking with iranians for years. to me, the real danger of am i wrong with nuclear weapons is not that they have a half a

dozen nuclear weapons. but that if iran does this, the saudis are likely to feel compelled to follow. the turks probably, the egyptians. then you have a region which is far different in terms of capacity than is now. so the question is can we reach an understanding? it is very difficult and one of our close allies, israel, feels very strongly about this issue of nuclear weapons. i had a chance to talk to president rouhani and foreign minister xavier when they were in new york for the u.n. and president rouhani explained it, let me explain -- he said

all the right words, but the meeting i attended he gave some cautionary -- he said, nuclear technology is an opportunity for the world. we need to be able to explore nuclear technology like everybody else. we don't want nuclear weapons, but you are telling us we can't. and you have no right to do that because you've done it, other countries have done it. so that this sort of the nature of the problem now. so the question, is there a way that iran can -- certainly they have a nuclear power reactor now, fueled with question uranium on a lease basis, not on an ownership basis, can we solve

this problem? i think we may be able to solve it. we have not up until now, and the last time under ahmadinejad the mullahs who really run the country said absolutely not. now, interesting enough, rouhani is going around talking somewhat more optimistically, and the mullahs are silent. so is it possible to carve this up in a way that iran can do some things like, for example, limited enrichment of uranium to 3% for the reactor? under iaea supervision. or give it all up, or whatever. i won't go into the details. they've got several other kinds

of things, but i think it is possible but it will take both sides getting over this distasteful series of decades that have really given a bitterness to the relationship that's going to be hard to overcome. >> let me interject this zbig story. so, zbig was in algiers october 1979 representing the president at the 20 this anniversary of -- madeline and i were there within. the iranian delegation led by the prime minister, defense minister and foreign minister, reached out and asked zbig for a meeting. he got permission from the white house and went to the meeting. 's. >> this is after the iranian revolution? >> yes. this is eight months after the

revolution. this is the first senior level, u.s. official contact with the iranian revolution a government. so the first engagement, if you will. and i went as a notetaker but i will just say as an aside, they brought with him some of the best best shows i've ever eaten. [laughter] that aside, zbig open the dialogue with them by saying we are prepared to recognize your revolution. we will work with you. we will even sell you the weapons with contracted to sell to the shah, because we have common interests. above all common interest is the soviet union on your northern border. and they said, give us the shah who was then being treated medically in the united states. and this dialogue, if you call it that, went back and forth for about one hour. and at the end, i'll never forget it, zbig stood up and

said for us to turn the shah to you would be incompatible with our national honor. that ended the meeting. three days later the embassy was seized. within two weeks all three of those officials were out of a job, and that began this process. and as i like to say, that began my now more than 30 year-long search for the elusive iranian immoderate. but i think it's important to realize where the united states started in this relationship in terms of the first senior contact with senior leaders of the iranian government. and as brent says, maybe this'll work out. maybe, just maybe our strategy under both the bush and obama administrations of putting the squeeze on these guys in a really meaning -- meaningful way economic lay, may actually work. and i think, i think it is worked to the point of leading to change in tone that brent was

talking about, whether leads to an actual change in policy as he says, i don't think anybody knows and, frankly, i'm not sure the iranians know. >> we've all gone through various phases of their own. i was in the white house at the time bob is talking about, but also during the clinton administration, there was a small or we thought something could happen. i'm trying to figure out the very lessons from the. partially i have to say that we were out of dissidents because we'd know anything about who the people in iran were. i thought that there was a meeting that kofi annan had set up in the u.n. that was to do with afghanistan, and it was my understanding that we were meeting with the foreign minister. he had been the perm rep at the u.n. the same time i was. we walked in, i thought he looked different but so did i,

and so i said, isn't it nice when the perm rep it comes to foreign minister? nothing but isn't it great when you know your way around the u.n.? nothing. so i turned to the entire bench behind me of all iranian experts and i said as this -- and they said we don't know. [laughter] it turns out that it is not on his the deputy prime minister who is now the foreign minister. i think the issues are that we lost our kind of knowledge of what was going on. also, i had to send anything to went to be careful about this now, we embraced and too much. and, therefore, whatever the reaction to him in tehran is was something that i think we need to watch now. but i have to tell you, sanctions were there, so i decided that i would lift the sanctions on the stashes, rugs and caviar. not that we needed them, but they were associate with the

merchant class and we thought they could be helpful. i have to report that the iranians actually have a great sense of humor because when i got out of office and could accept things they sent me a rug, caviar and pistachios. [laughter] spent let me make one more point. when there were competition ended with a brand, is who you deal with. iran has a very unusual state structure. they have a government run right now by rouhani. the laws passed by the government are subject to confirmation by the religious establishment, the mullahs, who really are the governing authority of the country. they rely on the revolutionary guards to give them, to give their authority actual account.

iran as an army, navy and air force. they've never been allowed any freedom of access. the revolutionary guard who runs it. so who in this triad, who has the real authority and how do knoyou know when you're talkingo one or the other of them? what kind of cachet they have to deliver. >> which is why i think if there is a reason to be optimistic, it is i think this. as madeline said, there were efforts to see if he could deliver. it could not. we, of course, than half all my dennis dodd u.s. the face of iran that is part of the best thing we could have asked for if you want to try to get sanctions. because he was a very -- ahmadinejad. use every object showcase for all the world to see. i think the point is there was a

dysfunction in the iranian system. we had a number of instances where we had negotiations going. we thought with large -- way to deal on negotiations to go back to tehran or and for a time when supreme leader wanted to do, ahmadinejad would kill it. and then in the end in the obama administration 2009 when it looked like ahmadinejad was going to accept the deal, then the supreme leader rejected the. this may have resolved a dysfunction in the iranian system, so that you now have a president hu was on the same page as the supreme leader and the supreme leader who is at least willing to let him negotiate with the west and see what he can come back with. the supreme leader continually though retain the option to accept or reject the.

don't know. may be an approved system for us to do with, only solution is to test it, see what we can get. >> so we have perhaps five minutes left with extended time before he moved to the next panel. and perhaps i might just take a few questions. i think rather than question, answer, question. why don't we bundle three '04 inventor back to the panel and let the panelists make whatever comments they choose. for anyone who'd like to ask a question, please find a microphone runner. yes, standing over at the side. >> you can raise your hand and david will call on you. if you can stand up and say your name and your affiliation. give your name and your affiliation. >> i'm a second or strategic studies at csi. this question for secretary

albright. do you think one of the consequences of a availability of information means that there is, is there greater pressure for viewers to respond to a large number of incidents and a large number of events in would given that this build is so much higher -- visibility. if that is the case how do you do that affecting u.s. strategy? how do you avoid distracting? how did kind of filter through information as to what you really want to look at, when there is so much volume out there spinning hold that thought here there's a gentleman on the other side, and other people like to speak, please raise your hand. >> hello. i'm a student here as well. my name is mark and my question is, if you were a student right now what would you try to focus on studying next? [laughter] >> this question came in mission

there are people using 21st century technology and the people are respond with 19th century ideas, so how do we get to the 21st century ideas? >> another great question. also shameless. [laughter] >> we have a question in the front. >> ani was wondering how much do you think will shale gas, both now in use and in the future, pretty ubiquitous he around the world, change the negotiating leverage of the united states in the middle east, including iran? >> one last one. >> i'm dr. brzezinski's current research assistant.

one of the articles in the book i found most interesting was the compression of dr. brzezinski and dr. kissinger and the discussion about the foreign security and international affairs establishment in the united states isn't bald. all of you spent careers in there. i'm wondering how you have seen the american foreign policy assessment evolve, where you think it's a volunteer in a source of people that are in there, the path they've taken and that sort of thing. thank you very much spent wonderful question with policy. i'm going to turn to secretary albright and secretary gates. pick whatever was directed at you or whatever. >> i just had to make a comment to the last one because i was secretary, dr. brzezinski's research director right after we left the white house. we didn't have to go to a conference and they want to know what my title was. i asked him and he said call yourself empress of research.

[laughter] >> remember? let me say that i think that the question about information technology has changed everything. because part of the thing, and it's interesting to go back and refer to president carter, and also what dr. brzezinski has said at the time, what is our national interest? and were human rights our national interest? the determination was that protection of human rights was in our national interest. so when, in fact, we see -- and the fact that as bob said, there was a decision not to return bashaw, that is part of our humanitarian approach to things. so the question is what happens when as a result of information technology we know that people are killing each other for no good reason, except that they are and nothing that they had ever done? and so what happens is i think there is pressure for us to do something. so at the same time we are tired from iraq and afghanistan,

questionable wars, and so the bottom line is, how do you react to this? and then, i have been very involved in the whole concept of responsibility to protect, which is if this is going on does the international community have some responsibility? and then the question is, who carries it out? i think we don't know the answers to this yet and i decided that the american people are the most you may attend and generous people in the world with the shortest attention span. so the bottom line is how do we deal with this? because this information is coming in very, very quickly and hard to deal with. americans don't like the word multilateralism. it has too many syllables and ends in an is him a. [laughter] sobol partnership aspect of how to deal with the issues is what comes up. >> first on the deluge of information. this actually is not as bad as you may think.

this actually in some way started with cnn, and our member of walking up the north drive of the white house when i was working for brent, and some young reporter from cnn came breathlessly up to me and ship this thing in her air and she said such and such is going on, what are you going to do about it? i said well first, i'm going to go in and find out if what you just said is true, and they will do something really unlikely. we're going to stop and think about it. and then we will decide what to do or not to do. i think one of the things that has been lacking, frankly, is simply discipline inside the executive branch. there's never been disciplined in the legislative branch, but what come in terms of shooting their mouths off, but there is a lack of discipline inside the executive branch in terms of refusing to be pushed by the media and by visuals running out

as opposed to taking considered -- looking at things in a considered way and taking your time to make the right decisions. as i told president bush when he was thinking about win to make his speech on the surge, i said take your time. it's better to make a tactical, have a tactical loss in terms of delay, then make a strategic mistake. the only other thing i would say in response to the question over here about people in the national security arena, and with something i don't do it when i and i feel very deeply about, when i left the government in come the end of june 2011, i was the last senior person in the american government who had served both republicans and democrats. there used to be more of a cadre

of people who came up through the ranks and became senior officials, who had served both republicans and democrats. and now increasingly, people align themselves with one or the other, even when they are young and whether it's on the hill or in the executive branch, they work for a democrat or a republican. and when they go out of power they go to university or think tank or something. and when another democrat or republican is elected, they come back. i would just say i think from the standpoint, than a national -- the lack of people with bipartisan credentials and who are respected on both sides of the aisle is something deeply to be mourned in this capital city. >> i'll be brief. i agree with what bob said in both parts, but particularly the first part of his answer. but i think it's largely, it's much harder to what he said.

and i'm going to take a page from something brent scowcroft has said many times. he said when he was national security advisor there was one big thing which was the soviet union, and at any point in time for a couple small crises to manage. and with the soviet union we knew what the strategy was but we disagreed or five over the tactics. but if you're a national security advisor now, you -- the pressure to be crisis manager is enormous. think about it, as i said, putting on a 12 burner stove and each burner has a part in each burner as -- it's close to boil and the pot as a spoon in it. national security advisor tends to go to pot the pot stirring them to keep them from boiling over. there's a limited bandwidth in the white house. and by the time an issue comes to the white house i think it

tends to be one of crisis by the time it's become a crisis, a lot of your good options are gone. the options for economic and diplomatic activities that take time to mature. so it's frontloaded if you will to sort of temp people to go quickly to the military options fairly quick. and i think that is a structural problem that we need to figure out how to fix. because i think the world is going to continue to look like that for a considerable period of time. >> i'll be really brief because i think everything i want to say has already been sent. but to add to the issue of flood of information, we are living in a new age. not only as steve said, the cold war is over. the cold war determined our strategy. the strategy was given. that's no longer true. but in addition there are forces

at work in this world that are changing the character of the world from the old 20th century nationstate system that we are all instinctively aware of. and what is it? it is now people who never before were part of a society. there was an inevitability to life. you were born just like your father, your children would be in the same job that you had. this was a rigid life. now they look at modern technology and say it's not that way at all. and some people who never were participants in national life now are. and every spring is a good example. it's people -- it's everybody now. and it's not simply we tend to think anybody arises against the dictator is a democrat. not necessary democracy.

it's dignity. it's dignity. it's being treated like a human being, not like chattel. and that's a world that is really hard to get around. >> so, i would say that the level of this conversation surely has been the level that our honoree and mentor and friend was expect and want. zbig, we are all your students. i think i speak for everybody up your, and thank you so much for everything you have done. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations] >> welcome to the second panel. before the panel discussion of the book and questions of dr. brzezinski i like to think the

co-authors who are here today. robert hunter, david ignatius, iraq off -- after gone. i deeply regret that professor nancy tucker is no longer with us. she was a co-author of the chapter with warren cowan. to satisfy your curiosity, dr. brzezinski knew about the project but he didn't read the book and tell after it was done. the details are to be discussed over drinks later on. i asked the authors, all of them, to be respectful but not uncritical towards dr. persons keep and that is what they delivered. i would also like to thank the

incredibly competent editors and publishers at johns hopkins university press, especially susanne and robin were also here with us today. now, for this panel, i am the warm-up act. the panel features sabena brzezinski himself as was robert hunter, jessica matthews and david roth costs. i will not waste your time with introductions. i will take a few minutes, however, to introduce the book itself. we have three objectives. first we wanted to offer the first comprehensive account in english of zbigniew brzezinski's work as an academic, as a key policy maker, and as a policy advocate and strategist. our second goal was to place his contributions in a proper perspective. several chapters, for example,

deal with the role he played in bringing a peaceful end. to deal with how he managed to combine political loyalty with intellectual integrity. not something very common in washington these days. and less obviously, the longest chapter in the book, chapter one, deals with the important role that he played in making room at the top for immigrants as well as for women, blacks and jews. please remember that zbigniew brzezinski and kissinger, the foreign policy of those and it was composed of white males. today, we know longer know when an immigrant or a woman become secretary of state. and blacks occupy the highest foreign policy positions at the nsc, or went to snack leads the council on foreign relations. of course, they encountered resistance. i'm referring here to come particularly to dr. brzezinski. i'll give you a no station from

the book. in 1974, dr. brzezinski learned that a member of the -- didn't think that someone named brzezinski should occupy a high foreign policy post. so he penned a feisty little letter, which i'm going to read. since you are a blunt man, let me say quite likely that i do not feel that henry kissinger's background has qualified him from getting with the middle east. nor do i think that your background as a millionaire capitalist prevent you from dealing intelligently with the soviet communists. [laughter] yours sincerely, zbigniew brzezinski. i hasten to add that they soon reconciled. so while our first goal was to evaluate his career, and the second to place it in

perspective, our third goal that i tried to emphasize was to publish a book that is readable, mixing very six essays with a few stories about him. that is certainly no time here to even mention most of these stories, but i will summarize two of them that i particularly like your. ..

music need. you have to come in the meet. [laughter] the second story that is funny, more sentimental takes you to boston where he became a u.s. citizen in 1958. the book/air, which is a conversation between him and myself, at least the question of why he didn't change his impossibly difficult name at that time. i did changemakers name when i became a citizen in a few years that that offers after him. he said he was confident that in america people can come american without masking that attended tt. the only country where someone named big new% he can make any

without changing the theme. this concludes my warm-up act. ambassador hunter, you go first. >> i had the honor to work for all four years one morning and he tvd eyewitness said my fianée and i are going to district court. to get very. he said congratulations and take the rest of the day off. so i did that. let me say before posing a question to it, just a few items that let you decide what is the most important. number one of me was never too busy to be concerned about the problems of the people who worked for. number two, he went out and

looked for talent is a brought in the talent, kept a small server and had to work hard and directly for him. what he gave you a hard time coming yuko would wonder how they made a dent at all. the next day you'd find if your arguments are any good heap but that to you very important, something very few people in government get, he never shot the messenger. he also was powerful in itself to speak to power. if you've never seen an official told the united states is wrong, and you start to see that. jimmy carter respected that in "zbig" just as the people who worked for him. number four, he was a person who always had a strategic

perspective, which is something very rare and today less evident that it was in the past. the sewers had to fit inside the house where he was come up with a different give and look at things as they changed, in effect enabled us to have a greater coherence coming even as times of turbulence that we might have otherwise have. jimmy carter recognized at one point when he was asked he left office about another member of the administration. why did she show a preference for dr. trade that sent? he said the other named person i sent him sacaton a deal with the month. with zbig, i get 10 a night. one very, very important thing to look at. with zbig coming to receive before, during and after power.

he helped to shape the strategic and intellectual environment going in to carter's administration during the key strategic role in the way forward and afterwards, even today, nobody can hold a candle to him when it comes to thinking about the future. i don't know anybody who can do that. zbig, let us say that in 1973, 1974 commuter called in by someone who is thinking about running for president. either he or she would say to you, i hope to be president in two, three years time. what should i be thinking about? who should i be talking to? how to prepare myself? how do i look forward to being

commander-in-chief? returned to you and you got a short period of time. what would you say to him or her kid and ready be president for national security? >> that's a really tough one actually. >> eat it before. i get to do it again. >> first of all, in general without talking individually to particular friends in parts of my past year that i am profoundly moved by this occasion and very, very grateful to everyone who's part of it. to you for initiate, who had the idea first and to you who authority spoken who have followed me that governments surveys indicate the added confidence about the future when i hear of the speech to what you do. my closest colleagues on the nsa with whom i work so closely take in, day out.

you have contributed so much to greater understanding in america. i feel very fortunate to be a part of this undertaking here today. that doesn't do even 5% justice to modesto to each of you individually could let me say this because i feel i really should knowledge within transpiring. as to this question, how do you prepare someone to be president, i would think that the essential aspect of it has to be an opportunity at some point in a person's career, prior to the assumption of such an ambitious undertaking to really become familiar from the complexities of today's world. there's a real risk that we may

be having candidates running for office whose knowledge of international affairs is either very limited are very primitive. i think if you look at the different combinations of candidates in recent elections and at least half of the two nominees. at non-exact way partisan statement. bush number one really understood a great deal about the world when he came to office. i was struck by how much obama had thought about world affairs prior to coming to office and focused about what is new in our age and that is initially would attract me. having said that fairly obvious

statement commanders a further thing that has to be mentioned. namely, they have to be aware of the presidential calendar opportunity because it is a relatively brief and highly condensed calender. you're not sure you're going to get a second term and therefore it is essential to deal among other things of foreign affairs, which is what i was talking to a candidate about. prioritize and think early as to which action undertakings are essential not only to future success as a historic figure, but to the more immediate american interests in the larger time for your work because he will not too much time to achieve the. it is probably accurate to say that, for example, president obama had a clear understanding of the big challenges he was facing in the speeches he gave

on the subject indicated profound knowledge. but there was not an intense and determined to follow a on most of the substantive ideas for a ticket they did in his speech. in part because of domestic diversions. in part perhaps because of the assumption they would be another term. the result is in some key issues that the momentum he brought to power within them the opportunity that seem to be created in which much of the world expected did not come fast. this is one lesson i think you have pursued if you think about it. >> let me start by thanking you. i think this book is a great contribution for every student in the room, any of us who thinks about international affairs. josé also anybody who hasn't read it yet, it is a great read.

[inaudible] [laughter] >> is a wonderful contribution. i will thank you and congratulate you. i was reminded of this by the first panel, remembering my first reaction. i came in, sat down. i was 30 years old my background is in biochemistry, so i was even younger in terms of knowing that. zbig said, how would you solve the arab-israeli conflict? luckily i had read the article he just published on that subject, which may have been the purpose of the question. what struck me reading this book, one of the things was the

contrast between zbig and many people serving government of not our first panel notably, but many whose views of the world gets frozen in that era in which they serve. no matter how much longer they live, what they write seems crystallized in that moment and what strikes you right away is how brzezinski has stated that for a cutting-edge of international affairs and thinking through an extraordinarily long period of time. one of the things that has changed that it ain't the first and all the people and stuff, it didn't hit head-on, which i'd like to ask about that very long period of time as we've gone from that beginning a time when politics stop at the water's

edge to the periods of the cold where with very deep divisions for 10 republicans and democrats, but where the potential and reality of agreement was real and was taken as the goal, and achievable goal, to today when foreign policy is bareknuckle politics by another name. where there is no expect tatian for anything would be met by the automatic opposition by the other party. i wondered zbig, what do you ensure your thoughts on this evolution. if you are starting your career now, how would you think about

framing execution, institutional base is for making foreign policy in this environment? and is it even possible to think about turkey jake and steady foreign policy making given this current reality of our policy? >> i don't think there is a choice. one has to think about the reality of a strategic fashion. whether one likes it or not, however one complicated it becomes, it is going to impinge on our immediate future, longer-term prospects. strategic thought has to be responsive to these dilemmas. it has to be driven by the realization that we have come to a prolonged -- we have come to the end of it or ladera in world

affairs in which struggle for hegemony was reality and struggle for local hegemony was for almost 20 years. global hegemony became at least the dream and perhaps the expert tatian of top-level political leadership at the turn -- beginning at the 19th century, roughly the time of the napoleonic era. napoleon was the first political leader who thought that the nation of europe would mean an effect domination of the world and in that context, he fashioned ambitious plan for not only current east of suez and displacing the british, but

incorporating russia and the european system, which he would terminate from france. that set in motion a change of events, which contained within next 200 years. the last big encounter involving the possibility was the cold war, which at one moment almost came to a military collision. and in the end, to a dramatic end that because of the sistine pressures that rival confronted in the course of waging the cold war, pressures we also could rent it, too much to handle. today with that in the world in which global hegemony is no longer attainable by anyone. it would have to be a dramatic transformation of global conditions. all of a sudden to entertain the notions of global hegemony or someone else's imposing a. we talked earlier about the

russians. one of the reasons that the russians are playing that game is while they stand to lose some income of if we cannot entirely and have come and have committed us to realize the stand to lose a great deal until the situation flanders and becomes explosive and there for some accommodation must be possible between their personal interests and ours. the same is true of the chinese beginning to enter the picture. indeed they're also beginning to enter the process of negotiating with the uranium because of the limitations inherent in the possibility of an explosion that would be damaging so much of what i've can do. as a consequence, we do with the world in which we have to choose much more carefully are going to be engaged in sometimes have to make hard decisions not to be engaged, even if there is

justifiable, moral imperatives that they because the consequences had become over engaged can be so disastrous. all of that things strategizing now is much more complex than has to take into account things we've mentioned such as global political awakening, which unleashes political forces that no major power can easily contain, control or repressed. it is a striking fact that since winning world war ii and the coalition in which one of our coalition allies did more than we did two women, the united states is the most important and most powerful power hasn't won a single war. we didn't win in korea. we didn't win in vietnam.

>> in terms of the satisfaction with the outcome but with the absence of any real bore in any sense. i think today, prairie tasting national polls, trying to create coalitions, learning how to deal with rifles, regime governments regarding this scale that those who wishes to see a better powers are limited and vulnerabilities may be racing at the same time it's an infinitely more complex process. that requires to turn to the last part of your question. more concentration of strategic decision-making, in my judgment. not in the state department.

randomness defense department all deal with portions of the problem and raised in importance depending which button becomes critical, war, peace, intelligence threats and so forth. the decision-making process of a strategic type has to come from a systematic effort. of course, within some institutions, but much more conscious for the need for political sensitive training for actions that need to be undertaken. by and large, to have long-term political, strategic planning and different branches of government. we have sent in the state department doesn't. it is not the range of responsibilities and the kind of capacity for advocacy at decisions that is inherently complex and dangerous circuits instance of which i speak.

something more in the white house, something more strategically focused on the meaning first of all people the think strategically, but also portions of the bureaucracy themselves preoccupied with comprehensive, national strategic planning in an era of change. we don't do that. that's only partially been done in the state department. the defense department coaxes some more for an intelligence community. that is not good as done. i think the president's responsibility are so demanding that he has to have people deliberately chosen with these qualities in mind and the mechanisms assisting them in the center of the government. that means that the secretary of state has to be his chosen agent

for seeking strategic solutions with a peaceful outcome and with full support. but not be responsible for the overall strategy because the overall strategy has to have all the other evidence as well. that is of course an unpalatable conclusion for the people and the responsibility of having to depart thence. i think those presidents who themselves provided some of that war who had some people who thought in that fashion tended to be more effective as presidential leaders in the area for policy. >> well, it's a pattern here come the soft but the first time that i met zbig. i was 22 years old and i was an aide to a congressman named

steve sowers, who's a wonderful guy, deeply interested in foreign policy. i had just joined his staff and he and inactive great charity invited me to join them for a meeting with the national security adviser in the white house. i've never been to the white house. i'd never met a national security advisor. as one of the most terrifying experiences of my life. so through his land, but also a little twinkly right now. when i met him in the white house command he was just as intimidating a human being as you could possibly be. and i felt ill at ease for the meeting. having said that, they were talking about an issue in the issue had to deal with north korea and god does. some kind of issue around that.

he peeled away strategic layer after strategic layer that he can with the north koreans have been the situation on the korean event and then with dick cheney said then that the russians had met with our interests. it was clear that behind this there was a worldview. i found this very intimidating and i've ended up spending a lot of life because of the scars from that meeting study and the national security council. i agree with your assertion here that you need to have a strategic capacity within the white house and the best of the people who've occupied the national security advisor chair tried to do it. i talked about rented the first had to do it and how they inevitably are overtaken. see a new burger talks about the phenomenon in washington for the urgent overtakes the important. all sorts of solutions. typically they involve adding

staff at the national security council. when henry was running the nsc and reached its biggest, it was 40 people are sent to mike that. today we are nearing 400 people of national security staff. but it doesn't seem any more strategic to me. i don't think making it bigger is creating to synthesize. for a while perhaps during the cold war, there is a kind of model, a bipolar world as was indicated in the earlier panel, there is a strategy at the center of the. it seems over the course of the past couple years, we've been slandering, looking for a model. one thing that strikes me as over the arc of your career, at the very beginning, there was a lot of talk about a lot of power. henry kissinger read about talents of power world in the early 50s. we just cannot have a balance of power war.

but i wanted to bipolarity and what we thought was unipolarity and after 9/11, we decided to equate the enemy that emerged them with their cold war enemy so we would be in a new pseudo-bipolarity. now, at the end of the cycle, we seem to be coming back to the balance of power. that actually requires understanding of the players, whether the regional actors, whatever the term matalin used. that requires a kind of poetic mind. we talk about the structures that require strategy. got a roomful of young people here steadiness. one of the things that struck me is people at grantor steve rennie people wake up a new kind of want to know what great people like this have for

breakfast. it's my impression that they have for breakfast is the world. they wake up and say what's going on? how do these pieces fit together? how does this affect my world view? there seemed to be fewer and fewer people out there looking strategically. he's got a group of young people in an institution trying to train people to do that. i am wondering what kind of rice you might care to sort of guide people in the direction of not looking at the headline are not looking at the regional issue in today's issue, but connecting the dots. >> first of all, i do want to say that there's no shortage of trained power in this country and there's no shortage in the analysis of individuals with the capacity to do with needed.

we had an example of that that panelists who would. and they're appearing now. the question is whether power centrally it can be organized in such a way that the strategic definition of the challenges we face can be pursued in a systematic fashion to some degree of prioritization and there is a president who understands he has a narrow window of opportunity for the fulfillment of the specified type is and who is able to mobilize public opinion on behalf of the. this is the dimensionality stress for a second. in most of the conflicts in which the united states has been engaged in since it became a major international power, it was easy to confide to the public that we have threatened

the very threat in a spirit are causes. they are bad. we are a democracy. they are not a democracy. today, it is so much more complicated. our public, given this context of everything moving in on this, and information been so available is staggeringly uninformed and therefore formulating a policy that the public's court is beyond the capacity of a single individual no matter how rhetorically skillful years as president. we need to thing about the issue of what is informing our public in this continuously conflict

conditions in which the leadership faces threats to national security day in and day out. china's not going to attack us somehow or another. conceivably, at some point in the next 20 years, if china were to do the unprecedented capacities and cyberwarfare and so forth to the conceivably we could be office had defeated one day without knowing we are defeated. much more likely, are ambiguous conflicts about which the public doesn't understand the basis which has not been made to a systematic education, training and information. we don't have them forward, almost five major newspapers in this century on the reliable basis basis than a day-to-day basis. we have minimum of serious world

news on the networks. the so-called evening news, half an hour about the world is maybe 45 seconds to world news is something really important happens. most of it is human interest stories. increases in medical information because that's a national obsession and probably something sensational and loving the major figure in entertainment business and so forth. it provides systematic information about the world today merrick public that otherwise watches television and the way people used to pray in the past. >> the conclusion you're coming to this form policy magazine. >> that is my punchline at the end. you're taking it away. >> and now, increasingly available to us, bbc, not bad at

all. not that france 24 and increasingly good and increasingly accessible, al jazeera, which does a surprisingly good job of conveying repeatedly 30 minutes of world news. but doesn't originate from within the united states. silly of the public is this a set to go to large-scale demagogy. overreacting. after 9/11, terrorism became a number one. here, there's the curious interaction between the public's ignorance and now official reaction. we immediately declared to war on jihad is terror without

considering what the combination means to those people to whom jihads means holy war, the equivalent of crusade to christians. we have created the public and atmosphere for proposition in the world, liddy to up rated college and, or if inerrant sense of national security. i said this a couple of times and it shocks people to hear me say this, but i'm appalled how they have these people on the ground floor can send uniform in which it is written prominently on their shoulders securitycompany but you two who you want to see in my floor and then you ask to sign a document and show your i.d. a number of occasions i wrote

osama bin laden. i've never once been stopped. last night last night the public have become so obsessed with different challenges, which in some cases not even warrant a judgment. it's very difficult for us to spend national security or intelligence or military force, but also gaining national influence with other key players who are not as powerful as we, but you came into play at it difficult to exercise the hegemony for 13 years after night he named the period we were supreme in the world. revert this dream global superpower. everybody knew it was signed to

a company its heyday, but how to respect it. recovering some of the territory will depend also on the ability of our society to generate enough public and the leadership to the country. courses of accommodation, restraint or cooperation with others, even those who don't have the same principles but are prepared to accept the reality of having to share responsibility for the world. secretary clinton was cc superb secretary for global affairs. she made some progress in that respect. this has to be continued as a long-term commitment and at the same time be faced with the necessity for having people respond to each challenge. in a way, i wish we had her secretary of state for global

affairs and secretary kerry first teacher challenges serving at the same time because we need the approach of public support. >> thank you very much. i'm going to follow the excellent example in on students preferably in the back. we will have time for three questions, please. >> students in the back. going back there. hold on. >> high coming to the mix for coming out tonight. the name is hillary mathis. i'm a first-year student here. >> we can barely hear you. >> high, thank you for coming to an hillary mathis, he firsters due to. i was wondering if you could comment on how you think the increasing use of drugs allergy and small-scale tactical strikes will change strategic

calculations on the national security council and in the white house. >> thank you good next question, please. >> my name is wilhite legend in the first year private studies concentrator. mr. rothkopf brought up the worldview that underpins approaches to foreign policy. i'm curious how you strike a balance between the worldview of local understanding of these issues. if you could talk about various studies and are able to help me this conflict. >> i'm not sure i understood the question. could you give us a summary. the relationship between area studies? >> one of the topics today that dr. brzezinski brought up was the number of wars unites cases lost since world war ii.

>> did not win. >> one of the reasons for that is their lack of understanding in these areas. >> one more student question right here. >> my name is david bino, second-year student here. as when and what advice you'd give to us for cultivating the strategic thinking you embrace and endorse. >> let's do one more. >> high, thank you. many miss david payne. i do question about the fact he mentioned how the u.s. had the spirits of -- the global system has had periods of dreams of local hegemony and this. and the sun. it's been a popular argument in the u.s. is on the decline. my question for you is how do you view the u.s. future in the international?

and do you think the u.s. decline is somehow indicative of the problem and if it is how to respond. that's my question, thank you. >> well, first of all, as a weapon, it is quite a sight is. the question is how do you sit in the circumstances? i can understand the need for techniques, which can strike across borders, thereby avoiding the necessity of some sort of military involvement, entanglement, enlargement of warfare. set dvd, precision and so forth are obviously assets that terrorism imposes on us the need to respond to. in that sense, i defend them.

what does bother me is the absence to my satisfaction of a mechanism first of all within the department of defense and ultimately in the white house that carefully reviews the scope of the likely event i.d. which should be afflicted that they drove and monitors carefully cases in which obvious he associated collateral damage to place on a scale which is political as well as morally not accept the vote. i don't think we have yet to work out such arrangements for processing the capacity in a manner which makes the response to terrorism effect is, but what of creating political as well as moral consequences, which aired for centuries. this is something that has to be worked out. i feel the same way about the covert assassinations.

it seems to me this is some thing to be engaged in only the most exceptional circumstances and to set a judicial procedure in the 60s branch, preferably the white house to make certain that i'll ask it would accompany any such decision. i'm managing conflicts, i would put it simply negatively. we have to realize we will be living in a conflicted world. we are beginning to live in an increasingly conflicted world. the global political awakening will produce more complex rather than fewer because it sets loose suppress fashions as well as ignorance and disinfect distance now repressed into immediate collisions. all of that is going tonight the world much more anarchistic and its overall shape. for that reason, we have to be very careful and potential energizes us to win to become a terribly involved.

syria is a good example of that. there is no simple military solution to syria without running the risk of the problem becoming not just national, but regional. this is why correctly the united states has exercised caution and this is also why other states such as russia has to some extent already started, realizing that if there is a regional explosion, they will be the dems had perhaps not to the same extent that week, but nonetheless vital interest would be presented. restraint and collective response is perhaps the best way to respond. i wasn't sure what the third question was.

>> you are in no way coupled with study abroad, but also emphasizing not just what we've been talking about, but also a sense of history and changing history and how it is interpreted differently in different, takes culturally and nationally, ethnically, religiously because history provides the fundamental motivation for retail what is happening in the world. real or alleged to send of unfairness, discrimination, are all of a sudden awakened in the context in which power can be exercised his use of force, outraged massive or by highly motivated terroristic groups. therefore for that reason we also have to be deeply conscious

of the fact that others thought. on the basis of historical motivations, which we do not either understand and certainly do not share in their own historical motivations are very subject to the product of very specific mission, which create conditions in which is more difficult for others to understand or accept motivations essence here or construct it. this is a new global mosaic that hasn't existed in the recent times. the process is intensifying because global political awakening is spreading. is spreading from the middle east and the further and northward. it is spreading westward across africa. they're a real possibilities of the indian native problem becoming serious and as a result, we are going to be dealing with more challenges in the next decade and a half.

finally, the u.s. future. >> that is the most difficult question to answer. the answer has to be a mixed with. we are certainly not in the dominant position we were 20 years ago. we are unlikely to recover it probably in the course of the lifespan of everybody in this room. that is to say we are not going to be as omnipotent and unique of those 20 years. they could recover a considerable degree of influence and capacity to act to maximize capacity to act intelligently. if in the meantime other countries, i do not see any of the dean candidate for that kind

of role. the ukrainian to have been engaging in extraordinary provocative behavior seemed to be received in a moderating. the chinese who are rivals to us are not ideological enemies anymore, even though they proclaim themselves a rule by a communist party. the notion they are building communism hardly ever enters the minds of those sitting in the leadership of the communist party. even in the party at the risk of the growing cynicism i once spoke at the party school for the chinese leadership. after answering their questions, said that may ask you a question. i understand your current president a few years ago as a great idea very represents. that was the way he phrased it in about three desirable, social

political conditions in the country and ask him about does it mean? the entire room burst out laughing. they thought it was so hilariously funny question, assuming it is obviously making fun of the president and inside my sharing my son does ironical detachment from that kind of souvenir he. the fact is we're probably going to be living in a setting in which contact by different states is going to be inherently ambiguous, even in their own understand and am very understanding about. that makes it inevitable that the condition of disorder and uncertainty is going to be an enduring reality. of course the more we learn

about others, the more of a census energy we have, the more it can gain partners, not quite allies, the countries which share some of our trees, basic interest in fundamental economic and social is the ability can coalesce. this is why talk about an american relationship that becomes increasingly close with europe. this is why something like this at the far east without excluding china from that is timely. these are the things statesmanship and the next phase of 20 commit dirty, 40, 50 years would require is infinitely more complex than anything anyone would study with officers as recently as 30, 40 years ago when i was a student. >> v4 we proceed to the recession and book signing, i would like to call in dr. brzezinski to make a few concluding remarks here. i would like to mention while

everybody knows he is a strategist man who can look ahead beyond today's headlines, it's been said several times today, what you may not know is dr. brzezinski of course together with his wife who was with us, and they plan strategically to shape even their family future. you didn't know that. you are learning a here today for the first time. their oldest son who is also here with us as a republican. their youngest son, mark, ambassador to sweden is a democrat. and we, their daughter, and the tv anchor is. now i have to ask you, can you think of any better way to be a strategist about the future? am going to ask dr. brzezinski to say fumarate before we go to the reception and book signing.

>> my german shepherd leans toward the tea party. last night started ecumenical family. now, i don't think i'm going to engage in any final word. i just want to express my appreciation again to everyone here for participating in this, particularly my colleagues in government on this podium and right there in the front row who has made such as funding contributions to america's well-being, all of which illustrates known as investment to vote. there's no special geniuses in charge. ability is distributed generous in our country and we have top-notch elite capable of moving from generation to generation. what we have to do is be alert to the fact the world has become infinitely mor