that point where there's an awful lot of people who recognize the crisis, recognize necessary fixes. not now the question is, can we get that last step, that last mile. >> it's that kind of gandhi quote. >> the final thing on this, the proposals we make are structural changes. we recognize that there are deep divides on issues like guns, on issues like preproductive rights and people are well organized to battle. what we argue is that many of the structural changes we propose in an honest debate can find left-right coalitions that are unexpected. across this country, where legislatures volted to overturn citizen united, republicans voted with democrats, in maine, 30 rum rums vote it with the democrats to pets television congress to act. we now have a republican cosponsor for a constitutional amendment, walter jones from the

carolinas, and saying, as a conservative republican this has to happen have to have a fair fight. our argument is that our job is to say, look, we can have honest differences on all sorts of fundamental issues but we ought to have a politics that works in this country and isn't just about big money, and during the shutdown fight issue thought republicans, members of congress talking about bailouts for corporations and complaining about this -- maybe there was some cynicism there. i'm not sure. i will tell you i think there's an immense amount of space and we have not begun to occupy that space. we have not begun to make those demands for the structural changes. it's time to do that. it's time to say that a conservative republican and a liberal democrat, ought to be able to agree that everyone should be able to vote, that our elections should have meaning, and that the vote ought to matter more than the dollar.

i'm delighted, if that's the framework of the debate, i'll debate anyone on that issue. one final thing to know. when the constitutional amendments have been proposed, not all of them get passed. the e.r.a. is still not on the books. i like to think i'll live to see it aid to our constitution. the equal rights amendment. but what happened also it was proposed, we got title 9. we got protections for women in the workplace, and so the bottom line is that when we aimed high for real fundamental reform, sometimes we got a lot of other things along the way, and at this point, we need all those other things along the way. >> i'm afraid from the day after that's going to have to be it but these guys have indomitable energy, and there's going to be a book signing and i get to ask one last question. will you sign my book while we thank them. [applause]

>> next,er hotta looks at the attack on pearl harbor from the japanese perspective. >> good evening, thank you very much for coming. it's always somewhat artificial situation of two people who know each other well, husband and wife, i suppose, fall into that category to do an interview in public like this, and why should i ask her questions that i can ask her over the breakfast table. on the other hand, one doesn't really normally discuss japanese naval strategy in 1941 over the

breakfast table. so, it's as good an opportunity as any to discuss this a little bit further. one of the thing is find most interesting about the book, and revealing, and possibly for many readers in this country also, is that it tackles certain myths about pearl harbor. one myth is -- which was, of course, very much encouraged in the media both par pareds, not only but the japanese and also the american administration, is that japan has been hijacked by the military and the civilians were not to blame for what happened. it was a kind of militarist coup and the japanese people and the emperor himself, were really sort of duped by the militarists into embarking on this reckless adventure. what would you say to that

particular myth? >> it was a very easy and convenient myth because it disengaged quite a few of the people who were actually responsible in reality, and of course for the japanese nation as well, to think that the war could have been averted was too painful a question to ask. i think. and that was sort of a self-perpetuating myth, that the japanese themselves took very easily to after the war. after having lost so much. >> in your book you also describe why it's wrong to think of it in terms of civilians being duped? because some of the civilian politicians, not least the prime minister for much of the time prince -- was actually to a

large extent responsible for what happened, even though he saw that it probably would lead to a disaster. we say something about that? >> right. the fact that the decision-making responsibility was shared between civilian and the military is hard to imagine because people just take it for granted the military is to cover. that was not the case. the leaders actually met over 70 times in the one year runup to the pacific war, and discussed the alternatives and different steps to be taken, and those conferences were calleddade dough conferences and that was not for anything that was called that because it was -- its function was to remove civilian and military strategies and policies and create a voice.

so civilian politicians can't say they didn't have any say, because they did have equal say. >> why did they go along with it even with great misgiving. >> i think it happened over a course of period which they gradually got themselves to think we can say this much, but then some kind of diplomatic breakthrough will happen. and when all of this is going on, the military leaders hat to put up a bold front so that to preserve their face and appease young over officers who were thinking about expanding and also an interest for the rivalry, the navy and the army always fighting with each other for bigger budgets, and i think

-- they were very much divided into different sympathies. so you can't talk about the military voice as one. so that's another myth that -- >> rather leads me to another myth, which is there always tremendous consensus. on the one hand, on the surface, there's consensus, but actually behind the scenes there was tremendous rivalry and differences, different factions and cliques. >> yes. >> trying to think and escapes me now, a japanese expression for the top guys being driven by the middle ranking people who are more radical. if you could explain. >> i think that the exact translation would be something like, the retainers upping the load. does that make sense? does that sound okay on the

translation? >> complete authority in principle but is actually weak and is sort of driven interest the more radical position by hawk heads who are in the middle ranks. >> justifies ousting of power as well by indicting the leaders as ineffective, basically. so, i think the one -- throughout the '30s, especially the beginning of the -- the first half of 1930s, up to february 2, 1936, i think they were really driven by this desire to rennovate the japanese policy and also to strengthen the system, and everything was done in the name of salvaging the emperor from corrupt influences that put japan under tremendous economic strain and economic considerations cannot be

separated in this period, like any other part of the world. so i think there were hot-belovedded -- hot bleed officers or soldiers who were ready to -- they had to be appeased. so there was fear about what could happen to them as well. >> destroy another myth of japan as a very authoritarian society, which on the one handhas some -- one hand has some truth, and on the hand the authorities were not in control you. mentioned the 1936 coup which may not be clear to everybody in 1936, a number of middle ranking officers, often from the northeast, country boys and the northeast was particularly badly hit by the depression, and that is where people were often

really hungry and the daughters had to be sold into prostitution and that kind of thing. the military officers at the time, they weren't unique in this in the world -- believed that people responsible for this plight were the capitalists, bankes, elite, establish. s, and they wanted to -- they were radicals of the right and wanted to stage a coup to put the emperor -- make the emperor into a kind of dictator, which he wasn't, and to set up a fascist state with the emperor in the center. and even though a lot of people, the admirals and generals and so on, were sympathetic to the aims of these young hot-heads and their sincerity and so on, for the more conservative members of the establishment, including the imperial household, they went too far. they didn't disagree with the aims necessarily but didn't like

the means. so this was a clear case of young people in the middle ranks driving the people in authority into positions they may not have wanted to be. >> i think the fact that the emperor was so affected by the experience of the failed coup, which nearly toppled him, is important, too, because that affected his passiveness and perhaps dissidence in putting his foot down in 1941, and he talks about it after the war, that he thought that if he tried to veto the war decision, he might be -- well, japan would have a coup d'etat of the time they try in 1936. hence i didn't say anything. but that also speaks for the fact that he thought that it was possible, which was in the constitution, not as clear as he

claims. >> the idea if they could have made a case he was badly advised and they would have replaced him with his -- >> one was a brother. >> one of the brothers. >> younger brother. >> much more radical. >> yes. popular. >> what about the other myth, which is that the japanese -- the myth that the japanese people, including the emperor, were duped by the militarists is one that is the standard mainstream myth. the right wing nationalist myth, which is still here in japan, is that japan was trapped into -- was forced into attacking pearl harbor because they were surrounded by western colonial pars, the a.b.c.d., my countrymen were involved in this, america, britain, -- >> china -- >> chinese and netherlands, and that japan had the perfect right

to defend its interests in asia, and interests in china, and they were surrounded by western powers who didn't want japan to have its moment in the sun. so they were driven by economic boycotts and that kind of thing. they had to do it. and then, of course, we can also talk about that. the americans kind of -- this is the myth-again -- the americans forced their hand. >> the a.b.c.d. -- a class explanation for many of the origins, kaiser's germany, world war i, complained about it very much and that was very much on the japanese mind as well. the fact that the wartime government made use of that narrative -- tojo in fact gave a

speech on the day of the pearl harbor attack that japan -- >> the prime minister. >> prime minister. japan entered the world war reluctantly despite all the nation's past efforts at trying to achieve peace in east asia. went hand in hand with this larger regional asia peace, the concept that japanese were taken by that sort of in the end, and in effect abused, but it was quite useful at the time as well, and useful to make them believe that they were fighting for the right cause. so, i think that narrative was quite strong and who would want to die for the wrong cause? so you want to believe that and if you are ordinary citizens without much access to full information, about the china role or japanese imperialism, i adopt think it's hard to imagine

how appealing that narrative might have been. >> a kernel of truth, too. it's true that, up like nazi germany, japan was fighting a war against other imperial powers, and george canyon was one person who actually criticized the u.s. diplomacy in retrospects' said they should have recognized japanese interests more than they did, and you could -- the whole problem stems from the fact that since the middle of the 19th 19th century, when japan was rather forcefully opened up by american gunships, the japanese saw their only chance to survive and be an independent nation and not be colonized it to be like a western power but that was late in the game. one can understand why it was

felt they had their rights and empire just as the european had empires. >> i can understand -- it's understandable but it's not an excuse, either. the fact that they had a relative -- a period of relative peace and democratic experiment in the 1920s, and this whole-hearted attraction to internationalism of the league of nations which the japanese more than anybody else took seriously. it's a shame they had to go down that way, and of course, in the understanding the broader frame of mind, it's useful to look at racism, colonialism, imperialism, and those are not triggering cause of war, or medium term causes of war. the cause for the war had more to do with japanese amibitions in east asia, rivalries for the

control of china, with competing against the united states and the russians as well, and the idea that the fact they had been quite lucky in their past wars probably affected the military's mindset, that perhaps this reckless war, too could be somehow won. >> the past wars had been imploded by the western powers. teddy roosevelt, when the japanese beat the russians in the russian-japanese war of 1905, talked about the plucky japanese, and so did the british, and the attack on the russian fleet in port arthur could be seep as a kind of -- not a dress rehearsal because it was the real thing, but a kind of pearl harbor at that time and succeeded admirably. >> the americans would object

the fact that the operation -- surprise attack as well, but the soviets don't seem to make as much of a myth about that. the surprise, stealth nature or the attack. has to do with the fact that so dramatic and the fact that the america was attacked on its soil, very heavily japanese populated island, ironically. i think it just became part of the american psyche, and collective narrative and became a symbol and departed from its real significance, perhaps. >> what does that play into american myths, john bauer among others, and he didn't necessarily condone the attack on pearl harbor. in fact he didn't. but his analysis is that one of

the reasons that the americans were so shocked by this event and so outraged, the idea of infamy, is that it played into the -- see it in so many western movies of the treacherous indians who were always attacking without warning from nowhere, the brave pioneers, and then suddenly these redskins screeching war cries and i think in his analysis, i think -- war without mercy -- i can't remember -- that's one that -- one explanation why it's still such a strong myth in america. it's exactly that. this treacherous attack. was it meant to be treacherous or was it a screwup? >> there's a huge debate about who is responsible for the delay in communicating the termination of the diplomacy to the white house. but the fact that the delayed document didn't really specify

they were -- it was not the declaration of war really, so you can't really argue -- the stealth of the attack had remained, and the sort of treacherous nature would have not been faked anyway in the world's mind. the fact he had this oratorical genius and could mobilize the nation, of course something to do with the enormity of the legacy, but something to be said about the comparison to indians or the native americans, shy say. >> redskins. in movies. not the word we use at our breakfast table. >> it's the -- just speaks for the disproportionate asymmetrical nature of the warfare being fought and that's why i think every 9/11, it was so compelling and so tempting for people to use that analogy,

the attack being much like pearl harbor, and that it is very underresourced power could overtake a giant, however momentarily. >> to carry on slightly from what we were talking about before, analysis by fusal, japanese intellectual who is no longer with us 0, who started as a communist, i think, and ended up as a ultra right wing nationalist, his phrase was, the hundred year war, and that pearl harbor was part of the war that actually started in he 1860s when japan was opened up by come

commodore perie, and ever since japan has been fighting back against western dominance. there is some truth to that? >> yes. if you look at the whole history in terms of cultural civilizational clash, that is very tempting and facile to explain all the political events that took place in the meantime, and reduce everything to these world views almost. of course, these things affect one's thinking but you can really say japan went to war because of the racism. of course, you can describe individual beliefs and how people might have reacted to certain situation differently, or certain leaders might have held on to certain beliefs more strongly than others, just

doesn't explain in the whole picture sufficiently in my eyes. i can see how it could be tempting and could sell a lot of books. >> my role here is to be the japanese right wing -- why did they do it? what did they think they -- what was the hope? even the great -- the master mind of the attack on pearl harbor, admiral yamato, who had been in the u.s. embassy in washington -- >> japanese embassy. >> knew the west very well, very sophisticated man who warned the government on several occasions it was very reckless thing to do but he did it nonetheless. now, i know that he was a gambling man and was probably vain enough to think that he was the man to do it, if anyone. what did they hope to get out of it? >> i think in the end it was a

gamble. but then by the time that they felt that they had been cornered into that situation, they justified it in terms of the slim possibility that something diplomatic could be worked out after inflicting a great deal of damage on the pacific fleet, on the united states. that even though the war was being declared in the name of the failure of diplomacy, they expected the american side to approach japan with diplomatic solutions. so japan itself didn't have any exit plan. >> at all. >> right. the fact that japanese war was -- japan also didn't have an exit plan then, either, and it was because of theodore roosevelt's intervention and peacemaking efforts that japan just got away winning it.

it was not a straightforward win. >> roosevelt -- the japanese almost wasn't bankrupt interest the russian-japanese war and were baled out by a banker in new york who had escaped the antisemitic programs in russia and was not a friend of the russians, and then white russian officers who were then arrested, taken prisoners by the japanese, introduced the japanese to the protocols of the elders and many japanese put two and two together to jacob shift. we have to keep the jews on our side was the conclusion. which is why the japanese during world war ii refused to hand over the jews to the nazis when the germans requested it from shanghai. i think we're getting close to question time. but the last question, perhaps, and -- i think i'm right in saying that in america, pearl

harbor has become a mythical occasion which is used over and over, not the least after 9/11, but in japan when people think of world war ii, pearl harbor is not the first thing that comes to mind. >> no. i think day aye tommic bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki the first thing at that time come to mind, and bombing in major cities tends to get forgotten or not discussed. i think that sort of experience dies hard. but then it's been almost 70 years, nearly 70 years, since the end of the war, and that sort of collective experience is becoming thinner and thinner. so, i can't really say even that they have this strong attachment to any of the bombings, including a-bombings, aside for the fact that they get taught in

school much moore effectively than they are being taught about -- >> maybe may be another reason, why so many japanese intellectuals, people who were not fascists, applauded pearl harbor because it came as an enormous relief. they had been fighting china, and getting deeper and deeper into what was a quagmire. people felt rather -- many people felt embarrassed, think, before the -- about it. even now. more people know if they think about world war ii, know more about the atrocities committed against the china than they know about pearl harbor. and into a lot of intellectuals in 1941 felt, at least we're

giving the west a bloody nose, fighting the proper enemy. this is the war we should have before fighting to begin with and not our fellow eric. >> quite a few of them had did studied in the west and had experience in we were matters. that's why their ingrained inferiority complex is much deeper than others. >> those are the worst nationalist. >> tend to be. >> people who are -- i don't know if this an argument against people studying abroad. it's a bit like -- what's his name -- daniel ortega who picked up his antiamerican rhetoric in berkeley, california. but i think it's 6:00 to perhaps we can open it up to questions. i'll field the questions. ...

one of my question is one thing he didn't discuss it in 1939 japan tried to attack the soviet union. they were soundly defeated with the soviets sending in a lunch of tanks and they just them. good news about not get out? i mean i know that experience

deeply shook a lot of the rightist people. didn't that sort of give them pause or was that hushed up and nobody really knew it? >> it was hushed up in the public. the newspapers didn't report it in full details but the army leadership was of course shaken and that is why they decided they couldn't really fight the soviet union after june 22, 1941 and that was very much on their mind. they couldn't really afford to fight the soviet union. they had their neutrality back, so we will just keep things quiet in keep biting china and going into china, so that they can sustain that warring position in china for the time being. >> its like let's attack another giant.

>> also the inter-services rival between the amy -- the army and the navy they had to strike the north faction which was largely the army to strike the south section of the faction which was naval because they needed the resources to keep going and they wanted to fight the war in southeast asia and the debacle in mongolia where these battles were fought against zug off. the debacle basically meant the end of the strike north faction. >> can i get a second question? >> we will come back to you but since you you're standing. >> all right. i'm also kind of interested in in -- to what extent was he sort of trying to ride herd on these factions in sort of move japan toward being more centralized and less factional a system?

>> sorry, at what point? >> so i mean what little i read about him indicated that he was sort of trying to be -- i mean japan was this factionalized place so to what extent was he trying to change that and was he a centralizer? >> he was into efficiency because he was an able bureaucrat. so sorry? >> and able bureaucrat. >> abell, yes. the very able bureaucrat who kept individual notes about people he dealt with every day in his life and held grudges against certain people and punish them and so forth but i think he did, he did try to centralize and also i think his primary motive was to help the emperor because he was a very devoted servant of the imperial imperial institution. when he was appointed by minister in october, mid-october

1941 the first thing he tried to do was to avert war, try to discuss alternative scenarios which really goes against this idea of toe show being bellicose and uncompromising about going to war which is not true so he was a bit more complex, simpleminded. his position was a bit more complex. >> jeff llorente. ian had mentioned the china quagmire at the very end of your dialogue and i wonder if you could explore for us to bed to what extent the 1941 was china and the china quagmire itself or haps the main driver of japanese war and diplomatic policy? the attack on the u.s. in a sense if you have a problem you can't solve, make it bigger and

then maybe you'll be able to find new opportunities and to what extent were they talking about either peace feelers are some kind of accommodation or was that entirely off the table for china? what were the war aims in china at that point and if you could make an even larger picture, to what extent where it's part japan's partners in the tripartite pact and their actions in europe like the invasion of the soviet union if anything an inducement that we can do more and think more boldly. look, the germans are at the gates of moscow. to what extent were they looking to their axis partners in europe as a model and a further incitement to thinking big? >> thank you. i think the china war was central and they did discuss that it was essential for them to end the china war somehow.

to end it meant to exit honorably in richard nixon's -- well, maybe, with peace terms that were favorable. they have this puppet regime where the japanese occupy again they wanted the americans to recognize that regime as well. they'd have to nationalist regimes basically in china which didn't make sense for the americans. the americans had no inkling to recognize it in the first place but in the negotiations that took place in washington between the japanese ambassador and roosevelt since april 1941, china was always there. the china issue was always there and the conference in tokyo was always discussed and it became a sticking point of the negotiation that military especially the army couldn't openly say that they were

willing to withdraw if the u.s. lifted sanctions or some kind of -- they couldn't really open open -- openly discuss these things of the military in japan were depending on civilian leaders to reach it diplomatic break rate through. he thought that he could pull off diplomatic resolution if he met roosevelt in person. so he promised too much at home to the military. you can prepare in the meantime because you never know but you have to allow me to go see roosevelt and say hawaii or alaska. he thought in the military stock that was going to happen until quite late, until september, mid-september and even earlier october. and then they sort of notice that americans were not going to

come to the negotiating table. so china was central. your second question was about tripartite? >> particularly the german successes. >> i think they were mesmerized by the german successes. not that they understood the lethal aspects of nazi ideology or embrace it because the japanese were relegated to second-class citizens. the yellow race was not -- the japanese themselves wanted to be the people who -- and the original germans didn't know the truth of hitler's pronouncements. that was not so much the embracing of the ideology but the sword of martial aspects of

the nazi success and also the fact that the shock factors in europe especially after barbarossa, that people were just -- the japanese casualty thought okay southeast asia is really right for plucking because no one is looking at it and if we could push the regime to hand it over peaceably with the threat of force, the western powers are not going to quibble because it's so far away. a big mistake i think. that is what triggered the total embargo de facto, total embargo on petroleum. and the freezing of japanese assets by other powers. >> just to add to that, i think did they also see operation barbarossa as an opportunity to us a tax southeast asia the united states because they thought with the russians out of the way, europe would.

>> the hardest call of the military strategist did toy with that idea. that was not the mainstream because they were not taking in terms of war at that point in july 1941 at all. they were more concerned about a power struggle at home. the eccentric foreign minister who is becoming the person on gretna had to be undermined and he was saying oh you know just show the gesture to allied germany and attack the soviet union just quickly so we can claim to have participated in their war and maybe take some possessions. everyone including the army had a political army that opposed it. he was partly up the experience

that told them otherwise but it was also to undermine the position that he was taking and he especially wanted him to leave his cabinet without him having to do it at his own hands. >> relation with the axis power was a very old one because they didn't really trust one another and the question or the issue of wanting to have the some their side. on the other hand, you hear stories from german businessmen until not long ago japan -- have been taken out for drunken evening by their japanese colleagues who got it would please their west german colleagues enormously if there signs of beer would suddenly start seeing -- it was not the thing to do to ingratiate themselves with most american businessman.

>> george pearlstein. i'm afraid part of the question has to be taken up. i was interested in whether germany was instrumental in urging japan to enter the war and i was curious, did they know that japanese were going to attack or any of the details of the? after the attack america declared war but not against germany. there was a period of five days or so when it wasn't clear what was going to happen and there was even some thought that it might be beneficial for hitler to not declare war and see what happened. that didn't happen but i do know the details of those few days and did the germans urged japan to do this? >> not as far as i know and i doubt if they knew. one of the mysteries of world

war ii is why hitler decided to declare war on the united states which be didn't actually have to do but maybe hitler was an honorable man. [laughter] and thank goodness he did he cause that made it very easy for roosevelt to get into the european war so when churchill was given the news of i think a late night dinner, he said he was -- it wasn't the first night he slept very well but he slept very well. >> to add to that, i think what germans were keen for the japanese to do was to attack singapore, for japan to attack singapore so they could help the war cause in the soviet unions somehow and hitler was obsessed with this idea of course of conquering the isle of britain so i think he probably thought

the japanese could be used that way more effectively by way of attacking. >> it was actually very little communication during the war between the axes. >> done simmons is my name. a different topic. for several decades after the second world war, both germany and japan did all they could to sort of reintroduce themselves and re-ingratiate themselves with the rest of the world. it was a new military policy particularly in the case of japan and generally trying to contribute as much to the common good as they could. in the case of germany within 20 or 25 years their relations with their neighbors including very much occupy countries were

arranged somewhere from coulter to -- cordial to warm. that did not happen with japan and still has not happened so i guess why the difference? >> you have written a book about that so maybe -- [laughter] >> well there is a very long answer to that and a shortish one. one is that they were very different neighbors. germany was in the middle of europe and its neighbors to the west were western democracies and were tied to west germany in the military alliance as well as in unifying europe. that was a very different proposition to being -- japan's immediate neighbors were communist china and south korea which was its ally and then you have north korea and there was an east asian alliance in any way comparable to the european committee or nato.

that is one reason. i think the other reason is and also one mustn't overstate the warmth of the relations between germany and its immediate neighbors. certainly i remember in 1974, no 1988 when my own country the netherlands beat germany in a soccer championship. more people into the streets to celebrate then on may 5, 1945 at the end of the war. [laughter] having said that they were very different wars. and there were two germanys. there was west germany and east germany and they have were different relations to the outside world. as far as west germany's concerned when people talk about coming to terms with the pass and that kind of thing people are not talking about the invasion of norway. they are talking about the holocaust. that's a very specific crime committed and i do criminal

regime. japan didn't have a criminal regime. they were the same people who were in power before the war and there wasn't an equivalent to the holocaust in the sense of an ideological war to exterminate a particular people because they didn't have the right to exist. so for all these reasons i think relations with the outside world and there are other reasons to do with it, the fact that the wartime history became very political issue in japan and a very polarized one unlike the history of the third reich in germany which is not a particularly polarizing issue. so i think there are a large number of reasons. none of them have much to do with some kind of essential aspect of the japanese character or anything of that kind. i hope that answers some of it. >> errands did you wish to add

something to that? >> i agree with him. >> i had a very. >> could you introduce yourself? >> matthew wilson. i had a very soft question which you have raised with her question i will start with the hard question. i have read about islands especially in the neighborhood of indonesia where entire populations were wiped out. i have never forgotten my reading of -- and so when you talk about the difference between what the nazis were doing and understand it was pretty awful, and with the japanese were doing i'm not clear there's a difference. the hard question, the second question just a few cam, starting with gradeschool when i first started reading history, they talked about the warm

relations between the united states after the opening of japan and that warm relation was supposed to have continued until the start of the japanese russo piece brokered by roosevelt. the explanation that i was given and i've never read a contradiction of this sense was that that was the beginning of the end of the japanese u.s. friendship because the japanese resented the fact that they didn't get more out of the peace than they thought they should have gotten and i thought that the united states cheated us. i am perfectly open to that hypothesis being questioned or denied but this is my first opportunity to ask someone knowledgeable on the subject. thank you. >> a second question.

>> i have not heard that narrative before because i think in japan they concentrate on the failure of the diplomats are the negotiators who didn't get russian and amenities in the terms of peace and there was a riot after the wars. so it was more perceived in japan as a failure of diplomacy, which sort of explains the popularity of very strong hard-nosed diplomats like -- who signed the tripartite pact. he was this very clearheaded diplomat who could stand up for japanese interests. he was incidentally the one who walked the delegation out of the league of nations after the manchurian crisis. i think it's more perceived the russo-japanese war and the

settlements are perceived in terms of the failure of japanese diplomacy than american designs. i have never heard of blamed on the american side. if anything it's sort of perpetuated the idea that america, a great power, could afford to be generous and be a peace broker, that sort of thing so when the china war was not really going anywhere from the japanese perspective, the japanese kept asking the americans to be the mediator between chiang kai-shek in the japanese. so i think that sort of built-in perhaps unfair expectations, japanese expectations of the united states as being some kind of benevolent policemen standing up for japanese interests more than anything else which is self-serving of course.

>> on the atrocities ,-com,-com ma of course it makes very little difference if you are the victim of somebody torturing you are letting alone shooting you. it doesn't really make any difference who is doing it or for what reasons but i think there is a difference between military atrocities and they were indeed terrible not just in china but in other places. which cannot excused. they should be faced. they are horrifying but there is a slight difference between military atrocities and we can talk about why they happened, and a government that has a program to exterminate people for ideological reasons because they do not have the right to exist. there was never such a thing in the japanese war. in the japanese were there many military atrocities and if you

like, if one is provocative about it the psychology of managing is a bit like what happened during the vietnam war but on a vast scale in that you had a lot of soldiers in hostile territory who often couldn't see the difference between civilians and guerrilla fighters. they were undisciplined brutalized by their own offices and often found themselves in a position where the safest thing to do was just to shoot everybody. that can quickly escalate to of violence. again what we are talking about earlier with the senior officers are not really improper control of the middle ranking ones played a role as well even though the image of the japanese army were entirely correct when he came to the russo-japanese war when they actually treated

p.o.w.s very well and so on at the discipline left a lot to be desired in the second world war. he did have these enormous massacres and raping and looting on a vast scale but it's not quite the same thing. to be at, to be a bit them of this equally unpleasant but it's not quite the same thing as gassing people or shooting people because they don't have the right to live. >> could you come down here please? thank you. >> hi. i'm richard katz. i am sort of fascinated by the degree of misperception in both tokyo and washington of the other and i have had conversations of people who are descendents of some of the japanese leaders at the time. the thought they really believe

that the united states was a proposal b plan b that the u.s. accepted the document that ratified the japanese control over china which of course the u.s. did not do. the fact that you really thought the u.s. might do this is incredible to my mind misperception of everything to a certain degree. if the american side from what i could see there were two groups in the leadership. both of them are kind of nuts about what they thought that they were well-informed people. on the one hand they had the state department in new japan well who insisted japan would never go to war with united states because they knew they were going to get smashed. some diplomats in the embassy said out of sheer desperation they might do it. he said let's take a very hard line because that will force the japanese to that down.

then you have joseph grew to an ambassador. knows how long in japan who kept talking about these mythological moderates and peaceniks in tokyo that what they're not undermine being too soft and take a very soft lines of the moderates could come to the floor. this seems to me that besides all the issues of interest and clashes or whatever, but the astonishing degree of misperception at least on the american side people should've known better, if you could discuss what is the self-delusion or what was going on that created this incredible degree of what i see is as just people lying to themselves about the other side? >> are you talking about japan or iran? [laughter] >> well you see that's the second question. i was thinking about china to tell you the truth.

>> i think the u.s. perception of japan could be described as an underestimation or a result of the desperation or whatever but i think the japanese themselves didn't really -- most leaders couldn't have conceived of this plan of attack had it not been for yarian moto sidhu coup. i think was an outlandish thing to do and to pull off anyway. i think roosevelt or hats was expecting some minor attack even december 1 a minor attack on the philippines or thailand or wherever because he saw troops mobilizing around taiwan. he couldn't have foreseen this attack on pearl harbor which really was a dramatic turn of events. the japanese themselves were surprised by a too. i think there was an underestimation of what yamamoto

could do on all sides almost. that's my feeling about it and the military leaders, when he looked at the plan in late october he said no way we are not going to do it. it's too risky. we are not going to win this war anyway so why risk so much in battleships? >> it's hard to underestimate the capacity for self-delusion. for example there is a wonderful film made in japan in 1942 that came out in december 1942 commissioned by the aerial japanese navy to celebrate pearl harbor and they re-created the attack so well, it was one of the first films that use special

effects so skillfully that they are still sometimes used in documentaries because there is little actual documentary footage of it. one of the scenes shows the pilots on the aircraft carriers on their way to pearl harbor. they listened into the american radio in hawaii and they heard jazz music. somebody conduct in a dance. they would all giggle and say this is the decadent weak-kneed americans. all they can do is dance and listen to this absurd sort of music. it's a common misperception of democracies held not just by the japanese but authoritarian regimes and then there were more idiotic misperceptions too on both sides. i think on the japanese side

some people really believed americans couldn't shoot straight it is their noses were to bid and they couldn't look past their noses. at the same time in america there were ideas that the japanese because of their oriental eyes couldn't shoot straight and so on. the stupidity of people is boundless. >> i'm sure japan 1941 was maybe not the topic of your conversation but you will probably talk a lot about it at dinner so i want to thank you both for being with us this afternoon. [applause] next on booktv charles gati author of the strategy and statecraft of zbigniew brzezinski in a panel of dignitaries discuss the life and career of former national security divisor zbigniew brzezinski. this is about two hours.