between machiavelli and neville chamberlain but in such circumstances chamberlain rarely wins. it's all well and good to discuss diplomacy with rogues but for the purposes of american diplomacy, what is a rogue? there's no consensus about what a rogue regime is a generations of diplomats have accepted the idea, it's a diplomatic equivalent of supreme court justice harvester quip about pornography. i know it when they see. still the rogue concept has been an element of american national security thinking for the better part of four decades. political scientist in the 1970s spoke of privacy but based their destination on those countries isolations and the hostility of its neighbors rather than moral judgment. against israel and taiwan along with south africa became a pariah state. the notion of pariahs or rogues begin tbegan to change at the ef

the decade assuming human rights concerns begin to impact foreign policy. in 1979, citing the i mean in uganda, the "washington post" differentiated between rogue regimes and near dictatorships. how does the international community deal with rogue regimes, those that under the color of national sovereignty commit unspeakable crimes against their own citizens, it asks. among diplomats, terrorism became an increasing concern. in 1979, forced by congress, the state department began identifying and labeling state sponsors of terrorism. the islamic revolution in iran underscored the notion that in the middle east at least, all bets were off. the next years were rocky. president reagan, for example, called libyan leader moammar get off the the madman of the middle east and described him as part of a new international version of murder incorporated. and years before george w. bush

would describe an axis of evil -- a confederation of terrorist states becaus but it was the cln administration that made the rogue regime part of washington's lexicon. when defense secretary aspen unveils the proliferation initiative in december 1993, he warned that the new nuclear danger we face is perhaps a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist groups. speaking in 1994 european politicians in brussels, let in and self-described iran and libya as rogue states. secretary of state warren christopher repeatedly referred to iran and iraq as rogue regimes during an address at georgetown university later that same year. in each case the clinton administration focus more on roads towards the united states rather than to the danger of the of people. saddam hussein was a rogue lid

because he pursued nuclear weaponry and had invaded kuwait. he was not a rogue because he gassed kurds and massacred shia. tony lake, clinton's national security advisor, sought to define the concept we've been together all the parallel definitions when he used the term backlash states, the concept was the same. their behavior is often aggressive and defiant, the ties between them are growing as they seek to quarantine themselves from a global trend to which they seem incapable of adopting, he wrote. they are ruled by cleats that control power through coercion, suppress basic human rights and promote radical ideologies. most important for the purpose of this diplomats, these nations exhibit a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world and they do not function effectively in alliances. even with those like-minded. in 1997, secretary of state

madeleine albright argued that the with rogue states is one of the great challenges of our time, because they are there with the sole purpose of destroying the system. she lamented that her friends and allies don't get it. secretary of defense william cohen worried that rogue states or immune to defend get -- deterrence. clearly rogue regimes pose a challenge but certain every reason to think as you within? the notion that someone not talking to countries as punishment to them is ridiculous, then senator barack obama said in 2007. you don't make peace with your friends. you have to be willing to engage with your enemies. hillary clinton opined in the context of talks with the taliban. within the state department there's a culture which treats engagement is cost free. we will be no worse off if we tried diplomacy and fail a formr under secretary of state nicholas burns commented, and bush era secretary of state promote a similar argument.

we also have enough confidence in our ability as diplomats to the eye to eye with people, even though we disagree in the strongest way possible and come away without losing anything. but the notion it never hurts to talk has never been challenged. to encourage diplomatic strategies, advocates of diplomacy often cite the high costs of military action. and both the slow pace and the high cost of sanctions. certainly they are right with regard to the cost of the other strategies, but just because strategy a them strategy be have cost does not make strategy see cost free or a panacea. the cost of engaging rogue regimes can be i. that is not itself an argument against diplomacy, but ignoring costs and ignoring the adversaries strategy can increase the price and diminish the success of diplomacy. a few observations. first of all, rushing diplomacy

undercuts success. there are two general schools of diplomacy. one believes that diplomats wait for the right circumstances to push the major initiatives, while the other advices engaging in processes to try to create openness. the former has been responsible for some of the most astounding breakthroughs. anwar sadat agreed to peace with israel only after having tried to achieve war and failing to the lightning speed of kuwait led to a conference in which countries like syria sat down with israel for the first time. operation desert storm also change north korean calculus dramatically. neither israel nor the palestinians would've reached the oslo accord had it not been for the demise of the soviet union. selden anymore to diplomats at the right circumstances for success. neither pakistan nor the taliban

have incentives to seek peace when the united states releases taliban prisoners before talks start, or announces timelines for withdrawal. norwell iran believe that it must compromise to the same extent on its nuclear program when it regards american power as being in retreat. hence, iran's backpedaling in recent days about the reactor and what enrichment compromises it has made. leverage has become a dirty word. the state department opposes new sanctions, politicians seeking outreach concur and presidents wave whatever sanctions they have at their disposal. the best example of this involves saddam hussein but in april 1990, the united states expelled an iraqi diplomat involved in a plot to kill dissidents in the united states. in light of this and iraq burgeoning weapons program from u.s. news and world report rendered saddam the world's most dangerous man. some of you may remember that

cover. still, proponents of engagement refused to give up. senator specter traveled twice to baghdad to meet saddam. so impressed with specter, that he helped block military sanctions on iraq. there's an opportunity or maybe an opportunity pursue discussions with iraq, he said two months later. and i think that it is not the right time to impose sanctions. less than two months after that, iraq invaded kuwait. only after several years did specter acknowledge that saddam had exploited him and his senate colleagues. likewise, iranian hostage takers have acknowledged in their own memoirs that they transform the 48 hour amnesty said in back in 1979 into a 444 day crisis once they read a "boston globe" article in which a carter national security staff are leaked that military operations options have been taken off the table. now, military strategists talk

about a paradigm in which every strategy has a diplomatic, informatiinformati onal, military, and economic component. and academics talk about hard power and soft power. the concepts are the same. success depends on all elements of government power being used together, and yet diplomats and politicians often seek to free sanctions and military preparations to enable diplomacy's success. nothing could be further from the truth. culture also matters. the problem is not inadequate american sensitivity to others' cultures. if anything, americans are too sensitive. for example, ambassador pickering and some colleagues warned after some iranians complained that iranians quote, ripped out the use of the phrase, carrots and sticks because it depicts them as donkeys and because it implies a threat of beating iran in this

mission if they cannot be bought. let's put aside the regular iranian chance death to america. iranian press has long used the phrase the carrots and sticks by accepting manufactured grievance as real, pickering and college effectively use my brain -- and blamed america. we should never apologize to rogue states. the iranians often demand apologies. for example, for the 1953 coup. let's put aside the debate with regard to 1953 coup for a second. iran's clergy at the time was a co-conspirator with the united states and great britain against the soviet leaning leader, suspected of leaning towards iran's commonest party. when officials have apologized for that episode, for example, secretary of state madeleine albright in 2000, and obama more recently, iranians simply upped the ante and demand

compensation. manufacturing grievance is not limited to iran. when the united states demanded inspection of some north korean weapons facilities in 1999, pyongyang claimed the united states was quote seriously insulting the dprk's honor and dignity. the democratic people's republic of korea. and demanded a bribe to ameliorate the situation. culture matters in other ways. robes did not accept american standards of diplomacy -- rogues. by western standards, north korea, iran and the taliban, but judge by the austin the tribe. if the goals is to gain sanctions relief, financial institution, or simply time, then they can achieve what they need by sitting down to talk even if the process goes nowhere. projection is always in had to assume that people approach negotiations with the same, the

same motivations that the united states does. we should never assume that others conduct diplomacy just like we do or that peace and reconciliation are a shared in the game. i have used this before in other talks, but i spent 14 years in a quaker school and multiculturalism was ingrained into me. but it's important, and after that i went to your mac and certainly multiculturalism was put on the cell there. but multiculturalism isn't simply about settling differences but it's not about going into a point and ordering a mojito. fundamentally we need to recognize that different people sit into the waste america understand that when we go into negotiations, not simply with adversaries but with rogue regimes which may base the ruling philosophy on something other than the evolution of modern western diplomacy as we know it.

now, incentivizing defiance also undercuts diplomacy. backfires rather than merely attention, they convinced roads that bad behavior base. both the ran and north korea, for example, modulate tensions to collect instances while developing nuclear and missile capabilities without interruption. a demonstration of force is often more effective than diplomatic niceties. the state department once understood this but its culture changed over the decades. since the cold war's end, western officials operate under the assumption that they should sequence diplomacy rather than combined and. the some of the parts because the whole, however. combined diplomacy sanctions, military strategies and an effective information campaign to broadcast the american perspective directly in foreign lands and amplified diplomacy's

affect. i should note that while senator in trying to outreach to the islamic republic of iran, senator joseph biden had urged american public broadcasting, voice of america and radio free europe, to tone down some of its criticism of human rights in the iranian regime in order to make diplomacy work i could. that the course was well over a decade ago. it simply didn't work, but simply making the information campaign to be part and parcel of a broader strategy, or part and parcel, select diplomacy is younger brother, is something the wrong way to conduct business. desperation often leads to philly. between 1995-2000, american diplomats sought to engage the taliban. our current negotiations with the taliban are not new and they

are not pathbreaking. we have done this before. the talk, of course went nowhere but the state department wouldn't take no for an answer or let reality intrude. in 1997, for example, the u.s. ambassador to extend wrote, there's little evidence to suggest that mullah omar is our radical with a western agenda. the head of the american negotiation delegation included that the taliban's refusal was actually a desire for more dialogue. he was subsequently promoted to national security council. the same has held true with north korea. on august 31, 1998, north korea launched a new missile over japan while talks were ongoing in europe. it symbolizes both the assessment of north korea's military under the agreed framework and pyongyang's continued defiance regardless of diplomacy, like a gambler sacrificing everything for one

more poll of the slot machine. the clinton administration used the missile test not to reassess the process but to justify more diplomacy. pyongyang concluded that it was suffer no series consequence for its propagation, just as important, but also the divided its enemies. while washington embraced further investment in the north, japan had enough and suspended its funding. the clinton administration did not allow the north defiance or it's breaking of commitments to sidetrack diplomacy, however, even as it congressionally mandated group of nonpartisan experts conclude north korean wmd program advanced since the framework was signed. the reality might undercut the sunshine policy. the covert 1999 missile talks went nowhere and north korea resumed construction of launch pads and bunkers the following month. sometimes the best way to diplomacy succeed is to demonstrate a willingness to

walk away. let me just say as an aside that while the news today is filled with tension between the white house and the israeli prime minister, benjamin netanyahu, this pattern also isn't new, or simply limited to the middle east. when the united states wanted to engage north korea, the south korean president gave an interview in "the new york times" in which he criticized the american initiative, not because he was opposed necessarily to negotiations with north korea, but he thought the right circumstances hadn't been set properly. and the clinton administration at the time went ballistic and we saw a lot of unnamed aides making ad hominem attacks on the south korean president and so forth. this all comes to be part of the pattern of bashing allies for

the sake of coddling adversaries. one of the most amazing things about some of our diplomatic initiatives now, or in previous administration, is we always believed that presidents when it occupied the white house always be that the failure of past diplomacy lies more with their predecessors than it does with adversaries. doesn't matter whether you're a republican or a democrat. it's a constant patter in high profile diplomacy, high-stakes diplomacy. and when someone suggests the emperor has no clothes, personal animus can be great. desperation cause can manifest in other ways. compounding the problem is the tendency of the state department to shop around for partners, the most compliant partners are seldom those who can deliver. partner shopping allows transport to play good cop, bad cop, collecting is a bizarre

pursuing goals for care. diplomats might exploit but seldom do into factions within such regimes matter on the issues of greatest concern, u.s. national security. simply put, factional rivalries in north korea and factional rivalries in france, germany or switzerland are not the same. when you are run by a dear leader or supreme leader, sometimes the factional rivalries are at best cosmetic. at any rate, during the hostage crisis, the carter administration was understandably desperate to reach out to any iranian who would listen. and i'm not going to criticize jimmy carter. remember, no one knew what was going to happen to those hostages. there was fear that they would be tried by revolutionary tribunals and might even be executed. and so we do need to put ourselves in jimmy carter's place when considering the fate

of the hostages at the time. so he would reach out to any iranian who would listen. secretary of state they us approved u.n. secretary-general kirkwall time, to set up a meeting with iranian foreign minister. that failed when he lost his post after only two and half weeks. his position, however, did not stop them from adding to iran's demands. no sooner did a former trainer for the plo assume the foreign minister's post in the carter administration also reached out to him the he augmented demands even for the. basically what happened, in order to prove their own legitimacy and their toughness to -- i wouldn't say the popular crowd in the street, but to the new regime, if we reach out time and time again to a succession of diplomatic foreign ministers and so forth, they need to prove

themselves by increasing demand. therefore, if we would only stop and take a box, the demands or the problems which are on the table and actually be less than if we simply single-mindedly drive forward with as much dialogue as we can. another lesson, metrics matter. the state department avoids metrics to judge diplomacy's effects and, therefore, seldom cuts its loss when its policy is failing. as daniel said in introduction, soldiers spend less time in the field than in the classroom. poring over reports and identifying errors, but diplomats seldom acknowledge or reflect on failure. before obama offered iran an outstretched hand and he never described similar efforts by jimmy carter, ronald reagan and george h. w. bush had failed. nor did the state department ever consider white lenses negotiations with the taliban

failed, but obama's talks to the same figures should succeed. i recalled albert einstein's famous definition of insanity. doing the same action repeatedly but expecting different results each time. some diplomats or some officials have been reflected. it is always an error to concentrate on negotiation rather than real progress on the ground. in my book i look at other aspects of diplomacy, for example, tracking dialogue or people to people dialogue. and entire industry has grown up around the idea that people to people exchanges work. citizen diplomacy is in vogue. able to people dialogue,

however, is a risky gamble. participants seldom can leverage the relationship into conflict resolution but costs can be high. rogue regimes have mastered the art of hijacking dialogue for propaganda gain, to buy time and to maintain momentum. at the height of the dialogue of civilization in the year 2000, certainly the clinton administration, not without reason, we seeking to promote dialogue with the islamic republic and people to people exchanges were taking off. if you look at the visa figures, the americans offered iranian passport holders about 22000 visas. iran offered american passport holders about 700. the pearcy wasn't there and, of course, this can lead to a great deal of self-censorship. those who don't say what the iranian regime wants, don't

amplify the position of the rogue regime will simply find themselves absent a visa. this can also weave its way into academia. academia of course -- if you want to get in here to break, open new archives and write creatively. but if the fate of your dissertation research or the fate of your book depends on getting that rare visa, then you have to watch very carefully what you would say. it ultimately creates quite a problem. likewise, in talking to many participants in practicing dialogue, one of the most interesting dialogues can happen with north korea. certainly there's any number of former officials or well-meaning conflict resolution who will meet in germany or elsewhere with north korean officials, or with north korean track to participants.

while they may be independent citizens free to say whatever they want without government instruction, does anyone really think that north koreans participating in those dialogues are free to simply improvise and discuss policy unofficially? what often happens is the north korean equivalent -- is in any of dialogue partners are just like them, pseudo-governmental, operating with government instructions to the teeth. therefore, if an american attractive participant says something that can seize upon and report it to the north korean leadership, suddenly that can throw a wrench in negotiations because the north koreans will claim that they have been given an incentive or that the americans had agreed to a certain compromise, which would done to anyone actually involved in the north korea mandate track two dialogue. now, this is not to say that

unofficial dialogue always fails. back channels are useful. that was the case of the palestine liberation organization before the oslo accord, for example. the decision to flip, however must come first. seldom if ever to back channels lead rogue regimes to change their heart. even when they do succeed in advancing talks outside the public eye, there comes a time when private dialogue outlived its usefulness. after all, if the goal is to resolve complex, eventually this requires rogues to demonstrate the public should buy years or decades of incitement that a new dawn is approaching. to continue back channels alongside processes, simply allows rogue leaders like supreme leader khamenei or perhaps even kim jong-un to gain the process. so where does this leave us? i'm not suggesting that diplomacy is a failed strategy.

far from it in fact. but it is not a simple strategy. diplomacy is not effective when it is conducted in isolation outside a broader strategy that includes economic sanctions and military posture. his former advisers now acknowledge that moammar gadhafi only came in from the cold in 2003 when he saw the build up of the iraq war and when allied forces intercepted the bbc china, a ship carrying north korean parts to libya. the demonstration of superior intelligence capability, coupled with the willingness to use military force, and able constructive engagement after more than 15 years of average. don't forget, moammar gadhafi had reached out to senator gary hart more than a decade before we had this about-face in 2003.

there are other costs. when americans are engaged in high profile diplomacy, diplomats too often a willing to the human rights and diplomats -- dissidents under the bus. avoiding my tricks and enables them to bypass the tricky questions about the efficacy of the process. and while the press often treats the politicization of intelligence as synonymous with the 2003 iraq war, affected the corruption of intelligence is a constant problem. one that even lyndon johnson complained about. the irony, however, is that intelligence can keep the peace rather than cause -- nor should we ever believe that engaging rogues changes their character. moammar gadhafi showed his true colors not only in 2004 when he ordered a hit on the saudi crown prince, but much more recently when he turned his guns on his own people. indeed, while diplomacy might

achieve an intermediate aim, the only way to end a rogue regime is when that regime fails. rogues simply don't have epiphany. there's great enthusiasm for engagement right now. no doubt talks with iran our historic. i'm a historian by training which means i get paid to predict the past, and they use only get that right about 50% of the time so not going to put a wager on what might happen with the iran talks now. it is dangerous, however, to confuse hope with change or to replace advocacy, to place analysis with advocacy. what we see with regard to iran is the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end. let me conclude simply by saying if history is any guide, the perils of engaging rogue regimes is faster because our high, and success is far from certain. thank you very much.

[applause] >> we have plenty of times under and -- we have plenty of time for questions. i'll call on you to know and wr, claudia, if you could stand up and identify yourself for the camera and i will repeat that. >> thank you. claudia with the foundation for defense democracy. to questions from one specific. you mentioned the north korea drew conclusions from operation desert storm. what were they? more generally, why don't rogue regimes have epiphanies? could you walk us through? >> first with regard to north korea. just, frankly, the rapid liberation of kuwait, something in like 100 hours, really astounded many of the regional states and other countries in the world about the vast

capabilities of the united states military to get something that can't be forgotten at the same time. we have a situation in which many of these states, these rogue regimes, please those from the former communist bloc have lost their superpower patron. i should say, it's not something i included in my talks, that in conducting interviews, and my book isn't partisan because often times there's a consistency to the way diplomats engaged, but in talking to those who were on the team which negotiate with north korea, oftentimes what i got in surprisingly candid ways both from diplomats and from military officials at the time, is a 1994 the agreed framework was a bad deal. but we looked around the world and saw that all these come regimes were falling. and, therefore, even if we promised nuclear reactors in 10 years, we were never going to get to the point where we have

to deliver them. because north korean regime wouldn't survive. as oftentimes that would also illustrate some of the wishful thinking that comes with regard to our diplomacy, simply look to the future and hoping for the best, what as that seldom hands out well. both democrats and republicans have been guilty of that over time as we both know. with regard to a rogue leaders don't have epiphanies, you know, i'm not a psychologist and i can't give a comprehensive answer to that. all i would say is that to become a leader of a rogue regime is often quite a cutthroat business. at the same time, many rogues come from countries which are rooted necessarily in western liberal culture.

don't come out, don't have their ideas diplomacy shaped by the congress of vienna and so forth. power matters. and oftentimes the rogues unwilling to cut a deal if they see that that will preserve their own power. that doesn't necessary mean that they're going to have a change of heart and overnight become democratic. the sitting president survived the civil war and the crisis, to expect somebody is going to return to that utopian notion that he's just a western educated itma and. i me, i would certainly welcome discussion, not right now, from others about why they think that rogues simply can't change their stripes. they can be contained, they can cut deals but that doesn't mean that there ever going to return to the normal fold of what

international committee considers normality. >> the negotiations with the insurgent groups and tribal groups and and more province seem to be successful. the wakening occurred. would you consider that a successful negotiation with insurgent come with terrorist groups? if it was why did it succeed and so many fell? >> that's an excellent question. tit illustrate many of the points. first of all, the insurgents in anbar didn't summit wake up one day and say, we love america and we're going to cut a deal. many were deeply dissatisfied with the american, with operation iraqi freedom. after all, they had considered themselves to be of a privileged minority, and suddenly they

found themselves to be, when it came to central government political power, a dispossessed minority. on top of that they are and a state of denial. one of my normal quits with regard to iraq, can find -- defined the constituent groups. they all make according to themselves, iraq is a country with about 237% of its own population. now, al qaeda, why did we have the wakening? basically, at first they supported the insurgents and jafa internationalization of the conflict. there's al qaeda in mesopotamia came in and started running roughshod over local culture. it was at that point in time that we had some of the tribal leaders, tribal leaders put been vetted very carefully, decide that maybe they should side with

the americans after all the research. after the -- at the same time when we look at the surge and perhaps compared to the similar surge in afghanistan where george w. bush announced the surge, the iraq war was deeply, deeply -- perceptions of the iraq war -- bush got up and defied the popular will by announcing the surge, at the same time he didn't attack us to attach a time when. he spoke about victor. that didn't happen with regard to the announcement of the afghan surge. because also if you look at military strategies, they are just as much psychological as they are military. when it comes to the idea of engaging with rogues, if you want to call the insurgents rogues, and the surge, the fact of the matter is we combined a military strategy with a diplomatic strategy, with an

informational strategy, and through the provision of subsidies and jobs and economic strategy. now, it may very well have beenc strategy. now, it may very well have been a shortsighted strategy, because simply put, we were promising things we couldn't fully deliver. and we are also incentivizing in a way violence. and iraqi system may not be perfect but to convince some of those who were engaged in insurgency and later engaged in the surge, that they could win political benefit through violence, they could win through violence but they couldn't win through the ballot box may be an item which will continue to pay for were more likely the iraqis will continue to pay for for quite some time. just wait for the microphone, please. >> thanks for that talk. i'm here with the american enterprise institute. my question is, you said at the

right time for diplomacy is when a rogue regime has turned sort of. how do you know when that is happened? because sometimes or very often negotiations which have occurred have prematurely. before a group as turned are portrayed as though that decisive moment has been reached. and the fact that we're having negotiations is seen as in itself proof of that. how do you do think which? >> that's an excellent question. you never want to intern for me. not for any of your interns, but one of the things i would have my interns do was compare the state department's daily or weekly press conference, talking about high profile processes and about the success which they were having with the intelligence that we now know about what was actually going on. and oftentimes discussion about great progress being made wasn't

reflected in the state department cables and memorandums of the conversations they had that day. we're talking about an alternate reality in that case. but you put your finger on it. how do we know? hindsight is always 2020. and certainly i could be flipping and say the only difference between compromise and appeasement is historical hindsight. but this is one of those issues which most confronted diplomats are you know, back in 2000 can't david, when president bill clinton wanted to finally be the president who ushered in peace between israel and palestine, he came in as the closer and his aides never would have let him do that had been expected that yasser arafat wasn't going to accept the deal that yasser arafat's own negotiators had agreed to. and that's why when we look at a

press conference after can't david to fell apart, we see how visibly angry and undiplomatic bill clinton actually was. now, fast forward to 2003 and the breakthrough with regard to moammar gadhafi. before the americans even started negotiating with moammar gadhafi, we went through years of the british, pretty much the british intelligence service, sort of betting the libyan negotiators and those making the outreach to be able to be certain that what they said no marco dawson would actually deliver. they could deliver. that's one of the reasons why that diplomacy was such a lengthy process. there's unfortunately a trend in washington, and this is certainly again the case across administrations, that second term presidents tend to rush

processes in order to secure their legacies. for example, bill clinton wanted three things. handshake, normalization with vietnam, and israeli-palestinian peace. he got normalization with vietnam. george w. bush, or i should say condoleezza rice, secretary of state, wanted to make north korea into his defining legacy. and so remove north korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list, despite the fact that if we look at nonpartisan sources like the congressional research service, the north koreans were indeed at the time with a tiger and with hezbollah, and yet for the sake of winning the second term, the second term breakthrough, we tended to wave off some of our better judgment. north korea is better for that today. it certainly hasn't helped american national security. and, unfortunately, i'm quite

nervous, not about the idea of negotiating with iran, bu with e speed with which we are negotiating with iran right now before making sure that all the ducks are in a row. it concerns me a great deal that we may look at certain statements by the supreme leader, for example, a call for a rogue flexibility, to be an endorsement of rouhani's diplomacy. but at the same -- the next day, or later that week i should say, the friday prayer leaders appointed by the supreme leader explained that a rogue possibility was about a change in tactics, not a change in policy. and so with any number of these examples and this goes to the notion that sometimes rogues our other adversaries will say one thing to our diplomats and one thing to the american press. and quite another thing back to their home audiences. it behooves us not to simply

excuse the discrepancies between the two statements, but to hold our adversaries into account not only for what they say in front of the microphones in geneva but also for what they say when they get back to tehran, pyongyang, or anywhere else. other questions? yasser the microphone -- yes, sir. the microphone is coming. >> what are your policy our recommendations concerning north korea in today's context? and i have second question. how rove is china in your definition? >> let me take the second question first. for the purposes of my book, instead of simply taking my own personal definition of rogue, i

was applying tony lake's definition to that was outlined in his foreign affairs article. and by that account, china may be an adversary and it may be problematic, and at times it's strategy may be quite to faced. but i'm not sure whether i would characterize it as a row be in the same way. now, with regards to north korea, north korea has become unfortunately accustomed -- north korea has become accustomed to receiving rewards in exchange for defiance. and if we ignore north korea, then it's defiance and its bluster only become worse. that said, simply making an

instant or giving north korea an additional all of branch doesn't necessarily solve the problem. at some point we need to break this cycle in which they believe that they can get incentives, or improve their negotiating positions through their bluster. and, therefore, i would strongly advocate taking a much stronger line, or a much more resistant line when it comes to some of north korea's bluster. they will bluster. they are going to suffer for the regime which is in place. there has been a consistent cost for working through china also in the empowerment of china in the north korea question, but ultimate some point we need to draw a line in the sand. if i want to go back in history, what happens when we don't -- when we don't draw a line

innocent? we can go back to the beginning of the korean war, when under the truman administration there is a national security corrective that defined america's defensive perimeter. and it left korea outside that defensive perimeter. within six months we were at war. we need to stand firm to north korea. we are going to be tested, and it's the response to the test that matters. operation paul bunyan, let me give an example. any of you may remember how an american serviceman, to i believe, were hacked to death in the demilitarized zone back i believe it was in the late 1970s. this was after, by the way, jimmy carter said he wanted to withdraw american forces from the korean peninsula. north korean soldiers hacked to americans to death. how do we respond? we cut down that tree supported by a carrier strike group, sometimes standing up to north korean bluster is important.

other questions ar. >> you briefly mentioned syria and assad. definitely the state department sees a victory in the recent chemical weapons -- or than dismantling their chemical weapons and abilities. can you comment on that? >> sure. i'm opining right now. i didn't use syria as a case study in my work, but first of all let's at least recognize the cost of diplomacy. if this was a successful deal, every member, it only involves the site which is suing government has declared. in the we've done is set a precedent that if you have chemical weapons, you can use them once to the greatest effect and then throw up your hands and say we will surrender them. the deaths of those 1400 people will be forgotten. so perhaps -- i'm not out there

trying to bash diplomacy, but am trying to highlight that it is seldom cause free as some of its advocates try to project. in the back, please. >> mr. rubin, may i assume that a lot of the success of your research has been due to the fact that you speak good arabic and, therefore, can read faces and understand nuances when you're talking to people, that if you had to go through an interpreter you might lose? >> no. i mean, quite frankly, both my arabic and my version are far from fluent. i mean, i'm up front with the. >> okay, but it must give you some clue. the reason i ask is that is, why should we assume that negotiating in english gives us an advantage? and link to that, in your

experience, how many senior level american officials, whether from the executive branch or from congress, speak fluent arabic, persian, pashtun, turkish or communicant any of the other critical languages that we need to understand the world? think you. >> it's a great question, and let me just say that if we had someone who spoke fluent arabic, persian, turkish and pushed him, i have no doubt that the state department and send them to korea. [laughter] now, when it comes to diplomacy, we don't always negotiate in english. certainly in the run up to the iraq war, a very skilled linguist was negotiating in pashtun and then persian. ryan crocker and the late -- were very skilled at negotiating

in arabic, but usually just as a matter of course, we will produce an english agreement, and arabic agreement, or whatever other liquid and this is one of those issues which united nations does a great deal. we could go back to u.n. security council resolution 242 with israel must withdraw from the territories rather than the territories and united nations went into quite some detail about which versions would be the tiebreakers and so forth, and open debate with regard to what the definite article meant for the lack of definite article meant and so forth. that said, first of all, we have many, many skilled diplomats, but it doesn't matter how good you are at a foreign-language its regional security officers prevent you from leaving from

the embassy compound. i think in iraq today, we have a fortress, and yet we don't have enough security, i have heard, to have 12 excursions outside the embassy walls everyday. and when you talk about a compound with over 1000 people and only 12 people are allowed to leave per day, and judas and several of those will be the ambassador making several trips, then ultimately it doesn't do you much good to have that in a foreign-language as the state department often calculate. so ultimately that is a problem. that said, without a doubt the united states has a problem with language fluency, and this is one of the reasons why the pentagon has graded a program in order to give much more rigorous like which training. but, you know, the old joke, what do you call someone who speaks three languages? trilingual. to lead which is, i lingual.

one like which, american. there's a question up here. >> i'm from iran. in terms of iran you are saying that negotiations -- [inaudible] my question is what is your specific recommendation? if you were in the white house over barack obama, what do you do regarding to find good deed or maybe more sanction or something like that? second question, for example, in 1970 americans had indeed been to china. in late 1980 reagan had a deal with russia. i think rush is more than just -- [inaudible] in terms of american national interest. so what's your recommendation? >> very good points, both of

them. let me address the question about the iran diplomacy. i'm not getting out there and sang diplomacy with iran doesn't work. after all, we had the algiers accord which led to the release of hostages in 1981. we have dealt every single president has dealt with the iranians. people forget that the iran-contra affair which is remember for quite a different thing inside washington has had its desire on the part of the reagan administration to reach out and have leverage inside the islamic republic after ayatollah khamenei died. now, when we look at president obama's first inaugural address, you know, in the middle east -- let me backtrack. recent history is 1000 years ago, but sometimes moving 100 miles away is like moving to the end of the earth. in the united states it's different to you go back four

years and it's ancient history that people don't think about moving 1000 miles away. you have a situation that president obama is being caught for extended, asking iran to stretch out its hand. but in george h. w. bush is an ideal address, there was much the same theme voice, that bygones can become bygones, that we don't need to assume that this cycle of animosity must go on forever. now, twice i can think of a time when the islamic republic of iran radically shifted positions. the first was with regard to what it would take to release the american hostages. the second was what it would take to in the iran-iraq war. with regard to the release of the hostages, if you read what warren christopher edited and

published, with different chapters contributed by all different policymakers on the iran team, they came to the basic conclusion that it was the persistence of diplomacy which led to the release of the hostages. the late peter brockman wrote in 1981 an article in the washington quarterly that that got it backwards. that the key episode which led to ayatollah khamenei change his mind was the fact that in september 1980 said on hussein invaded iran and the cost therefore of iran's isolation had increased exponentially. now, we know from declassified documents and recently released memoirs that in 1982 the iranians had more or less pushed the iraqis out of most of iranian territory. many people have floated the idea with ayatollah khamenei that there should be a cease-fire and he said no.

we should continue until we liberate jerusalem. there followed six more years of stalemate at the cost of hundreds of thousands of people, and finally in 1988, ayatollah khamenei and got up with mandates that i accept the cease-fire. the question is anything in our quiver of arrows, equivalent to having the supreme leader, drink from the chalice of poison. it's an open question. i'm not saying diplomacy doesn't work but it's a very tricky business. one last question. >> you kind of touched on this briefly but i was one if you go into more detail about engaging with the actors in rogue states that actually have the power to make decisions as opposed to an iranian foreign minister or because your for north korea who

may be able to convey a certain message but don't have the power to say yes or no. >> asked and answered but it's one of those issues, i would negotiating with the right people, why, when the defense minister goes to tehran destiny with the supreme leader, but we make headlines when william burns meets in geneva with the deputy prime minister. i'm going back to 2007. ultimately, it's one of those big questions which is out there come and what we risk by not answering that question is that we get caught into a game of good cop, bad cop or plausible deniability with regard to some of our partners. at any rate, i think there's wine and cheese outside. i want to thank you very much for your attendance, thank you. [applause]

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