transmitted the answers to 16 additional crew members. and then subsequently been 17 more crew members were implicated by voluntary admission. and that is what gave us the number of 34 officers who were implicated in sharing of test material. again, i am recapping what we said the couple weeks ago. now, as the investigation has

moved forward, we can now report there are a total of 92 crew members that have been identified as having some level of involvement. that means other participating in the cheating or knowing something about it and the standing of and reporting it. in an abundance of caution as we follow these new leads we have temporarily decertified these 92 crew members, and there are no longer on alert at this time. lieutenant-general wilson and just a few minutes will discuss police held is rearranging his impact what i want to reassure his that i remain confident to our bases last week even more confident in this safety, reliability, effectiveness of the nuclear mission. i remain this way for basically the same reasons as i reported to all of you two weeks ago. the differences i went and saw

it for myself one week ago. just to recap, there are multiple checks and balances in the system, and there are a variety of ways that we ensure the reliability and safety, not the least of which is the fact that we have a department of defense inspections and outside groups that come in and evaluate and nuclear teams to ensure that they know how to perform and do their jobs. moreover, as you are aware, we retested everybody really in the test and questioned which produced a 95 pastorate which demonstrates to me that our people know what their jobs are, no how to perform. again, we have the outside nuclear inspections that are going for and producing equally encouraging positive results. with all of that said, the situation remains completely on the acceptable. went on the road last week

specifically because i wanted to seymour, wanted to see it for myself and learn more directly for myself. so at each stop -- and i did get to each of the nuclear missile bases, at each stop i received a briefing. of course i did tors. i think most important him i had sessions with herrmann. added large town hall meetings, but i did small focus groups as well. in these focus groups were just me endearment. as everyone else to leave the room. and did this with unlisted airman, officers, and that did it at a variety of levels. i talked to the defenders. i talked to maintenance people, support people, facilities personnel, i tried to run the gamut indeed a good cross-section. what i learned in these rather confidential settings was very, very hushed and lightning. now, from all of those

discussions and that tour last week i have come up with the list of what i call my seven observations. my seven focus areas, you might say. and all of these areas will be addressed in some fashion over the next 60 days as we prepare our plan now we will be delivering on what to do with respect to the nuclear force and some of these issues we have uncovered. as you know, the secretary of defense has launched the 60 day review, and so we will be participating in that along with the navy and the zero st. no, how precisely we will put that plan together is also part of what general wilson will cover shortly. so let me know give you my seven observations, seven focus areas. the first one goes to what may be the heart of the question on many people's minds. that is, is there some sort of a cultural issue that is going on

in the force? so having done the conversations that i have, having looked at it very close in no six in created my own impressions, i guess i believe now that we do have system problems within the force them. i heard repeatedly from teammates that the need for perfection has created a climate of undue stress and fear, fear of the future, fear about promotions, fear of what will happen to them in their careers. i heard repeatedly that this system can be very punitive, minor issues the crop up, but not equally rewarding or incentivizing for excellent behavior and get work. i also heard that there is a level of micromanagement out there which means to be turned into more of a climate of empowerment.

and i also urge that although we s senior leaders talk about the importance of the mission, the team in the field is not always see that talk backed up by concrete action. so again, and sharing with you some of the themes that i picked up. my first observation is we do have systemic issues out there, and the need to address this stylistically, not in just one piece parted son. my second observation is we have lost the distinction over time in this career area between clerical training and testing. so in the current environment there is no room for error ebert that is the way people feel. and yet of course those of us who work with the military know that in natural environment, if this is an environment of learning, an environment where if you make mistakes that's okay because the idea is to learn and do better. eventually you go on and are

tested and evaluated. that is when the rubber meets the road. can you are canyon not do your job. in this environment those two elements of come together in a way which i don't think it's turned out to be of the. what i mean by that is all the of the standard on our test, a passing grade on these tests is 90%, the missileers still driven to score 100% all the time. in this is because their commanders are using these tests scores to be a top differentiator, if not the sole differentiator inhabits promoted so i believe that a very terrible irony in this whole situation is that these missileers' did not cheap to pass. it cheated because they felt driven to get 100 percent. getting 90% or 95% was considered a failure in their eyes. again, i think this is not a healthy environment.

we very much need to move toward a whole person concept will we are evaluating our mental and not just look into scores. my third observation comes back to the issue of accountability. we talked about this two weeks ago. there will be accountability caught all levels. the leaders will be assessed for this as well as the people who were directly involved. there will be accountability, i commit to you, and the score. the fourth observation has to do with professional and development. i think we have some work to do. there are all kinds of questions that i have walked away with. are these air men in this career field given the right kind of training? are they being professionally mentored in the way that our young leaders are mentored elsewhere by mid-level leaders, senior in ceos, what are their career paths? to the view this as a career

field that has promise and where they can see a path to advancement in the top? i believe that we need to fix it so that it is the easiest way, more so in the future. fifth, we need to reinvigorate a campaign on core values. and i also believe jet blue there are instances where our culture of taking care one another can sometimes lead to people making bad choices. so we have to reinvigorate what integrity means. it means to act with integrity. it is also your duty to report something if you see something wrong happening. we will go back to basics and remind people what that means. we will do this across the air force. remind people that there are ways to report directly in their ways to reporters anonymously, such as going to the ig. we have to give some reminders of this point in time.

six is what i call the clear incentives, accolades and recognition. we say this is an important mission. are we run boarding people appropriately? and by the way, part of the corrected review has us sitting down across the table from the navy and sharing best practices, learning from each other. so we are taking a close look away the navy handles this. this is such issues, should we or should we not consider incentive pay. should we or should bring not award ribbons and medals for certain participation in this career field. by the way, this pretends very much to the listed as well as to the officer team because they're working very hard every day as well. are we giving them appropriate recognition an incentive? in my last area of focus, last area of observation, if you will, has to do with other forms of investment. once again, this is a tough

mission. my question is are we truly putting the end of our money where mountains. the facilities that are aging, equipment that is now fully maintained, a variety of issues that i saw on my travels last week should you consider redirecting some of these resources to address some of the size priority investments? again, these are the seven areas that we will be looking at over the next 60 days in addressing. okay. let me begin to wrap this. you will get to the bottom of this. this mission is going to get killing ford senior level very persistent oversight. the oversight is deserved. and we're going to have a comprehensive holistic action plan to address all of these observations. as you proline noted, all seven of those observations come down to focus on people. this is a lot about a dozen people issues and getting this done right for our people here

really want to reassure everybody that this is a failure of integrity on the part of certain near mint. it was not a failure of the mission, not only am i confident in the mission, but just yesterday when we had our first meeting of the sec staff directed review memory laney reaffirmed his confidence. the commander of strategic command as well as the sec staff. we are unified on the front. i also want to reinforce to all of you that the vast majority of the 25,000 people who are in our global strike command are performing superbly. they're working very hard and doing a great job with great pride each and every day. and i am talking about people like first lieutenant colonel of corona who is the convoy response first flight commander for the 791 missile security squadron. in short to me is one of the leaders on the defenders' side of the house.

during his nuclear surely inspection last week his team performed flawlessly and was able to successfully deny access to their convoy under a simulated attack in less than three minutes. the defense threat reduction agency, the air force ig, and the global strikes commander all said that this was the best convoyed to mild exercise that they have ever seen. by the way, this is an example of one of those outside inspections where we look at, can people really perform the job. this job was performed superbly, an example of why remain so confident. i want to say, well done and please keep it up. you're doing great. remind everybody here today that there are many out there and the force, and i was honored to meet many of the last week. i want to also thank and congratulate all of them and also remind them, integrity, service, excellence.

core values. remember them always. with that, general wilson, over to you to discuss our mitigation action plan and how to get our plan together for the next 60 days. >> it is a pleasure to be here. airforce will strike a man in charge of two legs of the air force, the icbm and the bombers. in order to do that behrman must be focused and dedicated to performing like the professionals that we expected to be and their nation demands. but the ongoing go s.i. investigation has shown that we experienced a failure of some of our officers and their integrity. again, not a failure of the nuclear mission. remain confident in our herrmann's ability to accomplish the mission, and the btu like to read their knowledgeable, capel, incredible. let me tell you some specific actions that led it as a result of this. within 48 hours of this incident we gave i notice.

our headquarters' directive inspections of all five crew members. every crew member was tested. of the crew members tested, this court and 95 percent average in excess course across the force. in addition, i directed a nuclear charity inspection of altering missile wings within 30 days. we just had the first inspection completed last week. of me tell you a little bit about the results. the great is either pass or fail. they received a pass. of the eight major rated areas the gun of standing into an excellent and six. again, this is done by a joint team, defense production agency. therefore society as well as our commission inspector general. during that inspection 329 crew members were given molecular shirty tests. again, 95 percent was the

average. 99 percent pass rate. in one of those major areas which are called nuclear control order procedures they received an outstanding. what that means is that went out and evaluating the crew members' performance across the board. in one area they evaluated 12. all 12 members, zero defects. in a joint inspection team said this was the best procedures they had seen today. specifically the air force base. the secretary mentioned that we have 92 members. and the impact -- we talk about the impact. so those that are not where the certified, pulling additional alerts. it typically pull eight alerts per month. now they're doing ten. staff crew members are also

augmenting the crew forced to build those extra alerts. we have taken crew members from the staff, and then additionally are augmenting to be able to help them left the training and the evaluation and the procedural. much like any organization, we have contingency plans in place in case something were to go wrong to a much like what happens if a crew force were to get the flu. in that case we have contingency plans for an event like this and their implementing those as we speak. other bases -- and we will look at options and other bases, a potentially are renting in the future demand we are also looking as we get new people out a vanderberg air force base whether we divert some of those who have gone all the bases in can continue the mission. all to you right up front, there has been no operational impact and regency and operational impact such.

additional steps that were taken as i corrected a commensurate investigation, a vice commander there. put together a team. as to the specific look into areas, how we train and test and the leaders of the environment. he and his team are in route as we speak where there will meet with twentieth airforce. then there will go to all of the missile bases as well as a hamburger for space. they will identify the circumstances and the root causes that led to this. he has to report back to me within 30 days, and from there we will take action. we're going to take this river goes. in the information he brings to me we will take delivery and swift action. no much has been written about the morale. as the secretary just mentioned, when you get to the bottom, it's

about people what we want to do is the secretary and her seven initial findings, we want to take that and makes a lasting change. one of the areas we have done that co we're roaring with their other service, and sharing best practices, developed what we're calling a force improvement plan . the force improvement plan that we will put together over the next few weeks, small working groups of junior officers and chairman for operations, maintenance, security forces, and mission support, and there will be charged with identifying challenges and proposing solutions. i can't stress this enough. this is a grassroots level effort from the bottom of. that is where the solutions will come from. provided directly to me. at feedback, those that i can

act upon the will come to the secretary and the chief to implement the actions of the people doing the jobs to mcconnell to not be able to do their mission. this work is underway. initial results will be done at the end of february. a report back to the fed during keep you advised of the progress . in closing, i would like to say that our nation demands and deserves the highest standards and accountability from the force entrusted with the most powerful weapons in the world. as the secretary mentioned, 25,000 people that make up the air men and civilians of global strike command. if you get to meet then you would see that for the vast, vast majority of the then not only abide by, they live are fourscore values of integrity first plus service before self, and excellence in all they do. then make me proud every single day. today as we speak from the missile fields it is-31 degrees.

it is-15. we have a thousand airmen during operations and maintenance and security force operations. there been doing that for 50 years 247365. their tremendous chairman and are doing a vitally important mission for our nation of strategic deterrence. take you very much. the stomach to take any questions. >> he talked about the deployment problem. serbs the get the sense that this is -- if it is systemic, have you seen in the implications any of the other locations, because if it is a test of achieving issues, why wouldn't this be on some of the

other bases? is it then possible issue? >> i'll start. general wilson, you jump in. so the 92 people that we talked about a roster of. there is that datapoint. the data points that i gave you about my observation, i heard those themes and all of the locations. that is why i am saying now want to treat those in a realistic manner. my seventh things i heard throughout. >> the test was locally developed. one of his focus areas.

one of the key questions. >> i'm confident that what we have right now is a maelstrom incident. is not the same test. one of the questions you're asking is to get after how do we test and training. that is one of our focus areas. >> is the investigation far enough along so that you can say with any confidence monday to out of about 190 officers is the extent of it, or you'd expect the number to go higher? >> so we understand from the lsi there nearing their investigation.

your description. it's sort of a different piece, but we believe the lsi is nearing the end. >> you have repeatedly said low compromising security, safety, or operation. so if you can have a widespread compromise of the test without any real world impact of what's the point of the test? >> first of all, want to point out that when this first came to our attention, as you heard what you will recall from a couple of weeks ago : of the first things we did was retest everybody because we wanted to be absolutely certain that people understood their jobs. it's critically important. with that retest that it was confidence. of course their is a real-world impact, as you heard. the existing people because the 92 a been pulled off temporarily until we finish the investigation, there are people here who will be working harder,

pulling more alerts. there are people who understand how to do the job to are now doing staff positions, but we will pull them off of the staff position and put them back doing this a job for some time. and then there may be some levelling of some nuclear missileers from the other bases to come up out. so there are those unpacks where people will have to work harder. in terms of the safety, security, and reliability remain absolutely confident that the people know what to do their jobs. >> focus groups. the people who have to take this test tell you that they viewed it as just another meaningless requirements? >> what i heard in the focus groups -- and the did you visit every base of was that these tests have taken on in their eyes such high importance that

they feel that anything less than 100 could well put their entire career in jeopardy. they have come to believe that these tests are making or breaking, and this is where i came away with the impression that somehow we have lost this notion of their our training activities for people should and can then do make mistakes, but that the cellular and. and there of the things like evaluation. no kidding, you better not to do your job. we have done that and we feel certain that they do not do the job. i think these tests, the law of unintended consequences, perhaps, has come into play here . in our drive to have a zero defect nuclear force, these tests have become elevated to such a point where the environment has simply become unhealthy and where we are not looking at the whole person concept and the totality of how the perform. my opinion is we need to change

that, and that's the key thing that will be looked at over the next 60 days. >> i love saying -- that is the focus area and how we trained in how we test. and i think you saw that from the results all of these officers do not need to cheat to pass the test. we have demonstrated that 100 percent. tested when under percent of the crew force, and the average 95%. >> did you ask in your meetings with their men at the other bases with the cheating was commonplace? that tested three times a month on a variety of things. the cost of testing would seem to suggest that this activity and maelstrom, it's hard to believe that it was not going on in some form of the other bases. did you ask that question and did you get an answer? >> i did ask that question, not exactly in that way, but i ask a lot about the culture the

pressures to succeed. as a great deal about 195 percent is a good score. that is so i learned the one under percent score was with there were all striving for. so i can say that i get direct answer, but i got enough of an impression everywhere went to suggest to me that this is a problem. this is not helping, and we need to get back to the training or you learn and then the testing, but not to mix the two of the where ticket has become. >> ninety-two, how many actually were aware. >> of the 92 we have the full spectrum. we have some who were aware of it, all the way to the other end, some who received the information and deleted of their cell phones. the full spectrum, and we are

looking into it right now as to the specifics of each category. >> temporarily decertified. so the percentage of how many of those might be able to get their certification. >> right now we are focused on about 40 of the '92. again, we have a full spectrum of folks that we're looking at. that 92 encompasses everybody may have known about it to everybody and they have received a test in between. >> and the 40 you think will be able to get their certification? >> we're focusing on about 40 people. we think there were involved directly in their compromise. >> touched on the issues, the

fact that we're going to have to work harder. i would imagine. what do you feel better right now? >> let me tell you what we are doing about it is to make sure that they are motivated, well-trained, confident, and proud of their mission. is also certainly of people filling. as someone else mentioned, it's also about. so we're going to focus on some development at all levels from the year and is chairman to our squadron commanders and above. >> chairman, and a little bit confused. you say that this particular test. >> the locally developed test. apparently there are other tests that are conducted systemwide on a regular basis. >> every month they are tested.

in the past he's wind build their own tests to test the crew members proficiency. we change the procedures of that so that tests will be developed by twentieth there force. it will also be procter differently. rather than each wing in currently doing a test, and now the test will come from 20 there force. >> what about this test made it particularly punitive that put so much pressure on the air and at mills from? the difference between their test? >> the same proficiency tests to test their knowledge of normal procedures. it is given every month. there is nothing different about this test. everyone takes it every month. as the secretary said, lindy is passing. the expectation among is the true force was, they could not miss question.

>> is that a problem exclusive? says. >> i would say it is systemic. we need to change within the way we train and test within the community. >> tell us about accountability, or any of the wing commanders in jeopardy of losing their jobs? also, can you lesson update on the investigation? >> let me tell you, on -- the air turnover their permission. it will look and how we train and test. the environment existed. at the end of that will make recommendations to the personnel actions. >> potentially they could be.

and just trying to get an idea of how high a this is being looked at. >> were looking at everything. >> last time we talked to you it was a level. it was now 13 that are under investigation. >> the illicit force and the officers. i'm just curious, how did their concerns differ from the enlisted forces concerns differ from the officers? >> i want to meet with them separately. whitney from officers and one focus group enlisted another. the enlisted force are heavily in the area of security police, in the main facilities. so they are not the direct missileers you are indeed lost control centers. so they are concerned about, of

course, you know, none of the list of force are part of this investigation. they're concerned essentially had to do with the quality of life, it had to do with where they being incentivized their early? there were many rebels that were not at 100 percent in some cases. of course what that means is that people will either need to work harder. so there were sort of pointing of some of these issues to me the need to be looked at as well. and as i tried to point out, take those very seriously. if all we cared about was the cheating, although we do care about that deeply, but if that's all we cared about we could put additional proctor's in the classrooms and be done with it. but we care about much more than that, and that's what this will be a holistic approach. >> so as part of our force improvement program, the four functional areas we're looking ahead, the teams will be comprised heavily of unlisted members to get their concerns on the grass roots and out of the

address. >> force improvement programs starter already. >> it has. the team is not left yet.

the perception was needed 100 percent. if i missed a test question that then it -- i would not be good enough. but 90 percent is passing and his desk. >> only that mr.

>> so my feeling based on my trip last week is, this is the perception everywhere, and it is more than perception. a commander is using the test scores as the top differentiator to determine whether you get promoted or whether i get promoted, and if i score 100% all the time and used for some hundreds, some 90's, some 95, that means i get promoted and you go. so this is what concerns me. these tests are one element, but they're not the whole person concept. yes, and the back. >> a couple of questions. first of all, al is a specifically they you know for certain you don't have cheating incidents at your other locations? how is it that you can say it is only that mr. m? my other two questions are, are these tests -- he talked about training verses qualification

proficiency. these tests you are describing, they indeed trading tests and not qualifications proficiency tests? in my third question is, given all of this and given what you heard from herrmann across the board, al is it that you don't have what you might call a command climate problem to make the air men have these perceptions. they're getting it from somewhere. >> maybe let me start and then if you would take up. particularly a little bit more about the testing. i do believe we have systemic problems. and i have these seven points based heavily on what i have heard about this the last few weeks to read this holistic approach that we're going to taken this action plan that will be the following. i do believe there are clemens issues. part of that will be assessing commanders, how did this happen. and that will be part of the follow-up as well.

accountability. >> how do you know you don't have cheating in other places and proficiency versus trending? >> again, mainly we give and no notice test to the entire crew force. there was developed by higher headquarters. is troubling to those "-- 500 remember which they averaged 95 percent on the test. subsequently we tested again last week as part of a nuclear sure the inspection of which 329 crew members were tested again and 99 percent of them passed with a 96% average as part of this first lane go out and look and specifically focus come hell we train and test across all our bases. he will take a focus to do just

that, and he will start. he will report back to me. >> i guess the question remains in my mind, how do you know -- you got very high test scores, i understand, but have you know there has not been cheating in other locations in the past? >> well, i have heard full spectrum. talks to a lot of folks over the past few weeks, as you can imagine. of red stains that said this is gone on for a long-term war is not. that is the key area that we're focusing in on, to look at this across the command. >> you have some populations in the retesting that did not pass. yet most of this week it was 22. is that still the number? and help us explain why those chairman cannot pass this exam and get an opportunity to train again and ticketing and?

>> okay. the number is still 22 that did not pass. every herrmann gets -- if they fail in a proficiency test, retrain and retested to pass before their allowed. as a precautionary measure, as a result of this investigation we have temporarily decertified 92 members and they're not pulling do the. if you were to fail a monthly proficiency test you would not be allowed to perform an alert duty until you were retrained and retested satisfactory to pass. >> of fall lawn. let me give you an opportunity. >> thank you again for joining us today. top things on my mind, the years as well, do we have confidence as americans in our nuclear mission with cuffs and how since the secretary of defense reaffirm that to me yesterday. head of strategic command said

we are unified position. we are confident and the security of our nuclear mission. secondly, we told you about the steps which are quick indeliberate and comprehensive that we are taking to address these issues. we will continue to do this in the spirit of transparency. and lastly i just want to say again that overall i have enormous trust and confidence in our airmen as all. there are thousands and thousands of them out there working hard every day performing superbly, and i look forward to continuing to get to know more than because they give me great inspiration and pride. >> thank you. so the 25,000 airmen and civilians to make up the air force global strike command accomplished an extraordinary mission furnish and every single day. their mission of strategic insurance -- strategic deterrence is important to retrieve validated that the icbm occur for sure is knowledgeable, capable, and credible.

the 341st missiles continues to meet all its operational commitments. and with the secretary as talked about, this is all about people, all about could people, motivating people, all about making sure we have trained, confident, proud people who are professionally filled in their job. it to see them every single. if you did you'd be just as impressed as i am. there are amazing near mint, amazing civilians, and they do a fabulous job every single day 247365. thank you. >> thank you. >> tomorrow evening here on c-span2, state of the state address around the country. starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern. she is followed by governor pat gramm of illinois, dave heinemann of nebraska and dennis picard of south dakota. >> you're watching a c-span2 with politics and public affairs

weekdays featuring live coverage of the u.s. senate, weeknights what's key in public policy events, and every week in the latest of fiction authors and books on book tv. you can see past are raising their schedule on our website commended conjoin in the conversation of social media sites. >> california senator barbara boxer said it is awful lot that the nuclear regulatory commission has not turned over documents requested. she was to review documents on the safety records a nuclear power plants. we start off with her questions from the nuclear regulatory commission members. >> madam chairman, i requested documents relating to the floods. just two days ago he told me in writing that they did not provide me with everything requested, and you admitted that because of constitutional concerns.

i have here the comprehensive congressional research service manual a congressional oversight. i have confirmed there were to constitutionally based privileges that allow an agency to withhold documents from congress. one is an assertion of executive privilege, and the other is the exercise of the fifth amendment right not to incriminate oneself which one of these are you asserting as he did not give me my documents. >> madam chairman, the key for the opportunity to answer your questions your. we have -- we certainly want to have a good relationship -- >> i don't have time. unlike you. have a good relationship with you. what are you asserting? and need these documents. is it -- >> are you trying not to incriminate yourself or is executive privilege to make those other two that are allowed. >> we have been working with your staff, with the committee staff to provide documents.

in fact, we just provided another group of documents listed in the day before to the staffa was responsive to your request. >> you have given me all the documents requested? >> if we have not been responsive to your request to go through the documents that we just provided. we, of course, would like to continue to work with the committee. >> i don't want to work with the committee. you have promised the ranking member and myself that whenever we ask for documents. you also committed that to everyone else. so i am just saying to you, if we do not have the documents that we request rightfully and legally, you better assert why you are withholding them, either it's incrimination or it is executive privilege. talk of a separation of powers. we will share with your legal people. we also heard other things from your counsel that deal with other reasons which is still

make any sense. so we will continue to work with you. we have an aide oversight hearings. whether my colleagues want more because i do as well. that leads to an issue of your travel. no, we all travel and business because sometimes it is extremely important to do so. but i have looked over how many trips each of you have taken your time, 17 international trips. commissioner, 127 days of international travel since 2010. leno the chairman has requested all five questions be an attempt at least one week each month. in order to ensure that the commission can conduct its business and be available to testify before congress. so i am asking each of you would agree to a request starting with his finicky.

>> i think we worked very collegial the august scheduling matters. >> i'm asking if you agree with the request that you be in town one week per month, all of you together. >> i no there is a mature and up and. >> that's good. it makes it easier on us. so we will do more oversight. the nrc travel records are received a marked low public the taxpayers are paying for it. will travel we have to show where we go and what it costs. some of you publicly disclose some of your travel in your meetings. but most of you don't. serious are no, will each of you commit to this committee to making all of your travel and meetings publicly available going forward? >> they already do midwest cudgel publicly available and my travel publicly available.

>> will you do that? >> yes. >> i think i am already doing that. >> you will do it. >> yes, i currently do that. i make my meetings public. >> okay. well, my understanding, commissioner, you haven't in the past. we look forward to seeing that in the future. i'm going to introduce legislation that will ensure that the commission and staff are more open about that. >> i think we all agree compromises. you consider to restart a nuclear reactor. the reactor shut down, funds to be in very bad shape. the requested technical of permission from licensee in order to inform its decision on whether the reactor was safe. you're right to do that. but documents i have received a

plan is to have received some, indicate the nrc staff was preparing a document declaring the reactor, saying but the restart of the reactor was safe, it's before it received all the responses to the technical questions. achillea of confidence in the nrc independence when it was preparing to great industry request months before he received a list -- the safety operation. >> during the investigation of the steam generator failure at the nuclear generating stations, there were many concurrent issues that were working but the nuclear regulatory commission it was a complicated proceedings, and there was an active investigation. >> and just asking a specific question. documents show that you're ready

to allow the plan to start up before all the technical studies are done. and you have something drafted. i have just concerned, and i guess what i'm getting it, you close the reactor down. the bottom line is i want to make sure that in the future if there is an investigation going and you should not reopen. so i guess my question is, do you think it's right to reopen the facility will investigation is still going on? you don't really know what the problem is. >> it depends upon the particular situation. and for chilly air can't give you a specific cancer because it depends on the particular situation. some situations are regulations allow for a plan to restart while an investigation -- >> okay. fair enough. i will continue to work on this.

were these statements accurate? the nrc former resident inspector for teocalli file the form of dissent saying that there were operating outside the seismic requirements. is that accurate? >> i believe that this senior resident in years past did file a non concurrence. >> to believe that is correct? >> ee that's correct. >> second he also said that pg&e said that the newly discovered fault could cause crowd shaking net was 70% stronger than the nrc license allows. is that correct? >> of would have to -- >> can you get back to me. >> and the number of other questions i want to ask. recently the nrc voted to delay

a two people beast present. in order to protect against an insider threat. the department of energy has had a rule like that in place for decades. in 2011 the department of : security warned that violent extremists have attendance either positions of utilities and that insiders and their actions poses significant threat to the infrastructure in information systems of u.s. facilities. so i would like you to hansard, do you support the quick adoption of the two-person security greuel euros staff recommended? >> the commission decided not to go forward at this time. >> why? >> it was a commission decision. >> why? >> well was the book? >> on the short. of recall. >> does anyone recall what the vote was not to go forward with this? one of you remember? >> the specific issue was that

the staff did not complete the cost-benefit analysis to assess whether or not the two-person room was appropriate. >> could i just say -- >> we don't have an answer to what the vote was. >> i don't recall. >> five people : those about a lot of people. three to two, four to one. >> have voted against them. >> attitude? >> and voted against. >> average yield of? >> i believe i voted against. >> how did you vote? >> i don't recall. >> i am -- this is a big and important issue. this business of a cost-benefit analysis when you're dealing with the potential terror attack in the takeover of a nuclear plan, you've got to be getting. no, let me say, you have never done a cost-benefit analysis for

these sorts of material tracking in the past and found the costs are minimal, less than a million a year. i've been said the benefit of preventing someone from stealing nuclear weapons is pretty much priceless. i would suggest if you don't move and reverse yourself on this there will be legislation. thank you and turn my colleague. >> i think oftentimes in government and washington in particular we become very process oriented and lose the forest for the trees. some are just going to suggest a question not to be answered here but suggested question for all of us to think about. senator sessions once moved thrasher chateaus were recently. crystal river. duke energy.

if there were unsafe or not safe enough, that's a good result. but if we think, and i do, that most probably all of those sites were safe, were safe enough, that is a fundamental failure on the part of all of us. nrc, congress, the whole establishment. so i just want to try to have us focus on the forest and of the son of a. we have some specific questions. first of all, madam chair, it's your confirmation hearing he stated very clearly, to be effective a regulatory body must be independent from economic policy and political interest.

however, and the majority opinion on beckham mountain charge cavanaugh stated that the commission's political prognostications they are may not ultimately prove to be correct regardless an agency may not rely on political guess work about future congressional appropriation as a basis for violating existing legal mandate . he did not considered a close call. why did it take you to a court decision to move forward with that legal mandate? why was not the political prognostications about congressional appropriations were not being independent from political interest and consideration? >> the key for the question, senator. was not on the commission, so will not try to second-guess

decisions. what i can assure you is that we are fully complying with the court decision, and we are moving forward continue with the proceeding and moving forward public. >> okay. well let's move to that. the commission has repeatedly ignored launched in its order, including this week that it does not have adequate resources to fully complete the occur review and issue a decision. is that correct? >> we need to fully complete the licensing decisions. >> yes. >> you doing that have adequate resources. >> and issued a decision pursuant to the review. >> that is correct. >> so what action are you taking to solve the problem? have you proposed a supplemental budget? >> no, we have not. >> have you taken any other action to solve the problem? >> we are complying with the court decision. they told us to use the existing

funds that we had, and we are going for using those funds. >> let me ask you about existing resources. as was pointed out by other members a few minutes ago, nrc staff has increased about 34%, at least since 2000. meanwhile, the expected increase in workload has never materialized. quite the opposite. so a huge increase in staff, no increase in workload in terms of applications for licenses. are you moving any of that staff to solve this resource problem? >> you know, i would like to actually submit something for the record, if that is okay. i am a little chart here which shows our budget from 2003 to 2013. it shows that in actual dollars

and constant dollars. if you looked at the constant dollar charge, which is in red, our current budget is below -- the lowest it has been since 2007, believe. and in that timeframe since 2007 we have our -- our workload has increased significantly. ..

and as you know, those resources were given to you to meet an expected increase in license applications. increase in sights. increase in nuclear reactors. none of that has happened. yes, regulations have multiplied almost exponentially. but that fundamental graft industry has not happened. let me re-ask my question about people. because you will agree that at least since 2003 there's been a huge increase in bodies at the nrc; correct? >> since 2002. we hit our maximum a couple of years ago, and we have decreased in size since 2010. and we now have around 3700 employees. >> okay. well, not that long ago it's been 2900. there's been a big increase over that time period. are you moving any of those

folks to solve the yucca resource? >> absolutely. absolutely. currently -- the folks moved recently from something else. we are oil percent staffed up. we are -- ready to go on those very soon. >> again, i was talking about following the whole process. you've said several times you don't have adequate resources. i'm talking about that broader challenge. how do you propose to solve the problem? >> i think right now the budget appropriations have been setted. we're in a reasonable position going forward. i would ask my colleagues to weigh in, if they would like to. >> senator, if i could add to the chairman's answer. in terms of reallocating appropriated money to

yucca-mountain related activities. there are prohibitions on doing that. we have to seek a congressional reprogramming. activities used for yucca mountain, i believe, must be appropriated from the nuclear waste fund. our other appropriated money have to receive a congressional reprogramming. >> are you going make that request? >> this will be a commission decision. so it's something we will have to decide as a body. >> are you considering that making that request? have there been any discussions? >> there has been some substitution. we will entertain this as it comes up in the future budgets. >> new reactors instate has moved a number of the personnel over the last two years because of the drop back in licensing of new reactors over to help the fukushima the size of the flooding area. i think our executive director

for operations in the back row has taken a lot of steps to ensure that appropriate fiscally prudent use the resources. >> well, i hope you can understand it took a court order have the nrc follow a clear legal mandate. even as that is happening, there are all sorts of statements. well, we don't have the decisions to follow through yet everything done down the line. realize we're not talking about the immediate work at hand. but the full review and decision. and so why don't we start thinking about how we solve that problem? i don't hear any request for reprogram, any significant movement of individual even though there's been a major increase. any proposal to omb.

so can you all discuss how we solve that problem over tom and present to us and congress and everyone appropriate your plan for solving that problem. not just identifying the problem. we're not just pointing to the problem. thank you, that's all i have. >> thank you, senator. senator corker. >> thank you. i want to go back to the issue raised by chair. that is the two-person rule. let me note for the record. thousand of time and people ask me from time to time how did you vote on such and such? i don't always remember. i can understand how you may not remember how you voted. for the record, let us know how you voted much the other thing, for the record, locate us know why you voted that way. in my old job in the navy, we have from time to time nuclear weapons. and using nuclear death bombs.

two people were involved in that. it was for a good reason. let us know your reaction for doing this. if there's a good reason for it, we would like to know if. if there's not a good reason, we would like to know that too. we would like to know sooner rather than later. that would be great. the other thing, clarify for the record. we do a fair amount of travel. i'm chairman of homeland security. i need to do more international travel. try do a better job this year when i have my chairmanship behind me. you travel a lot. the chairman doesn't travel a lot. some of you travel to japan. that's clear. and i would ask my understanding

is the travel come not from taxpayer dollars but fees collected by the utility. give me the break down. 90/10. >> 90%. >> it sounds like you are fairly transparent on the travel you do. just make sure we get criticized for foreign travel. in a lot of cases it's stuff justified. we go places where we get americans shot and killed. it's hard to criticize that. but make sure continue to be transparent. it's important. it you think -- i always the front page of the newspaper and headline and i have to defend it. just kind of take that approach. and make sure that use the good common sense. sandy visited my state a little over a year ago. they did a lot of damage. i think if if it is real. i think it is. we're going see more sandy in the future and come to other places around our country and

world. not within the nuclear power plant but the governments? >> what are the lessons learned? we are impressed with our licensee's response to sandy. they were all on alert. they were all prepared. we ourselves were prepared. we had we were ready to manage. and the plant managed very well. the only plant that had any kind of incident during that time was oyster creek in new jersey, which high water level. but didn't reach the design basis and didn't effect the plant. >> other commissioners. what are some things we have learned from sandy that were acting on could have done

better. not just within the nrc the plant themselves but maybe state and local government. >> thank you for the question. we had a commission meeting earlier this month. the sale for the creek there. and i think the licensee learned some things. we learned some things. the two comments i have of regional coordination and how the licensee and communicate with fema. and then on sight there was areas identified to enhance the operative procedure in the event of a flood. okay. >> anything the nrc is doing. it could be for the chair or the other members. what they are doing better ensure that our nuclear plants and the communities around them are better prepared for storms like this in the future. >> well, we are certainly. we asked the plants to revalue the flooding hazard at the plant. we are getting their flood

hazard reevaluations in. we got a big trinch in last year. we are expecting another this year. you know, to keep up the potential for increases in flood hazard from climate change or what have you. we are on top of that. we are going to be analyzing other aspects of whether and natural disaster events that as we work through the fukushima tier 3 activity. >> it's going go across the world fukushima. how are they doing on the recovery. somebody give us -- how are they doing in their recovery from terrible disasters they were visited by? >> how are we doing? >> how are they doing? >> in fiewk fukushima. >> they are working very hard. it's a difficult situation. and it's unprecedented situation. they're having to make thins up as they go and in other words, you know, there's constant issue

of radiation leakage in to groundwater. they have a lot of water issues there. and they're working very hard to minimize it. they literally i think are working around the clock. so, you know, but new problems will pop up. and as commissioner noted. we are learning more about the accident. it's giving us more insight in to our own operations here. >> all right. some of you travel extensively to japan. anybody else want to give a quick 30 seconds. how are they doing in recovery? >> i appreciate the question, senator. what i think there's been some very important programs it's an important milestone. i think the biggest challenge they have in japan, frankly is continue skepticism the public has about the ability of the

government. the regulators to speak clearly to requirements and making decisions. they still have those. i think it's a big challenge for as they try to make good decisions. i think they're doing a good job so far. the public skepticism is very high. >> sticking with fukushima for another minute or so. in response to the fukushima event. the commission continues to lessons learned from the accident. that's good. the nrc has several deadlines to meet the next couple of years. i believe, to meet the timeline established in march of 2012. other lessons -- are there issues, rather, that have been a lot more difficult than you might have expected? and so what have they been? >> issues that have made the achieving the activity? are there issues more difficult to address than expect.

>> i would say at this moment not directly, no. there were certainly learning as we go and shifting things around a little bit as we go. we issued an order on it to make them more secure. last year the commission revisited this issue and said, you know, we need to make sure that -- hardin them to open them in -- commission of an accident. we revised the order and reissued it. and so this a these will be capable of being operated under those conditions as well. so we're doing that as we go. chairman. it was last september we sent a

letter to the commission that encourage the nrc to streamline the licensing process. since we sent the letter we understand that the university implemented a new expedited process. if there is any feedback you are receiving from the industry, please. how are we doing here? there are no complaint from the industry. i think we are doing fine as far as i know. >> anybody else want to respond to my question? yeah? all right. chairman macfarlane, can you give us an update on the waste confidence, please? >> yes.

as i said, we have finished our public comment period of getting public comments on the waste confidence rule and the generic environmental impact statement. we are in the process of going through those over 33,000 public comments and addressing them and we will be about, right now, the estimate is one month over time. so we'll be done by the beginning offing on the -- october >> okay. interesting questions that had on about the appropriate rule for state and local government. i have a clear interest in the commission around our country. any regulation to make sure they have the ability to plan it. for the state and local government to have some involvement. and we'll follow up senator

sessions and i will follow up with you and involve senator sanders if you would be like to be part of it. >> a thank you, madam chairman. i was -- i was hoping that senator sessions would make it back because i always do so much better when i ask my questions after senator sanders has asked his questions. you'll find out in a minute. [laughter] i -- let me ask this, also, i really think and i've been here for quite awhile. he's the chair of the committee a long time ago. i think we have an excellent commission. i appreciate your service so much. it's well-balanced. your going to be the next one coming up for renomination. i would hope that you would continue on and inclined to do

so appreciate your service to continue. in my opening statement, i want to repeat something i said there. because it's kind of following up a little bit on what senator vitter was talking about. it may be in a different way. i said that -- i remember so well, because at that time i chaired this committee. it was 2003, that the i center sphesk numbers. i have to say, you weren't here at this time. you are off the hook, partially. but they wanted to do this so they can add expected approval of four design certifications for a new reactor design and 17 of the. that's not the normal.

at that time in discussing this. we were looking in terms. i look back and check our notes. we would have to anticipate having that increase workload in three to five years. that's been a long time. ten years later we only have approved one design certification. so it's gone from down only one and two. now i say this, and i kind of would like to get a response from each member maybe start with, well, you said you weren't here at that time. tell me how that can happen. why did that happen? i would note, senator, some statistics i found very quickly here. that nrc does have underreview

right now. three design certifications. and -- is helping me out. >> i talk about underreview. we said at that time we would have those by three to five years some of the larger economic circumstance for the utility interested in building reactor have changed somewhat significantly. as a result some have suspended or withdrawn their application. some are decreased the pace at which they are supporting the review of the application by which, i mean, we generate questions they indicated they are content with a lower space to our review. some have become protracted for that. i want to get another thing in here. that is that the nrc near term

task force and two japanese report determined that the disaster is one that is we call made in japan. in other words, the cultural differences and the gaps that are out there. i would -- it would seem that we need to have that determined. we talked about this way back conducted a they are row gap analysis between the system and regulation to compare and contrast the complete picture compare u.s. and japanese model to more closely and wisely cost-effectively suggest policy changes. have we made that? >> yes, we did comparative study of the u.s. and japanese regulatory system.

it wasn't comprehensive. it wasn't. >> no. >> cultural -- in part because, you know, to get to the weeds of comparing the u.s. and japanese. we have to translate all of their regulations to fully understand the differences. but let me jump to the conclusion of the study we did. it would have been avoided in the u.s. what i've learned from the fantastic staff at the nrc is that one of the most important things for a regulator is operating experience. and the operating experience we've gained during the fukushima accident is significant. we did not, prior to the fukushima accident, expect or

analyze for more than one reactor out of sight to have an accident. >> okay. >> that was not planned for. we had not prepared properly for extended long-term station blackout. no electricity. no backup forces. and we are now addressing that. and every country with significant nuclear program around the world came to the same conclusion and they are doing the same thing. >> what i would like to have a copy of the report you have. >> certainly. it's publicly available. >> it's not a complete as we probably want. but i want to compare the notes we took three years ago on the changes. for example, you have to actually go get permission inned a van to do things that we are through the nrc empower. those people to do. and there are so many changes like that. and i like to ask, well, would you think it's important for us to have the benefit of the

complete report? i think we have thoughtfully taken aboard the lessons learned income the scope of japanese in the place of time for the areas important. >> okay, well, we like to have the benefit of everything. while we talk about getting reports, miami charm -- yucca mountain report and have been watching closely to see -- do you have a date we would have the report? i think about a year from jan. but i need to get back to you on that. let me take it for the record. >> for the record, i like to have you give me a date we should anticipate receiving it. i think it's, to me, anyway,

that's very important. in the remaining time, i ask the question in opening it up how we can when we're lookinged at -- first of all, increasing the staff as my information we have 900 more employees right now than we had in 2004. i don't know if that agrees with your chart or not. what i would like to have you do is take your chart. since this action took place in 2003. extend it to the three years prior to 2003. so we can get a better look on how much came from the increase activity that we anticipated are going happen in design certification. so i would ask you take the chart and go back to -- instead of start in 2003 start 2000. >> we can do that. >> the rest of you, in terms of

the increase for anticipating design certification in 17 and only getting one design certification at that time. other three of you didn't have a chance to respond that. tell me what i'm overlooking. it doesn't look good, i must agree. that's a good response. how about you? >> yeah, senator. i think that when you look at what is taking place come to answer the questions. is a little bit different than the gap that i'm talking about. >> there's been significant back and forth with the applicants over technical issues. and taken -- longer than anyone thought.

as the commissioner pointed out. there are reviews underway as we speak. >> yeah. we're almost out of time. >> real quick. two camps on design certification. mitsubishi had design certification called the apwr. the submitting group backed off the resources to folks back in japan. second one and the application for and the epr, the problems in the international community with digital -- >> yeah. my time is up. one more thing for my good friend. >> we have voted -- i'm afraid people aren't going to get a chance. >> one sentence. >> out of your time. that's good. do you think it was unfair for me to assert that perhaps we're trying to regulate the nuclear energy out of business just like we're trying to regulate the fossil fuel out of the

business? >> thank you for that provocative. with that we'll turn to senator sanders. >> let me begin -- [laughter] senator inhoff and i disagree every now and then despite being friends. i share your line of question about the growth of employees at the nrc. and the commissioner said doesn't look so good an the surface. i would agree with you on that. that's something we want to pursue together. the other issue i want to make about the role of state government and the commissioning process. before i do that, i want to get to the voting issue, which concerns -- an issue raised for a number of years. every person up here, as united states senators have to cast some very difficult and controversial votes. and occasionally those votes will be distorted and put on 30 seconds ads. that's our reality we live with. is there any reason why every

vote you cast should not be made public? right down the line. miami chair? >> i think there are -- when we vote. >> very briefly. >> the role, those votes, i don't believe are public. >> me point is give me an answer. we have to -- votes about whether we go to war or not. they are made public. any reason why your vote should not be made public. you're saying yes. there are some occasions. >> yes. i agree with that. and would add if there are security-related matters. those are not made public as well. >> that's a big word security. we can hide a lot of security. >> the vast majority of our votes are public.

>> every single one of our fiewk -- fukushima -- are all made public. >> i happen to think that some extraordinary circumstance they should be made. it's my own view. i think ranking member vitter raised the issue of nuclear shutdown in the country. there are a lot of people more concerned about nuclear power. we have concerns about safety aspects of nuclear power. we are concerned about the cost of the production of nuclear power. you know, many of my very conservative friends here silicon valley over and over again. they want the government to redpeg -- deregulate. the truth of the matter is, if we didn't have legislation like anderson, which is not a well-known piece of law. what it is about is god for bid there was a nuclear disaster of

consequence. like fiewk fukushima in the united states. i'm not sure everybody is aware. the taxpayers of this country would be called upon to come up with two knows tens of billions of dollars to deal with the cost incurred. am i right? >> you are correct. in the goal of getting the government out of the private sector. i wonder if they would cosponsor legislation to repeal price anderson so we can leave the nuclear power industry alone and not get involved. i look forward to working with senator vitter and inhofe of getting them out of the nuclear power industry. any volunteer at this point? [inaudible] okay, there we go! i'm not going to volunteer. i want to underscore exactly what i said i listed all of those shut counties. yeah. please don't take it off

bernie's time. i listed the shut down and said if you believe most or all of these sights are not safe or not safe enough within that's a good result. but if you don't, i think the vast majority of informed folks do not. then i think it's a failure on our collective part. >> can't do back and forth. i'm nervous people won't get a chance. it's not fair. finish your time. >> i have heard -- we have heard speech after speech about the government not letting free comprise do a thing. you have a situation without anderson it's likely the nuclear industry in america will collapse tomorrow. you know why? wall street whose job is to make money and the insurance company whose job is to make money. they don't think insuring nuclear power power plants is profitable. they won't do it.

the issue wanted -- in term of nuclear power. i think here knows inspect germany is in the process. people in germany are not dumb. people have different view on the nuclear power. here is the issue that i did want to focus on nap is the role of states. i appreciate the senator for reintegrating my concerns. there are a number of states in which nuclear power plants will be shut down. california, vermont, elsewhere. it is of enormous importance how

the decommissioning process works. will it take 60 years, will it -- has been the case ten years. who will get the job. what about the financial arrangement. all of which are very much concerned i have three questions. do you agree that states have a strong interest? >> i would agree that states in the public certainly have a strong interest. >> do you agree that it is fair

and reasonable for the host state to have a real seat? i know the real seat is not quite a term. but a significant role to play during the decommissioning process? not just a hearing. not just giving their opinion. but having a seat at the table helping to determine the outcome. >> let me explain. our regulations what we do is regulate the safety and security of these facilities. as they decommission. let talk about that. and in that, our relationship is with the licensing. we are holding them accountable to make sure they are providing safety and security. now the public should have some kind of role. and we encourage public engagement. we chattered. >> yes. we encouraged strongly that the licensing form for some time of

community advisory board in which they could -- >> i apologize. i understand that. we had a community advisory. that is not satisfying to me. because advise can be rejected. it my question to you all is should the states themselves who have to deal with the consequence of the decommissioning process have a real -- i understand real is not a technical term. but be part of the process such that if what is the negotiated between the industry and the nrc is not -- to be a real player in the process. should the state have that type of authority?

there is a local interest as well. they need to be represented. >> in our democratic society in state government in getting elected to -- let me just say. i think i'm probably not going get a clear answer for any of you. it's an important issue. i think your rule right now are not satisfactory. i think you do not give enough -- input. you don't give enough power if you would like in the decision making power to the people of the states. i would hope -- and we will chat about this, miss macfarlane. we will change rules. if you not change the rules i will introduce the rules to make sure that states have the authority. >> thank you. >> thank you. you can count on my support for that. i have decommission, i think, massachusetts has one coming as well.

senator sessions. >> thank you. >> we don't want to get the government out. i would assume of solar auto, ethanol. and wind powers. how about oil? not much. >> except $6 billion a year. that's disputed fact. >> okay. as to whether or not any special tax break or a normal tax situation. >> okay. well, i would like to see down in alabama. i don't know -- they sued vermont yankee -- i guess they finally just gave up and closed the plant. that's all right. they don't want to hire want to have the electricity produced using carbon fuels or whatever, so be it. i would like to see clean nuclear power be used around the

country. now, i raise this concern because i'm really worried about this. if they jump in and double up. it's one more burden that make it even less likely we have an expansion of nuclear power and more likely we will see this decline continue. i'm worried about it. you've been on the commission for some time. you observed these issues develop. would you give your thoughts to us to share your thoughts with us about what might be contributing to the erosion of nuclear power generation and the failure of new plants to get

started? while good for the united states effects the economic of both new nuclear but also current nuclear. and so from regulator standpoint. we don't com the marc economic factor. i think our pledge as a commission is to make certain that we do the most disciplined sort of analysis and work so we are only imposing regulationers that we analyzed and justified. is it possible the regulatory factors and let's say a lack of final certainty a waste disposal in yucca mountain and cumulative cost are affecting the future of pneumonia already power? >> i support the commission's

action to address the court remand to our waste confidence decision. i think that the commission and the agency staff are taking it responsible action to address the deficiencies the court identified, which were not the entirety of the rule we put forward. but the court asserted and found that our analysis and evaluation lacked certain points where remedying those specific deficiencies. as chairman noted although we have delayed our schedule by one month don't push forward aggressively. >> well, it's worst than that. the court hammered the commission and congress and all to meet this and declear it an absolute violation of multiple requirements of law. it goes to the very core of who writes law in america. congress passed law, we chose the site. it's been authorized and

directed. fees have been collected in billions of dollars and very little action has been done. wouldn't you agree it's a real -- the court's decision was a real critic teeing of the failure to act on the congressionally approved yucca mountain site? >> yes, on the matter of yucca mountain the court's language was unequivocal and very strong. we have taken action to express the writ of -- will it be completed? and what time? >> we are providing a monthly report to this committee. we do not have the team of nrc experts who address that work fully assembled. i believe the last i heard last week we have 75% of the experts asemiabilitied. you should ask for it.

comes down constitutional question. will the governor of the united states execute the law established by the duly elected congress. and not one member of the united states senate. some powerful senator ought to be able to block what has been decided by the majority of congress. i feel like -- i believe -- the fact we have failed to have an approved disposal sight is a factor in weighing against building and going forward with investment in the plant. if you're not sure that will ever be effected. ever saw it could reduce your confidence you can have the waste disposal disposed of as

required. we won't -- you will be less confidence in investing. how many -- are in license or relianced process now? >> licensing process? >> we have 9.9 complined license reviews underway. many have been slowed down in part because there are delays in the design certification for the plant -- and those delays were requested bit vendors themselves.

in south carolina. >> okay. and some entirely . >> they are entirely new design. >> yep. >> how would you describe -- the plant parts of your -- i hope they don't complain about it travel. [laughter] serve the plant and see what is going on. was it your observation the plant 19,000 so all power shut off. you can allow the water to cool the system and prevent disaster. would it be an improvement on the fukushima design and avoid some of the dangers that occurred there. how would they? >> half the systems are certainly better than active systems that have to be activated. those passive systems are an improvement. >> for people who are

listening. would you describe how the passive system works? >> i'm in light of the time i'm going to take it for the record. >> okay. do you feel like these plants the new ones that are moving forward could help the united states be a leader and set an example for the world as well as our country. >> well, it's our job at the nuclear regulatory commission to ensure the plant under construction are moving along safely the plants are operating safely and securely. we're protective of public health and safety. it's not our job to prognosticate on the -- of the health of the nuclear industry or what is best in term of nuclear policy or energy policy. we leave that up to congress and the administration. >> well, you have a role to play

in. and excess i have regulation, at this time, real competition for low cost natural gas that is fairly clean carbon fuel. but not as clean as nuclear power. i think the scale can be tilted in a way we can see a collapse in the future of nuclear power. i think you have to be aware there are ramifications from the decisions. thank you for your work. i thank you for trying to dot right thing for the country. >> thank you, senator. senator fisher. >> thank you, thank you for being here today. nice nice to see you. the nrc they emphasize efficiency and dpowsing on activities that have the greatest safety significance. rule making making is a small

portion of the total scope of your activities that licensees must respond to. how does your agency prioritize it's nonrulemaking activity to ensure your finite resources are focused on activities of the highest safety significance and in the most significant manner? let me say. thank you for your question. do you believe the prioritization process is necessary? >> we. we use the process. we work with industry? helping set the process. i believe we are receiving a staff paper on this topic this year. let me say that in general, we wait safety and security at the highest and priority setting factor. but we also depend on how new rules fit to the strategic plan and how what the interests are within the nrc within congress, within other governmental

bodies. i said industry, of course. with regard to fukushima and what is happening there, part of the evaluating that lesson, i think needs to be how you look in the future of the consequences in working with other agencies here within our government. especially with regards to more dams upstream. if there would be any failures of those dams. this is a subject i know not of interest to you. but also to our other agencies out there. the core, for example, department of homeland security. how is the commission coordinating the research on that? we are working with the other agencies that you mentioned as well. the federal energy regulatory commission which has some purview over dams. but we are working closely with

them to deal with these issues. they are significant issues. >> do you look at any uniformity in trying to come up with the good assessment on that? >> you formality among the federal agencies? how is that working? gla yeah. [laughter] we have our differences. >> do you think you're going to be able to work together? >> yes. >> this is a huge concern. do you have a formal process in place? yes, we do. our staff has been meeting them on a regular basis. >> okay do. you anticipate you're begin to be coming up with a plan soon or is it going to be targeted for each area? >> let me get back to you with a specific answer on that one.

industry assessment to identify tell me why. >> i don't think there's is any evidence that any there have been -- let me put this way. there are a number of voluntary actions taken by the industry. i think those have been prompted by actions within the nrc in anticipation of new rule at the nrc. my colleagues might disagree. i encourage them. >> do you have anything to add to that? can you give mae specific example? >> the study done in the mid to late '80s is certainly contributed to the --

[inaudible] but the most sitting safety improvement. i think we have made tremendous progress in fire protection, for example. of the industry and the nrc staff have come up with ways of improving the fire safety and understanding that. so i would say that's more significant improvement. >> thank you. >> thank you for the question. i provide another example the fukushima action. two comments. one, the commission back in 2011 made a concerted decision to prioritize the safety issues tier one, tier two, tier three. the most important. ting served the economy and industry and the country well. second piece i would mention is that in the context of fukushima

industry developed a for example proposal to deal with loss of power offset. on sight. to deal with other issues associated with the catastrophic ercht. it's going to partnership in the issues. yes, sir? >> senator, i think it's an excellent question. i think it's a complicated question. because you look at the operations of each individual nuclear power plant, licensees take action in response to nrc initiative and their own desire to build margin increase safety. and there's a handshake that goes along with those. i think each plant benefits benefits from voluntary action taken by licensees. how to compare it to regulatory actions. i don't think we have tried to do that. but i agree with my colleagues

that i think the regulatory framework put together is one that is built to assure safety. when they go above that it's a good thing. thank you very much. thank you, madam chair. so i want to thank my colleagues. because it's really great. the votes, i guess, just started. they just started. so that's really good. i want to thank you for coming here today. we're going to have you back real soon. because there's many more issues we didn't get to. specifically we're going to go in the next hearing. we're going to look at the transparency by commissioners who are going to look at the twelve rights that were made post fukushima for safety by your own staff between them all had 150 years of experience. laid out twelve things you

should be doing. at that time there was a hope in the commission to get those things done in five years. fukushima is march 2011 and 2012 pass and 2013 and we're approaching march 2014. my understanding there's one rule out of the twelve. everything else is we are going make public your vote. you don't seem to -- chairman you voted with everybody else not to do not cothe two-person rule. just a reminder -- jog your memory. we found that in the public records somewhere. we dug for it. so the issue is your own safe who had 150 years of experience get these 12 things done.

do a cost-benefit analysis. because the cost of fukushima might i remind you, is pretty much immeasurable and the benefit of avoiding that is pretty much immeasurable. you're doing cost benefit on everything. i'm going find out from you the status of each of these twelve recommendations. i hope you can move forward on that. i'm going put in the record, miami chairman, a letter i just got. as you delivered you signed it the next area of information. if you still a problem, call me. i have a problem. because you asserted some kind of a legal bar is your general counsel here? i've never met her. can i meet her, please? [inaudible] >> okay.

i think it's important you talk to my counsel and you also speak with those who advised us. our understanding is the privilege you are suggesting is absolutely off the wall. our understanding from every legal expert here, you can assert executive privilege the fifth amendment right not to incriminate yourself. you're talking about some separation-of-powers. the arrogance of that is unbelievable. you wouldn't be here without the congress. you wouldn't be here without the congress setting you up. you wouldn't be here. and you have to be suggestive to oversight and we have a right to document. and when you sit there and you tell me and you tell senator vitter you're going hand us all the documents we want and you

don't? and say very sweetly i'll be happy to find out. what, if you need anymore. yes, i need them all. and i need to know whistle blowers are saying. i need to know it. because i swear that i will uphold this constitution and defend and protect the people i represent. the people of this country. so this is not a good relationship. and it certainly isn't. i feel very bad. it's not personal. i'm sure. but each of us could be friendly on a personal level. that's not what this is about. it's about openness and transparency. it's about safety. it's about accountability. and for you to withhold documents, which you admit you are doing, based on some phony legal argument is beyond it. maybe it wind up in court. maybe we sue you. i don't know what we do.

i want the information. i will get it. even if i have to go to whistle blowers. i'm just telling you get me the information. because when i have a situation where a plant was obviously in a dangerous situation and even before the inquiry there was a staff opinion to threat go and open it and i can't find out why and how. it's just wrong. continue on and on. i thought maybe with a new chairman and a new spirit here things would change. but whether you're travel some of you don't even want to have buried asked us make it considerable. don't fell people what we spent. what is it about? you're not above the american people. i want you to travel somewhere. i want you to go to japan. i don't know somebody of the other places look like they're fun to go to. i don't know how much they have

to do with anything. but i am hoping you would go back to talk to each other. instead of going back and saying that barbara boxer, oh. you have a right to do that. but i hope you will also change your attitude about openness, transparency, about moving a little quicker. adopted one out of these twelve recommendations, i don't -- i don't understand it. just look at the faces of the people who got caught. and you can say all you want and it'll never happen here. don't say that. we never thought we would be hit on 9/11. we never thought we would see the like of hurricane sandy. no one thought kids would have to be on a bus on an iced road for overnight either. we're just not that powerful.

we're not. we're humble in the face of what could happen. so i hope you'll go back and i hope your counsel will look at the law in the light that our experts are telling us. our experts, they don't have any -- anything to hide or gain. they just have been advising the congress forever. and i have the opinion here. i'll give it to your counsel. the summary of it. this is the summary. we have the full book if you need. it i hope you'll take a look at this. should we give the whole thing? we'll give you the whole entire book about it. because what you're telling us is simply unheard of. we don't get it from any other agency. just so you know. we don't. people complain about epa. they're not asserting.