made by election board workers and staff, vastly more were made by the voters. they were supposed to fill in an oval, some would circle them or put a x next to them and the question is what does this mean? or they would use wrong kind of think that the machine couldn't read, forgot to -- a woman who changed their name, say they got married, didn't bother to change the voter registration so they signed with a different name and the election people are left saying this is the right person, they didn't change their address. response ability of citizenship and respect to the elections is extremely important in our democracy and i think this was a compelling lesson to people that they need to pay more attention, take their time, the conscientious and doing right. >> they are a very human process, a partnership between

the administrator ran the voter, the voter needs to follow instructions, ballots on time, the election administrator needs to do his or her job, you don't think about it when the race isn't close or if the election isn't in the news, once it is all of a sudden all the e election mechanics take center stage but one of the benefits is it built momentum and it gave the secretary of state a rare opportunity to make changes to reelection law. the mandate of the law is to preserve history, the state archives, the state library, we document oral history and biography is of washingtonians who have contributed to our history in some way. sam can tell you i know he was stopped on the streets all the time, people would come up to him and say you need to write this down and thinking about it,

we do have an obligation to document and as i say the big lessons our transparency, every vote does count. if anybody doubts that you can point to the 2004 governor's rays in washington and say look. we honored our mandate, felt an obligation these were circumstances that were so rare that to be able to talk about the lessons learned and how we handle that and what we would do right, what we would change would be invaluable to the election administrators in the future. of voting systems and elections will involve change but timeless lessons will remain. >> for more information on booktv's recent trip to olympia, washington and many other cities visited by our local content vehicles go to c-span.org/localcontent.

booktv is on facebook and twitter. like and follow us for book industry news, booktv's schedule updates, behind-the-scenes looks and author events and to interact with authors during live television programming. here are a few of booktv's posts from this past week. earlier this week political activist pete seeger died at 94. on tuesday we posted a link to a 2001 program on the late folksinger. booktv tweeted a new york times article about simon and schuster's plans to publish a book by former president jimmy carter on women's rights and on facebook we posted a portion of our recent interview with georgetown university law center's paul butler. >> if you listen to hip-hop you are reminded that there are 2.5 billion people locked up. you can watch all the reality shows about real housewives and all these movies about vampires and how that's and you will never know the we lock up more people in the united states than any country in the history of

the world. >> you can watch this interview at booktv.org. week wheated an article from library journal about 8234, recently introduced maryland bill on e-book pricing and libraries and on facebook we added some pictures to our booktv behind-the-scenes. follow us on twitter at booktv, like us on facebook, facebook.com/booktv for more news about the world of publishing and what is happening on booktv. >> next, eri hotta examines the attack on pearl harbor and entry into world war ii from the japanese perspective. this is about an hour. >> thank you for coming. it is always a somewhat artificial situation of two people who know each other well, husband and wife fall into that category and to do an interview

in public like this, why i asked questions i could ask over the breakfast table and done the other hand one doesn't normally discuss japanese naval strategy in 1941 over the breakfast table. so it is as good an opportunity as any to discuss this little bit further and one of the things i find most interesting about the book and revealing for many readers in this country is it tackles certain myths about pearl harbor, one of the myths which was of course very much encouraged in the postwar period not only by the japanese themselves but by the american administration is japan had been hijacked by the militarists, by the military and civilians were not to blame for what happened. it was a kind of militarist coup

and the japanese people and the emperor himself were sort of do by the militarists in to embarking on this reckless adventure. what would you say to that particular myth? >> it was a very easy and convenient myth because it disengage quite a few of the people who were actually responsible in reality and of course for the japanese nation as well to think that the war could have been averted was too painful question asked i think. and it was a self perpetuating myth that the japanese themselves took very easily to after the war having lost so much. >> in your book you describe why is it is wrong to think of it in terms of civilians being duped

because some of the civilian politicians, not least the prime minister for much of the time was actually to a barge extent responsible for what happened even though he saw that it would lead to a disaster. >> defect the decision making, responsibility was shared between civilians and the military is hard to imagine because people take for granted the military took over but it does not the case, the leaders 70 times in the run-up to the war and discussed the alternatives and different steps to be taken and conferences were called liaison conferences and that was not for anything that

was called because its function was civilian and military strategies and policies and create a sort of a unified voice so civilian politicians can't say they didn't have any say because they did have a say in those conferences. >> why did they go along with it? >> it happened over the course of a period in which they gradually deluded themselves into thinking we can say this much but some kind of diplomatic breakthrough will happen and it will -- militaristic steps they were taking and when all this was going on the military leaders had to put up a front to preserve their faith and that these young officers who were strategizing and thinking about

expanding their sphere of influence and there was also rivalry, the navy and the army were always fighting with each other for a bigger budget. the navy and army air very much divided into different sympathies so you can't really talk about the military voice as monolithic. that is another myth. >> takes me to another myth which is there was tremendous consensus. on the one hand on the surface there is consensus but actually behind the scenes there was tremendous rivalry and different factions. trying to thing, it escapes me, there is a japanese expression for the top guys being driven by the middle ranking people who are more radical.

perhaps you could explain. >> the exact translation would be something like retainers, does that make sense? >> the lord has complete authority in principle but is weak and driven into a more radical position by hot heads in the middle ranks. >> it justifies asking the power by indicating leaders as ineffective basically. so the young officers throughout the 30s especially in the beginning of 1930s up to february of the 1936, were driven by this desire to renovate the japanese policy and

also strengthen the imperial system and so on and everything was done in the name of influencing that put japan under tremendous economic strain and economic considerations cannot be separated in this period like any other part of the world's sole there were hot blooded officers and soldiers who were ready to mobilize, or perceived by the leaders, so fear about what could happen to them as well. >> again, rather destroys another myth of japan as a very authoritarian society which on the one hand has some truth about on the other hand the authorities were often not really in control. you mentioned the 1936 coup which may not be clear to

everybody. in 1936, a number of middle ranking officers often from the northeast, country boy is in the northeast, particularly badly hit by the depression and that is where people are often really hungry and the daughters are sold into prostitution and that kind of thing and the military officers at the time, they were not unique in the world, believed people responsible for this place where the capitalists, bankers, the elite, the establishment and so on, they were radicals of the right and want to stage a coup to put the emperor, to make the emperor into a kind of dictator which he wasn't and to set up a fascist state, it was the emperor in the center and even though a lot of people, admirals and generals and so on were sympathetic to the names of these young hotheads and admired their,

quote, sincerity and salon, for the more conservative members of the establishment including the imperial household, they went too far. they didn't disagree with the aims necessarily but didn't like the means so this was a clear case of young people in the middle ranks driving people in authority into positions they may not have wanted to be. >> stuff that the error saw affected by the experience of the failed coup which nearly toppled him is important because that affected his passive and this and perhaps diffidence in putting his foot down in 1941 and he talks about it after the war, he tried to veto the decision he might be -- the kind

that was tried in 1936, didn't say anything. also speaks for the fact that it was possible, in the constitution, not as clear as he claims. >> if they could have made a case, would have replaced -- much more radical. >> popular. >> what about the other miffed, the japanese -- the myth that the japanese people are duped by the ministry, the standard mainstream, the right wing nationalists which is still here in japan, that japan was trapped, was forced into attacking pearl harbor because they were surrounded by western

colonial powers, america, britain, china and the netherlands, japan has a perfect right to defend its interests in east asia and that includes china and sell lawn and surrounded by western powers that didn't want japan to have its moments in the sun so they were driven by economic boycotts and that kind of thing. we could also talk about that, the americans, the americans forced their hand. >> the encirclement from a classic explanation for many of the region's, germany and world war i, if that was very much on

the japanese mind as well. the fact that low wartime government may use of that narrative told you -- a speech on the day of the pearl harbor attack that japan was reluctantly -- prime minister tojo, japan into the war reluctantly despite the nation's past efforts at trying to achieve peace, the concept that the japanese were taken by but in this end and in effect abused, was quite useful at the time as well and useful to make some cells believe they were fighting for the right cause too. that narrative was quite strong and who would want to die for the wrong cause? you want to believe that, if you

are an ordinary citizen without much access to real information about china or japanese imperialism i don't think is hard to imagine how appealing that narrative might have been. >> it had a kernel of truth too. is true that unlike nazi germany japan was fighting a war against other imperial powers. george kennan, one person who criticized the u.s. diplomacy in retrospect said they should have recognized japanese interests more than they did. the whole problem stemmed from the fact that since the middle of the nineteenth century when japan was forcefully opened up by american gunships the japanese saw their only chance

to survive as an independent nation, not be colonized like western powers. at this late in the game, but one can sort of understand why it was felt that they have their right and european empires. >> i can understand it is understandable but that is not excused either in the fact that they had a relative -- a period of relative peace and democratic experiment in the 1920s and fashion to go international in the league of nations which japanese more than anybody else took seriously it is a shame that you had to go down that way. understanding the broader frame of mind is useful to look at

colonialism and imperialism and also not triggering medium-term causes of war that causes for the war had more to do with the japanese ambitions in east asia, rivalry for control of china with competing against the united states as well. the idea that the fact that they had been lucky in their past wars probably affected their military mindset that perhaps this reckless war could be somehow won. >> it was applauded by the western powers. teddy roosevelt when the japanese beat the russians in 1905, talks about the japanese, so did the british and the attack on the russian fleet could be seen as -- it was the

real thing but it was the kind of pearl harbor at that time. >> the fact -- the surprise attack as well, the soviets don't make as much of a myth about the surprise, the freak nature, stills nature of the attack, has to do with the fact, the so dramatic and the fact that the america was attacked on its soil even though it was a heavily japanese populated island ironically, just became part of the american psyche and collective historical narrative and became a symbol and the parted from it, real

significant. >> let's play in to american myths, didn't necessarily condone the attack on pearl harbor, he certainly didn't. his analysis is one of the reasons the americans were so shocked by this event and outrage, the idea of infamy and so on, that it played into these years in so many western movies of the treacherous indians who are always attacking without warning from nowhere, the brave pioneers and suddenly these redskins screeching war cries. in his analysis, all war without mercy, one explanation why it is still such a strong myth in america, exactly that, this treacherous attack. wasn't meant to be treacherous or was it a screwup?

>> there is a huge debate about who is responsible for the delay in determining diplomacy to the white house but the fact that delayed documents didn't specify that they were -- not a declaration of war really so you can't really argue, the treacherous nature, had not been affected any way in roosevelt's mind. the fact that he had this rhetorical genius and the mobilize the nation, the enormity, something to be said about comparison to indians or native americans. >> in movies. we knew our breakfast. >> it is the thought of it

speaks for the disproportionate asymmetrical nature of the warfare being fought and that is why after 9/11 it was so compelling and tempting for people to use that analogy, the attack being much like pearl harbor. and underresources power could overtake a giant however momentarily. >> to carry on slightly from what we are talking about before, another analysis, the japanese intellectual who is no longer with a started as a communist and ended up all truck right wing nationalists, his phrase was the 100 year war,

pearl harbor was part of a war that started in the 1860s when japan was opened up by commodore perry with his gun ships and jeffersons, even though there were periods of peace, after since japan, western dominance. is there some truth to that. >> if you look at the whole history in terms of cultural civilization, it is very tempting to explain the political events that took place in the meantime and reduce everything to these world views almost. these things affect one's thinking, and the furniture of

mind, and the racism. and describe individual beliefs and how people react to certain situations differently or 7 leaders might have held on to certain beliefs more strongly than others. just doesn't explain the whole picture sufficiently. i can see how it could be tempting to. >> my role would be the right wing japanese nationalist. so why did they do it? what did a thing, what was the hope? the mastermind of the attack on pearl harbor, yamamoto a cool was targeted and in the japanese embassy in washington, new the west very well, very sophisticated man who warned the government on several occasions that it was a very reckless thing to do but he did it

nonetheless. was a gambling man and was probably vain enough to think he was the man to do it if anyone but what did they hope to get out of it? >> in the end it was a gamble. by this time they felt they had been cornered into this situation they justified it in terms of the slim possibility that something diplomatic could be worked out after inflecting a great deal of damage on the pacific fleet on the united states, that even though the war was being declared in the name of the failure of diplomacy they expected the approach to be a diplomatic solution so japan itself didn't have any exit plan. fact that the russo japanese

war, japan also didn't have an exit plan they're either and it was because of theodore roosevelt's intervention and peacemaking efforts that japan just got away, it wasn't a straight forward -- >> almost went bankrupt, were bailed out by a baker in new york, jake shift who escaped anti-semitic areas in russia so was not a friend of the russians. white russian officers taken prisoner by the japanese introduced the japanese to the protocol of -- many put 2 plus 2 together, jacob schiff, we have to keep the jews on our side at the conclusion which is why the japanese during world war ii reviewed to hand over the jews to the nazis when they requested

it from shanghai. we are getting close to questioned time. the last question perhaps, i think i am right in saying in america pearl harbor has become a sort of mystical location which is used over and over at least after 9/11 office and so on. in japan when people think of world war ii pearl harbor is not the first thing that comes to mind. >> atomic bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki would be the first things that come to mind but bombings of every major city tends to get forgotten or not discussed. and that sort of experience dies hard. but then it has been almost 70 years since the end of the war, that sort of collective experience is becoming thinner

and thinner. i can't really say even that they have a strong attachment to any of the bombings including a bombings exit they get taught in school more effectively than they are taught about -- >> there may be another reason we haven't discussed, why sell many japanese intellectuals, people who are not fascists or militarists applauded the attack on pearl harbor in december of 1941 partly because it came as an enormous relief. they had been fighting china even though the official propaganda was japan was liberating asia they had been fighting china and getting deeper in this quagmire. many people felt embarrassed about it and even now, probably

more people if they think about world war ii, know more about the atrocities committed against the chinese than they know about pearl harbor. a lot of intellectuals in 1941 felt regaining -- at last giving the west and bloody nose, fighting a proper enemy. this is the war we should have been fighting to begin with and not our fellow asians. >> a few of them had studied and firsthand experience in that. that is -- the inferiority complex was much deeper than others. not against small issues. it is of bit like what is his name? daniel ortega who picked up

american rhetoric in california. it is 6:00 so open about to questions. i will field the questions. >> there will be another section if you don't mind. we have microphones set up on either side so i will ask that you proceed to the microphone and identify yourself and you can address eri hotta or ian buruma with your question. please come to the microphone. >> noaa smith from stony brook university. the worst dressed person in the room. a couple questions. one of my questions is one thing you didn't discuss is in 1939 japan had tried attacking the soviet union and it was a bigger operation than people realize and they were soundly defeated.

they sent a bunch of tanks and creamed them. did news of that not get out? i know that experience deeply shook a lot of the right people like -- did to that give some pause or was that hushed up and nobody knew what happened? >> it was hushed up in the public, the newspapers didn't report it, but the army leadership was of course shaken, they decided they couldn't fight the soviet union after june 22nd, 1941. that was very much on their mind, couldn't afford to fight the soviet union, we have this pact reached in the spring so just keep things quiet and keep fighting china and going into

french indochina to sustain that warned position in china for the time being. >> attack another room giant. >> part of the inter service rivalry in the navy and army, the no. faction which was largely army wanted to go for the soviet union, to strike south which was unable because they needed the resources to keep going, wanted to fight the war in southeast asia and the debacle in mongolia where these battles were fought, the debacle basically meant the end of the strike north action. >> can i get a second question? >> we can come back to you. >> interested in tojo, to what

extent was he trying to ride herd on these factions and move japan toward being a more centralized less sectional system? >> at what point are you talking about? >> what little i've read indicated that he was trying to be more -- japan was very fractionalized without chain of command so to what extent was he trying to change that? >> he was into efficiency because he was -- >> and able bureaucrat. >> very able bureaucrat with individual notes about people he dealt with every day of his life and held a grudge against people and punished them and so forth but he did try to centralized and also his primary motive was to help the emperor because he

was a very devoted servant of the imperial institutions so when he was appointed prime minister in october of 1941 the first thing he tried to do was to avert war, goes against the idea of tojo being an openly bellicose and uncompromising about going to war which is not true, so a bit more complex, simple-minded, his position was more complex. >> ian mentioned the china quagmire at the end of the dialogue. i wonder if you could explore for us to what extent in 1941 was china and the china quagmires itself the main driver

of japanese war and diplomatic policy, the attack on the u.s. in a sense if you have a problem you can solve make it bigger, and maybe you will find new opportunities, to what extent were they talking about some kind of peace dealers or some kind of accommodation or was that entirely off the table for china, what were the war games in china at that point and if you could make a larger picture, to what extent japan's parties and try party packed, we can take more, look at the germans at the base of moscow, to extend either looking to their access partners in europe as a model and further insight into thinking big? >> i think the china rule is

central and they did discuss it was essential for him to shine -- end china, to end it meant to exit honorably. and figure out the puppet mishima, and they want americans to recognize that regime as well, and it didn't make sense they had no inkling to recognize the regime in the first place. in the negotiations in washington, china was always there. and conferences in tokyo, was always discussed.

it became the sticking point in the negotiation, the military couldn't openly saying they are willing to withdraw, and some kind of bargaining. they struck they couldn't openly discuss these things, civilian leaders to reach a diplomatic breakthrough, to offer diplomatic resolution, if he met roosevelt in person, and prepare for war in the meantime, and allow them to see roosevelt and hawaii and alaska and he thought the military spokes that would happen until quite late, and mid

september and early october. and noticed americans will not come to the table, and they left. china was central. your second question was about tripartite pockets. and i wholeheartedly embraced it, and they wanted to believe that, germans did know the truth of hitler's pronouncements.

and sort of marshall aspects and the factories in europe, japanese casually thought, southeast asia is right for plucking, and if -- the western powers will not quibble because it is a big mistake and that is the total embargo. and freezing of japanese assets. >> to add to that, didn't they also see operation as an opportunity to attack southeast

asia and the united states because they fought with the russians out of the way europe -- >> the hardest course to military strategist and general staff raised the idea, that was not the mainstream because they were not thinking in terms of july 1941 at all. they were more concerned about power struggles at home, the eccentric foreign minister, he was saying shore of the gesture in germany, allied germany, and attack the soviet union quickly so that we can claim to have participated in their war and take some soviet positions, and the army traditionally seen the

soviet union posted. partly because of the experience that we nationalize it, the positions that especially wanted him to leave the cabinet >> and the axis power is an old one. and trust one another. the question, the issue of wanting the jews on their side, and the other hand you hear stories from german business men, a very long ago being taken out for drunken evening by japanese colleagues who thought it would please west german colleagues enormously if they

start seeing -- was not the thing to do. >> i am afraid part of the question has been taken up, interested in whether germany was instrumental in urging japan to enter the war and i was curious did they know the japanese were going to attack or any of the details of it? america declared war but not against germany. it wasn't clear what was going to happen and there was even some thought that it might be beneficial for hitler not to declare war and see what happened. the details of those few days and what the germans urged japan to do this? >> not as far as i know and i

doubt if they knew. one of the mysteries of world war ii is why hitler decided to declare war in the united states which he didn't have to do but maybe it was an honorable man. and thank goodness he did because that made it very easy for roosevelt to get into the european war so is not for nothing that when churchill was given the news over a late-night dinner wherever he was, he said -- wasn't the first night he slept very well but he slept very well. >> to add to that, germans were seen for the japanese to do, in the middle of 1941 in singapore for japan and singapore so that they could help the war court in the soviet union somehow end in bringing hitler was obsessed with this idea of of course

conquering england, the isle of britain so i think he probably thought the japanese could be used that way more effectively, by way of attack. .. in the case of germany within 2025 years their relations with

the neighbors, including very much occupied countries or somewhere from cordial to warm. that did not happen with japan, and still has not happened. i guess what is the difference? >> your burden a book about that. >> there is a long answer and a shortage one. there were very different neighbors. germany was in the middle of your. neighbors to the rest were western democracies who were tied to west germany and the military alliance, unifying europe. and that was a very different propositions to being japan's immediate neighbors or communist china and south korea, which was this kind of allied. vignette taqueria. it wasn't an east asian alliance

that was in any way comparable to the european community and nato. that is one reason. i think the other reason is, and also i think one mustn't overstate the warmth of the relations between germany and its neighbors. certainly i remember in 1974 -- note : 1988 when my own country, the netherlands, be germany at the european soccer championships. more people went into the streets to celebrate than in may may 51945 at the end of the war. [laughter] and so having said that there were very different worlds. and there were two germanys. that is the other thing. west germany and east germany. they have very different relations with the outside world so west germany, people talk about coming to terms of the past and all that and a finger. people really are not talking about the invasion of norway. the talk about the holocaust. that's a very specific crime

committed by a criminal regime. japan didn't really have a criminal regime. there were the same people who were in power and had been in power before the war. and there wasn't an equivalent to the holocaust and the sense of an ideological war to exterminate a particular people because they didn't have the right to exist. so for all these reasons i think relations with the outside world and there are other reasons to do with it, the fact that the history became very political issue in japan and very polarized, like the history of the third reich injury which is not a particularly polarizing issue. so i think the large number of reasons to do with some kind of essential aspect of the japanese character of that kind.

i hope that answers of the question. >> harry, did you wish that something? >> i agree. >> okay. all right. >> i had a very soft question. >> could you introduce yourself? >> so sorry, matthew also anita had a very self question, you every starred what the real star with a hard one. i have read about eyeless in -- especially in the neighborhood of indonesia where entire populations were wiped up. i have never forgotten my reading. and so when you talk about the difference between what the nazis are doing and i understand it was pretty awful, and with the japanese are doing, and not clear there is difference because they were both wiping of populations. hard question. second question, if you can,

starting with great school and i for started reading history, they talked about the warm relations between the united states first after the opening in japan and the warm relations supposed to have continued until the start of the japanese peace broker by roosevelt. and the explanation that i was given -- and i have never read a contradiction of this was that that was the beginning of the end with the japanese u.s. because japanese presented the fact that they did not get more of the peace. they thought they should have done. but the united states situs. in of opera for the open to that hypothesis being questioned or denied, but this is my first opportunity to ask somebody

eligible on the subject. thank you. [laughter] >> the second question i have not heard that merited before. i think in japan they concentrate on the failure of diplomats, the negotiators here not. russia and indemnities in terms. and so it was more perceived in japan as a failure of diplomacy would sort of explains the popularity is very strong, are loath diplomats. signed the tripartite pact. dino, here is this very clear headed diplomat who could stand up for japanese interest. he was incident of the one who what the delegation out after the manchurian crisis erupted.

silt i think it is more perceived. it is perceived in terms of the failure of japanese diplomacy more than american design. i have never heard it named on the american side. if anything it sort of perpetuated the idea that america, a great power, could afford to be generous and be a peace broker. that sort of thing. so that when that china loverly going anywhere from the japanese perspective, they kept asking americans to be the leader. so i think that sort of built-in to the expectations. japanese expectations of the unit is to its as being some kind of benevolent policeman standing of for japanese

interests rather than anything else. >> gabba. the atrocities, and makes apparel difference if you're the victim of some reports in new. it doesn't really make much difference who is doing it. but nothing they're is a difference between military atrocities when they were, indeed, terrible. which cannot be excused. they should be faced. there horrifying. but they're is a slight difference to military atrocities, and we can go in and talk about what happened. and the government that has a program to extend laypeople for ideological reasons because they do not have the right to exist. there was never such a thing and the japanese world. in the japanese were there many military sources.

if you like there were a psychology love to let what happened during the vietnam war. on a vast scale. yeah alatas soldiers in costa out territory who often couldn't see the difference between civilians and guerrillas fighters whiffs. they're often then fell into a position that it that the safest induced shooter but. and that can quickly escalate to orgies of violence. again, all we were talk about earlier where the senior officers are not really and proper control of the middle ranking ones. they played a role as well. even though the image of the japanese army is entirely

correct when the camp to of the japanese will when there were treated to the the is very well. the discipline often left a lot to be desired in the second world war. and so you do have these enormous massacres. scraping including invesco. but it is not quite the same thing. to be a victim of this is equally unpleasant, but it is not quite the same thing is guessing people a shoot people because they don't have the right to live. >> could you come down here please? thank you. >> i am fox lawyer by the degree of misperception.

and i have had conversations with people who are descendants of some of the japanese leaders who thought that they really believed the united states that the u.s. would set the document the ratified japanese control of china. of course the u.s. did not. and the fact that they really about the u.s. might do this is incredible misperception of everything. the american side there were troops who were kind enough to know what it bought about japan. they're very well informed people. in his a parallel, insisted that japan would never go to war against the united states because they knew when his last. some diplomats from the embassy said well, it's sheer desperation and that would do it

when this nation ever attack and should desperation. take a very hard line. over put the japanese to back down. in the new have joseph grew who is very, very informed, the investor for guns along the kept talking about is a mythological moderates and peaceniks in tokyo that we dare not undermine as being too soft. take a very soft line. the mother's income to the floor. and this seems to me that despite all the issues of interest, the astonishing degree of misperception of least and the american side, but if you kendis as the self delusion 60 was doing and getting credit is incredible degree of what i would say is just people lying to themselves about the other side. kutcher tucker but japan cannot run.

>> well, easy to a that is the second question. but was actually thinking about china to tell you the truth. >> japanese themselves the most leaders could not have conceived of this plan of attack and it up and the reason i think it was quite an outlandish thing to do and to plot the way. i think there were expecting some minor attack, even as late as december 1st, the philippines and thailand or ever . he saw the troops mobilizing around taiwan. he cannot conceive of this type of pro harbor which may be was a dramatic turn of events. so the japanese themselves were

surprised. so i think this is an underestimation of what yamada could do on all sides almost if that's my feeling about it. and i think the nato, someone like, when he looked of the plans in late as october he said no way, were knuckling to do it. it's too risky. we're not going to win this war anyway. why risk so much. >> to underestimate the human capacity for self delusion. for example, that's a wonderful bill may japan in 1942 but came out in december 1942. the commission's 1180 to celebrate pro harbor.

they recreated the attacks so well. it was one of the first shows the use special effects so skillfully that there's still sometimes used in documentary's about pro harbor because there's very little actual documentary physics of the. and one of the scenes shows the pilots and so on and the aircraft carriers on the way to. and then listen in to the american radio. they hear jazz music and somebody conducting intense. and they all giggle and say, will allow this is the americans decadence. we american spirit of the can do is dance and listen to this of surged sort of music. i mean, once they get a taste of the real japanese martial spirit they will cave in. it is a very common misperception of democracies that held not just by the japanese at the time. and then there were m