has reference but there is no domestic surveillance programs of parts of that? and that is accurate? >> section two did 15 of the patriot act. >> that is not a surveillance program? . . >> i was referring to what the context of the question was as to what mr. snowden claimed was his primary concern, which was a domestic surveillance. >> and that just want to make sure that was clarified for the record. mr. unions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this question is for director flynn and brennan in the release to the files that were found in abbottabad. i assume you're both aware that less than 2,000 files have been released publicly at this time. you are both aware of that, i'm

sure. there has only been less than 2,000 that have been made public >> i'm aware. >> okay. i actually have six specific questions that i will allow you to take for the record. i would like to have both of you independently send those responses to the committee. and we can take these later. one, what is the current status to exploit the be all documents, how many of these documents can be released publicly and how quickly. when will i be briefed on the full exploitation of these documents, what leads on financial supporters of al qaeda have been identified and acted on. five, how often did blogger receive reports from other terrorist groups and how many messages did he send to other terrorist groups, whether al qaeda or non al qaeda? how would like to move a -- director, would you be willing-answer those questions

for the record under clause abutter aren't classified? >> absolutely. i would just offer one comment that everything that we have to that has been exploited, just described is going to school on that to make sure that we are learning from that exploitation. and i would say that we are applying a lot of all we're doing in the current effort against terrorists based upon some of that information. >> thank you. i look forward to your responses to those questions. director, would you be willing to respond to those also? >> i don't know how long it would take to answer those questions, but i certainly will take your questions and follow up. >> thank you. director, i want to switch to benghazi. are you aware of any claims that e-mails regarding ca involvement were destroyed and are kept from this committee? >> no, i am not.

>> okay. were you -- director brendon, were you in tripoli in october of 2012 to review the benghazi attacks as a member of the national security council? >> no, i do not believe -- i don't recall exactly when i was there, but i was not there after the attack. >> sector were of 2012. >> i don't believe that's correct. and now you are familiar with this bomb. the benghazi survivors were made to sign nondisclosure forms. there was some confusion on that issue. have you had time to clarify why they were -- why they had to sign those disclosure forms? and non disclosure forms? >> yes. there were a number of contractors be whose contracts were being updated. anytime there is an amendment to a contract their is a requirement but for a nondisclosure agreement to be re-signed, which is the case

there. it was not to do specifically with any effort to discourage any individual from coming forward. in fact, actively explicitly encourages them to cooperate with this committee and the congress. >> okay. thank you. the director be, general dempsey said the u.s. forces are prohibited from killing the perpetrators of the benghazi attack. there seems to be this confusion about the differences between 48 and men and other al qaeda. i have never heard the term of 48 used in any of my intelligence briefings. could you him publicly say what the definition of court al qaeda is and how that differs from hq im, 8qi p. >> it refers to what i think we consider no theological center of the original al qaeda movement that refers to the

remnants some, to include have salieri, the leader of the global al qaeda movement. and so at least to me that is my working definition is the court al qaeda and its origins in pakistan me and now primarily afghanistan and pakistan. >> if you get communications from those groups across-the-board to carry out attacks, are you then -- are you just a al qaeda affiliate, are you some other terrorist group? are you related to al qaeda? >> well, there are -- and not sure i understand the question, but there are designated affiliate's, i think five of them. 8qap which we now regard that franchise, if you will, in yemen

"we regard know as the primary threat of all the franchisees. >> said think you understand the question. let me be more clear. the reason that we have not been able to get the benghazi attackers is because they are not designated al qaeda. >> a don't think that has any bearing on the investigation and hopefully prosecution of the perpetrators of the man as he attacked. >> take you, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> of libya in october of 2012. i just checked with my staff. >> thank you. thank you, a director. >> mr. hines. >> thanks you, mr. chairman. a vigil in for being with us today. i hope he will convey my thanks to the dedicated people you leading organization. another is people have suffered a blow to their morale as a result of the disclosures we have been talking about.

and while the route by which we got to this discussion was awful involving a clear violation of u.s. law and almost certainly putting americans a risk, i do believe it is an important cover station for our democracy to have, as painful as it may be given the circumstances. i also rejected it is simply a p.r. exercise in convincing americans that all is well. this is complicated stuff. forget what we say and do, two federal judges have ruled in opposite directions on the legality of the 215 minute beta program. privacies civil liberties oversight board spoke three to two. this is a good debate which i want to set aside for the moment in favor of a question of utility of the 215 omitted data program. also an area in which there's been a great deal of misinformation initially propagated by some of my colleagues, that 70 events were disrupted by what rapidly became

single digits. director, a question for you, and testimony in the senate in answer to question he said for the fbi, the primary value of this program is agility. allows us to do in minutes what otherwise take as ours. is that the strongest a sense of the utility that can be mounted? is there something else are we should keep in mind? >> it is the primary utility for the fbi. its agility is in the greatest value. it is a useful tool for that reason. >> i might add to that, i think as i have said before, i don't think plot's foiled is necessarily the only metric that could be used as to the potential value of section 215 met a data which is an important tool by them. last summer when we had been a number of diplomatic facilities

in the mideast that were closed because of what appeared to be potential terrorist threats, it turned out them some number of selectors that pointed in the direction of the united states were using this tool and/or able to eliminate the fact that there was no terrorist alexis and there was no domestic plotting going on. so bad at least in my mind be additional metric fell apart from the pure plus foil. and, of course, the program is conceived as a result of 9/11 and the inability to track of foreign communicant who is communicating with someone in the united states. it is kind of low probability but potentially very high impact to. >> thank you. director, i would like to follow-up with you on a different topic. we touched on a yesterday in closed session. pertaining to a run, are we

seeing compliance on the part of a run with respect to their obligations? put another way, are we seeing any evidence of noncompliance? >> so far they are complying with the agreement. the evidence to that is in the initial iae a declaration of compliance with the provisions of the j.p. away. that is not to say that they will take in advantage of that which is now prohibited. they will. and certainly is combination of the more intrusive iaea inspections and surveillance double little we're able to doom, we will be watching for that. >> thank you. do we have intelligence which suggests that the regime is in any way knifepoint acting in good faith at this point? any sort of collection which would suggest there is deception? >> no. , you told senator came on the senate side your opinion there

right now of the imposition of more sanctions would be counterproductive. let me ask a slightly different question. the president in the state of the union said he would veto sanctions. but what about resolutions or other measures that would have come out of the congress is threatening additional sanctions, how would you feel about that? >> as i said to senator kay when he asked the question, the iranians are students of us and our government. they clearly understand how the system works some. and so whom from their vantage i think right no impositions of additional sanctions would be a poke in the eye. and they understand the implicit threat is there any way. if the congress decides they're not -- for whatever reason not in compliance and they want to impose more sanctions. it is kind of a policy of paying.

i think from the iranian perspective right now says they do appear to be complying with the provisions of the jpoa, that possibility behold in reserve. >> to the iranians believe currently that if there were a violation that the united states government would be serious and rapid in imposing additional sanctions? >> welcome as there are various opinion pockets in this country about things, so are there. i don't think there is a monolithic view among the iranian decision makers about that. >> great. as see my time is up to about thank you for appearing. i yield back paribas. >> thank you. mr. westmoreland. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank all of you for coming back today to testify to this. general fled, afghanistan, what

is -- or maybe matt wants to address this, too. what is our counter-terrorism -- what kind of -- where are we at with our counter-terrorism right now in afghanistan? >> matt is probably best to talk to the group's and the scale and the skill, of the terrorist threat. i would say from the posture of certainly the intelligence effort that we have going on there, we have a significant continuing -- continually significant intelligence effort focused on the most serious threats that we are facing, our forces are facing. and we will, as has been highlighted in some of the comments below we will continue to have that intelligence capability until such decisions are made about the size of the force. >> congressman, i would just add from let terrorism perspective in afghanistan, probably our

biggest concern is the number -- and small number, but a number of 48 individuals who are in afghanistan into over the longer term may seek to provide a basis to reconstitute some degree of capability it. there are individuals in northeastern afghanistan who are connected with court al qaeda. >> i guess my question, what has happened. in fact, we mentioned earlier about the terror training camps in both iraq and syria. of course we know they are in libya also, the eastern part there. it seems like we evidently just don't have the will to stick to try to, you know, make what we are doing killed because we lost a lot of great men and went in the effort that we have had in afghanistan.

and it seems like with the approach said karzai has taken it might make your ability to get intelligence less because the pullout the we're going to do. i think the afghan people see what's happening. and so the fact that we have a date certain, the fact that we're pulling out, as that hindered your intelligence anyway as far as maybe some assets or never that we have there? >> we have the very active and robust counter-terrorism program inside of afghanistan working very closely with the afghan services, the in bsn others. so there is complications associated with uncertainty as far as what the presence is going to be like going forward. we rely heavily on our u.s.

military colleagues for the type of support that we need in order to continue our mission. and it's not just in afghanistan , but the whole border area. it is not just al qaeda, but others who pose a serious threat to our forces. this is something that we have to rely on intelligence and with our fd and colleagues to be will the toward those threats. >> of the opinion of anybody there of the panel, you don't think we're losing credibility with some of these assets that we've got, the fact that we leave they could be in great danger? >> i think there is great concern in the area about the future holds. from the standpoint of what the television is going to do after 2014. and that's why it's important that the bilateral security agreement be signed so that we

can continue. >> do you think that the afghan national army and their security forces are capable of continuing on, i guess, with the fight against al qaeda, so of the other issues, people that are in afghanistan commanded you feel like there is going to be terror camps that are eventually going to be set back up and afghanistan where we will be basically back where we were pre 9/11? >> well, that is a concern. i think over time the afghan national army in particular will have its challenges, principally because of the loss of a lot of

the neighbors. the u.s. i think in this scenario, there will be a will to maintain certainly the security of the major city areas where that alabama will continue the general trend toward growing stronger in the countryside. clearly having gone through this before the television, i would think -- i'm surmising year, think twice about allowing the resurgence of al qaeda back in afghanistan and the reestablishment of training camps. i think that -- i think it would pause before they would allow that to happen. >> i yield back. >> i would just add that, you know, there has to be -- and i know this is in discussion, but

the international commitment to sustain the capability of this afghan national security force that has been built by the international community over the last decade plus -- obviously there are concerns that may not be there. i know that in our estimate we believe that that is one of the major concerns that they have. sort of tactically the kind of capabilities the leno or at the forefront of the prairies we are addressing a things like -- as the director mentioned, these enablers, intelligence capabilities, mobility, fire, command-and-control support. these are all important issues, but as a force you're actually demonstrating in some respects a pretty good ability to secure some of the areas that they operate within. >> thank you. >> take you, mr. chairman. i would like to thank our

panelists as well as the individuals you director for your service to this great country. director, my question is really about our preparedness. and so my question is how would you characterize the probability of a al qaeda sponsored or inspired attack against homeland today as compared to 2001? >> well, our assessment is that it is a much lesser capability to affect the capability of al qaeda to melt a complex, a large attack the of the scale of 9/11 is greatly degraded we still regard and have come to regard still the 8qhp, the terrorists in human still pose the most dangerous and external threat to us and then enter early in the most frequent threats force still continues to be homegrown

violent extremists. >> hal has sequester affected the preparedness of your organization and budgetary constraints generally? >> well, it is having an effect. as i said in my oral statement, the combination of the compromises, decisions we have made and then the budget reductions occasioned by sequestration or sequestration like reductions is the cumulative effect of all of this is what i worry about. and the reduction in our capacity. it is not as great as it was a year or two ago, and if we continue these cuts it will continue to have a negative impact. >> that particular capability that is most at risk for

vulnerable. >> the most important asset -- and this has been a consistent tennant of mind as long as i have been in this job, our most important resources are people. that's why i'm so concerned about the cumulative effect on the morale of the workforce with sequestration, furloughs to the shutdowns, pay freezes on top of everything. so one of the things 252 of the things i'm concerned about is the continued ability to recruit the kind of people that we need and attrition which is around 4% , pre steadily over the last 34 years. so if those two factors begin to be affected -- and that think that will be emblematic of our challenge. the thing i worry the most about is the impact on people. >> if i may, congresswoman, i would just say from a prepared his perspective the integration of the intelligence community

under the directors lead, exemplified by the agencies. cia, dna, and in ctc have made as much better prepared, both from the perspective of sharing intelligence and green to bear all the capabilities of these organizations to identify and destroy a potential terrorist threats. again, the integration of this committee from a prepared his perspective is a real change until years ago. >> thank you. i would like to turn to cyber security. i guess fbi director whom. last year the threat assessment hearing led with a discussion about cyber and its significance as a threat to our security. as you know, the news routinely report cyber fraud and cyber crossbands. most recently the purging of security in -- i guess it started in neiman-marcus and

know michael's. but the threat not only is domestic, but also international with threats to our sovereign nation. in my home state of alabama the private sector in our higher education institutions have come together. in fact, auburn university leads in lme a consortium of several other institutions. in the work in concert to try to give ongoing our reach as well as guidance with respect to cyber. my question is, how would you see cyber ranking in the overall threat to global threat today. >> i think there's a reason. it touches everything we worry about. terrorism, counterintelligence, claims of all kinds because it is the place where all of our lives are, monday, secrets, control systems, social lives.

and so it is the way bad people, nations, groups, and us. it is nearly everything it touches everything. the notion of borders is an anachronism when you're talking about a photo. >> how is the government interacting with other private sector and higher education to try to come up with some solutions? likewise, do you think that the failure of congress to come together and pass a bill with respect to cyber, how has that affected our prepared list? >> we as a government have done much better working to deal with the threat. gutless better at working with the private sector, including education institutions, but we really do need guidance for the private sector as to the rules of the road. we need them to share information. we need to be able to share commissions with them. >> has our inability to pass information affected? >> it has made it harder.

we need that guidance. >> in queue. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. a first of all want to thank you . he stopped the bomb plot. did fantastic job, and the thank you for the effort. charged mof support to a designated terrorist organization. endo you will continue to prosecute that effectively. do you think that there risks today increase islamic radicalization and the united states is real? >> yes. >> and has the political ramifications -- we talk about this a lot. are the political ramifications, the fallout from these leaks, do you think that the actions the political actors might take would present some risk that you could not catch the next terry low in?

>> there is always a risk that we will throughout the babies with the bath water. we just the to make sure we have a clear right discussion about the trade us associated with changes. >> i think that is a yes. there is some chance that we will take action that would cause terry low and to be able to complete his actions if we get these policy decisions wrote >> there's always a chance. >> thank you. the director clapper, has russia of violating the 1987 median range ballistic missile treaty? >> we believe there is cause for concern. this is best left to a classified setting. >> thank you. director brennan, new york article where president obama was presented with the fact that the loser is no and control of the bad guys after lots of american lives lost in the fighting in and around the province. the president's response was that when asked about it, if a jayvee team puts on liquor uniforms, that does not make

them come bryant. is there such a thing as gb al qaeda? >> i am concerned about all al qaeda. they're dedicated to kill innocent men, women, and children. >> you would never characterize a member of al qaeda is being somehow a junior varsity participant? >> i characterize them as a murderous organization. >> thank-you. director, when you capture those killers and benghazi will you consider taking them to u.s. naval station one tunnel they? >> that is not a judgment for the fbi to make, but it sure all options will be looked at. >> the last time we brought the bad guy out of libya who had lots of affirmation about terrorists all around the world, in a matter of days he was returned to the united states and had lawyers. i am confident he was read his miranda rights. you think we lost their virginity to gain intelligence that we could have and we handled this in a combat nanette

differ way? >> because his case is pending, he is now being tried in the southern district of new york, i don't want to talk about his case in particular. more time is always of a less. >> do you think having less than a couple of weeks to conduct a series of interviews with someone who was a senior member of al qaeda coming to you think that is sufficient to garner all the intelligence information he had about the al qaeda organization and the impact that has on american lines, do you think that was enough time? >> again, i need to stay awake from the particulars. >> generically. you have him for two weeks. is that enough time to get the information that you would like to have? >> again, more time is always better. there is a particular time limit that leads me back to an individual case which i can do. >> appreciate that. director, this weekend we heard from a number of senior foreign

officials who were talking about the j.p. 08. the discussion of what the final agreement might look like including potentially allowing iran to continue to enrich. a number of nations in the middle east have agreed not to. the implicit statement from them was, iran is allowed to enrich, we are probably doing to be looked at as well. you have intelligence that indicates the we will have an increased number of countries that what the right to enrich uranium if the iranians are enabled to continue? >> watching very closely the status for these negotiations. what is going to happen from the . they're concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for ron to get a nuclear weapon. they're most interested in preventing that from happening. think they're watching mystery carefully. >> to you have intelligence that bears on what these other countries intentions are? we were told by them that they will seriously consider abandoning their commitment if

iran is permitted to do so. these are folks who are cooperating with us today. >> i think by definition your question leads us to a closed session discussion on that. >> the key. >> thank you, mr. chair. we have learned of the devastating effects of intentional declassification of material by an nsa contractor which has effectively betray his country. no i'm concerned about an unintentionally of millions of american sensitive data, and this is a new article that just came out that i would like to ask you about. came out last evening from bill birch wrote the article. u.s. intelligence agencies last week urged the obama administration to check its new health care network for malicious software after learning that developers

coproduce the website raising fresh concerns of private data hosted by millions of americans would be compromised. officials warned programmers in belarus suspected of inserting malicious code. the software links millions of americans to sign up for obamacare to the federal government and more than 300 medical institutions and health care providers. the u.s. affordable care act suffer was written in part in belarus bus offer developers under state control which makes this offer a potential target for cyber attacks, one official said. they said a potential threat to the u.s. health care data is compounded by what they said was an internet data hijacking involving belarus and state control that works. the month long diversion covertly rerouted massive amounts of u.s. internet traffic to belarus. goes on to say officials say

there are serious concerns that it contains malicious code that could be used to covertly to route data from the obamacare website to foreign locations. additionally they suspect that bill rescinds planted secret back door openings to the software that will permit surreptitious centuries to u.s. government networks by hackers are spies. the malicious code. reroute obamacare website data to belarus or possibly permit illegal backdoor access. the security vulnerability to provide access all necessary personal affirmation of u.s. residents ride in the theft of privacy violations. the article that the threat of diversion is compounded by the discovery that they covertly diverted massive amounts of internet traffic, u.s. internet traffic.

according to david kennedy, head of the security firm who he said the obamacare website was not designed well. a lot of security flaws it be one major concern is that the system connects the health care network to other sensitive u.s. government now works including the internal revenue service and the department of homeland security. that makes it a treasure trove for hijackers adding that a major concern would be cyber attacks from sophisticated state-sponsored adversaries. the threat of back door access points is a particular worry because the chinese military might technologies is expected of using that technique in its network equipment. also contained in the article was the statement from the national security council spokeswoman who said an intelligence report on the software was recalled by the intelligence community shortly after it was issued.

i am wondering if you can comment on why that until as report was recalled after it was issued. also, could you tell this congress and the american people why in the world health and human services should not immediately shut down and properly stress test the health care are protected from potential security risks from across the globe. >> we will have to get back to you in that. of not familiar with with the article -- >> are you aware of the problem? >> no, not. unfortunately the affordable care act is not my responsibility. we will look into this, particularly the allegation about the report be withdrawn. i don't know anything about it. >> director clapper, the article

says the u.s. intelligence agencies hers the obama administration to check its new health care site. you're the director of national intelligence. you are not aware of this red? and the u.s. intelligence agencies last week carries the obama administration to check the website. >> i am not aware of anyone in the intelligence committee doing that. >> is there anyone at the table that is where this issue? >> director burn. >> i read the report to you are referencing. >> are you aware of the intelligence community alerting the administration? >> will not. >> i am not. >> director, are you aware of this report? >> no, not. this is the first effort of the matter. >> director, are you aware of this report?

>> i am not. >> director also, are you aware? >> no. >> you are not. no one at the table is aware of this report that was issued last week? i find this of rage is considering the fact that we are looking at one of the worst intentional leaks in american history conducted by an nsa contractor, and in the midst of that this is one of the largest and intentionally to that could impact personally every american citizen as we are now required to sign up for health care, what this will mean it be the president of the united states recently stated that 3 million americans assigned a for health care of this website which no is potentially vulnerable to an ally of the russian government. i see my time has expired. >> think you very much says. >> anything i have learned is not to believe everything every medium.

>> thank you very much. we will continue to work in a classified setting of those policy issues that we believe needs of attention. strong bipartisan way. we look forward to working with you. please pass along to the men and women in each of your agency's our appreciation. we get the good fortune to meet them all across the globe in very difficult neighborhoods. the work is exceptional, the kurds is beyond the bounds and their sacrifices for defense and freedom in this country are well respected by members of congress and the american people. faq. we look forward to working with you. you will see you soon in a classified hearing. >> think you. [inaudible conversations]

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>> this year will come to order. let me begin by welcoming our panelists. we have two panelists. political affairs. undersecretary sherman has joined this morning by david cohen, the undersecretary of treasury. let me say at the outset that my support the administration's diplomatic efforts. analysts supported a two track policy of diplomacy and sanctions. at the same time i am convinced that we should only relieve pressure in exchange for a verifiable concession that will

fundamentally dismantle the iranian nuclear program it be done in such a way that alarm bells will sound from vienna to washington. in the deal the administration reaches will be verifiable, effective, and prevents a run for ever developing. in my view based on the parameters describing an iranian comments in the days that followed, i am very concerned about their willingness to reach such an agreement. this is not an nothing ventured nothing gained enterprise. we have placed our incredibly effective international sanctions regime on the line without clearly define the parameters of what we expect in the final agreement.

as the head of the iranian nuclear agency said last week, the iceberg of sanctions is a melting well our centrifuges are still working. this is our greatest achievement. frankly it is my greatest fear. the asparagus actions may melt before we have an agreement in place which may in fact be the arena and game. they understand that once the international community's ceases banking sanctions that they will have one regardless of whether and know we had to deal. at the end of the day any final deal must require run to dismantle large portions of its nuclear researcher. in the final drill must address the advance interviews research and development activities that allows for more quickly and more efficiently in restaurants.

it must eliminate the vast majority of the 20,000 to fusions to a close the facility and stop the heavy water reactor . something not directly dealt with by the joint plan of action experts including david albright , for ron to move to a final agreement it would have to close the portal facility and remove between 15 and 16,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges. even then we are looking at the potential breakup time of between six and eight months depending upon whether run as access to uranium enriched access to a 20 reconverted%. breakouts beyond a year more and insist on the long-term 20 year

plus regime of montreal and verification. no, in light of that testimony of we're going to hear today in an interview on cnn he said in response to the question, there will be no destruction of centrifuges, existing centrifuges. his answer was, no, not at all. so who that causes concern for those of us who are concerned about what this final agreement looks like a final agreement that mothballs the of for structure or fundamentally preserves their ability to break out is not a final agreement i can support. if all the chief is the essence of an early warning system of the future brick and ability, the sanctions regime has collapsed and the only option for this or any future president will be to accept a nuclear arms

around for a military option, in my view that is not in the national security interests of the estate's. i know that is not anyone's coal or plan to, but i also think we need to guard about wanting a deal so much that we can see more than we gain. at the end of the day iran can no longer be a nuclear weapon threshold's stake. that made my position quite clear and will continue to do so . and specific questions for all of our panelists that i hope you will be able to answer to help assure us that this is ultimately if achievable and all the type of deal that we can all embrace. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for those opening comments and your lead on this issue for many years. i think the efforts that you have put forth in the past

candidly helping to put us in the place that we are today. i applaud you for that and appreciate the position you have taken and welcome our administration witnesses. after reading the testimony by the witnesses that going to come on the second panel to lay in many ways i wish we had that testimony first so that we could then talk with the administration about what neutral observers are saying about the interim deal have done a good job. want to talk to you about the turkish issue the same thing happens in russia with our acquiescence. yes will find that during this hearing. and again, i thank you for your efforts and want to say that generally speaking i have been

disappointed in the rhetoric from the administration. about congress involvement. on one hand i think that you would readily admit that the position that congress is taken through the years has helped to be in the places you are. somehow because congress was to ensure that we end up with a proper in state, lot of unfortunate things of and said. by as the chairman mentioned support very much the administration's effort to ensure that a rhonda's not have nuclear weapons, and where will to do that in a peaceful manner. a very much support that. as a matter of fact a lot to say relative to congress of los with like to work whopper of lee. rhetoric around the sanctions piece is actually become a red herring. as been a place for the

administration can say, well, sanctions will end up keeping this deal from happening. congress can't keep saying were trying to do something about it. i think it avoids the topic of playing up to us with the estate is. i hope -- i just that your testimony. just given five minutes ago. i hope you will clearly laid out what the in state is because i think that is why so many of us concerned about. this interim deal becomes a permanent deal of. you know, if you look, they're savvy and have a lot of people better educated in our country. they understand us in many ways better than we understand them. if you look at what they're doing and what they've done in the past, of a perfect something and then a pause. a perfect something in the ponds. they have perfected this interviews capabilities.

i think people would say that they want to be a nuclear state, they can do that quickly. we have this pause where we have an interim agreement that does not address all the other areas that they have the ability to perfect. over this next year which administration officials are racing this not going happen, this will probably take much longer. trundle limited to six months. now we end up with a one-year agreement. basically we have an agreement that allows them -- they stopped in an area that they have already perfected. we allow them to continue on in other areas to be able to deliver nuclear weapons cannot even address. you can understand there are a lot of concerns. i hope he will lay out clearly what the administration will accept as the in-state.

i hope they will talk with us about it. pass a piece of legislation that lays of clearly the only thing we will except at the end. again, i think that there are concerns that members of the administration are negotiating to is ruling. the agreement we have no where we have the ability to monitor and yet did dismantle something is actually be in state, some of the people within the administration. i hope your clear today. thank the chairman for having this hearing. i appreciate and letting me talk a little bit about this. no afford to test a million questions. >> they cute, senator. will start off to a tearful statement will be included in the record without objection. ask you to summarize.

you're recognized. >> they cute. they cue, chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee. i would say to both of you, we'll have concerns. and very much appreciate this dialogue and our continued work together on this side most serious issue. to provide an update on the p5 plus one end european union negotiations which, as you know, are coordinated by the high representative of the european union. i also look forward to discussing where we are and other important parts. i come here confident that we, as you both said, share the same goal with regard to run, google that the president reaffirmed just last week to prevent a run from attending a nuclear weapon. thanks to a combination of one of the latest of diplomacy in the most comprehensive targeted sanction resume ever imposed on the country, i am certain that

we're closer today to that goal that we were just a few weeks ago. we are not met that goal, but we have taken a for step toward it. over the next few minutes i hope to explain why that is as well as where we will be heading in the coming months. on november 204th 2013 we and our partners agreed with a run on a joint plan of action. this was an important for step in our effort to resolve the international community concerns with the iranian nuclear program an january 28 the joy plan went into effect. as the president noted, the implementation of a joint plan marks the first time in a decade that a run agree to specific actions that called progress of the nuclear program and ploy back in key respects. the joint plan was explicitly designed this way to create space for further negotiation over a long-term comprehensive solution.

specifically the international atomic energy agency verified on january 20 if that among other things the wrong stop producing near 20 percent enriched uranium , disable the configuration of the centrifuge cascade that iran has been using to produce it, began diluting its existing stockpile of a 20% interest uranium to continue to converge near 20 percent enriched uranium at a rate consistent with past practices and has not installed additional centrifuges, has not installed new components. moreover and transparency and monitoring, the iaea stated that iraq had begun providing some of the information required by the joint plan and is working with the iaea on arrangements for increased access to its nuclear facilities. in order to carry out its responsibilities under the joint plan the iaea will roughly double the size of its inspection team and install additional modern equipment.

the international community's insight into the nuclear program will be significantly enhanced. this was an important for step. over the next six months brought has committed itself to further actions that will provide much more timely warning of a breakout of the declared in richmond facility. they also add new checks against the diversion of equipment and material for any potential culver gingrich or program. your average fully as to why we should trust to run to live up to these commitments. as the president said, these negotiations do not reliable trust. in the longer term deal we agree to must be based on verifiable action that convinces us in the international community that iran is not building a nuclear bomb. as my colleague will further outline in his testimony, the united states and the you have taken a series of actions to implement the targeted limited

and temporary sanctions relief we committed to as part of the joint plan. let me be clear, the joint plan of action represents really the first up of the comprehensive solution we seek to reach, and we seek to reach it within a six month time frame. .. >> will not acquire a nuclear weapon. so what does the solution look like? welcome as the president said,

we know that they do not need to have an underground fortified facility to have a peaceful nuclear program. they do not need a heavy water your in order to have a peaceful nuclear program. they also lay out basic elements of the comprehensive solution and among other elements the final solution would have a specified and long-term duration and it would reflect the rights and obligations with the nonproliferation safety and iada agreements. a as well as a number of steps before we finalize a comprehensive solution, including addressing the relevant u.n. security council resolution with a geared towards bringing the security council consideration of this to a satisfactory conclusion. iran has included enhanced

monitoring and the joint commission set up includes the eu to oversee the implementation will also serve as a forum for discussion to facilitate this and all parties have understood the nuclear program. indeed, just this weekend on the margins of the security conference, secretary john kerry reiterated the importance of iran abiding by the joint plan and this includes but is with the united states will continue to enforce existing sanctions. one final interest is that under the terms of the joint plan we have agreed with around the the comprehensive solution will be part of an integrated whole. when nothing is agreed until

everything is agreed. over whether to accept the terms of a final deal or not. or if we err able to reach an agreement we would ask congress to ramp up his sanctions immediately. and moving forward with them now it will derail the promising diplomacy that i have outlined and risk unraveling the cohesion that has proven cohesion to ensure that it is having that effect. my written testimony includes

further information on what we are doing on these issues and this includes robert levinson and others as well. this was another set of concerns that secretary kerry raised with the foreign minister in unit. i have also personally raised these cases is that the president and we will continue to do so with resources until these men are home with their families belong. in some and to finalize my statement, the negotiations with iran including the nuclear issue and with iran. and this includes the reaction

and past behavior as well as the current behavior. and we did diplomacy a chance to succeed. if iran lives up to this, to the commitment, it will become a safer place. if it does not, then we retain all options. to ensure that we will not obtain a nuclear weapon. this ensures that u.s. national security interests are transparent thank you. >> chairman menendez, ranking member bob corker, distinguished members of the committee. they given the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the implementation of a joint plan of action.

in this includes a limited relief of the joint plan. and this includes the vast majority of the sanctions that are in place. and this includes many of our partners in the international community and we are committed to ensuring that we maintain the same pressure throughout the six-month term including a long-term comprehensive solution that ensures that iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. and the joint plan went into effect on january 20. we issued guidance that suspended sanctions temporarily on transactions related to petrochemical products from iran and the positions of goods and services to other automotive

sectors and in this guidance we make clear the transactions of the seated with this relief must be initiated and completed and that is to avoid sanctions and it ends no later than july 20. and we have also caused the efforts to reduce further exports of crude oil to the jurisdiction. and there are more and funds that are currently restricted in council receipts. in this includes the humanitarian transactions in all of this relief is reversible. if iran fails meet its

commitment, we can talk about the unlimited sanctions relief and viewed in light of this, proximally $7 billion of relief is offered and will not materially improve around the economy. it will be in a recession for two consecutive years. and it is significantly elevated of the inflation rate. and we will continue to be buffeted by sanctions. especially when this remains firmly in place. we are continuing to implement and enforce our oil sanctions.

in this includes the sanctions and the overseas actions. our banking has largely cut off the iranian banking sector from this. this includes investments in the energy sector around oil and gas production and because these remain in place come iran will continue to struggle to finance imports and its government operations the continuing impact in the keeneland kilted impact means that the iranian economy will continue to continue for the foreseeable future. while we remained to providing all of the things that we agree to, we remain hard at work to

enforce a sanctions regime of the unprecedented force and scope. this includes the negotiations to come. to ensure that this continues, we are engaging in form foreign banks and governmental counterparts. many others from the administration reaffirmed the point that the sanctions and this is narrow and the sanctions that were made in place are broad as part of the effort in this is the united arab emirates to carry this message. iran is not open for business. we have made clear that we will continue to respond to their efforts to evade our sanctions wherever they may occur.

and we will continue to prevent terrorism and human rights abuses. i say this to others and other observers, stay tuned. we are poised to deploy or tools against anyone anywhere. >> thank you, secretary sherman. maybe can answer that yes or no. a final agreement would include including this facility. >> and all of these questions today, i am going to be careful about what i say because i do not want to be direct. but i don't want to negotiate with iran in public so that they know what her positions are going to be at the negotiating table.

and i'm making a statement just in general terms including having further competition in greater detail. the before that in my testimony we see no reason for toyota remain in richmond facility >> i would assume that would not be permitted to go online. >> especially in the type of nuclear program if they are interested in. >> reference with what they have talked about, with other published reports, they have suggested that facility they would need to remove the

centrifuges. i'm not going to get in to a specific number. >> i that we mean that there needs to be a reduction. >> yes. >> yes. >> with reference, you won't give us a number. though you say that this is the most domestic consumption? >> i believe that it is in the position i when expect any less. what we all should care about is what iran does. more commitments they make and which of those commitments can be verified.

in this includes the research and development program. and basically iran can continue with the development of the advanced centrifuges during this period of time including challenging the enrichment level of of the park before it is mixed. >> it is significantly or dramatically part of the development plans on centrifuges and a critical element of a final agreement.

>> i would say one thing, senator. there are programs but first well they cannot work on any advanced centrifuges that are not listed on the november 14 iada report for any they find continue of the report. it was frozen up to november 14, in terms of the centrifuges that were damaged that they could only do with the same type and not more advanced centrifuges and they cannot install any new advanced contributors. >> okay, let me redirect you to david albright's testimony on

the second panel. an area that was not frozen includes the continued development of the centrifuges under this loophole in the interim deal. and this includes the no enriched uranium is deposited in this meet letter of the deal. that alone is able to measure the enrichment letter before remixing. and they can further develop these centrifuges of having result of the progress on the iaea.

and this would allow iran to make up for time more quickly. >> i would agree with you that it is an area of concern on advanced centrifuges and it is an area of concern and something that we will be focused on and i am not in expert and i have our experts sit with you and your staff and go over the specifics. >> it was so incredibly important for the framework under which you are negotiating. it is where iran was weaponizing

and yet in this agreement with the joint plan of action we have no access. it is already gone on this when the world became aware of it. to cover up their weaponization program. if we were negotiating with access to parchin, and others believe it was true with access to this and the framework which we would be negotiating versus a supposition and they will reality. and when you didn't achieve it, it is a joint plan of action and this is part of a final deal. >> senator, we did raise parchin

and possible military dimension. and we require this on its past actions and we will work with the iaea to facilitate with past and present issues of concern and that is a formula to used by iaea in addressing the possible military dimension. in this includes addressing the u.n. security council resolution which were wires dealing with issues of concern and all the sanctions over these individuals and entities have supported the

nuclear program until the concerns are addressed. so to summarize, yes, we have raised it. second, they must be resolved. >> have they rejected any access to parchin? >> they have not rejected at. >> in your joint plan of action they rejected this? >> i hope it is addressed and in the possible dimensions archean central to the agenda. and that will increase the confidence that we will actually get to a final and comprehensive resolution.

>> is this a new development? or is this something that we raised with the iranians during the inner negotiations? >> i am not aware of that report rates would have to take a look at it. >> one final question for you, secretary cohen? >> all of the sanctions i have offered with senator kirk and members who have supported us. at least a six-month period of time to give countries and companies the notice required and is that a fair statement? >> i assume so. >> you're enforcing them. >> and i sit here right now and

recall the legislation, whether any of them were affected where there was a phase for all of them. it is as promptly as possible. >> the legislation became law. and it always had a very long lead time. and i went to work to try to pursue it. the problem is to try to suggest the sanctions to not recognize that there is six months from the date of signing for goes into effect. and the only effect that we have was and they got to looking to 16 weeks of the potential breakout period and sanctions,

to enforce them then will be far beyond the scope of the window. and that is part of a problem to suggest that yes, we can pass sanctions at any time. it and it is to have them be effective and to take effect. >> thank you, mr. chairman iaea >> we want to see a peaceful end to this. i'm not sure we want to continue on. we are concerned about the way that this interim deal has been struck.

and then protect other things as well. just curious, why did you all nod in agreement in any way address the military. >> especially when they have reached a threshold and we acknowledge that they can build a bomb, everyone knows that. have advanced centrifuges. they have a major loophole in the research and development area that everyone acknowledges. and that we are going to allow them over the next year to continue to perfect the other piece of this which is the delivery mechanism. >> first of all, and i should've said this. when the chairman asked the question. we see this as a first step so we don't consider the loopholes because this is not a final agreement. this is a first step.

>> it would take a year, she said it would take up this to discuss it. she's one of your partners on those. and we probably have a time longer than six months where they can continue on. and i don't understand why this interim deal would address or stop the perfecting of the rings allow what they have already perfected to be delivered. >> i would say a couple of things. first of all, the joint kind of action does address the fact that their ballistic missiles that can be used as a delivery mechanism must be addressed as part of a comprehensive solution because it is part of the u.n. security council resolution. and so it is true that in his first six months we have not shut down the production of any ballistic missile that could have anything to do with delivery of a nuclear weapon. but that is indeed going to be

part of something that has to be addressed of a comprehensive agreement. secondly i would say that if we are successful in assuring ourselves and the world community that iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, then them not having a nuclear weapon makes delivery systems almost, not entirely irrelevant. >> let me ask this question of her acting most neutral observers would state that all we have really done since we are not dismantling as both a president and foreign minister has made clear, in essence what you have done is given us 30 days additional time for a breakout. and yet they have a year.

the year to develop the delivery mechanism. i will say that some people may debate about what their encouragement of foreign i don't think many people on the committee think that what they have been doing it solely for civil purposes. but there is no debate on the delivery mechanisms and i'm just curious privately negotiated deal in that way. i do not get it. why do you think that that should be a part of the next deal since they have already perfected the first car. it seems to me that being able to deliver it is an important aspect and it's apparently not so in that case. >> senator, you and i disagree about the conclusion of the joint plan of action. we believe that it sent out a framework for a comprehensive agreement to ensure that iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. we are not through that conference of solution yet. we agreed on a six-month program that freezes where they are and rolls back their program in

significant ways to obtain a nuclear weapon. and in return we have given limited and temporary targeted sanctions relief. if we could have negotiated an agreement, which you would prefer and quite frankly that will be impossible to do that is everything that will use that time to march forward much more rapidly. and this is not perfect but it does friedel back your program and it is relative to where we

were. >> mr. cohen, since it has begun, do you agree that iran's inflation is way down in the economic projections are all over the world and i know that you have traveled around the world and talk to folks about what might happen to them. but is there any question that just the discussions, is that correct? >> i think that what we have seen and it is an octet with what happened with president roh connie in june. the value that we had all

increased with inflation. especially since the joint plan of action since september. >> everyone knew that was underway. do you understand why there is a concern. >> many believe that is the only effect because that is a very big concern. and there is expectation and people are expecting and we understand why the chairman would be concerned. and it is a series of rolling interim deals. and there are many of us are concerned at this point a minimum of a year and add a

point we lose all the leverage, if you will, to really do this. some have said that we need to pass a resolution on the senate floor that says there is a trade embargo or something much stronger. something that indicates that we will do something. you understand why we have those concerns? and do you have a way for congress addressing those in an appropriate way to put the sanctions in place in the first place? >> i certainly understand where those concerns come from and i can tell you from my travels around the world and my colleagues reporting the same. and we need make sure that to make sure that the banking community and business moodier counterparts.

and this is how this is concluded within the six-month time frame. that it is still facing an iranian banking center that is largely cut off from the international financial sector and it is still sanctions. but when we walk through the narrow scope of the sanctions, the extension sanctions and if there is a comprehensive deal. especially in the iranian market. but for the six-month period, the interest but especially the sanctions in just a few economic areas that have been agreed to is relatively like this.

please see the delegations going to tehran and you also see importantly the reflection that those conversations are about what may come in the future and not what is available today. we are as crystal clear as possible in all of our engagements that if these talks turn into something more ordeals that violate the elaborate sanctions remain in place that we will take action. >> thank you, chairman menendez. thank you for sharing this hearing and i would like to think the secretaries for their work and appearing before the committee. as you said in your testimony and as i agree. a strong sanctions regime imposed on iran pass by this congress and enforced by this

administration have brought them to the negotiating table and i remain strongly supportive of the ongoing enforcement and i am encouraged by your characterization of the sanctions enforcement in the joint plan of action as being temporary unlimited and intensely engaged in ensuring that that is the case. as a cosponsor of the bill i believe it is important for us to continue to maintain a stronger more additional sanctions to send a clear message and i have a number of concerns and unanswered questions about the joint plan of action and i will just reiterate that i share the goal of literally everyone on the community of reaching an agreement that verifiably refutable unit denies the capability to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. i do hope a final deal can be achieved in the next six months and that includes the most comprehensive inspection regime

possible and i have a number of questions to ask about following him. i sent a letter to the president along with several other senators asking a number of questions and in particular focusing on what the administration will need from congress and financial support in what the actions will be and pressing upon whether there is any progress in terms of establishment in the field often than the scope and reach of the inspections and what kinds of capability they may require so we can have some certainty about the allegedly novel inspection regimes that we have with previous examples where they failed to uncover clandestine action as has previously been talked about. so i'm interested on this and what can we be doing to work with you and strengthening this.

>> thank you very much, senator. thank you for your support. thank you along with all of the members of the committee for leadership on supporting our efforts to make sure that iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, which i quite agree is an objective that we all share. in terms of monitoring and verification, i will find out where that is and we will get it to you, senator. i apologize that it is not appear yet. the iaea is going to double the staff and it will have a field office as you know. the joint plan of action gives us unprecedented access and before when that fordo inspectors have daily access this includes the monitoring

vegetables that will be worked out with iaea. and they are getting this in assets for rock. they are getting access to the centrifuge production facilities with the mills, so it is an unprecedented verification and monitoring of the regime. the director general has said that there are some increased cost and we have increased the amount that we will make available out of our budgeted funds and other countries have come forward and we greatly appreciate your willingness for congress to take a look and ensure that the inspection monitoring verification act can go toward because they are quite critical, as you point out, to verify that iran does what it has committed to do in a comprehensive agreement will be even more crucial.

>> asking one question. and then in your opening testimony, you hired the efforts to holding iraq accountable with public executions and supported for the assad regime and has blood and i appreciate your hard work and holding them accountable. one of the most important accomplishments i think is an interim joint plan and the commitment to dilute the 20% highly enriched uranium. apparently they will take the steps when it has completed facilities improvements. one is the scheduled to be completed and what steps are being taken to ensure the ratings are not driving the reader using this as a way to covertly enrich some other vehicle and location? >> a couple of comments. first on human rights. we agree with you. the human rights report will come out and we will detail as clearly as we possibly can how we view the human rights abuses which you have rightly pointed

out are of grave concern to us. in terms of the dilution and conversion both on the 20% and ensuring that the 5% stockpiled this market larger than the amount agreed to. by the end of the six-month period, the iaea will be monitoring all of these actions and on the dilution the conversion will take six months to come is because the technology only allows us to move that quickly but they will provide a rope toward him on the monitoring and verification activities that they will share with the joint commission we will be glad to come up and greet the classified session about those unclear points. and so that will be one way that we will verify and the second will be on the dilution to these payments of repatriated frozen

on, the first on march 1, the second on april 15, so iran will not get this unless it is completed on schedule agreed to. >> thank you. i look forward to the classified briefing. thank you. >> [inaudible] >> supporting this committee for the efforts of the administration, don't put me in that column. i don't want to be in a column because i do not work what has been done. i think this thing is a disaster. i think that i was stunned when i saw what the agreement was and i have been disgusted as we have gone forward and i hope you approve me dead wrong. but i don't think i will give in the history of these people. but in any event i want to focus

on just a couple of aspects. number one is a constituent of mine. his only crime is being a christian. and why can't we get this guy out of jail and can you tell us the substance of that conversation what was? we completely agree with you. nothing i can say today will be satisfactory to you or to their families and i would agree with them and agree with you in that regard.

secretary john kerry raised the situation with the minister and insist that this be addressed as quickly as possible and there is no basis for any of the three of them and indeed we are doing whatever we can in whatever channel we can to bring him home as quickly as possible. >> you know, that is not good enough. these are just words. somebody needs to look these people in the eye and tell them that they are not getting another penny and they're not getting anything until they do a very simple act of letting three absolutely innocent americans go free. i hope you will convey that and i would hope that secretary kerry would convey that the foreign minister as well. this is absolutely outrageous everything that we have given and still to hold this. this is absolute nonsense. let me change horses here for just a second.

now that the sanctions have been relaxed and this has been something that has been a concern of mine from the beginning, now that they have been relaxed our partners, most, if not all, who are unwilling partners are now flooding in there with business people and the french and the time and the irish and the canadian and you have political people and you have business people flooding in there. ready to do business, and back to business as usual. his job is going to be to put the genie back in the bottle. >> as the under-secretary says, every single member of our administration talked with every country with whom we need about keeping the sanctions on board. with the conversations i've had with many including the french

and secretary kerry has talked about the trade delegation and it was a private business delegation and not a government delegation about how this is not helpful in this regard to ensure that it is not business as usual as the secretary said. toronto's not open for business and it's quite temporary and quite limited and quite targeted and that in fact most of these delegations were going because we talk to them all and we have told them what are the limits of what they can do that we will in fact go after them and that we will nation them. it doesn't matter what if they evader sanctions, we will sanction him than we have all delivered that message. and that includes every department in our administration and the executive branch and indeed most of these appear to be going in line and the comprehensive agreement is reached if it is reached we have

told them all that they are putting their reputations in themselves and their business enterprises at risk if they jumped the gun. >> is exactly why those of us were critical at the beginning were so critical. the optics are such that the rest the world says that it is back to business as usual could tell them what you want to tell them that their acts indicate that they believe that there is business as usual. including how we are making certain that our partners around the world understand that whatever interest they may have in the iranian market someday, that is not the market today. what is available today in the joint plan of action is extraordinarily narrow and limited to exports in the auto

sector and trade in precious metals and even that is essentially constrained and very limited with economic potential today in the iranian business that are not at the point we have made over and over again in these engagements. that point is getting through, i do believe terry at we have not seen deals being done. but even more internally what we have been an absolute thereabout is that we will continue to enforce the sanctions in the implementation agreements on the joint plan of action, recognizing that we have the right and that we will olein force the existing sanctions and i think that that message is one that we have communicated over the years and more recently in a credible fashion. >> i understand that it sure doesn't look like they believe

it. >> senator coons, has been the robust part of the sanctions that has led us to appointed a in which we have an opportunity and a chance to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis. as you know i was in munich this week on a panel and the foreign minister made the laughable contention that iran was at the table today for reasons having nothing to do with the sanctions policies. and having said that no one in the audience believe that, there was a discussion there about the different trade missions mainly of a private nature and secretary kerry was there pushing hard as you mentioned on

our partners to make sure that those were simply connected to future activities rather than undermining the sanctions. so let me give you my impression and you tell me if i am wrong. the fact that there are groups going were thinking about their potential future opportunities is to me to have nothing to do with the interim agreement. and to me if we were to have entered into negotiations right away on a final settlement, the same thing would have happened. once there was a window into potential allies trade relations with iran, they're going to be private entities. this includes about future trade opportunities and a negotiation

and i just wanted to, for both of you coming to understand that those are your impressions and as i was saying earlier, what we have been hearing from these various agencies and governments and to see what might come in the future. because there is some hope that these negotiations will produce a comprehensive agreement that brings a substantial sanctions relief. >> i would agree with you. and one other thing is a little counterintuitive. we hope people don't go to

tehran. that's her preference. but those who go raise hope that they were on the administration to have to deliver on and the only way they can deliver on those hopes is a comprehensive agreement that we will agree to. and that means a verifiable assurance that they are not developing or creating or will have in obtaining a nuclear weapon. and so although we don't want people to go because we think it does send the wrong message, if they do go it puts pressure perversely on the ronnie administration because as far as we have seen today there are not deals giving done but rather people getting for someone in the hopes that someday there will be a deal. >> to the extent that there is enormous economic opportunity today, it is because of the crippling nature of the sanctions that have undermined

the economy that there's room for improvement should they be partially or fully lifted. until we do have to pay attention to the political dynamics because it dictates whether or not they're actually going to be able to get a deal. and so is there any new information about the link of this that they have been given by the supreme leaders and any evidence of the hard-liners since this agreement had been signed are winning or losing the internal battle to be able to allow for the domestic political support for a deal that is amenable to the united states to be achieved in this? >> we asked our intelligence community to access that and that is one that we will share with you all on an ongoing basis. i think that there is no doubt that there are hard-liners and sometimes it's overstated for negotiating effects.

but it is real and substantial. and so i think we find a fine line. one thing is not to increase this for the hard-liners and not allowing tehran to overstate the politics that they have to deal with. >> thank you. >> let me decide this and i don't think it takes secret intelligence arrive at it. i was due this in our meetings before to go see what sanctions relief you can get without giving up a we believe it is the inherent right to enrich great if they can keep that in place, they are always having a few steps away from a nuclear armed power. and so according to the administration we have not

recognize the rights for the iranian government nor do we intend to. the document does not say anything about recognizing the right to enrich uranium. but in a letter he states that the agreement includes the formal recognition of the nuclear right in implying that they have a right to enrich. is that under no circumstances will there ever be a deal in which we agree to dismantle our nurturing capabilities and that is the one hand he has gone on the enrichment issues or do we have a line in and on enrichment issue cannot. >> are lying on the sand in the enrichment issue is any comprehensive agreement should give us assurance in a verifiable manner for iran not to obtain a nuclear weapon. >> my question is then the capability to enrich, it is not in and of it self a significant -- this the fact that you have

the infrastructure to enrich at any level. in a mad a critical capacity for a country to have a plan to have the option of going nuclear one-day? >> every country has the potential for that capability and if we dismantle and i would hope that we can. every piece of the infrastructure that they have, they would still have the knowledge and they cannot unlearn what they know. so they would be able to reconstitute and their scientists can't unlearn what they have learned how to do. and the plan in place by the verifiable assurance. >> i understand how they need to

do that and the facilities to enrich and many countries though i do a ago but they don't do it. including many of our allies. so now the concern is that we are going to leave in place that when the world is distracted on some other things, they can move really quickly. multiple countries have the ability to enrich, but they don't. because they obtain from elsewhere because they don't have this in few countries who enrich also have a ballistic missiles program. let me ask you the question. the security council resolution 1929 contains a provision referring to the ballistic missile program including commercial activity in many other states involved in technology related situations which you only build for the purposes of delivering a nuclear warhead. so how will that be addressed? because is not a key component in if they retain an infrastructure to enrich up 5% of their building ballistic missiles, the only thing missing

here is the enrichment capability in the nuclear power. >> senator, i hope that tehran listens very carefully to what you said. because we agree. it would be better for iran if they wanted to build a nuclear program to bring the fuel in from the outside and not have a nuclear enrichment program and they would get better nuclear cooperation and lots of things might be better for them and that will absolutely be on the table with the negotiations that we had with them. there may have countries that do this and that have dignity and pride and everything else that they need for scientific and technological advancement. but we have said in the joint plan of action by depending upon where we get in the contents of the agreement we are willing to consider a very limited and inclusive and heavily monitored small limited enrichment

program. and on the point about holistic missiles. incapable of delivering a nuclear weapon and if we can get to the bear that they cannot obtain a nuclear weapon we know that they cannot have a nuclear weapon, then a delivery mechanism important as it is is less important. >> senator coons? >> thank you, mr. chairman. when the interim deal was announced in november it was timed an interesting way in the same weekend when america was commemorated the 50th anniversary of the death of president kennedy and i was with many of my colleagues at a security conference in nova scotia when it deal was

announced in a great speech of senator kennedy's was running surmise that weekend and was discussing his career and a graduation speech that he gave at an american university a few months before he died in 1963 and he had started aggressive diplomatic efforts to try to reduce nuclear weapons between the united states and soviet unions. and he made a very aggressive cave for the fact that part of american strength is diplomacy and one of the phrases that he used in that speech and i would recommend it to anyone because it is interesting even when it was rewritten today is that with all appropriate skepticism and this is a direct quote, we can reduce tension without reducing our regard. it's needed to reduce this and it's needed to solve thorny

problems and we don't have to relax our guard. and we want around have exactly the same. we want them not have nuclear weapons greatly with her for that we can get to that diplomatically rather than having to use military orders. as a member of the committee recently cast a vote to use military force to enforce what i felt was a very important international watch. ..

problem. the diplomatic solution is the preferred solution. i'm very clear eyed about the iranian threat. not only the history of past events but current event. human rights violations have been mentioned and history of current practices that are bellicose in the reaming and beyond. it is the case that the sanctions that congress has put in place and so -- i haven't been part that have

legislation. i came here after the legislation was passed. i can praise those who have been here for putting tough sanctions in place. the vote was 100-0 in the body. the and the administration has been able to utilize sanctions to bring iran to the table because it is crippled their economy and isolated them in the international community. but the sanctions are not enough to stop an iranian nuclear program. one thing it crippled the economy. if anything it's making iran isolated accelerated their path to try to develop nuclear technology for whatever purpose. if we're going to stop that nuclear program, and that quest for nuclear weapons, we have to do it diplomatically or do it militarily. i support the sanctions and i'll easily and gladly vote for more if we cannot find an agreement. i have some ideas about a-- i want to raise ei