and now provide limited cooperation regarding the terror threats to u.s. olympic athletes. the uss that these are isolated events or do you see russia returning to more of a cold war posture towards the u.s.? >> that's a great question. i do think that this is somewhat reflective of current a leadership and i think there is clearly a desire to return to great and global power status, and i think that colors the behavior of the russian government. and the pursuit of their interests in which they are competitive with us.

>> thank you. specifically on the olympics in sochi, the uss that the russian government has taken adequate precaution to protect olympic athletes and visitors? >> let me, if i may, sir, pass that to matt olson, who has been working this problem pretty intensely as the director of the national counterterrorism center. >> we are focused on threats to the let the games and we're working very closely with the russians and with other partners to monitor any discrepancy disrupt as you know, the primary threat from terrorism perspective comes from the most prominent terrorist group in russia. it's made its intent clear to seek to carry out attacks in the run up to the games. we think the greater danger from a terror perspective is the potential for attacks to occur outside of the actual venue of the games themselves in the area surrounding sochi are outside

sochi and the region. but we are sure information with the russians. they are sharing information with us. there's always more we could do in that regard that as of right now i would characterize that level of sharing as good. >> do you know of any specific threats targeting the olympics? >> there are a number of specific threats of varying degrees of credibility that we are tracking. this is what we expected. it's what we saw in the run up to prior olympic games and prior events like these. so there are a number of specific threats as we discussed in closed session yesterday. >> is it safe for americans to travel to sochi? >> i would say that americans should follow the state department guidance in that regard. >> related to the situation in sochi, we have an upcoming world cup in the 2016 olympics in brazil. are we fully monitoring the safety situations in regard to those two events?

>> i can say for our part, congressman, at the national counterterrorism center, for all of these types of the instance we help organize the intelligence community to share information within the united states and also have relationship with our partners and making sure there is an integrated intelligence effort and we're doing that not only of the sochi olympics but also with future events like the games in brazil. >> director clapper, with respect to the ukraine, the uss that the pro-democracy opposition will prevail? >> that's hard to say, congressman. i hope they do, but i am struck with the depth and breadth of the opposition, particularly now as it has spread to the eastern part of the ukraine which, of course, traditional has been russian leaning. now we're seeing signs of demonstrations in opposition in each part of the country which i

think is an interesting turn of events. >> thank you. yield back, mr. chairman. >> mr. conaway. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you for being here. talk little bit about china's intentions, the growing tension in their efforts in the south china sea and towards japan, all those neighbors, vietnam, brunei, the philippines. why are they doing it? do we have the any idea as to what might come if with some sort of trigger event that occurred, ships running together, playing turning into china, some sort of interference that looks like an act of war. why is china precipitating these kinds of tensions in that area? and why don't you talk to us about -- >> china sees itself as a global player as well, and they feel they have historical, as

unreasonable as it may seem to us, but in their mind, historical claims towards the nine dash line in the south china sea and over these islands. they have great concerns about our pivot which in their mind represents an attempt to contain, contain them. so they have been quite aggressive about asserting what they believe is their manifest destiny if you will, in that part of the world. and so it does create potential flash points year over dispute over the islands and over energy and access to drilling and this sort of thing, particularly in the south china sea. and having traveled to the region recently i can attest it is of great concern, privately

more so than publicly with those countries that you mention. >> you talk about the traditional reach in the south china sea. d.c. china going beyond that area? >> i think they will over time tried to project themselves overly. they been interest in the indian ocean. they are reaching out and participating in more humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. so i think over time they intended to project globally. globally. >> how accurate do you think our estimates are with their increase in military spending have been over the last several years? >> i'll have two research -- i'll have to research the exact assessment of spending. i can describe them did last night was to me has been a very impressive modernization program

across every sphere that has a military application, including space, cyber, and in all of the armed forces. and they place a lot of emphasis of late on combined arms operations which they haven't done in the past. so across the board, whether it's their missiles, subs, aircraft, you name it, very impressive military modernization program, which i think is basically designed to, in their minds, address what they feel are our strengths. our naval strength basis, isr, command-and-control, et cetera. so they look at us and that's what it think has influenced a great deal of what they do. >> can you give us any insight into what we perceive as their internal threats? they believe that unrest among

the populace is a threat to the regime. >> one other major tenants, particularly the new regime in china, of course, is intro control. and they go to great lengths to control access to the internet and information exchange among their citizens. >> thank you, mr. chairman. yield back. >> thank you, mr. conaway. mr. schiff. >> i'm sorry, correction. my apologies. >> thank you, gentlemen. i really appreciate this opening. let me be clear, director clapper, do you have any concrete intelligence of a relationship between snowden and the russian government in regard to the stolen documents? >> as -- that's best discussed in a closed discussion as we

discussed last night. >> i want to thank you, director clapper, for your robust defense of transparency which has been characterized actually as a potential threat to our security or dismissed as politics it and i prefer to call it democracy. i believe that the national debate on domestic surveillance has been valuable. unfortunately, it was an nsa contractor leader who initiated it and not the government your and a drunk program is another example of significant activity that the public is trying to discuss that has been thwarted by lack of transparency. this year both amnesty international and human rights watch have conducted a series of researches and raised concerns about the consequences of the drone program on u.s. security. yet the government has not responded. director clapper, what steps can intelligence community take to increase transparency into the drone program and fostered a responsible national debate?

>> we are speaking of activities that are conducted covertly, so that's one area where being transparent is on one of a numbr of areas where we not going to be able to perhaps be as fully transparent as some might like. john, you want to add to that? >> when i was at the white house and i was assistant to the president on counterterrorism i spoke repeatedly publicly about this so-called drones, the remote pilot aircraft that he become an instrument of war. i spoke about that to the extent that they could. but this is something that they think has been discussed quite broadly. >> does the intelligence community way or consider how signature strikes, strikes against unnamed military age males may increase the terrorist

threats because they could generate hatred for americans, naturally motivate youth to join rather than reject terrorist groups? director clapper, or director brennan, either one. one. >> from a intelligence community perspective we're always evaluating developments overseas to include any counterterrorism activities that we might be involved in to see what the impact is. i think the feeling is that the counters and activities that we've engaged in with our partners, we, the u.s. government broadly, both from an intelligence perspective as well as military perspective that's greatly mitigate the threat to u.s. persons, both overseas as well as in the homeland. >> and the believe the signature strike model, if adopted by other countries, that are developing an armed drone program can be a threat to the united states? >> well, there could be, but i

would have to comment on, to the extent we can talk about this here, the great care that is exercised by the united states. and so i would hope in being very precise about which targets to strike. so i would hope as other countries acquire similar capabilities that they follow the model that we have for the care and precision that we exercise. >> one other question. as marked up by this committee, the fy 2014 intelligence authorization bill includes an amendment that i sponsored requiring a written plan for each covert action program to prepare ahead of time for the potential leak of that program. it increases the threat to u.s. sources and methods if the intelligence community is caught flat-footed by a leak and the reality is that any covert action can potentially be disclosed unexpectedly. director brennan, without

disclosing classified details, as each covert action program have or will it have a written plan of action to do with leaks of significant activities in that program? >> it's one of the issues that we take into account whenever there's a covert action program approved and implemented. it takes into account what the implications would be in the event of leaks. unfortunately, there are too many disclosed leaks about a lot of things that the united states intelligence community is involved in, and so it becomes a normal part of our business to anticipate those. >> i yield back. >> mr. king. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me thank each of you for the outstanding service you give to our country. director clapper, let me also thank you for the da vinci gave at the nsa. i think it's important t that tt on the record time and again. also putting in perspective the terrible damage that snowden has

caused to our country, to our men and women of the armed services, and americans generally. it's unfortunate that he's been almost glorified in some aspects of the meet, even by some members of congress, i people in public life and it's given i think a distorted version of him to the american people who some of think you some kind of a whistleblower rather than what i was is a person who sold out his country and put americans in terrible danger throughout the world. but as a follow-up to your conversation with chairman rogers about russia and also attaching it to snowden, against the backdrop of increasingly aggressive russian behavior, diplomatically the role in city is more than they've had in the region in the world in more than 40 years. they are seeking economic and weapons transactions with egypt and saudi arabia. they have a more aggressive actions in ukraine and reports of intrusive actions in

scandinavia. they in -- as a german point of effective use of this information in the past, can you can't especially concerned about the fact that snowden is basically in their custody? that he is how we define, i guess we don't know but i guess the fact is he is only allowed to stay in russia. against this backdrop of increasing aggressive behavior, how damaging can become information they get from snowden? >> well, it could be quite damaging, congressman king. and, of course, we don't specifically know, but it would be completely out of character having observed the soviet and russian security services in my 50 years of intelligence, and what they -- and they're very capable and very aggressive. so it's beyond belief to me that

they wouldn't be taking advantage of the opportunity, both to exploit and control snowden. i think to your initial commentary, this is again a part of russia's image itself as a global great power. it's long had syria as a client in the mid-east, so they've done all they can to sustain that toehold. as you said they've ha had in immediate and has voted against of opportunities where they can with egyptians as you mentioned. to extend their influence. >> as far as what we expect in the future from russia, to me, it significant enough that putin does seem to have this idea of bringing back the glory of russia, such as it was. but again if you attached it to him, he is, in fact, a former kgb person, trying to extract whatever information they can

use against us in many ways, including as was brought out in trade agreements, source undercutting us with our allies and spreading disinformation through the media as they did for so many years. >> i could not disagree with that, sir. >> i yield back. thank you. >> thank you, mr. king. mr. schiff. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director brennan, you have spoken frequently about the unmanned arial vehicles and program the president at ndu in making one of the more detailed accounts of the criteria that's used in those, otherwise known as the drone efforts. you've tried to increase transparency in the program. one way that a think would increase transparency and public accountability is if we could publish an annual report that

identified how many combatants were killed through the use of an armed, or unmanned vehicles, and how many noncombatants were killed. that seems to me a very limited value in terms of information to our adversaries, but in terms of public accountability and being able to correct the record at times when there are misleading claims, misleading casualties, it might be beneficial as well. is that something you could support? would that be another effort, transparency, that we can make? and with that, in your view, as in mind, be a fairly diminished value to our adversaries? >> i think it would be a recommendation that would have to go through the intercession and i would be a participant in the interagency process to discuss the advantages and potential disadvantages of it, but it is certainly a worthwhile recommendation if you would like to make that.

>> can you share any thoughts with us today on the cost of that? i mean, if it were done, say at the end of the year, if we had categories so you could pin point any particular incident. is it your sense that the cost in terms of giving our adversaries any useful information would be fairly minimal? >> congressman, i think this would be something, again, for you to be able to discuss with the administration, to policymakers, and then what we need to do is take a look at it analytically and determine whether or not this is something that the u.s. government feels as though would be worthwhile to do. there is a lot of debate about what is the basis for those determinations and those numbers. so it's something again i would defer to the administration on. >> thank you. i'll follow-up with you on that.

you know, the president in his speech in my also indicated there is a wide disparity if you regarding those numbers, and i think more transparency and public accountability would be beneficial. director clapper, moving to some of the privacy issues that have come up in the last six months, the tech companies are in a pretty impossible situation. they have a business model which includes a lot of international business which is becoming increasingly difficult to come by. there's a sentiment -- settlement recently with the justice department which i think will be helpful to them. can we go beyond that to let them assure their international customers that the number of times they are asked to divulge information is very limited compared to the overall number of transactions? and are there other ways that we can help them make the international business case?

because it's very much, i think, in i think, and ar in our intero do so. >> first, congressman, thanks for signing the agreement that was recently struck with the providers on categories of disclosures that they can now make, and they already have, which i think shows part of the administration's commitment to try to improve that situation. i also think it shows in the role of the population out there how in frequently these capabilities are called upon. one of the features which was in his speech and in a presidential policy directive was to see we could do to extend privacy protections and on u.s. citizens. this is i think unique in the world, so we are looking at that.

and again, just like in our own domestic context, we will have to weigh the risks versus again and how much that impinges on the question of foreign intelligence. so we are working through the air not in a position to today is how that will all come out. clearly whatever we can enhance transparency to the benefit of our commercial partners, we certainly will. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. schiff. mr. lobiondo. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks to our panel for being here today. before i start with a few questions, just kind of a quick comment that i recently turned from another trip to africa, and for all of our men and women, but the director brennan especially for your folks, a very heartfelt thank you for volunteering to be in a very difficult circumstances and some

places that are not very nice at all to protect the interest of the united states. very motivating. they are extremely patriotic making great sacrifices, and i know they don't often get thank you for what they do. not very many people know about it, but if you could please pass on our heartfelt thanks for for the great job that they did. >> absolutely, congressman, thank you very much for those kind words. >> i'm interested to have your cake on recent developments in egypt, and whether the muslim brotherhood, we can expect them to have a resurgence if the recent attack there was -- do we believe that's the first of many, or can you give us any idea we think that is all headed? >> there are a number of groups that are active inside of egypt. there is one group that is carried out some attacks. and has claimed credit for attacks inside egypt, cairo.

there are a number of groups in the sinai also operating carrying out some attacks against the egyptian security and police installations. there are also a lot of low-level violence being carried out by an increasing number of activists, some of whom may relationship with the muslim brotherhood. but there is a growing sense of they carrying out attacks of violence with either guns or ieds, and so the egyptian government has been trying to do with that as effectively as they can. but the number of attacks has gone up certainly over the past six weeks. some senior level egyptian officials have been killed at the hands of these terrorists. >> turning a little bit more to west africa. it seems that some my recent visits with nigeria, mali, that

these countries are very anxious, understand the threat with terrorists, what they posted own countries and to the rest of the world. facing very, very anxious to cooperate with us, although they have limited resources. do we have the resources necessary to prosecute the fight against terrorists in that part of the world's? >> i think one of the things we're trying to do to leverage a capabilities to work closely with the french. that was certainly the case in mali and in other areas. many of us met recently with the french minister of defense who i think has an excellent strategy for how to do the counterterrorism in that area of the world, that contains mali, nigeria, chad, all the way across. and the french have a long history there. they have access. they have insight and

understanding. in more important, a willingness to use the forces they have there now and to strengthen them in pursuit of counterterrorism. are part of that is to do, which i committed to, to strengthen their engagement through the provision of intelligence. >> so you feel we are dedicating or we are devoting adequate assets to the fight of there? >> we could always use more. clearly everything we did in africa, whether it's intelligence or certainly the military in form of -- this is clear what the military calls an economy of force operation. so we could always use more resources, and that's why, at least for my part, i think leveraging and partnering with the french is the way to go to

compensate, as a way of embellishing our effort there. spent thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. lobiondo. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank our witnesses today and for all the work you are doing to keep the american people safe, and the people that work under you. director clapper, you've mentioned in your opening statement and was referenced a couple of times now, the importance, the challenges of cybersecurity in the threat it poses to our national security. so i'm going to focus on out for a minute. here in the united states we have been working hard to create a cybersecurity framework that effectively defends the nation, and in particular our critical infrastructure. while we are arguably among the global leaders in this regard, clearly much more work needs to be done. director clapper, your statement

this morning references to cybersecurity is an international problem, and i completely agree. so -- and i certainly believe the united states has an opportunity to leverage its acknowledged cyber expertise into leading role in efforts to come together to tackle this issue. director, could you describe force the in intelligence committees outreach to the international cyber community and what more could be done, what more can we do to facilitate implementation of international cybersecurity standards to address the threats of today and tomorrow? >> well, our focus has been, internationally, has been working with our partners, the capable partners that have capabilities in the cyber arena. and, of course, we look first to our five eyes partners, but that extends out to others.

now, what is frankly somewhat, had somewhat of a chilling effect on all this has been the snowden revelation but i think it's had an effect both domestically and overseas. but that doesn't detract from the importance of our getting on with our partnering. and i'm speaking specifically now of intelligence relationships in the cyber domain. >> thank you. and turning to the issue of the innocent contractor who'd disclose classified information, as we have heard, the damage from the recent disclosures, it had a great impact on national security, and the range of national city secrets compromised is from everything i've seen and as you described, is astounding. these actions have placed our men in uniform -- men and women in uniform at risk as well as

others, folks who work in the field. and it causes and will continue to cost us countless resources. how can such activities be compared to the threats we face from traditional sources such as nuclear proliferation or cybersecurity, and how do we quantified these losses? >> that is a tough question, congressman. i don't know that i can give you an answer to that. the problem is because the potential revelations are effect so many different aspects of our intelligence efforts. and the other problem, frankly, is we don't really know the full extent or the full impact of these revelations. so it's a good question. it's just one that is kind for me is kind of them palatable. >> let me ask something related

to this. i was recently asked in a radio interview about the innocent contractor and the information that has been released. one of the things i focused on, the vast majority of the data that's been stolen that we been able to assess today had very little to do with just surveillance. most of it is in other areas of compromise national security. can use in broad terms talk about the percentage dealing with persons and persons deal with other aspects of national security? and kenya in broad terms touch on some of the other areas that you could have been compromised by these disclosures? >> well, that's also difficult. i can just say that the vast, vast majority of what has been potentially compromised goes

way, as indicated in my oral statement, goes way, way beyond the revelation about domestic surveillance, which i was given to understand that was his primary concern. so what he potentially, what he access, what he potentially made off with is, transcends that. so it's quite serious. >> can you say -- >> its hard-pressed to describe a number. >> can you give -- is it 10%? >> i would say probably less than 10% has to do with domestic surveillance. >> do you believe -- >> that's a ballpark stood deeply there's a targeted plan and the type of information that is being released at the time it is becoming public? >> i don't know. we've looked at that. they are sometimes appears to be

a pattern with the timing of some of these revelations, that i don't think we have enough evidence there to make a hard case. >> i know my time has expired. i want to thank you all for your appearance today, the work you are doing, and i yield back. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i just want, director, for the purpose of verification, he have called it domestic surveillance. my understanding there were no domestic surveillance programs spent i should've said, put that in quotes, so-called domestic spencer just something that press has referenced that would but there are no domestic surveillance programs. that's accurate? >> reef -- referring to section 215 of the patriot act. >> which is not a surveillance program? >> i don't characterize it that way. i should've said in quotes domestic surveillance. >> i just don't want people walking out saying 10% is even with domestic surveillance.

>> i was referring to with the context of the question as to what mr. snowden claimed was his primary concern, which was quote domestic surveillance. >> i just want to make sure that was clarified for the record. thank you for doing the. mr. nunes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this question is for director flynn and director brennan, it relates to the files that were found in abbottabad. the bin laden doctor mr. isom you are both aware that less than two dozen files have been released publicly at this time? your both aware that i'm sure. there's only been less than two dozen dead in a public. >> i'm aware. >> i actually of six specific questions that include delay you to take for the record. i would like to have both of you independently send those responses to the committee. and we can take these later. you don't have to write them

down. one, what is the current status to explode those documents? how many of these documents can be released publicly? and how quickly. three, when will i be briefed on the full exploitation of these documents? four, what leads on al qaeda financial supporters have been identified and acted on in these documents? five, how often did osama bin laden received reports from other terrorist groups? and six, how many messages you send to other terrorist groups? whether al qaeda or not al qaeda? i would like to move, director flynn, would you be willing to answer those questions for the record either a classified or unclassified setting? >> absolutely. and i would just offer one comment, that everything that we do that has been exploited, we are, but i just described is going to school on that you make sure that we are learning from the exploitation of that particular raid. and i would say that we are

applying a lot of what we're doing in the current effort against terrorists, based on some of the information. >> thank you. i look forward to your sponsor discussions. director brennan, would you going to expand -- to respond to those questions? >> i certainly will take your questions and follow-up on. >> thank you. director flynn, i want to switch to benghazi but are you where of any claims that e-mails regarding cia involvement in benghazi were destroyed and are kept from this committee? >> no, i am not. >> okay. were you, erector britain, where you in tripoli in october of 2012 to review the benghazi attacks as a member of the national security council? >> no, i do not believe -- i don't recall exactly when i was there but i was not there after the attack. >> not in october of 2012 the? >> i believe that's correct. >> i know you're familiar with

this, the benghazi survivors were made to sign nondisclosure forms. there was some confusion on that issue. had you the time to clarify why they were -- why the benghazi survivors had to sign these new disclosure forms, new nondisclosure forms of? >> yes. there were a number of contractors whose contracts were being updated, amended. and anytime it is an amendment to a contract there is a requirement for a nondisclosure agreement to be re-signed, which is the case there. it was not to deal specifically with any effort to discourage any individual from coming forward. i actively and explicitly encouraged them to cooperate with this committee and with the congress. >> okay, thank you, director brennan. director clapper, general

dempsey said that u.s. forces are prohibited from killing the perpetrators of the benghazi attack. and there seems to be this confusion about the differences between core al qaeda and other al qaeda. i've never heard the term core of how using any of my intelligence briefings. could you publicly say what the definition of core al qaeda is and how that differs from h2m, and -- >> core al qaeda refers to what i think we consider now the ideological center of the original al qaeda movement, and it refers to the remnants, to include the leader of the global al qaeda movement. and so at least to me that is my work -- working definition is core al qaeda and its origins and pakistan and now primarily

the fault our region of afghanistan and pakistan. >> if you get to mutations from those groups across the board to carry out attacks, are you just an al qaeda affiliate? are just some of the terrorist group are you related to al qaeda? >> well, i'm not sure i understand the question but that are sort of designated affiliates, i think five of them, aqap which we now regard, that franchise if you will in yemen is what we regard as the primary threat of all the franchises in terms of threat to the homeland. >> i think you understand the question. let me be more clear. the reason that we haven't been able to get the benghazi attackers is because they are not designated al qaeda. >> i don't think that has any

bearing on the investigation, and hopefully prosecution of the perpetrators of the benghazi attack. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> congressman, i was in libya in october of 2012. i just checked with my staff. >> thank you. thank you, director. >> mr. himes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today and i hope you convey my thanks to the dedicated people, i know those people have suffered a blow to their morale as a result of the disclosures that we've been talking about for a long time. and while the route on which we got to this discussion was awful, involving a clear violation of u.s. law and almost certainly putting americans at risk, i do believe it's an important conversation for our democracy to have, as painful as it may be given the circumstances. i also reject that it is simply

a pr exercise in convincing americans that all is well, if they just understood what was going on. this is copy the stuff. forget what we say and two federal judges have ruled in opposite directions on the legality of it 215 metadata program. the privacy and civil liberties oversight board split three to. this is a good debate which i want to set aside for the moment in favor of a question of utility of the 215 metadata program. also an area in which there's been a great deal of misinformation, initially propagated by some of my colleagues at seven events were disrupted, that very rapidly became single digits, maybe one, too, or three. director, question for you. testimony i in the senate and answer to question, you said for the fbi the primary value of this program is a guilty. that is, it allows us to do in minutes what otherwise would take us hours. my question is, is that the strongest defense of the utility

of the 215 metadata program that can be mounted? or is there something out that we should keep in mind? >> no. it is the primary utility for the fbi. its agility is its greatest valley. it's a useful tool for that reason. >> if i might add to that. i think, as i have said before, i don't think plots foiled is necessary -- necessarily the only metric that could be used to the potential value of section 215 metadata, which is an important tool. last summer when we had a number of diplomatic facilities in the mideast that were closed because what appeared to be potential terrorist threats, it turned up some number of selectors that pointed in the direction of the united states. so using this tool we were able to eliminate the fact that there was no terrorist nexus and there was no domestic plotting going

on. so at least in my mind, that an additional metric apart, the cure plots foiled. and, of course, the program was conceived as result of 9/11 and the inability to track a foreign communicant whose communicacommunica te with someone in the united states. so it's kind of maybe low probability but potentially very high impact tool. >> thank you. i would like to follow-up with you on a different topic. we touched on it yesterday in closed session, pertaining to iran and the agreement p5+1 agreement. are we seeing compliance on the part of iran with respect to the obligations under that agreement? put another way, are we seeing any evidence of noncompliance? >> so far they are complying with the agreement. and the evidence of that is in the initial iaea declaration of their compliance with the provisions of the gpl a speed

back. that's not to say we won't take advantage of that which is not prohibited. they will. and certainly the combination of the more intrusive iaea inspections and surveillance coupled with what we're able to do, we will be watching for that. >> thank you. do have intelligence suggests that the regime is in anyway not acting in good faith at this point? in sort collection which would suggest that there is deception or -- >> no. can't point to any. >> director clapper, you told senator kaine over on the senate side your opinion that right now the imposition of more sanctions would be counterproductive. let me ask a slightly different question. the president in the state of union said he would be the sanctions so that slightly off the table. but what about resolutions or other measures that were to come out of the congress threatening additional sanctions? how would you feel about that? >> as i said to senator kaine

when he asked the question, the iranians are students of us and our government. they clearly understand how the system works. and so from their vantage i think right now additional sanctions would be a poke in the eye, and they understand the implicit threat is there anyway. if the congress decides they are not, for whatever reason, not in compliance and they want to impose more sanctions. it's kind of a policy thing, but i think from iranian perspective right ow, since they do appear to be complying with the provisions of the gpl a, would hold the possibility in reserve. reserve. >> do the i run. >> that if there were a violation that the united states it would be very serious and very rapid in imposing additional sanctions?

>> well, as there are for his opinion pockets in this country about things, so are there in iran. so it's very hard. i don't think there's a monolithic view among the iranian decision-makers about that. >> great. i see my time is up but thank you very much for it being and all that you do. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. himes. mr. westmoreland. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank all of you for coming back today to testify to this. general flynn, afghanistan, or maybe matt wants to address this, too, what's our counterterrorism? what kind of -- were are we at with our counterterrorism right now in afghanistan? >> matt is probably you know, best to talk to the troops and sort of the scale and scope of

the terrorist threats there. i would say from the posture of serving intelligence effort that we're going on there, we have a significant continuing significant intelligence collection effort that would've focused on the most recent threats that we're facing in afghanistan that our forces are facing. and we will, as has been highlighted in some of the comments, we will continue to have that intelligence capability there until such decisions are made about the size of the force. >> congressman, i would just add from the terrorism perspective in afghanistan, probably our biggest concern are the number, and small number, but a number of core al qaeda individuals who are in afghanistan and who, over the longer term, may seek to provide a basis to reconstitute some degree of capability there. so there are individuals in northeastern afghanistan who are

connected with core al qaeda spent i guess my question was, what's happened in iraq, in fact we mentioned earlier about the terror training camps in both iraq and syria. and, of course, we are not -- we know they're and libya also in the eastern part. it seems like we evidently just don't have the will to stick, to try to make what we are doing count because we lost a lot of great men and women in the effort that we've had in afghanistan. and it seems like with the approach that karzai has taken, it might make your ability to get intelligence less, because of the pullout that we're going to do. and i think the afghan people see what's happening in iraq.

the fact that we've got a date certain, the fact that we're pulling out, has that hindered your intelligence in anyway as far as maybe some assets or whatever that we have their, director brennan? >> congressman, we have a very active and robust counterterrorism program inside of afghanistan working very closely with the afghan services, the nbs and others, so there is competition's associated with uncertainty as far as what the president is going to be like going forward. we relied heavily on the u.s. military colleagues who are the type of support that we need in order to continue on intelligence mission. and the threats not just in afghanistan but that whole border area, so it's not just al qaeda but the haqqanis and others who pose a serious threat to our forces. this is something that we have to rely on intelligence, and

with their afghan colleagues to be able to thwart those threats. >> so in the opinion of any burger planet, you don't think we are losing credibility with some of these assets that we got and the fact, when we leave they could be in great danger? >> i think there's great concern in the area about what the future holds, from the standpoint of what the taliban is going to do after 2014. and that's why it's important that a bilateral security agreement be signed so that we can continue. >> do you think that the afghan national army and their security forces are capable of continuing on, i guess, with the fight against al qaeda, some of the

other issues, that people better in afghanistan? and do you feel like there's going to be terror camps that are eventually going to be set back up in afghanistan? we will be basically back where we were pre-9/11? >> well, that is a concern. i think over time the afghan national army, particularly, will have its challenges, essentially because of the loss of a lot of the enablers the u.s. has long provided. i think under virtually any scenario though they will be able to maintain certainly the security of the major city areas where the taliban and will continue the general trend towards growing stronger in the countryside.

clearly, the taliban having gone through this before i think, i would think, i'm surmising here, would think twice about allowing the resurgence of al qaeda back in afghanistan and the reestablishment of the training camps and all that. i think that, i think they would pause before they would allow that to happen. >> thanks. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> i would just add that, you know, there has to be, and i know this is in discussion, but the international commitment to sustained the capability of this afghan national seek a divorce that has been built by the international community over the last decade plus obviously there are concerns that that may not be there. so i know that in our estimate that we believe that that's one of the major concerns that they have. and then sort of tactically the

kinds of capabilities that i know that are at the forefront of the priorities that we are addressing with him are things like, as the director clapper mission, these enablers, intelligence capability, mobility, fire, command control support. is all important issues, but as a force they are actually demonstrating, you know, in some respects a pretty good ability to secure some of the areas that they operate within. >> thank you. >> missile. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to thank our panelists today, as well as the individuals that you direct for your services. great country. transform my question is really about our preparedness. and so my question is, how would you characterize the probability of an al qaeda sponsored or inspired attack against the homeland today as compared to 2001?

>> well, our assessment is that this is much less a capability to, capability of al qaeda to mount a complex, large attack of the scale of 9/11 is greatly degraded. we still regard, we, regard the aqap, that is the tears in yemen, still pose -- the terrorists in yemen, still pose the greatest threat to us to an internally the most frequent threat for us will continue to be homegrown violent extremists. >> how has sequestered affected the preparedness of your organization? and budgetary constraints, generally. >> well, it's having an effect. as i said in my oral statement, the combination of the compromises, decisions we've

made, and budget reductions occasioned by sequestration, or sequestration like reductions, is, th that you were to the efft of all this is what i worry about. -- bekking that could affect. and the reduction in our capacity. it's not as great as it was citesunday year or two ago. and if we continue these cuts, it will continue to have a negative impact. >> is there a particular capability that is most at risk or vulnerable? >> the most important asset, and this is been a consistent tenant of min minds as long as i've ben this job, is our most important resource is our people. and that's why i'm so concerned about the effect on the morale of the workforce with sequestration, furloughs, shutdowns, pay freezes on top of

all the pilfering the workforce is entering. two things i'm concerned about is continue to build to recruit the kind of people we need and our attrition which is right around 4.4%, pretty steadily over the last say, three or four years. so if those two factors begin to be affected, and i think that would be emblematic of our challenge, but the thing i worry the most about is the impact on our people. >> if i may, congresswoman, i which is a from a preparedness perspective, the integration of the intelligence community under director clapper's leadership is exemplified by the agency's rep is by the fbi, cia and national counterterrorism center, both from perspective of sharing intelligence and bringing to bear all the capabilities of these organizations to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats. so begin the integration of this committee from a preparedness

perspective is a real change from 10 years ago. >> thank you. i would like to turn to cybersecurity, and i guess the fbi director is probably the most on point on this. but last year the threat assessment hearing led to a discussion about cyber and its significance as a threat to our security. as you know, the news routinely reports cyber fraud and cyber crimes. most recently the pillaging of security in, i guess it started and neiman marcus, and now michael's. but the threat not only is domestic hacking but it's also international with threats by sovereign nations on us. in my home state of alabama, the private sector and our higher education institutions have really come together to try to respond to this. in fact, auburn university sort

of leads and alabama consortium, several other higher institutions in alabama and they work in concert to try to get outreach as well as guidance with respect to cyber. so my question is, how would you see cyber ranking in overall threat to global threat to they? >> i think there's a reason that director clapper talked about it first. it touches everything we worry about, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, crimes of all kinds, because it is a place where all of our lives are, our money, our secrets, control systems, our socialized. and so it's a way bad people, bad nations, bad groups come, bad groups come at us. so it is nearly everything and touches everything. and the notion of borders is an anachronism we are talking about a photon spin how is the government interacting with other private sector and higher education to try to come up with some solution?

likewise, do you think that the failure of congress to come together and pass a bill with respect to cyber has -- how has that affected our preparedness? >> we as a government have gotten much better at working to deal with the threat. we've got much better a working with the private sector, including education institutions. but we really do need some guidance for the private sector as to the rules of the road. we need them to share information. we need to be able to share information within and we need guidance for them. >> so how has our inability pass legislation on information affected -- >> it's made it harder. we need that guidance. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director call me, i first of all want to thank you, you and your men for the fabless job of taking down a terrorist and stop the bomb plot which could potentially kill hundreds of

people. did a fantastic job and i want to thank you all for that effort. you have not charged him -- two dozen a terrorist organization but i know you available to prosecute ethically. i want to talk about the threat, do you think there are risks today increase islamic radicalization in the united states is real? >> yes. >> and the political ramifications, i will talk about in this context, the political ramifications, the fallout from the lakes, do you think political actors might take some risk but you couldn't catch the next in the united states? >> there's always a risk that we will no out the babies with the bathwater comments we just need to make sure we have a clear eyed discussion about what are the trade-offs associated with changes to our counterterrorism tools. >> i will take that as a yes, there is some chance we'll take action that will cause terri lilo and to complete his action in wichita, kansas, italy get these policy decisions wrong. >> sure, there's always a chance of that.

>> thank you. ..