will no out the babies with the bathwater comments we just need to make sure we have a clear eyed discussion about what are the trade-offs associated with changes to our counterterrorism tools. >> i will take that as a yes, there is some chance we'll take action that will cause terri lilo and to complete his action in wichita, kansas, italy get these policy decisions wrong. >> sure, there's always a chance of that. >> thank you. ..

>> i'm concerned about all al-qaeda. they are dedicated to killing innocent men, women and children. >> so you would never characterize a member of al-qaeda as somehow being junior varsity? >> i characterize them as a murderous organization. >> thank you. director comey. when you capture them in benghazi, will you consider taking them to guantanamo bay? >> that's not a judgment for the fbi to make. >> the last time we brought a bad guy, a 20-year senior leader out of libya who had lots of information about terrorists all around the world, in a matter of days he was returned to the united states and had a set of lawyers, and i am confident was read his miranda rights. do you think we lost the opportunity to gain intelligence that we could have had we handled this enemy combatant in a different way? >> because his case is pending,

he's now being tried in the southern district of new york, i don't want to talk about his case in particular, but more time is always better than less. >> do you think having, i want to be careful, do you think having less than a couple of weeks to conduct a series of interviews with someone who was a senior member of al-qaeda, do you think that is sufficient to garner all of the intelligence, all of the information he had about the al-qaeda organization and the impact that has on american lives in the united states, do you think that was enough time to uncover that information? >> again, i'm going to, if i could, i need to stay -- >> generically. >> more time is always better. >> you have him for two weeks, is that enough time to get the information that you'd like to have to try and keep americans safe? >> again, more time is always better. the particular time limits lead me back into an individual case, which i can't do. >> appreciate that. directer brown, this weekend we heard from a number of senior foreign officials who were talking about the iranian, the

jpoa, the agreement we've reached, and the discussion of what a final agreement might look like. as you know, a number of nations in the middle east have agreed not to enrich. and their statement was, hey, if iran's allowed to end rich, we'll probably relook at that as well. do you have intelligence which indicates we will have an increased number of countries that want the right to enrich uranium if the iranians are permitted to continue to enrich following a final agreement? >> i think regional states are watching closely the status of these negotiations and what is going to happen from them. they are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and potential for iran to get a nuclear weapon, so we are most interested in preventing that from happening, so i think we're committed. >> do you have intelligence that bears on what ease other countries' intentions are? we were told they will seriously

consider abandoning their commitment not to enrich. >> i think by definition your question leads us to a closed session discussion on that. >> thank you. thank you, director brown. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chair. we've learned of the devastating effects of intentional declassification of material by an nsa contractor which has effectively betrayed his country. now i'm concerned about an up intentional -- unintentional leak of millions of americans' sensitive data, and this is a new article that just came out that i'd like to ask you about. it came out last evening from bill gertz wrote the article. u.s. intelligence agencies last week urged the obama administration to check its new health care network for malicious software after learning that developers linked to the belarus government helped produce the web site raising

fresh concerns that private data posted by millions of americans will be compromised. officials warned programmers in belarus, a former soviet republic closely allied with russia, were suspected of infecting virus or codes. the software links millions of americans to the federal government and more than 300 medical institutions and health care providers. the u.s. affordable care act software was written in part in belarus by software developers under state control, and that makes the software a potential target for cyber attacks, one official said. they said the potential threat to the u.s. health care data is compounded by what they said was an internet data hijacking last year involving belarusian diverse covertly rerouted, massive amounts of u.s. internet traffic to belarus. it goes on to say officials say there are serious concerns that

the software contains malicious code that could be used to covertly route data from the obamacare web site to foreign locations. additionally, they suspect that belarusians planted secret back-door openings to the software that will prevent surreptitious entry to u.s. government networks by hackers or spies. the malicious code could reroute data to belarus or possibly apartment access -- permit access to the health care network. identity theft and privacy violations could ensue. the article went on to say that the threat of diversion is compounded by the discovery that belarus covertly diverted massive amounts of u.s. internet traffic to belarus. according to david kennedy, head of the security firm trusted

security, he said the obamacare web site was not designed well, it has a lot of security flaws. one major concern is that the system connects the health care network to other sensitive u.s. government networks including the internal revenue service and the department of homeland security. that makes it a treasure-trove for hijackers, kennedy said this an interview, adding that a major concern would be cyber attacks from sophisticated state-sponsored adversaries. the threat of back door access points is a particular worry because the chinese military linked washington way technologies is -- also contained in the article was the statement from the national security council spokeswoman caitlin hayden who said an intelligence report on the belarus software was recalled by the intelligence community shortly after it was issued. i'm wondering if you could comment on why that intelligence

report was recalled after it was issued and also could you tell this congress and also the american people why in the world health and human services shouldn't immediately shut down and properly stress it's the healthcare.gov web site to insure that consumers are protected from potential security risks from across the globe? >> well, i'll have to get back to you on that. i'm not familiar or aware of the article. >> you aware of the problem? >> no, i'm not. i don't, fortunately, the affordable care act is not my, not my responsibility. >> where but, director clapper or -- >> we'll look into particularly the allegation about a report being withdrawn. i don't know anything about it, we'll have to get back to it. >> director clapper, the article says u.s. intelligence agencies last week urged the obama

administration to check its new health care site. you're the director of national intelligence. you were not aware of this threat and that u.s. intelligence agencies last week urged the obama administration to check the web site? >> i am not aware of anyone in the intelligence community doing that. >> is there anyone at the table that is aware of this issue or has heard of in this issue? >> director brennan? >> i read the report that you are referencing there. >> you aware of the intelligence community's alerting the administration to this last week? >> no, i'm not. >> are you aware of the report that was withdrawn? >> i am not. >> director coemy, are you a-- comey, are you aware of this report? >> no, i'm not. this is the first i've heard of the matter. >> and, director flynn, are you aware of this report that was issued last week to the obama administration? >> i am not. >> director olsen, are you aware

of this report that was issued last week? >> no. you>> you are not. so no one at the table is aware of this report issued last week. i find this outrageous considering the fact that we are looking at one of the worst intentional leaks in american history conducted by an nsa contractor, and in the midst of that, this is one of the largest unintentional leaks that could impact every american citizen as we are now required to sign up for health care what this will mean. because the president of the united states recently stated that three million americans have signed up for health care on this web site which now is potentially vulnerable to an ally of the russian government. and i see my time has expired, i yield back. >> well, thank you very much for your testimony today. although -- >> one thing i've learned, congresswoman, over the years is not to believe everything i read in the media. >> i want to thank you very much for your time today, important

dialogue and discussion can. we'll continue to work in a classified setting on those policy issues that we believe need some attention, by the way, in a bipartisan way, a strong bipartisan way. we look forward to continuing to work with you. please pass along to the men and women in each of your agencies our appreciation. we get the good fortune to meet them all across the globe in difficult neighborhoods, and their work is exceptional, their courage is beyond the bounds, and their sacrifices for the defense and freedom of this country are well respected by, certainly, members of congress and the american people. so for that, thank you very much, we look forward to working with you, and we'll see you real soon in a classified hearing. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> president obama will be traveling to east lansing, michigan, today where he's expected to sign the five-year farm bill and speak about the legislation's effect on jobs and the economy. we'll have live coverage of the bill signing and the president's remarks at just after 2 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> the new c-span.org web site

makes it easy for you to find and watch all of of c-span's extensive coverage of official washington. look for it on our home page in a space called federal focus. each day you'll find comprehensive coverage of house and senate debates, congressional committee hearings, events with the president and members of his cabinet, press briefings from the white house, capitol hill, the state department and the pentagon, plus selected supreme court oral arguments and appearances by the justices. watch live or on your own schedule. federal focus on c-span.org. making it easy to keep tabs on what's happening in congress, the white house and the courts. >> as the u.s. and other western powers negotiate with iran over halting their nuclear program. the state department's lead negotiator came to capitol hill to testify about the talks. iran's foreign minister has said

a final deal is possible within six months. senator robert menendez chairs this hearing of the senate foreign regulars committee. -- relations committee. [inaudible conversations] >> the hearing will come to order. let me begin by welcoming our panelists. today we have two panels. on the first panel is wendy sherman, undersecretary of state more political affairs. undersecretary sherman is joined this morning by david cohen, the undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financing, and we thank you both for being here. let me say at the outset that i support the administration's diplomatic efforts. i have always supported a two-track policy of diplomacy and sanctions. at the same time, i am convinced

that we should only relieve pressure on iran in exchange for verifiable concessions that will fundamentally dismantle iran's nuclear program. not by a month or two, but by a year or more. and that it be done in such a way that alarm bells will sound from vienna to washington should iran restart its program anytime in the next 20-30 years. any deal must be verifiable, effective and prevent iran from ever developing even one nuclear weapon. in my view based on the parameters described in the joint plan of action, an iranian comment from the days that have followed, i am very concerned about iran's willingness to reach such an agreement. this is not a nothing ventured, nothing gained enterprise. we have placed our incredibly effective international sanctions regime on the line

without clearly defining the parameters of what we expect in a final agreement. as the head of iran's nuclear agency said last week on iranian state television about the agreement, the iceberg of sanctions is melting while our centrifuges are also still working. this is our greatest achievement. well, frankly, it is my greatest fear. salahi may be correct, the iceberg of sanctions may melt before we have an agreement in place. that may, in fact, be the iranian end game. they understand that once the international community ceases backing sanctions that they will have won regardless of whether or not we have a deal. at the end of the day, any final deal must require iran to dismantle large portions of its nuclear infrastructure. any final deal must address iran's advanced centrifuge research and development activities that allow to more

quickly and more efficiently enrich uranium. it must eliminate the vast majority of iran's 20,000 centrifuges, close the fordo facility and stop the heavy water reactor at iraq from ever coming online. and it must address iran's weaponization. experts including david albright who will be on our second panel have said that for iran to move from an interim to a final agreement, it would have to close the fordo facility and remove between 15 and 16,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges. and even then we are looking at potential breakout time of between six and eight months depending on whether iran has access to uranium enriched to just 3.5% or access to 20 reconverted percent enriched uranium.

a final agreement should move back the timeline for breakout to beyond a year or more and insist on a long-term, 20-year-plus regime of monitoring and verification. now, in light of that testimony that we're going to hear today, president rouhani in an interview on cnn said in response to the question so there will be no destruction of centrifuges, of existing centrifuges? president rouhani's answer was, no, no, not at all. so that causes concern for those of us who are concerned about what this final agreement looks like. finish finish a final agreement that mothballs iran's infrastructure or fundamentally preserves their ability to easy break out is not a final agreement i can support. if all we achieve is the essence of an early warning system of iran's future breakout ability and the sanctions regime has

collapsed and the only options for this or any future president will be to accept a nuclear-armed iran or a military option, in my view, that is not in the national security interests of the united states. i know that's not anyone's goal or plan, but i also think we need to guard against wanting a deal so much that we concede more than we gain. at the end of the day, iran can no longer be a nuclear weapons threshold state. i've made my position quite clear and will continue to do so. i have specific questions for all of our panelists that i hope you'll be able to answer to insure us that this is, in fact, ultimately if achievable at all, the type of deal we can all embrace. with that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking republican member, senator corker. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for those opening comments and your leadership on this issue for many years.

i think the efforts that you have put forth in the past with senator kirk and others, candidly, helped put us in the place that we are today. and so i applaud you for that and appreciate the position you taken. i welcome our administration witnesses, and after reading, mr. chairman, the testimony by the witnesses that are going to come on the second panel, in many ways i wish we had that testimony first so that we could then talk with the administration about what neutral observers are saying about the interim deal that's been proposed. want to also say -- but i thank you for your service, david. i think you've done a good job at carrying out the sanctions that have been put in place. do want to talk to you a little wit about the turkish issue and our knowledge of that possibly and why we allowed that to occur and do we have the same thing getting ready to happen in russia with our acquiescence. i don't know, we'll find out, i

guess, during this hearing. and, mr. chairman, again, i thank you for your efforts and want to say that, generally speaking, i've been disappointed in the rhetoric from the administration about congress' involvement. on one hand i think that you would readily admit that the position that congress has taken through the years has helped you be in the place that you are. but somehow because congress wants to insure that we end up with a proper end state, there's been a lot of unfortunate things that have been said. and i, too, as the chairman mentioned, support very much the administration's effort to insure that iran doesn't have nuclear weapons and is we're able to do that in a peaceful manner. very much support that. i just think all of us, many of us have legitimate concerns about what has happened. as a matter of fact, i just want to say relative to congress, i think all of us would like to work cooperatively with the administration. and in many ways i think what's happened is the rhetoric around the sanctions piece has actually

sort of become a red herring. it's sort of been a place where the administration can say, well, sanctions will end up keeping this deal from happening. congress can keep saying, oh, we're trying to do something about it, and i think it avoids the topic of you, candidly, clearly laying out to us what the end state is that you're trying to negotiate. and i hope today you will clearly -- i just got your testimony. i haven't seen it, just came in five minutes ago. i hope that you will clearly lay out what the end state is, because i think that's what so many of us are concerned about, that this interim deal becomes the prominent deal can. you know, if you look at iran, they're savvy, and he was a lot of people that are educated in our country. they understand us in many ways better than we understand them. and if you look at what they are doing and what they've done in the past, they become, they perfect something, and then they pause.

they perfect something and then they pause. and so what we have right now is they've perfected, no question, the centrifuge capabilities. i think people would say that they want to be a nuclear state, they can be that very quickly. and so we have this pause where we have an interim agreement that doesn't address all the other areas that they have the ability to perfect over this next year which administration officials are already saying this isn't going to happen in six months, this is probably going to take much listeninger. in your own agreement -- longer. i know carl levin tried to limit it to six months in meetings we had privately at the white house, but, no, we end up with a one-year agreement. so, basically, we have an yield that allows them -- they stop in an area that they've already perfected. we allow them to continue on in other areas to be able to deliver nuclear weapons. it's not even addressed by this interim deal. so you can understand there's a lot of concerns. so i hope today you'll lay out

clearly what the administration will accept as the end state. i hope that you will talk with us about it, and i hope that we'll figure out a way to cooperatively work together. and maybe what congress should do is pass a piece of legislation that lays out clearly the only thing we will accept at the end. because be, again, i think that there's concerns that members of the administration are negotiating towards rolling interim agreements that, basically, the agreement we have now where we have the ability to monitor, and yet they dismantle something is actually the end state that some of the people in sum within the administration would wish to achieve. so i hope you're clear today. i thank the chairman for having this hearing. i appreciate him letting me talk a little bit about in this on the front end, and i look forward to both testimony and questions, and thank you both for your service. >> thank you, senator corker. we'll start off with secretary sherman. your full statements will be included in the record without

objection. would ask you to summarize it in five or so minutes so that we can enter into a dialogue with you and secretary sherman. you're recognized. >> thank you, chairman menendez, ranking member corker, distinguishes members of the committee, and i would say to all of you we all have concerns, and i very much appreciate this dialogue and continued work together on this most serious issue. i provide the opportunity to provide you today with an update on the p5+1 and the european union's negotiations with iran which, as you know, are coordinated by the high representative of european union. i also look forward to discussing where we are on other important parts of our iran policy. i come here confident that we, as you both said, share the same goal with regard to iran, a goal that the president reaffirmed just last week; to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. and thanks to a combination of of what i believe is tough diplomacy and the most

comprehensive targeted sanctions regime ever imposed on a country with enormous leadership here on capitol hill, i am certain that we are closer today to that goal than we were just a few weeks ago. we are not at that goal, but bev taken a first -- but we've taken a first step toward it. i hope to explain why that is as well as where we will be heading in the coming months. on november 24, 2013, we and our partners agreed with iran on a joint plan of action. this was an important be first step in our efforts to resolve the international community's concerns with rapp's nuclear program. -- iran's nuclear program. on january 20th the joint plan went into effect. as the president noted, the implementation of the joint man marked the first time in -- plan marked the first time in a decade that iran i greed to roll -- agreed to roll back their program.

this was designed to create space for further negotiations and a comprehensive solution. specifically, the international atomic energy agency verified on january 20th that, among other things, iran stopped producing near 20% enriched uranium, disabled the configuration of the centrifuge be cascades iran has been using to produce it, gandhi luting its existing stockpile of near 20% enriched uranium, continued to convert near 20% enriched uranium at a rate consistent with past practices, had not installed additional centrifuges at the natanz or fordo facilities. moreover, on transparency and monitoring, the iaea stated that iran has begun providing some of the information required by the joint plan and is working with the iaea on arrangements for increased access to its nuclear facilities. in order to carry out its responsibilities under the joint

plan, the iaea will roughly double the size of its inspection team and install additional monitoring equipment. the size of the team and the access afforded under the joint plan mean the international community's insight into iran's nuclear program will be significantly enhanced. this was an important first step, and over the next six months iran has committed itself to further actions that will provide much more timely warning of a breakout at iran's declared enrichment facilities. they also add new checks against the questioner -- diversion of equipment. you have rightfully asked why we should trust iran to live up to these commitments. as the president said, these negotiations to not rely on trust. any long-term deal we agree to must be based on verifiable action that convinces us and the international community that iran is not building a nuclear bomb. as my colleague, undersecretary cohen, will further outline in

his testimony, the united states and the e.u. have also taken a series of actions to implement the targeted, limited and temporary sanctions relief we committed to as part of the joint plan. but let me be clear, the joint plan of action represents merely the first step of the comprehensive solution we seek to reach, and we seek to reach it welcome within a six month te frame. the in two weeks the p5+1 political directors and the e.u. high representative will meet with iran in vienna to begin with discussions on that comprehensive solution. our goal is to reach a mutually-agreed, long-term, comprehensive solution that would insure iran's program will be exclusively peaceful. this comprehensive solution will build on the initial steps we have already begun to talk. ultimately, the comprehensive solution would be one under which we would verifiably insure -- be assured that iran's nuclear program is peaceful and that iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon.

so what would a solution look like, as you asked, senator corker? well, as the president said, we know that iran does not need to have an underground fortified enrichment facility like fordo in order to have a peaceful nuclear program. they do not need a heavy water reactor at iraq in order to have a peaceful program. the jpoa also lays out basic elements of the comprehensive solution if i may take another minute to finish. thank you, mr. chairman. the final step of a comprehensive solution would have a specified, quite long-term duration to be agreed upon, and it would reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the non-proliferation treaty and iaea safeguards agreement. under the terms of the joint plan, iran has committed itself to a number of steps before we finalize a comprehensive solution including, among other things, addressing the relevant u.n. security council resolutions with a view toward bringing the security council's consideration of this matter to

a satisfactory conclusion. iran has agreed to implement transparency measures. the joint commission set up between iran, the p5+1 and the e.u. to oversee the implementation will also serve as a forum for discussion to facilitate the iaea's resolution of past and present issues of concern which all parties understand means the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. indealed, just this weekend -- indeed, just this weekend on the margins of the munich security conference, secretary kerry reiterates to foreign minister zarif the importance of iran abiding by its commitments under the joint plan, and iran and the p5+1 countries must begin negotiations with good faith. he also made clear that the united states will continue to enforce existing sanctions. one final issue to keep in mind with regard to the comprehensive solution is that under the terms of the joint plan, we have agreed with iran that the

comprehensive solution will be part of an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. what is also important to understand is that we remain in control over whether to accept the terms of a final deal or not. we have made it clear to iran that if it fails to live up to its commitments or if we are unable to reach agreement on a comprehensive solution, we would ask congress to ramp up new sanctions immediately. but moving forward on new sanctions now, as you know, we believe would derail the promising diplomacy i have just outlined, alienate us from our allies and risk unraveling the international cohesion that has proven so essential to insuring that our sanctions have the intended effect. before i conclude, let me briefly note that our focus be on iran's nuclear program has not deterred us from holding iran accountable for its human rights abuses, support for

terrorism and interference across the region. my written testimony includes further explanation of what we are doing on these issues, and i also want to emphasize that we remain committed to bringing robert levinson, said abedini and amir hekmati home. secretary kerry raised directly with foreign minister zarif in munich. as did the president in his phone call with president rouhani in september. we will continue to do so and use every avenue at our disposal until these men are back home with their families where they belong. in sum and to finalize my statement, mr. chairman and members, the p5+1's negotiations with iran underscore that it is possible not only to make progress on the nuclear issue, but with iran. we are not blind, however. to the more than 30 years of

difficult history between the united states and iran or iran's past actions and past behavior as well as its current behavior. but it is crucial that we give diplomacy a chance to succeed. if iran lives up to its commitments, then the world will become a safer place. if it does not be, then we retain all options to insure that iran can never and will never obtain a nuclear weapon. the coming months will be a test of iran's intentions and of the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the crisis. we look forward to continuing to work closely with the congress to insure that u.s. national security interests are advanced. thank you. >> secretary cohen. >> chairman menendez, ranking member corker, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to

discuss the implementation of the joint plan of action. in my testimony this morning, i are address the administration's steps to deliver the limited, temporary and reversible relief in the joint plan as well as our critically important, ongoing efforts to implement and enforce the vast majority of the sanctions that remain in place. the pressure on iran from sanctions, sanctions built through the collaborative efforts of congress and the administration along with many of our partners in the international community was instrumental in bringing about the joint plan of action. we are committed to insuring that we maintain this same pressure on iran throughout the six month term of the joint plan as our negotiators explore the possibility of a long-term, comprehensive solution that verifiably insures that iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. the joint plan went into effect on january 20th. on that day we issued guidance that temporarily suspended sanctions on transactions related to the export of

petrochemical products from iran, the provision of of goods and services to iran's automotive sector and certain trade in gold and other precious metals to or from iran. in this guidance we made clear that transactions associated with this relief must be initiated and completed entirely during the six month period of the joint plan. that is, to avoid sanctions, full performance from contract to delivery to payment must begin no earlier than january 20th and end no later than july 20th. we have also paused efforts for the next six months to reduce further iran's exports of crude oil to the six jurisdictions still purchasing from iran and began taking steps to allow iran to access in eight installments spread over the span of six months $4.2 billion of its own funds currently restricted in accounts overseas. and finally, we are working to further facilitate humanitarian

transactions. notably, all of this relief is reversible. if iran fails to meet its commitments under the joint plan, we can revoke in this this limited sanctions relief and at a minimum reinstate the suspended sanctions. viewed in light of depths to which iran's economy has sunk, the approximately $7 billion in relief offered by the joint plan will not materially improve iran's economy. for the first time in 20 years, iran will be in a recession for two consecutive years. it will continue to have limited or no access to almost $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings. its budget deficit will remain sizable. its currency will remain significantly devalued, and its inflation rate significantly elevated. over the six month duration of the joint plan, iran's struggling economy will continue to be buffetted by sanctions as the core sanctions architecture remains firmly in place. we are continuing to implement

and enforce our oil sanctions which have driven down iran's oil exports by more than 60% over the last two years. our financial sanctions which have locked up much of iran's overseas assets, our banking sanctions which have largely cut off the iranian banking sector from the the international financial system. our sanctions on significant investments in iran's energy sector which has impaired iran's oil and gas production, and the broad trade embargo between the u.s. and iran. because these potent sanctions remain firmly in place, iran will continue to struggle to finance its imports, to fund its government operations and to defend the value of its currency. in short, the continuing impact of our sanctions and the cumulative impact of those sanctions means that the iranian economy will continue to massively underperform for the foreseeable future. so while we remain committed to providing in good faith all the

relief agreed to under the joint plan, we also remain hard at work implementing and enforcing a sanctions regime of unprecedented force and scope. the reason is simple, we know that intense sanctions helped bring about the joint plan and likewise will be a critical component in the negotiations to come. we are actively engaging with foreign banks, businesses and governmental counterparts. secretary lew, secretary kerry and many others from the administration have reaffirmed this point that the sanctions relief in the joint plan is narrow, the sanctions that remain in place are broad and that we intend to enforce our sanctions vigorously. as part of this effort over the last six weeks, i have traveled to the u.k., germany, italy, austria, turkey and the united arab emirates carrying this message: iran is not open for business. in all of these engagements, we have made clear that we will continue to respond to iran's

efforts to evade our sanctions wherever they may occur. we will continue to detect, disrupt and disable those few facilitating iran's nuclear and missile programs, and we will continue to target iran's support for terrorism and its human rights abuses. and i say to this committee and to other observers, stay tuned. we are poised to deploy our tools against anyone anywhere who violates our sanctions just as we have always done. thank you. >> thank you. secretary sherman, so maybe you can just answer this yes or no. a final agreement would include closing the fordo facility. >> in all of these questions today, i'm going to be thoughtful about what i say, senator. not because i do not want to be direct, or but i don't want to negotiate with iran in public so that they know what our positions are going to be at the

negotiating table. so i will be as forthcoming as i can be -- >> well, some of these are so obvious, you said in your own testimony. >> i'm going to, i'm going to say it. i'm going to answer your question, but i'm making a statement just in general terms because i don't want to frustrate the members and be glad to have further conversation in a private setting in greater detail. but where fordo is concerned, as i said in my testimony, we see no reason for fordo e to remain an enrichment facility. >> all right, thank you. with reference to the iraq heavy water reactor, i would assume that that is not, would not be permitted to go online. >> we do not believe there's any reason for a heavy water reactor at all in a civil nuclear program of the type that iran is interested in. >> with reference to the centrifuges that exist which our understanding is about 20,000 at least by published reports and other reports, david albright who's on our second panel and others have suggested that for a final agreement mission to

closing the fordo facility there would be a immediate to remove between 15 and 16,000 -- a need to remove between 15 and 16,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges. to you agree with that estimate? >> i'm not going to get into a specific number in this setting, senator. what i will say is there's no doubt that the number of centrifuges needs to be addressed. >> okay. and by that we mean that there needs to be a reduction. >> yes. >> okay. now, reference -- so you won't give us a number, but when president rouhani says, no, we're not going to destroy any centrifuge, you believe that is domestic consumption. >> i believe that is domestic consumption, and i wouldn't expect any less. what i will care about, what we will all care about, what we all should care about is what iran does, what commitments they make and which of those commitments can be verified have actually taken place. >> with reference to an area

that was not frozen in the interim deal with iran which is iran's centrifuge research and development program which, basically, iran can continue its development of its more advanced centrifuges during this whole period of time at the natanz pilot program under the loophole in the interim agreement. and challenging because iran is able to measure the enrichment level of the product before it remixes it. so at the end of the interim period, iran is likely to be far better positioned to deploy reliable ir2m centrifuges on a mass scale at its enrichment plants, and this would allow iran to make up for lost time very quickly. is this significantly or dramatically drawing back on their research and development plans on centrifuges a critical

element of a final agreement? >> no doubt there'll be very difficult discussions around r&d because of its significance, but i would say one thing, senator. in fact, mr. chairman, there are, indeed -- the r&d program was frozen where development is concerned in a couple of important ways in the joint plan. first of all, they cannot work on any advanced centrifuges that are not listed in the november 14th iaea report. that is really the baseline for any continued work, so it was frozen at the november 14th setting. in terms of replacing any damaged centrifuges in fordo or natanz, they can only do it with same type, not more advanced centrifuges, and they cannot install any new advanced centrifuges into the natanz research facility. ..

obtaining natural uranium, no enriched uranium is deposited into the tanks. this remixing meets the letter of the deal. however, iran is able to measure the enrichment letter of the product before remixing it. it can further develop the centrifuges while hiding any results of its progress from the iaea, which has access onto the

product things are the natural uranium and does not see the enrichment measures. at the end of the enrichment period, iran is far better to be position to deploy reliable ir-2m centrifuges on a mass scale at its enrichment plans. this would allow iran to make up for time lost more quickly. do you dispute that? >> what i would say, i would quite agree with you that are in the is an area of concern. their research and development on advanced centrifuges is an area of concern and it will be something that would be quite focused on in the final comprehensive agreements. i'm not an expert of the quality of dr. albright, and i have great regard for his assessments and i would be glad to have our experts sai to do with you or yr step and go over this -- >> i appreciate that. what about parchin? why was parchin -- parchin being so incredibly important for the framework under which you're

negotiating. parchin, the world believes, is where iran was weaponizing its nuclear efforts. yet in this agreement and the interim joint plan of action, we have no access to parchin. now, parchin has already gone under mass excavation by the iranians when the world became aware of it as a way, i believe, to ultimately try to cover up their weaponization program. but obviously if we were negotiating with access to parchin, which i believe and others believe would prove their efforts to weaponization, the framework under which we would be negotiating would be much different, versus a supposition versus our reality. so is access to parchin, while you didn't achieve it, i don't know if you ever raised in the

interim joint plan of action, is access to parchin a critical element of your final bill? >> senator, we, in fact, did raise parchin. we raised possible military to mentions and, in fact, in a joint plan of action we have required that iran come clean on its past actions as part of any comprehensive agreement. in three very critical ways. first, the plan, the joint plan of action says we will work with the iaea to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concerns and that is a formula used by the iaea in addressing possible military dimensions, including parchin. so we expect, indeed, parchin to be resolved. secondly, the plan says before the final step would be additional steps in between initial measures and the final step, including addressing the u.n. security council resolutions, which require in fact even with issues of past

concerns. and third, all the sanctions on over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting iran's nuclear ballistic missile program will remain in effect until those concerns are addressed. so to summarize, yes, we raised it, second, they must be resolved. >> they rejected any access to parchin? >> they have not rejected it. >> in your joint plan of action they rejected during this period of time access to it? >> no, they have not rejected you. they know it has to be addressed. i hope it is addressed within a six-month while we are addressing the conference of agreement. the iaea will be meeting with iran on february 8, and the specific issues of the possible military dimensions are very key in central to the agenda. so i hope and i would urge iran to address parchin during the six months while we are negotiating the agreement because it will increase the confidence that we'll actually

get to a final and comprehensive resolution. >> reuters has a report this morning that the iaea's touring with iran's, productions of polonium which is a mature that can trigger an atomic explosion. is this a new development or is this something that you raise with the iranians during her into negotiations? >> i'm not aware of the reuters report so i would have to take a look at it spent i would ask you to respond to the committee. >> be glad to. >> one final question. all of the sanctions i've authored with senator kirk and members of supported, they always have to have at least a six-month period of time in order to give countries and companies the notice required in the time for you to do the regulations necessary to perceive them. is that a fair statement? >> i assume so, senator. i haven't -- >> you are enforcing them and you've had to pursue them. have you had less than six

months to be able to pursue any of the sanctions we have passed? >> senator, sitting here right now i don't recall every piece of legislation, whether any of them were immediately effected or whether there was a phase-in for all of them. we have, of course implement the sanctions that congress passes as probably as possible. >> i think it's pretty well, one can take additional notice of the legislation. the legislation became law, always had a very long lead time. and then after that he went to work to try to pursue it, and the problem is to suggest that we can quickly passed sanctions as to not recognize that when we passed sanctions, there are six months from the date of signing before it ever goes into effect. and then after that there's a whole period of time for you to pursue enforcement. so in reality the only effect that we have is overtime. when the iranians, based on testimony that has been received

and will be received today, looking at six to eight weeks, two months or so of their potential breakout period, if a deal doesn't come through, sanctions, to enforce the sanctions then will be far beyond the scope of the window and will not be a calculus for them. and so that is part of the problem with suggesting that yes, we can have sections at any time. it's not simply about passing sanctions. it's about the timeframe necessary to have them effective and ultimately to take effect. that is way beyond the window. senator corker. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, i appreciate again your testimony. i think you know that again all of us want to see a negotiated settlement. we want to see a peaceful into this, but all of us are concerned to idle if you want to continue on, concerns about the

way this interim deal has been struck. i made reference in my opening comments about iran's ability to perfect things and paused, and then perfect other things. just curious, why did you all hide in this agreement in any way address the delivery mechanisms, the militarizing of nuclear arms, why was that left off? since they reached the threshold able in acknowledges, they can build a bomb. everyone knows that. they have against centrifuges. we have a major loophole in the research and develop an area that everyone acknowledges. and yet we are going to allow them over this next year to continue to perfect the other piece of this, which is the delivery mechanism. why did we do that? >> senator, first of all, and i should've said this when the chairman asked the question, you know, we see this as a first

step. so we don't consider that gaps that exist loopholes because this is not a final agreement. this is a first step. >> it would take a year here she said it would take six months just to write a technical documents to begin discussing. she is one of are full partners, i know. we probably have a period longer than six months where they can continue on. again, i just don't understand why an interim deal would not address them stopping the perfecting of those things that allow what they have already perfected to be delivered. >> i was a couple of things. first of all, the joint plan of action does address the fact that their ballistic missiles that could be used as a delivery mechanism -- mechanism, it is part of the u.n. security council resolution. so it is true that in these first six months we have not

shut down all of their production of a ballistic missile that could have anything to do with the delivery of a nuclear weapon. but that is indeed going to be part of something that has to be addressed as part of a conference of agreement. secondly, i would say to you, senator, that if we are successful in assuring ourselves and the world community that iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, then them not having a nuclear weapon makes delivery systems almost, not entirely, but almost irrelevant. >> let me ask this question. i think most neutral observers which state that all we have really done since they are not dismantling as both the president and foreign minister has made real clear they're not dismantling, so in essence what you've done in this interim deal is you've given us 30 days

additional time for breakdown. 30 days. and yet they've got a year, a year, too, probably longer candidly, to develop these delivery mechanisms. now, i will say some people may debate about what that enrichment is for. i don't in any by people on this committee think what they have been doing it solely for civil purposes, but there's no debate on delivery mechanisms. and i'm just curious, why would you negotiate a deal that allowed that? i don't get it. why would you say that would be a part of the next deal since they've already perfected the first part? it seems to me being able to deliver it is an important aspect, but apparently not so in your case. >> senator, you and i disagree about the conclusion of the joint plan of action. we believe that it is set out a framework for a comprehensive agreement to ensure that iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. we are not to that comprehensive

solution yet. we agreed on a six-month program that freezes where they are and rolls back their program in significant ways to obtain that nuclear weapon. and in return would've given very limited temporary and targeted sanctions relief. quite frankly, if we could've negotiated a comprehensive agreement which you would prefer, and many people would prefer, we would have done it. but quite frankly, that was impossible to do in a short period of time. and had we, in fact, tried to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that would have dealt with everything that is of concern to all of us, they would've used that time to march forward much more rapidly in their ability to both develop a nuclear weapon and to develop a delivery system for that nuclear weapon. so this is not perfect, but this does freeze and rollback their program in significant ways, and give us time on the clock to infect negotiate that

comprehensive agreement. as you yourself said, we can discuss with the breakdown times are in a classified setting. it has added relative to where we were, sometime on the clock as well. >> if i could ask just two more questions. i know this is a topic we all care about. mr. cohen, since this negotiation has begun, do you agree that iran's inflation rate is way down? that their currency is way up? and economic projections within the country our way up? and that there are people from all over the world who are clamoring to do business with iran? i know you've traveled around the world talking to folks about what might happen to them, but is there any question that just the discussions have hugely uplifted the iranian economy? is that correct? >> senator, i think what we've seen in terms of the metrics

around -- iran's economy is there's an up tick in italy after the election of president rouhani in june. so the value -- the value of 9/11, inflation has come down since the election. there has been essentially no change at all in either the inflation rate or the valley of the rial since the joint plan of action was agreed to in september. >> everybody knew those discussions were under way. do you understand why there is a concern here that we are a leading sanctions? you all say 7 billion. i think no rational person believe that's the only affect, because any market to our expectations. that's why the fed buys securities and gives its expectations. and so people are expecting, and you can understand why the chairman would be concerned, that what's going to happen is at a minimum, a series of rolling interim deals.

and i think there are many of us rightly concerned that at a point, especially if it takes as long as catherine action is income at a minimum of year, we lose all leverage. some people have said we'll got to do is pass a resolution on the senate or the says if we don't come to resolution, there's a trade embargo, or something that is much stronger. not binding, but indicates we will do something. do you understand why we have those concerns? do have a way of congress addressing those in an appropriate way simply put the sanctions in place in the first place? >> certainly understand where those concerns come from but what i continue from my travels around the world and my colleagues, report the same in their dealings is that the limited nature of the relief in the joint plan of action and the sanctions that were remain in place, when we explain that, make sure that the business community, the banking committee

and the government of counterparts understands that a deal that would be permissible under the joint plan has to be commenced and conclude within this six-month period. that anyone shipping goods to iran is still facing an iranian banking center that is largely cut off from international financial sector. that investment in iran's energy sector is still s when we walked with a very narrow scope of the sanctions that have been relieved and the extensive sanctions that remain in place, what we hear back is that there is interest down the road potential is there's a comprehensive deal and substantial sanctions relief in the iranian market, but for this period, for this six-month period, the interest in trying to take advantage of the narrow suspension of sanctions in just

a few economic areas that have been agreed to is relatively pained. so you see these delegations going to tehran, but i think you also see, importantly, the reflection that those conversations are about what may come in the future, not what's available today. and i should say, we are as crystal-clear as possible in all of our engagements that if these talks turn into something more, these talks turn into deals that violate the elaborate sanctions that remain in place, that we will take action. >> thank you, chairman menendez, for chairing this hearing. i would like to thank the under secretaries for your work and for appearing before the committee. as you said in your testimony and as i agree, a strong and crippling sanctions regime

imposed on iran, large part passed by this congress and enforced by this administration have brought iran at last to negotiating table. and i remain strongly supportive of the ongoing implementation and enforcement. i am encouraged by your characterization of these sanctions enforcement and the relief of the joint plan of action as being temporary, limited and reversible but intend to be intensely engaged in ensuring that that is, in fact, the case. as a cosponsor of the menendez bill, i believe it is important is to continue to maintain the threat of stronger and more additional sanctions approaches in a clear message to iran if the ramifications are noncompliant. i have a number of concerns and unanswered questions about the joint plan of action. i will just reiterate, i share the goal of literate i don't on this committee, the administration of reaching an agreement that verifiably and irrefutably denies iran the capability to acquire nuclear weapons capability. i do hope a final deal can be

achieved in the next six months that includes the most comprehensive inspection verification regime possible, and i've a number of questions i'd like to ask follow up on that if i might. first as to the iaea. i sent a letter to the president along with several other centers, asking a number of questions and in particular focusing on what the administration wanted from congress in a way financial support, what actions will be with the iaea, and pressing on whether there's any progress in terms of establishing the field office, the scope and reach of the inspections and what kinds of capabilities funding to require so we can have some certainty about these allegedly novel inspection regimes we have very disconcerting previous examples in other countries where inspections failed to uncover clandestine action as has previously been the case in iran. so i would be interested, for

someone am i going to get an answer to my letter? and what can we be doing to work with you in strengthening the iaea inspections? >> thank you very much, senator. and thank you for your support, and thank you along with all the members of this committee for leadership on supporting our efforts to make sure that iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, which i quite agree is an objective we all share. in terms of monitoring and verification, i will find out where that letter is and we will give it to you, senator. i'm sorry it is not appear before this committee today and i apologize that. the iaea is going to double its staff. it will have a field office. as you note, the joint plan of action gives us unprecedented access before natanz, fordow inspectors went once a week. now they will have again aspect on which days they might not otherwise be the.

it will be surveillance cameras and other monitoring techniques that will be available that are being worked out with the iaea. arak as they used to visit once every three months, they were now monthly access to 10. they're getting plans in essence for arak. they are getting access to centrifuge production faciliti facilities, production facilities to uranium mines and mills. so it is quite an unprecedented verification and monitoring regime. the director general has said there will be some increased costs. we have increased the amount that we will make available out of our budgeted funds to the iaea. other countries have come forward, and we greatly appreciate your willingness for congress to take a look and ensure that the inspection monitoring verification act, if you can go forward because they are quite critical as you point

out, to verify that iran does what it has committed to do, and in a comprehensive agreement will be even more crucial. >> let me ask one more question with my remaining time. first time in your opening testimony you highlighted efforts to hold iran accountable for its ongoing human rights violations, public executions, support for the assad regime, for hezbollah, for terrorism. and i appreciate and salute your hard work and holding a rant accountable. this is a regime we cannot trust. one of the most important publishers i think of this intimate joint plan is the commitment to dilute the 20% highly enriched uranium. and apparently tehran will take the steps when it is completed necessary facilities improvements in a converging line. when is is scheduled to be completed and what steps are being taken to ensure the iranians are not dragging their feet or not using this as a way to covertly enrich in some of the vehicle and in some other location? >> a couple of comments, first on human rights. be completely agree with you. in the coming weeks the human

rights report will come out and we will detail as close as we possibly can how we view iran's human rights abuses which you have decidedly have rightly pointed out are of grave concern to us. in terms of the dilution and conversion, oath on the 20% and ensuring that the 5% stockpile does not get larger than the amount agreed to. by the end of this six-month period. the iaea will be monitoring all of these actions. and on the dilution, the conversion will take all six months to a college because the technology only allows us to move that quickly, but the iaea will provide a report on monthly basis of all monitoring and verification activities that they will share with the joint commission. we will be glad to come up and brief a hill in a classified session of those monthly reports. and so that will be one way that

we will verify. the second is that on the dilution, to of the frozen funds are tied to the dilution schedule. the first on march 1, the second on april 15. so iran will not get funds and was the dilution is completed on the scheduled agreed to. >> i very much look for to those classified briefings and an answer to my letter. thank you. [inaudible] >> supporting this committee, supporting the efforts administration in this regard. don't put me in that column. i don't want to be thanked because i do not support what has been done but i think this thing is a disaster. i think, i was stunned when i saw what the agreement was. i've been disgusted as we've gone forward, and and i hope you will prove me dead wrong, but it

don't think i will give in history of these people. but any event i want to focus on just a couple of aspects. number one, has to see that bikini is a constituent of mine. he is held in jail in iran -- saeed abedini. is only crime is being a christian. last week i see where we shower the iranians with what, $500 million? by kim at get this guy out of jail? you said that secretary terry had a conversation with the foreign minister zarif this weekend at the meeting in munich. can you tell us what the substance of that conversation was? >> certainly, senator. first of all, we completely agree with you. saeed abedini, robert levinson should all be home with their families. and nothing i can say today, because they're not get home, will be satisfactory to you or

to the families. and i would agree with that. and agree with you in that regard. secretary kerry raised the situations with the foreign minister, insisted that these be addressed as quickly as possible, that there was no basis for any of the three of them to be held. and, indeed, we are doing whatever we can in whatever channel we can to bring them home as quickly as possible. >> ms. sherman, that's not good enough. those are just words. somebody needs to look these people in the eye and tell them, they are not getting another penny and then not getting anything until they do a very simple act of letting three absolutely innocent americans go free. i hope you can say that to the foreign minister, and i would've secretary kerry would convey that to the foreign minister as well. this is actually outrageous for everything we've given to the iranians, and instill to hold -- this is absolute nonsense.

let me change horses here for just a second. i keep reading in the media about now that, now that the sanctions have been relaxed and, and this has been a concern of mine from the beginning, that now that they've been relaxed our partners, most if not all of whom were unwilling partners are now flooding in there with business people. the french and the irish, the canadians. you've got political people. you've got businesspeople flooding and they're ready to do business, going back to business as usual with the iranians. whose job is going to be to put the genie back in the bottle when this thing fails? who was going to do this? >> let me make one comment, then turned to undersecretary cohen. a couple of things but as the under-secretary said, every single member, key member of our administration talks with every country with whom we meet about

enforcing and keeping the sanctions in place and on board. and, indeed, i believe based on the conversations i've had with many, including the french and secretary has talked directly to foreign minister about the trade delegation, it was a private business delegation. it wasn't a government delegation, about how this is not helpful in this regard, to ensure that, in fact, it is not business as usual as undersecretary cohen said. iran is not open for business because our sanctions really is quite temperate, quite limited and quite targeted. that, in fact, most of these delegations that are going because he talked to the mall, we tell them what are the limits of what they can do, that we will, in fact, go after them, that we will sanction them. doesn't matter whether the countries are friend or foe. if they evade our sanctions will sanction them. we have all delivered that message, not just treasury, but every department in our administration and in the executive branch that indeed most of these delegations appear to be going to get themselves in

line for the day that impact the companies agreed is reached, if it is reached. and we've told them all that they're putting their reputation, themselves and their business enterprises at risk if you jump the gun. >> this is exactly why those of us who are critical at the beginning were so critical. the optics of this are such that the rest of the world says, it's back to business as usual. you can tell them what you want to tell them that their acts indicate that they believe it's back to business as usual. that's the problem. mr. cohen. >> i completely agree with undersecretary sherman in terms of how we have been making certain that our partners around the world understand that whatever interest they may have in the iranian market, someday, that is not the market today. that what's available today in a

joint plan of action is extraordinarily narrow. is limited as i said, the chemical exports, to sales, goods to the auto sector, and some trade in precious metals, but even that is substantially constrained. it's very limited economic potential today in the iranian business sector. that's the point that we make over and over again in these engagements. that point i believe is getting through. we have not seen deals being done, but even more importantly, what we have been absolutely clear about is that we will continue to enforce our sanctions. in the application agreements on the joint plan of action, explicitly recognizes that we have the right and that we will fully enforce existing sanctions. and i think that message is one that we have communicated over the years, and more recently, in

a pretty credible fashion. >> i understand that's the message you're giving them, but it sure doesn't look like they believe it. because they are acting entirely differently from what the message you're giving them. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator murphy. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for being here today. i want to frank associate myself with the opening comments of senator coons. it has been a robust pursuit of sanctions by this administration that has led us to a point today in which we have an opportunity, a chance to achieve a peaceful resolution to this crisis. undersecretary sherman, as you know i was in munich this weekend, sat on a cow with a foreign minister zarif. he made the laughable contention that iran was at the table -- sat on the commission with foreign minister zarif. that being said, though no one in the audience believe it, there was a discussion there about the different trade missions, mainly of a private

nature that has gone to tehran, and secretary was there pushing hard, as you mentioned, back on our partners to make sure that those were simply missions connected to potential future activities rather than undermining existing sanctions. let me give you just my impression, and you tell me if i'm wrong. the fact that there are groups going to tehran, think about the potential future opportunities seems to me that nothing to do with the interim agreement. to me, if we were to have entered into negotiations right away on a final settlement, the same thing would have happened. once there was a window into potential normalized trade relations with iran, there are going to be private entities that are going to start having those discussions. and so the idea that there are

some conversations happening about future trade opportuniti opportunities, seems to be a consequence of a negotiation beginning whether or not there's an instrument trade agreement in place. and i just wanted, from both of you, to understand is that your impression? >> i think that is exactly right. and as i was saying earlier, it's what we've been hearing from these various agencies -- trade promotion agencies, the private industry we been talking to come is that they're not they're looking to do business today. that they, they are there to see what might come in the future. because there is, you know, some hope that these negotiations will produce a comprehensive agreement that brings with it substantial sanctions relief, but that's down the road. that's not today.

>> i would agree with the under-secretary. i would add one other thing, which is a little counterintuitive. we hope people don't know to tehran. that is our preference. but those who go raise help him that the rouhani administration is going to have to deliver on, and the only way they can deliver on those folks is a comprehensive agreement that we will agree to. and that means a verifiable assurance that they are not developing or creating, will have, obtaining a nuclear weapon. and so although we don't want people to go, because we think it does send the wrong message, if they do go, it puts pressure, perversely, on the rouhani administration. because as far as we've seen today, there are not just getting done, but rather people getting first in line in the hopes that someday there will be a deal. >> and to the extent there is enormous economic opportunity in that country today, it is

because of the crippling nature of the sanctions that have so greatly undermined the economy, that there is such room for improvement should the sanctions be partially or fully lifted. undersecretary sherman, is one additional question. we do have to pay attention to the internal political dynamics in the country because it dictates whether or not they're actually going to be able to get the deal. is there any new information about the link of the leash that the reef and rouhani has been given by the supreme leader? is there any evidence that hardliners since interim agreement have been signed are winning or losing the into battle to be able to allow for there to be domestic political support for a deal that is amenable to the united states to be achieved in this negotiation? >> we constantly ask our intelligence and commuting to up date of the assessment, and that is certainly an assessment we should share and will share with you on an ongoing basis.

i think there is no doubt that there are hardliners in tehran. sometimes that's overstated for negotiating effects, but it israel. insubstantial. and so i think zarif walks a very fine line. i think one thing we all try to be cautious of is not to increase this space for the hardliners, while at the same time not allowing tehran to overstate the politics they have to do with. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator rubio. >> thank you. so let me describe what i think the leash is and i don't think this takes it amiss about of secret intelligence to arrive. i think the leash is, i said this before, go into a sanctions relief you can get without giving up what we believe i brings believe is their inherent right to enrich. if they can keep that infrastructure in place there always one or two, three steps away from being a nuclear armed power. so here's where i am -- needs

simplification. according to the administration we have not as part of this joint plan of action have not recognize the rights to enrich for the iranian government know to we intend to. the document does not say anything about recognizing a right to enriched uranium. in a letter from the president, rouhani, says to the supreme leader he says the agreement includes the formal recognition of the nuclear right of iran, implying that they indeed have a -- this acknowledges the right to enrich. is that under no circumstances will it ever be a deal in which we agreed to dismantle our enrichment capabilities. thathat is the line in the sande has drawn on the enrichment issue. he we have a line in the sand on enrichment issue? >> our line in the sand and enrichment issue is that any conference agreement should give us full confidence and assurance in a verifiable manner that iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon. >> well, so then my question is,

is a capable to enrich, isn't that in and of itself a significant -- just the fact have the infrastructure to richard any level. isn't that a critical capacity for a country that has a plan to have the option of going nuclear armed when they? >> every country has the potential for that capability. and if we dismantle, and i hope we can, i don't know whether we will be able to, every piece of infrastructure that iran has, they would still have the knowledge. they cannot unlearn what they know. so they would be able to reconstitute an enrichment program. they would be able to reconstitute their research and development because there scientists can't unlearn what they learned how to do. so what we are trying to do, senator, and a comprehensive agreement, is to put in place the elements that would give us a verifiable assurance that they cannot obtain a nuclear weapon.

and there are many paths to that end. >> i understand scientist will know how to do but you still need the infrastructure. you still need the facilities to enrich. many countries of scientists that know how to do it but they don't do it, including many of our allies. so we will now potentially the concern is we will even place any sort of assumed that when the world is distracted in five years on some other thing, they can move fairly quickly. let me point something else out. multiple countries have the ability to enrich but they don't, because they obtained it from elsewhere, because they don't have these designs. and few countries to enrich also have a ballistic missiles program. so let me ask you this question. the city council resolution 1929 contains a provision referring to the ballistic missile program. and prohibited them from acquiring an interest in a commercial activity in another state involving technology related to ballistic missiles. which only billed for the purposes of delivering a nuclear warhead. how is that going to be addressed? isn't that a key component?

if they retain a right and infrastructure and rich up to 5% of their building ballistic missiles, then the only thing missing here is a quick wrapup of the enrichment capability and now they are a nuclear power. >> senator, i hope that tehran listens very carefully to what you said. because we agree. it would be better for iran, if they want to build a nuclear program, to, in fact, bring a few in from the outside and not have an indigenous enrichment program. they would get better nuclear cooperation. they would probably get better price. lots of things might be better for them and that will be on the table in the negotiations we have with them. you're quite right, there are plenty of countries who do this, who have dignity and pride and scientists and everything else they need for scientific and technological advancement. but we have said in the joint plan of action that depending upon where we get into conference agreement we're willing to consider a very

limited, very intrusive, very heavily monitored, small, limited enrichment program if it becomes a necessity. but nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. and on the point about ballistic missiles, indeed we've said that the u.n. security council resolution has to be addressed. and ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear weapon are part of that consideration. and the last point i would make is if we can get them and i don't know yet whether we will be successful, but if we can get to the verifiable assurances that cannot obtain a nuclear weapon, if we know they cannot have a nuclear weapon, then a delivery mechanism, important as it is, is less important. >> senator kaine? >> thank you, mr. chairman. when the interim deal was announced in november, it was time in an interesting way. it was the same weekend where america was commemorated the 50th anniversary of the death of president kennedy.

and i was with many of my colleagues at a security conference in nova scotia when the deal was announced. in a great speech of senator kennedy's was running through many of our minds that weekend as television was discussing his career. it was a graduation speech he gave at american university a few months before he died in the spring of 1963. he had started aggressive diplomatic efforts to try to reduce nuclear weapons and the nuclear competition between the united states and the soviet union. and he was heavily criticized and as naïve, foolish, duped, et cetera for doing it. he made a very aggressive case for the fact that part of american strength is strong diplomacy. and one of the phrases he used in the speech, and i would recommend the speech to anyone because it is a very interesting one even if those written today, is that with all the appropriate skepticism, and this is a direct

quote, we can still reduce tension without relaxing our guard. aggressive diplomacy is needed to reduce tension. aggressive diplomacy is needed to solve thorny problems but we don't have to relax our guard. i see what we are trying to do around that spirit that we all want exactly the same thing. we want iran not to have nuclear weapons. we all will be for if we can get to that in diplomatically rather than having to use military force. as a member of this committee i have recently cast a vote to use military force to enforce what i thought was a very important international norm. iran should not have a nuclear weapon, and i will cast a vote to use military force should that be necessary. but everyone, everyone on this body, every one of our allies, everyone of the p5, everyone throughout the world would desire if there is a diplomatic alternative, a diplomatic path

to a nonnuclear iran that we pursue that path. .. the right way to obtain a diplomatic solution to a forney problem, the diplomatic solution is the preferred solution. i am very clear about the iranian threat, not really the nuclear threat, history of past events but human rights violations have been mentioned and a history of practices that

are bellicose in destabilizing governments in the region and beyond. it is the case the sanctions congress put in place, i have not been part of that legislation. i came here after the legislation but i can praise those who have been here for putting tough sanctions in place 100-0 in this body and the administration has been able to utilize sanctions to bring iran to the table. it has crippled their economy and isolated them in the international community. the sanctions are not enough to stop the iranian nuclear problem. one thing you would say if you look at the history is the sanctions cripple the economy but if anything it is also about making iran isolated, accelerated to try to develop nuclear technology. if we are going to stop the nuclear program we have to either do it diplomatically or do it militarily.

i support the sanctions that easily and let the vote for more if we cannot find an agreement and i have some ideas i want to raise with this panel or the second one. i think this joint plan of action, diplomatic efforts of the administration give us a historic opportunity we can't afford to put across into the middle of. the joint plan of action and interim agreement in my view from analyzing it and reading analysis done by many who are much smarter than me on this and even reverses aspects, not all the critical aspects of the iranian nuclear program which sanctions alone have not been able to do and also provides this country and our partners and all of our allies in the world better early-warning system about whether iran is cheating. we get more time on the clock and a better early warning system. we have to give diplomacy a chance. we have to. i think aggressive diplomacy has

been an underexercise american muscle in the last 15 years. we have to return to the kind of aggressive diplomacy the nation embraced when president roosevelt brokered the end of a rousseau japanese war, won nobel peace prize for doing so. since that time our strength has been measured not just by military strength, not just by economic strength but the strength of our moral example and the strength of our diplomatic effort. we can be appropriately skeptical. the president has been candid in talking to all of us that it is maybe 50/50 or whether we will find a deal that we think would be sufficient and if we don't of course there will be greater sanctions that we will put in place that will support, but we have to give diplomacy a chance not only in this instance but we have to return to the tradition of american diplomacy that has been one of the core elements of our power in the world. it has been underexercise and i

am glad we are getting back to it. last thing i will say just quickly, there may be a day when this deal doesn't work and we have to contemplate military action to stop iran from getting a nuclear weapon. i don't think it is that hard to complement that we might be at that day at some point in the future. as i said i will say on the record right now there is no other way to stop iran from getting a nuclear weapon, for us to engage in military action, hopefully with others i will vote yes on that. in order for us to vote yes on that we have got to be able to look. our allies and our citizens and especially the men and women we would ask to fight that battle we would have to be able to look them in the eye and tell some we had exhausted every diplomatic effort prior to undertaking that significant step. we may have to undertake that

but we shouldn't do it if we live diplomatic avenues unexplored. let's have this about iran's good faith, not our good faith. let's demonstrate and put them to the test about the nuclear-weapons program. >> let me thank the senator for special comments, the administration could be in line to understand difference between tactics and warmongering and fear mongering. >> i appreciate my colleague from virginia and those sentiments. i have not signed on to the new sanctions bill. i believe if diplomacy can work we allow it to work. i haven't appreciated the comments from the administration describing those who are in favor of a sanctions bill or

implying there warmongering, anything but the best motives, i think everyone wants the same thing to describe people, that is unfair. there are some concerns that i have. one of the criticisms of the joint plan of action is it deals with known nuclear facilities in iran, but it is of little bit unclear as to what will happen if we discover other facilities that were not known prior to is this. how are they covered? the term any new nuclear facility, is that a new one or newly discovered and what means do we have to try to find other facilities out there?

>> thank you very much, senator. thank you for your comments and senator kaine, thank you for yours. let me say for the record i don't believe any of you, any senator, any member of the house are warmongers, i don't believe anyone prefers war, i understand how as senator kaine described as jeffrey goldberg in his excellent piece and iran hawk's case against new era and sanctions describing how one gets to military action and the concerns we have that tactical considerations may lead us to that police but that is an issue of tactics as you have pointed out, not an issue of intent and not a characterization of any individual. so i quite agree with that. in terms of new nuclear facilities we meant what the joint plan of action says.

there can be no nuclear facilities either declared or undeclared and if we find undeclared new nuclear facilities, then that is a cause of grave concern to all of us because it will be against the compliance required for the joint plan of action. i cannot today tell you what our response would be today but i imagine it would be quite, quite concerning and we would have to respond in a very forceful way. >> concerns that if we were to impose new sanctions, would they strike their own deal and leave us out? is that a possibility? is that a concern the administration has? >> more broadly, senator, where our allies and partners in the world are concerned, one of the reasons the sanctions regime has

been as effective as it has been, people have climbed on board with us particularly in unilateral sanctions, when they don't believe in unilateral sanctions and tell us at every opportunity, they have followed them because dealing with the american banking system was so crucial to the economy of any country in the world that they comply even though they don't like them. if we in fact don't give negotiations a chance they have less incentive to stay on board with the sanctions regime and we could unwittingly create a rupture in that sanctions enforcement and sanctions regime which is crucial to the kind of aggressive diplomacy senator cain -- senator kaine was outlining. >> unilateral sanctions rarely work. there are certain areas, central-bank sanctions,

financial sector where we can lead that but we always lead the risk of getting ahead of our allies or partners somewhere where they won't go and the sanctions regime will unravel. anybody who thinks unilateral sanctions work very well, i will give you cuba as exhibit a. it is not produce the desired outcome, and the stakes, thank you for your testimony. >> thank you very much. he articulated my point of view, by these negotiations. let me ask a specific question on the issue of enrichment capacity, it appears at the

outset there is a divergent point of view in terms of whether iran can retain enrichment capacity, in the successful negotiation process, not weapons grade level but any enrichment capacity. would you address that? >> sure, senator. no question it would be far preferable if iran did not have an indigenous enrichment capability. they will always have the capability as i said earlier they can't unlearn what they know but in terms of actually having a program, it would be preferable if they got any fuel they needed from outside sources, bought it on the open market, at international cooperation, these would always be preferable routes to go. it may be that the end of a comprehensive agreement we have allowed for consideration of a

very small, limited enrichment program to meet practical needs that would be highly monitored, the verified with intrusive inspections over a long duration of time. potentially as part of a comprehensive agreement but what is critical in a joint plan of action is nothing is agreed to into everything is agreed to. no prospect that iran could have a small limited and highly limited program without agreeing to all the verification monitoring and all of the other aspects that will be necessary for comprehensive agreement including addressing the u.n. security council resolution. >> going back to ronald reagan's trust but verify the verification process involves e ieae inspectors currently on the ground. he testified that reports coming

that are encouraging in terms of their access. can you elaborate under that a big? there are those whose a there are things going on for a will never be able to see and will never be told about. those things could be the most dangerous and threatening. >> there will be no way, even with military action, to make sure we know everything there might be to know. that is true in any country. national technical means and other wastes we work to know as much as we can now lend the verification and monitoring we put in place with the joint plan of action increases our ability to know whether there are covered activities going on that we may not have been aware of. not only because we have greater access to daily to iraq at least

monthly. there are plans for iraq, access to uranium mines, access to the centrifuge production all of which provide clues as to whether something is going on somewhere else when we can look at the guts of these facilities. so i think we have greatly increased our ability to know if there is something that is covered, that is going on but i am not going -- this committee or the world to know that there is any way everett that any country can give you 100% guarantee that we know everything. >> mr. chairman, my colleague from illinois, senator correct, has been part of the effort of enhanced sanctions along with senator menendez. i want to join the chorus you have joined in. i don't question for a moment the motives of anyone engaged in this. we all have the same goal, stop

in nuclear iran. keep israel safe. stabilize and bring peace to the middle east. these are goals we all share and the approach may be different. i have not signed onto this bill. my feeling is if these negotiations fail there are two grim alternatives. nuclear iraq or a war or perhaps both and i want to be able to say we have exhausted every reasonable opportunity to negotiate an alternative short of those two outcomes. those of us in this committee may have a better appreciation for public sentiment in america on this subject. wasn't that long ago that senator menendez discussed the request for military authority when we believed and subsequently learned to be true that there were massive stores of chemical weapons in syria. i recall that debate and the

public reaction to the suggestion that the president would even have the authority to use any military action. the public sentiments was overwhelmingly negative. the vote on this committee was 10-7. it was never brought to the floor for obvious reasons and i will back up senator kaine's comments earlier. if we believe we are going to reach some awful alternatives in the future and want the american people to stand by us or even listen to us we have to convince them the we have exhausted every available, reasonable opportunity to avoid conflict and avoid war. that is why many of us believe we should give these negotiations and opportunity even with the president's admonition that it is a long shot, at least a 5050 shot of success. >> i thank the senator for his

remarks. it is an example of giving the president authorization that gave him the power to go to russia and negotiate an agreement to end chemical weapons for which he had devised a red line and from a position of strength, that maybe wouldn't have happened and so i think it is important to recognize that moment in history and what it teaches. >> good to hear your testimony. the administration consider itself bound to the comprehensive iran sanctions of 2010-2012? >> if you are talking about legislation passed by the president, of course. >> in those sanctions, they allow for termination of sanctions. once iran has verifiably dismantled its military, nuclear, biological, chemical, ballistic missile and ballistic missile launch technologies as

well as no longer be in a state sponsor of terrorism. i would consider the administration bound also but realize the are parameters even though you are asking for to waive these acts, the waiver is 120 days and you can keep asking, i would expect and hope this would not be the conclusion you keep asking to waive the sanctions and do whatever you want, i am all for negotiation but working on negotiation and the parameters of legislation that has been passed. my concern is, this is a concern for the way these legislations are written and has been written for many things. we caught out exceptions and waiver for the presidency. thinking that is the only reasonable thing to do but these waivers become so large that you contrived a truck through the man they end up having no teeth and we lose all teeth in any legislation. we are not going to give them

aid unless they are democracy, they are not very close to a democracy but the administration stamps them as a democracy and this happened before the two when it is not much of a democracy and not much of a democracy now. and we passed legislation expanding that waiver to make it no teeth at all. and continuing military aid after the coup. this is the big question and it should be a big legislative question when we consider how we white legislation and grant waivers. i believe, i fully believe no matter what the testimony is that the administration has shown a propensity to do what they want and we may well go through labor after waiver after waiver. in the end we may get a negotiated settlement that does not comply with sanctions that

have been written so it went sanctions we need to be concerned about how wide and expansively make these waivers and that is the point i would like to make. i like the comment that you feel bound by legislation and i hope that will continue to be true. >> thank you for being here. undersecretary cohen, you said iran is not open for business. the majority of the sanctions remain in place. yet we have seen people have alluded to here. a good deal of interest on the part of our european partners. and opening trade delegations, and sent a letter to catch the ashton, the u.n. representative and ambassadors of all those countries that expressed an

interest in trade delegations. and the kind of message that sents to iran about where the international community is reluctant to the missing of sanctions. with you could speak to whether these trade delegations risk undermining our international sanctions regime, and the appetite in europe continuing to enforce the sanctions that we have in place? >> i have seen your letter, quite appreciate your letter and agree with your letter, encouraging our counterparts in europe. and elsewhere to show restraint, to recognize sanctions remain in place that are so comprehensive, doing real business with iran

today, not worth the effort to go to iran to explore business deals now. we see some of these trade delegations are going. we are exploring the possibility of deals is a long-term agreement is reached and there is substantial sanctions that come as part of that. we have been very clear with our partners, our preference is businesses, trade delegations, show restraint right now, that in all events, no deals are struck now, that violated the sanctions and if any of that occurs we will respond vigorously in enforcing our

sanctions. >> can you also speak to what kind of message it sends to iran? these trade delegations? and whether that lessens the interest in continuing to negotiate at the bargaining table? >> i am wary of trying to get inside the psyche of the iranians. there has been a mixed message that gets to the iranians on this. on the one hand it shows an interest in the world and doing business and for sure the iranians are trying to elicit that interest. on the other hand to the extent these trade delegations convey the message that they are interested in business in the future, that not today but if there is a comprehensive deal, the remarks of the ceo, a italian energy company, before

he met with the president is for sanctions to be applied now and we are not doing business in iran now, we are looking potentially at the future when there is a comprehensive comprehensive deal. that can create within iran but dynamic where the iranian business community which is desperate to be engage with the world, they have been cut off from the world. senator murphy made a point that a lot of interest in europe and elsewhere doing business with iran is the iranian economy is performing below its capacity because of sanctions for the pent-up demand. >> excuse me again for interrupting. i want to get a final question about russia, the suggestion, and oil for good deal with iran and what we are trying to

discourage that and to discourage other potential countries who might be looking at the same deal. >> we are across the administration working extraordinarily hard to ensure that there is no such deal that occurs. >> if i may, on the russia for oil, oil for bartered goods deal that was in the newspapers, at all levels of our government including at the highest level have raised our concerns quite directly with russia about this, and john kerry has raised this as have i quite directly with iran. my own sense of this is after of fair amount of clarity about this matter, nothing will move forward at this time. we are very crystal clear that anything like such an agreement

between russia and iran might have sanctionable actions and would likely create tremendous risks within the p 5 plus 1 which would make coming to comprehensive agreement more difficult if not impossible so we have been very clear. my own sense is that is not moving forward at this time and i think if that is indeed the case we can continue to verify that is a very good decision. >> senator murphy. >> thank you very much. i understand during the six months period that began jan. 20th, the ieae plans to issue reports every month, and inspectors reported on their activities much more frequently, sometimes as often as daily.

is it possible to request the ieae to provide public updates on all activities within iran at least on a weekly basis which would give everyone a lot more confidence that there is no deception taking place on the part of the iranian government? >> we will discuss your request with the ieae. this is a different circumstance than iraq in terms of the extent of the program and particulars of this situation. the ieae will have daily access and other surveillance means that are available to them as well as at least monthly access to iraq and access to uranium mines and the centrifuge production plants. so i think they will have great increase the visibility beyond anything we had to date but we will certainly convey that.

>> it would be important for confidence-building in the united states and around the world. it would be much more frequent than ieae announced it intends on making public. we have a right to know that and the ieae works for us and the world on this and we should have that information on an ongoing basis. it would be helpful. if the ieae determines compliance concerns will you ensure such concerns are reported promptly to the american people and congress? >> we will take our responsibilities seriously. >> you will report. >> the monthly report, to classified briefings. >> it is important that we get much more frequent -- the

interim deal allows iran to produce centrifuges for replacing broken ones. will the broken centrifuges be removed from the facilities and provided to ieae inspectors to confirm they are no longer functioning? >> i don't know the exact mechanism. our experts will give you a briefing on what the ieae will do but since one of the details of the agreement is they can only replace damaged centrifuges with centrifuges of the same kind we have asked the ieae to verify that has occurred. >> it is important the rates used in 1:1 so the combination of old centrifuges to ensure they don't go to a garage and get fixed immediately and being installed which is very important for us to know that. the interim deal indicated that in a final agreement iran's the

original program would be restricted to mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs. judging what iran's practical needs are is in the eye of the be holder. ..