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"after words" with guest hosts dana priest intelligence reporter for the "washington post." this week week john rizzo in this book "company man" thirty years of controversy and crisis in the cia. the man who represented the cia and the iran-contra scandal and participated in approving the rules for waterboarding presents an inside look at the agency's evolution from an organization in the shadows to unfrequently epicenter of what occult controversy. this program is about an hour. >> host: john it's good to be here with you. >> guest: it's nice to see you again dana. >> host: i wanted to start in the beginning which is probably the easiest way to go. can you just tell me why you decided to join the cia? >> guest: well it was 1975. i had been out of law school for three years.

i had a good job, a good entry-level job at the treasury department as a lawyer and the customs service. as i say it was a good job but you know i found the atmosphere, the bureaucracy at the treasury stultifying. in retrospect i was young and ambitious and i was just restless. at the same time, the church committee hearings were being televised and as you know these were first of all a set of congressional hearings that exposed the cia activities, misadventures and follies from the 50s and 60's chaired by senator franken church from idaho. senator frank church. i was watching this and i knew

nothing about the cia and no one in the cia. in those days cia had no visibility at all that it just occurred to me as i'm watching all these tales of cia, adventures, that if the cia didn't have lawyers and i had no idea whether they did or not that occurred to me that they might need some now. so i just applied as a shot in the dark. >> host: or they might need some new ones because there was some wrongdoing. >> guest: yeah and that's a phenomenon. i found this a pattern repeated throughout my career. when the cia would get itself in some sort of a pickle or flap the cry would go out and they would say the cia needs more lawyers so i was actually, didn't know at the time that i was hired in that first wave of new lawyers. >> host: so, believe it or not people still are confused about why the cia is different than any other agency of the u.s.

government, so just if you could summarize why do we need as cia and whose control is the cia under? >> of course the cia is a secret intelligence organization and has been in existence since 1947. its very presence was shrouded in the third mystery for its first 20 or 25 years. and of course it acquires a mystique over the years, james bond novels and movies and all that but in essence it is unique among federal departments and that it operates almost totally in secret and two it is really an instrument of the president

and that has always been the case. the president has always been the master and i mention in the book that presidents and i served under seven in my time, they can direct it to do things in secret. they don't have to worry about the normal congressional appropriations process and it's a convenient and attractive and sometimes overly seductive tool in the presidents foreign-policy arsenal so it has always been and i think it will continue to be. there are times over the years after certain scandals or debacles that the cry goes out that the cia is going to be abolished. it will never happen because any person regardless of party or political persuasion once the cia at its disposal. >> host: it can do things that other agencies are not allowed

to do. it can break the law in countries overseas in order to do what it needs to do. >> guest: yeah. in the cia we can't break u.s. laws but espionage spy stuff when you get right down to it is international law and of course all nations have their intelligence services and are keenly aware of that so everybody does it and it's implicitly understood. so yeah the cia can do things that a normal federal agency couldn't do and the key is not to get caught or screw something up. >> host: right. what i found surprising about your book was your role and how much responsibility you were given and how many times people really depended on you to do something to make a decision that they couldn't make or that

they didn't want to make. i want to go back to the cold war actually and you tell a story about you sanko. if you could put the story into context and describe it a little bit in your visit with him and what your mission was and how that went. >> guest: to truncate this, uri just think of -- you sanko was it kgb and he defected to the cia in moscow i believe in february of 1964 which of course was only four months after the kennedy assassination. during the cold war of course the cia and the kgb were considered gold. the cia has long had a defector program to try to attract them and it's huge and sometimes vexing but huge contact.

here was this guy get sanko. he was sent. >> host: recruited. >> guest: . dari: and like a lot of them he had baggage and he was a heavy drinker possibly an embezzler of kgb funds so he was no st. but he came and he fell into their lap. he among other things had access to the kgb file and of course at the time it was huge. and basically what he said was that the kgb never had any connection with oslo. >> host: which was not exactly what they were hoping to hear.

>> guest: yeah. keep in mind dana it was 1964. i was in high school then. yeah i think there were some obviously different schools of thought but the cia took him at his word and others, like a legendary cia who was head of counterintelligence at the time was convinced that mr. yatsenko was a devilish ploy by the soviet union that he was dispatched to the agency into and to the u.s. to basically draw attention away from what was convinced they kgb connection with oslo. he was all powerful at the time he decided no yatsenko wouldn't be disbelief but he had to be broken so yatsenko was transported to the states basically in prison.

>> host: in the u.s.. >> guest: yeah in the u.s. in prison for three years was kept in a small room endured endless interrogations and deprivations and while some of his stories and his back story fell apart, he never buried his claims about oslo. finally after three years of this the cia richard towns decided enough was enough and basically let yatsenko go and when i say let him go in the custody of cia to resettle and try to put together in and the semblance of a normal life. self fast-forward from 67 to 1978 which is where i found him. i had been in the agency less

than three years so i was still trying to figure out what was going on and i was dispatched by my bosses to go see yatsenko who of course had an entirely new name and identity, had a new wife. not only have they shed their countries but their families when they came here and got married. defect in divorces a whole nother story. anyway so i was dispatched to go down and see him in this sleepy little southern town and i say in the book it's something out of mayberry where he had not a huge mansion but a nice bungalow near the water and you'd like to fish. he was filing some papers, i think it was state papers with the local probate judge and was using his new identity so the

stuff in his biography was simply false. i was sent to go to the judge in the chambers and at least give the judge some sense of who this guy really was and why he couldn't use his true name. so was the kind of job you would give the kid lawyer. >> host: whatever you do don't talk to him about his intention. >> guest: that i had that reverberating in my head when i went there. don't talk about it because the agency was still worried he might sue them or something. so okay i got that. my orders were to go and fly into this little southern airport and get my motel on the edge of town, spend the night and quietly see the judge in maybe meet with yatsenko on the way out. as soon as i got to the airport and got off of my little computer -- commuter plane there was

yatsenko who was a physically imposing guy. i describe them in the book. he had a mug like ernest borgnine and he had this russian gruff drawl this sounded like the old actor. he was hoping. he is there which was a surprise to me and he's not only their buddies as the hotel can wait. you are going to -- it was more like a command. you are coming to my house for dinner. so i said what am i going to do? i get in it a buick gas car and drives a million miles an hour in this country roads. i get to his house and no sooner do i get there then he breaks out these homemade fat of ahca. i proceed to get as drunk as i have ever been before or since. >> host: you say more than

three decades later i can still taste the stuff. in those days i enjoyed an occasional mug of martini but this is like like something i'd never consume like something i've never consumnivore sense. after one shot my hands were tingling and after the third i couldn't feel my face. meanwhile yatsenko kept belting them down and started talking more intimately. he then really wants to talk to about you about the thing you're not supposed to talk to him about his distention. >> guest: he starts offering this so at this point i have argued violated my orders. first of all this guy drives me to his house and starts pouring this vodka and then starts with no warning starts going on about his detention. none of which i was supposed to hear but i was trapped and i was getting increasingly inebriated

and not by choice by the way. he kept pouring them and he kept downing them so i figured i have to go with it. it was fascinating especially given what happened to me 25 years later. he started talking about what it was like to be incommunicado, to be subject to brutal deprivations. all of which, as bottom line was he understood. he said i know that the cia thinks i'm going to sue them. i'm not going to sue them because i understood we are professionals in the intelligence business. this is what you do with someone with me -- like me who comes over. just tell them i'm not going to sue them. i don't have hard feelings with anybody including anglican but

his kicker was go back and tell them that i won't ever forget what they did. so that was the yuri yatsenko story. >> host: which introduce you to the whole spy world and the characters that were so different than the other agencies that you worked for. let ask you about the iran-contra because that was another incident. this was the scandal that became a scandal in which ollie north was running his own shop with the help of some cia folks and exchanging arms from iran. >> guest: selling them. >> host: selling them to the contras in central america and you had a particularly important role all of a sudden in the hearings taking place on capitol hill in which the legislature was trying to figure out what happened here and how did this happen.

>> guest: this was 1987 so we are now 10 years, it's 10 years since yatsenko. i had acquired quite a bit of experience so i was put in charge of dealing with the iran-contra committee which as you recall at the time was this huge washington scandal, televised hearings, gavel-to-gavel and i was the guy the agency had to be the focal point to do with them in terms of documents provided to them, to deal with the questions they had or witnesses from cia that wanted to have testified. that basically consumed all of 1987 for me. >> host: at one point you are sitting in your office next to the telephone while the hearing is on and as members want to ask

a question they need to figure out whether they are going to divulge by mistake classified information so their aides are running behind the scenes picking up the phone and calling you right there as it's all being televised and you had to make a very quick decision. >> it was kind of realities tv. i decided at the outset that rather being behind the scenes i could be more productive and it would be more important to stay back at cia headquarters to sit back my office and closed the door and watch the live or seedings. it was at that point that i would look at the television and the hearings went on for 40 days. i could literally look at the television and see a member about to ask a question, it turned to his aid in the back

and slip them a piece of paper or something and the aid would go scurrying off the screen and i knew distinctively what would happen in 30 seconds. i put my hand on the phone because i knew d.a. would call me and say we are on live tv. my guy wants to be able to talk about the cia activity or wants to use the real name of a cia officer. >> host: you had to declassify or keep ossified information on the spur of the moment. >> guest: literally over the phone. a lot of the questions i was being asked but way beyond my pay grade. there was no time to talk to anyone about it so i was literally on this high-wire. as they say it happened constantly. >> host: talk for a minute about the prt 250. >> guest: the prt 250 sounds exotic doesn't it? in 1987 it was a fairly

sophisticated telephone communication. >> host: security mitigation. >> guest: between cia headquarters the command center at the cia and cia stations around the world. >> host: it would be something we could all understand why you would want to keep it secure and probably secret in order to keep it secret? >> guest: it was certainly secret. a number of them used it so it was fairly well-known inside the cia but never had been acknowledged as existing outside of cia and not even at the white house. as a matter fact this little tempest arose because the witness at the time before the committee was john poindexter the national security adviser to president reagan when the iran-contra broke. it was clear he didn't know this machine existed.

so what happened, we had told the committees about it and had given the transcripts relative information. the question was actually between william mukasey and john poindexter and late 1986 as the iran contra was unraveling. casey was that one of our overseas stations and poindexter was at the white house so during his testimony poindexter was suddenly confronted by a believe arthur weinman achieved senate investigator for the committee and was basically reading him the transcript and poindexter was taken aback. he said i had no idea where that came from and i had no idea was being recorded and of course this set off a tempest at the hearing and in the media at the time because it was thought that

william casey had a reputation of being widely and devious and maybe he constructed this nixonian tape system that no one knew about. i mean it was huge. >> host: you are being asked to tell the staff or if it was okay that the member could continue. asking questions and this is what you write because i think this kind of oils down sort of a lot of things you are asked to do at the time. you said holding the phone, i would take a breath close my eyes and make a judgment call. heads i would agree to the disclosure of some sensitive secret and tales i risk have an agency obstructing congressional investigation in the public's right to know. for the first time in my career i was alone on a high-wire without a net. this seems to be a pattern. >> guest: yeah. the prc 250 as i mentioned the

book to me that was when i was tempting fate. long story short the committee staff declassified so that they get publicly explained that know this is what the system was four. the committee was fine with it. >> host: and the republic did not fall apart once you did. >> guest: it did not and i said go ahead. two minutes later there's lineman reading a text that he brought by me for approval on television. the hearings ended shortly thereafter and i got a phonecall from the cia director. it was bob gates. he was acting director so i'm trudging down the hall from my office and i said this is it. the system has been in place for years and you know i just told

the world about it. it turns out gates had nothing to do with this. and so offhandedly i said by the way did anything happen at the hearings today and i hesitated and said as quietly as possible nothing much except that i declassified the prt 250 system and he shrugged. so i dodged a bullet there. >> host: that sort of secrecy and what happens when things are revealed is a theme i have heard you talk about before. in your book you say one thing you learned its secrets don't stay secrets very long. so i guess that's a good segue into talking about 9/11 and the things that happened after 9/11 that were supposed to be secret and some of them still are but a whole bunch of them are not. i wanted to talk to you about 9/11 and if you could tell me

briefly, you know you were in the building and you couldn't get away from the building. there was a crowd of people trying to flee so what you did was you started thinking like a lawyer. what are we going to need after that and you took your legal pad and started writing what? >> guest: yeah this was literally the morning of 9/11 probably an hour or two or certainly right after the pentagon had been hit after the towers were hit. and as you say they had a building wide evacuations. the cia headquarters, huge park and not and people are streaming out. i looked out of my window on the seventh floor with the view of the sky by the way with the big windows and i said i can get out of here.

so i figured the hell with it. i just close my door and started to try to think and basically let my imagination run wild on that unimaginable day. anything we have been doing in the terrorist field up to that point i knew was obsolete and woefully inadequate so i started literally sketching out the kinds of things that the president directed us to do that we could do and that included detaining high-level tataris and lethal operations against terrorists, financial or two east to get at the al qaeda machine and things that we had thought about at the cia in the days before but they were so risky and so aggressive that no person we knew would ever authorize it. this time i knew that we were going to be asked to do things we had never done before.

>> host: it turns out you were very much on the mark. the cia was the lead agency way before the defense department and going into afghanistan and tried to pick up individual high-value targets leaders of al qaeda and a certain point one of the biggest abu zubaydah who was for logistics head of al qaeda and help plan 9/11 within a couple of weeks i believe you said maybe two weeks the interrogators mainly from the fbi don't feel like they are getting anywhere and they are asking for permission to do a whole host of things that we have come to know as enhanced interrogation. >> guest: yeah. actually at the time in the interim between 9/11 and late march when zubaydah was captured we had constructed our first book came to be known as --

because we knew we were hopefully going to grab some high-level al qaeda guys guys in there wouldn't be anyplace to put them so we constructed a secret prisons overseas. >> guest: . >> host: tell us where? >> guest: now strike that. that is one of the few remaining secrets of the interrogation program which is the precise location so i can't. anyway, so the first, he was first interrogated. they flew doctors from johns hopkins to patch them up and he got patched up but he wasn't talking. the interrogation at that point i didn't precisely know this at the time but it was cia and fbi interrogators. i learned much later that the fbi interrogators thought they were making progress with

zubaydah and archives were convinced he was holding back for basically being brazen about it. he knew what we wanted to hear about the next attack buddy wasn't going to tell us so that was how our people and not the fbi really that did the stonewalling and some new departure was needed in the interrogation. >> host: that is when they come to you and they say this is what we have then you say tell me exactly what it is you want to do and don't spare me any details because you are going to have to make a decision at that point whether it's legal. so they describe quickly a tension grasp, walling, facial hold, insults lap, cramped confinement which is a big box that you can stand in or a small box box for fewer hours that you can't stand in, stress positions, walls standing meant to strain your muscles, sleep

deprivation and probably the most controversial waterboarding what i found interesting here was your description of how you felt after they explain this to you which in the book you say that lefty largely speechless. some of the things they describe sounded like something out of the three stooges, slapstick routine. other sounded and terrifying. things that you had never thought about before or were unthinkable before that and certainly potentially would transgress the antitorture statutes and then there's the scene in which you go outside the agency walking on the grounds, smoking a cigar trying to take this all in knowing that you are going to be responsible for making that decision not only whether it's legal but if you were to decide otherwise

that you would be the person whose shoulders this would rest. so what were you waiting at the time? >> guest: well, it's very hard and probably didn't succeed entirely in trying to describe what it was like back then and what i felt like back then being gob smacked with all these proposals and techniques that i had no idea what it was before i was briefed by her counterterrorism people. but this was just a few months after 9/11 and time was of the essence. the thought and fear and dread that were in the country was it wasn't a question is if there would be an attack on the homeland the question of when. as you know in my career i've

never had to deal with the u.s. anti-torture statute so i had no idea what the legal line was that some of these techniques like waterboarding and another one that i wasn't was able to describe in the book which was never implemented but if anything was more terrifying than reporting i had to process all of this and it didn't have a lot of time. right then and there this program germinated out of the cia. he didn't come for the white house. it was inside the building and its building and it had left the building and was just ideas at that time. i knew these people had some credibility and influence and i know i could've right then and there stopped it before it started at lease the more aggressive techniques, forget it

they are just real risky. i have been with the agency long enough at that point to know what would get the agency in trouble and i knew sooner or later these would get the agency in trouble. i could have stopped them but then as i was walking around the building i thought to myself our experts are saying we have zubaydah in custody and if anyone knows about intact gets him and he's basically making no bones about it that he knew what we wanted to know and we could not make him talk. so i was playing out this scenario in my head and i could have stopped it right there. i could've stopped it, an idea that our career analysts and operators albeit unprecedented but were the only way to get that information out of him and i would stop them and play out

the scenario further, it was the second massive attack on the homeland of bodies lying everywhere and in the aftermath i would have known myself i would have known that because of me, we didn't take the measures that are professionals thought were essential and this is what happened as a result. keep in mind. technically we had been accused right after 9/11 by everybody really of being too risk-averse before 9/11 and we were too timid and here was me the lawyer who had basically been risk of forest. >> host: and in a way responsible for the next attack and that is what you're thinking. >> guest: at least partly responsible. it would have been me and i would have known that and i'm sure the investigation would have uncovered that. in the final analysis i couldn't

countenance the thought of having to live with that kind of scenario. >> host: had you looked up waterboarding you would have found that the u.s. did hang some japanese soldiers that used it in world war ii because we consider that waterboarding and the spanish inquisition used it and considered its torture back then. there is actually a history of waterboarding used overseas although we use it apparently in the philippines and some of those people got court-martialed did you have a legal staff that asked you to look at the history of waterboarding? >> guest: yeah we did and we also did as much research as we could hurriedly. i remember them coming back and saying look the waterboarding

with the history described i remember the khmer rouge was doing it and i mean that was one of the reasons why i decided that i wasn't going to make this call. it was just too close and giving the precedence i was just not going to, certainly not going to approve it at that point so that is what let us go immediately to the department of justice department of justice to give a definitive legal review of the entire program but especially waterboarding in the way that people propose to carry it out. >> host: that's going to the legal counsel which is the white house legal team and they end up approving it in memos to you and others. looking back now, --

let me just ask one other question. if you thought that there was a history in which people honors the history in which this was considered torture i could also see how you might be worried that your people, even if the white house said okay that your people might be vulnerable at some point went again the pendulum swings and people are starting to rethink. was that also a calculation in your mind? >> guest: yeah, yeah i mean we as an agency during my time ,-com,-com ma i mean there was precedence for very important significant new legal questions for us to go to the office of legal counsel and the justice department to be the legal arbiter in the executive branch. we had done that before and this

at course the interrogation program made everything else pale by comparison. i thought certainly the precedence had been such that i wanted something definitive and actually very detailed especially if they were going to approve this technique. to basically give the agency might believe was maximum legal protection and especially mindful not of people at my level on the seventh floor executive but those that would carry out the program with these prisons in the middle of nowhere. i thought that might be an experience that taught me the ofc opinions were binding and they were as good as gold and they were basically make her people secure.

>> host: we have talked about waterboarding a lot but actually it's sleep deprivation that seems to be, in your book you say that is one of the methods that some of your interrogators believed broke one of the detainees and you also say that is what colin powell who was the secretary of state at the time was most concerned about and that rumsfeld used to walk out of the room and he didn't even want to hear about any of this. those must have rung alarm bells for you in a way. >> guest: what are you referring to is the national security council principles meetings that were held regularly actually during the course of the interrogation. with was the cia doing this on its own or all the policies were were -- policyholders were reefed on how they were being implemented. i would go to some of these meetings with the cia director

at the table so i would reserve reactions. it was fascinating. >> host: did it make you nervous sometimes? >> guest: yeah a certain sense of foreboding. i say in the book that waterboarwaterboar ding was laid out in detail and how we were using it at the time. i don't remember a lot of debate for concern or objections to waterboarding but i was struck by cowan powells general body language and first of all he gave off every possible via the not wanting to be in that room. but he did speak up. i was struck by the fact that and given his distinguished military background he would know this, he seemed to view sleep deprivation is the most brutal of all techniques which i thought was fascinating.

first of all he would try to avoid these meetings and the ones he couldn't avoid these were principles meetings so he tried but he couldn't delegate it. he just simply didn't want to know about it. i don't think he had any moral judgments but he was a savvy politician and didn't want to be touched with it especially after abu ghraib. >> host: which again leads you in the middle of that even though you are asking higher authorities for approval. you are still there representing the agency. you have been out now for -- >> guest: for years. >> host: for years and you've heard the debate on whether this constitutes torture and understanding your role as a lawyer to represent your client to protect them, i definitely get the impression by the way you talk about it that you actually and this is my question

in the intervening years that you consider this torture that it is not something less especially in combination. i'm wondering, you know there are a lot of, if your people were protected which they are, i mean nobody is going go back and say the people we have said this is okay to use these techniques we are going to go and cause them trouble now. but, is there a reason that you think it's necessary to speak in the most honest way about these now and do you think that these techniques did amount to torture? >> guest: no, i don't. again maybe it's because i'm a lawyer but torture as defined in the u.s. statute i mean you know they were brutal. they were harsh. some of them were scary but i

personally don't think they crossed the line into torture. i think some of them were close. certainly once i got the opinions from the department of justice and there were a number over the years addressing the program that the techniques did not cross the legal line into torture. and i still don't believe that. but you know one of the things i tried to do in the book was certainly not be a cheerleader for this because it did get a lot of those in the agency in the kind of trouble that i didn't anticipate in the beginning. and i wasn't alone in this. no one was deeply involved in this program and it went on for six years. we were enthusiastic boosters of

it. if we thought that the program was not working and wasn't yielding results of sums critics have charged, we wouldn't have done it. we would not have continued it and i certainly wouldn't have continued it. it was politically growing toxic lead a month. so i don't think it was torture and i also think it yielded benefits. listening to feedback from the cia i was convinced because they were convinced that it was providing worthwhile hugely important intelligence. >> host: so there is certainly a body of work that suggests that many people throughout the world believe that this amounts to torture and it has damaged our standing in the world in some important way and these

aren't just what some people might call human rights liberals but they are also people like thomas pickering who was involved in a study on this who said we need to address the world on this. do you see any value to that even though you might not think it's torture and breaking the law but it was something that so many other people do believe is and maybe in the end it's a question of judgment? should we somehow address this chapter in our history? >> guest: absolutely. all of those, not just ambassador pickering, there were a lot of eminent scholars and politicians and experts around the world certainly and also here in the u.s. that believe that, considering it a moral

stain. i certainly don't reject that convention and yeah let's have it all erred out. >> host: one of the ways that could happen is that the senate intelligence committee which has a very large voluminous report on this bed is still all classified, do you think that should be released in order to air this in its entirety? >> guest: yeah i do. obviously i have no idea --. >> host: you probably have some idea because you know what went on. >> guest: from what i would read in the media about what it contains i gather it's going to largely conclude that the program was worthless, largely

worthless and the information derived from it, the stuff that was valuable could have been acquired without resorting to that so that's clearly the storyline. as you say apparently 6000 pages a couple things about it though, first of all i think $6 million over four years. for whatever reason they never interviewed anyone at the cia about the torture. i don't know about others at the cia but i would have been happy to be interviewed for it. i don't see how one can do a comprehensive review of something like that just based on reviewing a written record. secondly it's not a bipartisan report. it's done strict divide

democratic member so i think you have to take that into account. >> host: you can see the senate declassified at all. >> guest: the final thing i am told the cia has drafted a rather lengthy and strong rebuttal to many of the premises conclusion so to answer your questions sure i think the american taxpayers footed the bill for this. they didn't really make the appropriate writ action but at the same time release the cia rebuttal so people who were so inclined could read the whole thing but sure i think as you know dana if it's not released i'm telling you it's going to get leaked so let's release it. >> host: one of the reasons that i can see it not being released is someone in the government who has the power to say so could say it will damage

our relationships overseas because the secret prisons for one thing relied on relationships with other countries who house these prisons and promises that this would remain secret however as you know the european council or the council of europe, other governments overseas have been investigating this. there are several countries whose names are repeated about the fact that they have did have these. you have been inside and watched these revelations about other countries come out and isn't it true that over time these relationships usually repair themselves pretty quickly because those countries don't have a national interest? >> guest: yeah i think that's right. we can see it now in the context of the snowden leaks and revelations and foreign

governments up in arms. my experience was that whatever tensions or whatever breaks in relations they get repaired over time. intelligence services need each other. also keep in mind that some of these protests and in my experience the programs have been leaked. foreign government and foreign leaders get behind the scenes. the intelligence services are reaching out to the cia basically saying look we have to say these things publicly. it's a huge political issue but we are going to keep working together. basically don't take this too hard. it's just something we have to do. >> host: why do they do that lacks. >> guest: well i think they know they have to work with the cia or the u.s. intelligence community.