listen but really didn't come to put his head together with us and help solve the problem. >> i have found, congressman, that since the prime minister's trip, your meeting with him, other meetings he had here on the hill, he spent about two hours with president obama in the oval office. he got a very direct message on a number of issues, and we have seen some fair hi significant changes -- fairly significant changes from that visit. so i want to thank you for the meeting you had with him. i think you made an influence on some of the issues which i know we'll discuss can, camp liberty we've seen some changes, and particularly in the need for a holistic strategy to defeat isil and enlisting the sunnis into the fight at the local level. we have seen some fairly dramatic and significant changes from that visit. ..

>> on the issue of the t-wall at camp liberty, why have there been only 235 out of 17,500 t-wall's put up? why we only seen and addition of 43 cents our november subcommittee hearing? can you please commit that you will put extra effort into saving lives there? and then thirdly, as far as al-qaeda's research and come to launch part of this is due to the failure of in the iraqi government and iraqi leadership since you left the country.

their national elections planned in iraq in april, we were successful after the surge in getting the iraqi government to participate in more inclusive power-sharing government. that kind of mollified the sunnis of iraq and left al-qaeda marginalized. then after we left the iraqis took another step backwards. now was the sunnis were marginalized drawing many of them towards al-qaeda. what steps are we taken to ensure that the sunnis are participating in these elections and that iraq can return to that sort of power-sharing government we saw in the post-surge iraq? continuing with the shia-sunni issue we've seen over the last few days that the iraqi military has been bombarding fallujah which was taken over by al-qaeda late last year, presumably preparing the way for a ground assault. however, the shiite dominated maliki government cannot successfully take fallujah on its own without the help of the sunni tribal leaders in the

region. can you describe the current relationship between the maliki government and these tribal leaders? do you think maliki will be able to gain their support, given maliki's crackdown on sunnis in iraq for these past few years? thank you, sir. >> let me take the topics in order. on the jewish archives, as you know, this is a very sensitive topic. i have been working directly with the iraqi on this. we are engaged in sensitive negotiations with the iraqis. in the coming weeks the director of iraq's national library and archives will be coming to the united states and hope to report progress on this. we are engaged in negotiations but i will keep you informed of those talks. on camp liberty, specifically an issue of t-wall's, i begin made a number of trips to a bracketed time i go from maliki on doubt i raised the issue of t-wall's. we got t-wall's moving back into the camp earlier this month.

they stopped. i raised it again last thursday with the iraqi national security advisor to understand key walls are moving into the camp again. i visited the survivors and residents at camp liberty earlier this month. i told them i promise i will do everything i could but i urged them to do everything they could. batman showing up at these meetings where plans are made to move the t-walls into the game. this is an issue i'm going to stay on top of. on the issue of elections and sunni participation, as i said we are focused holding elections april 30. this will be the third full term election for a for your government. the first one in december 2005. then 2010 and then this year. as you may know, the head of the main sunni coalition was in the united states two weeks ago. he had meeting meetings with the president, vice president, met the secretary state at some. we're focused on making sure the elections happen. that they produce a general, credible result of the of a government to reform the

reflects the makeup of iraqi society that is all represent. in fallujah as i described, the plan is at the tribes out in front it but with the army and support. this -- isil is an army. they have .50 caliber sniper rifles to their very well trained and fortified. we have to of the sunnis tribal local people out of a but they will require security support. as he general austin was in iraq last week. we're advising the commanders as best we can build on the lessons we learn in these areas for tactical and strategic patience and for planning and to make sure that civilian casualties are minimized. >> i know how hard you have been working, and to paraphrase ambassador crocker, everything about iraq is hard all the time. so please keep making progress. thank you, sir. >> mr. sherman of california. >> thank you. it was bipartisan support for leaving a residual force in

iraq. i require a status of forces agreement with the maliki government. and the status of forces agreement would've had to have included in unity for our soldiers so that they would not be subject to iraqi courts. we asked our soldiers, marines, airmen, et cetera, to take many risks. one of them we don't ask them to take is the idea that their actions would be held up to judgment in a court in iraq, or a court in afghanistan for that matter. we didn't get a status of forces agreement. 13 is the administration blew the negotiations. -- one theory is. the other argument is valid government was in place when this administration got there. maliki didn't have to give immunity to our troops, and

chose not to. we've seen that these immunity agreements are difficult for a host country to provide. karzai is in providing them, and there are several elements of iranian history going back 70 or 80 years when the shah was held at the great ridicule for providing such immunity agreement. did we fail to get a status of forces agreement because we blew the negotiations, or given the political realities starting with maliki, was there simply no way to get them? >> first, you are keen on the history is really important here. a history of immunity agreements, particularly anderson region, is really what colors the entire debate. the negotiation in 2007 and 2008 took almost 1 18 months.

while they got those two agreements pass, the security agreement which allow our forces to stay within in the anti-permanent agreement and they barely pass but they passed on the last possible day and almost by the skin of the chief. i was working on that issue for almost 18 months. >> this is passing the iraqi parliament. parliament. >> yes. our legal requirements in 2011 were at another fall on a greenwood had to go through the iraqi parliament. it was the assessment of the iraqi political leaders and also of our leadership that it was unlikely to pass. and, therefore, the decision was made that our troops would leave at the end of 2011 but we still have a permanent strategic framework agreement. that agreement has passed the iraq department, ratified in 2008 and it provides as a strong basis for providing security assistance to the iraqis. it is not provide a basis for having boots on the ground and training present. we do trained iraqi special forces under our office of security operations in the embassy and we are in discussion

with regional partners for having speakers i want to move on to another question. has there been discussion, the u.s. air force our other, naval air forces, bombing these al-qaeda camps rather than us providing a huge amount of weaponry to maliki so you can try to do it himself? and has there been discussion of u.s. air force's preventinpreventin g overflights by the iranians to the iraqis, they can't control their own airspace? >> know there's not been discussion of a direct u.s. role in the joint iraqi airspace or targeting the camps. we are focused on increasing the iraqi capacity to target camps and they have proven effective in recent months. >> i would point out the only we were bombing al-qaeda camps before, the years before 9/1 nie 9/11 we may have had a very

different history. we see the residents of camp ashraf, 52 of them killed last september, december, another for killed. the secretary of state has appointed a special adviser on the mek recently. what is the status of protecting these folks while they are there and insisting that iraq meet its legal obligations to do so? and finding homes outside the region for some of the residents. >> at me make a couple of points. when i was here in november i explained that there is a self we believe trained by iran and it is dedicated to attacking the mek at camp liberty. we had cells trained by iran dedicated to attacking us when we had a military presence in the right. we did everything we could to route those out and it was difficult. we were never able to do so. the only place these people will be safe is outside of iraq.

that's what we are as focused as you said, jonathan winer has been appointed to work this issue full time, to find a safe secure relocation for the residents of camp liberty. wall while they're at camp liberty the governor -- the governor of iraq has an obligation to do everything they can to keep them safe. that is something we responsibly to make sure that they're getting as much protection as possible. you also mention some of the notable developments. and there's finally some real international attention to this urgent humanitarian crisis. first there is a resettlement fun. we have notified congress for $1 million to put into that resettlement fund. phone i was in iraq last week the iraqi can authorize $500,000 to be obligated -- allocated to that fund. so we are getting some progress and i look forward to working with you and the committee and the congress to try to move this forward in the coming weeks.

>> we go now to mr. kris smith of new jersey. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. secretary mcgurk, thank you for your service and thank you for being here today. just a few questions. dimension on january 1 and reminded us 70-one trucks entered fallujah and ramadi. was that a tactical surprise on the part of the isil? or did we have intelligence as suggested they were mustering and about to move, or did the iraqis have that intelligence? and if we did, what was done with that? secondly you talked about the suicide bombers in a turn of twisted logic has become the most precious resource. and ominously you point out that in november of 2012 there were three suicide bombers, bombings and that has gone up to 50. what is the scope on that? is that expanding? to we expected to be 100 by november of next year, or has

that -- if you speak to that issue. 30, you point out isis have set their sights on baghdad in the south did you quote on januar january 21, how seriously is that threat to baghdad lacks forthcoming if you could, you point out the isil electrocution of iraqi soldiers, that the maliki soldiers did not take the bait, the army, but is that something that is ongoing? on executing fully? are they holding prisoners in center city fallujah or the center part of it i said say, fallujah. and the when it comes to the issue of christians. the religious of freedom commission point out the iraqi government continues to tolerate systematic ongoing and religious

freedom violations and that is against a number of the smaller sects, many of them going back 2000 years, including -- what is happening? what kind of pressure we trying to put on that government to get them to mitigate and hopefully completely and their repression of christians in iraq? and file you talk about the low boil type of insurgency that this represents. aren't we looking at the possibility of another serious? >> thank you. let me try to address these issues first in terms of entry into fallujah and ramadi. we started to see as the iraqi start in some of the encampment kind of moving around the isil forces and trying to relocate. they are entrée en masse on new year's day was a surprise. again i think it was a tactical mistake on isil sport. this is going to turn overnight but there has been a response as

i described in my testimony in ramadi. the response develop fairly rapidly to expel the benefits. industries. they may not like the government. they may not even trust the army but they really don't like these foreign jihadi fighters. so we are trying to kind of gathered common cause against them. in terms of the suicide bombers from the average now is a 30-40 a week. i don't think this'll be an exponential rise. i'm hoping that kind of 50 might be a cap. we saw this problem in the past and what we did in 2006-2008 was a very concerted regionwide effort. how did these people what they one-way ticket in their find to damascus with the military age males, we are fairly effective action that training the flu. one thing that trained the flow was increasing security in western iraq. so will try to re-create that strategy throughout the region.

isil's strategy is at to attack the south. i would not be surprised if you on the same playbook from 2006 reviewer -- you may remember after the election 2005, late february that al-qaeda than a pack a mosque which really kind of lead to the sectarian violence which is all for the next two years. i think they're going to try to attack very high profile targets in the south, particularly religiously symbolic targets. i hope and i don't think they will be successful. i think the iraqis have those areas protected but as part of this tragic. entrance of fallujah, yes, we do believe iraqi soldiers are being held in fallujah. and as i said these extremists, fighters are trying to go to the army into direct urban confrontation. so far despite some writer kim i.c. about storming fallujah, that is not a strategy that is under way. but the government does have responsibly working for local people to secure fallujah and i think there will be fighting,

particularly in the outskirts and then later in the central city but will try to make sure it is as contained as possible. and unchristian, a very good question. we are very focused on the plight of christians in iraq and throughout the region. when primus to maliki was he acknowledged in his public remarks importance of taking care of the christian community. in october he met with patriotic, had of the church. when i'm in iraq i tried to meet with christian leaders -- leaders. tried to focus on some other land disputes their having to the iraqi cabinet recent past of a social talk about about a christian province to allow them some autonomy and security. again this is something we continue to develop it i would mean with iraqi christian leader tomorrow in my office so we are very focused on it but it's an extremely extreme difficult issue. christians are threatened by these extremists as our sunnis and everybody. sunni-shia, everybody. >> thank you.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here. you know, the ties between iraq and iran, seems to be getting closer. based on defense, have a defense treaty that is supposedly put together. i am concerned that maybe the safety of people at camp liberty, the iraqis are not making the effort that they really need to secure these people. if i'm making a contract or treaty with iran, why would i be so intent on the safety of these people? in december they keep firing rockets into this camp. so how sure are you that they're making the best possible efforts to bring security to this camp? >> congressman, the issue remains extremely difficult. there was a rocket attack

earlier this month and i which is reminded there was a rocket attack near camp liberty which used to house our casualties. we took casualties there in 2011. that's when we had 70,000 troops tried to stop that activity. it's very difficult to deter and to root out a well-trained team with rockets. that is why we're trying to move as much protection into the camp as possible. that's what i went to the camp myself to meet with residents and to try to assess the security and protection. everything the very difficult issue. the indicators like the iraqi government. the iraqi government doesn't like the mek. it's a very dynamic issue and all we've got to do is stay on the mak to do everything they can to cooperate to move the residents to safe and secure location, and stay on the government. every time i meet with leaders of the can imagine this issue. despite all the other issue their did with i mentioned it

every single time. and as i said i just received a report this morning they are -- t. walls are moving back into the camps. >> how concerned are you about the treaty between iraq and iran, the arms going into iraq? >> the iraqis have been pretty careful get off on in terms of security cooperation with iran and so far that kept that line fairly firm. i have seen reports like that but i would not take it too seriously. iraq has made clear they want a long-term institutional relationship with the trendy. they want the united states to be the backbone of their military. that's why they want platforms like an apache helicopter system. when we sell a country a helicopter we're not giving them an attack helicopter. we are buying a 30 year relationship in terms of training pilots, logistics, maintenance. that's why we feel it's important. the f-16 program is the same. we want iraq to have a long-term institutional relationship military to military with the

trendy. general austin's visit last week he knows the iraqi commanders. they have bled together in the streets in the fields of baghdad and the outskirts and all throughout iraq. they have a very deep, deep relationships. i was in those meetings, and you cannot get a deeper relationship and people who fought side-by-side. that is something we're going to continue to develop. malik is the prim prime minister know. mib after the coming election. you might not be. where we are focused on is building an institutional relationship with the a rocky government and institutions, military, parliament, something is going to last for many, many years. >> and the sale of russian arms to iraq, are you concerned about that at all, whatever it was? >> just. i don't want iraqis buying russian hardware. but i have to be honest with given this is security situation there's a lot of strategic competitors showing up a notch on the same doors were knocking on saying hey, we're here to

sell you an attack helicopter. just write a check. we have a system, a good system, they make sure that stuff arrives with a long-term institutional relationship as i discussed. but it is slow and commerce and. earlier i was in saudi arabia, bahrain and other countries and there's a lot of complaints about our foreign military sales system is too slow. we hear the same thing from iraqis but i want iraq to buy u.s. equipment because that buys a long-term strategic relationship. so yes, it's unfortunate that they bought bmi 35 from the russians but on the other hand, they kept telling us they would do it if we couldn't get them the apache's fast enough. >> there's no consideration to sell drones, right? >> well, we are selling them unmanned, unmanned uavs. not armstrongs but we are selling them -- know, armed drones is not a consideration. >> thank you. >> thank you.

will now turn to mr. rohrabacher for his questions. >> thank you very much, and we are all impressed with your knowledge level you were able to do this, from your memory. we are impressed by the. i am impressed by that, but that doesn't mean that i agree with your assessment. let me just say that the idea that we are talking about can't ashcroft seems that fundamentally you're suggesting -- can't ashcroft, stop the massacre, the ongoing massacre the people at camp liberty, that we basically have to go to the maliki government and ask them, and the problem is they're not providing enough security. the maliki government is responsible for these deaths.

i don't understand. the military, the iraqi military invaded camp ashraf and murdered people. these are the people under maliki's command did that. they recently went in, the 50 or so that was left at camp ashraf, tied their hands behind the back and shot them in the back of it. and it was maliki's own military, we know we did that. we know that camp ashraf and these people were attacked numerous times by the iraqi military. this isn't whether maliki and these people are not protecting the mek. this is a crime against humanity. these are unarmed refugees in which maliki's own troops are murdering. not talking about, you know, rockets where we don't know where they come from. we are talking about actual -- by the way, i was just they

probably know about those rockets as well. maliki, let's make it very clear, as far as i'm concerned as for as many here in washington are concerned, maliki is an account was to the murders that are going on. and as an accomplice we should not be treating him, begging him to have a residual force of u.s. troops in order to help his regime? i don't understand why the united states feels like, we feel compelled to be part of all of this. why do we feel compelled that we have to go in and be in the middle of a fight between people who are murdering each other, 30-40 suicide bombers a month? thousands of people are losing their lives to this insanity, which -- why should the united states, tell me, is my question,

why should the united states feel that we need to become part of this insanity? and does that not instead turn both of the parties against us? >> congressman, the suicide bomber phenomenon, it is complete insanity. i agree with you. when you look at iraq and look at the region and to define our interests, and i don't know with any leader and beg for anything that we protect and advance u.s. interests as we define them. in iraq, whether you like it or not, oil, al-qaeda, iran, by the use interests are at stake in iraq. so we need to do what we can't -- >> let me [talking over each other] spent let them kill each other. i'm sorry. if it means that we're going to spend our treasure and more of our blood, we've already spent thousands of lives of american soldiers. we've done enough. and i'm so happy that you now can report to us that you are negotiations to provide a

residual american military force in iraq was not successful. because i'm very happy we don't have a bunch of american troops in the middle of that mess. and we are not even capable of leading maliki know that we are holding him responsible for the murders in his own ranks, for the people, for the military that he commenced to go into camp ashraf and camp liberty and murdered unarmed refugees. this is a no win situation for us. both sides seem to be evil. both sides, or oversight. one last question. i've got 30 seconds. who is financing -- you talked about 100 trucks and all of this -- this equipment costs money. bullets even cost money. ak-47s cost money. rockets cost money. who is paying for all of that on the mayhem on both sides of this fight? >> congress and, i defer to my

intelligence colleagues for the specific than what we believe it's the whole source of funding by private funding comes from throughout the region, global john snow but which is now really based in -- >> is about the saudis? >> again i'd have to defer to my intelligence colleagues for that information. but a lot of it is private funding spend private funds. thank you very much. spin while you're on the subject, did you want to share any details in terms of the attack on camp ashraf? and in your judgment he believed was involved in that? since that was the question at hand. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the last time i was sure i discussed what we know. we believe it was the militia. we believe the militia was trained by iran. and that's with the primary responsibility. we have, since that very horrific attack, we worked to get the survivors out of camp ashraf, which is about 40 miles from the iranian border and onto camp liberty.

if liberty is not safe but it is safer. we have the u.n. in the camp everyday monitoring they can't. i didn' didn't when i go i try o to the camp and meet with the survivors and the residents there. so we are doing -- >> and you're making efforts right now to relocate survivors? >> absolutely, yes. >> we're going to go now to mr. gerry connolly from virginia. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and welcome, mr. mcgurk. couple of questions first. the authorization for use of military force, the administration has indicated would not oppose the repeal of that, is the issue the timing with respect to, say, pending elections in iraq? might it disrupt things you're doing in iraq if we were to do that now and? >> i don't think there's much focus on the anoraks i don't think it would make much of a

difference in terms from the iraqi perspective. >> that's good to know, okay. >> those elections have to be held april 30th, there should not be a delay. >> what a novel thought, allowing people to vote remotely.

-- billions and billions of dollars. we've reconstituted, we've trained, you know, law enforcement forces. we spent our military, blood and treasure, to gain a foothold, to gain fallujah, and, you know, al-qaeda's success as an organization manages to occupy it. and i understood your testimony correctly, we're now once genre lying on -- once again relying on tribal support to essentially dislodge the occupying forces in fallujah. how in the world -- isn't that an indictment of the investments we've made in the iraqi military in its inability to hold its own territory secure? >> the iraqi military would have the numbers and equipment to go

into fallujah tomorrow and clean out the streets. we believe that were they to do an assault like that, it would actually exacerbate the problem. >> i guess -- excuse me one second, mr. mcgurk, and i don't mean -- before you get there, how did it happen in the first place? how is it that the iraqi government was not able to secure something as symbolically important if not really important as fallujah? >> as i tried to explain in my testimony, there was a series of events throughout 2013 including a protest movement which kind of added to the political instability in the region, and in fallujah in particular, it is an area, as we know, any outsiders coming into fallujah are resisted, and that includes the iraqi army, it included us, and it includes we hope now, these al-qaeda extremists. now, all i can say is we are where we are right now, and we're helping the iraqis develop a plan. they're developing a plan, but one that will lead -- i say tribal fighters. what i really mean is the local

population who know the streets and who are able to actually identify the foreign elements and push them out. right now in fallujah it's a mix of al-qaeda, former insurgent groups and former baathist networks that are in control of the streets there. it has always been a very difficult place, and so it's just a very difficult territory to operate in. >> the tribal support we're relying on or cooperating with, what is their attitude toward the maliki government? i mean, because doesn't some of that support cooperation, isn't some of that a function of how they view the central government? >> yes. certainly, there's tremendous mistrust in the area of fallujah towards the central government, there's no question about that. >> and does that impede our ability to try to dislodge the occupation forces in fallujah? >> it does. it makes it, it makes it harder. as i said, some tribes are

actually working with the extremists, some are working to oust them, and many others are on the fence. and that's a why it's incumbent upon the central government through resources and through dialogue and communication to mobilize the population against them. and when we worked with the awakening, we did three things. we trusted them, we funded them, but also significantly we protected them. they thought they were going to win. the head of the awakening in the early days, we parked two m-1 tanks in front of his villa, and he was still killed by a suicide bomber. so this is a very tough area, and these are tough folks. but the tribal leaders need to know that they're going to be supported, and i believe they're going to win. and that's why maliki's commitment most recently to give tribal fighters all the benefits of an iraqi soldier and to incorporate those fighters into the security structures of the state, meaning they'll have a livelihood going forward to protect their people, is a very significant commitment. it's one that's never been made

manufacture, and we i now need to make sure we hold the government to it and follow through. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> judge ted poe from texasment. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to talk about what you probably thought i was talk about today, is the mek. the last time you were here and you testified before my subcommittee and the chairwoman, ileana ros-lehtinen's subcommittee, i made the statement that there would probably be more attacks on camp liberty. and unfortunately, i was correct. camp liberty was attacked again, four people killed, seven injured. one young man lost both of his legs. since 2009 there have been seven attacks on camp liberty or camp ashraf. during that time 19 times members of the state department have testified. most of those or many of those were about camp liberty in addition to other things.

and all those attacks, to my knowledge as of today, not one person has been captured or charged with any of those killings. not one. and they're still on the loose. as i alluded to in my testimony, i perm hi believe -- i personally believe that the maliki government is in cahoots with the iranian government to let camp liberty, camp ashraf be subject to attacks. these last attacks, my understanding, were rockets came in that were 3 meters long, 40 of them. it seems impossible to me that a rogue iranian militia could sneak those by anybody and then fire them over a period of time and cause this chaos. and murder. and i bring this up for several reasons. one, it hasn't been resolved.

but this has become very perm to people who live in my district. i represent people who are iranian-americans. they know these people that are being killed. they are family. they are friends. and they come, and they visit, and they tell us it's happened again, judge poe, with tears in their eyes. so it's become personal. many of those people are sitting behind you, and they come up here wanting help. that's all they want is the united states as, you know, said that we promised to help them. we just, we no longer recognize them as a foreign terrorist organization, they just want their loved ones safe. safe, first, from the constant attacks by the, what i believe the iraqi and the iranians working together. but long term, they want to leave. they want to be in a safe country. now, when you visited -- and i commend you for going to visit the camp -- did you see these what looked like graves, but

they are really what these are used for, the people at camp liberty are in such fear of their lives, they no longer stay in these trailer houses here. they have dug themselves what looks like a grave to hide in when the attacks come from the rockets. and they dig these, and they put sandbags around them, and then they're ready for the next attack. they jump in these things, some of them sleep in these things at night even in the rain to try to be safe. literally digging their own graves. this is, this seems to me this is fairly tragic situation when people live like this in fear of where they are whether it's the iraqis, whether it's the iranians or both. were you able -- did you see any of this when you were there, these what they use as now foxholes to hide in from the rockets? >> i didn't see that particular lane, but i saw some of the

bunkers at the camp. >> well, i'm sure you'll see it on your next visit. now, this is what they have resorted to for their own safety. i think that is an international human rights concern. it should be. the t-walls, you mentioned t-walls are coming. my understanding is they haven't gotten new t-walls today. 17,000 of them were removed if a short period of time, now they're wanting to put them back in slowly. it's a safety hazard. they just want these t-walls to be safe. they ought to move them in now. the other concern that i wanted to mention is the resettlement issue. they want to leave iraq, we want 'em to the leave, the iraqis want them to leave, the iranians want -- i'm not so sure what the iranians want. but the west constantly says because the united states has not taken any of these people, we're not going to take them either. when the u.s. starts leading by example rather than just talking

about removing these people, then maybe we'll take them as well. why haven't these folks been sent to other countries? why haven't we taken some of them or all of them? that's my first question. and the second question is, when you visited with the you are viefers -- with the survivors of the ashraf camp attack, can did they tell you who they believed was responsible for attacking them and killing their families and their friends? those are the two questions i have. >> let me first say in terms of accountability, a shia militia leader who took responsibility for the attacks openly and was on iraqi television giving interviews, taking responsibility for attacking the camp, we thought it was ridiculous that this guy was walking the streets, inciting people to attack the camp. he was arrested by iraqi security forces and is detained and is being investigated. so that is something that happened in the last month.

i agree with you that this is an international human rights concern. that is why, as i mentioned in my response earlier, i find it encouraging that there's now united nations focus with a resettlement fund, a full-time person, to focus on this issue. and as you also correctly point out, very few countries around the world, despite the international human rights concern, have agreed the take the residents into their territory. albania, germany, a total of about 350, so we still have almost 2900 people at the camp. this is an international human rights concern, and it has to be treated with the utmost urgency. as you know, we are considering options to rehoe candidate and integrate -- relocate and integrate reds dents in close -- residents. and any eligible residents would have to be fully vetted, of course, under our standards by the department of homeland security. that is something that we are actively, actively considering, i can assure you. but we also, and i would encourage those who care about

the residents, as do we, to lobby other capitals around the world given that this is an international human rights concern to take residents into their territory. because so long as they're in iraq, they will not be safe. and you're right, four residents of the camp lost their lives tragically this month. 900 iraqis also lost their lives this month. iraq is a very violent place, and particularly the residents at camp liberty will not be safe until they leave. and that is why we have a full-time person working on it, we encourage the u.n., and they have now appointed a full-time person to work on the problem, and we have a u.n. settlement program to take residents in. >> and now we go to mr. ted deutch of florida. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. mcgurk, thanks for being here. thanks for your thoughtful testimony. last year we wrote a letter to the prime minister about the flight, the overflights of iranian aircraft. there are reports that the number of overflights from iran

has increased, that these are flights that iran sends to arm hezbollah to expand their influence in syria to defend the assad regime even as it slaughters, continues to slaughter its own people. how to you characterize prime minister maliki's relationship with iran? >> let me say a couple words about iran's nefarious role in iraq. just like al-qaeda has exploited the grievances of the sunni community iran is exploiting the fearses and apprehensions of the shia community as they are attacked by al-qaeda extremists. so it's a vicious cycle that iran very much takes advantage of it, and the most extreme elements of that. and maliki, and we discuss this with him all the time, tries to balance all these many pressures

that come at baghdad from the region and from internal space. he is under great pressure from his constituency particularly among the shia who continue to get attacked by these extremist groups. but so far we have seen the iraqi government resist the iranian efforts to have a direct security role in iraq. iran still, we believe, controls certain militia groups in iraq, although their activities are not nearly to level they were four or five years ago. >> so they've resisted iran's efforts to play a more significant role in iraq, but they've resisted the efforts of many of us here to convince them to play a more senate role if stopping -- a more significant role in stopping these overflights. why don't they do it? >> again, the overflights is something all i can say is we continue to raise the issue. we believe some of this material, a lot of it it, is cog

on civilian flights. we do have agreements with the iraqis which we look forward to testing as soon as we have intelligence in terms of actually catching a flight in the act, but we've not been able to test that yet. >> i'm sorry, say that again? explain that? >> we have agreements with iraq. it's very hard to get a precise intelligence picture in terms of what's coming on a flight and when. it's just very difficult. but when we do, and we've worked with countries around the region in similar circumstances, when we do, we hope to be able to work with the iraqis to be able to make sure that we're able to stop or deter that flight. >> right. here's what i'm trying to get at. it is, it is difficult to identify what's on the planes. i understand that. much of the frustration that i have on this issue is frustration generally with what's happening in syria and the ongoing assertion by so many that it's hard. so much about syria is hard.

and it's difficult even as there are now more than 130,000 syrians who have been slaughtered. so this is one very small area where it is, it is difficult. yet do you believe that the maliki government, that the prime minister discounts the suggestion that there are planes flying from iran full of weapons that are flying over iraq with those weapons to be delivered to hezbollah used to prop up assad's regime and to kill the syrian people? >> do i believe he believes that and knows it's actually happeningsome. >> uh-uh huh, right. >> i think we've given him enough information to provide a reasonable -- >> then when do we start -- how do we test these? you said we need to start testing this. how do we do that? again, this is one very discreet, and this -- i'm just

bringing in everything else that goes into syria at the moment which this committee has focused on extensively and will continue to focus on extensively. but with this one very discreet area, one very discreet point, that is weapons from iran to hezbollah that fly over iraq, it's one very discreet area where perhaps we can have some -- play some greater role in making it even slightly more difficult for hezbollah to help assad as he murders his own people. slightly more difficult. if our ally in iraq plays a more constructive role. so how do we test that? how do we get -- how do we make that happen? >> first, i would be happy to come and discuss in a different setting specifically some of the issues related to this topic. but i can just put you in picture when we have these conversations with iraqi officials and leaders. as soon as you mention syria, what they talk about in syria is

the threat that is coming from syria into iraq. and it's a very real threat. and that is like their primary threat perception coming from syria. we explain that the reason the terrorist groups are entrenching in syria is partially due to assad who, as the secretary said, is a terror magnet. and so long as the assad regime is able to be strengthened, this vicious cycle is going to go on. the iraqis have signed up to the geneva #-r communique to try to put pressure on assad, and the overflight issue, i've raised this issue specifically to get inspections increased again. and the next time i'm here, i hope to report some progress. >> thank you mr. chairman, mr. mcgurk. yield back. >> we go to judge holding of north carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. mcgushing, i -- mcgurk, i appreciate your level of knowledge and facility with the

facts and your ability to communicate 'em. in numerous answers you've detailed the support that iran is giving to militias in iraq and to al-qaeda-related and successor al-qaeda groups in iraq who are propagating this violence and undoing, i think, a lot of the good work that we were able to do in iraq. many -- in addition to that where the maliki government may be able to disavow it and say, you know, we're not supportive of what iraq -- iran is doing this iraq on that level, there are other areas which are in contravention of the sanctions that we placed on iran such as in the energy area, the energy sector. it has come to light that in the

basra province, you know, iran and iraq are negotiating the building of a pipeline to supply gas to new power plants there. in this all in contra contravention, you know, of the sanctions. are we putting iraq on notice that this is in contravention to the sanctions and detrimental to what we perceive as our interests? >> very good question, and this is also an ongoing topic of conversation. they share a 3,000-kilometer border, so there is trade, there's cultural ties. it's impossible to stop everything. the iraqis have been very conscious of trying to enforce, make sure that they are working consistent with our sanctions. in fact, they have not paid iran for arrears they're owed for certain electricity payments because they believe it might be sanction bl even though the banks they would pay are not sanctionable banks. so the iraqis have tried to go

an extra mile, making sure they're staying in keeping with -- enter and with regard to football institutions, i mean -- financial institutions, there's a great deal of evidence that the nature of the relationship between iraqi financial institutions and iranian financial institutions goes way beyond what would be permitted, you know, under the sanctions. >> i have to -- maybe i could follow up with you specifically on this, because it's a very detailed topic. but iraqi banks have cut off many transactions simply due to reputational risk. iraq has also increased its oil output while iran has asked them not to do that because we've taken a million barrels of iranian oil off the market. so, again, this is constant. but the pipeline you mentioned is concerning be that pipeline goes forward. that could, indeed, fall afoul of our sanctions. >> the, considering the extreme, you know, detriment to our interests from this iranian support of militant groups in iraq, is there any part of the

deal the administration is currently negotiating that would address these issues? you know, put it as a condition, you know? you have got to stop doing this. >> congressman, the nuclear negotiation is focused solely on the nuclear proliferation issues. but that does not mean that we are not also focused -- >> so we're not using any leverage or any of our capital in lifting the sanctions for the nuclear enrichment part of it to try to solve some of the other problems we're having in iraq with iransome. >> given the existential threat that a nuclear iran would pose, we focus specifically on the nuclear issue. >> the, as far as iranian support of hezbollah which, as you say, pointed out that you've given maliki clear, clear evidence of, you know, what's going on as far as the

overflights go and the supply of hezbollah with iranian weapons, is there any part in the nuclear negotiations that we're doing now with iran which would address iranian support of hezbollah fighters in syria? >> again, the nuclear negotiations are focused on the nuclear proliferation issue specifically, but that does not mean we don't deal with the other issues on parallel and separate tracks. >> but, again, we're not using any of the leverage we have in the nuclear negotiations to try to address the situation we have with hezbollah in syria? >> we're not discussing those through the nuclear channel, no. >> okay. thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> chair now recognizes mr. cicilline for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. mcgurk, for being here and for your insightful testimony morning. this morning. as you can imagine, events in iraq are particularly difficult to hear about in light of the heroic sacrifice of american

heroes and the billions and billions of dollars of taxpayer money expended in this region of the world, and you acknowledged that in your written testimony, and i thank you for that. i'd ask you to, first, speak a little bit to the difference of events in ramadi and fallujah. it seems as if if the turn around in ramadi was quick and fairly effective and, obviously, that is not the case in fallujah. would you speak a little bit about why that is, the extent of the coordination between the tribal fighters and the iraqi government and resource allocations between these two cities and any other factors that are contributing to either different outcomes or different strategyings. strategies. >> i think fallujah's always just been the most hardened, the most hardened part of the insurgency when we were fighting it, and it's a different environment. if you look at the protest movement over 2013, the protests in ramadi remain generally of a moderate tone focused on the

legitimate grievances of the community. the protests in fallujah, which also took place every friday, were far more militant, far more extremist. so it's just a different environment just like many, you know, cities in different countries have different cultures and different attitudes. >> and if i could just follow up on congressman deutch's question, i think you said that most of the foreign fighters were syrian, is that right? >> no, foreign fighters who come into syria. so from the greater region and global jihadist-minded people who come into syria to fight -- >> then coming into iraq. and so would you speak a little more about what the relationship is between the maliki government and president maliki in particular and president assad? do they understand that by allowing these flyovers and potentially strengthening or prolonging the assad regime they actually are undermining their ability to take back their own country from these same

extremists? do they make that connection? what is the relationship between the maliki administration, maliki regime and the assad regime? >> maliki and the top leaders of the iraqi government, this is no love lost with bashar al assad. if you look at 2009, maliki was calling for assad to be brought to a criminal court at the time based upon some bombings that happened in august of 2009 that the iraqi government blamed on the syrian regime. again, they signed on to the yes peeve -- geneva communique. i'll be perfectly candid, when we explain to them that assad remaining in power is a magnet for jihadis and terrorists who are coming into iraq, that is a train of logic that many iraqi officials don't agree with. frankly, they believe that if assad left, if the regime would collapse, it'd make the problem worse. so this is a constant, you know, just seeing the same picture we do. they don't see it. but we believe very strongly, as

the secretary has said a number of times and the president, that bashar al assad in power is a magnet for these foreign fighters coming into syria to fight a jihad. and until he is removed from power, we're going to continue to be in this very vicious cycle which is going to have pernicious effects on all of syria's neighbors, iraq, lebanon and jordan in particular. >> but what other tools do we have at our disposal to persuade the maliki government that that is the case? otherwise we're going to be left in a position where they're going to continue to implicitly or explicitly support the assad regime in the conduct of knewovers or other efforts. >> i think, and i just have to be really candid. i think particularly heading up to the election, iraqis are going to be increasingly focused inward on their internal issues and internal politics, and our hope is that after those elections with a new government up we will work with that government to really get at this problem. >> and, which leads to my final

question, and that is, is it clear to president maliki and to iraqi leaders in general that the responsibility to defend their country is their responsibility and that their expectations should not be that the united states is going to fulfill that responsibility, that they have to after a very long commitment from this country, they have to take this responsibility of defending their country and doing the hard work of bringing stability and peace to their own country? >> absolutely. and when general austin was in iraq last week and i was in those meetings with him and iraqi leaders, they all stressed four or five points. first, they want all of our support to be under the strategic framework agreement which is a permanent foundation. that means institutional, military-to-military. they want training support, and we're talking about doing some training in jordan or in the region. they want intelligence support, and they want to let us know when they feel that they need

weapons or systems that we can help them supply. so that is what they want, and they also want advice and relations for how to -- relations for how to actually plan effectively. they to not want us to be in the lead in this fight. it's their fight. >> thank you. i yield back with. thank you, mr. chairman. >> gentleman from rhode island yields back. chair recognizes himself for five minutes. mr. mcgurk, thank you for coming in. we really appreciate it. i appreciate your service to your country and dealing with these very tough issues. i'm, obviously, not very happy with what's happening in iraq, and i've been very clear that i thought the withdrawal from iraq was one of the biggest mistakes i think historically that'll be shown that the united states has made in modern foreign policy. so i'm going to express a lot of concern with that. it's not necessarily directed at you, but it is directed at decision by the administration. i'm a air force pilot, and i served in iraq a number of times, and i remember specifically going there in 2008 and still, you know, watching the environment and seeing people hunkered down, in

essence. there was still a threat of terrorism, but they were starting to emerge. and then i remember going in 2009 and seeing an iraq that had completely turned around and, actually, as, you know, somebody there thinking, hey, we're serving a purpose here, we've brought freedom to people, kids are out playing soccer even though most of our operations in some cases were directed against iranian assets. iran is known to be responsible for directly or indirectly the death of about half of the americans in iraq, including efps. and by the way, i might want to mention that we are now negotiating with iran in terms of giving them their ability to enrich uranium. i'll tell you another concern i had is i remember i was actually getting ready to fly a mission into afghanistan back a few years ago when i heard the senate majority leader from the other side of this, of in this building say that the war in iraq was lost. and he still has his powerful position, but he very quickly said that the war in iraq is

lost, and it's time to withdraw the troops. and then president bush made what i think is a very brave decision to not only not withdraw, but to actually surge more troops in, and we saw a great deal of success. i think the reason it's important to revisit these decisions is not beating a dead horse, but it's the fact that we're getting ready to face the same kind of decision in afghanistan. are we a country tired of war and we're going to pull out and have to deal with this shameful thing that we've seen in the fallujah, the equivalent of that in afghanistan now, or are we going to learn lessons from the past? and i think it's very important to learn those lessons. i've got a question, a couple of quick questions. there used to be a policy in this country that anywhere al-qaeda exists, they should know that there's no safe haven. i think president bush talked about that there's no safe haven for terrorists anywhere in the country. we see in iraq right now they, in essence, appear to be somewhat safe. hopefully, the iraqi government can push against them. we see the same type of situation in syria, and i'm for

intervention in syria. i want to be very clear about that. is this a change in the administration from the bush policy of no safe haven anywhere in the world and now we accept safe havens in iraq because we just lost the political will to do anything, or is it still kind of the bush policyinging against al-qaeda? -- policy against al-qaeda? >> first, congressman, thank you for your service. and i think particularly now everybody who served in iraq and has experience there, it's really time for us to have a constant, ongoing dialogue, because we can all bring our experience and relationships to bear at this very important moment. again, i can just speak the iraq, and in working with the iraqis in terms of intelligence support and hellfires and, as i mentioned in my testimony, we're confident that iraq will deny al-qaeda safe havens in western iraq. one of the reasons we believe we saw the convoys moving into fallujah and ramadi is because the iraqis started hitting their camps and safe haven in the

remote regions of western iraq. so i am confident particularly as the hellfire missiles -- and they develop even more sophisticated ability to deploy them -- and also with the apache helicopters and the other things we're able to do with our iraqi partners that al-qaeda will not have safe havens to plan and pot in those areas. that's -- plot in those areas. that's one moving they're moving into urban areas, because it's harder to move them. >> thank you. i have called for and believe that the united states should help the iraqi goth in a limited -- government in a limited way using air power, american air power, to take out these safe havens because this congress, this house has passed a use of force agreement that says attack, basically, al-qaeda. and so i think we have the authority, and we have the responsibility to do that. let me ask you one more brief question. israel foiled and dismantled what the israeli officials describe as an advanced al-qaeda plot within their borders. there's kind of this far war grand strategy with al-qaeda and a near war grand strategy.

the near war is co-oping, for instance, iraq, you know, all those places. the far war would be a threat to the u.s. homeland. do you believe that the situation we're seeing in -- and that it's the goal of aqi to be part of a far war strategy, aka, an attack on the american homeland eventually? >> again, my file is iraq, so i'm focused on iraq. i would just -- >> but, obviously, iraq has huge implications for the homeland. >> again, i think al-qaeda is a real threat if they're able to entrench in the heart of the arab world. it'll threaten our vital u.s. interests throughout the region. >> all right, thank you. and, again, thank for your service to the country. i appreciate that. chair now recognizes mr. vargas for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chair, appreciate it. you know, i think for most americans trying to keep score at home, it's becoming very difficult to understand the situation. i think a lot of the nations have become somewhat confused

and complex. i mean, iraq, iran, syria, it's all kind of running together, and the issue of the sunni/shia discord and what's happening there. but what is very, very clear, i think, is the terrible price that americans have paid. as you know very well and, again, thank you for your service. i mean, the amount of sons and daughters that didn't come home alive, the number of parents, mothers and fathers that didn't come home alive and those that did that brought the demons home with them that will will haunt them and their families for the rest of their lives. i mean, we've paid a terrible price. and so, i mean, today i heard even from some on the other side they're saying the hell with it, let them kill themselves. let them fight it out. what should we be doing there? i don't hold that same feeling. i think the price that we made has to mean something, and the sacrifice these people made, our brothers and sisters and you are our country, the price that they paid has to mean something at the end of the day, and we should coas much as we can.

do as much as we can. i'm personally very concerned about the christian community. the christian community has been slaughtered. i mean, the christians we saw killed on christmas, you know, a very unified attack against christians. 37 murdered. the community before the war was about a million christians, now i think there'sless than half, maybe even a third of that. we're very thankful in san diego that many have been able to come to san diego and the great community that's forming there and continues to form. but i'd like to hear from you what we can do and what we should do and what we're not doing to help not only the christian community, but especially the christian community, but other communities as well. what else should we be doing? >> congressman, thank you. i've visited the caldean community in michigan, and i would welcome the opportunity to come to your district also to visit the community there. >> you're invited. >> and extremist groups, as i mentioned, are threatening christians, muslims, everybody

in the region. it is a phenomenon throughout the region that is a regional problem, and one thing we're trying to do is work with the christian leaders in iraq to make sure a they have the resources they need from the central government and also the kurdish regional government and making sure that their areas are as secure as possible. in iraq the caldeans and other christian minority groups are located in the plains. there is an al-qaeda extremist presence south of there. we are working to try to make sure that local people, christians in that community, have the resources to protect themselves and to police their own communities, and we've made some progress in that area over the last six months in the north. and in the kurdish region, when i was in iraq a few months ago and i met, as i mentioned earlier, with the head of the community there and linked him up with the prime minister of the kurdish region to talk about schools for the community and making sure that they're getting the resources they need from the

kurdish regional government. so what we can do as a neutral player in iraq with relationships between everybody, because we've been there for ten years and we're seen as a neutral player, one of the very few, is try to make sure that the connections are made between the governments, provincial, regional and national, so that the christian and minority communities have the resources they need to protect themselves but also for schools, for children and everything else. >> now, i do have to say, though, i've heard from many that the central government, they claim that the central government's not doing much at all to help the christians. in fact, just the opposite, that they leave them exposed, that their churches are exposed, that the schools are exposed. i mean, could you comment on that, that they haven't been doing enough, not nearly enough to protect the christian community? and especially the churches? >> since a series of church bombings, if i recall correctly in 2009 or 2010, in the iraqis have really buttressed protection of christian sites in

iraq. but as you mentioned, there are still attacks on these sites. >> the christmas attacks, i believe, killed 37 -- >> that's right. >> -- christians. >> and i have found the prime minister when you discuss this issue with him fairly emotional about it, wanting to protect christians just like everyone else in his country. and looking for ways to do that. but it's something that, again, we're going to have to keep focusing on. but i think the more communication the better from the christian community, iraqi christian community here in the u.s. of who have deep ties back into iraq and with us. there's a lot that if your constituent is tell you something they're seeing and you can let us know, we can work those problems. >> thank you. i yield back. thank you, sir. >> thank you, mr. vargas. the chair recognizes mr. owe hoe for phi minutes. >> thank you -- five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. mcgurk, thank you for your testimony. i feel like you've been sitting there for a long time, you might need to get up and stretch. but i appreciate your endurance. what are our military assets and

and -- in iraq, and are they purely advisory? if so, how many? can you divulge that? >> we have under our embassy, under the chief of mission and ambassador beacroft, the office of security cooperation which works closely with the iraqi military, the numbers ebb bo -- ebb and flow, but it's about a hundred personnel. a very small contingent of half a dozen or so of our special operators who train some of the higher-end special operators as a training component. but that's all done under the embassy chief of mission -- >> all right. so we have a very small footprint as far as americans there. >> yes. >> what can be learned from how we left iraq and apply to the drawdown in afghanistan so we don't make the same mistakes or repeat what we've done there this so that we've got the benefit of the effort we put in there, you know, that both sides benefit from this?

what do you see that we need to do different? if you could rewrite a post drawdown of troops in iraq especially with the announcement, which i think was wrong, of the end date announced, what would you do differently so that we don't repeat that in afghanistan? >> i think, congressman, you'll have to forgive me. when i'm out of government, i might look back and work with historians, but right now i'm focused on the situation at hand and trying to, trying to protect our interests as we face right now. >> all right. let me switch over to a different topic. i've talked to many veterans that have fought both in iraq and afghanistan, and we've talked to members of the iraqi government. and what they have said is that we have come to a stalemate between the iraqi military or the iraqi men and our military in a standoff. in the meantime, countries like china, japan, south korea are going in there, building infrastructures and trading. would it not benefit us to put

more effort into that so that we do have economic trade and that way we can help them build an economy where they own more of trying to solve this problem? i know they're working hard on it, but if we can help build that infrastructure and work with developing trade -- >> agree with you 100%. and while the focus of this hearing has been the al-qaeda threat and the rising extremist threat, our policy as i discussed last time is really multifaceted, and one of them is developing economic ties and economic relationships. we do advocacy for u.s. companies. we are proud that boeing has signed a major contract with iraqi airways to be the backbone of the iraqiwares. iraqi airways. we're proud that hill international, a u.s. company, has contracted with the provincial government of basra to lead the effort there to try to modernize basra in a very long-term, five to ten-year

project. general electric and others are doing well in iraq. but i agree with you. there are a lot of opportunities particularly many parts of the country that are very secure sch. that's where i'd like to, you know, help focus our foreign policy, anding that's why i was asking you if you could rewrite that. with fallujah, do you think the iraqi government can control fallujah and defeat the isil? do you feel like they can go in there, they have the will power or the assets to do that? >> as i said in my testimony, i think without the support of the local pop haitian, it'll be extremely difficult. that's a lesson we learned in iraq. >> all right. what about you were talking about the bang bone -- the backbone, the u.s. is the backbone of the iraqi military. were you meaning with our military assets? >> with equipment, equipment and training. the iraqis consistently look to us to be their primary supplier and primary supporter. >> okay. and then chairman royce was

canning about where the foreign fighters were coming from, and i know a lot of them are coming from europe. is there any estimate how many are coming from the u.s. that go into syria, then go over to iraq? >> i don't have those numbers. i'd have to get -- i'd have to go to the intelligence community and get back to you with those numbers. >> all right, thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. thank you. >> thank you, mr. yoho. we go now to mr. collins of georgia. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i appreciate the opportunity. thanks for answering a multitude of questions today. i want to turn back a little bit about what was asked earlier about the elections. and really from serving in iraq back in '08 as my colleague has as well, the understanding the relationship between sunni and shia is something that, i think there's a huge mistrust that goes back generations. this is multiple issues there. and it looks like the current government has done little to relate with that or work on that

relationship. talking about al-qaeda in iraq, increasingly building the alliances with sunni tribal leaders and has adjusted his message in 2013 to try and earn more sunni political support. how would that translate into the next round of iraq elections? can we really see a move from shia to sunni, and what does that mean for the region? answer that, and we'll talk about iran's possible influence there as well. just speak to the elections at this point. >> thank you. first, congressman, thank you for your service, and it's a very important question and an insightful question. this election coming up is going to be pivotal and also extremely, extremely interesting. the first national election december of 2005, there were really three main lists people could go for, a sunni bloc, a shia bloc and a kurdish bloc. the 2010 elections there was a little bit more choice, really two shia blocs, the sunni parties were under one main list also with some shia, a cross-sectarian list and then the kurds. the election everything is

really fractured. so you have about four shia lists, you have three sunni lists, and even the kurds are running on four different lists. so what's going to happen out of those results are going to be a number of different permutations in terms of forming governments and forming coalitions. so the hope is that this election will give rise to the more possibility of cross-sectarian kind of issue-based politics emerging. as difficult as that is going to be, if you look at the candidate lists and the coalitions, there is a possibility there. as i mentioned earlier, what al-qaeda does very effectively is targets the fault line which has existed for 1400 years targeting symbolic areas and trying to increase fear in particularly the shia population which just rises the sectarian debate and discourse in the country. so on the positive side, you have an election that's shaping up with a number of different choices, kind of number of different lists which would allow for cross-sectarian coalitions. on the negative side, you have

extremists who are trying to incite and enflame the sectarian dimensions in the country. >> and i think that's sort of what we're heading in here in looking at especially with the iran influence in iraq, the shia population. and iran's influence is what we're seeing. there's also reports that i've read and others dealing with the rest of the arab world, sunni arab world having to deal with this dynamic of iran and iraq and what's going on there. do you see or is there a sense that there is more push in the shia with the iran influence there and especially with everything else we've talked about here? not encouraging discourse, maybe, is the best way to put it. >> yeah. we've seen, if i could say, you know, 2011 and 2012, and i described in my written testimony this hoe-boil stage of insurgency. shia militias were unable to really gain much traction because the violence was at this low boil. as the al-qaeda attacks went up this year, we've seen an increase in shia militia

activity which has also given inroad to the most nefarious iranian activity. so, and this is something that we continually have to to work with not only iraqi political leadsers, but societal leaders to try to isolate those most extreme groups. >> and i appreciate that because i think really what we look at, and it's been mentioned several times here, we look at the world of iraq right now and the issues of fallujah and the anbar region and the price that we paid in those areas that are continuing. we've got to maintain pressure on this administration in iraq whether it be the protection of those that are at camp liberty, ashraf, this is not something this congressman's going to let go. we've got to continue this process. we owe that in a large sense to what happened there. so i think really in these elections that's the concern that i would express to maliki, is you've got to do the process of working to sustain your own country without the division. and i think that's what we're expecting. and when we see stuff like what happened at fallujah, when we

see this -- it tells me maybe we're spending too much time doing other things ask not doing the things that will keep that country, you know, on a path toward a sustainable future. so i appreciate it and with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you. thank you, mr. collins. we go now to mr. weber, randy weber, of texas. >> thank you. mr. mcgurk, you were last here in november. something, i think it's been 78 days as we count, and with iran fostering all of the unrest over in iraq, there's been 312 executions. if you divide that out, it's one every six hours, it is four a day, 120 a month. hence, the 312 in 78 days. it's been 78 days since you were here. we have a are regime in iran -- a regime in iran that is built on sending terror throughout its own citizenry and, of course, exporting it into iraq. how many more executions do you

think is acceptable before we take the iranian regime to task over their executing their own citizens? >> i can address that from the iran standpoint. again, the human rights situation in iran is quite despicable. we have seen president rouhani and foreign minister zarif talking about wanting to make inroads and improve the human rights situation but, quite frankly, we have yet to see them make inroads in that area. >> so really, i mean, we need to be, we need to really be focused on this even in our negotiations with -- or i should say the administration's negotiations over relaxing the sanctions, because they don't understand -- you know, we're getting played for fools, quite frankly. i want to, i know you're here to testify about al-qaeda in iraq, so i have a question for you. the residents of camp liberty, are they as dangerous as

al-qaeda? >> no, no, certainly not. >> and yet we promised them, did we not, that we would protect them and that we would take care of them? back during the conflict when they were repatriated, so to speak, to camp? >> there were agreements between our kind of military commanders at time when we moved into iraq at camp ashraf. >> right. and can are you aware how many of them have paid a terrific price with their lives to live there under the agreement that we made? >> i am, sir, yes. >> okay. and you're aware that they're, basically, having to live in graves now? we're not getting t-walls, the protection -- installed, that they used -- i mean, it's just unbelievable, the paper thin walls they're living in and the attacks that are coming from outside, you're aware of that? >> yes, sir. and as i said, i was at the camp this month and talked to the residents about what it's like to live in a trailer when colleagues of yours are being killed by rockets in trailers, something that many of us can

recall quite -- >> well, good news and bad news. the good news is most of them, as i understand it now, are are not living in trailers. the bad news is they've had to dig out a 3-foot-wide by 6-foot grave, basically, and live in it to avoid the rocket attacks. how long should -- how long does that have to go on, and should we not be pressing for aid to get them out of the country? and at best, while we're working diligently on that, should we not be getting them protection? how much longer do you estimate that going on? >> as i said earlier, we need to do everything we can to get them out of country. >> well, you were here 78 days ago. has their situation improved? >> more of them have been able to relocate to albania, and we have to thank the albanians for being gracious and taking about 210 residents into albania. i wish there were more countries willing to do the same. >> i'm told in your comments earlier that you made comment

that is the t-walls are currently being ip stalled? >> that was the information that i received this morning, the t-walls would begin moving in again today or tomorrow. >> would you be interested to know that we've had cell phone communication from the residents inside the camp, and that's not the case? >> all i can say, congressman, my understanding there was of a decision made this morning to begin moving t-walls back into the camp. whether or not that's started, i don't know, but i can assure you based on the information i've received, we will follow up, and, in fact, if they are not being moved into the camp, that will be a serious matter, and i will follow up with you with the information. >> how soon? >> within the next 48 hours to make sure texas-walls are moving back into the catch. >> is there a third party -- i'm sorry, the iraqis don't have a lot of credibility. it's almost as if the residents of camp liberty are the enemy and not the victims that they are. is there a third, i mean, surely

you're not saying that you going to call them and they're going to say, of course -- >> no, no. no. we will talk to our colleagues at the united nations mission in iraq and the deputy there who is at the camp -- >> okay. >> -- regularly, and he will be able to verify with eyes on whether or not -- >> well, as we watch iraq descend, i hope you make it an extreme priority to get them out. >> we will do so. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you. well, let me just begin by thanking mr. mcgurk for not just for your time the morning, but for your work on this issue. as you know, as you can tell, this committee is extremely concerned about the resurgence of al-qaeda, the impact that's going to have there in iraq, the impact it's going to have on the region and, of course, even here to us in the united states. so we thank you for that. we look forward to continuing to work with you on the concerns

that we have in the house. there is one other issue that i meant to raise with you, and that's just turning for a moment to discuss the inclusion of the kurdish democratic party and the patriotic union of kurdistan in the patriot act's tier iii designation, terrorist designation. my understanding is that this has become a sort of catch-all designation that has inadvertently mislabeled the kdp and the puk as terrorists even though they have been a stabilizing force in the region and consistently loyal to the united states for decades. as al-qaeda and associated groups expand across the middle east and beyond, it seems like a good time to take count of our remaining friends in the region and maybe take a look at inappropriate designation and recognize that that's harming our very important relationship.

with kurdish people. so would the administration be supportive of a legislative solution to in this issue -- to this issue that would exclude these kurdish groups from the tier iii designation? >> mr. chairman, thank you for asking that question and for allowing me to put our response on the record. as you said, the kurdish people, the puk, the kdp has been among our closest friends in the region going back decades. we think they should be removed from this list as soon as possible. we think it is an imperative. we understand that it requires a legislative fix, there's nothing we can do by executive action alone and, therefore, we are 100% supportive of an immediate legislative fix to this problem, and we look forward to working with you and the relevant committees in congress to get that done. >> well, thank you, mr. mcbucker. we did have to get you on the record for that, and the senate is working on this with the house, and we very much appreciate once more your testimony here today. thank you, members. we stand adjourned.

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>> i have often said that when i am traveling on amtrak, that i run -- not walk -- to the quiet car. but what this, i believe and i know, will provide for consumers -- and it already has on some airlines -- is more opportunity for a data-rich engagement. it will open up the market for more competitors to provide options, so it will be, hopefully, over the long term less expensive for those to engage. when you look at the international ecosystem when it comes to this, they -- i have been told by those in the business that 90% of the engagement is data only. so a very small part of it is conversation. and what is also great about this, it's up to the carriers, up to the airline whether to permit that type of conversation. >> fcc commissioner mignon clyburn tonight on "the

communicators" at 8 eastern on c-span2. >> i think it's all an evolutionary process. you grow into this role, and my sense is that you never get comfortable if you're always pushing for change and growth not just in yourself, but in the issues that you care about. you're never done. so there's never a point in time where you feel like, there, i am now here, and i can do in the same way all the time. it's always changing. >> first lady michelle obama, tonight at 9 eastern live on c-span and c-span3, also on c-span radio and c-span.org. >> on capitol hill today, the senate and house are in session. the senate about to gavel in to to continue their work on military pay, specifically military pensions and repealing cuts in the military pensions. a measure that would seek to repeal a one percentage point reduction in the cost of living

adjustment for military retirees that was part of the budge deal passed by the house and senate in december. test vote expected on that at 5:30 today. the president pro tempore: the senate will come to order. the chaplain retired admiral barry black will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. god of grace and glory, hear our prayer and answer us when we call. you forgive our sins