i have no doubt that he's placed men and women of our armedded services at risk and will cost harm to lives on future bat 8 fields. i hope he recalls all material not already disclosed for the safety and security of all americans. i close by saying what an honor

and privilege it is to appear here on behalf of the men and women of the intelligence agency and intelligence enterprise. i thank you for your cometting confidence in their work, your support is vital to us as well as our national security, and i look forward to answering requester questions. thank you. >> thank you very much, general, we'll have a seven-minute first round. starting with you, questions about afghanistan. our isaf joint commander said that in 95%-plus of tactical fire fights in which the afghan security forces engage they held their ground and defeated the enemy and noted that at no time did the afghan security forces in the past summer lose urban area or urban population cementer. not a single center overrun by the taliban. do you agree with the military commanders in their assessment

of the capabilities of the afghan national security forces? >> let me start, and the general can chime in. there's no question that the ana, the afghan national army, enjoyed tactical success, particularly when they have had good leadership and had the enablers available to facilitate a joint campaign. there's extensive desertion problem, some 30,000 troops desserted last year in an army of 185,000. the other difficulty, of course, is the afghan national army had great success. tactically in their contacts with the taliban, the difficulty has been once something is cleared as holding it, particularly when it requires follow-up by the afghan police.

do you want to add to that? >> chairman, i would just add that the anf, particularly the army, but the afghan national police have made, i would say, modest progress over the years. i think ill they still, well, a couple things. one, there's great incertainty because in their minds because of the lack of assigning of the bsa, be very candid, i think that the enabling capabilities they still lack, things like intelligence, counter ied expertise and technology, the air lift, logistics so the sustainment capabilities that they still require enable, you know, in order for them to have progress on the battlefield. >> thank you. >> director, if we announce that we were going to await the next

president to seek the signature on the bilateral security agreement, what would be the effect inside of afghanistan? >> well, the effect already of the delay has been negative in terms of the impact on the economy and the psychological impact. particularly, last november, approved going forth with a bilateral security agreement. what we're already seeing is negative trends in terms of the economy, the gdp is dropping, and, importantly, i think, important statistic or factoid is the number of foreign businesses or foreign investors investing in business. >> clear the air for us to say we're going to await the next president? >> well, obviously, it takes two

to sign this, and it's my own view, not necessarily company policy, i don't believe president karzai will sign it. >> clearing the air to eliminate the uncertainty? >> well, that's a policy call, sir, not intelligence. i don't know what the decision will be as to whether -- >> or what the effect would be? do you have an assessment what the effect would be inside afghanistan if we made the declaration? >> the declaration of what? >> we'll await for the next president to sign the bsa? >> it would -- could be having an effect, and i suppose it would if we said that. >> in terms of iran, if the joint plan, it's been agreed to as successfully implemented, would its terms and conditions diminish iran's nuclear capacity? compared to where iran would otherwise be in six months

without that joint plan of action. >> it would to the degree it boils back the enrichment of the 20% uranium, putting curbs on heavy water facility in iraq, and most importantly, it imposes very intrusive and observation carried out by the iaea, and, yes, it would help to set back the programs some. he said the intelligence community reached the judgment, quote, that new sanctions undermind the prospects of a successful nuclear agreement with iran. could you explain? >> well, we think at this point given the impacts of the

sanctions imposed already, quite substantial, in terms of the contraction of the iranian economy, unemployment, inflation, ect., and the viability of them for getting access to the foreign rereceivers are substantial. our belief is, our assessment is, we don't know, but i think our assessment would be that further sanctions at this point would probably be counterproductive, but it's important to remember that the iranians understand our government and how we operate, and so in my view, the complete of additional sanctions is more than sufficient. >> all right. and then, finally, relative to syria, what impacts would a more robust training of equipping vetted members of the moderate

syria opposition have on the ongoing conflict? could it put additional pressure on assad? >> well, it could help to the extent that we can put through and train for more people who are vetted. that would be helpful. >> thank you. senator inhofe. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we had six things i was going to ask, but i think director clapper answered two of them. a lot of detail, but i want to mention snowden that tied a war, and then one other question about the iran. first of all, you -- i thought you covered it very well, director clapper, in terms of what snowden has done. the disturbing thing, and we hear from an awful lot of people, treating him as if he's

a hero, and i look at it more as a trader, and i would like to get from each one of you that he is ploabl, the degree he's perpetrated the single greatest compromise of information in american history, and secondly, respond that i believe that the vast majority of the 1.7 million documents that was stolen have nothing to do with nsa or surveillance programs and if disclosed or replaced in the hands of the add veer sorries to defend our homeland. the vast majority has nothing to do with the rights people are concerned about under the nsa. >> as i indicated, the revelations have gone way, way beyond the concerns about the

so-called domestic programs. to quantify this, that's a very small portion of the fatality of what he's looked at, and an assessment they looked at, we don't know what he took and what he's provided to the accomplices, but that's why i said in the statement, this potentially is by far the most damaging set of revelations in the nation's history. >> do you agree with that? >> yes, it's, senator, i agree, the ma majority of what he took, without the details of the types of exaibilities or components have nothing to do with nsa. >> yeah. back when africon was started, most interested in that, and i was interest we did it, but

setting it up they don't have control of the their own as sets comes back to haunt us, i feel, quite an. put that chart up, if you would, over there. if you look and see how much is going on now in northern africa and the fact they are comment for resources, and i just got back from after ryka, the headquarters and from that general area, and i just would kind of like to have you comment as to your concern. 12% of all the requests of isr, that's the intelligence recon sons are met due to lack of resources. my concern has been that -- i want your assessment as to the resources that are there, the assessments that have been made at 12%, and the concerns are met

or addressed, and then because my concern is that it's budget driven opposed to risk driven. what are your thoughtings right now and the resources they have? of course, you mentioned, general, in this time of the bucket restraint, that's my concern, that this is all budget driven. comments on that? >> well, sir, i can comment certainly on the threat that we see evolving in africa and the map is suggestive of that. in both the saw hill and the the proliferation of al-qaeda want-to-bees, or terrorists that profess violence, and so, of course, there is kind of the perfect storms conditions there with large ungoverned areas, porous borders, places awash in

weapons, primarily from libya, and you have unwilling or incapable security services able to go after these people. for the most part, they don't pose a direct threat to the homeland now, but they certainly could in the future. as far as -- referring to regime flynn, but an economy of force operation i think general rodriguez did a superb job in marshalling the resources he does have, particularly in monitoring the situation of soit sudan. one other point i mentioned because the president of france is here is that the french have capability in that part of the world from their history, and they have great access and have laid out a strategy in which

they want to purr see terrorism, and, of course, i think they would look to us, and i'm certainly going to try to do all we can to assist them, particularly with respect to intelligence. mike? >> yeah, and, first, i appreciate you asking the question. i mean, i think that that map is very telling in terns of the threats that we face, and i think for viewers, one of the things to point out, that number eight, at the top there, on the coast of algeria down to the coast of nigeria where the number 10 is, that distance is the distance from new york to los angeles so the scale of what we are talking about in africa as a continent is huge. in terms of what they are trying to do is working very hard to build african capacity where they can, basically partnering with the nations to be able to build capacity, bilaterally, and then vehicle coalitions.

one of the capabilities that is a shortcoming, right now, we appreciate the commerce on this, the need for recon sons capability, not just the capability that fly, but the human intelligence and other aspects of isr, and then i think as the director just highlighted, the reliance on other partners, particularly european partners that do support the operations going on in africa, that alliance is critical for us. >> okay, my time is about expired, but if i could get an answer from each one of you, i keep hearing things people in the administration talk about, al-qaeda is on the run, on the path to defeat. look at the chart up here they have a presence operating, and to me, it's the opposite of that. yes or no, each one of you. is al-qaeda on the run and path to defeat?

>> no. it is morphing and franchising itself not only here but other areas of the world. >> uh-huh. >> they are not. >> okay. >> thank you, senator. senator reid. >> thank you, mr. foreman. thank you, gentleman. general, could you briefly update us on the assigned service, purpose, and how it relates to agencies and organizations? >> in three areas, we have seen significant improvement, and that is our field presence in which we expanded our footprint overseas, the second area is building stronger partnerships, not only with allies and other nations, but also with our

services and with especially special operations command, and, of course, our great partner in the cia in this endeavor. the last area, really part of instilling discipline into this whole system, we have seen a modest increase in our productivity in terms of reporting and production from the capability put out there in the last year. >> thank you. general clapper, can you comment on the defense, and sitting at the apex of the collection activities. >> speaking specifically as a collection service? >> how you view it. >> i'm a big supporter of it, two former directer of dia and stood up the initial defense human service in the early

1990s. what this initiative to me is taking this to the next level, represents professionalization, greater partnering with the national clandestine service which is cia. i'm a big proponent of it. i think it is unique capability, the officers providing a unique service to the national intelligence community that no one else can do. >> thank you. general, turning to syria, you stated there are approximately fighters -- multiple issues, but stemming the flow into the country, and perhaps maybe more importantly, tracking them as they come from the country, and so can you comment on both points, and also how with respect to as they leave the

country, you are sharing this information with all of the relevant agency, fbi, tsa, i.c.e., ect. so we don't find ourselves, you know -- >> yes, sir. in that estimate, by the way, is probably conservative. nose are the ones we account forment they are probably more. this is a huge issue in europe with our european allies, and they share with us and them on this, that's the critical omelet for in terms of sharing, and they are very, very concerned about it. part of the problem, i can be more specific in a closed environment, is the -- in some cases, lax rules about terrorists as they transit through enemy countries. that's about like you say in open session. that's -- we're drying to work

that agenda as well. absolutely, sir, particularly, those who may have -- even if they aspiration name designs on not only potential attacks in europe, but attacks here. we are sharing this, and i think the secretary of homeland security, jay johnson, spoke to the issue recently. >> just to be sure i'm clear, that there is a conscious, deliberate effort to identify all of these foreign fighters in syria now and to be prepared through cooperation with our agencies and other countries to follow them as they come out, is that fair? >> yes, sir, as best we can. >> another question. you commented about this, your sense that some of the vast amounts of information that he is collected could reveal agents, sources that we have?

>> yes, sir. both as sets and those undercover. >> general, you spoke about weapons of mass destruction, are they chemical weapons, nuclear? >> chemical and bilogical exhales. >> thank you. thanks very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator reid, senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i thank the witnesses. director clapper, you see in your statement, the president remains unwilling to negotiate himself out of power. does that mean that you believe the suspects coming out from yes

geneva, and now geneva three, whatever it is, are minimal? >> sir, i have to say my expectations, and i think the nic's expectations about the outcome of geneva two have been pretty modest. , hopeful what they talked about -- >> the premise of the one was the transition of assad from power, and that is unlikely certainly given circumstances on the ground. >> well, it takes two parties to have a negotiation, and i think the syria regime position is that is not negotiateble. >> right. you know, this map that the

senator, i think that map would have looked different in 2009 than it does today, but going back to syria, have you seen the horrific pictures, and i'm sure you have, and revealed recently, the documented examples of torture and murder? have you seen those documents? >> yes, sir, they are terrible. and when you consider the humanitarian disaster, the two and a half million refugees, six and a half or seven million displaced, 135,000-plus people killed, it is apock lippic disaster. >> do you believe the documents are authentic? >> as best we know, yes, sir. >> so it's your professional opinion they are awe ten tick? >> i believe they -- i have no reason to doubt, and would be difficult to suggest, you know,

that something of that magnitude could have been fab fabricated. >> thank you. so the situation, as i quote from your statement is that regime and insurgents believe victory given their respective capabilities, in other words, next six months will be basically status quo? in your written statement? >> yes, sir. i think what we're facing right now is kind of a prolonged stalement where the regime does not have the sustaining power to hold on to areas they clear, and with the external support with the oppositions, thaim -- they will continue to be a thorn in the side. >> so that statement of the president of the united states if it's nots a matter of weather, but when assad leaves power is no longer operative nor the testimony before this committee by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and then

secretary of defense panetta, quote, the departure of assad is inevitable, and would you agree that the situation was dramatically changed on the battlefield when 5,000 hezbollah came in, raining government, and increased weapons supplies from russia, would you agree that that basically gives an effect on the battlefield? >> i may have said it here last year that at the time, at some point, you know, assad's days are numbered, but we don't know the number, and what made a difference is the support from, well, from russia, iran, and its surrogate, hezbollah. >> and sierra-iraq is an al-qaeda training ground and transit point back and forth from al-qaeda and al-qaeda affiliated groups? >> correct. it's a pore yows border this.

>> now, when you look at lebanon, jordan, turkey, and kurdistan, this is toot -- to the large degree of regional conflict, would you agree? >> certainly has regional implications, absolutely. >> 7,000 foreign nationals would want to return someday to their own country? that's the presumption. >> and the 26,000 there are extremists that, as you point out, who would like to attack the yeast of america? in your words, intentions, i believe. >> well, not all 26,000, necessary, and, by the way, that's the high end for the extremist, but there are long professed a desire of ultimately to attack the homeland. >> so the longer this goes on,

really, the more foreign fighters who go in, ect., ect., the more likely there is a greater and greater threat actually to the united states of america, would you agree? >> i would. >> so could you tell in me, in your mind, what are some of the options that we could example in order to change this stalemate on the battle feed as basically as you described it, and i agree with? >> well, sir, there's some things we could do that, at least in my domain, that are best left to closed session, but there are things. >> there are -- >> dramatically increase our assistance, but at least on my front, the intelligence areas, there are some things we could do. i thank you, and there are acigsal measures that we could

take that we have not taken? is that true? >> i'm sure there are, but it's not my place to speak to those. >> i understand that. finally, i guess, as my time runs out, it's a little difficult for a syria mother to differentiate whether here child is killed by a chemical weapon, starved to death r or by a conventional weapon, would you agree? >> well, absolutely. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator mccain, senator donnelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman, director clapper, general flynn, thank you for your service and thank the people of their organizations for their service as well, and we worry about

physical dangers and what i think about what can happen next, and i wonder what your greatest fear is as to a physical attack here in our country? >> a connecticut attack against the country or -- >> yes, sir. >> well, the potential the damage could cause on a large scale basis. fortunately, the nation state entities that have that capability probably have lesser intention to do so whereas the nonstate entities that have less

benign intentions do not have the capability. that's the mode we're in right now. that's why i'm very concern about kind of the up aerocomers, if you l not the first line, china and russia, and others that have more malign intent for us as they acquire capability. >> i answer it by two things. on the cyber side, there's the critical infrastructure, potential damaging effects, you know, our transportation, health care, clearly financial is an area that we have to pay very, very close attention to, our energy sector, and on the kinetic side, there's a range of things that keep me up at night. you know, when you see the mumbai style attacks, what happened in the mall in nairobi,

i mean, you know, what happened during the boston marathon, i mean, those are the kinds of things that we have to continue to work together in the intelligence community to make sure that we work as seam lizly as possible to work not only within the national side, but also on the federal, state, local, and try ball level. that's really an important aspects of what we're trying to do in the intelligence community, which is to work on integration on intelligence systems. >> that's where i wanted to go next, the integration. i think back do 2001, and i think of things put together, there's a pilot school, trained there, you know, how good is the coordination today in terms of all the different organizations talking to one another to say, look, we have something that looks off here, but we want to put it out to everybody else to see what they want to think. >> sir, i was around then, and

in the intelligence community, and i think it's vastly improved, and i think emblematic particularly is the integration of the fbi, end of the -- into the intelligence community, and that's made a huge difference in terms of penetrating what has been this fire wall for many, many years between foreign and domestic. the standup of the department of homeland security facilitated that as well as they engage with the state, local, and triball entities. i think there's been 5 lot of improvement, but this is a journey, not a fixed end point. >> in regards to the snowden damage, and he used simple software so to pull this off, so i guess the fear is how are we

making sure that when we put all this effort in with the different software packages, or, you know, they cannot do this again? >> sir, and, of course, in mr. snowden's case, a perfect storm for him because he was a systems administrator, and highly skilled technically skilled i.t. professional. they knew what he was doing. it was his job as assistant administrator to range across data bases, skilled below the radar, so what he was doing was invisible. had he been at fort meade proper at enrings sa headquarters, likelihood is he would have been detected a great deal sooner, so we are deploying, i mean, nsa

and rest of the intelligence community did things in terms of two-man control and tightening up discipline, who has access. we are going to proliferate deployment of auditing and monitoring capabilities to enhance our inside threat detection. we have to go need to change our security clearance process to a system of continuous evaluation. that said, though, there are no mouse traps saying we can guarantee there's never another edward snowden. our system is based on personal trust. we had historically, unfortunately, egregious violations of the personal trust. we have a couple right now, and we'll have them in the future. what our job is to ensure that we can detect sooner and cons -- consequently detour to this

magnitude. >> finally, i want to ask about -- you talk about organizations in materials they have that could cause incredible damage whether it's a portion of the wmd or they have these or those chemicals, and it is not always government. it is shadow organizations and others. in terms of tracking them, do we have an idea where the groups are located? secondly, you mentioned that these attacks are just as likely in europe as they would be here possibly you look at the situation in chechnya, that russia is also a potential. are we working with other governments even when they are not the most friendly to us, number one, and number two, are we tracking the groups on a constant basis? gel >> well, we track them as best wz can. it's tough intelligence problems.

it's particularly daunting with respect to bw since there are so many dual applications where you cannot -- it's not readily evident something is done for nefarious purposes. the other thing that helps us a bit, as we've seen in syria, is that without the required expertise and industrial infrastructure capabilities, it's hard for the groups to do much with them, but this is something we watch for carefully, and, yes, we cooperation as broadly as we can with all foreign partners to include the russians, who have, i think ire their level of cooperation has improved as time has gone on here, and now that we're into the sochi olympics, particularly with respect to external threats. >> thank you, thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator donnelly. senator chambliss. >> thank you, mr. foreman.

gentlemen, we often forget men and women serving under you put their lives in harm's way every single day, and in spite of the difficulties that we face that you've alluded to, we can never forget the fact that those men and women have done an outstanding job over the last several decades, but particularly, as you look back from 9/11 forward, they've done an amazing job of collecting intelligence, providing it to your customers to ensure that america did not -- has not sustained another major attack, so please express to them our proarks for their great work. director clapper, one country that has been a valued partner for so many years, got lost in the shuffle of what's been going on in the middle east particularly, and in africa over the last several weeks and months is egypt.

egypt has been a strong ally for so many years, a great partner in the intelligence community as well as otherwise. we've had military operations as well as intelligence operations with egypt for decades. now there's a lot of turmoil over there. when president mubarak was ousted, the add administration quickly threw him under the bus and embraced the muslim brotherhood who came into power. there's been no change in the position of the administration that i'm aware of on that, and even if there has been, i tell you having just returned from another trip to the middle east as well as having conversation with other allies from the middle east over the last few days and weeks, there is a strong perception in that part of the world that the united states has embraced the muslim brotherhood, particularly in e gyp from a political standpoint. with all of the opportunities

for training and the africa region, particularly libya and syria and other countries that are not far away from egypt, give us an assessment to the security condition of egypt today, particularly as they move into elections and where are we headed there? >> first, thank you very much for this commentary about the work of the men and women of the intelligence community, and we'll certainly convey that, and i think you are quite right to highlight the importance of egypt from the standpoint of the prominence, a population standpoint if nothing educational, a centerpiece in the middle east, an ally because of the access to the suez canal, peace treaty with israel, you could go ton as to why egypt is so critically important.

the security situation, something we are concernedded about, particularly in the sinai and emergence of a group called ansar, which is a terrorist group that is an al-qaeda wannabe, attacked the egyptian military in the sinai, of course, poses a threat to israel. there are other groups, jamal, some of whom were involved in the benghazi attack and other groups in egypt that we're very concerned about. that said, what we have attempted to to doings and john brennan because with his familiarity with that area of the world, led that effort with the ic, attempted to reach out to the egyptian security services and sustain our important relationship with them despite all the, ewe -- you know, the vague policies,

sustain strong intelligence partnership. >> general flynn, i was also in afghanistan on that same trip, and the feeling of our military, diplomatic core, and our intelligence community is exactly the same when it comes to the future of afghanistan, and that is there is just an uncertainty out there that has been created by the fact that no decision's been made by the administration by what sort of forestructure remains in place by afghanistan to ensure the games made over the years will remain in place and that there's security provided for both the diplomatic as well as the intelligence community going forward which is critical to ensure those gains are maintained. in looking at the elections that are forthcoming and taking into

consideration car disci who i think is off the charts now, and the statement that when you look at candidates who are up for election, and i know there's a significant number of them, but they can be narrowed down to serious candidates, it's my understanding that all of those have either publicly or privately said they intend to sign the bsa, so what's keeping us now from going ahead to make the decision that ultimately the bsa will be signed, why not clear up that uncertainty that exist with american assets on the ground in afghanistan? >> that's clearly a poly issue, senator, what the final decision will be by the president. i echo what i discussed, you know, the level of uncertainty,

the potential loss of confidence by the people of afghanistan, by the afghan national security forces, it was a real problem, and, you know, in the already held last year, late last year, you know, confirmed that they, that the people of afghanistan want this bsa signed, and president car disci, you know, stated what he stated, and i would just stay that for the long term, we have to make sure we keep in mind the international mind going forward. >> they have not coalesced around a lesser number, all 11 hanging in there, and publicly, at least to this point, president karzai has not indicated a favorite, so what that sets up, of course, is the election, and then probably after that, a runoff of some sort or more -- one or more

runoffs to come up with an elected president. then you have to wound every -- wonder, well, the first act to be to sign a bsa? this could be a very prolonged process. >> thank you. >> we went to the middle east in the summer, and my wife asked me my impression when i got back, and the sing the biggest impression is the quality of people we have working for us in the intelligence comiewrpt, the military, the state department, and, frankly, we have not been treating them well recently with shutdowns, furloughs, pay freezes, and i know it's sort of hallow to say we appreciate it, but, you know, we're not keeping up with the -- what we ought to be doing, but i just want you to convey there are people that realize sometimes i think we're

getting better service than we deserve, frankly, and i wanted 20 make that statement. the second is i've been coming to these hearings now for over a year, and every single one that i've been in, the alarm bells about a cyber attack have been sounded. i remember one of the witnesses said the number one threat was the cyber attack, and the next pearl harbor would be cyber, ect., ect., and yet we in the congress have not done anything. in 2012, there was a major cyber bill that did not pass, and this is not a criticism of anybody individually, but i'm getting frustrated that this institution is not moving on what we're told is the most serious threat we're facing. there are some motion and discussion going on, but i, for one, want to see that accelerated because you both pointed out this is a major threat and something to deal with. okay. first question. >> according to a story in the

12th of january there, there's significant difference in the intelligence assessment of the sighfullian agencies in the military about the future of afghanistan after 2014. since you represent those two elements, are there differences? if so, to the extent you can tell us in the open hearing, what are they, and i understand one side is not a little more, but a lot more pessimistic than the other. >> well, sir, first, thank you for your commentary about our people, and just bereave word on cyber legislation. i think it's clear we recently recognize we need a partnership with the civilian sector, and if nothing else, first line of warning. since we've done stiments in afghanistan in 2007, i think we, the intelligence community has been probably in the occupying

half the class that's empty, and other others occupy the glass that's full. there is, i think, some difference, i think we in the intelligence community, though, are pretty firm about, you know, what the future of afghanistan holds. i will tell you thee most important factor in influencing the future is the sustained external support for afghanistan, the afghan government in order sustain the army, which is improving. in our last nie, there's, i think, an instructive annex, annex b, that speaks to the russian history, and it does illustrate, and you can argue about the comparison between the russians and us and what afghan people think of them, but in the end, it is that external support that is going have the most

influence on the future of afghanistan. >> that was going to be my second question. just to be clear, you're talking about long term fiscal support, how about any military -- any troops presence? >> well, i mean, there is a debate about them, you know, there is the importance, i suppose, of to the extent that we can sustain a -- advise and train an assist mission, that will certainly facilitate the afghan government and ensure its future. >> the president of iran for a minute presents a different face. your professional opinion is this, is there a difference in kind or just cosmetics? >> i think it's probably substantive, but i don't think,

again, the supreme leader is still the supreme leader, and i think he whom they have nope each other for over 30 years, work ged together before, and i think the supreme leader has faith and confidence, but if he does not produce, if there is not some indication of improvement in the iranian economy because the extent that it degrades, that, of course, threatens the long term viability of the regime, so i do believe it's genuine, but it's pragmatic. >> does our intelligence community have a role to play in verifying whether the iranians live up to the commitments made in the original -- >> yes, we do. >> and do you think it's possible for us to have realistic verification? >> i do because of the extensive

additional surveillance authorities that will be given to the iaea. >> final question, and, general, i don't mean to be ignoring you, but directer clapper, you talked about snowden and the difference between a whistle blower and a person doing harm to the country. would you expand on why he's not a whistle blower or a hero? >> i'm only speaking to it from my standpoint, and i tried to stay out of the debate about his legal status and all that sort of thing. all i can speak to is the tremendous damage he's done which goes way beyond his concerns about the so-called domestic surveillance. >> in terms of damage, you mean in terms of damage to our ability to know what's important? >> to compromise sources'

methods and the trade craft and jeopardy place the on our value overseas partners. >> a final question on afghanistan, do you feel it's going to be necessary not only to have monetary support, but some kind of troop presence in afghanistan in order to maintain the gains that the country has made in this effort? >> senator, my judgment, i do. i believe we need that. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator king. senator graham. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i just got off the phone about a major issue affecting our forces in afghanistan. if i could, i'd like to read his statement and explain the issue a bit and not have it taken off my time if that's possible? >> take this a step at a time. >> okay. >> if there's objection -- i don't, but -- >> well, basically, the statement, just begin to me about five minutes ago.

the united states forces in afghanistan learned 65 dangerous individuals from a group of 88 detainees under dispute have been ordered release from the afghan national detention facility. the u.s. on several occasions provided extensive information that evidence on each of the 88 detainees to the afghan review board, the afghan national director of security, and attorney general's office. this release violates agreements between the u.s. and the afghanistan. we have made clear our judgment that these individual should be prosecuted under afghan law. we requested cases be reviewed, but the evidence against them was never considered including the attorney general begin the short time since the decision was made to transfer these cases to the afghan legal system. the release of 65 detainees is a legitimate force protection concern for the lives of the coalition troops and afghan national security forces.

the weapon of choice of individuals is the ied, widely recognized as the cause for civilian casualties in afghanistan. the release is a major step backwards for the rule of law in afghanistan. some previously released individuals have already returned to the fight, and in this substance release allows dangerous insurgents back to afghan cities and villages, i just want to lend my support to this statement, mr. chairman, and i've been working on this issue for quite a while. eighty-eight detainees the subject of the dispute. our forces have evaluated the people as very dangerous. the afghan people and the coalition forces. we oom requested they go through the afghan legal system. president karzai basically sidestepped his own rue of law, ordering the files over and immediate release of 65 detainees without ever going through the afghan legal system that had a 70% conviction rate.

we just lost two members of the reserve i work with as reservists providing mentoring at the main prison in afghanistan. i will be introducing the resolution condemning the action by president karzai, and i'll courage the colleagues to cut developmental aid off afghanistan as a response until after the next election. i just want my colleagues to know that the general has done a wonderful job trying to protect our forces, and he finds this release an offense to those who detained the people and those who died at their hands of the 88 individuals in question over 60 coalition forces have died as a result of the action of these 88, and i consider this a major step backwards in the relationship. i don't know what i'd tell a member of the coalition force killed by the 65 if that did happen, and i hope and pray it

does not, but the likelihood is great, and i end with this thought. president karzai, in my view, single handedly is destroying this relationship, that his erratic behavior, that his outrageous statements ewe mentioned, mr. chairman, are doing great damage, and i want the people of afghanistan to know that i yearn for a supportive relationship, politically, and economically, but actions like this make it very hard for an american politician to do business as usual in afghanistan, and general, you are over there dealing with this issue when i saw you in the last tour, and i just want to let those in charge of maintaining security over the detainees and all the people in charge of catching these guys, that this is a front to them, their work effort, and it's not unnoticed by the congress. i look forward to developing a bipartisan plan to push back as hard as possible.

the release is supposed to happen thursday. >> thank you for bird dogging this issue. >> thank you, mr. chairman. now back to the topic at hand. do we have the legal authority urn the amf to initiate strikes against syria in libya? >> >> sir, it's a legal area now that i would want to ask about. i don't want to give an unequivocal answer to that. >> i want to tell you what you told the committee this week and last week that the growing presence of a safe haven in syria now attached to iraq is presenting a direct threat to the homeland. is that still your estimate if >> well, it's a little more than that, but i think if i had to have a yes or no answer to that,

i would say yes. >> okay. well, if the testimony, general flip, do you agree with that? >> i think without some type of what i would just describe as ct pressure, we are looking at a growing sanction ware for terrorist groups to thrive from. >> they had the desire to drive us out of the middle east; is that correct? these groups? >> oh, absolutely. they would like to have their own islamic emirate. >> whether it's core al-qaeda or affiliate, the goal is the same no matter what the name may be is to drive the united states out of the middle east and create an islamic cal state throughout the region. is that the goal of all the organizations? >> yes. >> yes, okay. we have attempts against the homeland have been generated by

organizations, and that's the case. >> okay. you talk about the perfect storm, sequestering, diminished nsa capability, embolden enemy, and a region on fire. is that a perfect storm? >> questions. >> of the things we control, budgeting is one of the things we control here in congress. do you agree with that, both of you? >> yes, sir. >> can you give me a good reason why the united states' congress would be diminishing your ability to defend this nation given the threats you described? >> i hate to go where angels tread here, and, certainly, it's critical to congress, but we do the best we can with the resources we're given. >> let's put it this way, if

sequestering is implemented, how much more richtion will it assume in terms of the nation? >> well, substantial. i can't qiewnt -- qiewnt my that, but we are assuming more risk. >> do you agree with that, regime flynn? >> absolutely. >> the word "substantial" a good word, or should it be stronger? >> i think substantial is a good adjective. >> do you agree with that, general flynn? >> i do. >> okay. now, when it comes to the russians, this recent release of a conversation seen one of our dip mats -- two of our diplomats, do you think the russians intercepted that phone call? >> well, we don't know. ..

>> we told the united arab emirates that we would support a peaceful power plant, power program, but we deny them the

ability to enrich uranium. we just called one of our best allies that they cannot in rates if you had to risk in order of the country the you fear having a nuclear weapon where would you put kitchen. >> pretty high. >> to you agree whenever nuclear capability they possess would lead to a nuclear arms race in the middle east? >> well, sir, i think it would be very dependent upon the safeguards and the limitations of the program. >> this suny arab nations about whether or not they would claim the right to enrich if we gave it to iran? have you talked to any -- any leaders about whether or not there nationwide claim a right to enrich uranium. >> i have not had that conversation. >> would you please have that conversation and report back as an inappropriate for.

>> senator gramm the answer i think is yes. >> he said no. >> i have not had that conversation. >> this will have to be the last question. >> thank you. >> the question was, would you talk with them and report back to us. >> well, yes, i will when i can. >> thank you. >> senator sheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would just like to add a modification to my colleague's comments about the 1-to-3 agree with that we negotiated. in fact they voluntarily not -- they voluntarily agreed not to enrich. it is a minor difference, but nothing important one. director twitter.com/booktv, want to follow up on the question about the impact from the leaks by edward snowdon and but the agency is doing to address that. you commented they you are in

the process of changing the clearance process for individuals. can you describe a little more about what that means and when that will be completed? it has been over a year since edwards snowden has defected. i would hope that we can have a process in place. >> the system that we use today is, of course, people -- and i am speaking now of top-secret clearances, although it applies as well. an initial clearance and sometime firm after that is supposed to be five years, of periodic investigation is done to upgrade the currency of that person's parents. what we need is away -- and this is, i think, pretty much recognized -- a system of

continuous evaluation when a person is in the system, cleared initially and we have a way of monitoring their behavior, but of their electronic behavior on the job as well as off the job to see if they're is a potential or a clearance issue. and so our plan within the intelligence committee is to declare an initial operational cup -- debility by this september. well we're calling for the operational capability by september 16 which is pretty ambitious. this is not something we can do for free. it will require resources. in the meantime we can i stop. we have to continue with the current

slow walking rid of its weapons. can you talk about the role the russia is buying in what is happening right now. >> has a good question. it's something that we are monitoring as carefully as we can. given the fluid situation and syria it's hard to discern whether it is a genuine security concern which, of course, also could be used to slow roll. certainly it is in the regime's interest to stretch out this process as long as possible. in a way it serves to implicitly legitimize assad. i think is in russia's best interest because they view this as a dramatic diplomatic achievement on their part to broker this agreement, so i think that they will continue to press the regime to move, the

chemical either destroy them in place or move in and out of country. >> and do we have an acknowledged that resected of russia is continuing to put pressure on syria to do that. >> yes, they are. >> but they're not responding. >> well, the syrians will claim as they do, they have a genuine security concerns. they want specifically to have some jackets, i will call them, armored jackets around containers that contain not just the components but a mixture. and so they're concerned about that. it is hard to argue that given the security situation in terms of syria. >> are there other actions of the international community or the united states could be taking it would encourage more rapid compliance? >> well, that is -- well, the

big thing would be to continue the attention and diplomacy to insist that they keep added. >> there have also been reports on the news about the evacuation of refugees, some of the folks that are still there and have been suffering under the siege. the firing of those refugees despite an agreement to allow them to be evacuated. do we know who is doing the attacks on those reviews these? >> i do not. i will have to check on that. i don't know we have that level of fidelity. >> i would hope that we are taking whatever action we can recognizing that this is a policy position and not something that you are going to

comment on, but i hope we are taking whatever action rican to aggressively go after those people who are firing on the unarmed refugees in the un, people who are trying to evacuate. it is a just more than tragic situation. the international community is standing by about people being slaughtered. >> thank you, senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i wanted thank the witnesses for being here, for your service to our country. one task about recent reports that a somali pirates, there has been a failed prosecution of that case in the united states court where he has been potentially released. it really raises the question and i think and ask you about a particular in terms of our

detention program. one of the question and raises, the president said last may that he would like to get to the point where we've repeal the a you in half. here is the question. what happens in terms of detaining dangerous individuals, let's say members of al qaeda if we repeal the a you in half and close guantanamo, where do we eat detain these individuals and if we are in a situation where one of those individuals is acquitted in a united states court, a member of al qaeda and our options if we repeal the a you in half and no longer have guantanamo. i see this as a safety question for the united states. >> i have not. it is a hypothetical circumstance.

i would have to think that through and do research. >> do you think it is advisable that at this point given the footprint bse that at this point we are in a position where we can repeal the a you in half. >> well, again, i have to think that through. if, again, a hypothetical situation, just what would be done as a substitute, of the top of my head i just don't know. >> that's a pretty big question. here is another question. it is a question i have raised before. tomorrow we're able to capture the terrorists were would be with them? so if we capture the current

head of al qaeda tonight where would he be detained? faugh would it not be important to interrogate him and could you identify a length on how long you would need to interrogate the head of al qaeda? >> a hypothetical question, -- >> at think it is a fair question to the american people. if you capture the head of al qaeda tomorrow where would we put in, what would we did to interrogate him, where would we interrogate him? do we have a place to the interrogation, do we have a plan ? >> it would be situational dependent, and so i am reluctant to posit a hypothetical response to that is as i sit here i don't know. clearly there would be some arrangement made command we have done this in the past where we have an opportunity to interrogate him for intelligence purposes.

>> gen. michael flynn, how important would it be to interrogate that terrorist if we captured in tomorrow? >> it would be extremely important. >> and we know how long it would take us? would we want to put a time limit on the interrogation? >> we would not. obviously we would not. every interrogation is different . some take longer and obviously in that case it would be an important one. >> no longer the better. >> the longer the better. so we don't know yet what the plan is if we capture in tomorrow where we would put him and -- i see that as a huge problem and an important one unless either of you're able to tell me what the planned be. i guess the answer is no.

[inaudible question] >> the answer is no. >> again, i cannot speculate on a hypothetical issue like that. as important as it is common and is also would be. >> i would also like to ask both of you -- i saw a new york times report january 29, 2014, then said the u.s. said brush it tested a missile. it goes on to say that the american officials believe that russia began tests and they have concerns that russia has tested cruise missiles that meet violated the accord between our two countries. the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty. director clapper, says the u.s. have intelligence about this potential russian violation? have we had answers to those made?

>> and happy to discuss that in a closed session. >> thank you. i would like an answering closed session, if we knew as the united states senate was debating the new start treaty weather they had engaged in a violation and whether anyone was informed about the violation while the treaty was being negotiated. >> i very serious obligation to brief the congress. again, i think this would be best left to make closed discussion. >> i appreciate that. with regard to iran when we went to the munich security conference the foreign minister not only talked about did we talk, the ride of enrichment but essentially what he said is the the hotel rooms are filled with business when waiting to do

business with iran. what do you know what efforts being made right now to try to do business with iran and, in other words, how would you assess the strength of the sanctions and is there a concern that many are lining up to do business with iran? >> it is true that there are business interests that seek potential for business with iran there have been efforts made through government-to-government contracts to try to forestall that. >> but there have been effort made to forestall, but is there a sense that the sanctions are unraveling? that is what we heard from many people we talk to. >> there may be a sense of. will we try to watch in the intelligence community is the actual performance and the

performance of the iranian economy. so far we have not seen that, but that is something we're watching. >> you have not seen sanctions unraveling? >> i would not characterize that would not say that, no. >> i know my time is up, but i would like to take those questions in a classified setting with regard to russian treaty violations. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow up for stovall by thinking about the view and be very courageous men and women who serve with you and you often are unappreciated because of what they do in secret, risking their lives, putting there lives on the line every day. up with to say, very often will

we focus on is more of the failures rather than success because the successes are on scene and therefore unappreciated of unlike the baseball player who misses a pitch in the third inning, it hits five home runs and its toll by is manager, well, you miss that pitch in the third inning despite the fact that they've won the game. obviously we need to keep our eye on the results of the game and not compare what you're doing in any way to the sporting events because it is the most serious business in the world that we need to appreciate the successful work you did and do. of that said, with great appreciation of want to follow up on some of the questions that have been passed before regarding the techniques used by

at redstone which reported recently in the new york times. a very rudimentary kind of software and the spider that enabled him to scrape data out of the system. i found staggering the report of how relatively simple and easy is seems to be from the report for into compass tweeted. let me ask you, do you take serious issue with any level was in that report since february february 8th, the new york times article written by david sanger and eric schmidt? >> no, don't. it is probably accurate.

i think by way of explanation that thought is that once someone is inside the tent, so to speak, they are considered trustworthy. that was not the case your fists and throughout the intelligence community of pressure put on us to insure that analysts are able to talk to one another coming able to collaborate, have access to information that they need to do their job. so we have created an environment where analysts and others at the nsa had ready access to the information that they need or can refer to to help him do a job. again, the place to the perfect storm the last book cover your where the birds known as a skilled technician was aware of

that end aware of the safeguards such as they were built into the system and took advantage of them. >> would you agree that the focus has been on protecting against outside threats to infiltration or invasion and less so on the insider? >> a lot of the measures that you mentioned here in response to previous questions were put in the future tense, what needs to be done, will will be done. has been a year since the snowdon breach of trust, as you put it. perhaps with the tremendous damage. what has been done so far to protect against the inside. >> immediately what has been

done is remedial action in terms of to make control access to databases, much tighter control and monitoring of privileges' users. it -- the immediate aftermath. >> this morning to be done in your view? >> absolutely. and to go to, the system that we started a couple of years ago, a project called eyesight which was the enterprise community taking revenge of the necessary security enhancements and the basic mantra is attack the data and the people so that you can monitor where the data is and who has access on a real-time basis. >> why hasn't that measure been adopted already. >> it is, this is a big undertaking because it involves a senior -- single enterprise.

the whole intelligence community we have been looking at this for two years, but it takes time to do it. is laid out over four or five years. again, it's something we started before the snowden revelation. >> i'm speaking perhaps simplistically and unfairly, but i would, respectively that the immense and imminent threat posed by this kind of insider breach of trust with warrants even quicker implementation of such measures if resources may certainly -- anything we can do to assist. >> i appreciate that. >> let me switch gears, if i may, a little bit to an issue that has not been mentioned all. that is the threat of increased

naval strength on the part of china and in particular its naval capability in building additional submarines with ballistic capability. you mentioned it somewhat obliquely in your testimony. could you please give us an assessment of your view of the threat of chinese naval capability and in particular submarine capability and a threat to the homeland and it may represent. >> across the board the chinese embarked on a very impressive military modernization program across all realms. much of this seems to be predicated on the assessment of our strength. there will strengths, bases the

pacific, c4is our capabilities. and so across the board whether it is their missiles, the missile systems to lobby of the intermediate range, medium-range or icbm, going to more survivability which includes a summary component. and they have been committed and serious and a happy to go into more detail. >> i was calling to suggest the facts ought to be explored, we take the opportunity to do so. and and ask any questions of view but i appreciate you being here in thank you. >> regards anita class wed session and some foreign now needs questions the need to be answered. another colleague, also earlier

today as questions that needed a class by response. suraya and charter piecemeal is, this would be somewhat of a change. we will just have your range later on this week or next some time you come over and notify everyone on the committee and tell them what the subjects of the classified mean our so that everyone can come to a meeting if they choose. that is the only practical way to do it. >> thank you for joining us today. director you said in the intelligence committee in january that one of the extremist groups operating in syria has aspirations for attacks on the united states. i was wondering if you could elaborate on this and tell us whether or to what degree they have the capability or are close

to developing a keen ability of attacking the united states? >> this has been a tenant ever since they formed. ultimately planning for in attempting to execute an attack on the homeland. right now this is more aspirational than operational. rita seen evidence of the emergence of training camps. for example that have familiar signatures from afghanistan. of greater concern, as i mentioned in my opening statements, some al qaeda veterans from the afghanistan-pakistan area moving from syria which has served as a magnet for many of the extremists. they do harbor designs. and this is separate.

>> so there are other groups. what proportion of the rebel fighters in the syrian conflict with you and others in the intelligence committee characters as extremist and what level of the fullest you think that they have on the entire group? >> the number is somewhere in the neighborhood of all the other opposition fighters summer and a never read, the low range of 75,000 to 110,000. somewhere in the neighborhood of between 20, a top range of 26,000 every regard as extremists. they are disproportionately fighters on the battlefield. >> would you say that there is a significant relationship between between the front, especially

when you add and other extremist elements in what many people refer to as the more moderate rebel forces in syria? >> the question, is there a significant relationship between the extremist elements. >> well, they are there are agreements. oftentimes these groups will apparently, they're quite floyd, by the way, they may disagree ideologically, but as is convenient for them on a technical context we will agree to work together. of course we've had a falling and. they're fighting other opposition groups. >> if given this relationship as

his private there is, i assume frequently sharing of affirmation, perhaps sharing of equipment that goes on between extremist and moderate elements. >> well, that is hard to say, sir. this is very it fluid. there are some 151600 of these groups, various fighting groups, and they align themselves and realign themselves constantly. it is hard to make a generalized statement. >> warehouses of items provided as assistants to modern rebels where, as you know, wellness groups in december. were they involved in a seizure? psst --

>> i will have to research. i don't know off to my head. >> and to your knowledge, is there anything that was seized in connection with pat in december and has subsequently been used by any of the other extremist groups? >> i cannot say. >> iranian nuclear capabilities and beyond nuclear operations are obviously of tremendous importance. i would like to focus on a different aspect of that which has not received quite as much attention. the iranian development of a delivery system that would be capable of turning the united states or our forces abroad. if i could ask you, what is the

u.s. government assessment of the iranian icbm program development and its capability? >> as stated by the chairman in his opening statement we talked about 2015 time from given the development of we have seen, that's accurate. so by about 2015. >> the ability to test one. >> and so in order to you have to have someone that is potentially functioning. if they're receiving assistance from any of the country the development of their icbm. >> not currently, we don't believe. >> and when you say not currently, does that mean to you anticipate that they might be?

>> i was alluding to the history , the on-again off-again relationship. >> last december afghanistan agreed to negotiate a cooperation pact for long-term political security economic and cultural cooperation. the treasury department recently designated for iranian members to its list of global terrorists with their support of terrorism in intelligence activities against afghanistan. what is your assessment of the relationship between the government of afghanistan and iran, secondly the relationship between the taliban and iran. >> well, the iranians would clearly like to have as much

influence as possible in afghanistan, particularly with the forthcoming changes. they have had not been particularly successful. they have had disagreements, firings across the border. it is a less than one relationship, but that does not say the pair of trying to reach out. they have an astute diplomat to try to negotiate with the afghans, but i do not think long term there is suspicion and lack of trust behalf. >> thank you very much. >> senator nelson. >> drolen, thank you for your public service. you stated that 2015 is the time in which it is expected that

iran would be ready to test an icbm. is it true that there's is additional time that would be needed for iran to achieve the integration of a nuclear weapon onto an icbm? >> that is quite. well we are speaking of this simply a missile system the potentially has ranged. that is not to say anything about their needing a nuclear weapon. that's another problem. of. they're working on their space launch vehicle from the standpoint of the thrust in distance. hold it until the classified timing that it would take for the integration, were they to

have a nuclear weapon on to assume. we need to discuss this in a close session which of the bullet to the. it is to cut you tell me if this is correct, the administration policy that they are exploring shifting the use of drones, and unmanned aerial vehicles rights from the cra to media the, is that an accurate statement? >> yes, it is. that would be best left to a closed session. i just want to state at the outset that my opinions the that

is a mistake. i think fed what i consider to be a mistake and will ask with this question. one of the ballot of reasons, so stated is that by being the department of defense it would not be covered but over and therefore when the enemy says that we killed so many innocent civilians, which is usually not an accurate by any stretch of the imagination that we would be able to publicly state that. is that one of the justifications for the policy? >> yes, sir. it is awkward discussing this in public. i would not characterize that as the primary reason. >> and i will state the closing

that the enemy is going to state that anyway. and i think that the that this government has said has been exceptionally precise and that all of these accusations by those that are opposed to the interest of the united states but how many civilian casualties occur from the strikes. it is the senator's opinion that that is not accurate. >> let me ask you, since you all testified earlier that the department of defense is sending out this defense on this time service, tell me, do you worry about the clandestine services getting in each other's way?

>> i do not. i think actually just the opposite. there will accrue from this that this will help to promote more integration between the two services. this has been held longstanding arrangements, and that they under the tenants, of what is intended with the defense fund distance service that will serve to promote greater integration with the national clandestine service. >> okay. mr. chairman, i would like to explore the further. >> excuse me, i see the comment on classified meetings which we will schedule and will not come to day after this meeting. it will come at a later date. senator, thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. my thanks to those who work with you in the valuable mission that

you have. director, general, would like to follow a little bit on my colleagues, various colleagues to a spoken about the nuclear capabilities of iran and the direction of this seem to be headed. i would like to put it in a little different flavor. can you tell me what the reaction was of our allies in the gulf, the monitoring and also the israeli government with regard to the november deal that we came about with the country of iran? >> well, it is fair to say that many of them were not comfortable with this. in fact what they were unhappy with it. >> general flow.

>> in a region that already has enough tension. >> they believe that this interim deal is going to slow the progress in any way. >> these and other governments. >> exactly. >> they generally have concerns about whether you're willing not . >> which you agree with that? >> yes, i do. >> what is your intelligence tell you, and how do you believe these nations are going to react if they believe that iran is very, very close to obtaining and delivering a nuclear weapon? >> low, at that point they're not new that point as they sit here today. obviously that would be of great concern to all those.

obviously the objective here is to forestall a. >> right, would you have any intelligence that would give you an inclination on how those countries would react? >> as i said, if iran actually obtained a nuclear weapon they would go to general quarters. >> also director of we are going to pick it to the chinese and the russians. in your testimony before the senate intelligence committee you highlighted the chinese military modernization. are they modernizing and and for your forces as well? >> yes, they are. >> i understand the russians are investing heavily in modernizing their nuclear forces. is that correct? >> yes, it is. >> why? do you have any idea why these

two countries are doing that? >> in the case of the russians this is their kaufhof foundation to power status. whenever other deficiencies they may have how they're going to sustain the modern intercontinental nuclear strike capability. in the case of the chinese it's a much smaller capability which they view as more defensive. so since it is smaller they don't feel their players in the arms control of carmen. they profess no first use, and so their perspective is different. it's just part of their overall campaign to modernize and military across the board. >> are you believing that these countries elevate the role of

nuclear weapons would play within their total arsenal that they have? >> i don't think -- well, in the case of the russians i actually think it's probably less predominant, if that is what your question is. it is a much, much smaller force than they had during the cold war, so in that sense and in the case of russians given there chance to modernize their conventional forces that would say it's less prevalent than it was. >> i have an article here that says that reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the u.s. security strategy is a u.s. objective. russia pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy. this is from the national intelligence council report on

global trends for 2030. came out in 2012. do you disagree then with that report with regards to their assessment of what the russians are doing? >> no. >> so i thought i misunderstood you, known. >> i was just referring historically to the cold war. carol was going to emphasize that there will be an ingredient of the aspect of their overall national power. >> and would you say they are expanding with regards to that nuclear power and are they changing the way that they would perhaps use those nuclear weapons in the future? >> probably that would be best left to close session.

i also raised it in the current context only in the -- to ask whether it would help from an optics standpoint to split nsa from cyber come. i think all the reasons that -- which i think are compelling for keeping them together are still germane, and the president, i think, the president came to that conclusion on his own. >> and not just the optics but

the cost. would there be an increased cost in your estimation if the two were split? >> there could be. but the complication would be affecting such -- in the cyber domain there is so much integration and so much more e fresh sei that accrues from having them united as one. only though, i think, the decision is to whether to exploit or attack that i felt throw or four years ago and the best person to make the judgment is the director of nsa and cyber com is one. not to have them as competitive entities. >> thank you very much, gentleman. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator manchin. >> thank you. i want to thank you for your service and to the men and women who serve with you to the families who sport both the military and civilian side.

it's a tremendous undertaking you have. i appreciate very much. people in west virginia appreciate you. that being said, what we're going through and since i've been here for three and a half years i've had briefings on cybersecurity what it can do 0 the water and grid system and food supply. as you know, we're going through a difficult time in west virginia with the water. it shows me what could happen. we need some assistance to build confidence in. we can did have an alternative system or a backup system. we had to continue to run the water plant even though it ingested the chemical mchm. with that being said, we lost the confidence of the people in west virginia to where they believe the water is safe to try. -- drink. we have no official in federal government or state government that say it is safe. they say it is appropriate. they use different words because of legal ramification flps are

so many things to test it. with that being said, i think ours is a wake-up call. thank gosh we had no deaths. it's a wake-up call. i would ask all of you to look very carefully how we best control this around the country and help other states avoid what we're going through now. hopefully assist us in getting baa to be normality, if you will. we're going to come back bigger, better, stronger. we have to. we have people that are still much concerned and not using the water back to normal usage. especially expect assistant mothers, small children, and elderly. with that being said, i agree with general alexander, the outgoing director of the u.s. cybercommand statement last year play huge role. the national guard play a huge role. they provide additional capacity and ability to work with the state much like active duty forces today.

the guard consistent of homeland security. they are ideally suited for cyber warfare. as a former governor, and chief of our national guard, i know the capability they have in the capacity. and the ability on the frontline defense for every one of our state. every government will tell you that. they're located in every state and not limited few military bases. i just want to know from both of you what your -- what we can do assist that if you believe it is the direction we should go for cyber to help secure our state and vital necessities we depend on. >> well, sir, first i'm going to comment about water. and your characterization of what happened in your state adds wake-up call. i couldn't agree with you more. this increasingly, i think, we see as a national security issue overseas it can easily be the source of conflict between countries. case in point is the grand

renaissance dam that ethiopia is building and the impact that can have on egypt is a case in point. on cyber, the guard reserve,ic this is another case where they can play a huge role as they do now with isr, for example. so i know if admiral rogers is confirmed for the position of director nsa and cyber com commander he'll continue the same etch sis and support that general alexander had. >> from the intelligence community director embrace the guard would you support that position that the gourd would play the frontline in defense on cyber on homeland here? >> yes, sir. a little bit far removed from where i sit now, but from prior seats i can certainly agree. >> it makes all the sense in the

world from us sitting here watching what we go on the frontline. it would be helpful. >> i would add, senator, that the vital necessity for the guard and our reserve, especially in the intelligence aspect of what they do, especially as it relates to the critical infrastructure in many of our states. all of our states. you know, it's an understatement to say they're vital. >> sometimes we are thought process at department of defense incorporating them in to a full active range they have been sometimes runs strong head wind, if you will. i think we are getting past that now. we really need this. we look for your help, also, in our state of west virginia on trying to get back to normal, if any. let me go, if i may, the "the wall street journal" reported an attack on the california station. unidentified individual cut the phone line. within 30 minutes 17 gibbet

transformers were shot out. no one has been arrested or charged with this attack. i'm sure that we're pursuing that heavily, correct? >> the fbi and the state and local officials definitely are, yes, sir. >> and of the three are you most concerned about our grid, our food supply, or water supply? >> that's a hard choice. sin potentially all of them are at risk. probably the thick we have the most impact quickly would be a substantial attack on our power grid. and the incident in california is also a wake-up call and very instructive. >> general, if i may. resir judges -- [inaudible] threaten attack on them which is currently under militant control, i believe. portions our iraq have been

cordoned off with the iraqi army setting up security check point and blocking off the roads. iraq seems to be facing well-funded militant of al qaeda and the islamic state. how -- does the threat of resurgence of al-qaeda-affiliat pose for the recent stability there? >> i think it is a increasingly concern that we're going have to pay close attention to. not only inside of iraq but the whole region. the scale of the what they are involved in now. particularly the al qaeda element in iraq and the level of direction they're having. the level of killing they're doing inside that country is terrible. >> thank you. my time is up. senator man chain, senator

cruz. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director clapper, general flynn, i want to thank you for being here. and thank you for your service helping protect our nation and i want to thank the men and women military and civilian that serve with you both. there are a number of topics i would like to discuss. i would like to start by focusing on al qaeda. and you said previously, quote, sustained counterterrorism pressure key organizational setback, and the emergence of other power centers of the global violent extremist movement have put core al qaeda on a downward trajectory since 2008. i want to ask you what, if your view, is the definition of core al qaeda. >> my definition of core al qaeda is the leadership group that has been essentially in the pakistan. that is precisely what is meant by that. and clearly they have been

profoundly degraded not eliminated by any stretch. and so that area, in my view, remains the ideological center for al qaeda. but not the operational center anymore. >> okay. what is the value of that distics are they any less dangerous to american what the administration is defining core al qaeda? >> well, i think an organization like al qaeda and the arabian peninsula aqap poses a much greater sort of tactical near-term oarpgal threat to the homeland and does ideological center of core al qaeda and the fata pakistan. >>. >> given the recent revolution of the "washington post" that

the leader of the branch in dour ma, libya sb who is former detalk aboutee, as you know at guantanamo bay and trained in bin laden camp in yemen. and was in fact on al qaeda's payroll. shouldn't his group also be considered part of core al qaeda? >> well, they're not. and of course core al qaeda the central leadership picks and chooses who is among the wannabes or actually nighted or, if you will, so designated as an al qaeda organization. so there are a lot of these organizations that profess extremism have in some cases the same goal with but are not a part of al qaeda. soot jamaal organization in egypt. a violent organization, but not

yet a part of al qaeda formally to the extent it has meaning. >> so the determination of core al qaeda -- who is making that? it would seem to me that characteristic of al qaeda being on the payroll and -- >> it is ideological leader is probably pick somebody in charge of that. of course, he recently essentially excommunicated al qaeda in iraq or isio as known. so he is the does knee for deciding who is al qaeda. martin dempsey gave to the house armed services committee when general dempsey was asked about

the ability of the military to target the terrorist who attacked us in benghazi. general dempsey's response was that those individuals were not therefore not under the authorization for for use of military force. so the military didn't have the ability to target those individuals. i don't know about the leeltty i

can actually shoot at them. >> given that these terrorists are professing allegiance to al qaeda. at least portions of them are lead by others who with dies directly to bin laden and give they murdered four americans does it make sense in we should be restrained after going after them and bringing them for just science. >> we can go after in term of capturing or killed not -- our view is if they are terrorists of any stripe we are going to coour best to collect as intelligence on them as we possibly can.