she'll be 67 with a 68 birthday later on in the year, making nine-year commitments when you're 67 years old to, you've got to really think long and hard how do i feel about this, how do can i feel up to it? and she had an incredibly grueling job as secretary of state, and, you know, towards the end had some health issues and things come up. and i'm not saying it disqualifies her in any way because i don't think it does, but she's just got to do i feel up to it. and back in december of 2011 when she was of running for the nomination, i spent one today out on the road with her campaign in iowa, and i think we left the hotel at 6:15, 6:30 in the morning, we got back around 1:30 the next morning. and it beat the hell out of me, and i'm a lot younger. and she was doing that every day, and i just had to do it once. and so i think that nobody knows better than she does how arduous

it is to run for president. so i just think there's a one in three chance, a little less than a one in three chance that she doesn't run. >> by the way, biden turns 74 right after the election in 2016. >> yep. and just -- not that all of you are not much better at math than i am, so she'd be 77 at the end of the a second term. so you just think that and just say, you know, does she feel like it. but, again, if she runs, i think the odds are overwhelming that she'd be the republican nominee -- excuse me, democratic nominee. [laughter] she will have to deal with how do i become more relevant to be future than to the past, and she can't run a, hey, remember how great the economy was when my president, when my husband puz president back in the 1990s? keep in mind the youngest voters will be 2 years old when her husband left office, so, you know, she's going to have to run

a very different campaign than she ever has before. >> and i would just add i think she has to dump shade herself -- differentiate herself from barack obama and his 41% job approval rating. how does she do that without alienating obama's supporters? that's not going to be easy. >> i've got a couple of questions here, can they all seem to go in similar decisions. there are a lot of them on the debt ceiling and the brinksmanship is over for the moment, how long will the honeymoon last, and is austerity dead forever? i don't, i think we have austerity, but what is the next steps? the other one that is related to this is boehner keep his job after the next election, can he manage the factions that are in the house and on the -- is the house on the cusp of implosion? so on these issues as drama that we get a bit of a break from, when is it coming back and, actually, my father told me that boehner just got a vacation

house -- >> in florida, yeah. >> so he's wopped oring if he's leaving -- wondering if he's leaving. >> i'll do the debt ceiling fiscal stuff. we don't have another debt ceiling fight for another year or so. we go through the fall election into early 2015. we don't have to worry about that. i'm not sure there's going to be a budget this year or not, but i certainly don't see any kind of a budget showdown coming at any time soon. you know, as far as whether fiscal austerity is dead, i mean, i just go back to these two great themes that i mentioned at the beginning, the two great themes being we've got a very accommodative fed for two or three years, and we've got fiscal restraint also for another two or three years. and as charlie points out, we don't redistrict until 2021. and i think it's a pretty safe bet that this house stays republican for a while. and as long as it does, you know, people forget there's seven more years of the sequester. you know, they tinkered around

with it a little bit, they had -- they reduced it a bit and they had offsetting revenue raisers, spending cuts, but sequester's not gone. so i would argue that the discretionary outlays stay flat. the big issue as we go into the later part of the decade is whether anyone has the courage to take on entitlements. and the evidence in the last month is quite discouraging on that front. you know, paul ryan had a little, tiny change for military retirees, and it blew up in his face, and they had to undo it. you saw last week the white house abandoned its effort to have a small cola chained, a chained cpi for social security. so i would guess that's the real elephant in the room, whether we address that later in the decade is unclear. but domestic discretionary spending stays flat to down for the next several years. >> well, diane's father's right that boehner and his wife apparently bought a condo in south florida recently, but he

said they'd been going down there for years and just finally decided to buy one. i've been thinking for six months or so that speaker boehner would probably step down can, resign or something right after election, not before because, you know, you never want to be a lame duck speak for any extended period of time. but, to me, john boehner, here's a guy that he loves life. they were never going to carry john boehner out of the house in a pine box. this guy, i think it's, like, okay, i've been speaker of house for four years. it's an enormous honor, there's not a higher honor in congress than to be speaker of the house, and i'm tired of dealing with some of these, you know, some people close to him have described them as the caveman caucus. and i'm outta here, you know? and i kind of think that there's a very good chance -- and also if you watch majority leader

eric cantor, over last year, year and a half increasingly he's sort of looking and acting more like somebody that's about to take over power. and the add very star y'all relationship that -- adversarial relationship that they had four years ago is gone, and i expect that, you know, a year from today we'll probably be looking at speaker cantor, not speaker boehner. and it's not going to be that anybody beats boehner, because, you know, i don't think that's going to happen, but that baner's just going to say, you know, this has been a lot of fun, and there are golf courses yet to play. [laughter] and wines yet to -- vintages yet to sip. >> well, we've run out of time, ask i want to give my deep thanks to my two friends, charlie and greg. and few you know why i rely on them so much. i also quote them because i can't say anything that they say, but i quote them a lot because they say it so colorfully and so around tuck lately and make me a better economist for it.

so thank you both, and we appreciate you being here. [applause] >> and a live picture on this monday morning of nation's capitol where an early march snowstorm has canceled most events around town including the u.s. house. the senate, though, is still planning to meet today at 2 p.m. eastern. no legislative work is expected as lawmakers are continuing to make their way back to the d.c. area. the senate had planned on taking an executive nomination vote, that vote will be postponed now until later this week. on the agenda in the house this week, debate on legislation delaying the health care law's individual mandate for a year. you can see the senate live starting at 2 p.m. eastern right here on c-span2 and the house, of course, later this week on our companion network, c-span. in the meantime, president obama's 2015 budget is expected to make it to the hill this week. national journal writes: the

president's proposed spending plan for fiscal 2015 to be unveiled tuesday will command much of the attention in congress this week. both the committees have set hearings for wednesday to pore over its details. the senate's also expected to take up competing bills to combat military sexual assault. and house republicans, after abruptly scrapping a measure to address skyrocketing flood insurance premiums, believe they have resolved internal differences enough to proceed wednesday geared at attracting some democratic support. and join us later when secretary of state john kerry will speak at the 2014 aipac conference, the group is holding their yearly policy conference. you can watch secretary kerry's remarks live at about 5 p.m. eastern on our companion network, c-span. >> the internet as we know it today bears no resemblance to monopoly telephone service back in the 1930 and '40s and

'50s. and what the courts have said and what the congress supports is if i walk in to a grocery store and i buy a gallon of milk and pay $3.50 a gallon, if i buy ten gallons, i pay $35 for all ten gallons. well, tom wheeler's fcc wants to say you can use as much milk as you want, and you only have to pay $3.50. that's just wrong. netflix is the biggest user of the internet as people download their movies. sometimes they're as much of 30% of the volume of the internet, obviously, they should pay more than someone who uses the internet once a month. i'm being very sum policic, but that -- simplistic, but that's the genesis. and these companies have spent billions and billions of dollars to is the up their systems and to provide the fiber on the you cans and all the mega speeds

that we just take for granted. at some level they should be allowed to charge based on volume. >> net neutrality, spectrum auctions and other telecom issues tonight on "the communicators" at 8 eastern on c-span2. >> c-span2, providing live coverage of u.s. senate floor proceedings and key public policy events. and every weekend, booktv now for 15 years, the only television network devoted to nonfiction books and authors. c-span2, created by the cable tv industry and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. >> a senate foreign relations subcommittee recently looked at stability in lebanon including the impact of the syrian war and hezbollah's efforts to destabilize the region. state and defense department officials testified at the hearing which also covered the refugee crisis caused by the one million syrian refugees who now

live in lebanon. this is just under two hours. >> i want to call this meeting of the senate foreign relations committee, the subcommittee on the near east, and central asian affairs to order. i want to welcome all who are here, especially our four expert witnesses who we'll hear testimony from today. the senate is currently in the middle of a vote on a veterans' bill that will take a bit of time, but i want to take advantage of folks being here. we will proceed to a first panel and then a second panel with questions, and this is a very important topic. the topic of the hearing today is lebanon at the crossroads. i just returned from a trip in lebanon last week with senator angus king of maine. we went together because we served together on -- serve together on armed services and budget committees, but i'm on the foreign relations committee, and senator king's on the

intelligence committee. we spent time in israel, palestine, lebanon and egypt. and in some ways i think we were probably most excited about the trip to lebanon because neither of us had been to lebanon, we have strong feelings about situation there, but we felt like we needed to ground those feelings and thoughts with some reality check. and on the basis of that trip, i do feel very strongly that the title of this hearing is apt. lebanon is at a crossroads. syrian conflict about which we spend so much time in foreign relations and armed services has devastated sir or ya, many of its neighbors, but at least in the american press and in the telling of the story about syrian effects, lebanon is often an overlooked neighbor with respect to stories about the syrian crisis. lebanon's been extremely generous in welcoming syrian refugees into the country as has been its tradition. and it's paid the highest price, i believe, in terms of a stability and security of

country. remember than deserves our attention and continued investment and partnership, and if we do that and we do it the right way, it will be good for the country and good for regional and global security. in july and august, i'm sorry, in july of 2013, senator king and i in separate congressional trips visited turkey and jordan. and when we were in turkey and jordan, we saw, experienced, visited refugee camps and talked with leaders about the strain of syrian refugees on these u.s. partners. but it was important we go back to lebanon to have those same discussions, and what we saw was challenging. the population of lebanon is a little bit over four million, and there's nearly a million, by many accounts more, from syria on top of refugees of palestine that have been there many decades. kind of wrapping your head around the notion of a refugee

population equivalent to 25% of the population of the country is pretty dramatic. imagine 80 million war refugees coming to the united states over the period of about two years. that would be 25% of our populationment you can imagine how -- population. you can imagine how many challenges that would pose. and that size of refugee population, obviously, poses many, many significant difficulties for lebanese civil society. senate king and i set up this visit to lebanon a couple of months ago, but right before we arrived in the country, the government of lebanon was able to form after many months of gridlock. as many of you know who follow lebanon, the challenge of forming a government among competing factions with cabinet ministries in a sufficient ratio to receive parliamentary approval is very, very difficult. we had a chance to be the first congressional -- delegation to meet with the president and the

prime minister. we offered congratulations on the formation of the government, and we discussed with each of hem the relatively -- them the relatively prompt path for presidential elections. and they need to keep that path on time and the need for a balanced and strong ministerial statement, that statement of government that is done within 30 days of the formation of the government that sorts of establishes key priorities for this government in this phase. we think the formation of the government with presidential elections in lebanon, the president is elected by parliament on a two of thirds vote, the car ruing out of presidential elections to provide assistant in add ring some -- administering some of the challenges that result from the syrian refugees. but that will not be sufficient. there must be much more work done by international partners, including the united states, if we cower about the stability of lebanon. we met not only with elected officials, we also met with many ngo administering aid to syrian

refugees. we met with members of parliament and cabinet ministers in the newly-formed government, we met with the unhgr administrator to talk about refugee issues. and what we found, bluntly, was again and again even if we would ask questions about lebanese internal issues, within a very short time the answer would end up being about syria and about the syrian challenge. not only the refugees coming into the country, but how the decision of the hezbollah organization to participate so actively and visibly in the syrian civil war has increased violation, largely sunni/shia violence within the country of lebanon. it was a challenging trip. one morning we were leaving the american embassy to go have a meeting with president suleiman, and a bomb went off in downtown beirut near where we were. you could hear it, you you coule the smoke. this was an everyday event to

many, sadly. we assumed that our meeting with the president would be canceled. if there were -- if it were here, a bomb going off, two motorcycles exploding a bomb that killed many and secured many, many more -- injured many, many more, the president would say i've got my hands full, i don't want to have of the meeting. but president suleiman, basically, wanted us to see the kind of challenge that he was dealing with, and so the meeting continued. and in the midst of the meeting, the president was being interrupted with phone calls to try and talk to the iranian ambassador, this particularly bombing was near an iranian cultural center to talk to others. and it was a little bit heartbreaking to see the normality of the situation and to feel as advisers we're just -- visitors, we were just there for a brief time, but challenge that must pose for the everyday life of those caught in cross fire of violence occurring in random ways in random neighborhoods. on the question of syria, i think we all agree that u.s.

diplomatic energies notwithstanding, we're not happy with the path that the situation in syria's taking, not by a long shot. united states is the largest provider of humanitarian aid to syrian refugees outside the country, including in lebanon. the aid that we give is through the u.n. and then distributed through worthy ngos. we're the largest provider of humanitarian aid, we are deeply engaged in negotiations around the eventual destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile in syria, we're engaged in geneva to try and find a path forward, but while we are deeply engaged, we're not happy with the process and the progress. and so that continues to pose challenges that could be of longstanding nature for lebanon. we, weeks ago i called for a resolution after meeting with santorums of civil war in syria who exited through lebanon to try to provide more aggressive insertion of humanitarian aid in

syria. not just outside the country, but the focus op aid inside sir -- on aid inside syria. the u.n. last week adopted a resolution finally overcoming russia's propensity to veto even humanitarian resolutions. last week there was a little pit of a break but, frankly, it'll only be determined on whether humanitarian aid starts to be delivered in a more significant way. if we're to try to tackle the challenges and be a good partner in lebanon, we need to continue the delivery of humanitarian aid in syria, the provision for refugees who have exited syria and to try to find a path to a resolution or cease fire in the civil war. during our visit to lebanon, we also had the opportunity to visit with lebanese armed forces and explore the ways in which the united states is working in tandem with the armed forces.

we found a here degree of satisfaction with that relationship within the armed forces. many of the armed forces leaders we met, the lebanese armed forces had done training either in the united states or with u.s. military leaders. and i would say throughout the region probably this -- in lebanon, the degree of satisfaction in the mil-to-mil relationship was probably the highest. in some critical areas the armed forces are weaker than the hezbollah militia. that's an unusual situation to contemplate there an american standpoint where it would not be imaginable that a militia in the united states would be more powerful than the armed forces. it's kind of a -- challenges concepts that you have about the strength of armed forces. but every day and in numerous ways the american military leadership is working with the lebanese armed forces to increase capacity whether it's technology or training, and we found a high degree of satisfaction and appreciation for those relationships.

we want to make sure that we continue this. because it's not just syrian effect, it's also al-qaeda and other extremist groups that we worry about. they must not be able to establish a base of operations in lebanon. we feel like the lebanon -- the plight in lebanon is an untold story of the syrian civil war. finally, before i introduce our first panel and we have a bit of a dialogue, the other reason to have this is our hebb news-american -- lebanese-american population is such a strong part of america. this is not only to cast a spotlight on a part of the world where a story's not been told, but to the also honor americans whose tradition and heritage is such that they have strong connections in lebanon. and lebanese-americans are often not removed from lebanon, they're deeply engaged in lebanon. we find that in virginia and in so many communities throughout the united states. the lebanese-american

contribution many our society whether it's the foundation of st. jude's hospital which is a spectacular story or so many other areas is something that's really notable. and when we have significant chunks of our population who cower so deeply about their own homes, that in and of itself is a reason for the united states to be focused as well. so both because of the critical role of lebanon in the middle east, but also because of this strong lebanese-american population in this country, we decided to hold hearing and focus on ways where the united states can continue to be partner but find strategies and ways to be better partners. we have two panels with us. senator rich is the ranking member on the subcommittee on the near east, south and central asia, and i suspect senator rich will be here when the vote is done at some point. when he arrives, i'll ask if he has opening comments, and i may interrupt the testimony. but i want to move into our first panel, our first is two distinguished folks, i will introduce them both and ask each

to give opening statements. larry silverman is secretary of state for near eastern affairs. mr. silverman was helpful in prepping me and senator king to go do the visit to lebanon last week. he's been director of israel and palestinian affairs for the department of state and also served as vice president biden's assistant in russia. he focused on issues relating to the middle east, served as special adviser to bill burns. and, will silverman, glad to have you with us. we are also pleased to be joined by major general mike plane who's the principle director in the office of secretary of defense for policy, helping to execute national security strategy for 15 middle east nations including lebanon. of and we're happy of to have him with us today. with those introductions, i'd like to ask mr. silverman first to offer your testimony.

we accept your written testimony into the record. try to summarize within five minutes, then general plane, and then we'll get into question and answer. >> thank you very much, chairman cain, and thank you for -- kaine, and thank you for inviting me to testify on the situation in lebanon and our policy toward that very important country in a volatile region, as you saw directly. your hearing comes at an important moment for lebanon security and stability. public discussion of lebanon, as you say, in the united states is often focused on the ref of few gee flows into that country. refugee crisis that you witnessed firsthand during your recent visit represents an urgent, imperative need. that said, lebanon faces broader issue, and the united states is helping lebanon respond to these challenges because lebanon's future affects important u.s. interests in the region which are very obvious just by the geographical nature of lebanon's location and it neighborhood. the syrian conflict threatens progress if lebanon --

[inaudible] and to establish lasting stability and an effective political systemment the february 15th formation of a boft by prime minister salam after ten months of gridlock is a welcome development and an opportunity for the united states and lebanon to work together to achieve shared goals. the lebanese people deserve a government that responds to their needs and protects their interests. as it works to gain a vote of confidence from parliament and begins to exercise full powers, this government is in one sense better than its predecessor. nearly all political factions are represented in a careful balance. march 14th faction is in the government. in order to obtain confidence, the cabinet, as you say, must now agree on a ministerial policy statement. we have expressed support for this government. how we work with it will depend on its policies and its action. the next political hurdle, as you know, is the end of president suleiman's term in office on may 25th. presidential elections should be conducted on time, freely and

fairly and without foreign interference. we hope that the spirit that led to the government formation will also insure that there is no presidential vacancy. i think you know already, chairman, mr. chairman, lebanon's unique security problemsing as far as the border, hezbollah's weapons stockpiles, the need for all armed groups to be disarmed. and you know that existing political and sectarian differences have been spencefyed by the -- intensified by the war in sur ya. hezbollah hinted to dissociate lebanon from foreign conflicts. hezbollah on behalf of it foreign supporters is dragging the lebanese people into a war in defense of the assad regime. hezbollah's posture of acting inside the state when it is convenient but stepping outside the state to use arms and violence when it bushes the deeply threatening -- when it wishes is deeply threatening. through a wave of reprehensible

terrorist attacks that have killed and injured scores in beirut and other cities. amidst this, the lebanese armed forces have acted to to maintain internal security. just three days ago two lebanese armed forces soldiers were killed in a terrorist suicide bombing. as you know, the laf has had recent counterterrorism successes, capturing some high-profile terrorists including a facilitator for al-qaeda-affiliated groups responsible for several suicide bombings. these incidents highlight the ongoing dangers from hezbollah's support for the assad regime and the flow of violent's treatmentists whether they be from al-nusra, the islamic state of the levant. the critical material and training we provide to the laf and the interim security forces builds their capacities to

conduct operations against extremists, terrorists and criminal organizations. my colleague, general plane, will offer details on this. we are trying to increase our foreign military financing to the laf in order to modernize it and build its capabilities, particularly to secure its borders and its border with syria. we need to maintain, mr. chairman, we need to maintain the strong partnership we have built with the laf. we, and we appreciate congress for its continued support of state and defense programs that enhance lebanon's security and economic development. mr. chairman, you saw that -- and you said -- that lebanon hosts more syrian refugees than any other country in the region. there is not a single lebanese community that has not been affected by the crisis. the united states is doing its part to help lebanon deal with the burden, providing over $340 million in assistance. we urge other countries to meet the pledges that they have made. there's also been a very

damaging economic spillover to the tourism sector, to investment and trade. the world bank has estimated the crisis will cut real gdp growth by 2.9% this year, and the conflict would reach $7.5 billion. the most promising economic sector would be possible substantial reserves of offshore natural gas and even oil deposits. we hope those will be explored and contracted, and the state department is engaging with both lebanon and israel to see about potential solutions to the maritime, their maritime boundary dispute. undersecretary -- secretary general of the u.n. ban key moon and president suleiman last september launched the international support group for lebanon. we look to this group not to be a one-off in september, but to be an active vehicle by which the international community can provide the support to promote stability. secretary kerry will attend the next gathering of this group, the international support group,

in paris next week. we're also, the united states is also committed to insuring an end to the era of impunity and assassinations and political violence in lebanon. of that's why we strongly support the work of the special tribunal for lebanon which just began one month ago, the trials, to determine and bring to justice those possible for assassinating the former prime minister and dozens of others. the lebanese people have waited too long for accountability and justice. unfortunately, as we all know, political violence still plagues lebanon. just in december mohamed chat that was assassinated. lebanon's faced exist existentil challenges since its independence. u.n. security council resolution 1559 and 1701 helped structure a return to stability, and the 2012 declaration established a principle that all lebanese parties and factions should abstain from regional conflicts.

it needs to be implemented. the babda declaration needs to be implemented by all parties. fortunately, lebanon also has friends, and the united states counts itself as a very important friend of lebanon who will continue to be. we need to stand with the people of lebanon now. it's in our national interests to promote a stable lebanon prix of foreign interference and able to defend its interests. thank you, and i look forward to your questions. ..

that could have destabilizing effects in the years to come. of great concern and you mentioned it already, islamic state of iraq, the levant in particular has exploded the vacuum indeed in syria that carveout territory to train its fighters, recruit more fighters and plan attacks. both isil and al-nusra front have established the presence in lebanon and are seeking to increase their cooperation with sunni extremist groups already operating in lebanon. and as you noted, during your recent visit the sunni terrorist attacks in lebanon certainly are on the rise. since 2014, seven attacks against shia population centers have been executed, approximately 10 individuals have died and more than 120 have been wounded. i would tell you the lebanese armed forces have taken a variety of bold measures to

maintain stability in lebanon, and counted the destabilizing effects that the syrian conflict risks the lebanon security. the increased operational tempo of lebanese armed forces deployments over the past few months reflects their commitment to lebanon security. in fact, the last willingness to exercise its rule as the sole legitimate defense force in lebanon has made it a target as well. just last weekend, second border regiment personnel were killed when a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle, and -- at an laf checkpoint. our continued engagement and assistance to lebanon and the lebanese armed forces is all the more important in this time of increased challenges to lebanon stability. as mentioned in previous testimony the lebanese have just agreed upon a new government. this important step provides us with an opportunity to increase our engagements both with lebanon's government as hell and the lebanese armed forces in

particular. for fiscal year 2014 we have provided approximately $71 million in foreign military financing thanks to u.s. congress, and $8.71 in fiscal year 2013, 1206 funding to both strengthen the capacity of the lebanese armed forces, support its mission to your lebanon supporters, defend the sovereignty of the state and implement as mr. silverman noted u.n. security council resolutions 1559, and some teens are one. since 2005 the united states has allocated nearly $1 billion to support the lebanese armed forces and integral forces making as lebanon's key partner in security cooperation. recently in december 2013 president suleiman announced saudi arabia will grant lebanon $3 billion to purchase defense items from the french. so in gaza with international partners such as the french and in line with international

support groups for lebanon that mr. silverman mentioned we fully support strengthening the lebanese armed forces and will continue to work with partners to ensure our assistance is complementary and used effectively to meet these growing challenges. i would also to our international military education and training program with lebanon is our fourth largest in the world. it builds strong ties between u.s. and lebanon i bringing lebanese officers to the united states. in fy taking lebanon reef seed $2.9 million that about 67 lebanese military students to attend education and training classes here in the u.s. since 1985, this program has bought more than 1000 lebanese militant students to the u.s. for education and training. similarly our section closer successes and doesn't enable the last monitor secure and protect lebanon supporters against terrorist threats and the illicit treasure goods. since 2006 years has provided more than $100 million in

section 1206 to assist the last. we are also focused on the last desire for institutional reform. the duty has just instituted a defense institution reform initiative. this initiative complements u.s. whole of government efforts supporting lebanese security sector reform. in closing i would say a positive relationship with and continued support to lebanon and the lebanese armed forces is no more important than ever, and i thank you and the other distinguished members of your subcommittee were not only calling this hearing but for your interest and support for lebanon. thank you. >> just can't help but comment that only the acronym happy u.s. military could use the phrase laf with a straight face. lebanese armed forces, i'm sure everybody knows that but even the armed forces gave me a half laugh on it that i worry iran. let me ask you first, we went to lebanon, for either or both of you, a lot of what we heard

before we went was the warning that lebanon is approaching a breaking point and that was -- that was descriptively by different people. isn't that kind of language all our missed or accurate? >> mr. chairman, i would say we don't quite use that language. only because lebanon has been through so much. more than maybe arguably any other country. but this is very, very serious situation. lebanon is facing very, very serious threats. it faced threats even before the syrian more to its independent and its sovereignty and its security. there were political assassinations and for the syrian conflict, for example, by the syrian conflict has really exacerbated this. the lebanese are fond of using an arabic word that translates into saturation when they talk about the refugee issue, that they are saturated. in other words, even know you could give more money, the international community can and

should give more money but they're simply saturated as a society with this. but we are appreciative that they are reaching out and accepting these people. but i would say there are real risks and threats, and that's why it's so important that the international community behind the moderate, responsible voices in lebanon that are very concerned about threats to stability. >> general, any thoughts on that question? >> yes, sir. i would say that lebanon has proven to be amazingly resilient given the stresses that they been put under. certainly from what has been happening in syria as well. and i think a key component of that resilience, at least on the military side with the lebanese armed forces, has been that engagement between the united states and the lebanese armed forces. they had shown some very good progress recently, certainly in counterterrorism front as well. >> we spent time with the new prime minister talking about the formation of the government and

the system and the steps over the next couple of months or a little bit unusual and i wanted to get your opinions about what might likely echo. we are nearing the end of a secure presidential term and the expectation is there will be presidential election by late may. if there is a successful presidential election, the newly formed partnership and government would then dissolve after three months. but i gather they would dissolve with the feeling that they have done their job and depending on how the presidential election goes, there is some chance that that cabinet and prime minister could be the nucleus of the next government working together with the new president. is that, am i reading this the right way? >> you are. let me just, one of the comment on your first question just to echo what general plehn just said, which is this is a very tough situation. it could be much worse and much tougher had we not have the institution of the lebanese armed forces and internal security forces. assisted by us and the development of this relation.

this is a unique i think it's an overused word, a unique political situation. the government now has to try to reach agreement on a miniscule statement. if it does not it goes on being a caretaker which means it's not able to make even before the presidential election, not able to make real policy. some of these economic decisions which tend to get lost if the government doesn't, for example, pass it cannot issue tenders for this gas exploration. these are issues that generally have not been taken up by caretaker government. that's why they need to have a fully empowered government to do that. and as you say, it may be that if we can take the spirit that reached this compromise, to reach a government, if that extends to the presidential election been we will have another government, hopefully that would be easier to form, given that we have gone through a government fully empowered, a

vote of confidence, and a presidential election. that there's no sugar coating this gets down to a very complicated process in which a lot of equities had to be taken into account. one day there's going to be a government, the next day there won't be a government, and we thought th that we might have a ministry statement even yesterday. now we're waiting, i hope they can reach agreement on that. i hope we can build upon what spirit we've had in reaching, the creation of a government. >> my understanding, the selection of the present is different than welcome me might think of it. based on a two-thirds vote. it's not automatic that you get a two-thirds vote for a president, and we were in dialogue with local leaders. one of the possibilities they indicated was that in the past when it's been difficult to find a candidate who can reach the two-thirds threshold that they would be a temperate adjustment

of the constitution to allow the sitting president to have a holdover period, might be a year, might be to use. we met with president suleiman and needed messages anything about staying past his six-year term, but based on what you know now, what you think is the prospect that by may there could be candidates who could come out who might be able to develop a two-thirds support any parliament for the selection of a new president post late may and? >> no, you're exactly right, trendy and i can't put a percentage on the possibility that this will happen but it is very much in we believe it's important to do these elections which are parliamentary, not popular elections on time and according to the constitution. you are right, they've gotten around this before by extension of the president i don't know if that will happen. the intent is right now to truly elect a president to the our different means, whether it's done as you work it out and

bring it as more of a kind of rubber stamped by the parliament or you have a general, genuine debate within parliament. we don't know exactly what will happen. it's really very, very difficult to guess at this point. i would say the odds have increased but who knows? just to add to the complexity, then we would have another government, then it would have to form itself up and they would have to be, remember we're looking at parliamentary elections again later this year because this parliament will go out of business in november. just based on the previous extension of its mandate to we wanted election before and i think the lebanese wanted election before but they were not able to organize elections. so it's even more complicated than that. so this is a very eventful political year for lebanon. >> hezbollah, with hezbollah openly declaring support for assad and going all in to send

troops in syria, how has that affected hezbollah politically inside lebanon? i know there's been controversy about that decision by hezbollah to do that. it certainly has engendered sunni, acts of sunni violence that have spiked largely attributed to hezbollah's decision to go on with syria. so talk about hezbollah's political support in lebanon and how the decision to focus on city has affected their political support. >> as i said in my remarks, mr. chairman, this is not a war to which, in which the people of lebanon wanted or want to be involved. this is in effect hezbollah dragging people of lebanon into a foreign war. i think there have been political cost for hezbollah in this. i cannot say if that's why we have a government today. i think there's a lot of concern across the border, a across the political spectrum regarding the

violence that you witnessed directly and that has plagued lebanon of late. but even more so than her out its political life. so i think there have been political costs. we will have to see. that's what elections are important. we will have to see how that manifests itself. you can automatically translate it but i think there's deep-seated concern on the part of the lebanese people that are not getting anything out of this. everything is flowing from this is negative for them and goes well beyond the refugee situation. we have condemned the violence from sunni extremists as well, as from the shia extremists. lebanon is paying a heavy price, and the lebanese people deserve to stop being forced to pay that price. price. >> in your testimony and in my opening comments i've talked a lot about the serious effect on lebanon, which was a named

subject of virtually every conversation we had. i want to ask a question about one other significant dynamic that the u.s. discussions with the p5+1 with iran over nuclear program. and the prospect that a resolution of that particular challenge and some talk between iran and the trinity or other nations including saudi arabia could have within lebanon, could a potential talk with appropriate skepticism about whether we get there between iran and the west and saudi arabia opened the door to greater political stability in lebanon? or would there be a converse concerned and an emboldened iran free from some of the sanctions might further exacerbate tensions? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think if you talk to lebanese people, a lot of lebanese people would tell you that they would like to believe, genuinely like to believe that if we're able to

reach jupiter, p5+1 is able to reach a deal with iran, that it will have a positive effect. not a negative effect your most people like to think there's a possibility. iran's regional actions are obviously weak. we have condemned them. their state-sponsored terrorism, and they continue obviously to be a major supporter of the assad regime, among many other aspects of sponsoring terrorism. but it's not part of the p5+1 talks. we are very much focus on nuclear issue. i hope that what you say is true and that it will induce iran to adopt a more responsible, more responsibly behavior in the region. when it came to the geneva conference, and the issue came up over iran coming, potentially attending them could iran potentially be a part, a part of the solution?

theoretically yes, but we were asking it to do what any other, what everybody else that attended the geneva conference was being asked to do, which was to accept the geneva communicate and the purpose of the geneva talks which iran chose not to do. -- communiqué. iran exempted itself, accepted itself from that process. so hopefully it will have that more, if we're able, a big if, if were able to reach an agreement it will have the part effect on. that's up to iran but i think in lebanon, the lebanese people want to see obviously a change in iranian policy towards lebanon as well as to syria. >> let me ask a question about refugees before turning to lebanese armed forces question or general plehn. one of the issues we picked up in dialogue with ngos in the u.n. high commissioner was sort of the changing definition of this refugee challenge. so the dimension from numbers is

significant and sizable. if you assume the refugee problem is a short-lived problem and treat one way, but once someone has lived i in the couny fofor a year, then two years and three years, i think there's about 330,000 young people in the lebanese public school system and there's only 75 or 80,000 syrian children of school age were now living in communities. as the refugee challenge goes on for longer and longer, they need and the strategies for data with refugee issues start to change. instead of emergency aid, water bottles, what do you do to develop better water systems? do you think our strategy and the study of the human and other refugee serving agencies is appropriately starting to look at sort of the long-term need? or are we still focusing on the kind of emergency relief that might not really take into account the realistic nature of

that refugee by bush's? >> mr. chairman, i think your diagnosis is exactly correct. as large and as bad as the figures are in terms of the total number of refugees that are coming to lebanon and to jordan and elsewhere, in some sense the bigger number is how many years they might stay. >> right. >> and if you look at the region in lebanon has raised this very real challenge with us. i don't if you met with king abdullah of jordan when he was here but he has -- >> yes. >> yes often spoken of this. it is this challenge that when my these people go home. so then this is not something that comes new to us, or is a new consideration. and that's why we talk about assistance to refugees. we always need to make sure that people understand we're talking assistance to the refugees and to the communities that are hosting them. because even in jordan, 80% of

the refugees are not living in camps. as you know lebanon has ever restrictive formal settlement in a couple places but in general no camps. there were 1600 communities in which refugees live so it's a huge strain on educational systems and that has to be addressed. some of our money is going to expanding educational access to education. when we see acts as we also been access for the local communities because otherwise refugees are taking up that access. we've seen double sessions and things like that. >> just again for the audience, mostly follow this but it's pretty important to note. because of the number of syrian children in lebanon, many lebanese goals are going to split shift. morning sessions with refugee children, afternoon sessions with local populations, or vice versa. often having to teach into the language in the morning and afternoon sessions. again, thinking 303,000 u.n. public schools nationally but about 80,000 refugee children,

the magnitude of this challenge is very, very dramatic. so beyond the education issue, particular issues of health and infrastructure, water infrastructure which is hugely important in lebanon and in jordan as well. answer some of our money is going to the u.n. and other money is going to ngos, and some of that money, and secretary kerry when he attended the international support group in new york in september brought with them $30 million. that was particularly focus on aiding the host committees. we are dealing with water trying to enhance and increase water infrastructure to get to these communities. and it can be helping with housing, to be honest. money that is going to communities when they tried, when the add-on to the houses, for example, to accommodate refugees. so absolutely, you are right to focus on these longer-term infrastructure will burdens. because as you mentioned

earlier, you are getting a youth population. as i think you were when you in lebanon a lot of kids are just not being educated, treated. that has enormous implications not just for lebanon but throughout the region for the long-term. >> i gather the way you describe this challenge, the international support group that was convened is looking at this dynamic, instead of emergency relief as the conflict in serious stretches longer, they need to possibly change the kind of relate they provide to the refugee and host populations. >> that's right but i think, we don't need to wait for groups, either an international support group or any other institution. we need to do it, individual countries need to do it ourselves. that's why we're focused on the. our money has already focusing on the. we talk about lebanon with our allies, we are talking about these kind of long-term challenges that need to be addressed, not just getting the immediate needs of food or medicine. >> general plehn, turning to the

lebanese armed forces. before asked about the relationship of u.s. military, i would like your assessment on one sort of aspect of the lebanese armed forces. one of the clear challenges as we met with the leadership, the complexity of forming a government in a population where there's been this tradition a of very delicate power-sharing between sunni, shia, maronite, roman catholic, different groups within the country. it's a little bit like belgian politics where everything has to be allocated, not among language groups but among ethnic groups. and that together with applications of the syrian civil war was the reason it took so long to put together this governing coalition. moving over into the lebanese armed forces, how are they able to integrate these populations? the civil side has a hard time doing it but with the lebanese armed forces are the sunni-shia and christian servicemen and women well integrated in units.

and and that server leadership function in terms of modeling for the remainder of society that look, this can be done? >> mr. chairman, that's both a great question and a great observation. and you've highlighted certainly the difficulty within lebanon with the many different concession to come together in that country. what i would tell you is what you know, that the lebanese armed forces really is a model for of those of different confessions are able to come together within that country. certainly rally behind the mission of being the sole legitimate security provider for the country itself year and then i think as you noted, provide a model for the rest of the country for the future. >> talk a little bit about how the lebanese armed forces response to these twin challenges. first of having a sizable a powerful militia in hezbollah, and second, now that there is this spike in sunni-shia violence since hezbollah has

gone into syria. different kind of challenge is the lebanese armed forces have to do with. talk a little bit about their capacity in dealing with these two challenges. the hezbollah relationship and the spike in sunni-shia violence in the last year or so. >> yes, sir. if i may take the last first with the spike in sunni-shia violence. i think what we've seen is exactly what you would hope and expect out of any armed forces 40 country is -- for a country is that those individuals are willing to put themselves on the forefront of the fighting. and as i noted earlier in my testimony, and as you noted as well, the lebanese armed forces have paid the cost of that intervention to provide security for the people of lebanon. you yourself noted that lebanese, hezbollah, is a well armed militia, something that

just is not normal to us in america in terms of a construct for how we deal with armed force. certainly from the united states military perspective, our engagement with the lebanese armed forces to build a professional military force, to reinforce both to them and to the people of lebanon that they are the sole security, legitimate security provider for lebanon is certainly the path that we want to go down. >> mr. chairman, may i -- >> please stick upon what mike just said which is there is another component to it, diplomatic component, which is we have to work together with governments in the region, and even in europe, to stop the flow of foreign fighters going to this conflict are quick to stop the flow of financing the violent extremist. and that's a very important effort that's going on right now. we've seen some steps by some countries to constrict or restrict and to penalize, punish

with harsh laws, harsh penalties people who go over to fight. who are going over to syria, or anywhere else to fight. that needs to be an important part of our whole of government approach to this problem. and they think it will be accepted, for example, in president obama goes to saudi arabia later. that would be, because we're working with all the governments of the region, and within europe as well to deal with this. we really need to stop at the source as well. >> if we hope to increase the support we provide to the lebanese armed forces, how can we sure that any technological capacity or weapons systems or weaponry that they are -- are further safeguard unaccountably controls over u.s. supplied security measures so they stay in the right hands and don't fall into the wrong hands in the middle of a very volatile security environment?

>> mr. chairman, in lebanon, much as we have in many other countries, we have an office of defense cooperation in beirut. their primary purpose truly is to ensure that we have the appropriate safeguards, and that were performing the appropriate end-user monitoring is what we call it when we provide foreign military sales of equipment, partner nations. so our u.s. personnel in the office of defense cooperation in beirut will do that and enhance end-user monitoring to ensure that that equipment is both accounted for and being used properly. >> i found it interesting in the dialogue with the lebanese armed forces their take on the saudi arabia and french potential for receipt of saudi arabia and assistance to purchase french military assets. they said they liked the was equipment a lot better, basically is what the lebanese armed forces was saying.

but i gather from your testimony, general, you do like the more partners the better, the more systems the better. you don't find that saudi arabia provision of 3 billion to purchase french assistance, you don't find that troubling or problematic. you view it as greater partners to help the armed forces is to be decided, if not to be feared? >> sir, i think lebanon can use a lot of friends right now. they are in difficult straits as you well know. i would tell you that we certainly are working with lebanon and with the rest of our partners. as i mentioned in my testimony, to ensure that that $3 billion grant is complementary to other efforts, and that is used on the things that the lebanese armed forces to need the most. i would offer to you that there are infrastructure type projects that would help support the lebanese armed forces. that would be as if not more

valuable to them in many areas that specific pieces of equipment. >> thank you for that and. one more question about the economy, back to mr. silverman. you talked about the prospects for natural gas to be a boost for the lebanese economy, requires more than a caretaker government to make some decisions about accessing those oil fields which i guess would largely be in the mediterranean. could you expand a little bit of what these natural gas reserves might offer lebanon and how those could help the lebanese economy? >> we don't know exactly how large they are, but they're significant interest and it could be extensive. israel is on the other side of this and their resources are extensive what they found so far, as you know. so i think the interest is there, and it really could be a great, great boon. to the lebanese economy. there's no question about it. if it's handled the right way.

and if they get in and move forward. because this is not a static market. i'm not the expert, but the experts at the work on this have explained to me into the lebanese that there is a finite number of investors, a finite amount of money that the international oil companies have to invest. and they want, they will see a potential problem feel but they also need to have a certainty or the confidence that they can put in a major, major investment. not the investment to do an initial exploration or something which may not be very much. but when you get in and sign contracts and move forward with exploitation that's an enormous investment. meanwhile, other countries are attracting these companies. and lebanon is behind because they cannot attract because they cannot release the tender. so i think, i think it's hard to put a figure on how much you could contribute to the gdp of lebanon but i think everyone

acknowledges it could be quite significant, if the structure is put together, the regular structure, and the exploration moves forward. >> is one of the issues with lebanon, i think there are two sizable fields in the mediterranean. one pretty much in what all would agree are israeli waters, and one that kind of straddles the border, depending on how you draw the water border, between israel and lebanon. i gather the exploitation of the field would probably not just require lebanese non-caretaker government to decide to move forward but possibly also some cooperation with the israeli government about making sure that those borders are properly the limited? >> i referred in my remarks as maritime boundary line and that's exactly come you're exactly correct, that's what we're talking about here. i think companies have to make this judgment themselves but when i said they're looking for certainty and predictability,

they don't want to end a political dispute but they don't want to into a territory that will then turn out to be still subject to dispute. that's why we've been talking to both the israelis and to the lebanese, trying to be helpful in reaching a solution to their maritime boundary line and what can be exploited. we think it can be done. we absolutely believe that there can be an arrangement worked out and that lebanon can go forward, if the decisions are made spent i have about five hours more question but if you want to get to the second panel. before i say a few concluding words entities panel two, i want to ask senator risch -- let me just say a word of conclusion. one of the most powerful aspects of this visit, and i've got a state department witness and the dod which is here today but one of the most powerful aspects of the trip was going to the memorial the u.s. men and women from our state department, from

our military who lost their lives in lebanon. and a list of people is very, very long. i think gary king and i were struck looking at that memorial, the marine barracks bombing, the embassy bombing, the index, and holsters of instances, two, three, four, seven americans at the time during that period in the early 1980s t the late 1980s but it was a very powerful thing. it was a very visible indication not only of american sacrifice but as the kind of challenges that that very resilient lebanese population have been deal with on a daily basis. it also made senator king and i, you know, really step back and realize the sacrifice that our military and our foreign service can sometimes we don't express the same appreciation to nonmilitary who are serving abroad as ambassadors with -- that memorial makes very vivid

the sacrifice that any american to serve abroad, whether in military and other capacity, it's important that we we acknowledge that and i just wanted to acknowledge that as you finish. there may be additional questions from members of the panel that will be submitted in writing, but i appreciate you being here today and look forward to continuing to shed some light on the situation of lebanon with your help. thank you very much for coming. let me now introduce our second panel. our second panel will come up to the table with nametags ready. dr. paul salem is vice president of the middle east institute, leading an initiative on arab transitions. prior to join the middle east institute dr. singh was the founder director of the carnegie middle east center in beirut, lebanon, between 2006-2013 when he build a regional think tank is to which by the quality of policy research and high regional profile. from 1999-2006, dr. salem was

the director of th of the fairs foundation to making a dent founded and and directed the lebanese center for policies centers. dr. salem writes rightly the arab and western press and has been published in numerous journals and newspapers. dr. salem, we are glad to have you today. in addition we have with those mr. aram nerguizian, a senior fellow at csis where he conducts research in the middle east and north africa. during his time at csis, mr. nerguizian has worked on hezbollah and the lebanese armed forces extensively, history was consulted by governments and the private sector, appears regularly on television and has authored a number of books and reports on the middle east and regional security issues. i would like to ask dr. tim to begin with this opening comments followed by mr. nerguizian. again, your written comment except for the record if you try to summarize in about five minutes and they will move into a dialogue. dr. salem. >> senator kaine, ranking member

risch, -- it has about three years of the sitting president. can survive a fourth and fifth? the pressure is increasing at all levels. in space is at a crossroads in the sense that lebanon is very much penetrated by regional and international influence and the middle east is going through an intense period of restructuring. not only in syria but also as the u.s. sort of retreats slightly, the u.s., iran, the gulf countries and so on and russia playing new games. lebanon is very vulnerable to all of that. lebanon has been come has survived three years of the sitting conflict but for all of those three years has been close to the breaking point. indeed unless a resolution is achieved industry, lebanon split on security institution from its economy and social fabric might

indeed increasingly fall apart. lebanon is the weakest link in serious and private any investment lebanon is indeed an investment in regional stability and i would say global security. the spillover from syria is known as the lebanese politics has been outlined for and against the assad regime for nine years. that has defined political alliances in the country for a very long time. that has great political paralysis, the tension in the country for the past three years and the refugee situation is well known. the numbers really go into uncharted territory. i know of no other kanji that has received so many refugees in such a short period of time. the first those that are close to the breaking point. this is uncharted territory. no society is somewhat lebanon is attempting to do. on your that lebanon does have company mechanism to it's a coincidence it has survived for three is. it's a country accustomed to

crisis. it is better many internal and regional crises before. the political system although weak and often dysfunctional is also inclusive and is built on principles of accommodation and power-sharing and that's reported. the army, although severely challenged and viewed by some with some paint, remains a very important national and inclusive institution to the living memory of lebanon's own civil war that ended in 1990 deters most parties and most citizens from moving towards any major confrontation. as we know, a major step forward was taken contest with the formation of a national unity government. this is an extremely important step. it's the first step forward in three years. for the past year there's been a sense to form a, but let's not forget for two years before that, january 2011, lebanon was limping along with lots of government which did not include the coalition. after three years this is indeed

an extremely important step. certainly this new government deserves important support, endorsement and cooperation but it needs to be followed by the way with a election. presidential elections required yes, a two-thirds majority for a quorum. required two-thirds majority in the first vote but in the second vote requires a simple majority. so it's not exactly as difficult as an action. extended the term of the present or change the constitution, that requires a two-thirds majority so it is equally difficult. but you can elect to present with a simple majority of to get the first two-thirds quorum. there's hope that in the accommodation that happened in the past, the last few weeks this might be the case. i will indicate and come back to later, but the change is not so much only in internal bargaining and so when. there's been a change in the regional environment. the two main patrons of the two groups, iran and saudi arabia, i think there's been a shift of their certainly on the saudi

side. factor has been a geneva meeting. we can get back to that but there have been a shift in the region. that might help us move forward in lebanon. of course, we need to follow presidential elections with parliamentary elections as mentioned before. on extremist groups it's important to start by saying that all the major parties, sunni, shia, christians, troops are committed to avoid internal warfare. there's no major movement towards internal conflict. no will, no plan for it. but there is very high tension because of has those direct engagement in the war in syria. this has led to some radicalization in the sunni city states of lebanon, some homegrown groups but also encouraged a group from syria and others related to al-qaeda to take the fight to hezbollah territory inside lebanon, and that is that we've seen in the last few months. i think this will remain a serious security concern for lebanon but it is not about to

bring the house down. hezbollah is in a deeper rot in terms of its engagement in lebanon and syria and that will affect its long-term viability and the strategic environment between hezbollah and israel has remained an enemy. the key goal would be to end the crisis since the, the best way of lebanon is to do that but that doesn't seem to be happening anytime soon. for lebanon i would reiterate what many of my colleagues have said, endorse and support the new government, support the election of a new president and the holding of parliamentary elections. continue to take the lead generously in the nation to lebanon and to the refugee community can build on strong u.s. lebanese military cooperation and relations as well as encourage allies to do so as well. work to maintain stability on the lebanon -- the lebanese-israeli border. we saw an attack on the border between lebanon and syria. the borders between lebanon and

israel have been stable since 2006. it's important to keep that the case in certainly the u.s. can be important in that area. finally, i would also agree with mr. silverman that encouragement for lebanon to move forward on the offshore oil and gas issue is important, that we can talk more about that in q&a. it's not so much it was needed to get any revenues. this might take a full decade, but moving forward in that they would give confidence to the lebanese themselves would make major international companies and states have a stake in lebanon's stability and might be a 30 important source of stability and confidence in lebanon moving forward even if the revenues will take many, many years, if at all, to move forward. thank you. >> thank you. mr. nerguizian. >> chairman kaine, breaking the british, and distinguish most of the subcommittee him thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about lebanon and the

pressures he faces in the wake of the syrian crisis of our instability across the levant. i submitted a far longer written analysis that both explains and conceptualizes what i'm about to say in depth. using open-source reporting and research conducted in fieldwork in lebanon. i fully understand how members and the staff are. i hope -- how busy numbers are. i hope you can look to our level of detail that i can go into in this short statement. and i request that they be put into the official record. >> without objection. >> allow me to summarize some of the key points. serious civil war and the lebanon syria and security nexus now complicate and form every aspect of sectarian and factional competition in lebanon. in ways that neither the lebanese nor the regional and international allies have fully accounted for. the conflict in syria also defines how both the united states and iran do with their

respective sets of interest, partners and allies in lebanon and abroad region. impeding lebanese factions have different views on syria, iran, and saudi arabia. anecdotal data from polling and fieldwork also showed deep divisions along sunni-shia lines where in lebanon's shia, the assad regime, iran and hezbollah favorably. while maintaining unfavorable views of saudi arabia. meanwhile, the country's sunni continue to maintain the opposite view and sense of dynamics relative to the country of shia. the pressure that lebanon's christians feel as result of local and regional sunni-shia tensions are also growing. whether it is on assad, iran, hezbollah or saudi arabia come a significant portion of lebanon's christian remains divided about whether any of these regional and local actions can be viewed favorably on whether they could

be trusted to make positive and stabilizing use of their influence in lebanon. hezbollah's decision to commit to offensive motor operations inside syria in concert with assad's forces is a preemptive war of choice in syria that reflects its own priorities in the country. these include the primacy of preserving the resistance axis with iran, hezbollah since it can neither of these increasingly militant lebanese sunni political forces, nor reverse deepening regional sunni-shia tension. and the shiite community years as a regional minority group increasingly informed they need to great strategic steps in syria. in 2014, hezbollah's mildred priorities in syria continue to sit on its combat role east of the valley with a focus on strategically significant drain such as the mountain range.

both remain critical to supply lines and wherever controls them can shape the flow of aid, weapons and personnel. either to or from syria. hezbollah may have actually calculated that moderate and urban sunni faction of political forces would not or could not escalate in syria, or by resorting to attacks against a group or the lebanese shia committee. however, the rural sunnis in the north and the dakar have always been a separate demographic. and hezbollah actions in syria also dramatically accelerate major shifts currently underway within the sunni community. in 2014, lebanon mainly sunni rule condition maintain the highest over all and extreme poverty rates in the country at levels in excess of 82%, or more than twice the national average. dyer socioeconomics and feelings of being under presented by traditional sunni leadership have left northern sunnis

increase the global to the recruitment effort of militant and jihadi groups, including the brigade and the islamic state of iraq and al-shabaab. geishas within lebanon sunni community are taking place of alongside and because of acute demographics, socioeconomic and security pressures from influx of man suny displaced since. now number more than 900,000 in lebanon and said in parts of the country with high poverty rates, poor education, health care, and other infrastructure. while the skill of pressures on lebanon and his people continues to grow, there are still a broad range of actors and institutions that seek to play a stabilizing role, and no institution has contributed more to relative stability in the lebanese armed forces, or the laf. the principal national security part of the u.s. on lebanon has expanded from a force of 59,000 in 2010, to a force of some

65,500 in 2014. largely in an effort to stand up border protection forces including the first and second border regiments to do with the pressures from syria. the undemanding of conventional units has also proven to be necessary to ensure broader national deployment as possible totaling some 24,000-30,000 troops in the field. as result of the conflict the lfa -- the laf maintains priority. priority. these include greeting a real-world security and border regime along the lebanese syrian border, managing the risks of on again off again violence and activity along the blue line between israel and lebanon, and lastly conducting what the laf calls high intensity and general stability and counterterrorism operations. in many ways the laf the growing counterterrorism stability of a central role increase in define the u.s. lebanon military to

military relationship. the laf's growing ability to act on external intelligence focus on dismantling groups and similar militants and jihadi organizations and military interdiction of idg, vehicle ied and suicide attacks are a key source of even limited stability in a region in turmoil. they've worked hard to bring online true border regiments to manage its instability this has included building a fixed -- observation posts that would be equipped with day and night electronic surveillance system. netting and protection all long with other defensive measures. was the laf needs no at the national level to push through its national security priorities is strong government leadership, while prime minister forms a cabinet that includes march 14 at march 8 coalition and that enjoys broad international legitimacy, it still remains

unclear at the end of every 2014 whether the new cabinet would be capable of seizing on the laf momentum along the border. lastly at the international level, the laf and the lebanese, laf the lebanese need countries like the u.s. and other donors and partners to support military department efforts, especially the laf ski-doo is to develop a plan, the international support group for lebanon and the upcoming rome conference to support. i could go into far greater detail in all of these pressures but i will leave that for the q&a period. i thank you for your time and this opportunity. >> thank you, mr. nerguizian. we'll just start a dialogue and these will be questions that i will pose to either or overview as we explore in more detail some of your testimony. first, i would like each of your assessment about sort of what will likely happen in the next steps in the political process, from the ministerial statement

to presidential election, whether you think it is more likely that there will be presidential candidates in the selection of new individual for president, or whether it might prove more probable that we see an extension of president suleiman's term. i don't want you to pin down with precision your percentage estimate of chances but i think you'll be helpful for us as we think about our relationship to get the sense of u.s. experts estimate you think the next steps in the political process are likely, what are the results likely to be. >> well, as i said, the formation of this government does reflect the change in some of the regional powers and their position and they have encouraged their hours to work together to form this government. i think you missed your statement takes time and there's a lot going on, a leading negotiator but i think it will come out with the ministry of statement. i think this regionally supported nude to create some

stability of lebanon to keep lebanon politically a way from a conflict that is going on in syria even though hezbollah is involved there. i think this will continue in the immediate future. i hope that will impact a very heated sort of behind closed doors discussion that started about the next president. it's not clear exactly who that will be but i think there is current momentum towards actually electing a next president. there's more leniency from both sides to accept a candidate even if they are not, if the candidate is not their favorite candidate. none of the major players maybe except one of the christian parties is sort of playing a spoiler role. otherwise for the time being most of the players are in this collective game. i think the possibilities are, i would say it's more likely than not that there will be a new president elected, you do, 51-49, hard to say. the second most likely would simply be that the post will

fall vacant for a while. or longtime. the third possibility would be the extension of the term of the current president. that is difficult, unlikely. that requires -- so either we elect a new president or we fall into, you know, a period of vacancy. and the key factor, well, the key factor that created this momentum and the key factor that could ruin this momentum is the regional environment. i think where we happen to be at the moment, even though geneva didn't concede, it did happen. we moved from sites expecting the other side is going to fall within two months, to a realization that this will go on for a long time. there's been sort of the moment of diplomacy, how long that will last in the region, weeks, months, if in that sort of honeymoon period we can go ahead and elect the president we'll be lucky. if we miss that i think we'll go back to what we had before,

which is paralysis, we could have elections for parliament. we couldn't form a government. and we couldn't elect a president. >> mr. nerguizian? >> mr. chairman, most of the factions in lebanon have been competing with its domestically or in city with an assumption that somehow the crisis would be resolved within a relatively fixed or short period. i think it has dawned and every faction that matters with serious civil war isn't anywhere everywhere going to be a long-term pressure dynamics whether they like it or not, are going to have to cooperate with each other on, the next steps. so you have right now a cabinet and beyond that you have a number of other institutions that are deeply dependent on this. for example, in the laf you have an organization that's on another council which is conditionally played the role of a buffered in with a lot of sectarian pressure that remains largely vacant.

you have the longer-term issue of who will be the next laf command. and all of these events, leadership post, dealing with the presidency, and they do with leadership over the long term, they all require a set of factors that unlike delicate sequencing. but, frankly, mr. chairman, i think it's difficult to sit and think realistically about who the people are that could fill in this post. the presidency, just cabinet information has shown us, is deeply precarious and uncertain. none of us can predict how this will play out. you have only a finite set of players that are being considered anecdotally, but the bigger issue i think him and i highlight this in my statement, is that you have a christian punitive in lebanon and, frankly, in the region that, for better or for worse, feels that it needs a strong president. or at least a president enjoys

broad communal support. now, will we get to that in the scenarios that professor salem described, or will this map out in a way that is far more unstable? it's difficult to predict and unfriendly, i'm careful about making those sorts of assumptions spent i asked the previous panel the question of whether in its internal politics in lebanon, hezbollah has been effective or seen any erosion of his political support because of the decision to go all in, in the city and civil war. i would like to each of you sort of address the role of hezbollah and syria is one thing but how has it affected their place in lebanese society, and sort of their political profile. >> initially it was not a very popular move among hezbollah's own supporters to initially when the uprising here, seem like

part of the spring, pro-democracy, the regime was fine on people, there wasn't a clear understanding of why should hezbollah get involved. there was a get the appearance on the other side or related groups. but the community, i mean hezbollah's popular in the community is so overwhelming and so many levels, there's no real contest there, but even if there were some electives there was no real question of the decision. some explaining but no real question. i would say that the community certainly is drained, very concerned, but i think they are convinced to some degree that indeed there is danger, some threat to them. now, whether that threat was partly great by what the assad regime did to get the enemy that you desire, but indeed that threat has become real, has become real to all lebanese and has become real to the shiite community in lebanon. so i would say they're paying a very high price. they are not happy about it but

there isn't any major questioning right now of the decision. i think the major impact on hezbollah is long-term, that this is effectively a force designed to push back and israeli occupation. .. >> what i sort of worry about mosts the boarder region between -- border region between lebanon, israel and syria will likely not be stable in the long term because the powers are shifting, and hezbollah is not in a good

position be, although, you know, it's fighting on many fronts. it wasn't designed to do so. the community's too small to sustain it. >> mr.er in guess yang --er in guise yang. >> to stay nothing of broader arab popular support, that has essentially come to pass. they no longer enjoy that broad range of backing at the regional level. but that is the cost as hezbollah sees it of creating that strategic depth that it thinks it needs. the other side of this is that on net balance, hezbollah's role has brought some degree of predictability. perhaps not in the way many would like along the lebanese-syrian frontier. if one were to ask four or five years ago, you know, would hezbollah allow or sanction or facilitate the establishment of better border relations, more

demarcation, a robust security regime along the border, one would be hesitant to say yes. but the dynamics are such now that you have at least an opportunity to do good. to do good in terms of the lebanese and institutions like the laf focusing on building up these institutions and structures along the border. you also have all the patterns that dr. salem described in terms of what the long-term radicalization and instability effects are. in every way that matters, radicalization within the sunni community in lebanon and the inflow of fighters presents as much of a threat to mainstream sunnis in the country as it does to mainstream shiites. and that has bought hezbollah some breathing room. but in the long term, i think there is no doubt you have a transformation that is taking place that is part of internal shiite dynamics, but also part of a broader or regional pattern that includes saudi arabia, iran and the u.s. right now it's not clear if there is a resolution of the

syria conflict what will be hezbollah's future. but what is broadly clear to me is that iran is looking for a posterior arrangement. what i mean by that, if there's going to be some kind of a new regional order that ties in negotiations on a nuclear file, that ties on the u.n. blue line and hezbollah, it's something that they would like to see occur in a, as a result of ap arrangement or framework, not br r before it. so you're going to continue to see support by iran, and within the shiite community, i have to agree, there is no real basis to say that there's anything more than marginal dissent within the community. hezbollah has been very effective and, frankly, their opponents have helped craft a narrative of self-defense and countering terrorism which has become, in many ways, a national reality. >> thank you. >> chairman? >> yes, please. >> something that's relevant about the refugee situation and

both hezbollah and national security. you have a million, maybe up to a million and a half refugees from syria, the vast majority are sunnis. lebanon, in a sense by what's happening in syria by hezbollah's actions, is effectively turning into a sunni-majority country. and yet hezbollah is fighting, you know, in syria and lebanon, putting itself in a very precarious situation. the country has absorbed a quarter of the number of its population in refugees and yet, quote-unquote, nothing has happened, and one marvels at that. the metaphor i sort of of use is it's like you're pouring fuel into the basement. nothing's happened yet, but it takes one match for that to explode n. the experience of lebanon or other communities with refugees, it took several years. but if and when that refugee population becomes mobilized and militarized as some groups in syria and the region are trying to do, once that happens, then, you know, that fuel ignites, and neither hezbollah nor lebanon

can control it. for us that means, and, you know, maybe for u.s. policy, yes, it's been survivable so far, but, a, we need to stem the flow and, b, we need to find ways to get those people starting to go back either in a resolved syria or safe haven, you know, get the flow reversed. lebanon, i mean, one marvels that it's survived so far, but this could detonate at any point in the near future, and it requires urgent attention to be reversed, not just treated symptommatically. >> dr. salem, your comments really echo mr. silverman on the earlier panel where he said we're in uncharted territory. 25% of the population being equivalent as refugees, you know, so far no massive match strike. but we just don't know when that point would come in terms of that breaking point that you testified to. in terms of the hag any tuesday of the refugee -- magnitude of the refugee challenge, everyone

probably thought that this civil war would be something that would be resolved sooner, and everybody's kind of waking up to a reality that it is not going to be a quick resolution, it's going to take significant timement -- time. do you think lebanese civil society, the ngo community, the international support group, are they appropriately now changing their thinking and planning to treat this not as an emergency situation, but really to start to look at it as a long-term problem in which case the way you manage it is going to be different than a, you know, kind of a traditional emergency relief operation? for either of of you. >> mr. chairman, one of the side effects of regularly traveling to lebanon, and i traveled in 2013 about six times, is that you get to see the gradual e hughes of all the patterns -- evolution of all the patterns you just described. you no longer have any of the optimism that you can have short-term efforts with a quick

payoff. you have all the realities now that whether it's the ngo community, the humanitarian aid structures that are operating in lebanon or emerging structures like the international support group are all going to have of to exercise a great degree of strategic patience in all of this. this is not a civil war that is just born out of, you know, protests over a short-term period as a result of grounds. it is the basic collapse of a state structure that's been kind of limping along since as far back as the second world war. you're looking at a transformational moment. and whether it's the isg or local forces, i am seeing a gradual, slow and difficult shift to this. but it's always been a key challenge in terms of resourcing. you have all of the impacts, not unlike those we've seen here in the u.s., tied to national resourcing and aid that are now coming to bear. you don't have the kinds of funds that are acquired, readily

available, and the countries that do have it are mainly in the gulf and have interests that are not necessarily tied to finding a quick and stabilizing effect in lebanon. and maybe too closely linked to their open strategic imperatives in terms of regional competition. but that's where i think u.s. and allied influence is critical. it plays a key role in shaping how some of these countries that do also depend on the u.s., for example, in the case of the gulf security architecture. the u.s. can play a positive role the shaping some of this, because i think that there is an acceptance -- at least within the u.s. interagency, not the broader national level, the policy community -- that this is a decade of instability. >> dr. salem. >> well, i mean, i would everyone emphasize, i mean, i agree with all of that, and one must prepare for that. but i also, you know, definitely think that, you know, the world and the region cannot afford for this to go on for a decade. this, the regime in syria has

proven willing to fight to the last syrian, to destroy all of syria. it's willing to, you know, maintain power over part of a devastated syria rather than share power with others over a united syria. it is a regime that only understands force. when force was threatened against it, within days it made a major concession. so from a policy perspective, you know, it is such a dire crisis that it needs much more robust interdiction. i mean -- >> right. >> -- debates have been going on in other chambers and so on, but as looking at jordan, lebanon, turkey, iraq, the whole region, iranian gulf tensions, tensions among u.s. allies this the gulf themselves -- >> yeah. >> -- which have complicated the situation in syria and iraq and elsewhere. yes, the u.s. wants to disengage, but the u.s. is still the biggest player in the region. both allies and opponents look to it to figure out their own

policy. this conflict one cannot afford to leave it go on and on. now, what that means, what difficult decisions must be taken, i don't know. i for one know that lebanon cannot survive two more years, three more years of this. as we said, we are in uncharted territory, although what we've been in similar situations before with large refugee populations, it meant the destruction of lebanon and 16 years of civil war in lebanon. so we cannot at all be come place sent. we can be thankful that we survived these three years, but the lesson i take away is, yes, prepare for the worst but what needs to be done is, again, redoubled efforts to end this conflict. and i think in 2013 and 2014 there was a major initiative from the u.s. on the chemical weapons thing, got immediate results. there was great effort from secretary kerry which got at least some progress on the diplomatic front. this is not completely hopeless, but it requires more heavy lifting, and it needs to end. it cannot to on for years and years. >> i very much share that view.

while we're disappointed, obviously, with the path of the geneva discussions in syria, there's no substitute for those discussions. and even if the opportunity or the hope is just a flicker, we've got to do what we can to keep that ember alive. it is the case the united states is the largest provider of humanitarian support for syrian refugees outside the country. we are working on the dismantling one of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles in the world. that has been a significant diplomat you can project. and while there have been aspects of the roll of that destruction that we're not happy with, we're never the less pursuing it and going forward, and we will til its completion. the challenge about the delivery of humanitarian aid is a significant one right now, but we were at least gratified that the, that russia dropped its veto posture in the security council over the delivery of humanitarian aid within sur ya. if we could do that in a more aggressive way, that might staunch the flow of additional

refugees, it might, but the test is obviously going to be pretty apparent pretty quickly to see whether actually we're able to do that delivery of aid or not. much more heavy lifting has to be done. the engagement is there, the results haven't been what we want, but that doesn't mean that we need to back off. i want to -- i asked the previous panel, and mr. nerguizian, i think you addressed this in your testimony, talk to us about the lebanese armed portions in this inclusion aspect. you know, to a first-time visitor on the political side this delicate balance between the march 8, march 14 and others, the sunni, shia, christian, the way this is balanced is very delicate. and when you can't find that delicate balance, you end up with a caretaker prime minister, you end up with a government that can't form. as we had brief interactions in this visit with the lebanese armed forces, it seemed like it was less, you know, a group here

of sunnis, a group here of shias, a group here of christians, but a more integrated and inclusive armed forces. but that was from a, you know, brief visit, and i would be curious as to both of your sense on is the lebanese armed forces inclusive this that way, and is that inclusion within an armed forces of 60 plus thousand people, does that offer lessons to the -- that can be helpful lessons more broadly in lebanese civil society? >> well, mr. chairman, it's, first, critical to point out that the laf reflects the socioeconomics and demographics of the time. i don't want to get into too much detail, because i could easily write a book on the issue, but if you were to to look at the laf in 1965, you would see an overwhelming number of shiites because the laf then as now was a vehicle for socioeconomic advancement. it was a chance for communities or demographics to uplift themselves. when you fast forward to 2014, what you see is a pattern where the overwhelming majority of the

laf in terms of manpower is now sunni. and when i say overwhelming, i mean 42%. this reflects the reality of a force that is recruiting heavily from the north, because the provinces, frankly, need the income and need the structure. you have the pension plan with benefits and the promise that eventually your children might not have to deal with either military service or move on to other strata in the economy. but beyond this, which it does exist, you do have to bear in mind the officer corps unlike the demographics of the broader force is very heavily regulated in terms of which sect is represented and how. you have broadly a 50/50 split in terms of the officer corps of some 3,500 personnel. you don't have any quotas within the broader force. and trickles up all the way to the top in terms of, you know,

deputy chief of staff, army commanders and so on. and i think what does give this force a positive's prix decorp. to to use the analogy as opposed to one that is divisive, is that over the history of the laf going back to '43 you've had an effort to uncue bait an idea that this is not a nonsectarian lebanon or nonsectarian laf, but this is an institution to represent those interests. beyond that we you have a nucles of officers who are trained in 1980, '81 and '82. this is, in many ways, the vintage generation of laf officers, and they now are at their prime. they are cross-sectarian, they come from all the communities, and they genuinely want to do good. and if they are to advance professionally and to move on in their careers and play a role in the next two or three years that's favorable not just for lebanon, it's favorable for regional stability. if that opportunity is missed,

you're looking at the next generational gap somewhere between 10 and 15 years within which you have to wait for the next crop of officers to mature and play a role. and these demographics are delicate and difficult and dense. i'm happy to go into greater detail after the testimony. >> yeah, that's helpful. dr. salem? >> yeah, i would agree with that. i mean, indeed, in a sense everybody's cousin is in the army, everybody's sort of in the army as a family, and that's extremely important for national identity and people's general respect for the army. now, there's been incidents here and there where there's been, you know, remarks about thing or that thing, but it's one of the major institutions which reinforces lebanese identity and attachment to the state. it's also important to note, though, that this army being a multisectarian or cross-sectarian army reflects the very society it's part of. it cannot be used as a blunt instrument in internally against any community. many people why doesn't it fight hezbollah or fight, you know, it cannot engage directly in any

internal conflict. it is, it can maintain peace, it can create stability, it can protect borders, it plays an important role in reinforcing basic political understandings and political accommodations. so it has its strength, it also has its limitations. it's done reasonably well many this period. but the lebanese political system also for all of its faults and dysfunctions is a fairly ingenious and inclusive one and makes sure that all the communities feel they have a stake, that they're not threatened by the state or any decisions taken in that state. there might be lessons there for, you know, syria of 2025 or even iraq which is having a very difficult time managing a multi-communal reality. >> if -- so i'm going to ask you to make a general choice. for future u.s. military assistance to the lebanese armed forces, what is more important, training assistance or equipment? equipment and weaponry? >> mr. chairman, the net effect

of u.s. training has been to elevate the special forces to being true special forces by regional standards ask not just units -- and not just units in name alone. what you have now, though, is an urgent need to stand up the rest of the force. the corps, 3,700 special forces personnel continue to benefit from this training. and not just from the u.s. but you also have 11 mechanized by grades and five intervention regiments that, frankly, are going to be at the fore be front of what is going to be an even more difficult and challenging period for the laf. you have a force that is also gradually swinging south from the northern border with syria down past the bekka frontier, and you have communities that are not quite sure what the intentions are.

those who want to have, essentially, a soft glove approach ofwomen and working in partnership in communities, and that's a key point, i think the u.s. has a key role to play in standing up the third and fourth border regiments. this is not to say that we can pick equipment over training. frankly, one is nothing without the other, as you know. >> right, right. >> but right now one has to always revert back and look at what the capabilities development plan says. the overarching tenets there are not just about acquisition and systems. laf has learned a lot about that. it is far more focused on building an laf 2025, dealing with all of the pressures dr. salem and myself described. so i think while we have to prioritize some aspects of training, it's always going to be a case-by-case analysis in terms of looking whether or not to prioritize that over land systems, naval systems or other combat mechanisms. >> okay.

dr. salem? >> aram is the expert on this, i testify to him. >> i just report to -- i defer to him. >> i just report the opinion of the u.s. military opinion in lebanon is just as you suggest. they were highly complimentary of the professionalism the special forces, as you mentioned, it's not special forces in name only, it's special forces that they've merited by their training and their performance. and i was struck in meeting with lebanese armed forces leadership how many of them talk about their training either in lebanon with u.s. military forces or here in the united states. some of the training that we do of foreign military leaders here in the united states or in country are so cost effective compared to other things that we do. i'm on the budget committee, too, and we're wrestling with all these budgetary issues. after we were in lebanon, we went to egypt, and i had a

lengthy meeting with general assisi, and we have a lot of challenges right now this that relationship because of some of the suspensions of aid that we put in place after the events of june and july of 2013. but over all of those challenges we have, the year that general assisi spent in twux in carlyle, pennsylvania, give withs him a real understanding of the united states and a real affection for that military-to-military relationship. and in a period where there's some disagreements and challenges, having a background of but we trained together, i know these people and they know me, we've got a problem, but we ought to be able to work if for for it. that year of training or training that we provide to leaders in the laf, i think the value of it is so much greater than the incremental cost to, you know, training one more person at the war college or doing a little more training in lebanon. so i'm a strong supporter of this kind of training going forward. let me ask you this, how about the question about the effect of

a rapprochement with appropriate skepticism, some increasing rapprochement with iran, you know, either the interim joint plan of agreement around the nuclear negotiation then has led to a larger discussion about trying to find a diplomatic resolution of this issue of of iran's nuclear weapons program. it is focused on their nuclear weapons program. it's not focused on other issues. but we're, in human experience we understand that finding an agreement on one aspect makes it easier potentially to find an agreement on another. if there was some rapprochement between the west and iran or maybe between saudi arabia and iran, would the likely effect of that on the internal political dynamic in lebanon be positive, or would with it be hard to predict -- would it be hard to predict what that effect would be? >> well, if i may, there's been perceived rapprochement between the u.s. and iran as there has

been between syria. and particularly the gulf states who felt two years ago felt that the assad's days were numbered, that the u.s.' position was clear and also thought the u.s. and others had a very firm position isolating, containing or even combating iran. now they wake up to a different world in which assad is sort of a partner in the long-term chemical weapons deal, iran is, you know, in open negotiations which might take a very long time and which certainly at least indicate that the u.s. is coexisting with iran and with the assad regime for the current future. now, what did that create in terms of dynamics? i think it created several. first of all, it created panic in some countries in the region of the gulf and to some degree turkey. for a while that caused this them to, you know, escalate and want to go their own way. but i think in the last few months i think we've seen a more sober reaction that, well, this

is the new reality, you know? this is going to take some time. expectation that assad is going to fall tomorrow is not real, and the u.s. is not as tough against iran as it was. we're living through a moment particularly from saudi arabia and to some degree from turkey, emirates, kuwait, a sense of movement a bit towards accommodation, some stabilization for now in this particular phase. but i think what's, you know, missing from this entire picture is that iran is certainly -- u.s. has been negotiating with iran over the nuclear file, but from the iranian perspective and from the states in the region iran is maintaining and, indeed, extending its hegemony and the two ships are sort of linked. the more they talk with the u.s., more they have a free hand, they feel, whether it's

maliki and assad, hezbollah and so on. and that creates more conflict and more tension. now, this obviously is all complicated and as i said requires heavy lifting. but the region is sort of in a conflict system, and the is only dealing with parts of it. and often creating, you know, repose somewhere and tension somewhere else. what is certainly missing is the u.s. engaging iran with the states of the region to talk about things beyond the nuclear issue which is iran's projection of power into iraq, syria and lebanon and doing so in a very, you know, flagrant way that breaks all norms of international relations and so on. if the middle east is to see any kind of stability, that cannot continue. and, unfortunately, that's not part of the iranian/u.s. discussion. so i think if it remains at that level, indeed, it could be destabilizing. >> the, one sentiment i picked up in my travels in the region

that was actually very helpful to kind of hear this expression was the anxiety in the region not about the failure of the u.s./iran negotiation over the nuclear program, but there's an anxiety about its success. if there was success, would the united states say, okay, our work is done here, we've reached a deal on the nuclear program, and we don't need to worry about these other issues of projection of iranian power in the region and how that could destabilize regimes. there seems to be some significant concern that the u.s. would feel good about a deal on the nuclear program and then potentially say, you know, we don't need to worry about the other issues when for many of the nations in the region or, they're equally or more concerned about the projection of power and the destabilizing effects of iranian policy as they are about the nuclear program. so it was helpful to hear some of those dynamics when we were there, and that sounds like one of your cautionary warnings to us. mr. nerguizian? >> mr. chairman, the treish --

three issues that cannot be dissociated from each other are the p5+1 talks you describe, but also i think the core issue of the countries in the gulf are fundamentally misinterpreting or getting the wrong message about what, if anything, is the rebalance to asia. >> yeah. >> interpretation in the gulf is that the u.s. is abandoning the gulf security architecture. and, frankly, every meeting that we've conducted in the region reinforces this view. i think it is incumbent on the administration and, frankly, the broader diplomat you can community to just make it clear there is no pivot to asia. you have an acceptance and an understanding by key nato allies that iran's conventional forces are squarely focused on the gulf. and that drives a great deal of this. whether it's competing in iraq, competing in syria. but in all of this i think, again, key countries have

underestimated just how severe the scales are in terms of what syria doing. you have a new generation of fighters returning home to countries in the gulf, returning to europe -- >> to europe, yeah. >> you have all of the patterns in terms of prod socioeconomics, labor markets which we did not discuss in detail but that drive a lot of this. and i think countries like iran and saudi arabia that look at what's happening in syria as zero couple in terms of who wins or loses are slowly coming around to a view that i think the u.s. has slowly moved to which is that you need a pragmatic response to a trend that -- i agree with dr. salem, there needs to be short-term solutions, but this is a long pattern. the arc of history will be long in the region to what the end state will look like. you need metrics of stability. and if linking what's happening in syria and as a result many lebanon to p5+1 in concert with

a successful strategic communications effort in the gulf produces more stability, then so be it. >> dr. salem, i have one last question for you. you indicated in your testimony, you talked a little bit about the economic issues that could be with positive in lebanon if there's a pursuit of of natural gas development, and you said i could say a word more about that if you were interested. i actually am sort of interested in your expert tease on these economic issues. what do you see as sort of opportunities that these gas reserves provide for the lebanese economy and the likelihood that those opportunities will be accessed and taken advantage of in the near or medium term? >> yeah. yeah, i've worked a lot on this and met, you know, the people and companies that are involved. it's a very interesting and somewhat complicated situation. the reserves, of course, they're not proven, you know, one has to to drill and so on, but even from the estimates or the expectations are very, very serious particularly gas

reserves. they're a bit deep, so they're expensive to get at. much will depend on at that time what are the market outlets and what's the money, you know, calculations behind it. but i see it really in two stages. stage one is going ahead with the bidding to which many of the major oil companies of the west and the east have applied to bid. and bid round was supposed to happen last year because of the government still needed to issue a few decrees. when it resigned, it was a caretaker government, couldn't go forward. the first stage is going ahead with the bidding round, and for the first four to five to six years there will be no revenue. there will be, you know, maybe within five, six years you begin to get some energy, but to turn that into money might be seven to ten years' window. but what's important about phase one if you have major oil players from the u.s. and russia and europe and china engaged in the sector, in the eastern mediterranean alongside israel and