kiev today to support the country's government. this is just getting underway. >> last thursday check that your cell phone has been turned off. of course, we will post the program on heritage website for your future reference under outside visitors, online communications are welcome to send questions or comments throughout the program simply by any of us at speaker@heritage.org. hosting our discussion this afternoon is dr. james jay carafano, vice president of foreign and defense policy studies. he is our richardson fell and also directs the kathryn and shelby david institute for international study. he also serves as a senior fellow at the george washington university homeland security policy institute, serves on the board of trustees for the marine corps university foundation, on the advisory board for the west point center of or history, the hambleton society and operation

renewed hope foundation. is an agenda professor at georgetown university and the institute of world politics and to serve as a visiting professor at the national defense university as well as georgetown university. he has written several books, the most recent being his co-authoring of a textbook on homeland security and, of course, he co-authored for heritage, our book on winning the long war, lessons from the cold war for defending terrorism and preserving freedom. lease join me in welcoming jim carafano. [applause] >> thank you. i'm going to be extremely brief so we can get right to the top of. i want to start with a thank you but i want to thank our panelists, chris, kim and michael o'hanlon. put this together on the fly yesterday. i want to thank all of you for coming out in this but we thought this is such a critical issue as you're trying to follow over the weekend of a lot of people talking about a lot of things that nobody had chance to catch their breath. and have a dialogue.

and i think this is an enormous opportunity with three preseason and listen been looking at these issues in studying this part of the world for a long time. to actually have a deep breath and a kind of reasoned, principled discussion about what's happened, what does it mean, where are we going from your and what are our options. i couldn't be more thrilled at these guys are jumping into do this. chris is the executive director at the foreign policy institute. kim holmes is a distinguished fellow, long distance grew not just your heritage but also at the u.s. state department. michael o'hanlon as the research director at brookings institute is incredibly well-respected and very knowledgeable on these issues, so i am so thrilled that the three of them volunteered to do this but i will ask each to stick to 10 minutes, or and we're going to go i think maybe kim, chris, and then mike. and then i have two questions i want to put on the table and

they will try to get as any questions as we possibly can into for the end of the hour. thank you so much for coming. without further ado i'm going to kick it over to kim to start. >> thank you, jim. thank you all of you for coming here today. what i'd like to do is just offer a few preliminary observations about what i think the ukraine crisis means for the united states foreign policy in general, and particularly on the perception of president obama's handling of foreign policy. i have basically two points i would making. the first one is that looking at the unfolding of events there, and particularly the reaction from the obama administration to what's happening in ukraine, it's possible that we may have reached a watershed in what i called post-iraq era. for years now we have as a country been traumatized by the aftermath of the iraq war. and president obama's entire foreign policy which was premised on the assumption that

the first order of strategic business was to avoid conflict at all costs, and above all do not provoke one's opponents. the idea was that the days of great power rivalries were over. it was a new world. it was a world where diplomacy was largely divorced from balance of power. now, it's possible that the ukraine crisis is testing this assumption. obama's recent policy towards russia, if you look back and recover how he got started, really rested on the principle of undoing the tensions as he sought with russia that has been caused by president bush's reaction to the russian intervention against george. in other words, it was specifically aimed at undoing that particular event. we should not be surprised then that vladimir putin to the conclusion that we would eventually the other way if you move in a similar fashion against ukraine.

it is probably true, you'v it sn the country over the last couple of days, that the flip-flops of the president with respect to syria may have signaled indecisiveness to put in but i don't think that was known as important as the aftermath of the recent policy. even after most had concluded that the recent policy was dead, the administration continued to act as if we needed russia more than russia needed us. in afghanistan, iran and syria, for example. we should not be surprised then that putin believed he could take a risk of invading crimea given the signals that have been sent to him by the president. the real question i think is, is this. what has the administration really learned from the crisis? jimmy carter learned after the soviet invasion of afghanistan that his previous assumption about the supposedly inordinate fear of communism was not really because of the soured relations of the soviet union.

he learned that was not the case. actually have something to do with soviet ambitions. and to his credit president carter, to his credit he actually reversed course and last year of his in administration and carter actually began the military buildup that ronald reagan accelerated when he took office. but the question really remains, or the question is i should say, is whether president obama will do the same, whether or not he will learn a similar lesson. he's been dramatically diminishing our military strength, and so far at least he has shown no sign he is willing to change course. he's a man that has shown himself to be very attached to his view of the world. he's not known to change his mind very often, and his main interest over his presidency has been mainly domestic affairs. so we should not, i would not be surprised that if you wants to diffuse the ukrainian crisis as quickly as possible and with as little cost as possible to his domestic agenda. so what actually fear most is

that the president obama will not see as president jimmy carter did see that things have changed. i'm afraid he will test prototype to get back to normal as corporate as possible, and he may try to split the difference between his old views of the world avenue strategic reality represented by ukraine. in other words, he could very well continue marching down the path in weakening america illiterate are, for example, while pretending america's limited options that everybody seems to recognize that we have really has nothing whatsoever to do with him or what he's been doing in the world. i think that's the case if he doesn't take that path, the situation is ripe for miscalculation and confusion. i get the president obama talking tough one in offering an olive branch the next. while frankly, that can confuse an opponent more than reassure or even deter them. he's been blowing somewhat hot and cold over ukraine over the last four or five days, and

those we did the same thing of course over syria, which tells me that he may actually be confused about what power really means, particularly about the perception of american power by other countries. and i fear that he actually doesn't understand or could not understand actually a week america has become, and this can isolate him to overplay his hand on the one hand, or do the exact opposite and desperation, bolted for back and particularly if russia continues to escalate the aggression out that the situation stand without them not much opposition. that's my first point. second point which is the underlying context here is that i think we now have seen the balance of power actually still matters. we have been living with two ideas in the obama air. one of our remission is we really don't need no true strength much anymore because the air of great power of robberies is over with by the cyclone was that any attempt to

be militarily strong or to signal resolve was often interpreted by many of our countrymen as tantamount to wanting to go to war. now, clearly this is not the way russia, and i would also say china, see the matter. to them, hard powers still meditate they are not terribly impressed by president obama's attention to a flight analysis to international affairs. i don't want or even need to compete with america on a global scale but rather to be the dominant force in their respective region. this means that territory as we've seen over the last four or five days, means very much to them which also means that hard power means much to them as well. for the past few years, the default position of the american strategy has been a kind of minimalist realism. has decided that the power israel to the week, we really don't we really cannot influence world affairs all that much,

particularly with military power. it's interesting that the position being echoed in response to ukraine crisis by many people who call himself a realist and, of course, even some liberal internationalists in the wake of the ukrainian crisis. but the interesting thing is that's not the way the obama administration is reacting. is talk of sanctions, talking of loan guarantees to ukraine, and it's other measures against ukraine. so the question is, at least to me is that does this represent a fundamental change in the administration strategic approach, not just to ukraine but to the world? or is it just at living? isn't just trying to make the best of a bad situation and get through the crisis as easily as they can? i would think that for there to be a fundamental change there would have to be not just sort of a hardline position in promising punitive measures against russia, but in the long term a change in the perception of hard powers, specifically the

balance of power. i would think it ministers would have to start accepting the fact that power rivalries actually do so exist, and particularly that's a russia and china see their strategic wish and get with the trade particularly in the border areas and inner specific regions. we know which view of history, putin has. he does not have the view obviously that secretary kerry would like and how, the so-called modern view, with the balance of power was a thing of the past and we only saw in the 19th century. that's not how they view the world, and it leads me to play this is something we should be recognizing as well. i leave you with this. the real question is, we will be going through a specific measures about things that should be done here and we will discuss that in response to the question, i believe some of the details for that but i will leave you with two thoughts. the short run to me is not as important as the long run.

the long run i think we need to restart rebuilding our strategic position, signal that american retrenchment is over. this will go a long way to signaling to russia and to china and other countries that is long grip and american power is going to be reversed. and the second thing we have to start thinking carefully about is we need to stop thinking of military power as a metaphor for military intervention. we used to understand very well that the deterrent force of military power, today much of that has been lost partly because of the legacies of iraq and afghanistan wars, and because political leaders don't want to spend money on the armed forces. we used to look at the turnabout, the balance of power as a way of avoiding war and keeping the peace. not as an excuse for using force. that is a worldview i think we should be returning to. thank you. >> chris. >> thank you, jim, for organizing this conversation today. it's a great pleasure to be up here with kim and mike to,

respected friends in college. would like to step back and tried to provide some general observations, like kim did before diving into the specifics how to think about the crisis in ukraine. one of the important points, and this is a rare moment in washington, we were discussing some of the immediate steps, you can see this in the media and the commentary from administration and even among its critics, that there is some broad consensus about what we should be doing generally with regard to crisis in ukraine and the objectives that we should seek to achieve there. my organization, the foreign policy initiative over the weekend, we issued a statement from our board of directors, bill kristol, eric aid them in and dan siegelman, at the objectives that they describe because i work for a board of directors. those -- i think they are ones

that probably describe objectives most of americans want to see here, deter any for the russian that are individually to ukraine. restore your credit territory integrity and sovereignty, reassure america's allies in europe, strengthen nato's defense posture and to impose costs on the putin government. are broadly these are objectives that most americans want to achieve right now. but this particular circumstance, i believe, presents president obama with a fairly stark choice, at living was the term the kim use. i would describe it as muddling through. you can either seek to model through this crisis or he can use it to articulate a broader vision of the role that the united states should be playing and what we should be achieving through a global leadership at this time. this is important because the russian invasion of creamy peninsula is in my view simla matt of a role in which we see

growing pressure against our allies, our security partners, our friends in many areas in many regions simultaneous it. would compare this moment perhaps once again kim mentioned the example of president carter facing a soviet invasion of afghanistan, what comparable perhaps to president truman in 1947 looking at turkey straits crisis which is was a very specific circumstance to which there was specific measures taken in terms of u.s. military and economic assistance provided to turkey was also the opportunity for president carter -- president truman articulate the truman doctrine for america's of support for free peoples struggling. similarly in 1979 invasion of afghanistan was a moment the lead immediately to truman's description of the u.s. commitment towards the persian gulf region but also led to the groundswell of the new thinking about what the final days of our

the eventual showdown with the soviet union in the 1980s. as we look around the world today, we can see this global pressure. just to speak to a handful of examples, the u.s. navy says that china is preparing for a short and sharp war against japan over disputed territories. iran is to find decoration or the future of its nuclear weapons program. syria is being torn asunder by the regime of assad who is using incredible weaponry against his cell in population and the civil war there. we can see that human rights are threatened across the middle east into our own neighborhood in venezuela. and in the context of these challenges which range from traditional allies to security of partners and countries with our family with, to send the persons whose aspirations we should support, this is a moment where an uncertain trumpet will

tackle resoundingly throughout the world. so in my view the president should use this opportunity both to pursue the specific measures of the crisis ukraine demands that he should be conscious he speaking to three audiences, and to speak to those audiences in describing that the united states will punish a question, stand with allies and support the aspirations of people globally for freedom. and will stick to those three audiences that he must be too. first, most clearly russia in this case, putin personally. those supporting immediately, and when you look more broadly at countries like china, the assad regime in syria, iran, but are looking at this moment as a test of american resolve and whether they can engage in similar aggressive steps in the future without facing a strong american response. the great "washington post" editorial over the weekend

concluded, i quote, these men will not be deterred by the disapproval of their peers, the weight of world opinion or even this investment by silicon valley companies. they're concerned primarily with maintaining their hold on power. i pick that point is true, and looking at the challenge of there are three the immediate steps that make sense. one is to punish vladimir putin and his cronies personally. by taking sanctions against them, their persons, their finances that have consequences for their ability to in get away the benefits of living in the hypocrisy that is the russian federation today. point number two in that regard, that the united states has about $40 billion in bilateral trade with russian federation. union has a $500 million. that at the end of the day have a fairly minimal relationship with russia. this is a point that was expressed very clearly last

year. you may recall there was an effort to boycott russia over its treatment, it's anti-gay laws, criminalizing certain free speech in russia. no one could find a russian product to boycott because we just and we don't import enough from them. we went after the vodka and realize it's not really russian vodka. that's the way these things go, but at the end of the day if you're going to see really effective sanctions on russia, it's going to be with useu cooperation in immediate step, two tracks, both speaking to the individuals responsible for this particular act of aggression against ukraine, then there is the model provided in the united states which requires sanctions on certain -- gross human rights violations at home and we should be speaking to our european allies that they, too, should adopt similar legislation imposing sanctions both toward

this particular act of aggression and more broadly the state of human rights violations that characterizes the russian federation today. third, in our congress should look to consider a bill that would take the act sanctions for human rights violations and make them applicable not just the individuals in the russian federation but globally. and whenever we are looking at the types of countries that both i've used the populations at home and threaten their neighbors, that these things are, this is a situation that applies from countries, iran and china broadly, but once again as legislation sitting in congress deserves to be considered. the second audience, allies, partners, the people who look to the united states traditionally for leadership. ambassador eric aleman who serves on board of directors of foreign policy initiative has

pointed out that the russian incursion into ukraine since the particular dangers message because with the dissolution of the soviet empire can ukraine at the time inherited the nuclear weapons that happened to be located on its territory can be reached an agreement by which it returned those weapons to russia as part of the 1994 budapest declaration in which we will quote moscow committed to, i quote, respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of ukraine, integral. and also to quote, an obligatioobligatio n to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory, integrity of the independence of ukraine. as it stands, this act of aggression despite that declaration stands as a very dangerous message to any country that currently does not have a nuclear weapons program, that by surrendering its nuclear weapons

quite literally you cremate itself global to envision i russia. what steps should we take in response to this? there are for immediate steps. one, literally human to human physical engagement. secretary kerry, please to speak on television as we were coming over here this morning to kiev as a step in the right direction. it would've been more than official if secretary of defense haeckel also visited ukraine, and we should see visits by other nato and european union foreign and defense ministers to express their support for the newly established government and the territorial integrity of ukraine. number two, assistants, that ukraine economy is a disaster in many ways, that the ukrainian military will require significant assistance as opposed to have confidence in his ability to defend itself going into the future, that for both the united states, nato,

there's need to assess what our ukraine's economic and self-defense requirements, and to expeditiously provide those requirements both through nato and bilateral between the united states and you crane. just as an example, in 2008 after the russia-georgia war, within one month congress passed an amendment to the defense authorization bill that would provide not $50 million immediately for georgia, just a down payment on the type of assistance that's required. three, they need to enhance nato's deterrent posture against russia on the possibility of future russian aggression against current nato states, and future nato states, ukraine and georgia. these are brought back to the thick be taken are looking at the future in europe, cleverly between the united states and

our nato partners but this comes to the fourth but which is another one i would agree with kim, is the idea of the u.s. defense budget, that we are now in the third year of deep cuts to u.s. defense spending. the consequence of these cuts is that since the president came into office in 2009, we were spending 3.7% of our economy on the base defense department budget. that number is now down to 2.8%. about a 1% reduction as a share of gdp increased spending for defense, which incidentally is the same level where we were on 9/11 into the house and one. so you can see how far we've fallen compared to where we were just a few years ago. what we're seeing today is harmed in italy the u.s. readiness and capability, and the long-term major reductions to the science of u.s. forces -- which when you look at a situation like this in europe, the idea that u.s. ground forces are irrelevant to be able to

send a message about credible defense and to reassure our allies. deter are vicious, i think it would be -- [inaudible] as a final point, in terms of audiences, the president must use this opportunity speak to the american people, and explain our purpose in the world. the majority of americans now believe that the united states should mind its own business, and the majority of americans i believe that the united states is less powerful than a decade ago. this is not entirely surprising when you are told that the united states should focus on nation building here at home. this is not surprising in our objectives, even immediately like we see in afghanistan where american soldiers are fighting and dying on the ground, our objectives there on not clearly explained repeatedly by the commander-in-chief. despite them, when you ask them come and majority of americans, overwhelmingly, 80% with the united states should exercise

global leadership in collaboration with the talibans. nearly 80% believe we should listen to the needs and interests of our allies. that there is an audience in the american public is the president seize this opportunity to explain why and how the united states must lead. and with that, i'll turn it over. >> so we go from chris on the far post initiative to michael o'hanlon at brookings. i have a double thank you for michael. i bounced around like a ping pong ball yesterday while working to put this together so is not only a great scholar but he's a gracious colleague. over to you. >> thank you. i think you're calling for entertaining my daughter out in the hallway. it's a pleasure to be here, and an honor to be on this panel. i heard a lot of ideas that i agree with, and so let me maybe begin with just two broad observation, not so much direct disagreement with a slightly different perspective in trying to understand first the broad

place we're at with american foreign policy today and then try to understand a little bit about what might be into his mind or at least how we might try to steer putin. and i agree with many of the specifics that i've heard and i'm about to get into more detailed discussion of some of them as well so i will say that part for a few minutes from now. on the broad interpretation of president obama's foreign policy, let me begin with a couple of the points that kim megalithic president obama should be thinking hard about and correcting, but it also offers somewhat different take and should necessary field ukraine is a place where has to somehow show that he is more resolute. my biggest critiques of president obama's foreign policy which i think has been better than some argue, but nonetheless there has been a couple of notable cases that have been growing the last couple of years. one of them certainly is the isa failed policy in syria. what i think president obama natalie is witnessing a very tragic situation and actually should be willing empirically to

recognize he made the wrong call in 2012 when he decided not to take the vice of his visors and many others in this town and on the syrian insurgency in a more concerted and consistent and serious way. you can understand why he made that decision, but empirically speaking it hasn't worked well because assad has been overthrown and perhaps even more important the al-qaeda affiliates of the syrian opposition have only grown in strength. we were worried about those groups potentially getting some of our arms and that's why we didn't give them ours. what happened was perhaps even worse. let's look at syria and so we're fitting and let's correct that. let's look at afghanistan as crischris just mentioned and les say that the president owes the country and the men and women in uniform of this country a little bit more positive rhetoric that simply we are ending this war. if it was the only thing we're doing you would wonder what it took us four years to end it because we been using the rhetoric for almost four years. i was at the president's policies have been better than

his rhetoric. we've made more progress in afghanistan than he or many talk about and recognized. and when you talk about ending a war in afghanistan and then you don't engage in an effective policy in syria, it does invite these criticisms that somehow american foreign policy has lost its resoluteness and its strength. i look at the overall record and a seat a little better record. this is not to disagree with kim because i think you missed nation needs to fix the mistakes it's making anti-the sole into a broader message about american engagement in the world and not just talk about nationbuilding at home. i agree there's a need for a correction but i also look at foreign policy in this country right now and i see a president who really is committed to iran not getting a nuclear bomb on its watch. there are different people have different views on the interim agreement that's been signed on the prospects for a longer-term agreement with iran. the president does not seem that hopeful about it but i believe him and we will see if my confidence is worded, that he

will not let iran get a bum bomn his watch. i also see the president tried to do the responsible thing in afghanistan, even though his rhetoric is not very resolute. his actual policies have been careful and gradual, and in the last week or so we've seen him basically decide as i interpret it not to just implement the zero option because president karzai refuses to agree to long-term accord by to tell president karzai, listen, we will deal less with you and wait for your successor t who we thik will want that the court which we also recognize will be in our interest. that's what i interpret that. ..

making the kind of decisions we made today and knowing i think hillary clinton as she runs isn't going to be on defense i'm looking forward to a fairly robust presidential race itch i hope will reallocate the need for that international affairs. we know there are competing elements in both political parties but don't want to hear that and they do want to do

nationbuilding at home and i understand that argument that i think we need a rebalancing on that one as well. in summary, president obama has a better foreign-policy than he himself acknowledges, and he should actually based the ukraine policy on the need to prove that america is re- engaging because the state skier i think are simply too high, and the risk of making the wrong decision to hire to use ukraine as a litmus test for leadership to fix serious policy and then he made ukraine on its own merits. point number two and this is intended as an attempt to get at the worldview of vladimir putin and it's been haunting me the last couple days so i'm going to burden you with my view what is the analogy for putin? in american foreign policy to what he's doing now and by the way, don't worry i'm not justifying putin.

i'm going to come back in a second and say why i don't think it is a good analogy but he hasn't articulated this and maybe it is panama 1989. we had the panama canal, something that was important to the american strategic interest in a lot of americans who had been in the panama and the president h. w. bush, george h. w. bush saw the kind of criminality in the noriega regime and including drug trafficking why he didn't think the government was legitimate any longer so he overthrew it. perhaps for putin this is an analogy to what is going on now. here's why it's not a good analogy and why we've got to get putin away from this kind of thinking. first of all, noriega has proven himself to be a monster and if there is any analogy in this situation with noriega, it is

yonakovich and we've learned why he's a bomb and why he's the only legitimate leader of ukraine you can make a legal argument about that, but it doesn't hold water. so we have to get putin off of that but maybe this is part of why he thinks this. second, the panama analogy wouldn't be good for putin to invoke because we stayed for the minimal amount of time needed to restore order and allow a democracy to return to panama and that's what putin needs to be held responsible to do now. a very specific point. i will save that discussion for the conversation we are about to have an amendment. why haven't we demanded that putin clarified distinctions? i'm not saying that i would delete anything he says but why don't we say to him do you plan to stay in all of these different locations and definitely? because what we need to do is force for putin to either admit that he is thinking in the

secessionist or annexation terms or to get him on the record saying he will get out as soon as possible he can and return simply to the use and otherwise recognize that it is for ukrainians. i want to make that kind of declaration because what i'm worried about isn't so much he's done so far. it's not a very pretty, it's old-school, it's russian chauvinism and nationalism at its worst, but not a lot of people have died and there is no permanent declaration of the annexation. so that's what i'm worried about the possibility for this to escalate and i want to get all of the tools on the table now so we can use to prevent a worsening of this crisis. my basic view is we've gotten so much better at applying economic sanctions that we have a powerful litany of sanctions that we can use and we should start thinking hard as people have begun about how we do that.

and it should be very clear who in the world is going to apply sanctions in a major way for a long period of time, not just for a few months if he stays in charge and ukraine tries to restore yanukovych to power or punish the ukrainian people. that's the line in the sand i want to see us draw and worry less about everything that's happened so far has been properly handled. i don't agree with it, but if we can somehow undo what happened the last few months in crimea it won't be a catastrophe. however it might very well be a catastrophe and that's what i want to focus on. i will stop there trade >> i couldn't have asked for a better set of opening remarks on the panel. it's a great fruitful area to discuss. here's what we are going to do from here. i have two questions and then an e-mail i need to ask and we will go to the floor, so be thinking about your questions. if you have a question and the audience, raise your hand, we can be recognized and wait for the iger front of everyone can

hear your question. state your name and affiliation and as quickly as possible to get as many as we can. we will try to end directly at the end of the hour. the first question is our list of recommendations today i want to ask about one and specifically which is one of the most dramatic and controversial and maybe kind intuitive to some people that the u.s. should pull out of the new start treaty that is a agreement that was the cornerstone. i think the argument would be that there is no strategic advantage for the united states to be in the treaty and the withdrawal would be the most dramatic and impactful statement about the future of the u.s. relations, particularly the strategic relationship which at the end of today is the most fundamental thing that we have with russia. so i would like to run the panel very quickly and get your thoughts about that. >> this is the danger of setting the closest to the moderator.

[laughter] >> i haven't read the full paper. a couple thoughts that come to mind immediately, i don't clearly see the benefits coming from the new start mac treaty along the two lines that there is a day-to-day benefit of having the monitoring and compliance provisions of the treaty to provide some insight into the russian behavior with its strategic forces. and number two, in terms of the what we don't live in the universa universein which we hae administration that would withdraw from the treaty or maintaimaintained the option of expanding the nuclear forces were moving in other directions to conduct additional cuts, so i don't see the immediate value of the argument along those lines after the new start treaty was

announced that president obama reached out in the speech speaking to the prospect of additional u.s. strategic forces negotiated with the russians which immediately said they weren't interested in and this year perhaps with the prospect of additional cuts the envelope was offered and that last offer that was ignored at the time. they have no interest in easing the tension, so somewhere in the middle i don't see value in further cuts from where we are. >> one of the great ironies of the charge that you hear about from president obama and also secretary kerry about not wanting to go back to a cold war perspective on russia is that the focus was represented by the new start was doing exactly that. at the time when it was

proposed, at heritage we were asking and scratching our heads by saying i thought we supposedly moved beyond the strategic nuclear arms competition between the former soviet union and russia and the united states and yet this was the centerpiece of the administration's approach. so, we oppose the ratification of the new start to begin with because we just thought it was a bad deal. we thought it was lopsided and russia's fever, and we thought it also was basically a cover for really what i think was the preference in the administration for the preferred reduction of u.s. strategic forces. and they saw that politically and even geopolitically as a way of moving in after action. so, i wouldn't at all be upset if we pulled out of it. but i also would say that i would add to the mix that russia is -- the charges there is information that russia is violating the inf treaty as well

by developing missiles that exceeded the range of the limits of the treaty. and yet, you hear nothing in the administration, hardly anything about that. so, my point is that this is part of a larger piece. it's not just what we do have to start but also if you let the violations of the treaty go forward without any protest that is just one more signal that the uniteunited states isn't serious about the relationship. >> interesting question. i guess i support start, but rather than getting into a prolonged discussion on that, all of the planes are valid i would agree. i would simply say it's an example of the kind of thing that we should begin to put in play. whether i agree on that particular point, there should be a message to president putin now that your next step is crucial. so far we are sort of teeing up ideas for the next step is wrong. some big stuff is going to start

to happen in response and i will leave it at that. >> one other question. if the focus has all been on the russian reaction and what's lost is the conversation that we are having the week before just the future of ukraine itself, and regardless of whether putin moves forward or not in the economic freedom which is online, and if you look at their score in this remarkable uptake it would say things are getting better. but you kind of have to read the whole page. one of the things you find is there are a hundred 55th in the world. and they are 42nd in the region. so, here is a large country with all kinds of resources and prosperity z. they are one of the poorest performers and then when you actually read about what is holding the score back it is basically political interference in the country and rampant corruption.

corruption. so these are serious structural problems, and so now we have the crimea invasion on top of that, but any thoughts about how this country begins to write itself and move forward? in the midst of this confrontation? >> once again, i believe you look at ukraine, you look at its economy credits the largest share of any economy in the world, and the initial motivation for the protest begins to question last year of a closer relationship between ukraine and the european union and it comes down to the question of wealth ukraine moved to the west which will require the types of economic reforms that can address corruption and after us the state of the managed economy or will it move into the russian and putin dominated influence and if the latter happens, you don't see the proper reforms that ukraine

ultimately needs. so that is the key question that is being addressed. >> when the crisis explored i felt like i have seen this movie before. the revolution had the same players and the same figures and you have the same corruption in the problems in the economy back then that you have now. so after the years of the revolution not much has changed and until ukraine figures out how to get its economy under control and figure out that the oligarch control is basically just making the economy the private property of just a few individuals, they are not going to be able to get out of the spiral of the international crisis that they find themselves in. and i fear that what's going to

happen is the same thing all over again. is that some of the people that the oligarchs are worried about in ukraine are worried about their own private wealth. and they may even be sending some people to moscow to try to get some kind of degree that mat maybe great news as far as a crisis is concerned, but that would only mean that you are freezing about corruption in the economy. and therefore, we very well could be seeing this kind of crisis continued again in the future. >> i would simply offer that first of all i'm glad that you are underscoring this point because a good friend of mine, the former ambassador to poland wrote a good piece on the foreign-policy.com where he pointed out at the end of the war a sized the country's more or less and have about the same per capita gdp. i think that ukraine was actually slightly ahead at that point and now poland is three times richer per person. so to just underscore the

gravity of this stagnation has been ongoing in ukraine for so long. i don't have a good answer on how to fix it, but i would use this argument has one more tool against putin and he tries to claim yanukovych is the legitimate president of ukraine. by some legalistic interpretation, short you could force that argument down peoples throats. but the point is that yanukovych had lost his legitimacy because of economic mismanagement. what we need now is to create a process that is inclusive enough that russians feel a part of it and serious enough that all of the ukrainians can feel like they have a greater hope in whatever political system is created in the next round of elections, and i don't know how that's supposed to happen, but that is to combine the project we should be working with all ukrainians including ethnic russian ukrainians and with putin. and we should dramatize that it wasn't acceptable putting yanukovych back for the reasons you mentioned including the economic one.

>> to underscore the point of ukraine in this year ranks 155, 156. poland is 50. so, i am going to -- i have a question i'm going to throw out to mike and then if anybody on the panel wants to address this that's fine and we can go to the floor. this is a question from the "the washington times" reporter online. the russian foreign minister cited the presence of the russian citizens and compatriots justification for the russian troops entering the crimea peninsula. does this set a dangerous peninsula for the public in russia's neighborhood and is there a risk this russian policy world and unrest among russian speaking populations in the region? >> that's a great question and this is one of the issues i thought secretary kerry was at his best in his speaking over the weekend, because one of the things he said is that it's a bogus argument, mr. putin because you had other things you could have done to address the issue of the safety of ethnic

russians started with asking international monitors to go. the implication is if those monitors report bad things, the world has an obligation to find a step to protect those russians where at the moment the seemed to be inventing charges and certainly not concerned in any way, so the kind of measures that john kerry was suggesting are the right ones for us to propose if we need to, for example, help russia and ukraine feel more secure. >> one of the concerns i have is the implication of ukraine for the baltic states. latvia has a fairly large number of russian speaking people inside its country, and the same arguments that are to be used and are used in ukraine can be used in latvia. the question is what do we do to reassure the states and other countries in spite of nato that this kind of new attitude from russia isn't going to apply to

them. it lacked a strategic identity. if you look at any of the documents about the purpose you will not see any mention or reference at all. expand moving away from this direction for a long time even though for the states and i would say poland, that was one of the main reasons that they joined. so, i think that we have to find ways to be more serious about applying become at it and making it very clear so it would help them believe that in the future this is not a gambit they want to risk with respect to these countries. >> i would agree and emphasize the positive side. when you look at the states as they are directly trampled on it is because of that guarantee and

when we look at the future of the u.s. forces they are planning to bring the capabilities but also there is a very positive outcome that we have achieved in the expansion of nato. >> we have four questions. right here in the center and in the back. >> the afghan american chamber of commerce. it seems to me since the shooting hasn't started all of a sudden it's changed and it looks like he has made a blunder here economically and already we see the stock market crash in. our own stock market is now booming again and it seems to me the ace in the hole his economically and the future sanctions and everything else puts it on putin to do something here. the timing may be how do we deal with this from an economic

perspective and just wait them out. >> whitney ask if anyone else wants to. >> this should make the final litmus test and the key to this is we don't necessarily get to choose what is the test when it comes to how the united states is perceived. when you look at the ones they spoke to when it comes to punishing and putting pressure is on the economic side. when it comes to expanding the credibility of the commitments that is the message that further aggression is not acceptable and it comes down to additional investments in the alliance through the future of ukraine. so i think msn's if you have the tools that putin has miscalculated it ever prevents

your enemy from its calculating. >> very quickly i would agree and i want to underscore that us there be any confusion. the question is if putin makes any further or worse decisions, then i think we have to come down like a ton of bricks on the economic front. i went to quickly say that it's become my think a major bipartisan accomplishment in this town to be able to apply economic leverage more effectively over the last ten years. we have enough debate about what to do next especially towards iran but we wind up not necessarily, you know, recognizing that collectively first under president george w. bush and people like the treasury and then under president obama we've managed to apply i should have said in a previous administrations we were showing the early signs in the civil war we started to find out how to target was a melissa --

under the president republican and democrat and we have got partners that have helped ironically putin even helped on a couple issues with regards to iran and north korea. but we can do this pretty effectively and let's remember that bipartisan accomplishment is a tool that may or may not be adequate but it is a tool that is a little bit more sharply than it used to be. >> i think the sanctions that have been proposed by the administration should go forward until russia reverses but it's done because we don't want to get into a situation that we have essentially the test to what's already happened. so, if they reverse the situation than we can look at reversing some of the sanctions. as for being a litmus test i don't mean to imply that this is kind of like a strategic showdown with russia.

that isn't the case at all. on the other hand it is true other countries like iran and china are watching and not just russia. watching how we handle it and not only how skillfully that also whether or not we show the result is necessary to get the situation changed. >> is very question down here. >> i was in ukraine the last five years. sorry for my english. i apologize. they didn't want us to know english. [laughter] thanks for your presentation. what is next? despite the withdrawal of the

militant forces, the problems remain the same. the possible [inaudible] as far as we know she was in jail for two years and shared a lot in common with putin. so maybe they will be satisfied. the second is still in crimea with the president yanukovych and second is the only oligarch that took even more power.

[inaudible] how would you deal with the new government? >> i do want to say that your english is better than my ukrainian. [laughter] his name is on the buck. he's supposed to understand all this stuff. [laughter] whitney ask him to put all those together and talk about what is the way forward for ukraine and if anybody else wants to jump in. >> we've argued many times one of the things that was missing in the policy and other countries in the region was an economic reform package and one of the reasons -- i am ambivalent about the idea of the guarantee because i think that it would be wasted so long as they have the oligarchs in charge and they don't fix the problems of corruption. and so we are dealing with a near-term crisis in the next couple of weeks we will see what

happens. as i said a minute ago in the long term if we don't start finding ways either to condition the aid were to come up with a better emphasis on trade and economic reform in the relationship not just for ukraine and other countries, they will always be throwing that money at the situation. so this is a long-term problem, but at the very least they can try to figure out as we say in the index had to get to the government control of the economy to try to have a privatization program that it doesn't end up in only a few number of people controlling the economy and also have an economic liberalization program that brings a long-term prosperity. the foreign-policy initiative a few weeks ago. they wanted to see came out intd

the second point briefly as it gets wa by on of the reasons yanukovych rejected the relationship moving forward is because he didn't want the conditions of the agreement and ultimately it will be economic integration. >> do you have a question right here. >> good afternoon. thank you very much for the presentation. my question is it seems one of the next steps president may take as a referendum on the increased independence by the crimea autonomous regional government. the question for you is in the u.s. foreign policy we supported the independence in the southern sudan and we also supported a peaceful independence and others

such as montenegro and we wouldn't have come back like in scotland. my question for you is if there's a successful referendum or session by the local population of crimea, what leverage do we have, but leg do we have to stand on to dispute that? >> that's a good question. >> that's a great question. i think -- i think in this case it's too likely that it would be a very opportunistic use of a crisis by putin to accomplish and i think the only way that you could imagine it is if the process were slowed down, if it were separated by a long period of time from the times we are having today if the motion is cooled, if ukraine gained the sovereignty and any such discussion could have been if

there were plenty of international development and monitoring the behavior of the different parties so it wasn't based on the failed threats and everything else but on people's aspirations but most of us know that crimea has a bit of a different place in russia and ukrainian history than other points of the territory, so it's not illegitimate to ask the questions but it is illegitimate to try to create out of this crisis in a short-term. ..

>> which is when this whole thing . so what, you know, what's the relationship of that, of the economic collapse of europe and the origin of these protests that have nothing to do with actually the leadership of ukraine, but the decision not to join the e.u., and now there's support by the united states, by the president for neo-nazi organizations in ukraine. this is a very dangerous situation. it's putting us up against russia, so i would like to ask you would you really support a nuclear war with rush that? -- russia? [laughter] [inaudible conversations] >> let me ask chris to respond and help we'll go down here for a question. >> yeah. no, likewise no. no nuclear war. that the question speaks to what i believe is a very important

and significant development which is the role of, essentially, that russia, russian-controlled media and propaganda in the context of russia today and that telling the story that's getting picked up in the western media which you can look at facts on the ground to look at why, you know, it's fundamentally not true in terms of that the opposition that led to overthrow of yanukovych essentially being a nazi-esque cast of characters with anti-russian leanings in terms of what would happen in crimea and the east under their control. and if you haven't checked out the way that this media is carried, the english language access for russian news and the english language, it prevents -- presents a starkly different view of the world than the one i would argue that we live in.

and whenever angela merkel warned that president putin may be delusional, it was perhaps to suggest that he believes this narrative about the nature of the opposition and also the nature of crimean people in support of russian ambitions in the region. >> so if we have, i think, time for one last question down here in front, in the front row, and this'll be the last question, and we'll wrap up. great, thanks. >> thank you very much. my name is -- [inaudible] with voice of -- [inaudible] i thank the heritage foundation. i think this is very appropriate that we have it debated here, discussed here. and i took dr. o'hanlon and dr. griffin's proposal that maybe first we immediate to pay attention to our defense force, and with the heritage foundation support, the repeal, how it'll stop the sequestration. and i think the president had

announced his -- [inaudible] this morning, and he did request for 26 billion more for defense. i hope the heritage foundation will support it with your collections. and the second, the important part i want to ask is where is the role of china in this whole picture? because this will send a message not just to ukraine, not just to russia, but to the whole world especially talking about a rebalancing to asia. we have a lot of unsettling conflicts and allies in asia looking at how the is handling this. and the lesson from georgia kind of put everyone at a very concerned and uneasiness. so would you think that this is a good opportunity for the u.s. to test china in its aspiration of rising to be another global power? can china step in and support us

in sanctioning, support us in its action against russia taking over crimea? because china is important in the u.n. security council, and they have the meeting yesterday. i didn't hear much from china. can we openly request china to make a statement saying that it's not supporting? and that will be a test for china to assert itself if it's wore thu of a global power. it has to share. >> thank you. okay, that's a jump ball. [laughter] who wants to talk about china? >> i'll offer a brief word. i think that it's an interesting question. i'm glad you raised it. it got me thinking. i don't know that it's realistic to expect china to be forward leaning on this. but maybe it's reasonable to at least ask them to consider making some statements that

would be suggestive of where they might go if things get worse. so i'm not sure we can expect china to threaten putin even at the u.n. but i think maybe china can start to say how important it is that this not go any further. that kind of veiled language may be a reasonable request, and it would be interesting to see if beijing would consider it. my guess is they probably won't, but i think there are things we could ask them to consider. >> jump in. just agree entirely with mike. and two observations from the points you raised. you mentioned the $26 billion in addition to the budget request that secretary hagel has asked for, and i think something to keep in mind as we look at the debate that's coming up over this defense budget is that if he gets what he asked for, if he gets the extra $26 billion, that still puts us on a trajectory to have the smallest army since the second world war, not to have army modernization, to withdraw various forces from the air force. so there's a bigger debate, you

know, beyond this $26 billion is by no means a panacea. of interesting very quick second point when it comes to what you mentioned for surrogate broadcaster. in terms of the importance of supporting surrogate broadcasting and in countries -- russia can be one, but others -- where the media is controlled by the government that hearing opportunities to hear independent media voices. >> the details of what kind of sanctions the administration really wants to impose, whether they're unilateral, the europeans or who they would be with. but if they are to go down the road of asset freezes and sort of targeting certain people, there's a longe's a long historg that at the united nations security council. i'd have to say, though, i'd be very surprised in china would support that effort. perhaps we could and try it. but i tend to agree with michael, this is -- ukraine's not the place to to draw the line with china.

there's other issues that we have to work k with them on. >> yeah. i just, just a couple of things to clean up before we convene. so there are a whole range of issues here, many of which we just barely touched on. for example, just in the end we got into publicitydiplomacy and political warfare and the future of voice of america, some of our own public diplomacy. there's a huge information war going on out there that's gotten very little discussion actually. it's a really important point. there's been no discussion of the cyber war. we know about the cyber war wees tone ya, with georgia, there's been very little press in media about what's going on in the ukraine, and there is an element of cyber war going on there. and that's kind of interesting. we talked about new s.t.a.r.t. and some of the strategic issues, but i think that's an issue where we could really spend forever. for example, what lesson is iran taking away from this in terms of do they really want to have a nuclear weapon or not? what does that tell them about do people mess with you if you have a nuclear weapon or not?

and then michael wrought up a whole -- brought up a whole really series of interesting, cascading really key foreign policies in the united states whether it's afghanistan or syria or our relationship with china, just incredible breadth of issues. the one i really wish we'd had more time to get into which which all three of our panelists touched on was the defense issue, and what are the implications for us not to go to war in the ukraine, but really, in other words, what is the sufficiency of the united states to defend its own national interests all around the world and not risk, in a sense, compromising your interest some place or another. i think we could spend an awful lot of time on this, and all these gentlemen have an enormous amount of different, interesting ideas. one thing i would commend to you a paper i just happen to have with you which is our heritage 2014 defense reform handbook where we do look at a lot of of these issues. not just do we get $26 billion next year, but how do you have

the sufficiency of military over the long term and how do you afford that and what's appropriate. that's very timely. that's on the heritage web site as are the other products i mentioned. this event, which was completely spectacular and i just want to thank our panelists so much, in 24 hours this'll be up on our web site, and folks can access that video. c-span also be replaying it. the most important thing we have to do is to thank our panelists for figuring out how to get here today and rearrange their schedules and be so brilliant. so please join with me in thanking our panelists. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> we're having some technical trouble with the program --

>> as we leave this discussion, if you missed any of this event, you can watch it anytime in our video library at c-span.org. and president obama has made remarks on situation in ukraine. he did it just a short time ago after introducing his 2015 budget at an elementary school here in the nation's capital. the president said that russia's military invasion of ukraine could end up driving countries away from russia instead of closer to it. here's what he had to say. >> there have been some reports that president putin is pausing for a moment and reflecting on what's happened. i think that we've all seen that from the perspective of the european union, the united states, allies like canada and japan and allies and friends and partners around the world there is a strong belief that russia's

actions is violating international law. i know president putin seems to have a different set of lawyers making a different set of interpretations, but i don't think that's fooling anybody. i think everybody recognizes that although russia has legitimate interests in what happens in the neighboring state, that does not give it the right to use portion as a means -- use force as a means of exerting influence inside of that state. we have said that if, in fact, there is any evidence out there that russian speakers or russian natives or russian nationals are in any way being threatened, there are ways of dealing with that through international mechanisms. and we're prepared to make sure that the rights of all ukrainians are upheld and, in fact, in conversations that we've had with government in kiev, they have been more than willing to work with the

international community and with russia to provide such assurances. so the fact that we are still seeing soldiers out of their barracks in crimea is an indication to which what's happening there is not based on actual concern for russian nationals or russian speakers inside of ukraine, but is based on russia seeking, through force, to exert influence on a neighboring country. that is not how international law is supposed to operate. i would also note just, you know, the way that some of this has been reported, that the suggestion somehow that russian actions have been clever strategically. i actually think that this has not been a sign of strength, but

rather is a reflection that countries near russia have deep concerns and suspicions about this kind of meddling. and if anything, it will push many countries further away from russia. there is the ability for ukraine to be a friend of the west's and a friend of russia's as long as none of us are in, inside of ukraine trying to meddle and intervene, certainly not militarily, with decisions that properly belong to the ukrainian people. >> the president earlier today at a elementary school not far from the white house where he unveiled his 2015 budget request, and a live look now at the capitol where earlier today the budget was delivered to lawmakers on both the house and senate side. the associated press writing that the president's 2015 fiscal blueprint includes proposals to upgrade aging highways and railroads, finance more pre-kindergarten programs and enhance job training. the white house said it would also extend the earned income

tax credit to coffer 13.5 million low-earning workers without children, expand the child tax credit for some parents and make it easier for workers to contribute to individual retirement accounts. we have a link to the budget proposal on c-span.org. we also could hear reaction to today's budget release from senators when they gavel in today at 2 p.m. eastern for general speeches, about 45 minutes from you. no votes scheduled for today as lawmakers continue to make their way back to the washington, d.c. area after yesterday's snowstorm which closed the federal government. tomorrow senators will take up a nomination for assistant tone general for the justice department's civil rights commission. you can see the senate at 2 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> the new c-span.org web site gives you access to an incredible library of political events with more added reach day through c-span's nonstop coverage of national politics, history and nonfiction books.

find c-span's daily coverage of official washington or access more than 200,000 hours of archived c-span video. everything c-span has covered since 1987. and our video is all searchable and viewable on your desktop computer, tablet or smartphone. just look for the prominent search bar at the top of each page. the new c-span.org makes it easy to watch what's happening today in washington and find people and events from the past 25 years. it's the most comprehensive video library in poll ticks. politics. >> navy secretary ray mabus discussed the future of the navy and marine corps at an event hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. his remarks came a few days after depence secretary chuck hagel announced significant deductions in the budget and

troop drawdown. he talked about military exercises in south korea. csis president and ceo john hamre gave opening remarks. [inaudible conversations] >> okay. is this working? can you hear me? good. please, sir. well, thanks, everybody, for coming. we're delighted to have you here. my name is john hamre, and i'll apologize if i sound a little dopey today. i landed at two in the morning having flown back from taiwan, and i promised i'd be here to be with the secretary. so he's going to sound brilliant, i'm going to sound stupid, but that's normal. [laughter] at least today i have an excuse. we're really very happy to have secretary ray mabus with us today. i will say thank you for coming.

you know, he has so many titles. [laughter] governor, ambassador, secretary, ceo. which -- just before we get started, which do you prefer? >> just a plain, simple your excellency will do. >> just your excellency. [laughter] okay. really delighted to have you herement and, of course, everybody here in this room wants to hear you say things you can't talk about which is the new budget, so -- and i suspect, i'd like everybody here to be somewhat respectful of this awkward situation the secretary's in. you know, there's some things he just can't talk about today, and you'll just have to understand that that's part of the business. but he is going to give us insights into, into his thinking and his advocacy that helped shape this budget. and so, mr. ec tear, i thought maybe you would start by saying as you're trying to guide the

navy thinking about, you know, the fundamentals, it's not just today's navy, it's the navy we have in 30 years. what divides you? what's dividing you -- what guides you? what's guiding you? >> the one thing that the navy uniquely -- and when i say "navy," i mean navy, marine corps team. >> sure. >> two services, one mission. but the thing that navy uniquely brings to our country is presence. presence is the purpose. it's what we do. it's what we're about. not just being in the right place at the right time, but the right place all the time. and in the defense strategic guidance that the president came out with in 2012, if you look at that focus on the western pacific, focus on the arabian gulf and focus on partnership

building, that is a maritime strategy. that is a strategy that requires a great navy, requires a great marine corps. and so that overall idea of presence and the ability to give our leaders options in times of crisis and in times, peacetime and wartime. so that's the big idea. underneath that the way i've organized it has been in order to get presence, you need to look at four things; people, make sure we've got guide and retain very high quality sailors and marines and civilian, platforms because quantity becomes a quality all its own at some point, power because the way we get and use fuel can

either be a military advantage or a military vulnerability and, fourth, is partnerships, building those partnerships around the world because no matter how big, no matter how good we are, we cannot do these things alone. and we need partners, and they need to have the capability to act together with us to meet whatever eventuality there is out there. >> secretary, i heard that abundantly in asia. i was at a conference that involved representatives from all of southeast asia, and etch talks about the -- everyone talks about the importance of america's presence in the region. and be, of course, when they talk about that, they talk about the navy. how do you feel about the -- because you've traveled extensively in this which is, i think, an important part of your mission. how do you feel about our capacity to partner with them,

both our ability with our budget to be able to meet their expectations and then honestly their capacity to be a partner with us in these missions? >> well, i think in the first half of that equation it's important for them to know that we are going to be there, that the shift to the pacific is very real both in terms of numbers of ships and aircraft, but also in terms of our most modern platforms are going there. that the exercises that we do, that the engagement that we do we are going to be there, those big gray hulls are going to be on the horizon. in the second part, many of these nations have great capability and great capacity and the ability to grow. and a good example is every time north korea starts rattling its

sabers, you've got south korean ships with aegis capability, you've got japanese ships with aegis capability and you've got our ships with aegis capability already there, already very interoperable. and for other nations -- and i'll just talk about the pacific now -- but for other nations in that region, the sharing of maritime domain awareness; who's in your waters, what are they up to. and the fusion of that, of that information that comes from a lot of different sources, we can, we can help put together the pieces that already exist there. but you have the to have that constant, never-ending communication and collaboration. there's a saying that you can surge equipment, you can surge people, but what you cannot surge is trust. and that you have to have those

relationships, you have to have that interoperability, you have to have that familiarity with each other before the day that a crisis, regardless of what kind of crisis that is, arrives. >> big changes in asia with standing up darwin operations. would you just describe a little bit of that? i know that this is a major focus for you. >> from the navy perspective, we're going to move from about 55% of our total fleet being in the pacific to 60% by the end of this decade. and as i said, our most modern platforms are going there. from the marine standpoint, we're going to have this rotational presence of marines in darwin, australia. started out with a company size about 200 marines, this year it's going up to more than a thousand marines, a battalion size, and it will end up a size

of more or less 2500 marines with supporting assets. but it's not just to train with the australians, although that's an important element of it. but it's also for engagement in that part of the world. engagement bilaterally, multilaterally throughout that incredibly crucial part of the world with so many maritime chokepoints, so many potential areas of instability that we can going back to the original thing partner on. and finally, we're using our ships differently now. more forward deployed, more -- you're going to see more of our ships forward deployed for longer periods of time. a good example is the four littoral combat ships that already going to singapore.

we don't have any here right now, we've already done our first one. the freedom was there on an eight month deployment. but by 2016 we will have fourly to haval combat -- littoral ships on extended deployment. but looking to the other side of the world, i was in spain two weeks ago when the first guided missile destroyer, ballistic missile defense destroyer arrived in rhoda. we're putting four of those home ported permanently in rhoda. now, each ship that we have forward deployed, according to the cno, takes the place of about four ships home ported here in the united states. because of transit time, because of maintenance, because of things like that. and so is we can get -- so we can get a larger presence with the same thurm of ships -- same number of ships, although i to think it's important that we continue to grow our fleet, and i think that what the secretary

of defense said on monday in his statement pointed out that the navy will continue to grow just in numbers and in types of ships that we do have that we can forward deploy. >> to the extent that we can within the ground rules, could you amplify on this? i know i hear many times friends in other countries will ask, you know, you're facing tough budgets here. are you really going to be able to sustain this? you must confront this all the time when you travel. how do you talk about that? because we do know we have tighter budgets coming. >> well, the number that i give that i'm very happy with, the four or years before i became secretary the united states navy put 16 -- put 19 ships under contract. that was not enough to stop the slide in size of our fleet, it was not enough to protect our industrial base. in the first four years i have

been secretary, we've put 60 ships under contract. so we are growing the fleet. and under our current plan, we're going to get back to 300 ships by the end of this, by the end of this decade. now, we've done that. there hasn't been any magic to it, but i do tell our friends, our allies, people around the world about thisment but i think it's also important to make that point here, to make that point to the american people and to as how we look at our defense and at our defense strategy. the way we've done it is by some very basic business things. putting competition in, doing firm fixed-price contracts, doing multii year procurements -- multiyear procurements, keeping stable designs, building what we know how to build. not trying to force immature technology on to platforms,

being transparent about what we're going to build so that industry make the investment, industry can do the training that they need to do. now, if we do those things, what we expect from industry and what we've been getting from industry is that every ship or aircraft of the same type that we haven't changed the design, that we haven't changed the technology dramatically ought to cost less than the preceding one. so i'll give you one very quick example. the ddg-51, one of the great warships in the world today. we have two shipyards that build it, maine and pass ca gool la, mississippi. we're building two a year, so these shipyards took that as, basically, an allocation. and we weren't getting the prices that we needed to get to be able to afford the number of

ships. so two years ago we bid out three instead of two, and we said the low bid will get the third ship. and in addition, the difference in the high bid and the low bid, that delta, will come out of the high bid's profit. well, one shipyard won pretty decisively. last year as part of a multiyear buy, beput out a nine-ship -- we put out a nine-ship solicitation with an option for a tenth. so the low bid will get firmly four ships, the high bid will get four. ask once again -- and once again the difference in the high bid and the low bid will come out of the high bidder's profit. the other shipyard won decisively. so putting that sort of competition in concentrated the mind. [laughter] >> is that what was behind secretary hagel's thinking when he challenged you to do even more on -- >> well, i was very pleased that

he put that in, because i do think we're doing a great job in terms of that, in terms of being, driving a very tough bargain. the way i put it is my father was probably the cheapest human that has ever lived on the face of this earth. [laughter] >> a loot -- lot of laughter out here. >> he thought it was a real compliment to be called a cheapskate. i am his son. [laughter] i want to drive very, very hard bargains for the american people, and i think in virtually every ship class we have driven down the price, we have accelerated the schedule, and the quality has stayed there. i mean, you're talking about the virginia class, you're talking about the ddg-51, you're talking about the littoral combat ship, the amphibious ships that we have coming in.

the other thing that we are doing that was, i think, part of secretary hagel's mention of that is one of the easiest things to do is look at the platforms. one of the hardest things to do is look at the services. at the service contracts. we're spending $40 billion a year in navy and marine corps on service contracts. and tracking that from the dollar that's appropriated to the dollar that's spent is pretty difficult. but we're getting a handle on that. and we think we can say -- i'll go to a lot further than that, we know we can save significant amounts of money just by setting up things like contract courts which require, there's a more formal name for it, but it requires contracting officers to come in every year and justify the contracts that they have.

why do we have that contract? and i'm talking about everything from very high-end i.t., things like that down to mowing the grass. why do we have the contract, has it been rebid lately, is it, is it the best price we can get, is it needed anymore? and that was one of the things that we have been talking about internally, that we have been pushing internally are not only are these platforms which are the most visible and sort of the easiest to pinpoint, we've got to look at there's a lot of other money flowing through the pentagon and particularly flowing, in my case, flowing through the navy/marine corps that we have got to make sure that we spend every dollar well. you need to do that all the time but particularly in this budget. >> secretary, a lot of our

friends here are in the contracting community, and, of course, they, their argument is is -- oh, there we are, twisted around. their argument is frequently we can save money, but you've got to help work with us so we can be partners. how do you respond to that? >> they're right. we've got discipline requirements. i mean, and i'll go back to platforms for a minute. there have been a couple of ships, ship types that we've built the ship while we're designing the ship. >> yeah. >> that's a really not a good way to build a ship. it's not a good way to do much of anything. and so we have, and that was what i was talking about. the design of the platform needs to be stable.

the technology needs to be mature. if you get some new gee whiz technology, put it on the next block. put it on the next group that you buy. don't try to force it in and change the requirements. and the same thing this is the of contracts. same thing in service contracts. be very clear about what it is and don't change it all the time. don't sort of block the requirements out because it's not kansas efficient for one thing, but -- it's not cost efficient for one thing, but it's also not fair to our industry partners to change the requirement in the middle and say -- >> yeah. >> -- do it for the same price. >> secretary, you've championed broadening the energy pace for the -- energy base for the navy. how is that a going? and, again, how do you manage that? >> well, first, it's going very well. i said in answer to the first question that it's fuel and

energy is a military vulnerability particularly the way we're doing it today. i'm very glad that america's producing more oil and gas. but even if we produce all that we can use, there are two pretty overriding factors. number one, oil and gas are global commodities. and the price is set globally. so you get some instability somewhere, you get somebody threatening to close a strait somewhere, you get anything, when the syrian crisis started, the price of oil went up $10 a barrel. syria's not a major producer, but it's a security premium that traders place on oil regardless of where it's coming from. every time the price of oil goes

up a dollar a barrel, it costs the navy and marine corps $30 million in additional fuel costs. in '11 and '12, i was presented with, the navy was presented with an additional unbudgeted $2 billion in fuel costs. well, there are not many places to go get that sort of money. you can take it out of operations, so you fly less, you train less. or if a bill gets too big, you take it out of platforms, and i just don't think either one of those is a good idea. so what we're looking for is a more stably priced, domestically-produced source of fuel for sea going and aircraft. that's something like biofuels. and we demonstrated biofuels at rimpac in 201. every single type of aircraft that flew off the nimitz flew on

a blend of biofuel and gas lean, and all the combatants were steaming around a 50/50 blend. the big news was there was no news. we bought the biofuels, put it in the normal lo to gistics chain, took it out, refueled at sea, in the air. following a presidential directive, we've been working with the department of agriculture and the department of energy to come up with a nationwide biofuel industry. we have contracts today under the defense production act that by 2016 with four biofuel companies, assuming that all of them make it through this process, they're contracted to provide us with about 163 million gallons a year at a good bit less than $4 a gallon. which is very competitive.

with oil and gas. and it's also domestically-produced, it comes from -- all four of them have different feed stocks. i don't really care where it comes from, but it has a bunch of advantages, not the least of which it gives our farmers a new income stream. four shore bases. it's any kind of technology from solar to wind to geothermal to hydrothermal to fuel cells that can use different kinds of fuel to power them. so our goal, and i'm confident we're going to reach it, is that by 2020 at least half of all naval energy will come from non-fossil fuel sources. we've got six years to do that. and i think we're on track to get there.

>> secretary, again, we're ahead of the budget, but secretary hagel did release earlier this week outlines, some controversy about cost reductions or not cost reductions, but lowering cost profile for people costs. that's, of course, hitting everyone. you have 900,000 people in your command. what do you say to them about striking this balance between honoring our commitment to them but then also honoring our commitment to the people to have the equipment we need in 30 years? this trade-off of people and resources and equipment? i mean, how do you speak to your command about that? >> i've lost track of the number of all-hands calls i've done around the world. i know i'm north of 500, somewhere up there. in fact, i think i've just about

met every sailor and marine that we have. i've sure tried to. and the way that -- the questions that i get are about uncertainty. what's going to the happen. in this year after year after year of uncertainty. the way i respond, number one, is we ought to, we ought to have some certainty here. but number two, we have of got to get control of our personnel costs or, to your point, we're going to begin to take tools out of the hands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marine, coast guardsmen that they need. but also the other way to save money on personnel is to get rid of personnel. so, you know, it comes down to -- and i do think it has to be absolutely fair. you've got to be fair to the

people who defend us and who protect us. and i think that particularly over last ten years with the rise of military compensation going up more than 40% more than civilians that we are being fair. and what we're talking about, i think it's important to note, is not cutting but is slowing the growth. and it's slowing the growth in some things like health care for retirees, for working-age retire eeries. retirees. who work for companies that can give them, that to offer health care. -- that do offer health care. i think it is fair to look at that instead of saying we're going to keep on this march, we're going to keep watching those costs rise, and we're going to begin to make decisions about not modernizing for the

people who -- the best way i've heard it said, we should never send our folks into a fair fight. we should always if we're going to fight, we should have, we should have the advantage whether technologically, whether -- it doesn't matter how. we should have the advantage. the final thing is sailors and marines that i know and, as i said, i've met most of them, i don't think there are very many of them that joined for the money. now, it's an important part. and it's important that we keep the faith. but to make this all about money and to make it all about them and money, i think, degrades the patriotism and the sense of sacrifice and sense of of service that they bring to us. >> secretary, you were remark my

successful governor -- a remarkably successful governor. you know politics. you know what it's like to sell tough deals. do you think you can sell this deal this year in this budget? >> i think -- well, number one, be we can sell it on the merits, yes. i think that it's something we have to look at. it's not -- and we have to make the case for. because it's not something that is vague and ephemeral and couln the road somehow. it's today. those choices are going to have to start being made today because for every dollar that you do not get in compensation, savings and, again, slowing the growth is a dollar you're going to have to find somewhere else. just not the unlimited money that defense got used to a

decade ago. and so we are at the trade-off now. and i do understand the politics of things. i understand trying to sell hard choices. but at some point you've got to step up to those hard choices, or the choices how you will begin making are even more unpalatable. >> yep. this isn't a slow pitch question, this is tee ball, okay? [laughter] i'm just going to let you whack this one out of the park. it concerns the modernization of of our nuclear forces. you're looking at some pretty steep bills coming for trident modernization, trident replacement. and overwhelmingly, our nuclear deterrent now is with the navy. we've got some trade-offs. are you able to ea ford this modernization program?

>> well, they -- two parts of the modernization program. the first part is ohio class replacement submarines that carry those nuclear weapons are going to begin to reach the end of their service life, and we literally can't extend them -- >> right. >> and so we are doing the research and development of the designed to for that ohio class replacement. and we have to start buying in quantity about 2019 to get the subs that we're going need. we have to have the common missile compartment designed and ready to go even earlier than that because the british are using the same missile compartment, and they have to have that before we do. their submarines are ahead of ours in terms of retirement, in terms of rebuilding. and be i think this is a debate

that between now and 2019 which is now inside the five-year defense plan or it will be in '15, that we need to have. because if we build these -- and we build these, not an if we're going to build them -- but if the money to build those comes out of navy ship building, comes out of pure navy -- >> right. >> -- it will take at least half every year of all our ship-building dollars. it will, it will devastate the rest of navy shipbuilding. and i'm talking in the late 2020s, 2030s. it will devastate submarine building in terms of the attack submarines, surface ship, every kind of ship that we build. and i think that we need to have a debatement this is a national -- a debate. this is a national mission. as you said, a lot of it is

beginning to be on the shoulders of navy. >> yeah, right. >> which is -- we have the most survivable part of the triad. it's a crucial capability that we have. we've to the to make sure that we have it, but it is a national commission and be to degrade the rest of navy missions to meet that, you know, i think that is a debate not only in congress, but also with the american people how should that be paid for. >> yeah. i think that's exactly right. this is a national debate we have to have. we know we have to have a reliable deferment. it's now overwhelmingly going to be on the back of the navy. your resources aren't going to be able to accept p that without compromising our forward presence capacity over time. so it's a debate that we have to have. >> yeah. and we are driving the price of our ohio class replacements down. we've taken almost $2 billion per boat out already just by

using commonalities with virginia class attack submarines, with doing some innovative things with this but there's a limit to how far we can go. >> sure. friends, i'm going to turn to you for questions. in my stupor i forgot to say thank you to our very good friends at rolls royce who make it possible for us to bring this to all of you. and steve plumber's here, and i just want to say thanks. let's open up. if there are questions that people want to offer, we'll start right down here with you. but i reserve the right to change questions if they're too narrow, so you go ahead. >> hi, john, hi mr. mabus. i'm jennifer, christian media network, one of the tv networks in china, and my question is u.s. navy are ready to to deploy the laser weapon for the first time this year, so do you think the development of laser weapons will be against the ccw

eventually? >> we are deploying our first laser weapon very soon. and we are well into development of laser weapons. at some point it becomes almost impossible to hit a bullet with a bullet, and you have to change technologies. and this is one of those very promising technologies that we think you're going to see a lot more of. >> sidney? >> thank you, dr. hamre. >> microphone, please? can we get you a microphone? we want everyone to hear you. >> i'm really plenty loud of midwest people -- most people, but thank you. will secretary, i, among others, have heard you spend a lot of of time and energy over the past year plus saying littoral combat ship is a real warship, it is survivable for what it needs to do, and now we have the secretary signing off on something that says, well, maybe

it's not. maybe it was survivable enough for a different world, but especially with the pivot to asia and a higher-tech sort of threats -- and my apologies to the young lady from china -- the lcs isn't adequate for that part of the world. so, you know, what's your take on this change of course, and how's the navy adjust to it? >> well, i think it's very important to look at exactly what the secretary of defense said. which is keep building lcs that we're building today through this five-year defense plan. take a pause in contract negotiations past that. and take a look at some of the things you mentioned; survivability, he that wouldty, concept of operations of the

ship and other things -- cost of a replacement, how soon a replacement could be done. we are just beginning to operationally test the littoral combat ship, and we started now in '14 doing that. the secretary has given us a direction which, frankly, we welcome. and we have done with every type of naval ship before which is see if there are any gaps and see if it's going to be adequate , do you need to -- and one of the things he specifically called out was a modified lcs or the next flight of lcs. but if that doesn't work, we

ought to look at different options. different design. how long would that take? how much would it cost? what would it do to that presence? argument? other types of things. there may be designs already out will although i know some, not the secretary, but some have recommended, well, look at foreign designs. well, number one, i don't think any foreign design is up to our standards and, number two, i'm pretty sure that the navy and congress doesn't want to put americans out of work doing that. so i am, my position on lcs and the cno's position on lcs has remained stable. but if you rook at every other -- look at every other ship type, if you look at our ddg-51s, when we were at about

this point, we did some pretty extensive testing, and we started building the next flight. we are now about to start building a fourth flight of ddg-51s. the flight three, which is the forty flight which is a lit -- fourth flight which is a little confusing, is a very different ship from flight one. the same thing with the virginia attack submarines. the subs that we're building today are about a third flight from the ones we started building. so we have this year with the decision coming in the '16 budget on lcs, and i, i frankly think that this is, i take this as pretty good news. we have to have a small surface combatant.

and what the secretary said was we have to have small surface combatant, it has to have of the capability, and we have to have it for presence. and if lcs can meet that bill, do it. and modify it in a way that it needs to. if it can't, figure out something else. >> terry? >> yes, sir, mr. secretary -- >> microphone, terry, if you could use -- >> you and i are former ship drivers, and we share a common university which is pretty common, i have to say. but i wish as a member of the harvard military unit, i wish to thank you for what you did to bring the ivy league back into what might be called the rest of the country with rotc a few years ago. but now i will ask -- [laughter] >> that's good enough. >> no, no. [laughter] i'm a former, i'm a former amphib officer, and i keep seeing all these wonderful words about 11 aircraft carriers.

and i think, gee, i don't do the math very well. don't we have 23? just a question. >> the short answer's yes. >> thank you. >> with the big deck amphibs, we just commissioned the next, america, who will join the fleet this summer, and the capability that those bring us is simply astounding. particularly with the b-22 osprey and then in the future with the f-35, the stovall are version. if i could loop back just for a second about your first comment. i was at harvard right of after rotc was asked to leave. and following only west point and annapolis, harvard has the

most medal of honor recipients many america. in america. in any university in america. >> [inaudible] >> and now we have rotc back at harvard, at yale, at columbia, at princeton. and i think it is very important that the military that defends america reflects america and reflects all of america. and i was, i was very happy that we were able to do that. not just at those four places, but making sure that the military and the 1% or fewer than 1 percent of america that serves in uniform does not get detached or distanced from the 99% that they protect. >> yes, ma'amment -- ma'am. >> thank you so much. i'm from china central

television. i have two questions -- [inaudible] military exercise. and we know that the united states and south korea just begin joint military exercise. and what we saw on 27th, north korea launched -- [inaudible] missiles into sea. how do you value the situation there, and what kind of message do you think north korea's sending to you by this action? and another kind of -- [inaudible] is taken by russia, so within the ukraine crisis as we know there, so this morning we saw yanukovych hold a press conference. so what kind of role will the united states navy in this kind of crisis? >> he let me take the last question off the table. i don't think it's pair to ask the secretary that -- fair to ask the secretary that question. the president of the united states will talk about that, okay? >> the exercises that we do with allies, friends, around the world but particularly an ally

like south korea, they are scheduled, they are announced, and we are very transparent about it. and it's part of thing i talked about presence, and it's part of the thing i talk about the engagement. we're going to be there. we're going to be there all the time. so this is not a provocation, because we do it all the time. this is, we're not escalating a crisis because we're there all the time. and i think particularly in a volatile region -- and north korea has shown that it is that -- that these sorts of exercises, these sorts of making sure that we are interoperable, making sure that we know what, how we and our allies work together -- >> we'll leave the last few seconds of this discussion to bring you live coverage of the u.s. senate now. senators are set to offer general speeches more most of

the -- for most of the day. the senate was not in session yesterday because of the snowy weather here in washington. the entire federal government was shut down because of the storm. no votes scheduled for today as lawmakers are continuing to make their way back to to washington d.c. tomorrow they will take up the nomination of assistant attorney general for the justice department's civil rights division. and now live senate coverage here on c-span2. the president pro tempore: the senate will come to order. today's opening prayer will be offered by pastor dave weigley, president seventh day adventist church in the mid-atlantic united states. pastor? the guest chaplain: let us pray. almighty god, creator and maker of all, who sits enthroned above the earth and in whom we live, move and have our being. we praise you from whom all blessings flow.