but eviscerated section number to leaving a lot of sensitive information without the exemption that applies. i think it is fair to say that there is no reason oppression legislation is is needed and as grassley asked that question two years ago it is irresponsible for the executive branch not to have proposed amendments of the exemption since that time. . .security agency.

have a

good tuesday. >> i will use my own experience right now. we have a continual outreach to the broader commercial industry sectors in an attempt to identify what technologies are available that we could use. there is an aggressive effort to do so. >> we have expressed many times our concerns about iran and the threat that they pose to us and as farr intelligence back as 2007 indicated they auld have a capability of weapon and delivery system by 2015.

it was even more forcefully by oured in a report intelligence and 2010, referring -- reaffirming their suspicions. i have been concerned about that. we have a president that somehow think there is an opportunity to get them to joining the global community and reform their ways. an article suggested that the iranians were able to successfully infiltrate the navy commuter -- computer network. it raises questions suggesting it ran was able to access the bloodstream of the navy network. i will quote from that report. 's infiltration was far more extensive than previously thought. it took the navy about four months to purge the hackers from

its biggest unclassified computer network. geopolitical consequences of such an attack should be profound. what this unclear administration will do in response to such behavior. byt a similar penetration americanarplanes into airspace be treated with such ambivalence? your currentrs, in job as commander of the fleet, you are the one responsible for defending navy networks. this happened on your watch, correct? >> yes, sir. >> what are the consequences? >> as a matter of policy and operational policy regions, we have not categorized who penetrated the network. i would be happy to discuss this with you in a classified session. discusseds has been

in an unclassified session for sometime. >> not to my knowledge. i apologize. ourifically, a segment of un-global unclassified network was compromised. in response, i generated an operational requirement for not just pushing the amount of the net work, but i want to do a foundational review of the entire network, to use this as an opportunity to drive change within my own service. >> what is the ministrations doing in response to this attack? >> i am not in a position to comment on that. testified laster year -- with the number of cyber attacks doubling from 45,000 in .011 to nearly 100,000 in 2012 that is not very good.

does that concern you? my current position is air mobility commander. we have taken action to secure our networks. the nature of our network that commercial providers of transportation requires us to have access to the information from their networks as well. working diligently with those contractors and commercial providers to secure those networks. the number of attacks is not equate to the number of intrusions axle traded. is confirmed for the position of trance, commander, i will continue to work that issue with general rogers' team as well as with the 24th air force team, which is the unit that provides external security for our networks. inwhen we had a hearing

-- general alexander and i have become good friends. we have had a lot of personal conversations. he was asked when a cyber attack andn act is an act of war to explain what sort of actions an adversary might take and crossing that threshold, he answered that he believes this and attack destroys military or government networks, or impacts our ability to operate, you have crossed that line. rogers --nk admiral do you agree with his characterization? >> do you agree they have crossed that line? they that you are referring to, sir? >> when general alexander was asked when a cyber attack does cross that line and become an

act of war, he said that ability to operate, you have crossed that line, do you agree with that characterization and that we have crossed that line? >> i do not believe we have crossed that line. >> do agree with the statement that was made by general selva that the number of cyber attacks against trans con doubling from 45,000 in 2011 to nearly 100,000 in 2012, does it properly express our deterrence against attacks? does this concern you that we have doubled in that period of time in the number of cyber attacks on us? i apologize. is your question to the general or myself? >> it is a question for you.

general fraser testified that the number of cyber attacks on hasce, -- transcom increased. are we not doing the job we should be doing? >> it is reflective on the level of investment that the department is making. we face challenging budget times and this is one of the departments where we remain committed to growth in capability. believe a lot of the things i have gotten from an unclassified media and classified that iran is very active in this area. i am concerned about their capabilities and i have expressed that concern. " if iran seizes this opportunity and chooses to join the global community, we can chip away at the mistrust that exists."

we need to be talking about the fact that we have an enemy. he has demonstrated that clearly. this new capability -- a few years ago, no one knew what a cyber attack was. we all understand it can be just as critical and damaging to our n attack with weapons on this country. i think you all agree with that. >> senator udall. >> thank you for your distinguished service to our nation. admiral rogers, i want to turn to you. responses,ed policy i noticed you stated the government could continue to access phone records through phone service providers repositories. that could serve as a viable alternative to the current records collection program. i was glad to read that. you wrote that the business records 215 grew out of a desire

to identify cap after 9/11. a gap after 9/11. aw anoted that the nsa solv call, but could not see that the call was coming from an individual in the united states. i am concerned that a program such in 215 could have prevented 9/11. as the 9/11 commission pointed out, the commission knew about .lmodovar i don't know why the nsa could authorization to determine if this member was in contact with anyone in the united states. i don't see wobble collection authority would be necessary.

the constitution is not an impediment to our security. it is the source of our security. andan and bulk collection of infringe on the rights law-abiding americans. the president acknowledged what i have been saying. the status quo must change. i look forward to working with you to make those changes. looking ahead, i want to turn to the 702 program and ask a policy question about the authorities under section 702. the committee ask your understanding of the legal rationale. you replied the nsa's court-approved procedures only allow using identifiers for intelligence purposes. the statutes written to

anticipate the incidental collection of americans communications in the course of collection the communication of beeigners believed to overseas, but the focus of the collection is clearly intended to be foreigners communications, non-americans. declassified court documents show that in 2011, the nsa sought and obtained the -- sought and obtained the authority to conduct warrantless searches for the communications of specific americans. have any of those searches ever been conducted? >> i am not in a position to answer that as the nominee. if you would like me to come back to you in the future if confirmed, i would be glad to do so. >> director clapper was asked this question earlier this year. forum not believe in open was the appropriate setting in

which to discuss these issues. the problem i have is that we have tried ways to get an unclassified simple answer. we want to have an answer because it relates to american's privacies. can you answer the question before the committee votes on your nomination? thene of my challenges as director, if confirmed, is how do we engage the american people and the representatives in a dialogue in which they have a level of comfort as to what we're doing and why. that is no insignificant challenge for those of us with an intelligence background. one of the takeaways from the situation over the last few months has been as an intelligence professional and later, i have to be able to communicate in a way that

highlights what we are doing to the greatest extent possible. if it comes to the how we do things and the specifics, those are best addressed in classified sessions. inave to be able to speak broad terms in a way that most people can understand. i look forward to that challenge. >> i will continue asking that question. i look forward to working with you to rebuild the conflict -- confidence that the public has. let's turn to cyber. before i ask a specific question, i do not want to steal senator mccain's funder, but he has a creative idea in setting up a special committee on cyber security so we can cut through some of the jurisdictional tensions that exist. in a more specific context, you we have to work to develop and train a significant number of highly capable cyber

personnel to meet them nation's needs. there is no doubt that we have to have those personnel. we have done it in the physical world and the genetic world. we can do it in cyberspace. genetic world. we can do it in cyberspace. cadets the ability to fly small aircraft and their college years. they are familiar with the fundamentals in the field of flying an airplane or helicopter. level oft giving that attention to cyber training programs. should we invest in more hands-on, real-world training for the next generation of cyber warriors? >> yes, sir. as a navy component commander, i ave worked with our navy to

academy. minimum i look -- >> i look forward to working with you. again, both of you, for your willingness to serve in these important positions. >> senator mccain. >> i think the witnesses for their outstanding service. when i asked, because of the overlapping jurisdictions of many committees of congress that he thought that toelect committee investigate the entire issue which covers a wide spectrum would be a good idea. do you have a view? if you have a view on whether we

should have a select committee are not. i'm not used to autopsy station fucation.e are you on track to remove all of the necessary equipment and armaments from afghanistan by the end of 2014 that you are tasked to do? >> yes, sir. >> you are on track right now? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. admiral, i want to bring up this issue again of the iranian hack of navy computers. according to an article, the computerhe navy's network to more than four months to resolve, raising concerns

about security gaps exposed by the attack. the hackers were able to remain in the network until this past november. that contradicts what officials this pastublic september. officials told the paper that the intruders had been removed. deal -- iteal big was a significant penetration." >> that is why over the past few months multiple updates to staffers on the committee. how do we learn from this and work to make sure it does not happen again. i conducted a response to that. it was much broader than to come

back and say they are not there anymore. i wanted to use it as an opportunity to drive change. we put a longer-term effort in place then if i had just sent i want to remove them. i wanted to do more than that. >> the damage done? the interview said "significant." >> i would not say significant, but of concern. they did not engage in disruptive behavior. my concern was what if they had decided that was their intent? >> i thank you. problem here, from the standpoint of those of us who feel that our ability to behavior of possible attackers of the united states of america is vital. some reallyhas done

significant damage. s -- 57% ofpoll americans branded snowden as a whistleblower. 37% called him a traitor. ofox news poll found 68% americans were glad to know about the nsa program snowden revealed. thosesurvey found disapproving outnumbered those approving. a significant number of mr. snowden as a whistleblower and many significant portion of americans as a patriot and approve of his conduct. what do you think we need to do to counter that impression the

american people have, when i am sure we are in total agreement that this individual violated a solemn oath that he made to not reveal this information and has damaged our ability to defend this nation. >> i would agree with your assessment. the first is the idea of transparency. the idea that we have to have a dialogue that talks about what are we doing in the why. we have to inshore strict accountability. we have to make sure that we follow those processes appropriately and when we make a mistake, if we fail to meet those requirements, we are up front about the how and the why. >> to having thoughts about the allegations that the pfizer courts are just a rubber stamp for the administration? >> i don't believe that to be

the case. you believe they are exercising sufficient oversight? yes, sir. >> you appreciate the fact that we have a large number of we have a-- that significant problem with the pr aspect of the work that you and your organization will be doing? >> yes, sir. my personal opinion is that the pfizer structure works well. we should look at a range of potential options to improve that transparency. >> if i had a recommendation for you, it would the as much as possible, given the aspects of national security that you maybe give some speeches in various venues where you could explain

better to the american people --t you're doing and not perhaps on exactly what you're doing and why you're doing it. i don't think americans are aware of the extent of the is not onlythat accomplished, but being attempted by our adversaries and potential adversaries around the world. ma'am i think you are correct. >> i think you are correct. >> thank you both for your service to our nation. thank you to your families as well.

the white house recently announced the creation of a voluntary framework to establish a cyber security guide for organizations involving one of the critical infrastructure and this effort and framework standardizes the cyber security defensive measures to assist in protecting, detecting, responding to, and recovering from potential intrusions. how effective do you think this voluntary framework will be in protecting us from cyber attacks and what additional measures should the senate or the nsa take? >> it is a step in the right direction. i do believe in the end, some form of legislation which addresses both the requirement and need to share information, as well as trying to address the issue of setting standards for critical infrastructure for the

nation in the long run it's probably the right answer. if confirmed, i look forward to working with a host of other people that would be a party to that. i agree that legislation will be necessary. there have been efforts to achieve it. bipartisan efforts, i should emphasize. some of them have been opposed by representatives of the business community on the ground ,hat there is no need for it no urgency, or other reasons that i think are specious. thank you for your offer of cooperation. i look forward to looking with -- working with you. >> it is only a matter of time before we start to see more destructive activity. that is perhaps the greatest concern of all to me. there areas of the private defense industrial base or even financial utilities and

so forth that you regard as most vulnerable? >> there are core infrastructure that is critical for us as a .ation in unclassified form, i would be insights, butding i would be glad to discuss that. >> if the chairman at some point does have a briefing in another satisfying -- and other setting, that may be an area i would like to discuss with you. let me shift to the role of national guard in cyber security. the cyber calm commander general -- cybercom commander general alexander talk about the resource and the role it could expanding capabilities. at the present, the

department is in the process of doing the admission analysis to address that question. if confirmed, i will be a part of that process. i intend to dig deeper into it. is that thekeaways naval commander for general do you build an integrated team that harnesses the power and the expertise of every element of that team? >> united states is not have a guard structure. apply itrked hard to in my current duties. reserveers of the naval bring capabilities, training, education, skills that are valuable? >> yes, sir. area if i may, the use of contractors following up

on these very important questions asked by my colleague, senator mccain. here was a contractor who was entrusted with responsibilities that never should have been. many of us are concerned by the scope and scale of the use of private contractors, even to screen and evaluate other contractors. are you concerned? >> i share your concern. i need to ask some hard questions. what led us to this, are we comfortable with the position we with respects in to the role of contractors? >> are there other defects you can see the need to be corrected? to mindng comes immediately. this has not been the same issue on the navy side as it has been on the joint side of the work. that concern shared widely

in the intelligence community? >> i would believe so. general, if i can ask you a question. the chairman began by asking some questions about how quickly we need to make determinations about our presence in afghanistan. what is your assessment now about how flexible we are in determining our time frames there? i would say we have the greatest flexibility that we have had in the past several months. our optionspasses, decrease. there is a limit to the capacity of the networks to bring back equipment and those personnel out. i will commit to consulting with austin of the specific

limits of those networks. we want to make sure the transportation distribution layers of those networks is come -- prepared for the capacity of whatever comes at us. >> thank you for your helpful answers are it i look forward to working with you. thank you, mr. chairman. to both of you, thank you for your service and commitment to freedom. make a comment for the record. admiral rodgers, with regards to comments that senator udall made, i don't want to leave a false impression with the american people that if we had had 702 and 215 in place in 2001, there is a strong probability that we would have that ale to determine

major attack was going to occur. there is the probability we would have picked up on those inion between those that were planning the attack. knowing that he was in country versus knowing he was in communication with terrorists planning an attack are two different things. we did not have to 15. we did not have 702. we knew that a phone call came from the night -- to the united states. we did not know it went to san diego. if we had had more information that we had gleaned from these programs, there is strong probability that we might have picked up on that.

i want to make sure that the record reflects the actual facts on the ground relative to him. we discussed something that senator mccain discussed earlier. those with respect to trying to communicate these programs to the american people. it will be very difficult. he mentioned doing speeches and that is part of the. -- that is part of it. what can we do to show more transparency to let the american people understand how these programs work. >> we can be a little more

communicative with why we are doing this, what led us to these kinds of decisions. it is important that the dialogue needs to be more broad than the director of the national security agency, regardless of who that individual is. there are more aspects to this discussion than just the intelligence piece. in the end, it boils down to an assessment of risk. a terms of our security as nation as well as our rights as individuals. we value both. we have got to come up with a way to enable us to ensure that both sides of that risk coin are addressed. we should never forget that there is a threat that aims to do us harm. that does not have the best interest of this nation in mind and wants to defeat with this nation represents. >> you are right. it is unfortunate that general alexander was put out there on a limb by himself by the administration to seek to

explain these programs. he did a very good job of it, had the president with the bully pulpit been out there with him, i think we would have already had a better understanding on the part of the american people. number one, the misrepresentation of the facts regarding what information is collected on individuals, what is done with that information, and how very difficult it is to be able to access personal information on any single american. it is extremely difficult and requires the same process, virtually, that you would have to go through if you were a u.s. attorney seeking to get information on an individual american. the fisa court is not a were stamp. all you have to do is look at

the makeup of the court as well as the decisions. some of them will be made public. i think that is a good idea. as long as we do not real sources -- reveal sources. administrationhe did not give general alexander the kind of support that they pretty discerning on my part. i am hopeful. yesterday,ned to you i have expressed this to the administration. i hope they will give you more support in explaining these programs than they have given to general alexander. i have confidence that maybe they will. let's talk about information .haring we have been working on a cyber bill for years now. we are getting very close to an agreement within the intelligence committee between the chairman and myself on a

cyber bill. provisions and the last remaining obstacle we is the immunity provision. would you talk for a minute how importantnion liability protection is to companies that will share privileged and personal information if we are going to have a program that works relative to cyber? >> i am not a lawyer, but my sense is it is a critical element of any legislation. to be successful, we have to provide the corporate partners that we would share information with some level of liability protection. firms will are to survey in the sharing of information if they are not

granted blanket liability protection? >> i think they would be much less inclined to do so without a. >> thank you so much. >> senator donnelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, admiral, and your families. the chairman mentioned an article and i thought one of the interesting quotes was where they said why would somebody want to be the head of cybercom now? >it reminded me of the movie apollo 13 were they said this might be one of the worst things that could happen to us and they said this could be the best. this could be the most amazing time. we have more challenges may be than ever before. we are giving you the football and expecting big things from both of you. you, general, in regards to what we have seen in

ukraine and the dealings we have had with russia before, are you making alternate plans in terms of transcom as to the work we do with russia? are you gaming out worst-case scenarios as to how we proceed in the future? >> if confirmed, that is a priority. -- airair, opponent component to transcom, that we have been building alternative lands. the distribution network that flows to russia consists of five different options of how we move cargo in and out of afghanistan. we will have to look at other options should the conduct in the ukraine continue. get would recommend we working on that right away in light of what we have seen going forward. look at what you happened with mr. snowden, i

know we have done reviews. and you continue to look ask what if about this or that in regards to where we are now to make sure that we are not going to face this again internally? >> as the nominee, i have not done that. >> have you thought that through? >> if confirmed, we need to ask ourselves -- given this compromise, what are the indicators that would highlight compromise. how are we seeing changes in behavior and how will we have to stay ahead of that threat that faces the nation? >> you will determine what policies -- where did we go off the highway, how do we fix it, how we squared away? one of the areas of interest to me as contractors.

in a position not why do we have contractors in those positions as opposed to military personnel or other government personnel who are expert in those areas? is it a lack of individuals who can fill those positions? >> i can't speak to the specifics of mr. snowden. it is reflective of a trend over the last decade or so, whereas we look at the size of the government and workforce, some decisions were made in some of be solved bycould using a contractor. you should use contractors for the functions that are either so

specialized that you do not have the capability or skill resident within the government workforce or it is prohibitively expensive to try to achieve that capability. core operation functions, those need to be government. snowden'srds to mr. area, will there be a review through all of the contractors as to what is core to what we need to do and when we regard thereview expense, i guess next question is, what is the expense of what we're dealing with now? >> i do not know the answer to that. just trying to lay out -- here are some things as we move forward that we look at. mr. snowden remarked that the u.s. government has no idea what i have and will not know what i

have and they will find out as a goes on. when we look at ukraine, one of the concerns that has to come up putin'such of mr. actions may be based on information given to him by mr. stoughton. -- mr. snowden. analytice an in-depth effort going on to determine and ask that question. i have not been party to that review. i have seen some of the initial work. we have tried to identify exactly what the implications are of what he took. that operation is ongoing and will take some time to finish. >> in another area, it would be remiss of me not to ask you about supply chain integrity. it is of concern to me.

how are we going to partner with to work together with our intelligence officials and others to secure the integrity of the supply chain of what we have?? ande see counterfeit parts missiles and planes. it is an extraordinarily dangerous situation. what are your plans as we move forward to try to get this squared away? in transcomation is to work directly with the defense logistics agency on the issue of supply chain management and integrity of the supply chain. it is out of the lane that i have been in. it is one of the areas i have committed to spend time with.

it is more than just the data. it is the ability of counterfeiters to bring to that market parts that appear to be genuine, but in fact, are not. it is a physical issue as well as a data security issue. it goes right to the heart of our industrial capacity. >> i would ask you to make that a priority. we are one counterfeit part away from disaster on a constant basis. thank you both for your service and to your families. >> senator ayotte. >> i want to thank both of you for your service. let me start, general selva. with regards to the dod

refueling capability, how important is it to our military capabilities and our national security? mobilitypacity of air command to provide refueling around the world is critical to being able to move our forces to where they need to be and when they need to be there. the air force talks about global vigilance, reach, and power. tankers are what makes us global. , the 157leased neweling wing, the hampshire air national guard, it has been chosen to receive the new tankers. we had a very positive public hearing for the basing of the 5c46-a. 46-a.

what is your assessment of the refueling wing, how they perform, and how important is the garden all of this capability? uard in all of this capability? >> they are one of the units to which we have appended an active duty associative unit. the unit is performing well. in an areanit exists of high demand for tanker services. their performance speaks for itself. they are a great unit and we look forward to base the pegasus at these, subject to the environmental impact statement. supportnk you will get and having the new tankard there. it is important to our national security. i also wanted to ask you, i know center dot lori -- i know

senator donnelly asked you to issue of the northern distribution network with regards to our retrograde from afghanistan. in light of what is happening in the ukraine, we are -- many of us are pushing for further economic sanctions, other types of sanctions against russia for their invasion of crimea. if the russians were to take retaliatory action as a result of that, to shut down the northern distribution network with regard to the transit operations of those roads, what impact would that have to us and how would we address it? it is something we have to understand and be prepared to address. >> if they were to take action --constrain our action access to the northern

distribution network, we have other options. the singular item that moves across the network that would concern me at this point is the subsistence cargoes in the form of food and noncombat articles. i am told about 20% of the subsistence cargoes move through the network. we would have to use another option to get it in. is, for some reason, we would be prepared to use other options if we had to and could do so? >> yes. >> thank you. thank you for tanking on at a challenging time this important position. russia is using cyber attacks against the ukrainian telecommunication system to block the ukrainian leadership from assessing -- accessing the

country's phone networks. to what extent do you believe russia is conducting cyber attacks against ukraine and what do to help. defend itself against attacks on russia? >> in an unclassified form, i am not prepared to answer in specifics. it is becoming a norm. as we were to partner with others to develop norms of behavior and expectations for what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, examples like this highlights what is not acceptable. as we work with the ukrainians and other nations to figure out what is the best way to address them, whether it is ukrainians ask for specific technological assistance, i believe we work on it on a case-by-case basis.

>> we should be active in this area. cyber attacks or otherwise. -- thed to ask you about department of defense's vulnerability to a cyber attack. --january 2000 team, a task in january 2013, a report concluded that the united states cannot be confident that our critical information technology systems will work under attack from a sophisticated in row -- and well resourced opponent. we are not confident that many of our mattila terry -- our military systems would work. assessment andat how can we make sure the ideas

more resilient to cyber attacks? >> i share that concern. that is why creating a defensible architecture has got to be one of the most important things we do. i have watched the challenge across the entire department. the jie is so important. we have got to get to a defensible architecture. talk about a lot of edward snowden today. do you believe the disclosures --made have put americans potentially put at risk the lives of americans and our allies, or at greater risk because he has released this information? >> yes, ma'am. >> yes is the answer to that? >> people need to understand that. .e has put people at risk

that is very important for people to understand. thank you both. you, senator ayotte. senator kaine. it is good to see you again. if i was in an airplane out of atlantic, the 101st could take care of you quite adequately. as you look across a broad range of commercial assets that transc om employees across the globe, what are the greatest risks and m toerabilities to transco execute its responsibilities and how about the more ability of --

the vulnerability of commercial attacks?to cyber >> there are two things that worry me the most. we havet is -- once completed whatever retrograde operation happens in afghanistan, whether we have a residual force or no force remaining behind, the demand surface and air will diminish significantly. we have seen nearly a 50% reduction in requirement for sustainment cargo in afghanistan. that has an implication for our , sealift, airlift, as well as surface and for our commercial partners whose networks we access to make that entire distribution network work. that decline in requirement, a return to a more stable

has some negative implications across the enterprise. we are studying those in all of and commercial sectors of the market to understand those implications. they have significant impact on the commercial cargo carriers. >> what percentage of assets are organic versus commercial? difficult number to quantify, but i will take a stab at it. roughly 40% of our capacity as organic. about 50%, if we access all of the available assets through the civil reserve air fleet will be brought to us by commercial partners. i do not have the specific statistics. >> as demands of afghanistan to ansh -- diminish, is there

industrial base here in terms of the commercial carriers? ,ill they find other business is there a risk of not having the capacity when we need it? dynamics thatwo play in that dynamic. the health of the airline cargo ands a whole, commercial passenger carriers. the two segments within that industry, the charter and scheduled carriers. the decline in the demand signal on those commercial carriers will change the economics of that industrial segment. the second thing that is changing is the nature of commercial charter cargo. with the introduction of large aircraft with large cargo bays below the passenger decks, we now see commercial passenger carriers three and trying the charter cargo market. that has changed the dynamic of

our civil reserve air fleet partners. we have to understand the impact of that change in economy on their capacity to be with us in crisis. >> we will have to watch that as it evolves. >> yes, sir. we have an ongoing study that we are about a year into working with our commercial partners to understand economic dynamics of what is changing in the cargo and passenger markets. we are in a bout a three-month period of understanding what they have done. >> thank you. admiral rodgers, i am going to ask a question you are not prepared to answer. i may ask it again in a year. i have been in a number of , cybers on cyber issues command, an essay. how can you do both of these jobs?

>> there is no doubt it is a challenge. i will be in a much better position after i have been confirmed to tell you what the challenges are. to not do it this way would create real concern. i say that in my current duties on the navy. i worked for general alexandra as cyber -- alexander as cyber command and nsa. >> over the past year, both jobs and grown in responsibility you have to be a spokesman, you have to manage, i think it is something we are going to have along with the administration going forward. i understand the desire to have it in one person, but i would think running the nsa is more than a full-time job. >> i will be busy, sir.

major issues we have been discussing for the past year and a half, and the years before i was here, is the necessity of cyber legislation that allows better coordination between the private sector and the government. how do you assess the importance of that kind of legislation coming out of this congress? >> that legislation is a key for our future. we have got to change the current dynamic. >> i hope people are listening around here. ever since i have been here, everyone has been saying that, -- my doesn't seem father used to say if you drove at the pentagon, it seemed to get further and further away. i hope you will work with us to try to develop that legislation. i believe one of our greatest vulnerabilities is a cyber attack.

the next pearl harbor is going to be cyber. the problem is, we are more vulnerable than many other places. we are so advanced in terms of our linked-up network to society. how do we prevent -- what are the tools and are we where we should be? i don't want to have a set of hearings about why we were asleep at the switch. >> we are not where we want to be. we are generating capability, capacity, and those are positive steps in the right direction, but in the end, we have got to get to some idea of a cyber arena. >> i think you're right about that. we have the whole strategy of deterrence on the nuclear side. we have to develop it on the cyber side. if someone comes into our

network, they are going to have some serious problems with their networks. thank you, admiral. king.nk you, senator >> thank you for joining us today. admiral rogers, thank you for visiting with me in my office. i appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues. there has to be a balance struck between achieving our national security goals and protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of american citizens. i agree with my friend, senator udall. properly understood, these two things are the same thing. our security lies in our constitutional protections. we cannot overlook

constitutional protections in the interest of national security. in our well intended efforts to recover and move forward past september 11, 2001, we have at times tied -- tried to strike a balance in a way that i find troubling. as i stated before, i have some pretty deep-seated concerns with some of the things that have been revealed in recent months , things that previously were known only to members of congress and two with the right security clearance within the government. i worry about the nsa's metadata collection program and the risk tot such programs could pose the constitutionally protected rights of american citizens. the fourth amendment stance to

safeguard those rights. even if one assumes, for purposes of this discussion, that currently the only people employed at the nsa are people with only our best interests at risk, eventill run a if that assumption is made, that at some point in the future, whether it is a week from now, month from now, you're from now or 10 or 20 years from now, unless we have the right safeguards in place, those powers will be abused with respect to american citizens and given the fact that the nsa related to foreign intelligence gathering, we need to make sure we protect american citizens and their constitutionally protected rights.

admiral rodgers, if confirmed to this position, how would you were to protect the constitutionally protected rights of american citizens while doing your job? >> yes, sir, i would attempt to be as transparent as possible to the broader nation as to what we are doing and why and try to ensure a sense of accountability in what the national security agency does. if confirmed, the nation places a great deal of trust in this organization which is an incredibly important mission. it's a mission that involves attention in our society given the fact that the fundamental rights of the individual are so foundational to our concept of the nation. i welcome a dialogue on this topic and i think it's important for us as a nation. i look forward to being part of that dialogue. as you and i have previously discussed, i am committed to being a good partner in that effort. >> i understand that a certain level of confidentiality must almost unavoidably surround

many of thensa programs that might be of concern to the american people to ensure their ineffectiveness -- their effectiveness and keep our enemies from working around our systems. developed aas certain distrust of many of those programs. in discussing this concept with senator mccain a few minutes ago, you mentioned there might be a range of options available to us. can you describe what some of those options might look like in balancing the need for confidentiality on the one hand in order to protect our programs and the need for transparency on the other? >> i would be looking at the mechanisms we use to assess the value portion of this and how we can do this potentially in a more public way. fully formed my own thoughts in this regard but i think it's something that's incredibly important. i think it's very specific to

the duties of the director of the national security agency if confirmed him of the ability to lead an honest and open dialogue about what is the value of these efforts as we try to move forward. not on the job yet. i need to get much smarter but i'm committed to doing so. >> the president has directed that the government start to transition out of having the government itself hold onto the collected and thatg an update on how process is going and how it might unfold. >> as a nominee, i have not been part of that rossa so i'm not in a position to tell you how it's unfolding. the president said that on the 28th of march indicating he wanted feedback on how the best way to move forward was. that is among the many

that is important to me as we as we try to figure out the best way is how we address the idea of speed and the ability to query the data in a way that both protects the rights of the individual but also enables us to get answers in a quick and reasonable time period. >> president obama stated in a speech in january the following -- he said i have directed the attorney general to work with the foreign intelligence surveillance court so that during this transition period, the database can be queried after a judicial finding or in case of a true emergency. mighto you think constitute a true emergency in this context? >> potential loss of life, hostage, criminal scenarios. scenariose in those there would have to be a time component, and urgency component for that to qualify? >> yes, sir, i would think so. and not just an inconvenience

to the government personnel involved but some practical reason that would make it impossible rather than just inconvenient to go to the fisa court, is that your understanding? >> inconvenience is not the standard intended here. >> thank you very much. >> senatormanchin. >> i want to thank both of you and congratulate you on your nominations and you have quite impressive resumes and thank you serviceert just -- your to our countries for it i want to acknowledge the passing of one of your fellow air force officers and one of your fellow comrades to the air force of majornd the passing general stewart. we are very sorry for that loss. can, the equipment in iraq,

where did it go, the equipment we should have taken out? how much did we leave behind and where did it go and what have we done with it and how does that lead to what we are doing in afghanistan? i heard there was so much stuff left behind. from the standpoint of state of west virginia and watching nickels and dimes, how is that fair? >> i'm not in a position to comment on what we left behind in iraq. is that because of security? >> no, i was not party to that. i can try to find out for you. i will let you know that in the current discussions we're having on what we left behind yvette denniston, one of the issues is the residual value of the equipment and whether the cost of lifting it out of afghanistan is worth that investment.

we have to do that essentially in a business case scenario. >> do we have any buyers in that part of the world for it? >> in some cases, the equipment would be disposed of military sales and others would be grants but i do not have the specifics. >> if you can confirm that, i would appreciate it. admiral rogers, give me an overview of the cyber attacks from russia especially with the ukraine situation we have now and how that escalates to concerns and more activity for the former soviet union countries like cats extent and others and even poland. -- countries like cats extent and others like -- kazakhstan and even poland. >> that would be best shared in a classified situation. thatwould assume

discussion has been had. my state of west virginia has gone through a water crisis, if you will, because of aspill. if anyone wanted to know the effects it has on population and the concerns and the hysteria and no loss of life, no one what a cyber, attack would do to the people's confidence, if you can come down and help us with that -- with that eating said, our most vulnerability is our water and food and grid system. -- this isng privately owned are currently owned, are you interacting and how much are you interacting with those concerns to beefed-up security? that is not my current duties but if confirmed, that would be an aspect of the mission.

at some legislation, we are attempting to do that on a voluntary and partnership basis. those partnerships in some areas work well and others are clearly not as mature as we would like. >> maybe you can elaborate more. hadow that senator keane mentioned this -- senator king - what has been thrown into the mix of what you are expected to bring everything together with the demands on the growth which is what we are concerned about. should we still stand under one umbrella?ot -- one >> it's a demanding set of duties. i would also highlight the director of nsa, the commander of cyber command is not operate alone by themselves but operates with a strong team and i have worked with that team on the cyber command site and the national security side for the past 2.5 years. they are a strength for the team.

it's amazing to me -- i don't see this in west virginia at all -- they are trying to lift a hero and he is basically a traitor and what he is done to our country and with that being said, there had to be a frustration level to where he felt that maybe that was the root direction for him to go because there was no outlet. are you able, in your new position, to look at how you can -- you will have contractors involved and looks like you will have more contractors. are they able to have their concerns and do you have an outlet that would work with them so that we do not continue to go down this road? sir, there are avenues within the national security chain of command and avenues within the inspector general structure within nsa and u.s. cyber command is agencies. >> did edward snowden never take those avenues and air his concern? >> i don't know but in the

ongoing investigation, as we review the particulars of that case, that will be one of the questions of high interest. >> yes, he just went down the sabotage route. some of the things he has done and has continued to do is irreparable. >> i'm not sure i said irreparable. i believe it has a significant risk, damage, and consequences. >> you would look at him as a traitor? >> i don't know that i would use that word but i certainly do not consider him to be a hero. >> thank you. senator graham. >> thank you both for your service. i look forward to working with you in future. i have every confidence that you will be confirmed and these will be difficult but i think very rewarding jobs. general, on the trans patient what effect will sequestration have on the ability of air command to meet our defense needs over the next eight years?

>> i think there is too significant impacts sequestration will have. the first is as an industrial funded organization wherever users that use transportation services pay out of that -- out of their operation maintenance accounts for those services, the decrease in the availability of those funds. the corollary to that is that will force our organic capacity, the training and seasoning of the people that do that work whether it is military sealift command or air mobility command, to spend more of their dollars to achieve that training as a byproduct of moving transportation requirements around the world. there is a bit of a two-sided coin on the impact of sequestration on the readiness of that fleet. >> in simpler terms, it would be damaging? >> yes, sir. >> from an air mobility command point of view, how is eric airfleet then affected by the operational tempo of the

last 10 years? >> we have had a fairly high ops tempo particularly in airlift and air refueling fleets. the fleets are holding up pretty well. doing continuous assessment of the structures in our large airlift aircraft but the tempo is showing its -- >> is it fair to say that when we accept each plane into the fleet, 10 or 11, that the operational tempo has been unprecedented since world war ii probably and when it comes time to evaluate our future needs, we are flying the wings off these planes? i know they are structurally sound but i want the committee to understand that no envisioned this level of operational tempo before 9/11. we will have to make accommodations. admiral, are we at war? use the wordt "war" but there is no doubt we

are in a conflict. >> if it's not a war, what is it? >? is it a disagreement >> i apologize, i did not understand the question. >> i said are we at war and you said no. you said i think something else like a conflict. how could you say we are not at work? or has a very specific legal definition and i don't believe we have met it. >> do you believe we are at war with al qaeda and their affiliates? >> yes, sir. i apologize, i assumed you were talking in the cyber arena. >> absolutely, my bad. you don't want to go down that road -- i got you. but we are at war in terms of radical islam being the enemy of the nation? >> yes, sir. the nsa program is designed

to protect us from the enemy who is hell-bent on attacking our nation at home and throughout the world, do you agree? >> yes, sir. that their fifth column movements are in the united states embedded in our country, sympathetic to the enemy? >> we have seen those kind of actions with people within the united states. we have thelieve nsa capabilities in effect in september of 2001 that we have today and is there a high likelihood we would have intercepted the attack of 9/11? >> the potential would have been much greater. >> as we reform the program, will you stay in the forefront of your thinking not to take us back to pre-9/11 capabilities? >> yes, sir. > when it comes to monitoring content of an american citizen on the phone, the nsa program is very restricted in that regard, is that a true statement? >> very restrictive, sir.

>> that the threat we face is very real. are you familiar with major assan? >> at fort hood. >> how could he communicate on aki internet a withnwar al in yemen and we not understand or not find out about that. do you know? >> no, sir, in general i believe he took advantage of the protections of our citizens. >> can you do me a favor and evaluate how we missed major hassan? i believe in privacy and transparency but i believe that any system that will protect an american -- america from attack has to be able to pick up a communication from a major in the united states army to one of the leading terrorists in the world? if we cannot do that, something is wrong. would you please go back and

evaluate how we missed major hassan and if we need to change the law to catch future perpetrators. i would like to help you in that endeavor. the boston attack, is it fair to an that our ability to take intercepted indications and identify the perpetrators fairly quickly gave us some late time about anything they may have been planning in new york? >> yes, sir. to being at war with radical islam, do you consider the homeland one of their chief targets? >> yes, sir. >> if they could attack anyplace in the world, the top priority would probably be here at home? >> yes, sir. >> when it comes to reforming this program, how much can we talk about how the program works before we destroy its ability to protect us? >> there is clearly always an element there that we don't want

to divulge sources and methods. >> would you say the discussions about how this system works have already helped the enemy in terms of being able to adapt? >> it has given them greater insights into what we do and how we do it. >> is it fair to say that when the enemy communicates uses commercial networks like the rest of us? >> yes, sir. >> if the only way we can detect what they're up to is to be able to access these commercial networks in a reasonable fashion? >> yes, sir. >> do you agree the only way to deter them is to prevent them from attacking us because killing them is not a deterrent. a welcome death. the best way to protect death against radical islam is to find out what they are up to and hit them or stop them before they hit us. >> yes, sir. >> is that the world which we live in? >> yes, sir. >> thank you.

,> thank you very much gentleman and your families for your devoted service to the nation. let me begin with general selva. one of the important components thehe civil repair debt to civil reserve air fleet and you are undergoing studies with relationships and what we do now so we reset after significant extensions in afghanistan and iraq. idea,u give us an parliamentary at least, what we have to do to ensure the program supports there were time needs in any highlights that are ready for prime time? inside the relationship with the civil reserve air fleet, we have 28 separate carriers that provide cargo and passenger services, each with their own business plan and each with their own motivation for how they run their businesses. part of the study was to get at

how the industry runs and get the broad macro economics of how the industry is going to involve overtime. we put those two big pieces together and we are now working with the senior executives in those individual carriers to come to some agreement on what contract mechanism might look like to incentivize their volunteer service in the civil reserve air fleet. as you may be aware, the policy that governs how we managed national airlift policy was last of dated in 1987. this study is the first major post-desert storm to get at what the economics of the industry look like and how they affect our relationship with the craft. that thexpect volunteerism will continue. the question is, how do we make it a meaningful business incentive for them to do that. >> do you anticipate any legislative requirements that you would have that would help

you achieve a more efficient outcome for the government? >> based on the preliminary work we have done in the study and their interaction with the carriers, i don't believe any legislative changes are required to the national airlift policy to make it successful. >> if they do, you will inform us? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. congratulations vice admiral rogers. havetwo huge possibilities -- cyber command and an essay. -- and nsa. in your organization, are you going to have or contemplate or have now principal deputies that would essentially focus exclusively on one or the other? >> yes, sir, each organization has its own deputy and a complete operational organization. -- at there is no changes this time? >in those deputies?

u.s. cybersay the changing in the course of the next few months but that is part of a normal routine. >> and part of the normal rotation. let me change gears. we have all recognized the growing importance of cyber in every capacity. i think the lessons of history suggest that the more we practice, the better we are when the game starts. to my mind, i don't think we have had the kind of coordinated exercises between cyber command, nsa, homeland security and every other agency which basically would give us -- confirm what we believe it may be surprises about what we don't know. is that your impression? >> i think we have done a good job of exercising within the