after a very difficult war. south korea wasn't south korea or more several decades. it only became a vibrant democracy several decades after the end of korean war. but president bush wasn't able to see this through to its end. president obama was elected on a anti-war platform, and his vision of iraq, in my view, was more of that of vietnam; an unwinnable quagmire that u.s. troops needed to get out of as soon as they could and allow the locals on the ground to sort it out among themselves. ..

>> well, thank you for the remarks this afternoon, and thank everyone here today. it was just slightly over seven years ago that washington converted food court of the pentagon city mall the night after, you know, petraeus' confirmation hearing before going off to baghdad that then colonel on the phone to someone

motioned me to walk over to him because he was -- want you to come over to iraq, and four sol it years working for and with general petraeus. there are some themes to that, that you talked about today, some themes you cover that i'd like to teds out more fully. maybe open a little more grounds for discussion. reading startses with military eyes. first, as someone who was there, a smaller machine, it was a reminder of just how much activity the lfl and various complex activity was going on in the headquarters in iraq at the different levels, at the force level and core level and liaison to the u.s. embassy and iraqi government and united nations and so on. it's an amazingingly complex

landscape that general petraeus have to manage and sink news, an incredibly difficult thing to do, and so it's among other things your book reminds us of the complexity of an endeavor like that, but reading it with military eyes, it also reads like a cook book to me because every few pages, as i turn every few pages, i'm reminded of, oh, yes, the strategic counter insurgency command has to be prepared to deal with this particular kind of problem, and it has to fulfill this kind of role, this aspect, this responsibility, and it is dozens of strategic functions that have not yet been captured in militaries, and i think it's important for us to take to good a book like yours, and we don't have to relearn this every time we do a major campaign in some

foreign country which as little as we want it to happen, it is certain to happen again at some point in time, and i hope we are better prepared and better equipped so that we can have the knowledge of how a counter insurgency command and iraq and u.s. mission in iraq work, and so that we can be in a more advantageous starting point the next time we have to do that. tls also a reminder as you flip through the pages with military eyes of the different levers that strategic commander like general petraeus had to pull happen and train and equip command under lieutenant general jim generate k 135,000 iraqi forces that he mentioned, joining us on the battlefield in the course.

there's a detention coming up that is trying to do count what general petraeus turned counter insurgency inside the wire so no longer are your detention centers for insurgency academies, but using intelligence to map out the networks inside the command so that you can have an effect on those that are still out on the battlefields, and on and on and on, there are so many different functional levels that the strategic commanders have control, and the ability to sy, this c those is a rare trait i'd say in a leader, and, luckily, we had others to pull that off. now, a lot of those levers do not exist early on in the war and a lot of the functional commands were not present early in the war so, really, only i would argue that as you get in

the latter stages, senior in command and general petraeus senior in command, he had create some of his own weapons in order to have those tools to fully address the complexity of the problem. could you pick up the serge from 2008 and put it down at another point in the war. could you have done in 2003 what was done in 2007? could you have done it earlier? could you have fully exploited the opportunities that might have existed in 2003 for, five, and six in the way they were exploiting it in 2007 and 2008. there's precursors for the serge that i'd argue unfortunately were not present earlier in the war. the first is that there's change in secretary of defense, and in december of 2006, and it's a key

change between secretary rums field and secretary gates, and senior military leaders at the time would say that surge probably couldn't have taken place without that change. secondly, one of the things that you get in the pages of serge, that you get in the pages of my csh michael's book, the end game and others, is a near encyclopedic knowledge of iraqi politics, iraqi society, iraqi culture and interrelationships with the various political factions, ethnic, and sectarian groups, and it tells you and shows just how little we knew about iraq, that iraq was such a black box to us in 2003 when the invasion took place, and it was a very hard learning process, and it was one that we, unfortunately, had to pay for in blood between 2003 and 2006, just to get the knowledge so that you'd know, for example,

that ray mad di is a shape, or as you put it, a minor shake of a minor tribe, but stepping into a larger role. why? because the majors dpled from al-qaeda, press in there, and in jordan. i mean, would we have known that kind of thing in 2003, and the level of knowledge that you had to gain to be able to be able to see where the seems were that you could exploit is extraordinary. one of the things, also, lets say in your opening chapter where you describe way went before the surge, the major -- the major developments that commenced, i think, in the campaign, the campaign as it's plan for in 2004 to 2006 is the

indicators of an emerging sectarian war. we can see it in 2004, i think, that the major problems, there's an insurgent problem, and there's a problem of income pass at a timed stake so you have to build the capacity of the state and also handle the problems on its own, but along the way which ewe get to the point you help build the capacity of the government that is, itself, a party in et nos sectarian war, then you have to ask whether your strategy is not competing itself. i think that's the point you come to by the end of 2006, and i think general casey noted that. that's the major factor they are confronting and the pulling out, pulling the rug out from under the assumptions that underpin the plan in 2004, 2005, and

2006. you also -- i would also empathize one of the points you make is that general petraeus in 2007 codified and expands to the entirety of the command across the country. some things that are being learned by trial and error in 2004, 2005, and six, and places like the lost and anbar, and as one former senior coalition put it to me more recently, that if you adapt the tactical units, u.s. unites and other coalition unites in 2003 and 2006, the process of buying time so the seniors could cowhat was to be done in the first place and codifying should have been done in the first place.

third point i'd make, one of the take aways i think from your book, colonel, is that the nature of the problems the iraqis are dealing with is an ethnos secretary of power, and e would put it, in many cases, survival. to fill a vacuum created when saddam's regime disappeared, but they are also dealing with aftermath of state collapse and difficult to overstate, i think, the extent to wit the disappearance, the collapse of the iraqi state over cataclysm in iraq, politically, socially, economically that touches every iraqi. the difficulties that a foreign army has in trying to restore order, save lives, and

environment like this, all infrastructure of a modern state. you have a modern functioning state whose infrastructure disappeared. this is completely gone. that's something that i think outside iraq, and people on the ground in baghdad, and later in the search, you understand what i'm talking about. there are places in west baghdad in 2007 that i remember seeing. well-to-do, upper middle nabbeds turned into utter waste lands, separated from the rest of the city, blocked off by mounds of trash, burned out cars and barb wires that residents themselves put in place, it's a post apocalypse scene. what would beverly hills, california look like if you turned off electricity, removed

everything, picked up in trash, no running water, and had that situation, and that's what parts of baghdad and other major cities in iraq looks like. that was the extent of the problem, not an easy problem. i'd also say that, too, to draw another analogy about the unnecessary collapse of the state in 2003. i will say the finishing off of the job of the clash the state with the iraqi army. pronounced the iraqi army disbanded itself in the spring of 2003 like going not pentagon friday evening saying the department disbanded itself. they are going to come back. you can eared them back to work, and that's probably what should have been done in my opinion, and having said that, i want to add this. i'm not speaking on behalf of

the u.s. army and other department of defense in any way. this is only my opinion as i should have prefaced everything i said. lastly, to extrapolate from your book to the situation today, i think, unfortunately, you give us the key to understanding the violence that's racking iraq today because the various strategic problems that you described being resolved or being with the surge and talking about the awakening and splitting of the mainstream away from al-qaeda and other insurgents and elite sharing power pack that takes place amongst the major political parties, and insulation of iraq from terrorist sanctuaries in syria and in iran and the containing of the militant groups, all the exact same things that have been eroded, up raveled to create a situation as it stands today, and,

unfortunately, if we were to continue on with the violent chart and see it and creeping back up today, probably back in 2006 in iraq, probably in the early part of 2006, and so you -- hopefully some sort of forces are willing to keep it from being where it was at the end of 2006 because at a certain point, it's corrosive, and there's nothing to stop it, but you identified very well the things that need to be done in iraq to prevent that kind of outcome, and, unfortunatelily, this dynamics are moving the opposite direction now. >> thank you, well that naturally segues into how you ended your talk which is is it entirely fair to sort of blame the obama administration for lack of the deal that the keep

american forces in iraq, and after all, the negotiator was, as you know, playeded a key role, and he made a big effort to try to make it work in the theme. iraqi parol limit a problem, or how would you assess that negotiation? >> well, in two ways, first, i'd point out that president bush personally got involved, almost on a biweekly basis, and president obama never is involved in a relationship with him. he said that he gave a portfolio to the vice president and didn't have the clout and iraqi know the difference between a president and haven't. they understood where the president stood. if you backtrack before that, i think the reason we were not able to spend the second some of the election of 2008, and what -- >> for the audience, what is

that? >> allows the forces to operate the election won by a shia, but running in a party supported by sunni, and in iraq as well as many other shia and non seq. tearian people. the -- we had been telling the sunnies to enter the political process, things will be okay. your voice will be heard through politics, the ballot box. they won the election. was their voice heard? the answer is no. we didn't back the winner of the election. we didn't give him the tout to try to form a government. he might have failed, but we did not allow the prospect to go to fruition. instead, our ambassador on the ground said, no, malawki is the guy, we have to back him.

a deal was caught in iran, and, you know, the equivalent of the smoke filled room in iran, deal in which the officer of the mother-daughter, oms, the party, the holding, supported malaki for another term, and malili was sidelined. what did the sue gnus learn? no matter if we win or not, it does not matter because the next prime minister is decided in washington. we're going to be left out of the process. this is the reason why no one would support the extension of the u.s. forces in iraq the next year because what good were we? we were supporting the other side. >> what our reasoning? assuming it was not completely iran's fault, thought he was a good al and best hope. i think the stable iraq going

forward was a system in which democratic rules and rule of law was suspected. it was not. >> as indicated, back to the situation we were back in 2008 with 8,000 deaths, civilian deaths every year, and, obviously, the number of could go up, 35,000, whatever it was in 2006, but, really, the wrong direction. what, if anything, has to do, in your view, to hampen that down? >> i don't think we should be doing anything. i wrote an op-ed to the fact that malawki needs to be in his own juices for a while until he reverses the political decisions that suppressed and alienated the sunnies in iraq, and until he does that, the group has power. and abide by it.

until he agrees to and a number of the cases. allow protests, and why help him? >> how do you assess the straint and/or weaknesses in iraq, seeing in flaw gsh -- fallujah. >> they have not aloined with them the way they did in 2006. this is the good news. they know that al-qaeda, nothing good will come of aligning with al-qaeda, and what's happened is the alliance that we created with the pride broke down, but they have not gone back to the supporting al-qaeda either. they are more on the sidelines of fighting for themselves, really. survival. i don't think al-qaeda will ever be able to create a safe haven

in western iraq. they -- every time they try to take and hold ground, they position themselves such that can be combated with some other military force and defeated. on the other hand, the situation throughout iraq will continue to spiral downward with car bombs, suicide bombings, and political violence until you have dense resolution among the elites and buy-in among the elites that the best way forward is the political way forward and not violence way forward. >> you were critical of the general, who, obviously, is sitting darg the war, the concept of the war that's administered, you know, several thousand miles away. does that make sense? other lessons to be learned about how -- obviously, they had a different level of authority, probably than talking to the president all the time. are there any lessons learned and, obviously, the

administrator, trying to sort of undercut him as being this. does that structure make sense? >> it does because the general command has a wider responsibility. the problem we have in 2004 with the general, and, again, in the surge with the admiral, is they should have. focusing on the wider region. they had o four-star general in iraq to fight the war, and instead, it was like magnet falls, kids playing soccer, everyone wanted to follow the ball, and they didn't want to look at the wider dpeeld, and what we felt central command during the surge is looking at the wider region. do something about all the suicide bombers, for instance, flocking in from all of the arab countries into iraq.

>> obviously, the u.s. military has gone through major experiences where lessons were unlearned because they were too difficult to kind of process the one way or another, and, obviously, vietnam was the big one, because we're never going to do that kind of thing again, and, therefore, we don't have to learn about it again. how 1 the u.s. military positioned this time around, not to unlearn the lessons, the very hard lessons, you write about in the book, and how would you assess -- there's an effort underway by people who make sure

lessons are learned, but what's your assessment? >> lessons too difficult to learn, and i disagree with that characterizization. >> mostly difficult. >> emotionally difficult. unwillingness to learn the lessons. we like to fight the normandy invasion and the campaign across france and germany, if we could do that, like, every war, everybody would be happen. those are not the wars we are handed, and we have to learn the fight the wars we have to fight, and, you know, i agree with joel, you know, none of us want to do a long term counter insurgency big unit campaign again. i hope it does not happen, but we would be nice to be ready in case it does. >> yeah. >> and i am a libel encouraged -- little bit encouraged they are taking the study of the iraq war while the officers are still fresh. it remind me of the lessons learned out of world war i, for

instance, british army does not look at the lessons of world war i until 14 years after the war, produce the study, and too critical of army performance, and it's suppressed, and it's never published. the french army cherry picked battles and developed a doctrine based on incomplete view of world war one, and the only army, american army does good, but the best army is the german army from world war i. 4 # 00 officers on a number of committees for two years right after the end the war to study what went on, and as a result, they create the tactical doctrine whatever you say about the strategy in world war ii, the tactical doctrine found and rooted in looking at the experiences of the past war. you know, it's an untrue statement that militaries that look at the last war are doomed to fight the last war and are not ready for the next one. they are able to look at the last war and, you know, get the

right context and learn experiences and understand what went on in the last four that you can then prepare the forces much better for what they might face in the future, and this is the case looking at iraq and afghanistan and lessons they have to offer and vietnam and lessons offeredded if we have to do an industrial counter insurgency again. >> final question about how you proceeded in terms of the research for the book. how did you go about? >> i -- what i really needed were the primary source documents in general petraeus' papers at the international university, and so a lot of it was requesting requests stations of chunks of his archive, which, you know, thankful the folks there did in a timely matter, and, of course, i had contacts

with the social works and notes from the campaign and the secretary sources that i could look at, and so it was really an easy research for me. i didn't have to spend extended time in the archives somewhere and dig through papers because i knew what i was looking for, and i knew where it was, and, in fact, it ended up being sent to me on a cd, and so no archive time at all. >> okay, well, if you have a question, can you wait for the microphone and identify yourself. this gentleman here to begin with. >> should be on. >> tony smith, retiredded army like you. on your opening slide in which which you look at the over arching reasons for the lack of success, the assumptions that's going in, are you being a little rougher on jerry breamer and easy on donald rumsfeld on the issue of dismantling of the iraqi army having done a couple

tours in the pentagon, it's inconceivable, to me, to believe those decisions were made in isolation from leaders in the defense department. >> it's a good question, and i think there is probably a good book yet to be written when actually we've some hard, fast facts, but i -- i won't hold my breath it'll come out because a lot of of people now want to hide what occurred. i do know that ambassador was the president's representative, and he used to tell the secretary, i'm the president's representative, and if he was ordered to do something that he felt was not right, he could have gone to the president and said, you know, secretary rumsfeld declassify iraqi society extensively, you know, all of nazi germany, and disband the army, and i think this is a really bad idea, and he gpt, and

so, you might be right. we don't know. bremmer, in my view, he didn't -- clearly didn't push back at all. >> tom? >> thank you, research fellow with the national security program here and at the aspen institute. i have a question. in terms of the other myths you painted, you never mentioned the population displacement trend happening at the time. after the bombing in 2006, there was significant removal -- displacement internally and out of the country and segregation in the population separate from the deaths, and i argue, a, that's one of the other variables cribbing to the drops we saw in violence because the populations with self-segregates

themselves and not moving home. shia moving into shia areas and so i was wondering if you can comment on that dynamic, and, also, i'm not sure i disagree with the general argument that the serge helped, but i wonder why you stick to such a causal story. it's app interesting point that if it happened in another point in time without the other variables you present adds myths, was it possible? my take was that all the other conditions, awakening, the cease fire, the displacement, the sectarian violence reaching a saturation point almost, had to have been there for the surntle to have the impact it had. wondered if you could comment on that. >> the sectarian violence in the serge, and if it was displacement making malters better, why was it so much

sectarian violence at the beginning of the surge and why did it continue? in baghdad, there was a lot more mixing of the sects even as throughout the serge and by the end of the surge than that narrative would have you believe. that there was some sort of a clean separation of the population, but that was not what our commanders on the ground were reporting, and there's a consensus they were taking, that there were still a lot of mixing of the population. i believe that it was not the segregation of the population, but it was the gating of baghdad into gated communities with the glass barriers and by yo -- biometric scanners and security check points that stopped

militias from preying on sunnies, and likewise making it difficult for sunni terrorist to inject car bombs and suicide bomber into shia neighborhoods. on the other point, i agree with you. i don't think i presented a causal explanation where the surge succeeded, and, n., in the book, in the conclusion, i say the serge transplanted to another time and place if not worse. i never make the claim that it was the way to go before 2006. i fully acknowledge that all the other factors came into play, and were extremely important. the point is that without the surge, there's not that catalyst to bring them to fruition. i don't think that iraq is in a better place in 2008 than it was in 2006 had we not served. in fact, i think abceps the surge, iraq would have broken

apart in the country. the way it was trending. >> just a follow-up to that was was an an important signal to the population that the united states, was there a style, not using the pa seniortive term, but saying, hey, we're staying? >> absolutely. in fact, i mentioned that and i talked about it in the book didn't say it in the talk, by the psychological impacts of we're not withdrawing. we're not turning if over, but here with you partnering to the end, and they take their cue from what the president of the united states is saying. and the iraqi leaders and why it was not renewed in 20 # 11, when, you know, there was no indication when president obama was all in in iraq.

testifying in 2007, tell us the atmosphere of that. i mean, that was probably one of the most important hearings of the post world war ii era. >> it was -- it was tense. it was surreal. you know, there was the "new york times" ad by moveon.org attacking general petraeus' character and personality. >> calling him general betrayuos. >> yes, that he was a mouthpiece for the white house, and it was a high stakes two day, and i thought that general petraeus, ambassador happen -- handled himself great, given the pressure and scrutiny. great chapter in the book, and nothing -- but that testimony, and --

>> what were the stakes? >> there was a move afoot to force a withdraw time line on the administration, and when those hearings were over, i knew that the way it had gone that general petraeus squashed that basically, and it was not necessarily intention to create a political dynamic, and it was certainly the outcome of him giving his testimony of what was happening on the ground, and when the hearings inned, i looked at him as i was walking down the corridor, and said, you bought him six more months. it was true. >> another one over here. >> in baghdad, 2007, general petraeus and mr. crocker showed up, i'm retired from the marine corp., a couple comments. first of all, another operational doctrine successful called am fib because warfare we use after that we learned from

after world world war i and ii e armies, we took the boats, but we forgave you. the second thing is, and general shoemaker, success in iraq, introdugs of the brigade modules is an amazing transformation of how the army attends different brigades, and they are all put together, and i was very, very impressed by that, and saying that as the person using the joint task organizations, but the fact that you could have almost a court sized group of unites of different parts of the united states and europe come together in baghdad and work almost -- one focus, significant achievement by the army and thank you all you for doing that, did a great job in doing that. what doo you say to the state department? one of the things i found

amazing when i showed up there is part of the baghdad cr 2-rbgs that was unfunded. how were they to compliment and supplement that in baghdad with lack of funding and honestly poor leadership in the state department? i recognize that's not their job to do nation building, but there were signed up with significant speedometer, and if not for the fact you had funding and other money put in that we could use, we wouldn't be able to do any work at all. how do you, given the fact that the defense department has significant resources and figure out how to get to that point to congress, what do you say to the state department's war with this warfare and how do you use it to comp prelim the program or military program in this warfare? >> it's a -- we wanted a civilian surge as well as a military surge.

we needed the capacity, and what was done was give brigade commanders embedding reconstruction teams so they had commanders, and had been elected, and civilians embedded in the brigade area that help him with the reconstruction aspect of counter insurgency war fights, and, you know, it was not perfect, and did we get as many civilians as we needed? no, in fact, a loft used our militaries as you, you know, and thank you for the service, by the way. i'm not sure how to do this belter other than you take an agency like the u.s. agency for international development and

you put it on steroids. it's much, much larger today than the vietnam, conflict, fringe, and more of a port, and the force program, and i don't see that happening, there's no really political energy to give the state department more resources in that regard because, again, most will not fight a war like that in our lifetime, and maybe we won't, but maybe we have to ramp it up when needed. anyway, you're right. i would say, though, that building capacity that the state department brought were absolutely critical. i point to the introduction, it could not have happen the without the treasury department that made it happen, and it was wonderful, and military didn't have that kind of capability,

and so state department both, and civilians capacity really crucial, and they were not perfect. >> a few more minutes, i have questions for the gentleman has to leave after the book signing. >> department of state, retired. saying at state you make policy by your personnel policy. could we have picked better, went through all the mistakes made early by the general by the ambassador, could we have picked better people and avoided mistakes, are people like petraeus learn from the secretary, and they were so good later. >> [inaudible] >> i have a comment, but the

question 1 if you advise the counter parts in the iraqi army today, a people who are involved in the violence, what did you advise from the lessons learned? >> okay. >> and the lady bind you. >> hi, thank you very much, margaret from the university, analyst. i appreciate very much what both of you are trying to do and the importance of it. i think your presentations underscore two problems, one is a policymaking problem and the other is a planning problem. can you talk about the role of your organizations in better informing the policy decisions that were made at the outset to even go into the war because as we know, there were wars because there was wars done in the 1990s that did a pretty good job of anticipating problems that arises from an invasion in iraq, and then, secondly, once

those -- so better informing the policymaking process, and then the planning process itself. okay. >> okay. a final question in the back. i am. [laughter] >> i'm retired state department, and i want to ask you about that map of president bush and his commitment to south korea and obama to -- the big rational for maintaining a 60-70 years, and korea, defense of japan, parallel strategic rshal for maintaining us 60-70 year occupation of iraq. thank you. >> all right. we'll begin with the great man theory. better people in place, things would have gone more smoothly.

i reject that notion. now, we didn't have the right people, i believe, in 2003, either the military or the political level, but we also didn't have the right organization. we had the most junior three star in the united states army organization that was not designed to conduct theater responsibilities as well as operational responsibilities, and it was not until spring of 2004 that we had a four-star command and three thf star communed side by side, and the decisions of the responsibilities. it was too much for one to handle to focus on countering a budding insurgency with the political military interface in both baghdad and washington at the same time. we could have had the best person you can imagine, and it wouldn't have been p able to complete that job. now, in terms of terms of

ambassador crocker had been in ambassador's position in 2003, would things have gone better? possibly. i think in my view, better problem, the problem is we stimhave to work for donald rumsfeld, who is not going it allow him a lot of lee way, and he's going to steer things in a certain direction as developed as the previous question indicated, you know, did secretary rumsfeld want this to occur, didn't. ed the army to be disbanded, just like germany in 1945, k4-6s the division they had, which was inaccurate historic analysis, and i don't know that better people would have resulted in a better outcome, but, you know, that's the fun thing about history. we don't know. the second one was -- >> lessons -- >> well, the big lesson is

really a political one problems iraq faced today in anbar are a result of political impact at the highest level, and if you get over the political impact and bring in all ethnicities, factions, and parties into a political way forward, then dealing with the military aspect is countering terrorism, and anbar would be easy, but the provision of the specific tactics, techniques, procedures, apache hell cometters, hell fire missiles, that's all noise. you know, you can pling away all day long, but they will continue to rear their ugly heads until the root causes of the problems are addressed, and the root causes are political. that would be my, and, unfortunately, that advice has to got to the top, to the prime minister. >> and policymaking -- >> yeah, you know, it's really

interesting that a lot of people say, boy, i wish the military had intervened and give them a piece of their minds, and i think, you know, i have not studied these runups to the war with primary sources, but, really, all that i've read, i think the military bought in to what was being espoused by secretary rumsfeld. yes, there were plans on the shelf that said we needed 300,000 troops and so forth, but i had a different commander. he was all in. he was okay, and i think that the military did give the best advice. the bigger issue to me is how can we train and educate our leaders such that when they pin on four stars, they give better advice? this goes to the professional military education system in this country, and the need to have very rigorous systems,

professional military education that counts in an officer's career and is not a weigh station between this. >> a final question -- iraq -- >> oh, the need to defend. well, you know, i can give you a specific reason for having strong allies, and that's that the middle east has a lot of oil and will for decades to come, and i know we all love green energy, but for decades to come, we'll be dependent on hydrocarbons to seal the world's economy, and, therefore, the middle east matters and will continue to matter. >> very shortly -- >> becoming the new saudi arabia, shale oil deposits in southern ohio. we're good. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. [applause] >> you'll be willing to sign books? >> [inaudible] >> yeah.

[inaudible conversations]

[applause] >> thank you. well, it's really exciting to be back at the computer history museum with my good friend and colleague eric schiement and my colleague, jared. last time we were here, we were talking about the new digital age and future of the world. >> no, you've really done this job, and running and lean in, lean in within google. you don't work there. >> we're excited. it's a real treat for me. eric, i owe my career eric. he hired me, and many people wouldn't. >> it's worked out well for you. you've done so much better since you left google. [laughter] >> well, i feel lucky because we talk about this a lot, and everyone needs mentors and sponsors in life, and eric is that for me and continues to be, and i'm so grateful. i met jared when i first came

back, and friends with our head of the products, and chris, there's one guy, and he totally guessed it. he runs around the world trying to get other people get it, and he's been a voice that's super important to our industry, and technology, i think, all over, so it's an exciting to be here with both of you. let's start at the beginning. you're both fairly busy dude, r right? jobs, job, and it's not obvious you know each other that well. tell the story, how did you meet? what possessed you to sit down? where does this start? >> my friend, don,mented to visit his son fighting in iraq, and i went along, thanksgiving in iraq with the troops would be interesting. we show up in baghdad, and we were the first people to show up on a commercial flight, sort of

got lost in the airport with the marines on the other side. >> they knew what to do with you? >> no. >> hi, i'm in baghdad. >> so i meet jared, and because he was an interesting person, my daughter was drsh we took video, and i remember playing the videos when i got home, and all i heard was jared's voice talking, talking, talking. >> the best things to say. >> no, just talked about stuff. [laughter] >> well, what i remember about eric, and we get to the airport, and, normally, people, when you arrive, and you don't see the guards anywhere, they are, like, eager to get out of there. in eric's case, they put a jacket on him, ready for him to go, and what does he do? before he will leave the airport to go to the green zone, he insists on asking the security detail to give him an in-depth history of flat jackets, and it's not because he's worried about his safety and security,

but he's a geek scientist who really wants to understand the history of the jackets, and why is the velcro here, and at what stage in the history did it move from over there? >> why doesn't it protect certain parts of me? [laughter] >> was there an answer to that? >> not one the marines were willing to reveal. >> lesson of the experience is when you travel in a war zone with somebody, you become very close with them, and since then, we traveled to somewhere between 40 and 45 countries together, and when we first began the journey, we talked about stability and instint. eric wanted stability, nice hotels, and ease -- >> stop. look, jared does not like to go to normal places. already right? so never been to south koreas and he wants to go to north korea. >> there's only one place i couldn't get eric to come with

me to is somalia. that's probably better. >> where there's no hotels at all. >> or government or banks or institutions, yes, that is true. [laughter] >> i'm still not going. [laughter] cut after the pipeline, no money, no roads, no police force, nothing. the leadership has an hour with the duoof us, and what do they choose to do? spend the entire time handing us their android devices asking of us if we can keep this for them. [laughter] priorities. >> now you're listening -- >> one of the guys is the rebel president now. >> it's unclear whether he's still involved in government. he seems to have left. >> so you're watching the video, and you're listening to jared's

voice, and this makes you want to write a box? >> i actually talked to jared, met in new york, and he wanted to write a book. he talk about the idea, that's not very interesting to me because turns out that the foreign policy people don't understand technology, and they don't understand foreign policy, and i don't either, so i wondered around, and you are shocked how miserable people ice lives are like. we take our -- the wonderful world around us, and we're very fortunate here. >> you write the book, and the internet is something they don't truly understand. i know i don't understand, but i felt certain you did. [laughter]

to be honest, if you don't understand the internet, i'm sure no one does. that's concerning. what do you mean by that we don't understand? >> my career, has been within 35 years, a half mile, and i'm constantly surprised. i think i kind of understand it, and then something wild and whacky comes up, and i remember 1993 sitting in my office thinking, things are really boring. i kind of understand it all, and that's when i saw the browser at the time, and people are enormously creative. they are enormously surprising. they are not utilitarian and follow the liewls and so forth and so on. the internet is the first time we can hear all of this, and i think it's for the next ten or 20 years we'll see more, and all

of us, oh, my gosh. jared -- >> sorry, i didn't -- that was a low blow. >> jared, next time, the book is amazing. the internet is the largest experiment involving anarchy. you are a student and a scholar and a partitioner of what is civil society and what is democracy and states. why is this anarchy? >> if you think about the deaf fission, it was coined in the 21st century. ..

>> if you think about state power and military power, they don't work in the online work like they do -- the treaty of west failure that established the system of sovereigned states is based on the idea that they bre breakdown as the worlds come online and disrupts the power in the world. states have physical power, but a state maybe a cyber power in the online world when in fact it is week. estonia and sweden with punch

way above their world in a way that is connected. >> i concluded that foreign policy hasn't changed. there are realist and he explained this. but in technology, what is in fact now is the empowerment that smart phones and internet are providing. and data perminent, the idea that one information is linked it can't be put back in the box. >> you said internet can't fix everything. and we are big believers in the power of what technology can do.

your book focuses on what happens when another five billion people are coming online and google and facebook is focused on that and so many people in the audience are interested. but thinking about the limitations are interesting. what are the limitations? >> i will get in trouble if people tweet this, but it is a joke. so, let's where are the boundaries? when does the internet stop and bad stuff happen? i think the answer is when you have a civil war like in syria or possibly what is going on in ukraine and crimea. so it is clear to me, and i want

to go back to the technology optimist view of this. we can fix education, entertainment, we can fix the empowerment of women, we can fix corruption with the internet. but there is a threshhold. we have been having this debate of how would you fix syria? >> syria and ukraine offer two examples of a bug in the techno-optimism. would you have people getting killed and chemical weapons being used and there is no shortage of videos and each one is more horrific. the government is setting up checkpoints to see what is existing on their various

profiles. >> you should not go to syria for a variety of reasons. i saw friends i had not seen in four years. i read a story about a group of friend getting sick, passing out and it took a month to get information on what happened. in damascus, they stop and ask for your phone and hold a gun to your head and ask for your password. if they don't like what they see, they will signal up to a building and have them shoot.

that is what happened to my brother's friend. they need a humanitarian int intervention and a cyber intervention as well. the every day syrian who has a phone and spends all day online trying to find out what is happening is caught in the cross fire. and that is why people don't understand why they should use chrome browsers. and we need to address how we make sure the average citizen is secure online. >> we use the example of somalia and imagine no government at all for a while and the

telecommunication telecommunication dustry indust which is the only business in somalia. it becomes an alert of hey, there is a gang around the corner. we heard a story of school girls using google gaps to get to school safely and avoid bombs. imagine being in somalia and they take your phone and they have your contact list and they can impersoninate you. >> thrusts with -- there was a sense people didn't know what was going on and the striking thing about syria is we know.

>> when you were at google, one of the amazing things sheryl did was set up and spend time talking about development and development world and the growth rate and the problems of the third world. things have gotten better because they are getting connected. but the other issues are not getting fix dfixed. >> and that is to your point the internet can't fix everything. let's talk about the military. we have the first women that ever became a four star general in the military. it is on honor to have her. [ applause ] >> she is a dear friend of my mine. so you show up in baghdad, the

general will explain why the flap jackets are made the way they are one day. but how does this affect the military? >> we are still fighting the wars the old way rather than the new way. so our intervention is trying to deal with the citizens. the best thing you can do is empower them and build them wi-fi towers so they can get all of the facts, figure out the previous dictator was lying to them, get all of the fact and develop a society. this is the last thing the military does. one simple answer is since all

of the fighting involves civ civilians that can turned against this. the internet changes the perception of people. it can empower people and the natural strengths of the society come out. why don't we build those wireless networks? in iraq, sadem didn't let the people use any cell phones. and in burma, we learned sim cards were $5,000 which is a fortune there. they were lowered after we were there to $5 and the system fell over capacity. >> on the military side of it, we interviewed a group of navy

seals that were on bin laden raid and asked what technology they needed and they said we don't need new technology. we need cycles to change so we can bring our i-phone out into the battle and keep track of our friends. a friend said when he has to jump out of a plane they have a battery attached that last an hour and a half because they can not use over the counter technology in combat. and we talk about the military industrial complex, we have a real challenge in the sense that cyber security isn't achieved

out agility and it is compromised. helicopters and traditional systems, tanks and various weapons, when do we get a point where providing cyber assistance by being attacked by people many c c continents over. >> what should we do about the army that is organizing cyber attacks on western targets? is it serious? that needs to be in the conversation. >> and what is interesting is you have the foreign fighter problem in syria. 15,000 foreign fighters coming to fight in the civil war in syria. a third are coming from europe and a third of them are converts. it is a global problem.

what is interesting is the russians are sending foreign fighters into syria and they are sending software engineers to fight on behalf of the syrian eelectric -- electronic army -- >> let's move from the military to the economy. one thing that is happening with the progress and efficiency is a real crisis for jobs all over the world, particularly for the use. how do you think, and i think eric particularly with your google hat on because i know you cared deeply about google as a company and about the impact google as on the world. they have always have that and us at facebook want to pass that and have that sense. how do you think about, i think you travel broadly, how do you

think about the impact technology has on jobs throughout europe and asia particularly? >> it seems the jobs is going to be defining everything. we live and work in the economics we accept this. and there has been a displacement of manufacture jobs because it is documented you need fewer people to build cars and the process is more robotic. and with the advances of technology and computer, knowledge workers with repeative jobs are being replaced. the people who win in this process tend to be the

incumbents and the middle age and elites. so if you model out going forward, you have a significant problem because of the lack of jobs. there are economist that believe there will be jobs, but it is a transfer of middle class, relatively high paying jobs to service jobs. think of this as the driver of a talent person working in a normal job and they are laid off or something bad happens and they have employment in the service job and do the best they can. and most economic thought says that jobs will be less predictable, especially for young people. and there is a separate set of poplic policy issues around that because in that situation, you need a safety net of some kind. you cannot have people begging on the streets in america. in europe, you have the problems

that are effectively worse for lack of jobs, lack of competition and lack of globalization. and in talking, and this is something i am working on this year, i think there are solution and they are not good identify. i would ask everybody to help me think about how we will solve this. it is our problem to. we have to fix education and you will have to have a more educated workforce because the uneducated jobs are being audited out. >> we are all seeing this. >> mark gave a similar speech last summer so i know he agrees with me. the second thing is to focus on immigration. not because we want to replace

the current workers, but immigrant tend to form companies and there is a lot of correlation with great outcomes from allowing immigration. and then conitutety and you have to create an environment with incumbents can't block new enterance. you have to a place where the regilators won't kill them. most industries are highly regulated and the regulators and regulatees know themselves well and the new start-ups are not at the table. you have to fix that. >> i think there is no doubt

that is all necessary. >> and one more thing. here we are obsessed with china. they are doing a great job. imagine the conversation in 20 years. we look at the demographic trend and then the automation trends and realize a couple hundred people jobs are going to be replaced by robots. what are you going to do? it isn't just a united states problem. it is a global problem. >> so, there are benefits to technology. and some are personal. your first chapter is your future self and i will read: there is no alarm clock in your wake up routine, instead listen to this everything within, you will be roused by the aroma of coffee, light entering your room

as curtains open, and by a back massage administered by your bed. eric is administering the back massage to his wife every morning, but for the rest of us. you are more likely to awake refreshed because there is a special censor that is monitoring your sleep signals determined to wake you up not to interupt your rem cycle. with simple flicks of the wrist, you can control temperature, lighting, and music. you are able to skin through the news while a freshly clean suit is retrieved from your closet because your calendar is indicating an important meeting. i need this. all of this. just raise your hand if you would enjoy the mattress with

the monitors for your rem sykes cycles and the back seat. i need a self-driving car. i need the several driving car before he can drive because i feel confidant google technology can do better than his driving. >> certainly at the age of 16. >> where can i get this? is this several products or one product? >> our daughter invented that scenario and i think it is going to happen. when you go through the analysis, every component in that description is available in some form. you can have a rem cycle that wakes you up and the book says

talking to the equivalent of a wall, do i need to get up and the wall says no. and the reason is it has figured out the airplane is late, your boss is sleeping in, no one is going to call you. will you use that service? you betcha ya. >> so i would have known you were going to miss all those days we worked together. how realistic are the changes? >> the timing and so forth is real. i am happy to say that facebook is working on ai and research. but similar areas are going from the searching and questions model to a model that is more suggesting and assisting. google is experimenting with something called google now

where you have now cards and it says things like how long it will take you to get to work, how is the traffic doing, and as the ai gets better -- >> a friend of mine was in a meeting. it deepbeeped and said you need go. you have a meeting in the city. >> good. another example is look at the company called ways. it is crowd source calculations about traffic to give you optimal traffic rating. there is human intelligence, crowd source, ai played to physical map that makes your life better. in five or ten years, that opening scenario will seem straightforward in one form or another. >> this will affect our sleep patterns, being on top, and

massages, but it will affect us as parents as well. >> a little over a month >> you will be a father in a little over a month. and parents will have a privacy talk before they have the sex talk. >> i am going to. >> and long-term father -- >> and terrible naming advice -- >> jared needs to learn more about what happens when you are a parent. he has figured out what happens when the child is 12 and 13 but he can't run the household. in the book, we said you will give your child a unique name so

it shows up in the first results. so if you want to get along and be calm, you give a simple came. so i asked what name will you give and i said of course it is going to be stand out. so it should be berroom hill da. >> i suggested this is slept on the couch. >> i don't think i understand the name. >> can anybody spell this name? >> i have been working with his wife and she is coming around.

>> no, she is not. she is just being nice. >> one thing my wife and i are going to do is create an e-mail for our daughter once we figure out what we will name or and cc her on the photos we send out to the family and hand over the password when she is 18. >> so when she is online she has 10,000 unanswered emails. when i have unopened emails, i feel like i need to open them. she is behind before she starts. >> she is going to catch up, though. there is an interesting and more serious aspect of this. >> he is going to do this. >> i have the idea also, this is getting into areas of levity,

but i don't want unsupervised parties in the apartment, so when our daughter is old enough, i will make everybody hand over their devices when they walk in. >> they will not come to your house. >> we traveled all over the world and made it a point to talk to points from saudi arabia to various parts of asia to how they are thinking about this. the stakes are high. it is more than your child posting things that might hurt their job. in saudi arabia, you talk to parents there, and their nightmare scenario is their daughter at ten years old is chatting with somebody of the opposite sex and saying things she should not be saying but because she is ten it isn't an issue. but what happens when the things

she say follow her around like a digital scarlet letter and something takes it out of context when she is 25. we talk about honor killing and there is a concern that damage from things being taken out of context might be the virtual version of an honor killing. >> you can take out insurance on your reputation? >> we argue in the book that identity is going to be so important that people will obsess about these questions. and jared likes to say online maturity matches physical and that is not never as good as in teenagers. so imagine the antics that are out there and people are looking for a job and now it is out

there and being used against them. does that seem right? in the system, it has been true that if you a juvenile, below 18, and you commit a crime that is within bounds of not murder, you can go to a judge after an appropriate sentence and have the record be removed from the court and you can legally say you were never convicted of a crime. that is impossible today given the online world. is that fair? i am not so sure >> the last question i will ask and then we will open it up to the audience is on women. obviously something i am deeply passionate about. and unsurprisingly the benefits of technology don't accrue to men and women. women are nearly 25% less likely

to be online all over the world. part is due to not having the capital to buy the technology and part is due to the investme investment made in education. women are more likely to be literate because families put their boys in school. if you get internet access to an additional 600 million women in the next three years which given the rate of growth should be possible you would increase gdp across 144 countries by 13-18 billion. we know that investments in women pay off for the economy and at higher rates for the well-being of children and their health and their own education. so it is good cycle. but we are caught in the cycle of investing more in men always including in technology. how do you thing this changes? how do we make sure people

understand all over that this technology has to equally be in the hands of women as men? >> so, one of the things that secretary clinton used to say we talked about women's issues and she would remind us that more than 50% of the world's population is women so whatever the subject is you can talk about any issue in the entire world and it is women's issue. i think you can make the statement in a stronger way. i think there is something the numbers don't account for. i spent a lot of time ought accurateic societies that hold women back and there is an observation i made and my friends made and that is when women in the middle east get a chance to go to school they

outperform the men. >> as they do here as well. >> a friend in kuwait told me something interesting. she said we need more women's empowerment here in kuwait. 80% of the men work in the government so they don't show up and go to shopping malls. fast forward 5-8 years and you will be talking about a need for men's empowerment. >> sheryl you remember talking to us about microlending and the great success in the developing world was micro lending and the women are the ones that managed the money. i think that is true with phones and activity as well.

if we can get inexpensive phones, an android phone is about $100 in china and they are powerful phones and the prices are falling. so you can imagine $70-$50 within 3-5 years. imagine it is loaded with information about literacy and culture. in a small number of years, by giving these phones to women you can solve the education problem, the early education problem, childhood iq and involvement of parents. you could have a huge change. hundreds and hundreds of millions of people empowered. and eventually they have to win

against the oppressive male structures. i cannot imagine the women behind the veal in saudi arabia texting. >> what a powerful image. behind a veal but texting. >> we visit one of these universities and at some point the men just have to give up. >> the notion behind the vealeas very interesting. we met a group of women who were atta attacked by acid and because of the scars they have they have a stigma. we are asking the women how they are able to be optimistic.

one smiled and shows us her phone. they live in a house and training for skills and learning how to surf online. one women said online her scars are invisible and she loved the internet for giving her a second chance at life. she met a man online, met him in real life and now they are married. so i think not think of a group of women that are more beaten down than the acid victims in pakistan and you see them enjoying life. >> that is an amazing story. we will take audience questions now. yes, you have them? yes? okay. how will issues related to net

neutrality effect access to bandwith? >> most of them with monopoly providers and you will not get good internet until there is competition. in africa, the internet is more than it is in the united states. and if you divide that by the gdp is astronomical. we can solve the smart phone with the money, but the bigger problem is get thing quality bandwith. we don't have common carrier laws that apply to the internet. so a combination of public pressure so the internet isn't

used to favor particular content and our answer is the same: competition. if you have one provider of something and you don't have another choice that is an example of not having enough competition. >> can you comment on digital currency? the bit coin defenders are saying that if one bank that holds dollars goes out of business, it isn't the dollars, it the one bank. >> it is called the federal reserve. you work there. >> i am well aware of it. but it is half a million bit coins gone this weekend. 6%? yeah. so how can digital going?

>> the question you have to ask is is crypted currency here to stay and that is yes. and how long will the unregulated currency last? >> we should have sheryl this. when is the united states going to step in and regulate this? >> i don't know. there was a good article that ecplained them and it said i have an apple, i give you the apple, you give whatever for the apple, now i own the apple and i don't need a regulator. >> i think at harvard you

studied the depression, right? the technical answers on bit coins is that is remarkable cryptographic investment. it has value and it is incredible and useful for many things. so without commenting on if they will get regulated, because you are the expert, but having the ability to do this is amazing. >> people don't talk about the digital wallets either. there is a question of how security the crypto currency is, but if the walls are not secure, that is another problem. so the canadians tried their hand at something called mint chip and they shutdown it down

because the digital wallets were getting hacked. so if they are not secure enough to support the eco system we are missing the challenge. >> i remember when paypal came out, i was shocked at the number of attacks that ebay and paypal faced. it is important to remember that when you have these economic systems, there is an awful lot of people trying to break into them. and that is going to be permanent no matter what. >> how do you see human interaction involving in a world that is increasingly automated? the more connected we get, the more distant we are. in your book, you said there are two worlds with a virtual world and a physical world.

your book explores the way this virtual world and physical world interact and i think what you said in the question gets to how do you see one empaimpacting th other. >> i am working on turning my phone off during dinner. >> how is that going? wendy, what is the percentage? >> 80%. >> that is not bad >> dinner is short. i am count the minutes before i can turn it back on. >> for what it is worth, in north korea after seeing him his device for five minutes his thumbs were twitching. i can this is a medical problem. >> specific to eric? >> maybe to everybody out there.

>> the good news is you all together have built this amazing interactive world. but there are terrible to people that become online addicted with terrible outcomes. so you have to learn the off button and know when to turn it off. and the deeper question is what is doing to the way we interact. the traditional people said i don't have friends any more, but you are interact with millions. >> more people come to know us digitally than will ever meet us in the physical world. >> especially with your daughter. because her entire record is on her e-mail. >> and she is 10,000 emails behind when she is two. >> jared decided it isn't okay

to post sonogram pictures before birth. >> there is no consent. >> are you going to hold up pictures of your baby saying can i post this picture of you? >> good luck. parenting is quite different than when you think. there is nothing better than talking to someone who doesn't have kids. >> eric's first response was resist the urge to think you are the first person on earth to ever think you had a child. i forget where i am going with is. but we will be better known online means the implications of what we do online are better

consequences of determining our identify and we have less control so it is challenging. >> you start off with a baby and you have control over your identity, and as you age the percentage of control decreases, by the time your daughter is 20100 thing about percentage of her and what she did and all of the things that happened compared to who she is. >> it isn't just what we say and post, it is what others post and say about us. so we are one unit in an group of people who are shaping who we are. >> it brings up something else we are all working on and that is what is the company's responsibility for privacy and the increasing american element of the internet?

we are in a system where countries have voice for data localization for what has been a good global system and that ties to the identity of their citizens and the ideas you have in the book about virtual statehood. how do you think about how all of these connect? >> in the paper book coming out tomorrow -- >> that is right. here it is. >> $12 on amazon. >> easily multiple times that in learning. and easy to carry around. >> you heard it here first. there is even a robotic hand. >> that is the cover that was

done by jeff coons. >> it is amazing. all of the hands, one is virtual or i guess robotic. >> he is an artist. the stone revelation did a number on our relations with a bunch of countries. think about germany for example. and sheryl and i have been spending lots of time dealing with the consequences and the perceptions of american nsa activity and this is a good example of what is going to happen in the future. countries are not going to stop spying on each other. and no one knows how to solve th these. in germany, they said they would be okay with location and it is bad idea for citizens and would break the internet.

i don't think we have figured out all of the consequences on a government sense. on the privacy sense, you have to say we will keep your information private, you have a responsibility for how much you want to disclose and where you want to disclose it. you cannot assume it is the old model. >> i didn't plant this question. but i want to thank whoever wrote it. there is a lot in the press about the lack of women in computer science and in the 1980's women were getting 35-37% of the degrees and now we are down to 13%. if you believe this is important, if you believe the wage gap matters, if you understand technology jobs are so important to future employment you have to worry about quality and the wage gap

increasing and a lot to worry about with women not being in computer science. google is the forerunner of this. even when i joined them they were focused on this. it is very hard to get women at 13%. how do you think about how we should encourage more women all over the world? >> i can understand the lack of women in the society as an escalator problem. there is an escalator that people follow and there is evidence that women are getting off at some point for various reasons and we need to address them. this is a crisis for america. there are other fields where they have figured this out.

classic example is biology. we are not coming out with a better set of ideas on empowerment, training and making it cool. there is a problem in the teenage years and you write about this in your book, and we have to come up with an agreement on how we will guide this. >> i sent my son to computer camp, it is great program, in silicone valley. so you don't know this, but eric does, but at seven you are deciding what your kid does for the summer. this camp, 35 kids, five girls. of the five girls, i put three in myself because it was my niece and her two friends. so anyone who thinks this is about to get better needs to

look at. ivy tech comp is doing programs only for girl this summer to try to encourage. but it is stereotypeing problem and i think the impact on the future can't be underestimated. how are you thinking about this for your daughter? >> my view on this again, not being an expert on it, is start early. you hear about goldie locks and they are working to figure out ways to create opportunities for young girls to get inspire and exciting about stuff like engineering camp. there is not enough examples. you cannot wait until your child gets to college and is deciding a major. if you don't start earlier, you lose the early investment that shapes they want to do. >> as the engine room is getting

better and you accept the stereotype of more men in the engine room, the opportunity is at a platform level and it is possible we will solve the problem by move up the stack. there were no women in computing at all when i started but nothing was visual and it was very nerdy and no interaction. now we have groups of women working on projects at google. i think that is where the growth is. i am worried about the 13%. but in america we are producing analytically skilled women in other fields so maybe we can attract them.

>> so, looking towards the future, one of google's ideas goal is to end censorship and you said by 2044 we will end it. why take up this goal and what are you doing to achieve it? that is a big and bold aspiration. >> a lot of the travel we did was to countries that were ought auto au autocratic and they are still coming online. it sounds like an obviously thing, but if it is, where are

the prescriptions with it? right now, there is a lot of people who are doing interesting proxy work, but there are two problems with the efforts. they don't scale because the government shuts it down quickly if you are successful and the second is trust because you don't know the origin of a proxy or tool. so we want to leverage inside and outside to address content being taken offline and the second is the filtering challenge of the regime filtering things. >> it is fair to say the life of

au autocratic dictators is going to be getting worse because of the empower. >> it was a good gig while you had it. >> it goes back to what is new. we always had crazy leader. but the empow empowerment of an individual is a new power. they cannot shut the internet down so they have to work with the citizens. china has banned us in one form or another and they are likely to do so. there are new services in china, wee chat is a link chain where you do messages to a private set of group but it can be large.

it is heavily censored. so what happens when you have a clever idea and everybody thinks it and you send to all your friend and 10 million people think it is great idea and there is not enough prisons to hold them back. so you have to fear the results of empowering the people with knowledge they are doing bad things. >> one last question. what are you most optimistic and most pest -- pessimistic about -- >> we would like to think technology is a silver bullet and answer to all of the problems but there is mass killing and huge portions of the

population living in poverty. it betters people's lives but doesn't solve those problems. the thing i am most optimistic about is the fact we are going to experience the most individually empowered global citizenry the world has every known. in china you will have a billion people coming online in one decade, in one country. imagine having access to the world's information and making changes. a citizen is going to be more

empowered with options has to be a benefit. >> eric? >> when we started the book we didn't know how we would few the future for the developing and developed world and now we are optimistic about the benefits of for the society especially in the developing world. i am worried about two areas. the first, and i will pitch them as races. in a situation where the technology can be used to hurt people, it can allow for sail and damage. i worry about that. i worry that is a race and we don't fully under some of the platforms and implications of things we might be doing that

might empower evil people. we have to thing about that. and the second is the jobs question. and that is the race between hum humans and computers. i am on the humans side here. they have to win. >> that is right. the ratio is very good. >> the things that are uniquely human like judgment and creativity have to shine while the infrastructures are getting build and the human systems have to be updated. i worry it isn't happening fast enough. in the first case i worry we don't understand who we are empowering and the second one we understand the problems, but the human systems, we are arguing the last decade's problems instead of the current future

problems. >> please everyone thank me in thanking these brilliant writers. [ applause ] >> sheryl, thank you so much. eric, jared, thank you so much. >> this has been the best venue over our various format. it is great institution. support it. come to it. its legacy will last longer than us. >> eric, thank you so much. you are such a good friend. thank you so much. that was wonderful. >> eric and jared have been interviewed and will continue to be in many settings but we had a

great moderator and i hope you enjoyed that. as sheryl mentioned, the book is on sale on paperbook tomorrow. there is a new afterward and a different take. some see bob tomorrow and stay in touch for future programs. thanks, everybody, and have a great day. [ applause ] >> booktv is on facebook. like us to interact with booktv guest and viewers, watch videos and get up to date information on events. facebook/booktv. >> i think what happens to hoover as the depression de

deepens, and people didn't know it was the great depression, they thought it was a typical, cycle, but he found himself increasing for help and hold the line against that and became a fiscal conservative balance the budget save the gold standard republican in the last year of his life. and that perceived people being ridged as part of the reason he was attacked for not doing anything. he was quite active in his time, but on the other hand, he was struggling against a total statist turn that he saw coming. >> editor george mash on the missing link in "herbert

hoover's memoirs" and we will take your comments, calls and tweets on the middle east and wars in afghanistan. in-depth on c-span2 booktv. and a discussion on a new book of stokely carmichael. go to booktv.org to enter the chatroom. here is a look at books being published this week: "the story of the jews: finding the word 100 bc to 1492 ad" three american citizens recount their experience of being encaptured and imprisoned while hiking.

the arab spring has created more civil unrest it is argued in "the lost spring". and in "not cold" thoughts are presented on the government to the media. look for the titles this coming week. ...

c-span: henry louis gates jr., author of "colored people." why the title? >> guest: well, we were colored in the 1950s, and this is a book that attempts to recount what it was like of african descent in the united states between 1950 and roughly 1970. and partly it's a book about names and naming, and not only the names that the race has given itself -- colored people to negro to black, ultimately to african-american -- but also one's own names. as you know, i talk about the names that were given to me at