this is article ii. this is where we start and this is something that is largely been unregulated, right. what is changed the nature of communications have changed, so many communications were essentially gathered unsupervised for foreign intelligence purposes are being sort of routed in a different way so that it falls within technically speaking what we might consider a different sort of format which then looks like more like a classic fourth amendment case. but i think that the larger point i'm trying to emphasize here, there are real fourth amendment issues here with respect to law enforcement but this is also about foreign tell expense gathering. it is not just a total sham. it is not as if the government is claiming here that this whole thing is a scheme in order just to get, gather information for criminal prosecution. essentially they're are both interests part of this analysis. that legal analysis with respect to foreign intelligence gathering needs to be considered and, it should frame our

analysis what is going on here as well. >> thank you. so good way, what you said, professor ku. i want to understand you, professor donohue, what you said, i may not being took the best notes. walk me through the argument. a minute ago you said you were making distinction between collection of for little intelligence purposes and collection focused for the purpose of prosecution. so are you, is it your view that 702 collection is for the purpose of prosecution? >> it is one of the two stated purposes for which the information can be retained once it is collected. so it -- >> that is different. what i'm asking about, you said for the collected for the purpose of prosecution i thought? what is, i guess what i'm trying to get at, this distinction between foreign intelligence purpose and criminal purpose relevant at the collection stage

only or all stages or what, help me understand what you're -- >> so in the previous panel brad addressed this point. he mentioned in the context of it's a moment which the information is obtained that a search occurs, right? if we do our fourth amendment analysis that point the moment which you're obtaining the wiretap evidence is the search at which point you would require a warrant under -- i believe professor ku's point is no, you don't need a warrant for intelligence purposes at the moment you require the information with the international nexus to it and he cited where there was no next sus to the united states where the search occurred overseas. the problem with this case, this gets pack to my first point, i apologize if i spoke too quickly at the beginning of the panel, with regard to the targeting it is is not just information to or from the target or held by the target but any information about or relating to the target, and here, it is interesting, i was a little bit confused by the earlier panel because according to the actual documents, the nsa has released, the nsa can

actually use computer selection terms and other information such as words or phrases or discriminatetors to scan content. if it can collect all the international communications and scan the content of those communications i would argue that is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment at the point of collection. >> but let me get to the distinction between foreign intelligence and criminal purpose because 702 requires not only that the collection be non-u.s. person abroad but a foreign intelligence purpose. that the information you reasonably believe to collect foreign intelligence. i'm not quoting the statute. but, doesn't that statutory requirement suggest that it has to be foreign intelligence purpose? it might also then collect evidence of a crime then there are procedures for what to do with that information. seems like you're suggesting that you think the collection itself is for criminal purpose? that is what sort of piqued my

interest and i wanted to understand what you were saying there. >> sure. so to push down on this a little bit, under fisa to be a foreign power, non-u.s. person, a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, not all of the agents of foreign power require criminal showings but many of them to do. to say this is purely foreign intelligence purpose when an individual can be targeted based on either being a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power in which case there is criminal activity involved there may be element of criminality from the aspect. >> professor ku, looks likes you were -- >> i was going to speak to the foreign intelligence exception more generally if you want to pursue this. >> go ahead. >> well, so i just want to caution the board about starting from the premise that there is in fact a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement. the cases in which courts have held that there is such an

exception, predate fisa. there is arguably one exception to that but the vast majority of them predate fisa. and so, and their rationale has been undermined by practice unfisa over the last 35 years. the rationale for those cases in large part that the courts might not be capable of overseeing foreign, collection for, surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes but the courts have been doing precisely that now since 1978. even if you accept there is in fact a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement you have to ask the question how broad that exception is. all of those case, those pre-fisa cases involve situations where there was probable cause to believe that the target was a foreign agent. the, the surveillance was approved personally by the president or the attorney general. and the primary purpose of surveillance was to gather

foreign intelligence information. section 702 doesn't include any of those requirements. so no court has ever approved a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement that is broad enough to reach section 70. section 702 is a broader statute than any foreign intelligence exception recognized so far would allow. >> i think that it may also be important to emphasize that concluding that the warrant requirement applies doesn't mean that the government has to get a before surveilling legitimate foreign targets. it doesn't mean that in order to surveil you know, some suspected terrorist outside of the united states the government necessarily needs to get a warrant but at the very least it means that the government needs to take reasonable measures to avoid acquiring americans communications without warrants.

it means, it has to not acquire them in the first place where it can not acquire them. when it does acquire them it has to destroy the communications that it acquires relating to u.s. persons and when in narrow exceptions it retains those communications there should aback end warrant requirement so the government doesn't access americans communications without a warrant. that is what compliance with the warrant clause would mean. >> miss cook. thank you all for coming. i find these panels to be incredibly helpful and informative. miss donohue, professor donohue, i apologize i would like to follow up on something you mentioned at the end of your opening remark, your position that 702 raises firstment concerns. i think -- first amendment concerns. i think it is clear from my previous separate statement on our 215 report i don't necessarily approach the first amendment analysis the same way

but what i would find helpful from you, if you could just describe your approach to when the first amendment would be implicated, when concerns arise and when something would be unconstitutional based on first amendment concerns. and so, to, would a traditional wiretap raise first amendment concerns and would it potentially be unconstitutional under first amendment concerns? would a traditional grand jury subpoena for bank records or credit card statements that could reveal payments to lawyers or payments to various charities or associations, would that raise first amendment concerns? would it be unconstitutional under the first amendment? so if you could just walk me through on the spectrum, where you're finding concerns and where you're finding violations. >> sure. and just to return back to miss brand's point i agree with

jamil, on analysis what it would kick in for warrant requirement. the point either about the information. i feel i didn't quite answer what you were asking me. i want to make sure that do answer it. the point which you're getting information about that individual and which is different target and analyze that information then at that point i would believe the fourth amendment warrant requirement would apply. okay, so in response to the first amendment question, so, the courts have recognized there is a close link between the first and the fourth amendment. i frequently find whether in remote biometric identification systems and in view of public space and facial identification there is a first amendment context there as well. it tend to be in the shadows in the room. in this particular context the way that i see it presented, is with regard to the target, that is, in the statute it is very, the target can not be selected -- >> could you answer the question i had posed which for example,

was starting with a traditional -- >> that's why i do not see traditional wiretap implicating first amendment. >> why? even though it could, for example, reveal the fact that i belong to the aclu or i called my attorney or i'm discussing, you know, private contents and communications. so, why not? >> because there is a balancing that occurs with regard to the element in this case, of probable cause, that you have committed or are committing or about to commit a crime under title ii. which in case having gone before a neutral disinterested magistrate, a law enforcement officer says, oh, no, i sus spoke professor donohue is engaged in this bad activity and i think that balancing test basically take that is situation out of a first amendment context. >> let's take a grand jury and pen register trap, trace, there is definitely no determination, no probable cause. so does that traditional pen register trap trace which would

reveal potential phone calls to the acu. lu, my lawyer, existence of potentially private conversations does that violate the first amendment. >> again with prior judicial approval and review, no. >> take a grand jury subpoena which can be issued by a prosecutor? >> yes. >> so in the absence of beforehand judicial review does that violate the first amendment? >> no. i would say, same for administrative warrants. i would say in the case of administrative warrants. here is where the tippingpoint is for me with prtt, let's take a section 215 as kind of a bulk metadata collection program or a section with 40, right for these bulge collections of pen register trap and trace type information. when you have the bulk collection of information in a way that changes the political discourse in society then i think you have a first amendment question that arises. >> okay, so if there is a perception that there is a

change in change in political discourse you have concern about first amendment? not necessarily prior judicial review, probable cause? i'm just struggling to understand, at what point there is first amendment implication and at what point there is first amendment violation? because to me i think it is a bit of a sea change to look at either traditional or really these fisa authorities as violating the first amendment. i do think that is fairly novel approach. >> should be fair, that the distinction between individualized surveillance and bulge surveillance is also a bit of a sea change. so i think the question is, whether the bulge surveillance, the bulge surveillance. be the bulk surveilance. the fact that the government is engaged in bulk collection or bulk acquisition of this information makes the first amendment relevant in a way it ebb wasn't relevant in the context of individualized

surveillance in the kinds you were describing. i think your question perhaps goes more broadly to the question of incidental overhears. when the government defends section 70, one of the government's defenses is that all of this information is about americans is overheard incidentally. i go into this in a little more detail in my written submission but i don't think it is fair to call this kind of collection incidental in any conventional use of the term. the collection of americans information is entirely foreseeable and in fact it was the purpose of the statute. if you look at the statements that administration, then bush administration officials made, to justify this act or to advocate for the statute, they were quite forthright about the purpose of the statute and the purpose in their view was to give the government broader authority to collect information, collect communications, between people outside of the united states and people inside of the united states. obviously there is no

illegitimacy to the government's interest in collecting those communications. the question is whether there are sufficient safeguards in place but that's why i say incidental is probably the wrong word. but if the government is relying on the incidental overhear cases from the fourth amendment context, those cases involved very different contexts. those were cases in which the surveillance was individualized. it was based on a probable cause warrant. the scale of the surveillance of the incidental collection was much different and the fact that there was judicial oversight at the front end provided a kind of protection for incidentally overheard people that doesn't exist under a statute like 702. >> let's, give him a chance to request questions. then we can come around. >> okay. >> thanks to the witnesses. question for jameel and for rachel. on the about.

according to the statute what is the strongest context al argument about surveillance? the statute says targeting persons never even refers to the collection of communications or interessential or et cetera. so if you, if you're collecting something about somebody, isn't that almost para diametrically targeting the person? where is the text? what is the text -- >> ambiguity in the statute in part and this is one of the things i mentioned in the written submission that target isn't defined. i have to say some of the answers in the first panel which answers some question about targets and selectors opens up new questions. i do think the strongest

statutory argument literally looking at the language is what the statute talks about. so it says here, literally looking at 1881-a subpart a, attorney general director of national intelligence may authorize jointly the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be outside the united states to acquire foreign intelligence information. as i say you sort of see implicitly but i do think you see implicitly these two sort of the halves of the targeting requirement. foreign intelligence requirement and this nationality and geographic restriction and that when you're doing is collecting about communications, what you're doing is kind of adding together, you're kind of completings, your morphing together these different parts of the statute so the targeting has usually been literally thinking about the facility that -- >> the government, excuse me, the government has determined that a person that is

outside the united states and collecting information about that person will yield for return intelligence. >> well but the, i think that may be what is suggested by the about collection but i think the foreign intelligence determination is a separate one. the government identifies these targets or selectors which generally have been generally to or from. we know especially from judge bait', thousands, tens of thousands of collections are using about targeting, the about collection that are wholly domestic that have no foreign intelligence value which i think undermines an argument there has been some determination of foreign intelligence value there because some extent -- >> wait. then you would be, then you would be questioning the legitimacy of the to and from. because they only do, about

people that they also do to and from. you can't say that the foreign intelligence determination of the abouts is illegitimate because you call into question the to and from. >> i think the to and from is pretty clearly contemplated by the statute. you target persons. you are trying to find communications to or from them. >> that's not what it says. let me go to jameel. jameel, what is the best textual arguement against abouts? >> let me first agree with what i think rachel is saying at the outset which is that the statute, i don't think explicitly forecloses about surveillance or explicitly authorizes surveillance but i think a fair assessment of the statutory structure and some of the statutory text leads to the conclusion that about surveillance was not contemplated by congress. and i will answer your question. >> yeah. >> here are a few aspects of the statute that i think show that

congress was contemplating that the target would himself or herself be the person who's communications were acquired. first the definition of electronic surveillance, it says, the acquisition of the contents of -- >> this is not electronic surveillance. 702 explicitly does not cover electronic surveillance. >> well, i think the point i'm making is relevant nonetheless. >> electronic surveillance definition is irrelevant to 702. it is not, 702 does not regulate electronic surveillance. >> i think the point that i'm trying to make is just that the entire statutory scheme, both fisa and the faa contemplate that the person who is the target will be the person whose communications are actually acquired. if you look at the definition of aggrieved person, for example, which does apply in the faa context, aggrieved person to implicitly contemplates that the

person who will be raising the claim is an aggrieved person is a person whose communications are actually acquired. in fact if you conclude otherwise, what you're concluding is that the target would be an aggrieved person, even if his or her communications weren't acquired which i think is a nonsensical conclusion. and one that the government itself would reject. but i think it follows from accepting that about surveillance is contemplated by the statute. if i could make just sort after broader point about surveillance, we have sort of combed through the legislative history for discussions of this kind of surveillance and as possibly overlooked something, but we have not found any exchange in the legislative history around the faa, that suggests that congress was contemplating about surveillance. to the contrary, when people, when lidgetores discuss the kind of surveillance that would take place under the statute, they discuss surveillance of the target. and even on the government panel this morning, one of the

panelists used example, bad guy at google.com. which again, is suggesting that the surveillance that is going on is of the target who, of the target himself or herself. and in defending the statute before the supreme court the solicitor general and the justice department more generally characterized the statute as one that allowed the government to collect targets communications. so i think this is an entirely, an entirely foreign concept, foreign to the lynntive history and foreign to the text of the statute. >> thank you. >> judge wald. >> let me pick up on the about thing and pose one of those terrible hypotheticals. if you had a targeted, a legitimately targeted person, and in the process of collecting information you got, you came

across this email between, i will be facetious a bit, the grandmother of one of them to the grandmother of somebody else saying something along lines of, my grandson was talking to me and he was telling me all about this wonderful service he did by plotting to, i'm using extreme, plotting to blow up a facility kind of thing. i mean how do you, how would you take care of that situation where you had it between two people who were not the to and from? you wouldn't ignore it or would you? how would you handle that, if you had no abouts? >> i'm not sure -- >> who was that directed to? >> what? >> who are you asking? >> the two people who talked about abouts, mr. jaffer and miss levinson-waldman i think.

>> i'm not 100% sure i understand the question. the question is, you know, if you are conducting about surveillance and you come across evidence of a terrorist plot, do you really expect them to ignore it, then no, i don't. but that is like asking, you know, if the government breaks into a home unconstitutionally and finds evidence of a terrorist plot do i expect them to ignore it, i don't. but we still need to ask the question, what are the proper limits on the government's surveillance authority in the first place? and i think we need to draw those lips in a way that is consistent with the constitution. i'm not sure that i'm answering your question. >> you are except i'm puzzled too. i'm not sure i know the answer, where as i say, you had, maybe that is an extreme example where they have a plot but where there is actually some foreign intelligence information which even everybody would agree had some relevance to a

legitimately-targeted individual and it's, it's right there and it's picked up in -- >> but i think i would echo jameel's point to some extent sort of elaborate to say i do think there are always hypotheticals, presumably for any of these programs, for section 702 for section 215, for other collection programs that are going on where there could be some piece of information out there that might be useful but would be protected, that would be collected by a program. i think it is dangerous to build surveillance programs, to think about the constitutionality and practicality based on hypotheticals and especially when we know that there is significant overcollection that occurs and significant collection of americans communications. i think the hypotheticals are, may need to be thought about but i don't think they can drive how we think about the constitutionality and the statutory implications of the

collection. >> in other words you are, anybody over there, wouldn't, wouldn't consider if that happened, some other means that the government might have to take that about information and go, go to somebody, some authority and say, is this -- >> we keep this, can we use this, et cetera, et cetera. >> so what i'm a little bit confused about, and i did hear the previous panel say, oh, well there would be all previous implications if we had to return to a judge on the foreign intelligence surveillance court to get approval to do further monitoring. what i'm confused about if that information was appropriately obtained in the first place and indicates other people are implicated why they wouldn't go back for title itron i can search and they have what they need for that. >> if it is two grandmothers an they're probably opinion innocent. all i'm saying the only reason i

raise it, i'm trying myself to figure out are there not gray areas here an wondering if you had any solutions authority of about authority which you find is too broad and completely ignoring it. let me not use up my whole five minutes. i did want to ask you about, as you know the president's review commission said they wanted to see a warrant, an actual, go get a warrant for probable cause before you could search the data using a u.s. person indicator. my question to you, is, and, we have heard some reasons why they think that would be very onerous, including the fact that the president's review commission indication was that there had to be a probable cause that the person was about to commit something, do bodily injury or commit some terrorism

crime. my answer, my question to you is, if you think there are legitimate and you do, problems under the fourth amendment, refusing u.s. person indicators to survey the prison data, would anything short of a probable cause warrant, such as they recommended satisfy you, i.e.? i'm just throwing this out. you know, having, going back to the, say to, the fisa court and you know, having them look at it to see if, either post or pre, before they used it, approving the so-called, you know, select tore, et cetera, et cetera, in fact a reasonable cause to be that the person had information or didn't have information? >> i mean i don't think that would be sufficient. i think that you need a warrant at the back end and -- >> well what kind of a warrant?

>> warrant to issue probable cause. >> probable cause of what. >> well so, i think it could be foreign intelligence probable cause although i hope that the panel will, that the board will think about the scope of the definition, the definitions of foreign agent, foreign power and foreign intelligence information. but i think foreign intelligence probable cause could be sufficient for that particular process. or, obviously criminal probable cause. but, i also, just want to say that don't think back end procedures alone, are enough. no matter how strong they are. and i think that, you know, i know that the board can't talk about "the washington post" report from yesterday but if you just take it as kind of a hypothetical, you know, if you accept the back end procedures are enough, and that we'll focus solely on protections on searching and dissemination and analysis of information in the government's hand, there is nothing to prevent the government from recording every phone call, copying every email,

creating a permanent record of everybody's movements, associations and communications and the only question we'll be asking, when can the government access it? but the creation of that kind of massive database will have huge implications for the way that ordinary people operate in society. both the way they interact with one another and the way they interact with their government. people who believe that the government is surveilling every movement and every communication believe justifiably that it is doing it will act differently. they won't go to controversial websites and they won't engage in controversial communications that are necessary for any, any democracy. >> i know my time is up. i will wait for the next round. i have another question. >> i want to go back to the back end searching u.s. persons searches raise two questions. one the government panel asserts this lawfully obtained information and therefore should be per missably used without any further fourth amendment implications and why that is not a persuasive argument.

and then two, if it is not persuasive what is the procedure you envision? i think it is different from professor donohue, where using that u.s. person information to get more information. use the information we already collected under authority for, say criminal purposes or foreign intelligence purposes. i guess two parts. why isn't it already legally usable and if it is not, what procedure would you apply to access it? to any panelist. . .

to see this information was collected and now we can do searches. >> because it isn't certain that person whom you are collecting information is a non-us persons of the burden of proof is to establish this individual is a non-us person, so the assumption that all of the collection that is going on is of bond u.s. persons i think is an iranian swan and the reason i think it is air out of yes is that the nsa is under no obligation to check and see and make sure that individual is not a u.s. person. to the contrary, in their documents they say they may take these databases. there is no obligation that they do so. mr. de reverted to the test that

say they have two strikes against and they look at everything. there is nothing that obliges them to then go back and dig up more information to find out in that circumstance and not only that but actually if you look at the requirements for what is required to positively identify to conclusively determine it in the minimization procedure the bar is actually significantly higher. you know their name, their title, their address some of the personally identifiable information in the context of activity related to that particular person. if reference to a brand name and manufacturer name, that's not sufficient. not only are they had under no obligation to to establish it it is a very high bar. it isn't clear to me that information is lawfully collected in the first place. >> place. >> i want to add to that if i understand the question why is it not okay to do informatio sen information unlawfully

collected, also bootstrapping, it is collected for a purpose for a foreign intelligence purpose and that you are right of course congress knew the u.s. personal information was going to be collected within there are minimization procedures. as a kind of almost bypassing the procedures and allowing that body of information to be collected without needing a high bar of probable cause warrant seems like going back and bootstrapping your way into that information in a way that is different from the searches i think any other or almost any other body of the lawfully collected information because the standard for which it is obtained in the foreign intelligence standard and purpose is different. >> there are two kinds of bootstrapping. the first one is pointing to the fact that foreigners outside of the united states lack fourth amendment rights to collect huge volumes of information. and then the other is pointing

to the foreign intelligence purpose to gather information later used in criminal prosecutions of that is to save the problem, it isn't a solution of the problem and that's where the concern comes from. >> i am not sure that strapping is the purpose. it's not that they are not also collecting it for foreign intelligence purposes but it's also true if in the old days they came across an american person to a foreign person it seems unlikely to me that an american sense of the letter that he can't -- they lawfully obtained the letter it isn't clear to me why they couldn't use that letter. possibly it's bootstrapping, that there is a long history of going after foreigners and i'm not sure -- the only difference is technology does make it easier to flip back. but i'm not sure that fundamentally this is really different. >> thank you. it seems like there are some

fundamentally opposing world views about the fourth amendment on the panel, and i want to -- this board isn't going to move the fourth amendment law. i want to get to what you think the wall it is and what you think it should be. there might be some completion of those two things going on. first professor ku, thank you for submitting your comments. we haven't had a chance to read them so i want to ask to make sure i understand where you're coming from. when you talk about in here and executive authority to conduct surveillance of broad, or even if non-us persons abroad, in your view does that in here and executive power operate alongside the fourth amendment or irrespective of the fourth amendment or does that create an exception to the fourth amendment? cynic i don't think it creates an exception. it operates within the constraints whatever they might be. but i would like to point out that historically -- just to clarify, the reason i raise this

goes to the point that historically the government operates without statutory authority to conduct foreign surveillance. the power was granted and it was coming from the constitution. it is a statutory scheme hasn't been thought of as necessary to authorize the type of intelligence gathering that's going on. now the fourth amendment does apply but as i also emphasize, it hasn't always applied. if you didn't originally thought of to apply at all, but even to the u.s. citizens i think that we understand that the courts have come around and said that it does apply to u.s. citizens overseas, but i think it still has a limited impact compared to the way for the purely domestic searches. so that's how i would analyze that. >> and how does it apply to the purely domestic searches whether it is a purpose of the foreign intelligence gathering click >> i think that here it does --

the fourth amendment has been interpreted in different cases to be a much more robust perfection for searches domestically. and even in some of the cases and the exceptions and the requirement for the foreign intelligence purpose it still continues to exist within the domestic sphere. a lot of this has been supplanted by the system. the rise of the system has in some degree ma made the fourth amendment analysis little bit less onerous because what is happening is that everything has funneled to the system and the challenge to the system hasn't been. i think that maybe if we had more cases that would clarify exactly what the fourth amendment limits on the domestic foreign intelligence. i do think that is applied the most strongly to the domestic searches. there's there is a reasonable ot needs to be respected if it i view it is sort of on top of that to add the additional

privacy protection that i think the congress has charged and probably rightly so i'm not sure that a loan it would necessarily require all of the procedural limitations and protections that we have. >> very briefly because i have a question for you do you think that there is to the amendment is that what i heard you say earlier? >> i don't think there is any exception. >> and there is -- what i'm trying to get at is the collection for the purpose of the foreign intelligence gathering as it applies to the collection to purpose the bank robbery for example. >> there are certainly narrows circumstances in which the courts have held that there is a foreign intelligence exception. you have to evaluate whether the cases survived for 35 years of experience. >> and then you referred earlier

to -- while you were referring to it as a large-scale collection. i'm not sure if it was upstream and the assessment but if you take the government's fact as they stated them to be true, what about that program strikes even large-scale for that description? >> two responses to that, i think it's important to draw a distinction between the statutory restrictions and executive free strength. so there is a question of what the statute allows and then there's the question of how the government is implementing it. i know much less how the government is implementing it and the statute on its face allows. but then as to whether it is large-scale collection or not, the problem is that everybody is using these in different ways. the panelist this morning says

they were not drawing a distinction between the surveillance and collection. but their own documents all distinctions which is the defense department implementation of the executive order on intelligence collection. it draws a distinction between electronic surveillance and acquisition on the one hand and collection on the other hand collection involving the tasking of the communications as the surveillance do not. and so we have always thought of this putting the vocabulary to decide for a second. we have always thought of this in two stages. the first, just there is a kind of you might call it scanning or collection. there is a kind of large-scale acquisition of data and then there's the government asking the data with selectors. so to try to be a little more concrete if the government

installs on a switch somewhere and installs and diverse of the information in a large part of the communication or scans a large part of the communications, we would call that will collection. i'm not sure that anything turns on the vocabulary that we should make sure that we are talking with the same content. >> right at the top of the list. i think that we have used in this conversation alone we have use tused the scan, inspect, ree here, collect, access. and so i guess my question is if you have access to -- in your hypothetical, you have installed something that gives you access to this stream of communications. is that a search for the purpose of the fourth amendment analysis in your view? >> i think it would depend on what you were accessing. the question would be have you invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy, but we have taken the position that for example, the bold accessing of telephone

metadata is an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and we certainly take the same position with respect to the bold acquisition of telephone calls or e-mails. the program, again, as a hypothetical, that program in my view involves double collection of telephone calls and voice mail messages and telephone calls even if the government doesn't access more than a small portion. >> may i add something to that very quickly? i was a little bit confused on the earlier panel because of the one hand they were saying this is a limited program and on the other hand, they say that it is the most used and the slides that have been released say that it draws from microsoft, google, yahoo!, skype, aol and that it gets a voice over internet protocol chat and all this information and that it's hard to square -- and what they see as the value of the program in

its limited nature. >> i appreciate, but i had a specific question that i'm really trying to understand the panels view on when the fourth amendment is implicated and how. and so, if -- under your hypothetical if you have the acquisition of all phone calls from a country with subsequent access, at what point would the fourth amendment attached? >> certainly the moment you put it in the database and by that moment, the fourth amendment has attached. >> so flipping that if it is access to the wide swath of communication, like the acquisition into the government possession or control, when with the fourth amendment attached? >> i lost a >> i think that you used scan.

but some of the ability to review the communication and pole and filter -- >> the filtering would implicate the fourth amendment in my view. >> i wanted to follow-up on a differenfollow up on adifferentd just close the loop. if the determination was made that the acquisition of the information pursuant to 702 was lawful and acquired in the information would you still take the position that a subsequent search, and by that i mean using a u.s. person identifier would need some sort of probable cause determination that there would be a separate fourth amendment analysis and can you explain why? is it because of the view that there is a lack on the front end and therefore you have to have particular findings? >> that would be my position as well. >> one question for the professor if we could. we heard that 702 is silent on

the precise question about there are some structural arguments and purpose arguments that you can look to. in view of the evolution of our understanding of article number to, how would you as a constitutional matter process the silence in 702 because title vii is an authorization and restructuring on article two. >> i think that -- i don't know if i have any sort of grand insight on the purely textual analysis although i do think the background is what can help us here. if we understand where we are coming from it can help us analyze that. the u.s. government was engaged in the search is. you have to start thinking about what degree. this isn't about authorizing

committees about restricting imposing restrictions on what i think the u.s. government had the authority to do prior to the enactment of the statute so if you look from that perspective if it doesn't silence the lack of clarity and specificity and maintains the power i would die radio completely from the radiocommunication and a lot of people argue that was on the assumption from 1973 that would continue going on gathering as much radio signal intelligence as he could and no one uses radio anymore but the point is if you add the research into the statute it doesn't stay to the previous or the other authority to conduct the surveillance prior to the enactment.

the distinctions between collecting, acquiring, etc. my comment is if you have to take yes for yes and no for no and move on the government has said to my mind totally clearly they are not relying upon the use of 18 concepts implementing 702 we have to move on from that. this is for anybody, rachel. in terms of the data otherwise lawfully acquired what is the best case law that would limit

the proposition that the data could be subsequently inquiry without limitation? >> on your comment i think you are right that the government said on the panel they were not relying on the distinction between acquisition and collection but i think that the government also acknowledged that it was engaged in surveillance my understanding is there is no way to engage in the surveillance without inspecting in some sense any communication within the universe of those that you are monitoring were surveillance. you can call the double collection or something else.

if all that you are saying is we should just address the constitutional issues than i entirely agree. if i steal your computer i think and then i give it to the government, the government lawfully acquired it or certainly in the title iii context of the government acquires or in the normal searching seizure context or in the voluntary disclosure conte context. where is the case law limiting the proposition that the lawfully acquired information cannot subsequently be inquiry essentially without prior

authorization and without meeting any threshold? is there any case law limiting that? >> we are starting to see the cases come out where border security issues and i would be happy to send you the name of the cases afterwards where they have been seized under the custom walls but then they cannot be searched for all of the information on the privacy implications involved and the lack of activities of those cases might be one source that you would look to in the new age where such information is available. >> i think it's important to ask the question the other way around which is where is the case law showing that the constitution is in deference to the government collecting huge volumes of information without any individualized suspicion or particularly independent bootstrapping its way into the free reign.

>> we are in a situation -- i'm trying to pose the situation of let us assume that the collection was lawful. >> i'm not suggesting it was unlawful. i'm saying the collection here is different from the kind of collection the courts have been concerned with and others involving the use of information acquired. it was important to those cases. >> the information collected is lawfully acquired independent government can subsequently inquiry that license plate database. that is a standard procedure. >> i'm not sure that it is established with any certainty that the book collection type of the inquiry of the license plate reader information doesn't raise

fourth amendment concerns. >> looking through some cases, doctor donohue -- >> i would be happy to -- >> i would welcome any other cases limiting the proposition. >> judge wald? >> this is partly an unfair question that i will ask anyway. given the fact the agreement about 702 as it operates today have included a series of things. one, it has been raised and the lack of the review of particularized targeting i know it is a lot about statute, but nonethelesnonetheless to capture use of the information to search the database use and retention of the information. but my question is if you had to focus on one or two imported changes that you would like to see made now in 702, what would

they be? anybody that wants to answer. >> i would say an attendee information to or from the target and the mechanism of the judicial review is information uncovered that would lead to subsequent prosecution prior to the analysis of the database that is held. >> the only thing that i would add to that is that the structure of inadvertently acquired communications that the government itself acknowledges shouldn't have been acquired in the first place and should be destroyed immediately. >> they say that they are purging them, but you mean -- >> there are broad exceptions. >> do you have any? >> i able to clarify it defaults i've been arguing for that

doesn't encourage to clarify further about section 702. to help our interpretation of the statute. >> i've mentioned three things. one is i agree with the robust involvement. more robust involvement in terms of the review and there's some review that it is a box checking procedure and how that may be more active. >> so they do what they do now but more carefully? >> not even -- it's not so much they are not careful with it now but it limits the scope of some of the review. they don't get behind the curtain. >> including the targeting. >> if you think about section 702 but having been minimization procedures be a part of the statute, certainly limiting and potentially eliminating the use

of information for law enforcement purposes. and obviously this is something the nsa and the president's group spoke to and made that recommendation. and to list the standard back up to the power in the foreign intelligence requiring the foreign intelligence purpose is so loose. >> for targeting? >> for targeting, yes that's correct. >> i have one minute left so a quick question. some of you, and a prior when we were talking about 215, talked about the desirability and necessity of having an adversarial element in the proceedings. a very quick notion of how whatd you see an adversary however appointed in a 702 proceeding? in other words, what function could he or she served in the

702? 715 was a little bit more evidence, a technological case coming up to the court. what would you say -- what they have any function on the 702? .. our biggest concern is with judicial rulings that have far-reaching implications. nudges applications in the

individual case. when you talk about individual cases i do think in theory adversarial process would be a useful thing. on the other hand, i think the closer you get to an individualized warrant application or court order application, or surveillance application, the more it looks like traditional title iii or search warrant context which is ex parte. but when you get to judicial opinions that authorize about surveillance at some level of generality that is something that ought to be argued in opencourt with a closed hearing to follow if there is, if there are legitimate sources of methods to be protected. if i can abuse the process to add one answer to your previous question. i agree very strongly with what rachel said, that reforming or revising a standard, the targeted standard is crucial. right now there is, there's really no limit on who the

government can target overseas. the example that government panelists keep coming back to his bad guy of google.com or bad guy at yahoo.com. but it could easily be journalist and google.com. i think it's crucial that some limits be drawn around the category of people whom the government can't -- >> we only have a couple minutes left. >> can i ask one quick follow-up question? you had said lived a standard back to reform power or foreign power. what were you referring to when you said that? >> i guess back to envisioning, section 702, when he came into being it was a foreign intelligence requirements. but i guess thinking of fisa more broadly narrowing that foreign intelligence standard in

some way to match what is in other sections. one option would imagine what another section of the isa foreign power. i think that would be our preference but narrowing that in some way. that was an impressive way of referring to. and if i could add one of the briefing. i think our other, if we have a wish list, it would be, i'll say restore the thinking but other parts of fisa, having the collection be, these made one or the other but having the collection and the foreign intelligence be the primary purpose rather than a significant purpose. that has allowed potentially after amount in terms of the collection. >> any final questions? i want to thank the panelists very much for joining us today but it was a very enlightening discussion. we are not going to take a lunch break and we will resume with the third panel at 1:45. thank you.

[inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations] >> a lunch break in this daylong public meeting of the privacy and civil liberties oversight board.

live coverage when they reconvene. we have several more life events today on c-span networks. heritage foundation host a forum on the federal reserve wonder just after it was created. a former vice president of the federal reserve bank of atlanta, a number of academics and a heritage specials will be part of that discussion beginning at 1 p.m. eastern on c-span. at 2:30 p.m. the new fed chair janet yellen holds her first news conference at taking over from ben bernanke. she's expected to talk about the fed monetary policy and i will be like starting at 2:30 p.m. on c-span. coming up at 5 p.m. on c-span center for strategic and international studies holds a forum on russia. bob schieffer, former national study advisor to president carter, zbig brzezinski and brent scowcroft will all share their views about russian intervention in ukraine and crimea's vote to join russia. that's up five on c-span.

and some news on that as vice president joe biden warned russia views will respond to any aggression against nato allies. "the associated press" writing vice president biden told reporters today that there are quote growing costs that come with naked aggression but the vice president spoke a day after russian president putin signed a treaty to annex ukraine's crimea region. the united states and other nations are calling that a violation of international law. that is from the ap today. >> today's young adults, the so-called millennial generation for having a lot of trouble getting started in life because they have come of age in a very hostile economy. they are paying money into a system to support a level of benefits for today's retirees that they have no realistic chance of getting when they themselves retire. so there needs to be a rebalancing of the social compact. it's a very important challenge, very difficult challenge for this country politically because not only is social security and

medicare half of our budget, about to become have our budget, it is by far the biggest thing we do not it is symbolically appears a statement in public policy that as a country we are a community all in this together. these are programs that affect everybody, and the old math of these programs doesn't work spent paul taylor on the looming generational showdown saturday night at 10 eastern and sunday at nine on booktv is afterwards. and in a few weeks your chance to talk with military strategist and former assistant defense secretary in west. he will take your calls, comments, e-mails and tweets on the mideast, iraq and afghanistan live from noon to three eastern. booktv every weekend on c-span2. also this month joined online discussion of peniel joseph's new biography of stokely carmichael. look for the book club tab at booktv.org.

>> now a discussion with some "foreign policy" magazine's top global thinkers of 2013. climate scientist, a civil resistance expert and a graduate student who reacts with leading economic report and austerity. former u.s. ambassador to iraq christopher hill moderates this them from university of denver. >> so thank you all for coming. this is panel one of our session with global thinkers, and we're very pleased to have three of the "foreign policy" magazine's top 100 global thinkers here at this panel which deals with global challenges, climate change, austerity, and returned to our authoritarianism. so we're going to have some science, going to have some

economics. that would be the dismal science i guess. and then we are going to have some issues of politics and security questions with the return of authoritarianism. so what i'm going to do now is introduced our three panelists. i'm going to start with erica chenoweth was sitting in the middle. erica is the co-author of the award-winning book, why civil resistance works. the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. erica along with co-author maria found the campaigns of nonviolent resistance were more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts. i.e., condi works. more for their research showed successful nonviolence resistance ushers in more durable and italy peaceful democracies less likely to regress into war. our second panelist seated to the immediate left is thomas herndon.

thomas is a ph.d student at the university of the if you wish you were miami. we're going to three inches of snow tonight, just to make you feel at home here. the university of massachusetts at amherst, and the co-author of the influential essay does high public debt consistently stifle economic growth, a critique of reinhart and rogoff. in this essay earned an and co-authors point out errors that reinhart and rogoff widely cited economic study, thereby undermining the intellectual foundation for austerity program to slash budget and social standing around the world. so we look forward hearing from thomas on this. and, finally, we are very pleased, on the extreme left of the stage, not on the political spectrum is stephanie herring, stephanie is weather and climate extreme project lead at the

national oceanic and atmospheric administration, or noaa. she published a groundbreaking report that sought to explain the connection between human caused climate change and extreme weather events like hurricane sandy. we are very pleased to have you join us. site think we're going to start with erica. i have a set of questions, and i think you all have had a chance to look at these questions. i don't think there are any curveballs or knuckleballs in these questions. so let me start with the first one, erica. your research with maria show that nonviolence resistance has been more than twice as effective as violent resistance in overthrowing authoritarian governments. so explain with how can you explain that phenomenon. >> so the main finding is that nonviolent resistance is quite a lot more effective and for many

reasons for that is because the power of participation. people are went because of the people are involved. in fact, what we saw is that the average nonviolent campaign just in raw numbers is four times larger in terms of the number of active participants than the average violent campaign. and if you look at the number of participants as a proportion of the overall population, there are 11 times larger than the average camping. what happens when you have these large numbers is that they can ban generally as much more inclusive and representative of the society as a whole which means that the participants in the campaigns might know somebody in the police forces. they might know someone in the interim security forces. they might be friends or neighbors with economic elite. and those are the pillars of support on who's up against the authoritarian realize to maintain power. so the more people involved the more likely there is to be an opportunity to sort of leverage those intimate relationships with society. it's important to point out we

are not making the argument that nonviolent resistance is morally better. it's not taking the moral high ground. it's actually choosing a method of conflict that allows for more people to produce but who who ordinarily wouldn't purchase but in their violent campaign. so you get more women, children, people who are elderly, people with disabilities who are able to participate. that's what starts to build power from below and then draw power away from the authoritarian regime. >> so, erica, since you kind of like extreme weather, there seems to be in your field as well a lot of data points in recent couple of years. maybe since your research. i don't know whether your research, for example, captured the arab spring. so if you can tell me, are there any adjustments to your approach given the cataclysmic events around the world, especially in

the middle east of recent years of? >> well, we have sort of updated the data. it ended in 2006 in i started updating the data and, obviously, with help of research assistants, and the most amazing thing that we found is that through 2013 the success rate of nonviolent campaigns back from 1946 through 2013 is 51%. and the violent campaigns is 26 which is almost the exact same proportion that we found in a book. one important qualification to that is that we are talking only about campaigns that have already developed a significant following. we're on the campaigns with at least 1000 of their participants. they are not the small demonstration in the street that just goes away and doesn't come anything. they have matured to a certain point. when we look at both violent and nonviolent campaigns side by side the nonviolent ones still

are as less effective. one recent blip on the radar is that since 2010, the success rates of both nonviolent and violent campaigns have gone down. violent campaigns success is, way less than 2%. almost never happen. where's nonviolent campaigns success is gone down about 18%. for me this is why i was interested in talking about the return of authoritarianism, or what you might call authoritarian upgrading. in my sense what's happened is that this kind of sweep of nonviolent challenges as they the way the authoritarian leaders are oppressed up its marketing said going after and during the to connect coercion which was always yanukovych doesn't pay. instead of doing things like first of all, the narrative is this is a western conspiracy. they try to mobilize nationalist sentiment using those types of narratives. decide what is that political

dissidents are terrorists whether using violence or not. they are often we don't establish if they are threatening our political system. they might pos post pictures bue third thing the candidate is trying to divide the opposition by splitting secretary intentions or fears of sectarian tensions. they counter mobilize their own groups of people that they see as supporters even if they have to pay them. to go bring their own people out into the streets and they will do the streetfighting. the fifth thing is with modern technology it's much easier to engage in surveillance, and that's to undermine any the technological advantages that social media game for activists. >> you are saying your theory even works on the oppressors aside of the divide, that even the authoritarians are doing better with nonviolent methods of? >> i think the most authoritarians will use these types of methods to try to divide and rule the opposition.

but once they get them plenty divided, there's plenty of violence they use against them. but at that point the legitimacy of the opposition has been undermined to the extent it doesn't produce the same level of backfire that it might if the opposition was speeded so you would agree with the overall proposition that authoritarianism is somewhat on the rise due to these compatibly, more sophisticated methods of? >> i don't think it's on the rise in terms of raw numbers. we still have way more democracy and authoritarian regimes. there are too many new authoritarian regimes coming around that haven't been before but what's happening is authoritarian regimes are now more durable than they been in a long time. that is to say, that have protected those in some of these more recent currents but i don't think this is a permanent trend. i think what happens is anytime we get some kind of new knowledge like this in the other side gets a chance to gain it, as my friend was saying last night. so i think basically we have a situation where there is always

going to be a strategic interaction, but historical records reveal to us that when people rely on nonviolent methods that allow for large degrees of popular conclusion, that undermine the narratives that they are terrorist, that are locally legitimate in a way that undermines the rhetoric that they are foreign promoted, they, increases the chance to any method the government uses to try to repress them will backfire. >> you are not pessimistic about democracy? >> no. i think i'm a little bit pessimistic about the ways that we develop you can authoritarianism, and i think that authoritarians have done a good job of protecting their offices in recent years. and so it's now up to us to think more critically about the tools that we have at our disposal and maybe nontraditional tools. maybe we do more to step out of the way of people power movements but engage with

governments in ways that buys them time. >> and i should mention by the way that erica seems to have half of the student body at korbel school chained to present asks. i sort of worry about the human rights of it all, but crunching data like you wouldn't believe. i must say, erica, you've done frankly so much for our students to understand the empirical nature of some of these issues, and the fact that one can go into very non-empirical subjects with very empirical means and then come up with very sensible and conclusions that i think really allow one to understand these phenomena. let me just ask you, so what should the u.s. do about all this? let me see, should we have more people on television talking about it? what can we do as a country?

>> especially when a look at the recent failures of civil resistance campaigns are ones that have dissolved into violence, i think maybe for different things the might try. one is to step up our attempt to mitigate repression, or the ways that other governments acquire the means to repress their own population. the second thing is to demand when these movements set on, that foreign journalists must be allowed in to observe events. many of these leaders have taken to kicking out foreign journalists immediately once they perceive the threat. and that allows them to reinforce their own narratives about what's going on, and it deprives people on the ground the opportunity to be truly witness -- witnessed in the court of world opinion. the third thing that u.s. is developing a system to coordinate the faction. went our security forces that want to leave, how could it be made easier for them to do so? and how could it be made easier

for them to do so without taking their weapons with them and setting up shop on the border of the country from which they can launch armed attacks? the third thing would be to consider briefing aid to countries that are engaging and abuses. i think in recent cases we've seen even the threat to freeze aid often does provoke those shifts within the loyalty of these supporters. civilian bureaucrats, economic elites, once they get the threat that their assets might be frozen that often unwilling, quite willing to change their loyalty. so coming up with these types of tools, which are coercive in the sense that they don't require a lot of lost blood and treasure but instead using the political path that the u.s. has at its disposal but also not directly supporting the campaigns in way that would undermine their own domestic basis of legitimacy. >> one follow-up question. i think what is remarkable about

this group here, and you will soon hear from thomas and stephanie, the degree to which the data is really the basis of this. data relating one to conclusions, not simply serving conclusions already reached. erica, you mentioned using sanctions. i'd like to ask, do you think it is possible to put together a kind of database of the kind you've done on this issue of nonviolent change, nonviolent movements? could you put together a database to determine whether sanctions actually worked? >> in fact it's been done by the international peterson institute for economics which her own college is a fellow there. and they have a database on economic sanctions dating back to think the early 20th century. we actually, many scholars have

addressed the question whether the worker i had to say, like stephanie's colleagues, the jury is still out on the question. it's a very controversial. there are all kinds of reasons why you might imagine that once you to come to the point of using sanctions, the chances that they succeeded go down because you have picked a very difficult environment in which the sanctions are being used. so at that point it might not be a lot of willingness on the part of the targeted sanctions to cooperate on the other hand, we know that sometimes there are increase in total division among the elite which is the way that people power campaigns about winning, dividing and ruling the other side. and so in that sense there might be some fact. we looked at whether international economic sanctions directed specifically at regimes that were targeting unarmed resisters helped the campaign. we found that they had no

affect. that could been they had an effect in some cases and not in others and that effect is zero. but what we're doing now is actually collecting more data on different types of intervention, targeted sanctions might be more productive than just generalized sanctions. so my guess is this is a very contingent relationship as many things are, and more will be revealed on all of that. >> thank you very much, erica. i should mention after we talked to thomas and stephanie that we would then have an opportunity for question. if you can pose them and maybe we'll figure out to make this might make a little more movable in case people have trouble getting out of the seats. thomas, you're a strange to me is quite -- you take a couple of well known, famous i would say, economists who made a certain conclusion about the role of

fiscal austerity. and you look at the date and you found that there were problems. why don't you explain to the audience exactly how that happened, what your conclusion was, and where do we go from here? i've always worried about economist talk of something and now you've made me completely frightened about it. [laughter] >> so thank you very much. like i mentioned earlier the project started as a homework assignment. in a course where the assignment was to replicate a major work in the field and that just means reconstruct it from scratch. it's good for students, you have to learn all the new techniques that are at the research center and all the. it surprised me, too, when i was unable to reconstruct their extreme results. it was not at all what i

expected to find. i look at the results they had and i thought they were a little a bit implausible, but given the results they had i thought their interpretation was wrong and that they probably got the wrong way. the original plan was to very quickly replicate their simple results and use some of the more modern economic techniques were developed to us to really ask the question about whether their interpretation was right. but i was unable to get to that step. throughout the process when i was unable to replicate basic averages, it was really, i lost confidence at the very beginning. what's wrong? i thought i would be able to do it but i thought when i first found errors are the chances are i was wrong. they are the really well-known study, it's been cited throughout the media, policymakers here, europe, at the highest levels. so i thought i just made a mistake.

>> you should be able to do this simple homework assignment? >> i would say they were some conversations that i thought i could do better as well, but he was also incredibly supportive at every step of the way. i was learning some techniques while i was doing this. and michael, he really help me out every step of the way, suggested new things i should try to try to reconstruct their results. but really none of us thought that i was right when i first found this. it was only through the process of triple checking your work, making sure there weren't any typos in your statistical scripts that she wrote for the program, all those things. as you do that you do gain more confidence. i did find a couple typos on may but they didn't change the results. and so by the end of the semester i think i had convinced the professors and myself that

more likely than not i wasn't the one making the mistake. it was only when we got there working a spreadsheet where were quickly able to identify a set of problems. one was just a straightforward xl and where they were supposed to average line 30-49 but average lines 30-34. and others were more about how they collected the cases and process the day. we thought they did things that didn't actually really represent the tendency of the distribution. once we published it, it kind f set off a firestorm and it was quite the honor to be able to contribute to that discussion. and i learned quite a bit being, seeing the other side of the media and also taught me about the interface between economic research and the telephone game between like how it is present d in the media or policy circles, et cetera. and so i'm quite honored to be

able to participate in the process. process. >> i assume you got at least a b+ on -- that you did well enough on that and you kind of have come out about, at some point in you agree or going to be putting out another hat, and that is the policy have. tell us, what is the deal with austerity policies? i mean, how do you look at them now having researched it? >> it was interesting, and austerity policies have a long history. and so there's been a lot of times you can test to see if they work. a lot of the common wisdom in the economics profession that you see in basically any macro one-to-one textbook is that during a recession, cutting the government budget with austerity policies is really damaging to you will contract economy more

than one to one. that was one of the reasons why i thought the research was implausible at the beginning. and so i think it helped my confidence a little bit to see that basic wisdom, that hard-fought wisdom we learn from polling the world economies out of the great depression was actually pretty i tricked it and i think the profession forgot some of that wisdom. >> i thought the idea of austerity was a little debunked as far back as the hoover administration. >> certainly stick how did it make such a comeback state looks that's an interesting question. it reminds me of something the polish economist michael belinsky said. and that when you see an idea that gets debunked repeatedly over and over, like, for example, during the great depression and the new deal, we went into a double dip recession because roosevelt tried to balance the budget. he was like, have the initial

round of public intervention, it's doing really good, let's pull back. when they pulled back the economy just collapsed. so that had been, being part of that, they saw it is pretty good evidence that there was really bad. i think there's political reasons for it. and i think it has a big part. when you see an idea that keeps coming back and back after the data and individual case studies and all those things suggest it might be wrong, there might be more political reasons. there's a lot of opposition to kind of public intervention into the economic sphere. there's very practical things that public institutions can do and really need to do with the private institutions are not capable of getting out of the recession on their own. and i think we need to be more open-minded. there's also when you talk about issues of debt, it's kind of difficult. because there's a lot of moral

language that just, it's just immoral to bar any time for any reason. when you look at the role public borrowing has and the conditions under which we would expect it to do good, which happened to be the conditions i think we're experiencing right now, none of us were saying that you should just borrow from here to infinity forever, but that it has a very important role for getting out of the recession and that public debt can actually have, you know, one, if economy has problems with aggregate demand, what that means is the understanding to buy all the goods and services the economy can produce. and when that happens this will produce that much of that. they will cut back on fat and cut back on employment. in the short term the public deficit is a private surplus. they can close that gap which is important. moreover, one thing we saw coming out of the great depression and world war ii is

that it's good for banks to hold public debt on their balance sheets because that cleans them up. it's much safer of an asset than mortgage-backed security or anything like that. so it has, for this particular event coming out of the financial crisis, the financial sector is in shambles, this can be an important thing to clean it up. so i think there's a lot of reasons why you would expect it to be very effective right now. and i think the weight of evidence is on that side. however, there are likely a little reasons. for example, the people who support of austerity policies that support them before the paper, they still support him after the paper has been debunked. you might have to ask them what their opinions on that is, but i think it's really a telltale sign of more political than technical reasons. >> let me just ask are we going

to turn on cbc at some point and you're going to be talking on cbc or are going to write some academic in an airport bookstore, paperback about you and your money and lo and behold there you are, thomas. what are you going to do? >> it seems that we have real possibilities. >> what i'm going to try to do is continue to do honest research. >> even if michael were not here? [laughter] i mean certainly. that's the point, to do honest research that touches on a central public policy issues of our time. that's what i became an economist. i thought we could do a lot better. it's kind of an interesting thing, too, because the slogan coming out of the great depression and out of world war ii was that unemployment never again. like the great depression was a period of weather was an immense

amount of unemployment, 25%. and it really destroyed the social fabric and cost so much tension, but they found that during the war that with public intervention we could have full employment, making all sorts of armaments, et cetera. but after the war they were like, we can afford to pollute by making tanks and bombs and guns, you can surely have been making schools, parks, hospitals, all the roads. from a technical reason if you have unemployed people and things that need to be done, you can do that. there's unemployed construction workers and with potholes in the rose. we can go fix them. the resources are there to do it. it's very wasteful not to do. but then again that might be underlying political reasons why these policies aren't pursued.

it's not a law of nature that we have to have unemployment. it's a failure of our institutions, and we can do better. >> thomas, terrific. we are not going to switch from one inspiration to another inspiration. stephanie, you are in a field where, just listening to what training he bad in a field that really quite extraordinary. i don't think there's a person better prepared for being with a field that is so -- so affected by people who have political views of it in which many people don't like to be confused by the facts. so i wonder if you could talk about some of the challenges of dealing in this highly politically charged field, in making people understand things in an analytical way?

>> sure. as mentioned harder i work for the national oceanic and atmospheric administration and one of the nice thing about working for noaa is where science agency. we are not the ep. we don't regulate things like carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases and with very little rhetorical outside of fisheries. i don't work in the field as much. and so i think it is really important that the united states continue, and from a government organization perspective, that the science agency doing a lot of the work to understand how our climate is changing, why it's changing and the impact of those changes is separate from the discussion about what to do with that information. so science has a seat at the table, whether a republican, democrat or moderate, information that is different political parties work with should be the same. what they choose to do with that information can vary greatly. they may have different economic

models that they trust. they may have different values. it's important for society. they may have different police on the best way to grow our economy. different understanding of what things may and may not hurt our economy and i think we have heard that it's not universally accepted that austerity measures are good or bad. science, in particular for climate change, it's important that they are at the table. it's important we continued to do the research and advance our understanding of the science, but science is also just one piece of information that our society is going to have when it comes to making decisions about what to do about climate change. and that discussion is one, it's important that we all engage in, and that we look at the information that we have and not try and to stage it or twist it because we want a particular outcome. but deal with it very frankly and acknowledged that the information can say one thing and people can have different responses about what the right thing to do with that

information is. it doesn't change the fact that climate change is happening, that our plan is one that we are experiencing consequences. and the extent to which we understand those consequences, obviously the jury is out in some of those areas and we have more confidence in some areas than others, but it can be very challenging when people on both sides try to make more or less out of the data than is really there. and i think that it's not as simple as saying this is something that just environmentalists view, or just republicans or conservatives do. i think it's a trend in economics. it's a trend in the physical sciences and the social sciences where you have your desired outcome first, and then you either pick the data that you want or you ignore the data that you don't want, or you disparage the data that you don't like. i think regardless of what field

you're in, that it has big implications for society. austerity measures has a huge implicationimplication force. the taxes that we pay to how the money gets spent, and for climate change, because there's a real and present issue with the planet warming, what we decided to about it as a society has huge implications for us. >> so let me drill down a little more on this issue of extreme weather. i think you're making the point that this point we don't know. i mean, -- >> so i would say one piece i would make sure is clear is that when i say extreme weather i'm talking about in aggregate different types of physical and meteorological phenomena it floods, heat waves, tornadoes, hurricanes. those are all extreme weather events. and the degree to which we have certainty around the way in which climate change is impacting those extremes really

differs based on the extremes. much like doctors have better understand of certain types of cancers over others, you don't think it can't as one huge thing that will we have one generic answer to the extreme weather events are the same. with things like extreme participation -- precipitation and its unique events, the confidencconfidenc e level is much better. we are much more confident that climate change has and is impacting some of those events. for things like tornadoes and hurricanes, it's much more difficult for us to say in large part because the observational record that we have. storm surge, another sample where we know sea level has risen and we have really good conference the sea level is rising because water warms, it expands. and the glaciers have begun to melt. they're putting more water into the ocean. in the future we expect ice sheets and others to also impact the sea level rise. so what does that mean? that means when yo you have sto,

cannot of water that can get pushed onto land has increased. so we call those storm surge events. we know the storm surge is increasing. how have the patterns of the storms changing? we don't have a good handle on that yet but we know that storm surge has increased. there are extremes where we have more knowledge and extremes for which we have less knowledge. >> so something like hurricanes and he is anything, a hurricane, and extremes event. not necessarily related to global warming, but the fact that it is so extreme, the fact that there is this surge could very well be the global warming phenomena? >> a group from noaa looked at this and looked at the stations at the better entries locations along long island and eastern shore were hurricanes and it. again they weren't looking at the hurricane itself. they were looking at the storm surge but they did show because of the rise in global sea level, that there has been an increase in the likelihood of that high

storm surge. and some those are areas where our scientists can come forward and say something about individual extreme events. say something that the hurricane sandy is more challenging. >> right. i'm from rhode island, and there was something called a 1938 hurricane. people through all my youth talked about the 1938 hurricane. because in providence, rhode island, it was 10 feet of water. the whole downtown was under water. i don't think we've seen anything since, but the point is you can't talk about an individual event. yacht to talk about how many such events are you having we get this kind of search. and clearly that's on the increase. so in terms of foreign policy issues, and i think this gets to some of what erica is dealing with, we have more and more of these effects of climate change.

we are seeing droughts become more serious. we're seeing storms become more serious storms. and how to see this affecting us in terms of foreign policy? i mean, one thing we have to deal with is often a trendy has turned to help for people turn to us for humanitarian aid, and it seems that we are running through that much more quickly than we used to in the past. >> it's really interesting. we were all invited in front of the global thinkers to an event in washington, d.c. as well, and it focused much more on foreign policy and not specifically climate change. that as a scientist who spent most of her day inside a science building it was interesting to interact and hear from folks like current ambassadors, people who are defense advisors, people who work at the pentagon. in almost every single channel discussion we had come climate change came up as an issue.

these were not sciences, these were not active as. they were even in uniform offer typical inside the beltway, so this was not a convention of environmentalists on any stretch of the imagination to these are realistic were looking around and saying the over one body of scientific evidence says the climate is changing. that means things like where people are living to where they're getting their water, where they're getting their food. things are going to change with it. we may not know exactly where these changes are going to happen or be the worst, but you better start preparing for and think about these things. i think you take it for me but you can also take it from our leader in the national security community and in our own community of world leaders who are saying climate change is something we need to be conscientious of as we think about how the united states considers our national security

and were our foreign assets are located and where we expect to future problems to occur in the world. i think that from the perspective of a scientist, it's our job to try and make sure we provide that information in a way that we can best use it to make decisions that is the uncertainty? of course. these are smart people. at the same time, is a something that you should disregard because we don't have 100% confidence of? now. i think it is information that can be very valuable in helping the united states think about where future issues might arise. and one of the ways in which you think about that from a scientific perspective is you have your extreme weather events. then you have your exposure and your vulnerability. so, for example, when extreme heat waves can extreme drought hits the united states, certainly our farmers have been impacted economically.

we been impacted. but really has a cause greater disruption in the united states? no. we are pretty adaptable. we're a developed nation with great resources. we have at conditioning. so from -- the average person in the tray is not to to impacted. take that same level of drought and extreme heat and put in a country that doesn't have the resources that we have, or is already unstable economic or socially. they can have huge consequences. it's not just the extremes event but it's a vulnerability of the people who are being impacted by that event. from a foreign policy perspective the united states needs to be looking around the world trying to identify those situations and be prepared. >> take the example of a domestic issue. there was a pbs program or year or two ago. ken burns documentary on the dust bowl. what was quite extra about it

was we chronicled how we begin to take the switchgrass, pull it out and plant wheat which had a different degree of going into the ground, the consequence was when an inevitable drought came, and had catastrophic effects on the ground cover and before you knew what you had dust storms everywhere. so that would be an example. if we had understood that better in the first place we might have told farmers know, you're not going to be week. saw them are examples of that where we understand the phenomenon better and, therefore, we can't prevent those things from happening? >> absolutely. today, many, many different parts of our economy are making major, major investments on the fact that while this change. coastal communities are a perfect, a good place to look where we know storm surges happen. rebuilding after sandy, a lot of requirements about people having

to raise their homes. certainly the insurance sector is very sensitive to this, and they are, for example, when it's linked to climate change are not coming the insurance rates are very responsive to natural disasters and extreme events. but i think that the other part of this is that we are talking about with the adaptation side of things. there's a certain amount of climate change and the georgia turn of all greenhouse gases today, the way this would work as they would continue to be a rise in global temperature. so we continue to live with some of the consequences, how do we adapt to it? certain individuals are making some of those decisions by choosing where to buy their homes and whether to live along coastal areas, whether to do fire mitigation behind the houses. there's also big, big companies

investing. monsanto bought a company called climate.com for almost a billion dollars. what they do is they try and help people understand how come with the climate is in their local area and how to make decisions on the agriculture perspective. monsanto also invest a lot of money in trying to understand climate change because again, it impacts what crops you might be investing in in the future and where they can be selling their crops in the future. this is not just some government rebuilding after sandy as an effort. this is something that cities and corporations and towns are taking seriously and spending a lot of money on. it's important they have good information so they can spend that money in a way that's helpful to the community. >> i'd like to encourage people to stand up in front of the microphone if they have a question. okay, good. we'll go right to -- [laughter]

>> i have a request for thomas and i have a query for erica. i'll go with the query first. erica, would you comment out the observation that in the united states, the response of the government to the occupy wall street movement, which was nonviolent, was excessive? consequently, does that encourage violent observation to governmental policies? >> right now or do you want to ask -- >> right now. >> i think, you know it's interesting. occupy wall street was a heavy localized movement. i think that they were certainly places in the country where there was an excessive reaction to it. and i think in fact that in the short term there's -- those reactions backfired.

in fact, when i was sort of standing the lifecycle of a spoon, i don't think that any more popular support and legitimacy than it did the day after a guy at uc davis, the pepper spray to cop, pepper spread although students were sitting in the face but i think a day after that happened the movement had more support than it did at any other time in its life cycle. that being said, i think that the lack of unity that was present in the movement, the actual, the lack of consensus among many of the different occupy, local occupies about whether on by the our nonviolent means should be used and under what conditions, and the fact that those two conversations kind of took over the general assemblies in the way they drove many people away from the movement. i think are good reasons for what it could be mobilized somewhat. i've a friend and colleague who wrote an amazing book about

whether repression causes earth while none -- she finds that the answer is no, not always but, in fact, a lot of times your impression is nonviolent movements bigger. but it depends very much on their or session capacity, the ability to discipline themselves, the ability to commit to nonviolent action even in the voice of radicals within moments that are demanding for violence. some kind of collective vision forward that draws more people into the movement. i think the explanation or white it be mobilized is less likely to be excessive. i agree admirably to the organizational structure. >> thomas, i would just like you to turn your laser gaze on the question of the minimum wage. >> i would just say that i'm lucky that there's been an amazing amount of new research

on the minimum wage actually done by the professor in the course, who has gone and looked at a lot of the evidence and found that the research designs weren't as good as really separating causality out as well. once you correct for them you find that the minimum wage regional increases in it is not going to cause mass unemployed and actually will reduce poverty quite a bit. and so that is a really excellent research done on that action by one of my professors that i respect quite a bit. >> one lesson that may not be apparent is that cain can be a good investment. sometimes get you to the head of the line, and i appreciate that. [laughter] i did not hear the word population in what the speakers have talked about. and i think this can really be addressed to all three of them,

because population is at the heart of global change. i wonder if people are thinking, well, what would be the ideal population for the earth, and how do we, over a long period of time, get there? >> that's a tossup between thomas and stephanie. i'm going to give it to stephanie. >> it's a great question. i am not a population demographic expert. i'm sure from a research perspective, -- but i will say that as we talked only about the vulnerability exposure to extreme events, and that's hugely based on climate change. one of the numbers that often gets to around, the $1 billion disaster and attorney. generally those are on the rise.

how much damage an event cost being over a billion dollars and tightly that over the years. we've seen it go up. but there's a pretty good argument the reason it is kind of is because our population has gone up and the amount of infrastructure that we have in the way of extreme events has also increased. so certainly population has that influence there. there's also of course the rise in population and the rise in global wealth certainly contributed to the amount of greenhouse gases that we are invading as the global population. in terms of the carbon emission aside though, should the question population reduction or more thinking about what technologies we can try to make more pervasive around the world to limit, to start reducing greenhouse gases and make our lifestyle less carbon intensive. i think that's an issue regards of with the actual population of the planet is.

>> thomas, do you want to comment? >> i think stephanie really touched on one of the most important points. in general, so population growth is good for economic growth. it allows more folks to go out and work and produce things, but the question is, about the carbon intensity of reduction and how carbon intensity of our methods are. and so finding some type of balance with that, good thing, there's not necessarily a trade off between more growth and more carbon emissions. certainly with existing technologies there are, but there's also a lot of research also coming out of umass that shows that a lot of the green jobs program, they produce quite a bit of jobs and help us become more energy sustainable. so, for example, in terms of green energy, a million dollars into green energy sector will produce almost three times as many jobs as in the oil and gas

sector. one of the reasons for that is not necessary for moral reasons, but because if you're going to retrofit the building you have to do it here. so there's a lot of message content in that type of economic activity. so the question is, how can we reduce the carbon intensity of the production. i'm not sure, staffing is quite a bit more whether population reduction will be necessary or not, i'm not sure, not my field but i would say that there are ways we could very much reduce carbon intensity production. there are things we can do better. >> ericka? >> i have no comment on that. >> no comment. >> they both said wastewater things that i can say. >> i hope you all three run for office at some point. and maybe to for the fat, i went to see if each of you would be willing to speak about just one kind of moral gratification you see of the research.

very that it driven a at a think as we are credible but i would love to hear you speak about the dimension morally. erica specifically i would be curious your take on kind of the wielding of nonviolence as a tool for geopolitics and geopolitical interest. >> we will start with erica. >> yeah. so the preliminary trouble that are finding brings for kind of the standard on the use of violence, is that over a thousand years we sort of tried to hammer out the conditions under which morally acceptable to use violence. that comes out in the theory and in other ways. but one of the key conditions that someone has to credibly meet is to make the case that violence is necessary for them to achieve their goals. that is, that it's not casually being wielded or whatever. that it's actually, it's just in the violence is necessary when it's a last resort.

when it's proportional, when it's discriminating and so forth. and what our findings presented is a real difficulty for the theory because it's demonstrating that the violence in many cases may not be necessary. and moreover, from what it looked at in my cases, in cases where people are using violence or armed struggle, they almost never use concerted civil resistance for a significant period before they turn to violence. in other words, many people seem to be in these armed groups turn to violence before they exhausted all other potential methods of civil resistance. in fact, the average civil resistance campaign takes almost three years to run its course and almost every armed insurgency that occurred from 1900-2006 started within maybe six months to nine months of the onset of a real dissident movement. in other words, it seemed like they were jumping the gun both

literally and figuratively. in terms of using nonviolence to promote one's own and, this is the current moral quandary. because from the way marie and i argue, civil resistance is actually a method of conflict. it's in very blunt terms a weapon. so the question is, under what conditions morally is this weapon being abused. a lot of people ask me because they're watching what's going on in thailand addressing okay, so people are waking so the resistance to subvert a democratic government. many people have made the same claim about ukraine, that civil resistance is being used there, a constitution legal leader. and whether we agree with the assessments or not it presents the real difficulty of when it is -- when is it okay to use civil resistance. given the fact with a couple spending a thousand is developing a just war criteria i think it's time for us to spend

a few at least the subject just civil resistance criteria. >> stephanie? >> yeah, so i discussed earlier how i felt that the science has a seat at the table and that people have to bring their values to the discussion as well. i think the decisions about whether we as a society or a community choose to do or not do anything about the fact we're changing our climate system is very much a moral challenge. i think that in part it starts with the question of what are our morals on this question was how important is it to us that we have, that we get to enjoy certain things now? are these changes okay? maybe they are. i think the other aspect of that is the moral questions all round who is going to be impacted. for us, more heat waves, okay. can handle that? probably. more floods. or have a huge flood, you can

barely tell. we will probably be okay with a lot of these change for quite a while to come into united states. for the most part. but we live in a plant that is much larger than the country and the people who are going to really be impacted don't all necessarily live here with us and enjoy the covers and enjoy the economic growth that we do. and so i think we do have a moral question of how much we as a society think of ourselves as global citizens and not just citizens of a very lucky developed nation. there are going to be consequences -- there are consequences much larger for of the people around the world. for example, with the coastal innovation issue, a lot of those committees will be impacted and all the people are not second homeowners on the east coast. ..

due to our extreme events impact that climate change. it is important question and i certainly care about the ant there. i think we as a society need to have a conversation about the moral impact of the answer to the question. >> so, you know, economics is particularly