due to our extreme events impact that climate change. it is important question and i certainly care about the ant there. i think we as a society need to have a conversation about the moral impact of the answer to the question. >> so, you know, economics is particularly challenging.

between values and morals and the scientific technical questions, very much in economics we have to do with it. top rate technical questions about what the model is, why is there appropriate how to interpret the statistics, whether all your conditions are satisfied. but then there's also questions about the type of society we want to live in. there's also questions about intense distributional conflicts as well. posterity is often times a distributional conflict and it's a really hard thing to navigate at times that clarify the decisions. but there is real moral implications. like more of the problem of the financial crisis as there is a lot of private debt in the runoff from financial institutions, buried a lot of money to invest in the craft of the public authorities had to

take those onto their balance sheets. and on the question of how to pay for that, right? is it really right to, for example, cut schools, health care and pension so we can pay off creditors who oftentimes, you know, did not pick the best interest of everyone in mind. so there's other really tough questions, too. if you read the political aspects by michael kowalski come he asked the question of why business interests opposed for employment policies to a large extent in his time. there's here is where you can compromise and have a lot of good name, but these underlying kind of distributional conflicts come back and they keep coming back again and again. so how to navigate that is really difficult and this unseen we have to confront in phase.

it's easier to talk about data about whether it is significant or something like that. but then when these policies really affect things. sometimes you have to make judgment calls about what is acceptable, what's not and who bears the burden of adjustments as well and in what ways you can bear the burden of adjustment. one of the points keen has made about the international system at the time is one of the main problems was there was always on the burden of adjustment was always on the country. they would have to cut wages to become more competitive with the other countries. well, could there be a more equitable distribution of the burden of adjustment? in upcoming necessarily the

deficit countries having to cut their wages, you could have inflation the surplus countries as one of the problems between recent germany right now. sometimes there are times to compromise where writing down debt can be l. -underscore sanchez because most streams of income is better than having none. so there i room to compromise. but sometimes it's very difficult. different forces will try to use political institutions to very match look after their own interests. so it's very difficult. sometimes there's room for compromise. sometimes parties that led to compromise should these are utterly different questions. they are questions we all have to face. thank you very much. >> thank you. i'm a practitioner i confess

there are dean. [inaudible] -- are like dentists. around how to be better dentists. the two quick comments on erika and stephanie. i believe that problem of the south and my last piece of it nice for him to study before i left and earlier, we did a lot of work on sanctions. much of it is published and not published. now i have this question of economics as dentistry. we'll just put it in that wing. one problem is that it's not really about causal relations. it is about correlations.

there are two aspects that i would like you to consider and discuss. what happens after a while? i mean, debt and growth. the other one is about the conceptual problem between debt and deficit that really is the deficit should be more the flow aspect and not the start aspect of debt, which is important. so in a way, it is like barking up the wrong tree. so those are my questions. >> thomas, go ahead. >> so you know, in terms of encouraging people to be more humble like dentists, it is difficult, like i mentioned before come incorporating the critical spirit that animates science is these things are tough. it's hard to say how to promote

honest research. that is a tough question. more critical minds, more graduate students and their courses. another thing as critical popular engagement, when i look at the history of economics, i think so many of the times when we've seen the development a really excellent new ideas and public policy tools to handle the problems have been when the public engaged with the discipline and said, you know, your answer is unacceptable. you know, you can do better. when you have critical popular movements questioning, it really pushes the economist to be more creative in and of better ideas of ways to save it. for questions about one, causality and two, and those are actually reasons why i thought the results were implausible. those are things we discussed

really early on. in terms of the causality thing, it was the initial goal of the project to quickly replicate the results and then ask those questions. we never got around to the second part if we didn't do it the first. one of my professors did look into that quite a bit. what he found his current growth because current debt predicted past growth better than correlation for future growth and current debt. past growth was very much correlated with it. it's a telltale sign of reverse causality. he included some really basic controls for reverse causality and was able to cut the estimate a coefficient by 50% to 70%. the people at the next variety of methods was a different panel

method have come down to very little evidence that it's really high debt and growth. it's probably more the slow growth is causing the high debt. the question before, it is very much the deficits that are end. the new spending injected into the economy and spending as a flow. a lot of different tools to manage stocks in debt that i anchored the employed in a lot of ways. one solution could be one thing that could help quite a bit. but there's a lot of other tools that come out of, you know, out of the expansive second world war, the great depression and also dealing with a lot of development, economics of the 20th century that i think public authorities have so many more tools to handle those didn't come a know, the private sector. we should very much look back at

the whole system that sometimes was discarded in the profession. >> thank you. >> this question is for stephanie. at lunch you had discussed her flex capacitor, what is the best technology you can see to get the best data. so my question is about the use of technology in getting that new data. i am wondering what you see in terms of drone usage to actually gather data points. i know university of boulder is using as an academic research. i wonder we see the future of an insistence on gathering the data for you and what the landscape might look like. >> yeah, good question. we actually do have a program trying to explore more uses for unmanned vessels in part because they're cheaper. they can save a lot of money and that's important. the one area where they are becoming in the ocean and something drove into the ocean

to pick up data and of course been able to do so in locations with depths of the ocean column. i think it is an area that is going to increase. certainly if the topology gets better and technology gets cheaper, though several important things. another interesting technology emerging as nano satellites. we spend billions of dollars watching a satellites. the very good, but they're very, very accurate and they're very, very good. nano satellite you put out a lot of them. the technology at this point aren't as good. they're cheap and you can put a lot of them out there. so there's trade-offs. the technology is changing to observe the climate and hopefully will continue. >> i wanted to thank you all. it's been a very refreshing

conversation about science with these important moral questions that i wanted to speak particularly to thomas. iran across an interview with you because my stepdad are close to evergreen state. i think those at evergreen state and umass in the premier and, people are encouraged to think about which social science has often been. paul krugman of "the new york times" endorsed colette d. saying he had believed kowalski before. and cited larry summers, since he's not going to be famously involved with the factories are, actually recovered himself as an economist and has pointed out that we have permanent unnecessary unemployment and millions people. the reason we have this is the political aspect to what color

scheme saying is rich folks don't like government spending money on poor folks, even if it would benefit them, even if it would stimulate the economy and make their businesses more successful at year. the most extreme example recently in japan it is necessary to cut off food stamps for poor kids. i don't know what country the people who did that live in, but it is not one that i want to live in. this is the question he spoke very eloquently, but it seems we have a conflict between the scientific conclusion with the impression you should spend money on poor folks and the powerful, wealthy, political interest, which have created this great environment including the economics profession reaching to reinhardt is coming

to pull ryan in congress is going to cite them in alsace and denounce. is there much we can do about this without some sort of big movement from below? hussein unknown to persuade those that have to to be persuadable on the basis that the evidence that really spends a little money on poor folks from their point of view. >> thomas, what might you take that. maybe erica will want to talk about coercive magnets. >> the points you raise are really important. you know, i think it's really interesting. within the economics profession, i think it's a little more politically homogenous some of the other social science. one recent research like this came out of a department or open-minded and critical along

with the commissioned evergreen. i think there is more political diversity in people's team -- interpreting things in a different way. that is why it was really good from a scientific did you have people who question the received wisdom and critically interrogated. in terms of dealing with the political problems of conflicts of interest, it is really difficult. sokolowski kind of mentioned that one of the reasons why some of the more powerful historically opposed full employment policies is because the idea that we don't have to depend on the private job creators for jobs with the public sector can actually do that is actually coming in outcome if you take that to the logical solution, you know, it applies that big changes are possible. in the past, we've also seen compromise, too.

his untimely seen compromise is peered over the last 30 years, there's been kind of in a 10 to kind of renegotiate those compromises in a way that was more resemble a boulder social contracts before the new deal era, before these public interventions were except you. i think this is problematic. about how to change it, i would lose a lot less sleep is the way it really worked with sound research always informed policy. but it's kind of you know, it's hard to get someone to understanding that their job depends on them not understand them. so it's kind of a difficult thing. that is why i encourage popular engagement that says we can do better and i think it's much more democratic, too. the essential principle of the

democracies people affected by policy should have a say in those policies to the extent they are affected by them, then there is sent in undemocratic about the immense attack aircraft in the computer labs, you know, creating the optimal policy is for everybody and we should just do that. the critical popular engagement is really important. i think that's what we've seen the best ideas that have addressed the needs of the many. that's where we stand on the marriage that appears dead were more critical and popular engagement. i think that's what i would say. >> maybe i'll just close with an anecdote related to that, which is when fdr was elected president when he got a visit from the delegation of some african-american activist. many of whom had spent years in india studying gandhi and spending time at his ashram and what not and they came and presented a plan is not would be

for people living in this country who are african-american and involved a number of other social programs, the site says and they explained it and laid out the whole idea of justification and said that's great, i agree with you. now make me do it. what he was telling them was i cannot stand in front of a congress and tell them an idea unless you show me that there's millions of people that are willing to show up in the streets in support of this and so that is where these great kind of social movements of the mid-20th century came from was politician saying we are not leaders, we are followers. so if you want and being done, make us do it. >> so if you look at reasons to not forget for example, i think africa -- [inaudible] the congo, but you don't see as

much media coverage and things like that. i do think the environment has set aside to push land movement and how exactly do you incentivize them? who exactly is the best actors to bring about the type of nonviolent movement? who exactly do you advise? i know i'm cheating, but thomas, what is the argument austerity is used as spending in europe because once the economy gets better, government just don't seem to stop spending. >> thomas come you take the last one and then erica come you will have the final word. >> so, the argument that we need to rein in spending now because governments just don't have spending is if you look at the history -- i guess they say two things. one is that it's not really accurate based on the facts that

there have been periods where after world war ii and how the public sector deleveraging pay down the debt, they did that quite a bit. the other thing is public spending isn't necessarily bad. it depends on what it is. sir nephew of public name that's used to give politicians, best friends a lot of money, that's terrible. a lot of public spending can pose the history of kind of how a lot of it grew it is very much through public interventions, public spending on things that can be good for developing basic technology, industrial policy, there are reasons for it is a really good. markets can provide certain classes of things decently. things that have kind of a public good aspect or positive

externality are not as good at pricing them in a way that would get them produced in quick quantities. so you know, in a couple grounds, one i don't think it is actually true that politicians are always doing runaway spending, if better. there could be very legitimate reasons for those programs, especially in a slump or basic mechanical reasons you would expect the deficit to happen because more people will need services if you have unemployment. the question is asking how we can do it better and how we can make sure there's accountability from the political institutions that are benefiting all that. things like infrastructure, schools, et cetera. right now it's interesting that real interest rates are lower than inflation rates that we have to pay back less than they borrowed in the future.

almost like free money on the table. the fun of it targeted infrastructure development, that can be incredibly useful. is asking questions about how to do it well getting away from the narrative that the public is always bad and inefficient, et cetera. i don't think that stands up to scrutiny based on historical record. >> thanks for your question. research on what is nonviolent that's come out of it's pretty inconclusive. i seem to come out of any environment under many conditions in literate and illiterate society is followed the maps in poor places and which places. we don't know what the causes are, which means it's kind of a universal emerging phenomenon. personally, i know when i was a kid i knew how to make it really hard for my parents to pick me up. i would just become a bag of

potatoes and that was simple disobedience. it came from an intuitive thought. i believe that most humans have the capacity to do it. i'll just answer your question more broadly within an. martin luther king i stay young forever in named watson to go to national and desegregate it right at the beginning of the civil rights move in. >> we will leave this program here. you can see the rest of the c-span video library. privacy and civil liberties oversight or discontinuing their hearing today on part of the foreign intelligence surveillance act. the government gives authority to conduct surveillance overseas. >> teen college's president and ceo of the district council, but this international security researcher at the human rights watch. the criminal law and criswell, a

partner at bubbles. each of the panelists will need a brief opening statement and we will proceed with the board questioning. i guess we can start alphabetically with mr. ballenger. >> well, thank you all very much for having me in. members of the board, i am going to focus my comments on whether international law places any restrictions on electronic surveillance of foreign nationals at the united states. i think you know i served as a legal advisor for the department of state from 2005 to 2009 is the legal advisor for the national security council from 2001 to 2005 and announced the national security adviser to the head of the criminal division of the justice department before that, so i have extensive experience in intelligence activities in international law. so in recent months, i think you know many scholars and human rights advocates have argued

that nsa surveillance of foreign nationals violate the so-called universal right to privacy recognized in international law. they base their article xvii called the international covenant on civil and political rights in which the u.s. ratified in 1992. article xvii provides, and i quote, no one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy family home or correspondence, end quote. the argument that nsa surveillance violates article xvii of the icc pr is incorrect for several reasons and i will say in my view, international law, an international place international legal restrictions on the nsa, any of the nsa programs with respect to the iccpr first, for the last 64

years, the united states government has taken it this imposition that it does not apply outside the borders of the united states. the u.s. took this position when we negotiated the treaty in 1950 and we articulated it in 1995 when the clinton administration submitted its report to the u.n. human rights committee, which is the group that oversees compliance with the iccpr. my predecessor at the time, the bad legal advisor conrad harper thanked the committee that the iccpr poses allegations on the united states, only inside the united states and that is because article to as the iccpr, which defines its scope says that a state party is bound to respect and ensure the right and the iccpr only to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.

as my predecessor, conrad harper said at the time, and this is dual requirement that establishes the treaty obligations applied only if both conditions are satisfied. an individual must be under united states jurisdiction and within united states territory. and now the negotiating position of the united states of the treaty confirms that interpretation. the phrase, within its territory was added at the request of the head of the u.s. delegation, eleanor roosevelt at the time in 1950 and she explained that quote, the purpose of the proposed addition is to make it clear that the draft covenant would apply only to persons within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting states. there was a vote held on that addition and that addition was adopted 822-1950. subsequent efforts to change that have failed him again in

his statement to the human rights committee in 1895, conrad harper explained that the words were added, quote, with the clear understanding that such wording would limit the obligation to within a party's territory. now it's true, and i know that laura pitter can talk about this. lot of other countries don't agree with the long-standing u.s. interpretation, but the human rights committee statements don't have any legal effects on the united states or to any other country. we give respect to them, but they are not binding on us. both the bush and obama administrations have confirmed that clinton had menstruations position that the iccpr does not apply extraterritorial lee. in fact, just five days ago in geneva, we were making our periodic report to the human rights committee and the acting michael advisor, mary mcleod

told the committee, qualcomm and united states continues to believe that its interpretation that the covenant applies only to individuals both within its territory and within a jurisdiction is the most consistent with the covenant language and negotiating history. we really have 50 years of u.s. practice on this point recently reaffirmed by the obama restoration. but even if the iccpr did applied extraterritorial lee, the treaty would still not place limits on nsa surveillance because persons in other countries are not subject to u.s. jurisdiction. the human rights committee itself has to find the phrase, subject to a party's jurisdiction to include people within the power or defective control of the forces of a state party acting outside of its territory. ..

just there are legal norms but i'm not aware that the government are suggesting that there is an actual violation of international law. and finally, just to close on my analysis at the donohue even if the iccpr dead in posed a territorial conduct and people

outside of the united states would continue to be in the jurisdiction of the united states, article 17 of iccpr bans arbitrary unlawful interference of privacy. we can certainly argue about what constitutes the arbitrary and unlawful interference but there is no form on that point. i'm sure lots of people can suggest to the nsa program is arbitrary and unlawful but when we are talking about the international law there has to be a specific norm that people have agreed to and there is no generally accepted framework under the international law that defines what kind of surveillance is unlawful or arbitrary. so the bottom line despite the statements that we are violating the article 17 of the iccpr if you just simply does not apply nor does any other provision of international law. so let me close by saying just because the international law doesn't create a universal right

of privacy that is binding on the united states, by no means i'm saying we ought to be insensitive to the rights of noncitizens. certainly if i were still in the white house i would be saying that we need to be respectable of concerns both as individuals and leaders and that's why we make these policy decisions. the signals of intelligence activities must take into account all persons should be treated with dignity and respect regardless of the nationality and where they might reside and all persons have interests in the handling of their personal information so it is appropriate to take into account privacy interests but the international law doesn't place a binding legal obligations on us. >> on behalf of the 56 of the most dynamic innovative companies in the world thank you for inviting us to testify today

and us will for your efforts to advance national security and civil liberties. we have the firm view that those concepts are mutually reinforcing and are not mutually exclusive and we want to do whatever we can to support your efforts. i would like to focus my testimony on two areas. what we are experiencing in the marketplace and that may remediate the challenges that we are facing on the first of the economic impact from the disclosures are significant and ongoing. the folks in this room are very familiar with section 215 and the distinction between that and section 702 for folks outside of the roman much of what they experience and what we are experiencing are diminishing trust particularly diminishing trust in us-based technologies

so rather than the basis to the question of the integrity and security of technologies that has a real-world economic impact and there are a number of analyses that put the number of the impact in the tens of billions of dollars. as a significant vanity economic loss is the broad societal impact more generally. they are all very familiar with the benefit to transform all of our lives. the policies aimed at changing the open ubiquitous global internet internet into one of silence so the legislation that actually being debated today in brazil with the walled gardens around the data and we are

seeing the same europe as you all know where the parliament is questioning the continuing viability of the safe harbor of territories within europe with the clouds that would again create the islands rather than the internet. so what do we do about it? they build on global principles that we released earlier this year after working with the members to forge a consensus. we believe that to address these issues effectively, higher-level global communications and engagement around surveillance is critically important. the first aspect of this and solutions is around

transparency. this body in its january report made the report that transparency is a foundation for democratic principles. we firmly agree and we think it is a foundation for separating the fact from the table so there is an awareness around 702 where protections in place already for there to be greater awareness would be quite helpful. as it relates to our companies the ability to share more about the request that comes than pursuant to those as well as the account particularly the numbers would be incredibly helpful and so greater transparency is one element of what we recommend. they are offered with a great deal of humility because we don't know what they know.

we are making sure there is a civil libertarian advocate or liberties advocates within the court process but developing a framework for enabling that we think is very important. the solutions are based on working to rebuild the trust that has been eroded and there are a few statements from the government that would be quite helpful by way of example there's been a lot of reporting around the steps that may or may not have been taken to undermine encryption standards. nift has been taking steps to

bolster but the statement from the government of that i that io not intend to take steps to undermine and to undermine the integrity of those standards would be incredibly important. similarly, taking steps to a firm that the data acquisition pursuant to 702 is not being done in an indiscriminate manner and i think would also be incredibly helpful. with that i will pause. thank you for this opportunity and for having me. we filed a lengthy statement with the board. the obligations in the international covenant for the political rights. i would disagree on this issue

as did herald recently released memos where he does a great as well and try to get to the obama administration to take a different position arguing that it was not actually in the u.s. interest to continue to not apply the iccpr in a exit ariel manner. there's been a debate whether or not this flies out of the borders and this stems from the operative jurisdictional clause which says states have an obligation to ensure that those in the territory and subject to the jurisdiction the rights under the covenant. so the word jurisdiction has been interpreted to mean power and effective control but the u.s. does not accept that and it takes a territorial stance and this means a state has to abide within its territory but it can willfully violate outside its territory killing and pillaging it outside of the borders doesn't really make any sense.

the law requires that language be interpreted in accordance with the context as well as its object and purpose and the context in this case was post-world war ii when they were aiminaiming and empowering peopt universally diminishing them and responding effectively to the atrocities. to interpret the treaty in that limited way would allow for example not see germany too many concentration camp as a prominent scholar on this issue has pointed out into the u.s. is a clear outlier on this. they take such a strict interpretation of the treaty so how does this apply to the right to privacy? some have argued even if the iccpr applies it should only be the case the government has physical control over the individual like in the context of detention or torture. and that doesn't apply to surveillance simply because the individual isn't in the states

effective control. but the problem is the communications are. and so to recognizadesso to rece duty to respect privacy creates a kind of absurd situation where the u.s. would be barred from going into someone's house in germany taking letters out of someone's drawer but not reaching into the computer doing the same thing remotely. these are novel questions and i won't deny that. the human rights committee which is the interpretive body of the iccpr has not educated this matter. there's a body of case law and the jurisdictions particularly in the courts and human rights that have tackled the issue and do provide guidance on a framework for how to analyze the surveillance law. that said those decisions came out before the snowden revelation so they are not informed by a lot of the information in the public domain about the collection that's going on.

but these issues are novel in the u.s. because there may not be a case on point it doesn't mean the obligations don't exist. they are in the treaty. just what many in the u.s. argued that it has to catch up with technology and recognize reasonable expectations of privacy, international law has to acknowledge when it comes to surveillance though an individual may not be in the state's physical control, the communications are into the right to privacy can be violated remotely through technical means. but just because the obligation applies doesn't mean the surveillance has to stop. there is a framework for surveillance can take place and also be in accordance with human rights obligations. the surveillance has to be nonarbitrary and necessary through legitimate cause that's proportionate to the aim. 70 to maybe for the purpose of

protecting security which would be a legitimate aim. but are they are more narrowly tailored ways to achieve that aim, and if the answer to that question is no, and i'm going to quote from the group here it is and whether granting the government authority makes us safer but whether the additional safety is worth the sacrifice in terms of individual privacy, liberty and trust. and also is it worth the other harms that would result? we are in a situation now the countries are rushing to enact the law and the companies are rushing to offer alternatives to the data being stored in the u.s.. from the technological standpoint of the data isn't necessarily based on geography but travel the most efficient route. this means the transfer to someone in the same country can mean passing through many countries without the defender even knowing it. so to respect the right to privacy, extra territorially imposes the u.s. data to the

former ability when it situated in other states. the president has eventually recognized alrecognized office. his presidential policy directed reports to bring rules and retention into the data collected on the foreigners closer to those that govern on u.s. persons. but it didn't in both collection and exempted the data to facilitate a targeted collection. also this was through an executive order so they can be changed by future administrations. at the bottom line is the u.s. isn't a position because most of the world's data flows through its borders into this comfort is an obligation to respect the privacy rights of those individuals whose communications fall in the jurisdiction but also refrain from interfering the ability of other countries to protect the data from their own citizens. and failure to recognize the value of this undermine the business and long-term national security interest the administration says it will make some changes for the law remains

the same and that has to change. >> professor sieber. >> thank you for the kind invitation. it's a pleasure to be here. as far as the program for which we are asking can be based on two different sources. interest at stake and interest of persons. the two are interrelated so it's a protection of the states territories and also have protected functions for its citizens. let me start with a few remarks on this approach before turning to the specific rights which have been addressed here. the international law and article two of the charter protect the territorial integrity of all of the states. the state therefore violates

that accesses copies in the nonpublic data into computer systems, located in the foreign states to initiate the data processing located in the foreign territory. there are no public international law that permits by you waiting other states serenity by across-the-board worldwide surveillance. there is also no customer of international law that permits the sovereign resulting act of espionage the espionage committed from the protesters of the embassies, violates the obligations under article three of the convention and diplomatic relations. these infringements of the

territorial integrity of many states by large-scale surveillance programs have two impact our topic. first with respect to policy considerations, infringements of the territorial integrity of the foreign states violate international law on additional cybercrime statutes that are globally agreed upon in the budapest convention. these violations pose a threat to the continuing trust and integrity of the u.s. and its it industry. this infringements may be more serious than the violation of privacy rights, the scope of which is disputed in most countries. second, the programs on the

foreign territory take over security functions of the affected states. this control provides citizens any other legal protective systems in these security measures. since their home state cannot protect them against violations of their privacy and intercepting in a foreign state often does not recognize every aliens right outside its territory where the interception is taking place. in such a global system dot citizens including u.s. citizens are deprived of any protection especially authorities of different countries that exchange certain data. we are all losing a protective

system which mankind has been one in a long historical battle dating back to the enlightenme enlightenment. if we are engaging in the transnational programs, we must at least recognize certain basic human rights regardless of nationality and place of residence. and if we want to create a global solution just must be supported by international human rights to which i will now turn. in the field of international human rights i would also concentrate on article 17 of the civil and political. the international court of justice, the un human rights committee both in its case law and its general 31 as well as many national courts and governments acknowledge the

extra territorial applicability. i also simply refer to the well-founded memorandum presented from a legal adviser from the state department in 2010 and 2013 with respect to that iccpr for the extra territorial ability of the convention. according to the prevailing opinion, the iccpr is extraterritorial applicable to anybody within the power of effective control of the acting state party. in the physical world extra territorial applicability of the iccpr is limited to situations

in which the government has a total control over a territory. since communication and privacy rights are by their very nature exercised in the virtual world and are prominently infringed upon the control of the virtual world by the programs should be a decisive factor. if we do not accept these conclusions, we still must deal with an argument of the german constitutional court for the american discussion. the court argues that communication and deception not only infringes upon privacy rights by the first act of recording the telecommunicatio telecommunications, but it also

infringes on these rights by the following transmission to the home country, the analysis, linking with other data of a long-lasting story, and further transmission to other recipien recipients. all these acts are repeating and deepening the infringements of privacy rights and they are committed on the territory of the state's. of us evestate's. the vest even in cases of foreign intelligence gathering, we are not only dealing with actions outside of the national territory. accepting the arguments for the applicability of the international human rights law to promote a deep discussion on the scope of the protection of privacy. a first attempt to define the

contours of the international concept of privacy can be seen in the general assembly resolutions of last december on the right to privacy in the digital age. when this discussion proceeds, it will be most important to recognize that threats from abroad are different from internal threats. the principle of proportionality has developed by international courts and will lead to very different results in different circumstances such as data collection to the homeland in afghanistan or today in ukraine. these differentiations under the principle of the proportionality can recognize many security concerns. thus appl applying certain

transnational privacy rights would not present a reasonable security policy especially also sends that iccpr is the executing national citizens could not initiate in the proceedings against the u.s.. i would advocate for an international solution and discussion in order to maintain or to gain the leading role of the u.s. as an advocate for the rule of law and human rights and democratic societies as well as the trust and its clouds. more emphasis should be placed on the efforts to provide more guarantees for non-us persons. for that reason i welcome the respective presidential

directive 28 of last january to apply certain safeguards for all individuals regardless the nationality of the individuals to whom the information detains or where the individual resides. this policy is also the position of the constitutional law in the cases of your interest it would be a pleasure for me to provide you more detail on the comparative aspects later on in the discussion. as the chair set in the outset i am the person or in the law firm on the practice in 2013 they published a white paper examining the similarity of the regime's unauthorized implement governmental access to data into the work began before the snowden disclosures in response to certain cloud service providers the storage of data

made it safer from surveillance into storage and a us-based called provider. the surveillance of the regional clouds have been renewed. the governmental access to the data internationally noted the availability of mutual assistance treaties and other forms of cross-border sharing addressing the claims of regional cloud service providers about the vulnerability to the access that service might provide. the paper specifically looked at section 70 to surveillance and frameworks in australia, canada, france, germany and the kingdom. the testimony today synthesizers the findings in the white paper and additional information on the laws in brazil, italy and spain we intend to publish soon. i would note it foreshadowed last week the parliament

criticizing the practices of certain member states for the lack of transparency and controls on their surveillance activities. my principal point today following the white paper is straightforward while the policies and practices of the united states addressing surveillance and related privacy concerns obviously need to be and are being reassessed by the u.s. has on its books and greater process of surveillance activities than many fellow democracies. as you know section 702 requires court approval and is limited to foreign intelligence information and oversight mechanisms exist. they are not always found in the law of many of the counterparts. australia, canada, france, germany, italy and the united kingdom do not require court approval for the national security surveillance. it is to conduct surveillance to protect economic and scientific essence even when they are not

at stake. the issue of intelligence agencies about any process at all asking companies for data we found that australia, canada, france and the uk to allow the government to ask private entities to disclose government data into the u.s. is not allowed to seek voluntary transfers in neutral body must approve the request. the resolution by the european parliament recognized extensive surveillance systems into the member states and the fact the member states have over the intelligence community. the resolution also questioned the compatibility of the economic espionage activities within the eu and with the internal competition law. it didn't go into the detail that the resolution resected baseline findings of the research that there are substantial deficiencies and transparency about the national security access.

also considering about sharing arrangements available to the government information they collect for surveillance it is misleading and the extremes to contend the regional clouds for individuals with security from government surveillance. i commend the board for engaging in the assessment of the practices and looking at how they are related to the counterparts. there are no guarantees i'll swear that agencies will abide by the law restricting the surveillance but to the degree of authorization required and the kind of review that occurs is obviously relevant to a determination of how well personal privacy and liberty are protected. i look forward to your questions. >> there are two issues here. one is the jurisdictional test and the substantive test evaluating the program is arbitrary in some fashion.

i want to start with the jurisdictional issues and there are three interpretations in the applicability of the treaty one is that there has to be both territorial presence in the jurisdiction and the other is that can be one or the other end of thandthe approach is a sort t and that is there is a respect require much across the board and adventurer requirements to the territorial and jurisdictional issues. i want to ask about the jurisdiction side. from the discussion today is the information collected on the program being collected in the united states albeit about non-us persons? my question is how should we interpret jurisdiction is it going to be up to us to interpret it but in understanding the jurisdiction is it over the information, and

if -- how would that apply in the countries in terms of the scope of the responsibilities? i will take a stab at that. the u.s. has reaffirmed its position again that the iccpr doesn't apply extraterritorial he and the point that the individuals have to be under the power and control. i guess this sort of novel suggestion that anybody that is subject to electronic surveillance is therefore under u.s. power and control. but i don't think that is a credible argument. even though human rights committee wouldn't go so far to say that if one can touch a foreign national through electronic surveillance that is someone under u.s. power and

control. the fact the surveillance may be collected inside of the united states doesn't change the fact that the collection is being done of persons outside of the united states episode that does not change the essential jurisdictional elements that doesn't apply extraterritorial outside of the united states and that those individuals are within the power and control of the united states. again these are things one might wish or so and i'm not sure there's much of a disagreement as suggested. if one were writing a new treaty and could get people to agree to certain things one might agree there is a policy limitation one might accept that the way this particular treaty is resting now

certainly the view of the government and i frankly think i am not aware of any single government in the world. this is government to be leave that the rights t right to condt electronic surveillance people outside of their territory. i would be very surprised if we found any european government as upset as they might be with electronic surveillance by the united states who would say the article 17 limits our other -- our ability. the government in a submission made it to the cour court of hun rights interpreting the convention on human rights argued that convention didn't limit its electronic surveillance outside of germany. so again the view of government

is that this doesn't have jurisdictional control over people outside of their territory. >> where would someone be into territory not in their jurisdiction? it says both territory and jurisdiction. are there situations one would apply but not the other? >> certainly there would be people who theoretically there could be people who are not in our territory and who could be subject to the jurisdiction. that is the problem ellen r. roosevelt was trying to solve at the time. >> the position was taken in 2008 before the revelations came forward and sponsored a resolution which underscores the importance of respecting the right to privacy.

so i would say that the interpretation is that on the one hand the duty to ensure the right within the state's territory and jurisdiction and then there is also a duty to respect the rights of individuals outside of the territory in the united states. so there is an obligation even in the jurisdictional clause to respect the rights of privacy out of the united states. it's loving through the u.s. borders although i'm not sure about the backbone of string where that's taking place. it would be the duty to respect the rights to privacy. >> i have two questions.

we recognize the government has reaffirmed its earlier position about what the iccpr means in relation to people abroad. but i wonder if you say a word about how they dealt with the question of article 31 of the convention on the interpretation and the treaties insofar as deference should be given to the interpreters of which in this case i believe have taken a broad interpretation and a couple of our supreme court justices have said in various cases that whe but when they are interpreting a treaty or look to the interpretation for guidance and controlling other parties in

the same treaty just a word on those aspects of the reasoning that led to what is in the reaffirmed and. >> i think what you're talking about is the general comment of the human rights committee which certainly to do with the united states and i'm not aware of any government in the world of that belieworld a betterdeal leaves t belief is the views of the committee actually our really binding. the human rights committee was set up to monitor compliance and it makes the statements which governments including the united states give respect to. but we certainly don't be leave that is the interpretation nor do we b belief that it's legally binding. >> oabout committee is a very authoritative source regarding the interpretation and the u.s. is under an obligation to give

effect to the rights in the treaty in good faith. so what the committee said in that regard is very important. >> these are important points right now for the treaties that human rights watch is interested so human rights watch can speak for itself but most human rights organizations is that the statements made by these treaty compliance groups that do great respect are not binding on the united states if they were in fact considered to be those with change obligations under the treaties and we would never get any treaties through the senate including the treaty that both of us would like to get through the senate and the disabilities convention.

>> my second question very quickly is the acknowledging what everyone's talked about that the big debate in the international world will continue despite the most recent position we've taken. given all the people special interpreters, whatever they are called, harold, sarah, the leading expert on the iccpr my question deals with the last paragraph into the tent and oral testimony and that is that you would see no problem with a policy that gave a greater consideration of non-us persons within the surveillance eluting to the fact president and his directive suggested that that having served the position you did do you have any more

specific ideas in this context or others we could do just that. >> i've not given a lot of thoughts to that. my general sense from the surveillance that i saw was in fact we are targeted on the requirements and it is and a isa dragnet of the surveillance of average individuals. this isn't a violation of the rights of privacy of every single foreign national and focused on individuals that may pose a national security threat which the united states has a valid interest. >> taking national security assuming you didn't have the

risk basically bombed u.s. persons should try to approximate in the equal treatment and use retention and those kind of things in the surveillance or not? >> some of the things president obama has been focusing on to ensure the information that is collected and that we end sure that it is kept private -- i personally haven't seen this happen that way would be extremely concerned if we found out the united states had collected information about foreigners, great or small can either a world leader or lesser-known person and we were not careful with that information and to let it out. i would very much interfere with that individual's right to privacy. as a national security official

it is important to collect the information we've collected that we need to be careful with it. my sense is that as a policy matter these are imported. >> a question for mr. sieber. among the countries cited among the other major democracies that do form an intelligence surveillance, is there anyone that has a law you would point to as a better model? >> is there a country that has a better model of surveillance van than ours?

>> what other country has a better model in general? >> is a very broad question because you have to consider many aspects in the application. i can give you some reliable differences between the german system and u.s. american. if you have a look at the german system, you have to see that germany has a strong constitutional court and is attached to human rights.

this is a reaction in any steps in this direction should be prevented and this is the reason for very basic differences between the u.s. and germany. the first one for example is that intelligence agencies in germany have no executive power so they cannot execute or arrest warrant or anything like that if they can just collect information and this is the idea the lack of control must be balanced by the lesser constraint measures. second, germany has constitutionally founded strong separation of powers between the police and the intelligence

agencies. this has been changed a little bit after 9/11. but still, there is a fundamental separation exchange that is only possible in the very limited way for very serious crimes. third, ie would say the differentiation between the institution is scripture. we don't have multipurpose institutions like the fbi on the institutional fight. there is absolute strong separation between these institutions and despite certain things we have done after 9/11. you could go further if i compared and look around at the control agencies, which you have. in germany it is separated. we have a special commission

appointed by the parliament who is doing the job. and for the intelligence agency there is a parliamentary commission who does these things. maybe one last point if you look at the aspect of protection in this right and applicability of the institution of broad, the german attitude is more in favor of applying the national constitution of guarantees and with respect to the first question which is in territory, section one of the basic law says that it binds all public

authorities and this is in general whether it is in the country or outside the country there are differences of course that they have to do more with different circumstances because the risk running from abroad might be different than coming from within the country and for that reason i absolutely agree that the systems might be different for internal intelligence than external but it's not based on the fact that we do not apply the constitutional guarantees of broad and it's not based on the fact into getting the different rights to the foreigners. at least in this area of human rights and especially in the privacy rights. so, for example, there was a decision of the court which was

controlling intelligence gathering and which checked the systems. so with respect to the question that we are dealing with here if i may generalize it, i would say we are more open to applying the fundamentals. we don't go into these. we stay out of it. we would apply it but then we have a principle that we check whether these things are justified. i mentioned the court said yes it is dangerous coming from the board and rebalances it was justified with one exception to

the internal conflict into the constitutional set so these are the main interests which i can tell you it's impossible to say better or worse. i would never do that. >> i would like to say a few words with the applicability. >> i want to thank you all for coming in to congratulate you for being the panel that has come the farthest out of the distances to participate today. it's very helpful to have this type of discussion in an open forum. we talked a fair amount today about skepticism of the u.s. law. i think it's fair to say there was a high degree of skepticism -- i will get closer here.

i think it's fair to say that there is a high degree -- if i can get through this question without hurting someone that is going to be my goal. [laughter] there is a high degree of skepticism about the contours and applicability of international law as well. so having experts that are able to speak to these issues is critical i think to us. and i wanted it to trawl off of something that you mentioned and i have to confess it wasn't a focus of mine. i had been focused on the iccpr and applicability of article 17 that you talked about the interest of the state's. and if i understood what you said correctly, that the interest of a state and its own sovereignty is that surveillance by one country in another country is a violation of that sovereignty.

there is no exception under customary international law that would make it any less of a violation of the state sovereign status. that would lead me to say no one is conducting surveillance on any white house. if no country is doing a surveillance but as a practical matter i think it is fair to say that every country is either engaging in foreign intelligence collection or attempting to engage in foreign intelligence collection. if you can explain to me how you can have a principle of customary international law in the absence of an exception that is honored by not one country in the world as i understand it. >> i would remain with the saying there is no permission of espionage under the

international law because the principle of self-defense and conflict therefore the ordinary case into the customer law would require the conviction of the people that espionage is right that our estimation they are strict if we are considering our own we would say yes we do it and we give them a medal if they are considering the other we would see it illegal so there are two durations but we cannot say that international law we can't do it. we have this in the german reunification because there have

been people doing espionage that are now under our jurisdiction. the discussion came up into the constitutional court said there is no way of international law and i think that you would agree with that we have to live in the conflict ended in a way that normal. the world is getting worse and we have many conflict in regime's today now so we can stand with that. >> my question and perhaps you can speak to this is a violation of the international law and infringing the other state to engage in the foreign surveillance? >> i was going to jump on that as well. in answeand the answer to that k it is clearly no. i'm not aware of any country that he leaves the un charters statement on the protection of territorial integrity actually

prohibits electronic surveillance of another country. certainly if that were the understanding of our senate becoming party to the un charter that prohibited us from spying on another country because it would violate their territorial integrity and we would get out of the un charter and immediately. i'm not aware that any other but to say for example the international law does not prohibit the surveillance or spying in the domestic law so that basically means there is a compact between companies. countries have to agree that they are not going to do these things to each other and that charter wasn't saying we promised not to spy on one

another, we promise not to use force. u.s. surveillance in another country might violate the other countries law but it's not a violation of the international law. >> thank you all for being here today. one of the things i find frustrating about the discussion not here specifically but in general there is a tendency to not distinguish between what is the law and what people would like to be the law or what is the matter of policy. thank you for making that distinction in your marks. and if moving from what you think is the binding law to what is not. so i wanted to know one policy

for our meant if we are trying to determine what the government is doing under 702 is legal then do we think there is a binding international instrument that affects the question? is a violation of the article 17 of the international rights do they not recognize that? >> if the u.s. government doesn't recognize that, what is the body document and what is it that makes that binding on the agencies? >> it is the treaty itself. it's too a bite by and to honor the commitments in the treaty and could face. >> it is the body that has the last say on the interpretation

because obviously the u.s. government interprets them treaty debate could differently. is there some other body between the government itself that's been binding on the way that they are implemented? >> the committee is one of the most authoritative sources on this. >> it is not persuasive as it is bonding. >> from the opinion as many other governments, it is. the united states doesn't recognize the extraterritorial application of it. >> this is an honest question. give me an example of a country that views the itpcr and abet itself takes its own advice or interpretation. >> surveillance as i said as a novel issue and isn't something that's been addressed by the case law. and especially not since the revelations from snowden which have disclosed even to the policymakers in many countries

the degree to which the law, the domestic law is being applied and the programs how much data is actually being collected. so it is a novel interpretation in question as it is in the united states. >> sorry to cut you off but we have a strict timetable or here. i'm interested in your interpretation of what constitutes control and how being surveilled what he would eventually put someone within the control. my concern about that interpretation in part is i am not sure what meaning is left in the phrase under its jurisdiction. if the statute talks about the territory and jurisdiction if jurisdiction means something in addition to territory it seems like a meaningless phrase that could include surveillance.

>> it is meaningless in the sense that the united states has taken out and used the technology to conduct surveillance on a mass scale so it affects an enormous number of people. the jurisdictional clause has been extraterritorial in terms of the torture in which a smaller number of people have been affected. >> when you talk about someone being detained or tortured i would say within the control of the government who is detained. so my question is when you get in the surveillance into the person isn't in the physical custody what is within the treaty lacks to go? >> the communications are in the affected control of the government so that is one way to look at the obligation, but in addition they have an obligation

to ensure the rights territory of the but also to respect extraterritoriality. although they are not necessarily bound to enact the legislation domestically regarding -- not necessarily bound to ensure the rights of individuals with regards to privacy they are bound to respect those rights extra territorially. ..

national security, and i guess in particular if you have comments on the agreement was reached between the department of justice and a number of firms, whether that agreement goes far enough and provides sufficient detail to give comfort to business partners of those firms overseas. >> the agreement, thank you for the question first of all. the agreement with the justice department is used as a significant step forward that are additional steps that can be taken. that would be helpful as well. one is the level of detail that the companies are able to share, including disaggregation of data between section 215 and 702 or

whether it's a national security letter. so the greater level of granularity would be helpful. the second part of that is, it is not only important that the companies be able to share out information but that the government share information as will a provider with transparency which is often lost in these discussions. a debate that's been taking place today speaks to the importance of great transparency because 702 already includes a number of protections that are not generally known, particularly internationally, that christopher wolf point, if they were more well known it would be clear, the extent to which steps are being taken in united states that are not necessarily being taken in other countries. >> and you also recommend, a couple of recommendations were oversight and indiscriminate collection.

and the 702 broke up there are already oversights to the foreign intelligence surveillance court and some internal government, in regard to indiscriminat indiscriminaten we've heard only the sba foreign intelligence purpose. so it's somewhat constrained. you think with regard this program it meets those requirements? >> corrected my recommendations there were not content to suggest that it in fact was indiscriminate. it was suggested, it was a suggestion that taking steps to be clear about the protection that are in place and to the can it is not, it is, in fact, not indiscriminate, to reaffirm that would be helpful as we go about doing our business internationally. >> mr. wolf, you and allies the laws and shown -- you analyze the laws and shown they're not better but maybe not as good as our laws. by some cry too. what lesson should we draw from the in terms of how countries should conduct their surveillance program?

>> so the purpose of our white paper and our research was will be more -- than to reach judgments and to take winners and losers or to decide who is better or best. but we thought it was important in light of the claims that would be made quickly by the cloud industry and europe that there is national security access that goes on in the eu and elsewhere around the world and often without the controls and safeguards and transparency that we have here. so the overall conclusion that we reached is this is a global problem. obviously, is one that has been focused on intensely here in the united states because of the snowden revelations, but it is an international issue that needs to be resolved internationally, particularly with sharing that goes on among intelligence and authorities. it is heartening that the european parliament in its resolution last week adopted a draft report that came out in january that focus on european intelligence gathering practices. we hope that the data protection authority in europe who have

been vigorous critics of the nsa practices will comment on their own countries practices as they have been relatively silent on that. we think the debate that has to be made should be among all those interested in privacy protection and obvious event include state commissioners abroad. >> the countries have a lot of self interest in conducting surveillance programs. do you see a forum in which countries can or even should agree with the methods that were taken? >> that's well above my pay grade. i really don't have a view in the. if i could mention on the transparency point, we get a white paper in august that then general counsel of the commerce department john kerry cited that showed on a per capita basis access by national security law enforcement on a per capita basis is larger outside of the united states in many instances. >> judge wald? >> i have two questions.

given what most, many observers can see are widely varying practices in different countries about surveillisurveilli ng their own, and other countries citizens. would you advocate as we are sitting here, have to make some observations, maybe recommendations on 702? would you advocate that we unilaterally, recommended unilaterally putting in place one, the same protection for non-u.s. person surveillance that we have for u.s. citizens, or, too, raising a non-u.s. citizen persons protections to the level that the official bodies of these international organizations that we've talked about say they should be lax if you come out on the second, what specific criteria to we have to go on as to what those practices

would be? in other words, is a slightly cynical into the question, what would be the additional protections in real-time to privacy interests of non-u.s. persons if the u.s. took a position that the icc p5 does apply to our activities outside territorial u.s., we've already met those standards such as seems to be the case with some of the other countries who espouse the official, the official broader interpretation of the iccpi but then go on their way as mr. wolf suggested and don't? >> well, this is -- so, i mean, i think one could change that needs to be made is the purpose of the surveillance it's been much more targeted to the definition of foreign intelligence information is much too broad. it encompasses, you know, things that conversation that could be

just a generally the foreign affairs of the united states and in the we've heard in the panel testimony earlier that that is somewhat reined in by certifications, but those are not public and we have not seen them. they should be a lot more transparency in the law. i think the difference in the german law is that there is a lot more transparency. the capacity also is less in germany. the u.s. has vast capacity. it affects a lot more people. but definitely targeting a more targeted approach and applying, you know, necessary and proportionate principles to the surveillance as well i think would go a long way. there's probably plenty of room for recommendations that i can get involved in here, but -- >> in general would you're your standing be that there should be a presumption that we treat non-u.s. persons like u.s. persons in our surveillance activities, or rather that we go

to the best practices we can pull from the people who endorse the iccpi, even if we don't actually warrant the application? >> i think that there can be differences in the law itself, but it has, the differences have to be ones that don't impair the impact of the right itself. so the right to privacy has to be part of can has been made part and parcel of the assurances that they can be different for practical reasons when it comes -- >> can you give us in my remaining two seconds some application of what you just said to 702? >> well, i'd like to go into more detail now but right now -- >> but -- >> there's not a word requirement under 702 for individuals. but there should be -- it may be

that is not a practical requirement to have a warrant for individuals outside of the united states. it's also facilities and about targeting as well. but the procedures that are in place to protect against sort of suspicionless coming in, there's no standard for what authority has defined before it can target an individual. the main distinguishing principle is that it is a foreigner and that information will be acquired for foreign intelligence purpose. so that is too broad. >> okay. >> does that make since? >> yes. all right, very quickly i guess. mr. wolf, your testimony, you know, recited the report about the lesser, basically the lesser protections most other countries including our closest allies

give to privacy, at least despite some of the countries adheres to the iccpi broader definition of privacy. yet you also note that the economic risks a us-based imitation companies, threats from both competing companies inside those countries and from the government themselves, that they may balkanize and insist on collection of storage activity being conducted in the country poses a risk. is it above your pay grade to give us some indication of what may in line our policies, u.s. should follow given those two competing concerns of? >> i think our concern in doing the work that we did on the white paper was the misperception that was a rising -- >> let's assume you've done those and that they are real. but also are real the threats to the competitive miss of u.s. companies, foreign governments

and peoples very excited and want to keep everything inside their own country. >> to our position is they are receiving themselves when they think they keep data presumably within the four corners of their own country that it's safer from surveillance not only from the own surveillance authority but, of course, through sharing arrangements from surveillance authorities from elsewhere around the world. and the balkanization of data is not a useful global phenomenon at all. >> what can the u.s. are what should we recommend they bring -- spent time has expired. spent you can think about it. [laughter] spent all my last round we were talking about what were committed any other countries laws that did a better job here, and mr. garfield come you are ready to jump in. do you remember what you want to jump in on? i want to give you a chance to make the point if you still remember what it was? >> it really was the point that

was made in response, which is that, in fact, our expense in getting out our businesses that there aren't many, if any, of the country to have as many safeguards in place. the lack of open discussion through multinational engagement as well as transparency here in the u.s. furthers that false perception that somehow other nations are doing more than we are. and that is certainly something that can whether through legislation or recommendations from the pclob we can do something about. >> a question for laura pitter. a couple of other witnesses have raised this in a couple times i grabbed for the book in order to raise it and didn't get a chance. the definition of foreign intelligence. as i read it, i mean it's information that relates to the ability of the united states to protect against actual or potential attack, grave hostile acts of a foreign power,

sabotage, international terrorism, international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or clandestine intelligence activities. none of those are too broad i would think it and then it says, information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the united states. i mean, isn't that precisely what foreign intelligence is supposed to be about? information with respect to what foreign countries are doing that might affect our foreign affairs. why is that too broad? >> i think the first category of information you said good, would be permissible but the general foreign affairs of the united states allows for the collection of a vast amount of information that doesn't necessarily have any national security archive's. >> but it has foreign affairs purpose it is by definition about the intent of foreign governments and are you saying that other countries self

restrain themselves from trying to understand what their adversaries are doing? >> well, speed these are matters that don't attack -- involve attacking zone spent if other countries laws are overbroad and vague, then they are in violation of the the international covenant of political rights as well spent i think john would say if everybody is doing it, it probably isn't a violation of the treaty. everybody didn't bind themselves not to do what they all were doing at the time they bound themselves to the treaty. >> the revelations about how this is being applied are just coming out now and they're going to be challenges and are already challenges to the law. i think we're going to find that there is room certainly for reining in the overbroad of some of the stages as they exist right now. i think that because it allows

for the communications of things that don't necessarily have to do with national security, that it just, it's overbroad and it's impacting -- >> in what way does the collection of information about foreign affairs overbroad? >> because it could be coming in, someone talking about, you talking about, you know, their opinions about foreign affairs of the speed is not someone talking about their opinions. it's the information with respect to a foreign powers. so this is not joe schmoe in germany saying i'd like a don't like the united states. this is about what germany thinks about the united states. >> it merely has to relate to the foreign affairs of the united states. >> yes. >> in my opinion it's a tube broad. it allows for much too broad a

type of king negation. >> now, i feel. i'd like to have a second round the second round from another tiger grant if we could but i will yield for now spent mr. bellinger, i think you put your finger a bit with his and i like to follow on this, this conversation as well because it struck me, first, where would you draw the line? and i'm struggling to determine what precisely is impermissible about collecting foreign intelligence in the category of foreign affairs set forth in fisa? >> thanks for that question. and i think this is a very important point and judge walton started it and you have continued it. we have to be clear about what international law is. international law is not principles that we think would be fine policy, principles that you and i might agree. international law, we are serious about international law

and this is the definition of international, are things that nations agree to be bound by treaty, or that his customary international meaning that countries do it so often that everybody does it and they do it by a sense of binding legal obligation. so two points here. and judge wald, i heard you say while it is true that other countries actually take a broader definition of whether the iccpr applied extraterritorially, i'm not aware of any country in the world that believes that the iccpr actually binds them with respect to electronic surveillance, that that right to privacy in article 17 actually limits their ability to conduct electronic surveillance of foreign nationals. so that is just not a treaty obligation that countries have accepted, even unto the iccpr. it might be something that human rights groups which were the case but it is not something that the governments and certain

something the united states government has accepted. and one more round on the human rights committee but again, the treaty itself does not say that the decisions of the human rights committee, which is basic group of academic experts, are binding. governments the right treaties not out to right language. for example, the u.n. charter says that we undertake to comply with rulings of the icj, but the human rights monitoring groups, countries have not said that we undertake to comply with their decisions. and, in fact, the senate, and all of you know this, the senate would never agree to cede responsibility for the future interpretation of the treaty to a group of academic experts. that would completely take out of the hands of a shared understanding between the executive and the senate the interpretation of the treaty. the united states, the obama

admission is welcome recognize that other people may not agree on the extraterritorial application of the iccpr, but no country believes that the iccpr actually limits electronic surveillance. >> i just wanted to ask a follow-up question to ms. pitter. thank you. i know we've and a lot of our questions at you. i think there's a sense within the united states government, a little bit of exasperation, that when the concern is that our surveillance lacks transparency, or that we are somehow outside the mainstream of what other countries are doing. and i look at 702 in particular and i see something where our legislative branch has specifically said exactly what our executive branch can do. executive branch headed by -- then oversees the execution of that authority.

it is subject to the oversight of the judicial branch and it is subject to the oversight of our legislative branch. i guess my question is, systemically, what else could the united states be doing to help build the confidence and trust of other countries? >> so, the oversight so far has all been in secret. i think that's one problem. even the first panel today said they were in the process of declassifying a large number of documents and they're looking at doing that because they recognize the importance of transparency. the oversight has not, i mean come easily what happened with 215, -- >> about 702 which is the focus of -- >> we don't know the details of the oversight regarding 702. the only information i have about oversight would be regarding 215, and we saw that the judicial oversight in that context, you know, wound up,

there was an opinion that had an impact on the vast number of communications of americans kept secret from americans. >> let me push back on this notion the oversight is not transparent. so again we have a statute that tells the world exactly what the executive branch must present to the judiciary committee what findings the judiciary must make, what authority the judiciary has, the city that application, and the framework for the surveillance. we have a public statute that also tells you exactly what the executive branch is obligated to share with congress. so where is the lack of transparency in that? >> you know, the judicial oversight for the 702 program is annual. they look at just a procedure to get a look at the individual targeting requirements, that's done by an nsa analyst at a computer desk. >> actually i think if you were

here for the first panel the testimony was that that is not, in fact, the case, that it is an ongoing process of oversight. there are regular reporting requirements both to the court and to the congress. so -- >> i didn't hear the first panel and i believe he said -- i did hear the first panel and these are the targeting of the panelists argued eventually buddies not something that's done at the beginning. >> so there is not public review of specific targeting decisions. so this is the united states government saying we would like to collect foreign intelligence information about this specific -- that's a lack of transparency that is problematic for you? >> the transparency can even the certification that the trend for court kids, there's, they don't even see the identifiers or the selectors. they disapprove the procedures. so that's a transparency -- that's a problem.

in terms of -- >> we are over time. thank you. spent is this the microphone that works better? okay. i guess maybe this question is directed at john but if anyone wants to jump in, that's fine. if the iccpr did have application to the u.s. government surveillance of non-u.s. persons abroad, something inside the territorial issue, what does privacy mean in that context? i have found the lack of a universal accepted definition of privacy very frustrating writ large across everything that we do, and the same issue, i guess is there a universally accepted definition of privacy? is there a definition of privacy that is binding on the u.s. government? if not, how would we -- if you

could sort of help us understand that. >> it's a great question and that's really the third prong. the reason the iccpr doesn't apply is, one, within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, then even if it were subject to our jurisdiction, then it would have to be within the power and control and know what is really going to legitimately argue that, as i think you said earlier, power and control in the view of those who take that interpretation of power and control, someone physically have into custody, not electronic surveillance, and then there's the issue even if those applied, is something unlawful or arbitrary violation of privacy and they are not definitions that are universally accepted. people can argue about these things, but for it to be law of the country actually violates, there has to be an agreed definition on privacy and has to

be an agreed definition on what is arbitrary. and there just are not those definitions. i can, someone can say that someone has an absolute right not to have any country buy into anything that they're doing, that that's a violation of the privacy but there's not an accepted definition of that. i could frankly imagine if one were to accept the first part of your premise, which is that it were to apply extraterritorially and let's also say that it were so within the years jurisdiction come was a someone, the united states is actually holding a terrorist in any other country and we agreed that the iccpr applied them we agreed the person was in our power and control, and then we were to do extensive interviews of that person about the person's private life, and then we just publish it willy-nilly not as part of a criminal proceeding but essentially just as elite. i think i there might be an argument that that might be an

arbitrary intervention with that person's right to privacy. but i think that's, there's not a definition of privacy or of arbitrary or unlawful that is binding as a matter of international law. >> any thoughts on that question? >> which you repeat the question against? >> what does privacy mean in the iccpr context? where does the definition come from? how would you define the definition of? >> well, it guards against unlawful and arbitration interferes with an individual's privacy. so there has to be, you know, respect for correspondence, for example. and a respect for an individual's personal space and it there has to be an ability to have personal space spent where are you getting that definition? >> well, i mean, that's coming from the interpretation of the right to privacy is connected to

freedom of expression, freedom of association. it impacts that, and you know, the right to correspondence comes from that as well. so it's, i mean, it's defined in the treaty itself, and -- >> what is the definition? humor me. if you have to look it up, never mind. it sounds like what you're giving it is sort of your sense of what privacy entails, not a sort of legally defined or legally articulated definition. >> a private dealers and goes back to brandeis warned us of the right to privacy is the right to be let alone but to recognize and i think it's been recognize ever since 1890 that there are exceptions for the good of society for law and order, for social good. and factually where the rubber hits the road. what are the permissible exceptions for national security surveillance, and you know, that's the discussion that needs

to be had globally. judge wald asked what should the u.s. government do. i think to promote the discussion as a global matter, and at the same time i think it should promote the decoupling of national security surveillance from cross-border data flows for commercial purposes, the threat to withdraw safe harbor, for example, the declaration that the transatlantic trade and investment partnership shouldn't address david because of what happened with national security surveillance is a non sequitur. those issues need to be dealt with between governments, but that shouldn't interfere with cross-border data flows, which havhave to privacy protections built-in, no question. but those are not something, that isn't something the defense issues not something the countries themselves can really address and they have done about as much as they can in pushing for transparency, pushing very hard. >> did you want to add something?

>> the question was as early about what the appropriate venue is, and i would say a reminder that the strategic and economic dialogue didn't exist beyond five years ago. and so this is one issue that's getting left behind in the discussion. the importance of creating a framework and a venue for greater multinational dialogue around the surveillance issue. and i think the pclob and its recommendations could have a dramatic effectiveness. >> it's not the we have an international definition because the countries are two different did however in the country, international law, european law and other legal bodies, these definitions are emerging. and, of course, they have to develop. what is sure is that there is a core area of privacy that we all would agree that privacy is infringed, for example, if you directly, due i