option. ladies and gentlemen, in times like this when the security of the euro-atlantic area is challenged, the north atlantic alliance has not wavered, and it will not waver. for 65 years we have been clear if our commitment finish in our commitment to one another as allies and to the global security system within which nato is rooted. our transatlantic foundation is our strength, and it has given us the ability to consult, cooperate and cope with any crisis. this does not mean that they toe is the only -- that nato is the

only solution to every crisis in the euro/atlantic region. but i do believe it is part of every solution, because the alliance provides three elements that are crucial for facing modern security challenges and that are right for europe's and america's defense. these are political legitimacy, tried and tested structures and military strength. now, first political legitimacy. the combined and voluntary will of 28 of world's strongest sovereign democracies is an extremely powerful source of political he visit massey.

legitimacy, something that unilateral action or coalitions of the willing simply cannot enjoy. this carries over into our missions and operations. it attracts partners whose political support and military contributions add to our broader international legitimacy. our isaf mission in afghanistan is a clear example. it has included 50 countries, all 28 allies and 22 partner nations. that's one-fourth of all the world's countries. the biggest and most effective coalition in recent history. a coalition that only nato could have gathered and commanded.

and that leads me to my second point. nato provides tried and tested political and military structures. we have a unique permanent forum for political consultation where north americans and europeans meet every day to debate and decide how to insure our collective security. just two weeks ago we met at poland's request to consult within the framework of article iv of the washington treaty. this allowed us to immediately address the security concerns of one of our members and to reaffirm our solidarity. our political and military structures also provide us with

a permanent crisis response system so we can react quickly and effectively to any concern with political measures, with military measures or an appropriate mix of the two. we also have the permanent nato military command structure, so when we decide to take any military action, we have the right framework with the right skills and the right people already in place. we have headquarters that can be with deployed quickly to command operations and missions, we have reaction forces on standby, and we can bring the necessary military contributions together

quickly from nato allies as well as from other 40 partner nations on fife continents -- five continents. time and again when an ally has felt its security under threat, we have come together and quickly provided the necessary support. after 9/11 when we deployed surveillance planes here to the united states, during the syria crisis when we deployed patriot missiles defense systems to turkey and today when our surveillance our craft are monitoring our borders in eastern europe. now, imagine that nato did not exist. every time a crisis broke out, a political and military framework would have to be built from

scratch. political consensus would have to be forged, partners found, military plans developed and capabilities designed, delivered and deployed. would be costly in terms of effectiveness, in terms of money and in terms of time. indeed, once the necessary elements for the response were in place, it could be too late to the stem the crisis. so our standing structures save time, they save effort, and they save taxpayers money. they bring other advantages, too; they allow us to harmonize military requirements across the

alliance, they support the equipping, training and exercising of our troops, and they have helped us to build the most capable and connected military forces in history. and this is my third point, nato's unique military strength. it is a force multiplier, and it allows every ally -- even its most powerful one -- to pack a bigger punch. let me point out a few of the ways that american security has benefited from nato's collective strength. again, afghanistan is a good example. in 2010 as more than forces -- as american forces surged,

european allies surged, and partners surged too. over the past ten years, for every two u.s. soldiers who have served in afghanistan, one european soldier has always served with them. some 400,000 european soldiers have rotated through afghanistan to help make sure it would never again be a launching pad for international terrorism. in libya three years ago, european allies, canada and may toe partners played a crucial role in enforcing an arms embargo maintaining a to no-fly zone and protecting the people from attacks by their own leader.

today in kosovo over 31 nato, european and partner countries are keeping the peace. and off the coast of somalia, ships from four allied navies -- spain, turkey, italy and the netherlands -- are sailing with u.s. ships, patrolling against pirates and keeping vital sea lanes safe. european nations are helping to ease america's security burden in other ways too. for example, the european union is running its own counterpiracy operation, and several european nations have stepped up to respond to the growing instability in africa, in particular in mali and central africa. so nato makes a unique

contribution to our security because only nato brings together the world's most capable democracies in a permanent, integrated political and military structure. and only nato delivers the political legitimacy and military strength that no one nation or ad hoc coalition can deliver on its own. it comes down to a simple truth: shared security is better than solitary insecurity. and it's cheaper too. it's why nato is a great defender of america, a great deal for america, and it's why

nato matters to america. that said, i'm the first to version that europe -- to stress that europe must do more. i take every opportunity to point out that there should be a fairer sharing of the costs and the responsibilities. both between north america and europe and within europe. and developments in ukraine are a stark reminder that security in europe cannot with taken for granted and that neither europe, nor america can come up with a solution alone. that's why i will continue to remind european nations that

they these to step up -- they need to step up politically and militarily to hold the line on defense cuts, to increase their defense spending and to work together to fill key capability gaps including missile defense, cyber defense and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. later this year in wales in the united kingdom, we will hold our next nato summit. >> they're seeing a lot of colleagues and friends here. good morning. just for those of you who are joining the second part of our, of our conference, my name is heather conley, i'm senior fellow and director here at the europe program. at csis. for the last several days, we have brought together an

extraordinary group of europeans and americans, and we've taken them to beautiful colonial williamsburg, virginia, for several days of very focused conversation about the future of europe. and using the american historical experience and the creation of our union, our work in progress. so as we looked at the concept of having europe become an ever closer union and the elements of that ever closer union -- the economic pillar, democracy, leadership -- how do you create a more perfect union? and we realize both our unions are not very perfect if many ways, but there's some endearing qualities. and so through the generosity of the colonial williamsburg foundation and the college of william and barry, csis joined and brought these thought leaders together. so what we're going to do for the next hour and a half is give be you -- i wish you could have

been with us for those three extraordinary days, but we're going to give you a flavor for some of the themes, some of the conversation that we had about the future of the european union. and as our first discussion with our journalist colleagues gave you a flavor for, the state of the european union is a strong union, but it's been tested severely over the last five years of the economic crisis. we had our framework for this discussion was if you think of the european union as a house that was under, you know, half construction of an economic union and then the crisis thrust upon it, it's been trying to to build a house, weather the storm, maybe enlarge the house if we think about ukraine and expanding european integration, but there are some real challenges before europe, and for the united states a strong europe is absolutely essential.

certainly before the crisis in ukraine, now more so than ever. and sometimes there's an -- well, no, not sometimes, there is a constant underappreciation in the united states for how europe is evolving and transforming but facing some severe headwinds economically, politically and democratically. so as i said, i've been in my williamsburg nirvana, and with our journalist colleagues, and you got that sense. now we have our foreign policy heavy hitters and thought leaders who have really looked at the expansion of -- can expanse of transatlantic issues, european issues. and so let me just very briefly introduce my colleagues. i'm going to let you give some of tear own reflections about the state of the european union, perhaps reflect on the upcoming european parliament elections and what that means for the

future of europe and then, again, we will welcome you into having some questions and some dialogue as we finish. we are very delighted and honored to have francois with us, the chairman of the council of the geneva center for security policy and also chairman of the london-based international institute for strategic studies. francois has written a new book, and i hope he shares a little bit about this new book that's out about a european dream that maybe is a different dream than what you originally had. and then we're going to turn to enrique -- [inaudible] she's based in berlin but has been a thought leader in understanding the construction of europe, and she will provide us with her perspectives. and then finishing up is my dear friend and colleague, and i

would say mentor in this job, john kornblum is a csis senior adviser whom i rely on greatly and heavily to help me understand europe. john is a former assistant secretary of state for european apowers, former u.s. ambassador to berlin, to the osce. he is timeless, and he is ageless, but he has been at the, at some very critical moments in the formation of the transatlantic relationship that, again, i hope he will share some of those reflections. so with that, francois, over to you. >> thank you very much, heather. it's really been great participating in these meetings. i feel a little bit like boris yeltsin when he was asked at a press conference in istanbul when he was president what is the situation of russia today, and boris yeltsin said, well, do

you want the short answer first or the long answer first? journalist says i guess the short answer first. yeltsin says situation good. what is the long answer? long answer is not good. [laughter] that's one way of introducing the topic. [laughter] but there's another, there's another way of introducing the topic of the state of the union. it also happens to take place in istanbul, and that's a speech which the prince of darkness, richard pearl, gave 12 or 13 years ago at a meeting organize toed by turks, the turkish foreign minister. and richard was going on about how hopeless, feckless, spineless the europeans were and that the european union was a complete, you know, complete

wreck. there's nothing good to be said about it. and then he said, oh, yes, and it is unacceptable that they will not accept you, turkey, into their ranks. then, work of course, it came my turn to speak and i said, well, you know, there's a little bit of a problem here. if we're really spineless, hopeless, feckless as has been painted, it is a strange friend who would want to urge you turks to somewhere that particular -- to enter that particular community. so you can't have it both ways. but the fact is, first of all, we've never had a strong union, heather. we may have had a strong europe, but we never had a strong union. i mean, a strong union is the united states of america. constitution. as any one of our participants, professor wood reminded us, european union looks more like the u.s. at the time of the articles of confederation. that is a weak union, not a strong union. and that's not a critique, just statement of fact.

and, therefore, it is not a strategic animal. this was already stated earlier on. when it does strategic stuff, it tends to do it inadvertently. and this is to a large extent what's happened in the runup to the events into -- [inaudible] secondly, it doesn't have a demos. it doesn't have a people whose primary identity is european. the primary seat of identity is international. here again, this is a statement of reality, not an expression of some sort of hidden wish. thirdly, the situation -- sorry, the third thing is that progress towards a closer union has not

happened recently. the last time we tried to do a great big push was at the european constitution in 2005. we had a convention, and the comparison, the analogy with the u.s. was quite deliberate at the time, have a constitutional convention to produce a constitution. constitution was not passed. it wasn't so much the content per se because it actually wasn't terribly federal as a constitution, but the fact is that seem in france and the netherlands, two of the six founding states of the european union, were not ready to go into constitutional mode. and that's, that was the situation. what i've just described describes the european union as it was ten years ago as it does today. but in the interval, bad things have happened. it's been further weakened.

first of all, the european dream has been crowded out by the night pair of the -- nightmare of the policies which have had to be undertaken to save the euro project. this is what my book is about. it is considered that there's a real risk that these policies are rebounding not against the euro per se. people are actually quite happy with the euro as an instrumentality. but against the european union where the trend and the opinion polls over the last, the pew opinion polls in particular since the beginning of the crisis all going the same direction in about the same proportions in every country where the poll has been taken except in the united kingdom where the percentages were so low that if they went any lower, they would have struck oil. [laughter] but everywhere else it's opinion downwards. everywhere else it's been downwards. secondly, we have run out of money.

notably, i will come back to that. thirdly, we have no growth. last can be counted in the hundreds of billions of euro if not up to a trillion euro over that period. that is a lot of money. relations within the european union have become worse. we have the north/south divide, we have cooling of the french, german couple not to mention the cooling of significant relations between specific members of the european union and other significant countries, the german-american relationship was talked about. even worse, the four freedoms

which are really the european union's dna, the four freedoms, freedom of movement of people, of goods, freedom of movement of capital, freedom of movement of services, these are being severely challenged within the union. so all of this looks pretty bloody bad. and it looks even worse if we look at where we stood 15 years ago. pause at the time -- because at the time we had the ambition of going constitutional. we were on the verge of launching the great euro project which was supposed to bring growth, stability and convergence -- which has done exactly the opposite. ..

how public opinion is actually adverse to solutions. but for the moment, politicians know which side their bread is buttered. i know that if they come up with anything which looks like ever closer union, they will be shot here so at the oncoming european elections, the month of may, there is an offer no overt federalist agenda. any political party in any

european country. that is obviously bad. and yet, let's look back again 15 years. bob jenkins formula, and bob kagan was i can a lot more careful in talking about the title of his book which would suggest. that is a fantastic accomplishment. we have defused the sources of conflict, not simply between the western countries of the union, franco-german reconciliation and all that but also between the eastern members of the union. think hungary and its neighbors with significant hungarian minority. thank poland. -- thank poland. this is absolutely remarkable. and this, by the way, was not backward looking. this was not the narrative of we

are awful people and we have to build our own straitjacket so that we're not going to get at each others throat again in the future. this is actually not the way the pacification of your occurred during the last few decades or and notably through the great wave of enlargement which make the european continent whole and free during the last 10 years, since 2004. secondly, the single market, it works. whether you're a member of the eurozone or whether you're not a member of the eurozone, the single market works. and although i said the freedoms were challenged, they may be challenged but apart from a non-eu country, which is switzerland, the challenge has not materialized, and i hope it won't materialize, practical, political form yet.

so not only is the european union, does it deserved to live, to prosper, only if one looks back at the track record of enlargement, but it deserves to enter into step changes in the future, get back to the union. but that's not going to happen soon. what is going to happen soon? where to go next? first, we are going to have the elections in may. very interesting. there were plenty of shocks in the election. the national front they become the number one party in will be essentially a protest vote in france. [inaudible] utep in the uk dutch the ukip in the uk may be number two party. but although this is not going to look good, the fact is that for the first time we're going

to have a european election where people are going to vote as if it were a real election, as if they were real stakes. and that in itself is positive. the extremist parties are awful but they will have had one virtue, and that is to actually force some sort of discussion of what europe is about. so that's the first step. second step, we're going to do the recount some of who does what with in the european union. commission, high representative, foreign security affairs and so one. that's casting, hopefully, will be good. i.e. immediately add, -- i any of the ad, if you asked me to think it would be good, i would say honestly doesn't look good

for the moment. the looks like the next head of the commission is going to be yet another politician who having lost an election in his own country, or is no longer legible in his own country is going to be, is going to serve in the commission. doesn't look good. but we'll see. and i think there are good hopes that we may, not that we have tested and actually seen work the office of the high representative and the external action service, and there have been real accomplishments with kosovo and serbia reconciling, and the partaking in the iran nuclear negotiations. we probably can now actually put a high-powered individual at the head of that office. and that would also bring a lot

of improvement. thirdly, we have to restore growth. that is the precondition for anything good to happen in terms of the development of the strengthening of the european union, and to restore growth, what we do know is that current policies do not restore growth. i have my own suggestions in my book which are essentially about removing the straitjacket of euro for those countries who suffer the most under it, i checked of debate and discussion can we discussed a lot at williamsburg. but whatever one may think about the future of the euro, we may have to do something in any case which look-alike abenomics. if people tell me, italy has much to hide debt to be able to find growth again, well, italy has a debt which, presented in terms of gdp 90% lower than that

of japan. japan is 220. italy is 135. anybody tells me that, therefore, japan can grow and italy cannot will not meet with a good reception from me. maybe abenomics won't work, but it certainly is worth a try. and it sort of looks as if italy is thinking pretty much along those sorts of lines. so we're not going to get to the sunny uplands, to speak churchillian, in churchillian mode. were not going to get in to the sunny uplands time anytime soon, but there are things that we can do to pull ourselves out of the mire of the lost -- the last six years. there are things that we can do to change our fortune. don't count us out, but at the

same time do not expect the union to be something that it is not and will not be for a very long time. it is not and will not be a strategic animal. member states will continue, as is the case for nato. we on the native is no strategic animal because the member states to decide to do something and do it under the nato plan. european union is pretty much the same. and don't beat up on the union because it bumbled in strategic but without realizing what it does. it is sadly not equipped to make those sorts of decisions in a deliberate manner. the critique which have been made about the eastern partnership has been one of the coldest of prudence pushback in ukraine six months ago. that critique is actually valid in terms of the pushback, but i don't think that one can imagine

for one second that mr. barroso was thinking strategically when he was working on the eastern partnership. if i'm wrong that would mean that the rows of had an incredibly, an incredible battle incredible hidden agenda but also it would mean that he would've been an entirely reckless individual dating russia delivered without having the means to face him. i don't think he was doing that deliberately, or that he was reckless enough debate the russian bear. no. this was a case where could have made a lot more sense for the member states to have paid attention to what the institutions of the union were bumbling into at that time. so this is, in conclusion, the tricky aspect of where we are. we're sort of in the middle. we have elements of the eu action, eastern partnership with

eu action. and yet at the same time the major receptacle and certainly the essential vehicle and strategic terms remain the member states. and it's the combination of those two which can lead to some very techie decision making. but once again we may have our problems, but when we look at our achievements, and they have been great, notwithstanding the crisis, i think there's still a lot of fight. thank you very much. >> thank you, francois. ulrike? >> treadway commission are comparing yourself to yeltsin, then i am comparing myself public with -- said that the women who hear voices and hearing voices about her fully united european union. sometimes soon and then i put into position of the catholic church the vessel got it wrong

history because he was bring the french king to queer nation and was ending the 100 years war, if i'm not mistaken. so i think i'm not telling you the story that the eu or the eurozone in this existing situation is fine or doesn't have any flaws. the thing is that they very interesting discussion that csis has offered us to have for three days come as many american counterparts, i guess i think is, in terms of analysis, we are all on the same analysis. we know, we knew that the euro was a political story. we know that it has flaws on the monetary side. we knew that the institutions are lifting behind. we knew it didn't -- writing exercise, so an so forth. we know this. we also know that the european euro crisis had a big disaster in our economies that basically everybody -- the germans did ask

party in the south, spending part and we're basically dramatically lacking european executive which could have done the same sort of sharp cuts like the u.s. government did on the banks, so and so forth. we know this. so in these discussions where we are always forced competitive longer accept this framing, more europe, francois is on the left side and i'm -- i'm not spending. i'm here to to i defend more of that. we know that this is a your pet does not function, that doesn't fill the basic needs for basic europe which is not able to convey this citizens vote to what people really want and that this is a techno- structure which politics doesn't play in which department is refined, so uninstall. i'm not giving you the discourse in that respect. but what a geeky is that if you look at sort of the solutions and where we actually do divide, where i divide with francois,

right divide a little bit less i think with john and with the brits that we have to give lecture on the future as a nation state and so we are honestly do divide. what comes next. here i am with -- [inaudible] you roll the stone, it comes down. now it's coming down the european stone. we roll it up again. probably in a different way because history is always forward and not backward. and so it's not enough for me. i tell you what, the moment the eurozone should explode are you ask what i see will never happen on purpose can you not see -- and, therefore, now be closed his shop or close the banks for two weeks. it will not happen. it may happen. it may happen because we do not

know because we do not know how ukraine will impact on our capacity to deal, or whatever. a happen by default. the moment that should happen, what about wishing for is the moment they as the default. it's been the agenda going back to national centers or do we have smart people who say okay, the stone is coming back and it's not there and we hopefully will have enough people and i'm betting we do have enough people there who will say look, let's do europe again. needs to be different but the learning curve cannot be in the way we should the last time. we know what to do better and now going to give. with other people on this bill that basically if you do all this from now your building. what you come up with is probably likely to happen. the moment they should explode or implode you positive eurozone countries not giving up the

euro, most of them. we will have a polling joint and the question comes down to whether -- a lot of work or not much because still expensive so why shouldn't he give that memorandum? if you do this and now your building, you quickly come up to the situation where we will all be stopped unless we are in a situation of completely uncontrolled. and that's why i sit here, and i'm completely unaware of the fact that we're in a catch-22 and the current system cannot deliver the solution to that is the catch-22 we're in because we are only doing at the margins and these reforms at the margins do not help our do not improve the situation. that is basically the catch-22 situation we are in, which is why moving the whole system from -- were just the it and probably you need at some point some

systemic breakdown which made the. but you didn't work for it. it is based in the coming by default. i happen to printed a little postcard which basically most people like and only the european construction. [inaudible] what i get is lots of european citizens which, it's not a blue flag which basically pushes everything down but it's just the thing of ownership and we the european citizens, european raise, public good that we do need to organize together because the real country is called your land and not france and germany and the netherlands. on which we need to build a different kind of democracy. you may say i'm hearing voices and i'm completely new at this and this is what the catholic church said, but if you want to have it more sort of rational,

it is a very good opinion poll which i can send you if you send e-mail in which basically -- a limit its discussion. exit freedom in uk can you get more than 50% averaged of european people for either status quo or more integration or even federation. even in hungary you have 23% of people actually want the european federation of europe. in germany you have 25. even in france is 31. and then you add those go for -- for those who at least for the status quo, you have a 50% averaged and more of most citizens want this. so why? this is not in the party programs of both parties but why is this not articulated? there's a simple answer. the answer of churchill, the answer of the first present, when signing the nader thing of

the american president truman said i hope this is just the preparation for european defense initiative, so all these great people were always convinced that should be the union. and what they had in the speeches is little little things. the nationstate, it can to our strategic on this comp if there's one big flaw in how the european system actually works is a nationstate that is the council but it's these overnight sessions would have who ever talking and give the solution, it's transparent to citizens cannot voice, so on and so forth. so that it is a very tricky and i don't go into details but look at european politics. 1.3 been said since signed up for the water initiative which means that water should not be privatized, right? they're sucking this in your why

is the european systems into this? because on energy is the same thing. most european citizens are for sustained energy and the whole thing. the lobby is done -- [inaudible] and because these business lobbyists can sew will work both the parliament and the council and the commission the end of have a policy which basically are the opposite of what citizens want but citizens cannot voice because the parliamentarian structure of the european union is still the council, that's the nationstate your the biggest problem so citizens willing to articulate, citizens for your. so the moment you can overcome, that's an easy little task i'm -- this is not an easy little task. if i'm just choosing my energy, i am placing my energy still in that so i need to overcome the

instructional of the structure of european union, the citizens voice to build a different kind of europe, a different europe which is parliamentary base which has a strong view on parliament. i'm talking eurozone so i feel would merge national peace with the european legislative body with a national body. i get a strong legislative that controls a strong executive within the eurozone. that is something i could call european democracy. rather than have a european parliament which has no rightful initiative which is no control and which need to spend all its energy to fight against the council that should be lobby driven, decisions of the council. this is the mechanics of the european union and i will spend the rest energy i have for my next professional life to get the system to work the full-fledged european democracy, and this is what's helping because i know i have more than 50% of european people behind

me. thank you very much. >> all right. last month hundred and -- you can understand why we are having a lot of fun in williamsburg. john, from an american perspective, put this in to some perspective for us. thank you. >> thank you, heather. i think my job your is, in fact, to? >> guest: all that into american english. >> great. >> because there was a lot of truth in there but i'm not sure how much of it came out to you. america and europe in whatever shape either has been, have been at odds with each other since the early 17th century. the europeans rescinded that we were formed, lease intellectual, an immense amount alleged about how the intellectual said this new america can't succeed the very idea of a new world was already too much of a challenge for them and this kind of

friendly back and forth has gone on for 400 years and will continue to go on because we are of the same cultural roots as we always say, but the implications of what we have done with these cultural roots are the source of this dialogue that we are in. as you probably know, a great percentage of americans are actually of german origin, a very high percentage. and i sometimes say to my german friends and what happens when you let germans lose on a big continent, so be careful how much you criticize us. but this misunderstanding was carried on, or deepen in the way after world war ii. because after world war ii, the europeans were, shall we say, in a bit of a psychological low point. the americans were at a very psychological highpoint.

and so the recipe for europe was what else could it be, the united states and europe. there's only one good form of government as we know, that's the united states. so they should have been the face of europe. and i believe that this misunderstanding, which started in, has carried us to this day. basic understanding is that in order to overcome the tragedy of the 20th century, to become a modern, productive, democratic, et cetera, europe somehow had to replicate the institutions of the united states. and francois pointed that out. there was even a constitutional dimension your a few years ago. the fact is that the institutions of the united states as we know were set up for a very specific situation. over 200 years ago. and we don't really have a lot of relevance either do the geographic and historical situation of europe or the mentality of europeans.

american institutions were set up to stimulate controversy and even confrontation among the branches of government. they were done on purpose that way. the europeans like consensus. they like discussion, dialogue, agreement and consensus. and so the job of adapting what postwar europe it became, which is something extremely positive and good, to this vision of a federal-state sort of somehow modeled on the united states has been very difficult, and both of my previous speaker said not totally successful. the first push towards this was we know when churchill talked about the united states and europe already in 1946, but then not too many of you remember that the entire administration of the marshall plan was done on

the basis of an opposition called the odbc and which later was the oecd. this job was to come up with a common european economic project for the future. this was an american requirement for getting the money. in 1949 when harry truman signed the nato treaty in the white house here he made a statement which you can read in any archive when he said, i'm signing this treaty on the understand that the united states is committing itself to european defense as a basis for the establishment of a european union of states. in other words, the us will defend you. and so a venomous understands continued, continued, continued. and the result after all have been one of the most successful most democratic of most prosperous bits of international cooperation in all of history.

if you look at what europe was in 1945, look what the american view of the world was in 1945, and compare it today. you can only say it's been an amazing, wonderful success and we should all be thrilled by it. the problem is that as a no history never stands still. and so the mentality and the institutions which led to the success are not very much on strain. united states is having a very hard time adjusting to whatever we want to call it, a multi-polder world, or a multi-centered world, whatever the world is but we're just having a lot of trouble getting with it. our reaction is been to go and fight enemies and shoot them dead so they won't bother us anymore. but that's not going to work. and what we have done is given up the constant management together with our european friends of this continent, europe, which in reality is only 25 years into its recovery from

probably the worst series of force that the continent, the anybody have experience in a long time. they call sometimes, call it a near-death experience in 1945. eidm that all this was assaulted with the fall of the soviet union is probably one of the biggest illusions which anyone ever had. as we see now, is to put in has warned us, showed us, the putting together of the european project is going to be another half-century, at least. and it will not work unless the united states plays its role in the europeans play their role, but do it on the basis of what the world is now today and not of 1945. and that is our problem. the previous group, rogers said and i think, i don't know if gideon did or not, but the u.s.

europeans relations out one other low points. well, if you analyzed according to 1945, you might argue that, but i have three numbers which i wrote down, which described a different kind of relationship. the numbers are 40,000, 60,000, 90,000. those are respectively the number of french, british and german engineers and information technology specialists who work in california. the atlantic is being unified more rapidly than any of us know your it -- at various levels. the trouble is that governments aren't playing much of a role in this. when they do they tend to mess it up like in the nsa scandal. and so it's very hard for everyone, i include myself very much in that group of everyone, to try and get a handle on what's really happening. the articles of confederation, exempt from is probably good

because what was said and friend law suggested also -- francois suggested also, the requirements of the 20% you cannot be met by the structures of the european union. they can hardly be met by the structures of the united states government but we are more flexible. to take the euro crisis started in 2010, this is now 2014, and to the outside observer again, europeans would state this isn't true, but for the outside observer, it looks like about what is happened since 2010 is several dozen, maybe several hundred meetings, each which came up with a communiqué which adobe another meeting, take another step towards the social which is not yet been described. now, give the europeans would say that's a stupid american we're looking at that's the way we see it. it took us about six months in

the fall of 2008 and the spring 2000 to come up with a program to deal with the fall of the lehman bank and all the unbelievable, horrible consequences which came out of the mortgage problems are took us about six months. and so far after that our economy has been on a generally positive upward track. and i don't have the figures in my head but we're going to a half, three, 3.5%, something like that. in germany the press trumpets success if they make it over 1% of growth and francois said it very clearly, the consequences of what's going on. the structure simply won't work anymore. that's the real story. and our structure is dealing with the world isn't going to work anymore either, so we have a joint project year which is to overcome our backward looking

views of the world. i found this quote from mr. steinbach was the german foreign ministry, as you all know, which illustrate what i'm talking about. he wrote this in an article marking the ones anniversary of world war i. and he said many seemed fine along such a compromise of the brussels negotiating table to be too difficult, too boring and too stagnant. but in this anniversary year, it is vital to appreciate what a leap of civilization this method represents, the committee sleep of civilization. when large and small member states who opposed each other in countless wars on this continent, today debate through long nights in a peaceful and civilized search, solutions. now, this is what mr. steinmeier

wrote to celebrate the european union. for most americans, that would be a recipe for a nap and i'm not trying to be sarcastic here. this is our problem. we see europe which is based on ideas that we gave them as struggling towards a nap, and they see us based on the civilization which they gave us as heading towards some kind of civilizational catastrophe. that's not the best basis for dialogue. and i don't believe that the president and his colleagues will take this issue on the next week when he sees them, but i do believe that for csis ever groups like all of us were trying to understand this, it's very interesting to look at it from this perspective rather than from all the details in what nato is doing. in the end we have this wonderful accomplishment which has put the world in a position of more freedom and more

prosperity than anybody could ever have expected, even 50 years ago. and we are in danger of losing it if we don't start changing gears and looking into the future. thank you. >> and that was the beauty of the last three days. i'm going to get a chance to think of some caution but for such a rich miss -- richness, wide ranging set of issues. am going to try to drill down and be more specific. so john, you give us a challenge of how -- the united states has given a constant management of europe. europe is only 25 years old and thinking for europe today after chairman reunification. gave me the contours of what a new management plan would look like, a transatlantic management plan for your. and i guess i would offer some of the reflection from the other

side, francois entry to come will be a new management plan that europe would see as its approach to the united states? we have been now given this new geostrategic moment, which almost forces us to be backward looking because we can fall back into old patterns of behavior. but it's such a new setting which you all three have articulated. how do we overcome these obstacles and put ourselves in a new place, and a new level of dialogue box out of the president obama can't even scratch the surface of this but i'm hoping that this really big thinking happening at the state department and the white house to think through and capture some of that. so that's my question for a balance. i'll let you think now, let's bring it into the conversation but i'm so glad we see some hands going up. i have to rake. again, please identify yourself

and you'll have to speak very strongly into the microphone but sometimes we have a hard time hearing you. thank you. >> okay. i am from poland to so i would like to ask about 25 may come not only in europe but also european union but also ukraine. so should united states and the european union help to prepare the presence election in ukraine, especially in the crimea? because what do you think about the situation is a presidential election not take place in crimea? to discuss about the other european powers which will take the position in the new european parliament. but in moscow -- [inaudible] because in the very beginning the european parliament there is a big coalition. it doesn't matter if you vote for social in the crowd or -- the same language that probably only

bureaucrats from brussels can understand it's i think that my opinion this is very good european parties will go to european parliament because all parties in the parliament -- no more struggle and the political making process involving all sorts of society because it is confusing that me, i have problem to go to parliament the to my members of parliament and i don't have any problem being in congress in the united stat states. >> that was the exact question we asked during our conference about, what are they voting for? i be voting for the same thing. if the voters vote for change how do they express that change? we analyzed that question exactly as you posted. >> from american university. [inaudible] don't you think it's an imperative that for you to come

back -- receiving countries such as the own country, greece, -- [inaudible] that it tackles a democratic deficit? don't you think that the eu needs more democratic to hold itself together? we should not underestimate the importance of the european parliament elections this may. it's still a fact that the european elections are more like 20 different elections. they are totally based on national issues instead of european issues that dominate accordingly. isn't it essential we have -- [inaudible] and we have the president of the european commission, no matter what the difficult of that will be, to be directly elected from the european people. and then thirdly, how do we move on from this crisis to illustrate that centralization and federalization are the solutions to this crisis?

and how do we resolve the european problem when people like myself, european give from the ages of 18-25, and countries like greece, suffering almost 60% of unemployment, that europe is more part of the solution than a part of the problem? thank you. >> we have a question right in the back, please. >> hello. i the mic with "bloomberg news" but i'm curious the panel is, particularly former assistant secretary of state, think that president obama can get done in terms of a response to the ukraine challenge of russian, ukrainian and crimea. where does the european interest in the american interest diverge? and what is the path this week to shaping a cohesive response, or can they really be one?

>> well, why don't we take those, those several questions and we can just go into original order. i want to pose the question -- if you don't mind when were done into questions i'd like to turn the microphone to you and if you don't mind offering some reflections on the decision that came out this morning on banking union. i want to give you time to not surprise you, if you don't mind doing that. i will introduce you formally been. spent actually, the three questions including their own which are highly converging, because you cannot answer the question about useu relations without raising the issue of the big crisis which we have just entered into, which is a game changing crisis. we will have to consider the future russia, vladimir putin's russia as being an antagonist

power. i don't call this new cold war an ideological opponent as often as note is not there. but certainly russia is determined to play by rules which are no longer those which it had been to at least giving lip service over the last few years. annexation of other people's territory is now considered kosher conduct by russia. and that is something which is 180° from the european vision, and from the american vision. so this is a crisis which forces us to act together and it is a crisis which will give the biggest content to our relations. so how do we deal with that? in an useu framework? several levels. the first one, of course, is to help ukraine and its government in kiev to become functional,

economically and politically. the emergency financial and economic package from the imf but also for the european union. iinstead government after the election of the 25th of may cannot get itself to a somewhat better order than the governments we have seen in ukraine since independence, 22 years ago, it is going to become very, very difficult. and we may not have much time to get their act together, given some of the indications which have been coming out from the white house over the last few minutes about worries about russian troop movement around the east and the south of ukraine.

item a., may improve providing the ukrainian government with the means to ensure its self-defense. not simply meals ready to eat as somebody said early this morning in this room, but we're going to have to think very hard in europe and the u.s. as how we're going to respond to the legitimate ukrainian government, legitimate request to have the wherewithal to defend itself. imb, u.s. and europe -- item be, europe and u.s. together. that means two things. one, energy. you have on the table in the state the issue of are going to export hydrocarbons or not. and the europeans have on their table, are they going to stop our silliness about shutting down existing sources of production of energy, nuclear

energy in germany, and preventing ourselves in exploiting new sources of energy like unconventional gas. this i understand will be a significant element of the eu-u.s. summit. this is truly of the essence if over the next two years we want to unbilled the strategic dependency of europe on russian gas -- gas. thirdly we have to build up the credibility of our capability of defense. article v is of the essence. it would be nice to have our heads of state in government say that together, and not wait for the summit, nato summit next may

to do that. because events are going to go much more quickly than that. and their arguments to bring those, more russians, russian speakers in love you, proportion to the population down to our in the eastern ukraine. and as we all know, president putin considers that -- on the fate of russian speakers outside its own borders, a little bit in france, considered that it has a duty to intervene in belgium or in switzerland when french speakers are in trouble with their german-speaking for their dutch speaking brother and. this is the new world in which we are entering. on the other question, about european parliament, i am a federalist. that is, i would not have minded at all if the european constitutional treaty in 2005 had been put to a single

constituency referendum in the whole of europe. that is a test of whether you're a federalist or not. are you ready to contemplate that? are you ready to contemplate the creation of european democracy? our countries whenever he to do that at the time. i think it was a mistake. but this is the third. there is no european the most common no european -- demos. and, therefore, do not have a bona fide of the parties in the european parliament. not in the sense that your political party at the national level. that is not unfortunately going to change anytime soon. and why? because you have a number of european countries, youth unemployment which has exceeded

50%. 50% youth unemployment in spain, and more than 50% resilience been to countries where youth unemployment levels which are highly above 15%, 20% increase. 25% in spain. are you going to tell those people, oh, give it a fantastic track records of the european institutions and of our national government, since 2007, we are going to give even more power to the folks in the european institutions. i have not yet met a politician who was ready to step on the soapbox and say something of that sort. because of course that person would not stay on the soapbox for very long. soapbox would be removed from under their feet quite quickly. which is why i am an augustinian

federalist. lord, ma give me chastity but not straight away. but in this case, in this case it's the lord who is the problem and not san augustine. >> i'm going to concentrate on the other question on democracy. i think that's precisely what i said to i'm not against the anger of a understand that. if you don't have opposition and judaism have no choice, he always get the same policy, you can go to you want, you know, but you can't change the policy which is what they did increase which is basically we were preventing a referendum. then the only choice you have if you're not happy, you go in opposition. so yes, but what does it tell us? we do need to be careful. it does not necessarily mean and

then you go back people are anti-european they -- but what they do want is opposition and reversibility within the system, and that comes precisely back to what i said which is a parliamentarian full-fledged structure, legislative controlling party which is division of power and not a nasty and transparent council driven not only by national interest but even worse, by bobby interest of national country. this is what gets european union wrong. now you go down. in a state at this moment. soun[inaudible]

hopes are in italy comes down can you get little footnote the italian movement for european union picked up my little republic and just sent a week ago a letter for european republic. so this is the level. [inaudible] so you go down. i think it's a real problem. that's what actually pretty happy with the you. they are unhappy with the migration thing and it's unfortunate. if you look at sociology, it's a very old sort of white men over 60 losing legacy sort of party. if i may say, this is pretty good for most of the sociology's of the right wing parties, which is to be very blunt, i'm sorry but it's more or less losing legacy parties. and so i want i want to point to

if we want that conduct which a parliamentary system, what i building strong on this just a shift of the whole discussion to the whole of european discourse is completely dominated. i can give you pictures from a conference that's not even over 60. and it's completely male dominant. but what i'm saying here is that current european discussion is not reflecting -- it's not reflecting on his website start out the. [inaudible] and, therefore, the pipe is parties have a very -- not getting a true picture. everybody is against you but it's not the case.

i guess you might sort of -- if you press some of the dynamics in, you get a very different picture. i mean, to make a long story short,. [inaudible] and chances are that we succeed. >> power to you. john. >> well, first i'll go to your question, what should we do next. i think what we shouldn't do next is try to come up with great new institutional solutions, because i think we're beyond institutional solutions. i think we need to identify what we need to get done. and i'll start with the united states. with the united states needs to get done more than anything else is to remember that it is, so to speak, the managing partner of

the world, not just of the atlantic world but of the world. it has to do what i was taught to do over 40 years of diplomacy. that is, to work every day to keep the structures going. this is what we did between 1945-1995, or 2000 that, that vocation has been lost. we don't do that anymore. you just have to see the way both the bush and obama administrations related to europe to see, in a most sent relationship, this is simply been ignored. there are a lot of reasons i won't go into them, but the presidents give it towards asia is a good example, as if we've never been involved in asia. i think of something called the vietnam war which was quite an engagement, or maybe there was world war ii. we were in asia right up to our necks, but somehow for whatever reason people, and i can tell

you, i hear this from endless numbers of americans who come to europe, even the president of the augusta council on foreign relations a year or so ago saying europe was irrelevant to the united states. our own political system has gone awry. if that's the way we're going to protect our foreign interests, we've got to start all over again. maybe we should join the european union join the european union individual judgment a joint constitution can you, i don't know. we've got to start all over again. on the other hand, the europeans got so involved that they also forgot their interest. one of the main ones that they sacrificed really for nothing without even thinking was the strategic link with the united states. until 1990, europe was the strategic point on earth to it at the entire loyalty and engagement of the world's greatest military power, united states. once the cold war ended, that central position was no longer there.

what did the europeans do instead of workout a new strategic relationship with the united states? they decided they're going to go into their own clubhouse, the european union, and build up something which is now called the current form current policy which is neither ford, current foreign policy. but at the effect of breaking the link with the united states. and i can say, i'm not involved in it anymore but i saw have enough contact, that link is now gone. the united states does not see its strategic interest as being involved in your. maybe mr. putin has reinstated it for us, but up until recently it was gone. on other points, that's what i would do. i would start talking about common agendas, whether the heads of government do it. whether we need a wise man's commission. we had a wise man's commission after the wall went up which actually devised detente policy and took us toward the end of the cold war. so wise men commissions do work

sometimes. whatever it is we need to have an agenda and we need to know what we're talking about. some the things that francois mentioned are right. we need to understand what we're doing about energy. on the other hand, the shell corporations has just at least said before the trouble started they would invest $5 billion, no, $500 billion in ukraine to develop shale gas. they be that's under way. we need to have an agenda when you do the legwork. more than that i don't know what to say. on the question of federalisfederalis m, well, you take for my comments i do not believe european federalism is the right future for europe. i think it's a dead-end. europe is a beautiful, wonderful the first place which doesn't have the push towards a federalism which the united states had come and we got, as francois and others were saying, we've got a wonderful description of american federalism from professor wood down in williamsburg let's not forget american federalism has

been a fight from the beginning to the end. and we had a civil war in the middle which still the worst for the united states was ever involved in. and you don't want to take our route to federalism, let's put it that way. i think that in the new world that's coming up, globally integrated world, europe will have a great opportunity because it's not federal. because individual states can, in fact, work together on a different level but it will take a while as i said. i apologize, we sold you all our institutions but you shouldn't have bought them. there we go. i think the world will evolve into something else. >> now, i could have another round of questions, i promise, but i can't pass up the opportunity of wolfgang, cofounder of euro intelligence, and also a columnist at the financial times has been with us in williamsburg and i just thought if i may put you on the spot, please forgive me, few thoughts on economics of europe

very specifically for any comments that you have on this morning 7 a.m. decision on banking unions. wolfgang, thank you. and we will take another quick brown. >> heather, thank you very much. i saw it on twitter this morning at 4 a.m. local time to rephrase tweets saying we been negotiate for 11 hours, no deal. now 14 our tweets, no deal there and then suddenly it's a they finally got to do. in many respects very european feel. as for a grant from the a pinnacle a federal deposit insurance corporation to backstop the banking sector. in the way the europeaneuropean s do these things, first the ministers agreed, so if you saw the headline before taking union agreed, that happened in december and your these things have failed twice to the

european parliament has co-decision rights so basically they have to agree to it as well and it was a very big conference last night in which the council, the commission and parliament remain institutions of the eu and negotiated the final details. the main weakness of the agreement in december, and you could ask different people and they would give you different list of weaknesses and strengths of that agreement, was that unlike the fdic, it was not backstop by any government money. the funds for the european fdic which is called single resolution mechanism is about in dollar terms about 60, $70 billion. that's enough and a failure of one bank, to banks maybe. couldn't handle deutsche bank. that's already too large for this mechanism but you don't have a couple of medium-sized banks. this is a useful for situation with the bank manager runs away

with the money. it's not really useful for a systemic financial crisis of the kind we had. so this is not really a big macroeconomic stabilization mechanism, the one that was agreed to, because the fund itself has no backstop. the fdic by contrast is backstop. it's intricate backstop by the us government if the fdic failed to note that anybody's mind that he was government would step in. that situation does not exist in your because we don't have a european government. so the question of the backstop was important. when i spoke to a very senior leader of the european parliament, he told me that this is really the only issue. the fact that the backstop, angela merkel told him don't know what you would accept a backstop because that's way too common funding, about the work of the roundabout way to europe which is what the germans have projected. the question that they have been asking themselves in the parliament should we block it?

should we boycott this legislation because of this funding mechanism? the ultimate reason they ended up not boycotting this legislation this money was political. they have an election to the european parliament in to two months time. if they boycotted it now, the various parties boycotted a particular social us would've come under attack for wrecking the this agreement him and it could come it could have led to financial market panic. nobody would have known this but there is a risk that your crisis might have returned, even briefly, and the parliament would have been -- now with the russian situation also overhanging, dominic the debate i think anybody wanted to open this so the basically closed it down. ..

having 16 hours of negotiations without sleep is pretty prime minister excessive. -- impressive. in substance this is the minister's proposal.

one of the finance ministers was woken up at 6 in the morning. he had been really tough in the negotiations and he had no problems agreeing to that agreement, that deal, it was small concession that is they made. the fund will be built up a little faster with different formulas of these 55 billion euros and 70 billion euros will be replenished than the original proposal. there is a some small stuff that is different but this is same old weak bank resolution mechanism. it may eventually, this is what i'm going to close here, eventually we will have a banking union in the e.u. my guess it will be a about 20 to 30 years from now. it will not affects the current crisis. if you think that the banks need to be restructured, which they will need to be this bank resolution mechanism is not there for this particular resolution. this is for the next crisis, not

this one. they acknowledge that. this is not a cynical position to hold. the whole idea of the lack of a backstop is not to use this funding mechanism to sort out the current banking mess, what the germans call legacy debt which is existing debt. that is what it is, legacy debt, the debt we have now. this is about the debt we're going to have in the next crisis. so you know, that is off a rather theoretical procedure. a structural response a very cyclical problem you. >> heard it here first, guys. that is great explanation. i will have you pass the microphone behind you. mike you have literally 10 seconds. >> these last two comments raised a fundamental question. how can you have a common currency without a federal government? the u.s. has the national treasury to move money from new york to alabama. nothing like that exists in europe. you have a weak central bank.

you're talking about a weak fdic 20 years from now. how does the common currency keep going without these kind of props? >> go very quickly. you put your finger on the sorest of the points and quite rightly so. this currency was fated not to work and when a storm occurred in 2007-2008, it very rapidly demonstrated that it did not work, at least not to accomplish what it was supposed to accomplish. that is stability. instead of stability we had the great divergence of interest rates within the eurozone, with greece at 75% i think at one stage and germany at 1.5. it certainly did not, it certainly did not help promote growth. rather the opposite. some of the eurozone countries

have witnessed the longest recession, industrialized countries have ever been through in peacetime, including the great depression by the way. six years without any growth is, you know, it take as certain talent to do that. and that is what we got with, that is what we got with the, with the euro. now, mario draghi has bought us some time. the currency is not going to explode all of a sudden the way it nearly exploded several times in 2010, 2011, 2012, early 2013. we may have several years in front of us in order to try to set things right. now here's where there are great differences of opinion, i believe like you, that only federal solution could actually allow the euro to operate in what would then be an optimal

currency area. but since federalism is not going to be offered any sooner than the banking union which wolfgang promised us for some time, i would no longer be in a position to ask myself questions about has at this at this -- chastity. 20 or 30 years you said. therefore the euro will have to go. there are several ways which you could do that. i offered one. wolfgang has another by the way he can talk about if you want to. others consider that we can do, continue to do what is called muddling through which is really muddling down. while the rest of the world will continue to grow, europe will continue to grow much less than it could be growing. >> i want, we're so past time, come up and see you, he has really good ideas. i want to first of all thank our three panelists.

that was a fabulous discussion. again it demonstrates we need, we need thought leaders to help us through this important period. i thank you so much. we'll resend out to you, we had two incredible live webcasts of two events in williamsburg. a live debate between the deputy minister of labor in the german government in his private capacity, and liam fox, foreign british defense minister for and against the united states of europe. it was worth the watch and a economic discussion featuring wolfgang. we will send these out to you. they were important bits from williamsburg. gratitude to the colonial williamsburg, college of william & mayor 8 mary and the conversation about the future of events in crimea take place and ukraine. i thank you all for joining us. come back to see us at csis soon. thank you.

[applause] [inaudible conversations] >> you can watch the forum on the state of the european anytime on our website, go to c-span.org. just over an hour ago before leaving for florida from the south lawn of the white house president obama spoke about ukraine. this is about five minutes.

>> good morning, everybody. i wanted to provide an update on the situation in ukraine and the steps that the united states is taking in response. over the last several days we've continued to be deeply concerned by events in the ukraine. we've seen an illegal referendum in crimea, an illegitimate move by the russians to annex crimea, and dangerous risks of escalation including threats to ukrainian personnel in crimea and threats to southern and eastern ukraine as well. these are all choice that is the russian government has made. choice that is have been rejected by the international commune as well as the government of ukraine. and because of these choices, the united states is today moving, as we said we would, to impose additional costs on russia.

based on the executive order that i signed in response to russia's initial intervention in ukraine, we're imposing sanctions on more senior officials of the russian government. in addition we have today sanctioning a number of other individuals with substantial resources and influence who provide material support to the russian leadership. as well as a bank that provides material senator to these individuals. now we're taking these steps as part of our response to what russia has already done in crimea. at the same time the world is watching with grave concern as russia has positioned its military in a way that could lead to further incursions into southern and eastern ukraine. for this reason we've been working closely with our european partners to develop more severe actions that could be taken if russia continues to escalate the situation. as part of that process i signed a new executive order today that gives us the authority to impose

sanctions, not just on individuals but on key sectors of the russian economy. this is not our preferred outcome. these sanctions would not only have a significant impact on the russian economy but could also be disruptive to the global economy. however russia must know that further escalation will only isolate it further from the international community. the basic principles that govern relations between nations and europe and around the world must be upheld in the 21st century. that includes respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. the notion that nations do not simply redraw borders or make decision at the expense of their neighbors simply because they are larger or more powerful. now one of our other top priorities continues to be providing assistance to the government of ukraine so it can stablize its economy and meet the basic needs of the ukrainian people. as i traveled to europe next

week, to meet with the g7 and other european and asian allies i once again urge congress to pass legislation that is necessary to provide this assistance. and do it right away. expressions of support are not enough. we need action. i also hope that the imf moves swiftly to provide a significant package of support for ukrainians as they pursue reforms. in europe i will also be reinforcing a message that vice president biden carried to poland and the baltic states this week. america's support for our nato allies sun waiverring. we're bound together by our profound article v commitment to defend one another and our set of shared values that so many generations sacrificed for. we've already increased our support for our eastern european allies and we will continue to strengthen nato's collective defense and we'll step up our cooperation with europe on economic and energy issues as

well. now let me close by making a final point. diplomacy between the united states and russia continues. we've emphasized that russia still has a different path available, one that deescalates the situation and one that involves russia pursuing a diplomatic solution with the government in kiev, with the support of the international community. the russian people need to know and mr. putin needs to understand that the ukrainians shouldn't have to choose between the west and russia. we want the ukrainian people to determine their own destiny and to have good relations with the united states, with russia, with europe, with anyone that they choose. that can only happen if russia also recognized the rights of all the ukrainian people to determine their future as free individual and as a sovereign nation. rights that people and nations

around the world understand and support. thank you very much, everybody. thank you. >> that was the president earlier today just after 11:300. this afternoon the president is set to give a speech about women in the economy. he will have remarks from valencia college in orlando, florida, that is coming up 2:30 this afternoon. news from european and nato pete meets. this from "the washington post." leaders weighed additional sanctions against russia after ukrainian troops are evacuating their bases in crimea. europe would expand the number of individuals punished with travel bans and asset freezes.

as european leaders prepared to meet in brussels there was little sign that they woe propose broader financial penalty that is many analysts see necessary to change russian behavior. coming up four p.m. eastern, robert ford, former ambassador to syria will be at the wilson center talking about the on boeing conflict in that country. that will be on c-span starting four p.m. eastern today. tonight looking at booktv, prime time, stories from recent history. at 8:00 eastern, sandra grimes, with circle of treason. ciia account of traitor aldrich ames and the men he betrayed. nicholas griffin on ping-pong diplomacy. 9:50. the astronaut wives club. a true story. that is booktv starting at 8:00 p.m. tonight. >> if we do not deal with the issue of know vision, if we do not translate all those findings

that occur at the pharmaceutical industry, at the university level, into health care products which affordable and treat disease and that cures them and as long as we do not understand the disease, the causes and how to treat or cure them, there is no point really in talking about the solution of the health care problem because health insurance cover us, it is, what is going to provide health insurance but when it comes to drugs, when it comes to premiums, when it comes to subsidies, where are the subsidies going to come from? no taxpayer's money. not just that people will get dollars out of the trees. no, people have to pay for that. there is a limit. the economy is basically the science of limitations. so if we don't deal with a better system of working on prevention, of working on understanding, how we could take care of our own health then there is no point just having

health insurance because, what is going to happen what happens in colombia right now which people are covered. like what happens in panama. everybody can have access to health care. or what happens in europe too which people are covered but, when it comes to the medications and when it comes to access drugs, then governments are having problems affording them. >> the future of health care, sunday night at 8:00 on c-span's q&a. >> now supreme court justice elena kagan talks to student about her life and career at the georgetown university law center here in washington, d.c. law school dean william treanor is the moderator. this is part of the dean's lecture to the graduating class series. this is about an hour. he. >> good afternoon and welcome, everyone. very excited. this is our first dean's lecture

to the graduating class and what we're going to do is, in the years moving forward beginning with this year, have a leading member of the bench or the bar talk to the graduating class about their ininsights based on their career, about things that you should know as you're starting out and graduating from law school. and we could not have a better inaugural lecturer than justice elena kagan. so welcome to georgetown. >> thank you, dean. [applause] thank you. really a pleasure to be here. i sort of thought today was going to be a snow day so. i guess i'm glad you didn't cancel. >> well, today is a snow day and i i want to particularly thank the justice for coming here. the federal government is closed today. >> i was in my office.

i was ready for business. >> so we thought you know, the law school was actually closed until 1:00. and i have to say, i was a little concerned that since the school was going to be closed for most of the day that we might not be able to do you justice in terms of the crowd but as i look around and i see every seat here in the auditorium is filled. >> pretty good. >> you're clearly a great draw. thank you for being here. >> expectations are high, huh? >> expectations are high. so, so the idea behind this, these lectures is to, you know, to reflect on your career and offer people advice as they're starting. >> i'm supposed to be wise today. >> a lot of pressure. >> yeah. >> for those, it is really unnecessary to run through our biography but that is really requirement for me. so very quickly, justice kaig

began like a plurality of the supreme court is from new york city. a graduate of hunter high school, princeton, oxford, harvard. clerked for two of the legend of the united states judiciary. first judge mixsa on the d.c. court of appeals and of course for judge marshall. , justice marshall, rather. you then worked briefly for williams and connolly. went into teaching at the university of chicago. then left teaching to work in the clinton administration, first associate counsel and then as a deputy assistant to the president. then went to harvard, became dean from 2003 to 2009. one of the reasons why you know, i thought that it was really perfect that you would be our inaugural speaker was in addition to having a really great career in academia and

public service you're also someone who as an academic was really famous for being really focused on helping students. you know, really ranging from revising the curriculum at harvard to free coffee. which, i would love to emulate. if there are any donors out there. and then after being really one of the great deans of harvard law school, of any law school, in 2009 you were nominated for solicitor general. became solicitor general in 2009. then in 2010 you were named to the supreme court succeeding justice steven's chair on the court. so you've been on the court since 2010. so -- >> you're very kind, dean treanor. when people used to go through my resume' like that, if they were introducing me for something i used to get up to the podium and say, well, now you know my secret, i can't keep

a job. [laughter] but i think my new job has solved that, you know. [laughter] so no longer. very good. i am relieved to hear that. so now, let's start, you know, again, what i wanted to do is have you offer advice to people but let's start, when you were a kid what were your first thoughts about what job you wanted to have when you grew up? >> you know, i'm not sure i remember all of that well. i mean i had my, you know, years when i was going to be a famous tennis player and stuff like that. i was a voracious reader. so, so i definitely thought i wanted, like being a writer seemed a good thing to me. being a lawyer honestly did not. so, my father was a lawyer, and when i think about the kind of law my father practiced now, i very much understand why, why he

had so much fun in the profession and why it was so meaningful to him. but i have to say, as a kid, it did not seem all that exciting to me. you know, my colleague, justice sotomayor, talks about how when she was a kid she watched perry mason. this is, you know, way before anybody this room's time but in perry mason was this great trial lawyer and there were all these sort of ah-ha moments when parimason at trial solves the great case and it was all very exciting. and justice sotomayor talks about how watching that made her want to be a lawyer. when i told me this, i said i knew practice of law was nothing like that because i saw my father go to work and come back every morning and he never had those ah-ha moments n fact my father did a kind of law where he thought it was a terrible failure when he went to court. i mean he had a small practice. sort of a small-town practice in new york city. small practice. just helped ordinary people

solved their problems. loved doing that. i think found it deeply meaningful and valuable. but, always thought of when you got to court because you had failed someplace along the lines and, and, you know, as i say now i sort of look at what he did and think, what a meaningful way to spend your time in the profession but as a kid i thought, it did not seem very exciting. >> so when did you think that you wanted to become a lawyer? >> well i never really did. you know, i'm sure you were a dean. i was a dean. i spent so much time talking to perspective students and telling them, now don't go to law school just because you can't think of anything else to do because there are all these students. as they get out of college and they don't really know what else to do, i think i will go to law school because it will keep my options open, right? and for several years i said this to all these students. then i kind of realized, that is

why i went to law school, you know? so where did this advice come from exactly? i mean i did. i went to law school. i had sort of thought, i majored in history in college. i sort of thought about being an academic. by the time i got to the end of my undergraduate experience having gone through a year of doing a senior thesis, which is a very big project at the college i went to, i thought, is no way i'm going to be a historian. and i really didn't know what i wanted to do. i of thought, i will go to law school. i will keep my options open. something will turn up. that's why i went. but instead i went to law school and i fell into the lucky group where really from the first day i just loved every moment of it and i thought, my gosh, what a lucky thing that i ended up here. >> what did you like about law school? >> well, i liked the combination of two things i think. i liked that it was, i liked

just thinking about it intellectually. i liked the puzzle aspects of law. i was like one of these law students who always liked the really technical classes actually. i loved tax. because, i liked sort of thinking through really complicated props. but i also liked the fact that it wasn't purely a puzzle and purely abstract. there were way that is people could use the law to actually make a difference in the world and so it seemed very practical and grounded to me at the same time as it seemed intellectually fascinating and that's what i liked about it. >> and then when you got out, or as you were going through law school did you have a sense of what you wanted to do next. >> you know i think i played with a lot of different possibilities. i remember i thought about being an academic and that was definitely something that i, you

know, i contemplated. but i also had a professor who said, you know, you have never really known anything but school. you should go out and get some, do some other things. get some other experiences before you decide you want to spend your life in an academic environment. so i tried to do that and, so you know, i think, but i think, you know, i think i thought about academia. i thought about private practice. i suppose i knew that at some point in my professional life i would go into public service in some form. so i think i hoped to have as, and i was lucky enough to have this actual happen to me, i think i hoped to have a career where i could experience a lot of different things. dove a lot of different things during the course of my career. maybe i have a short attention span or i thought a lot of

different things would probably be interesting. so i hoped to be a person who bopped back and forth among a number of different areas. >> one of the things as people are starting out the question is, how do you think about your career? so do you focus on just your first job? do you focus on, this is where i want to be in 30 years? what advice would you give to people as they're starring out as they think about their career arc? >> don't, definitely don't think i guess just about your first job. i think, i think try to be more holistic in your thinking about the kinds of experiences you want to have and the kind of work you want to do during the whole course of your career but then also sort of understand that sometimes i think that, just saying that it sound like you should plan every step of the way and i really don't think that. i actually think that law students tend to plan too much or at least i don't want this to be a kind of anti-plan, like you

should never plan for anything because you should think about what matters to you and think about the different kind of experiences you want to have but realize they're just not all going to happen in the order you think or in the order you want. that different things are going to sort of randomly and serendipitously present themselves to you and i think, actually the people who have the most fun legal careers are the people who are very open to serendipity in their lives and who, who, you know, will be doing one thing and sort of thinking that is what they're going to do for a number of years but then will see an opportunity and will seize that opportunity rather than say, oh, i'm sorry, this doesn't exactly fit into the plan that i have. you know i'm growing to wait for that, for, you know, another x-numbers of years and that is not just quite right. because i think at love life is sort of luck an opportunities presenting themselves in way that is you might not think that

they would and people who end up i think, with the great legal careers are the people who just sort of, you know, grab the things when they come. >> was that with your career? is that how it was structured? >> you know i think i was lucky enough to do that. if you said to me, you know, what what was planned, almost nothing was, actually. you know, just different things presented themselves at different points in time and i was sort of lucky enough or maybe i knew enough to sort of grab good things when they came up. >> now, and you started by clerking. >> yeah. >> so is that something that you -- >> well, it was a great experience and i loved it. i hope the clerks that i have love it. you know, if you like law it's a, it's just a wonderful place to think about law for a little longer but also to see it in action and a judge can be a great mentor of course if you're lucky enough to get the right

one and i was. i was lucky enough to get two great mentors and two, sort of miraculous human beings and to, just see them in action, which was, in unbelievable experience for a young person. and, so, you know for me it was, it was a great opportunity. >> what did you learn from them? >> well, all kind of different things. you know, first i, i think i probably learned something just about the various kind of non-legal qualities and attributes that people, that people have. judge mixa was one of the world's most generous men. going through a year with somebody that had sort of deep in his bones generosity and actually sort of love for people was the great experience for me. i mean justice marshall of

course was an iconic figure. one of, and that was, you know, one of the great experiences of my life. justice marshall, by the time i clerked for him was relatively elderly and was a little bit, you know, he turned 80 but it was a little bit of an old 80. he was sort of looking back on his life at that point and the clerks were, you know, lucky enough to be there with him at a time when he was really thinking about his life and what he had accomplished and, and he was the world's greatest storyteller and raconteur. you would walk into thinks office and first you would talk about the cases and you would do all your work. then at a certain time he would sort of flip over and start telling stories. and you know, they were unbelievable stories because they were stories about some of the most important aspects of 20th century american history and you know, there you were, you were there listening

to this man who i believe was the finest lawyer of the 20th century. you know, tell about his cases and the way he approached his cases and the decisions he made and the difficulties he confronted, the dangers he faced including the physical dangers. it was an unbelievable experience. >> it must have been incredibly inspiring working for him? >> it was incredibly inspiring. if you're not inspired by clerking a year for thurgood marshall you're a little bit dead to the world. it was a lesson in what the law can accomplish. the reason i think he is the greatest 20th century american lawyer, i mean he had all these incredible skills and i don't think there was anybody who combined what he did in appellate courts what we did in trial courts and all of that, but just, looking if you're going to measure a person by the, the degree to which they promote justice in the world

which i think is one important way to measure lives and law, you know, i don't think that there was anybody who really, you know, approaches him in that. >> i think that's right. so did that, you know, having the privilege of working for justice marshall did that shape your career at all, you know, affect the decisions you made? >> well i think both he and judge mixa were good sort of lessons in thinking about, you know, just, a leading lives in the law that were just not about you. they were about the way in which you could help people and make a difference in the world and for every individual that will mean a different thing. a different, but, i think, i think there are very few people who have really deep,

fulfilling, meaningful, legal careers without finding some way to make a difference, you know, to things a little bit bigger than themselves. >> now how important are mentors for a lawyer? >> well they have been really important in my life and i've been lucky enough to have them sort of every place i went. i mean i had them in law school. i had them, the two men i clerked for. and i had them when i was a young academic and when i was a young lawyer in practice, you know each step of the way, people to learn from and also people, you know, who make the next step and the next step and the next step a little bit easier. one of the things i did a few years after clerking i went to the university of chicago to teach. why did i get a job at the university of chicago? well, you know, partly it was my