first -- but i call myself an i'd log. i don't regard that as a negative, as a pejorative. i am ideological. i have a philosophy. i have a vision. i have principles. how many people if in this room are ideological? just about everybody. how many people in this room -- this is great polling we're doing right now, i wish i could great specific numbers on it. [laughter] how many people in this room believe that a majority of americans are ideological? very few. i agree with the majority in this room. a majority of americans are not ideological. having an ideology, having a consistent philosophy, having a vision of the way the world works requires a lot of hard work and research and self-education and a lot of brain power. and it takes too much work. and it's not as easy as spending time on social media or watching television or going to nascar

races. or bronco games, whatever you like to do. americans are not ideological which is, sadly, why ideological appeals don't always resonate with americans. if you in this room represented, if you are a firm representation of the american body politic, we'd have no problems. you're not, i'm very sorry to say, and neither am i. ideology is about ideas, politics is about winning elections. and you only win elections in the aggregate as divorced from any individual election where anything can happen. but when you take a look at this great nation of ours with 435 congressional districts and 100 senate seats, in order to be a majority party you have to put together a majority coalition. this is a two-party system. it's going to stay a two-party system for a long time to come.

no minor party is going to emerge and suddenly displace one of the two major parties, the democrats or republicans. not in my judgment anytime soon. you remember ross perot. ross perot lost that election, 1992, helping bill clinton get elected. and he got something like 20% of the popular vet. and -- vote. and he got zero electoral college votes. zero. why? because our constitution is biased in favor of a two-party system. you have to win a state to get its electoral college votes, and ross perot did not win one single state. and his party -- help me out, what was the name of the ross perot party? >> reform. >> the reform party, thank you. the reform party sought to survive the failed ross perot presidential attempt and hung

around for a while but, ultimately, dissipated. there's an old expression what if you gave a party and nobody came? a more contemporary paraphrase might be what if you gave a tea party and less than a plurality came? and the answer would be that that plurality that did get more votes than any other party would be the governing party. and it's all about being the governing party in this country of ours. i like so much of what ted cruz stands for. i like his courage, i like his principles. i don't like all of his tactics ask all of husband strategies. his strategies. and the holding obama's feet to the fire because any rational person would compromise on a continuing resolution, that strategy failed. because obama is not a compromiser, and he's not

politically rational. he's obstinate. he's not going to cave, and he certainly wasn't going to give away obamacare. his singular achievement. talking about ted cruz, as i said, there are 435 separate congressional districts in the united states of america, each one with its own character, each one with its own demographics. in how many of those 435 congressional districts if ted cruz were running for a house seat and how many of those 435 congressional districts do you think he could win? somebody throw out a number. >> [inaudible] >> how many? >> 230. >> 230. it would be a miracle if he could win in 60, in my judgment. of those 435 congressional

districts, maybe 50 of them are competitive. maybe 50 of them are up for grabs. that means you have the other 385 districts will be voting solidly for either a democrat or a republican. and i don't mean either/or. they're already committed to one party or the other. and that governing electoral heart in the -- majority in the u.s. house will be determined by which of the two major parties get which of those 50 swing districts. and if you want to be, if you aspire to be a major political party that governs in this country, you cannot be pure u.s. or dogmatic. purist or dog dogmatic. i wish that weren't true. i wish a majority of americans shared my vision. i won't go so far as to say my dogmatism, but my fundamental principles. but they don't. the republican party is not a minor party, but it's a minority party in the united states.

with about 30% of americans calling themselves republicans. the democratic party is also a minority party. with a few more than 30% calling themself democrats. and then we have all of those independent, unaffiliated voters. elections are determined on the basis of who can win the swing voters. you can win an election based on platitudes. barack obama demonstrated that with his hope and change platitude. but you can't govern effectively on the basis of platitudes, and that's been demonstrated by this president who is perhaps the worst governing president in the history of the country. he has no concept of how to govern. [applause] george will yesterday toward the

end of the program in answering a question along the lines of is there any hope for the country, and george said when he talked about the american public, that the american public still stands for those fundamental values, especially freedom. but invoking this collective notion of the american public as so many people do from both parties, you hear some democrat stand up advocating this, that or the other thing and then invoking we, the people, believe that this should be. well, can people? which people? even though barack obama won, he wasn't elected unanimously. an awful lot of people voted against him. and a republican will stand up in colorado and say we, the people of colorado, want such and such. well, which people in colorado? there's a majority of democrats in each house of colorado's

congress, the colorado legislature, that is, and a democrat president. colorado is split. there is no such thing as we, the people. as if americans all agreed. we've never all agreed. we didn't even agree at time of the revolution. there were plenty of loyalists to the king. when the constitution was crafted and when it needed to be ratified, you needed to get the consent of those 13 colonies to ratify the constitution, the 13 new states. and they were split right up the middle on slavery. southern states, the slave states and the northern states. so the compromise was -- the constitution was a compromise on slavery because it couldn't be resolved. it was later resolved, oh, 80 years from then from that point during the civil war as a

consequence of that. but if those members of the continental congress weren't able to get together and compromise on the issue of slavery by kicking the can down the road, we'd have never ratified the constitution. the republican party, as i said earlier, is a minority party, but a major minority party. and the tea party element is a minority of the republican coalition. and within that tea party element, they're not monolithic. they've talk talked -- i've talo dozens, hundreds of tea party people who disagree with other tea party people. as well it should with. but on dozens of other thicks, we -- things we agree on the vast majority of principles. it's the politics and the strategy where we disagree.

ayn rand once said if you've got a fundamental conflict, you and someone else, the first thing you should do is check your premises. well, what's the fundamental premise that this topic, as i see it, is based on? what will be a successful strategy for winning? and that premise is where does the american public sit? is the hearn public ready to -- the american public ready to embrace uncompromised tea party principles? and i'm sorry to say, no. donald rumsfeld said you go to war with the army you have. well, you go to the election with the american public that we have. and the american public is not ideological, and they're soft. i like to believe they're a right-center country, but we're not as right-center a country, in my view, as we were when ronald reagan was elected. that was a wonderful time. but reagan was elected on the heels of a failed presidency, jimmy carter. with americans held hostage in

iran, with the soviet union on a roll, with double-digit inflation and interest rates. it was time for change, and that's why people were willing to change with ronald reagan. ironically, barack obama was elected on the heels of what the public perceived to be a failed presidency. and a great damage to the republican brand. this business about the republican establishment is a great overstatement. there's no such thing as a republican establishment, an only -- only nip tent republican establishment. those states have different characters and 435 different congressional districts. in many of those congressional tickets, a rock solid reaganite conservative can win, and that's great. but in some of those congressional districts and in some of those states only a more compromising, softer republican can possibly win. i'm sorely hoping that mike coffman is able to win, carry

that sixth district, get reelected in november. [applause] i think the world of mike. i'm very familiar with his voting record. it's solidly conservative. i should note, however, that mike coffman is a traitor, a traitor to the united states. that's what something called the tea party leadership fund has said. they've branded mike coffman as a traitor because mike coffman voted to jettison that losing republican strategy about a government shutdown. other traitors, names you'll recognize because they're in this room. congressman scott tipton from colorado was a traitor. corey gardener was a traitor according to the tea party leadership fund. they're not traitors, that was a wad strategy. we can agree or disagree about the meritses of the strategy, but it's not traitorous. this kind of language is

destructive. it's self-destructive. in order to be a majority party, we have to recognize that you fight each battle based on the rules of the battlefield in those congressional districts in those states. and in some places you have to pull your punches, because that's what politics is all about. william rusher, former publisher of national review, a solid conservative, a longtime friend of mine who died several years ago, he said politicians will always disappoint. of course they will. republican party is an imperfect party as far as i'm concerned ideologically. but i'm a partisan republican because i believe in limited government, constitutionalism, individual liberty, many other things that most republicans agree on. but i also recognize that in some races identify got to support -- i've got to support a republican who's not up to by standards because if i were to

run in some of those races, i couldn't win either. that's the reality of politics, and that's why it's essential that the tea party recognize its limitations. and pull together to form a majority coalition. now, the republican party has already been pulled to the right by the tea party, and i'm flighted to observe that -- i'm delighted to observe that. take you back to 2006. bush was still president. in that last midterm election in his second term, republicans got murdered. we lost our majority control of the united states congress. we did because a lot of so-called blue dog democrats won in districts that had elected republicans, in swing districts. blue dog democrats. more conservative democrats. even though there's a left-wing element to the democratic party, moveon.org, that crowd, they learned their lesson from the 2000 presidential election when something like 6% of the people in florida voted for ralph nader for president. giving george bush be enough

electoral college votes to carry florida. a lot fewer people voted for green party candidates on the left side. after 2000 they learned their election -- they learned their lesson. and they also demonstrated that in 2006 when they supported blue dog democrats. not left-wig democrats -- left-wing democrats who were able to give the democrats the majority in the house. after that devastating loss in 2006, another loss in 2008 with obama, republicans made a comeback in 2010. tea party candidates won in those same swing districts where blue dog democrats had won. i was delighted to see that. but tea party candidates can't win in every district. so the tea party has succeeded in shifting the republican party to the right and congress, this is not your father's olds mobile or congress, this is a much more conservative congress than we had during the bush administration thanks to the tea party. but that perfect tea party candidate is not the perfect

candidate for every congressional district. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, mike. all right. thank you, mike, and thanks to our panel. i'm going to start off with a question, and if you could all take a couple minutes or pass if the answer has been provided by someone else, in your opinion. the tea party is discussed as a noun as though it is an entity that one may be, may join and be a member. many candidates, i know i often get asked, i'm not a candidate, but i get asked all the time are you a member of the tea party, and for the life of me, i wouldn't know where to sign up to be one if i wanted to which raises the question, can that be defined? is it just a general statement about a movement if and what concerns ought there be about who gets to define -- i mean,

mike, you read a memo from an organization that uses tea party in its organizational title. there are several of those. there are dozens of those. and the, you know, the difficulty is, you know, some renegade group could take the tea party man r banner, i supposes, and say we represent the essence of the tea party and malign it. the media's always looking at the big rally. they're trying to find the one guy who's got the racist statement to put on national news. so my question is what exactly is this group? is it a movement? and if it's some big, nebulous theme, is it capable or possible of putting forward actual strategies, actual proposals? >> i take a crack at that? i'll take a crack at that as probably the closest thing on this stage to a card-carrying member of the tea party. and it's always frustrated me, the media at some point was

trying to figure out what to call this thing, and they started calling it capital t, capital party as if it was a party. i think it does a disservice. it's not, it's not a partisan-affiliated thing. it's a social movement. and it's a social movement based on a simple set of values. you wade into any tea party crowd at any event, and they will tell you that they're for individual freedom, constitutionally-limited government and fiscal responsibility. and no one told them to do that, that's just how they self-organized. i think today the tea party's probably morphing into something else. it started off as a protest movement. we became a get out the vote movement in 2010, and it's much broader today. here in colorado, as you guys would know, it's the liberty movement. and it's a mash-up of, you know, old school conservatives, ron paul millennials and tea partiers and all of these things. and they agree on a couple things that really matter. they disagree on a lot of other

stuff. but i think that what the tea party really is, is the tip of the spear on a fundamental shift in american politics. it's no longer really -- it no longer is really a two-party system. it's not the dnc and the rnc, it's something that is more empowering of individuals. people have better information. they don't rely on "the new york times" anymore. or i know tea party moms in f who have -- in florida who have larger facebook pages than the local gop. think about the marginal cost of organizing now and how that changes everything, and i would also argue that those values are not, they're not far right. a lot of tea partiers are staunchly in that growing class of independents that are sort of fed up with the partisanship on both sides. >> you can say it's not a two-party system anymore, and that might be your vision for the future, but it is a two-party system.

after the last election, we were governed by either republicans or democrats. in some states we were governed by republicans. after the next election, we will be governed by democrats or republicans. and ideological groups like the tea party, if they want to have an influence in governing, they will adhere themselves to one of those two parties, because we'll be governed by one of those two parties. and if the tea party were to break off and form a party of it own, it would be marginalized. it might get more support than the between party or the american constitutionalist party, but be it has no prospect of being, in my view, a majority party because, i'm sorry to say, that the vast majority of americans aren't up to the rigors of libertarianism or tea partyism. >> well, what -- let me address that for just a second. i think that if you look at the majority party today, it's independents, not democrats or republicans. but we are in the process -- [applause]

i would argue that the republican party is actually ours, small r republican. we're not leaving the party. those values are ours x it's the people that have abandoned those basic principles that need to either find a better home or rediscover what it is they believe. >> well, and that's the point i've been making. [applause] when, this is about revitalizing the republican party. when governor cuomo in new york said that no place in new york for conservatives of various stripes as he defined them, i mean, how imperial. i'm a republican. i never thought of myself as an establishment republican, but i guess i've become one. maybe i'm an elder statesman right now. [laughter] republican party cannot win without support from the tea party. republican party cannot win -- by win, i mean be a governing party -- without support from social issues conservatives.

each though not all republicans agree on tea party issues and social issues conservatives, but we all need to come together to form a majority coalition. we want to win. >> so in 2010 we, i think we helped create which was the large itself republican landslide since the 1940s, and then some g be op experts -- gop experts turned around and blamed us for not doing better. i think there's some confusion about this. i think the 2010 model matters, and i don't think it was an ideological race. i think we ran on issues. we ran against a government takeover of obamacare. and if you look at the history of the republican party, when we're not running bob dole for president again and again and again and again, we actually do something. we win. and we win based on values and issues. i don't think it's idealogically right or left -- >> drawing -- [inaudible] >> it's an alternative. >> drawing lines in the sand to let people know where you stand, and, you know, in terms of the government shutdown, i just, i'll recall for people in 1987

the democrats had a, quote-unquote, clean water bill which was just filled with pork but, you know, it was an environmental bill. president reagan made up his mind to veto the bill. he went to house republicans, he was being castigated on the house floor, he announced this. he was being castigated as being pro-pollution, and, you know, he wanted dirty air and water and all this sort of thing. he calls in the house leadership, republican leadership, mind you, and he says i want to veto this bill, you know? and he goes through his reasons. and they said, oh, mr. president, don't do that because the votes aren't there to sustain it. he says, well, you know, i understand i'll lose because of the democrats, but i want your support. at the end of the day, he got support from only 26 republicans in the house of representatives to support his, to sustain his vetoes. he went back to the mansion that night and wrote in his diary that he'd made his pitch and what these folks didn't seem to understand is you have to draw a line before, as he put it, the

dems and the repubs to take a stand on an issue. and if you're going to lose an issue, he was the sitting president of the united states, he lost the battle, the veto was overridden. he made it abundantly clear where he stood, and two years later his successor was elected in the last landslide to elect a republican president. and it's because ronald reagan did those things consistently. that's what the tea party does. [applause] >> i'm a big fan of ronald reagan, too, but he was major compromiser. he had the huge expansion of the welfare state under reagan. reagan's genius politically was to pick his fights. i mean, it was taxes, and it was the evil empire. and then he compromised on a lot of other things. i think a lot of this is a rhetorical battle, and i have to

say i'm way outside the beltway. i live in california, and when i watch it, i am most appalled by the attacks by the republican -- by the boehners and karl. i mean, i have a lot of respect for rove's political intelligence, but the attacks on the tea party, it's just, it's the language. i long for, long for the day when i can see, when i see republicans fight democrats with the same level of vitriol and nastiness which they fight each other. [laughter] [applause] and i do think, you know, i think what i said about the business mentality, i mean, i've watched this for years. you know, i came out of the left, so i have this, you know, fight mentality. that's the way i was brought up. when i was a little kid, i mean,

at the breakfast table we'd have these big political arguments. i understand fighting, solidarity, all those things the left does so well. in my view, it's this that's lacking. that if we would focus more on attacking the democrats and, you know, traitors. call people traitors because they, you know, ron johnson who was elected by the tea party is a wonderful person and legislator. i mean, he voted against cruz op that issue. on that issue. you know, when i hear "traitor" applied to who deserves it, which are democrats who sabotage, for example, whatever your opinion of whether we should have gone into iraq or not, they sabotaged that war for five years. they destroyed national security programs.

and the bush white house never held their feet to the fire. >> that's right. >> and said you're betraying our men and women in the field which they did. they got americans killed, no question about it. nobody said anything. and that's where i think the tea party so refreshing and important. and it's true, christine o'donnell, i mean, i actually -- somebody in hollywood asked me to go out and do speeches for her, and i did. but the woman is a blithering idiot. [laughter] but it's not just, look, i don't know how she got to be the candidate, but i sure know the republicans in delaware despise i don't even remember the name of the guy who was -- yeah, castle. mike castle. so, you know, we have a problem in the republican environment where you say, you know, run bob dole again and again. well, we did, mccain and romney. >> and we're surprised at the -- [laughter]

>> so i'm really glad to hear what matt just said. i mean, i think there's a hugely healthy development, and i think a lot of the, you know, stories about splits and divorces comes from a media which is very unfriendly to us. and from people who are threatened, like boehner. i mean, he should be out. [applause] you know? >> when the tea party got started, it was immediately disrespected by the liberal immediate and ya and by the -- media and by the democrats. they called it an astroturf movement. they pretended people were pulling the strings and it wasn't spontaneous. of course it was spontaneous, it was sincere, it was legitimate. their strategy became to turn the tea party and the republican party against each other. they've continued to advance that strategy in their own interest, and we just need to be careful not to fall into their

trap. [laughter] >> we do have to be careful, i will say, you know, to use the term, "traitor," i would agree that's inappropriate. i can say this, and this is fact. on the basis of that environmental veto, the clean water bill i was talking about, reagan also wrote in his diary we administer rabbits when we needed tigers. so i would just suggest go with rabbits and tigers. [laughter] >> we need both. ted cruz can be a tiger. i'm glad he's out there doing what he does can. but everybody can't be a ted cruz if we want to be a majority party. >> i want to get to a point that really brings in the purpose and vision of this group, the leadership program of the rockies, as it relates to some key elements in the discussion here today. ronald reagan had been consistent in an on message as a principled conservative for many, many years, but i can't remember who said it, but it was not until the 1980s, until 1980 and that campaign in particular that his message

ended up resonating with the country in a way that it had not, at least not to the same extent prior to. and that tended to be a function of a long chain of failurings. the carter administration. and an enormous level of discomfort and discouragement among the person people. but the key element is he used that campaign and his presidency to combat exactly, mike, what you've pointed to out, and that is the majority of americans are not ideological right now. ..

the frustration i think we see right now, in this discussion about the tea party, is the tea party does very well articulating what is wrong with, that the health care plan is bad. what is the plan we should be for? we can all agree that the u.s. department of education, no child left behind, the obama strategy with race to the top and so on is a bad idea. what is the conservative message we can rally around? no one has really articulated that clearly. tax policy, consumption tax, what is at? that moment it seems to me that allowed reagan to rise to the top in a way we are all still praising him today, and right

now in this discussion

a tea party of the '30s on the left we should call them the red bulls. so remember something about reagan in 76 campaign like the spirit of the tea party but what does he have to do to put himself over the top? gerald ford things yesterday and richard schweikert as his running mate, a liberal republican. damaged him with conservatives. you remember that sid. a stack of angry letters are like two feet tall. >> i went through them. spend what we did in 1980?

george h. w. bush, a catastrophic mistake in my opinion but as david said, politics is a crapshoot but it's not possible to tell perspective of how things will work out. which leads to proposition number two. the old axiom, perfect is the enemy of the good. the new left as david can tell you completely ignore that in the 1960s and '70s as they were breaking the democratic party. it damaged that party given for decades to be learned to live better. which is why they're back on top today. the word -- i'm we were about to make that same mistake. not so much about issues. issues are not on the ballot. people are on the ballot. like david, you have to get people who can sell the ideas, the ideas don't sell themselves in a vacuum. thank you. [applause] >> i agree. this thing about the education department, i had a friend who is a democratic party strategist

who was a closet conservative, looking to get off the reservation. and he said, you guys don't know how to fight these political wars. he said, you don't say you want to abolish the education department, because all they hear is your against education. what you do is you increase the education department's budget, then in the fine print you take with all of its power. [laughter] they are cynical, machiavellian and they have to lie because their agenda would never wash with the american people. but i really think it's the battle that will unite the republican party. that's what i'm so happy to see the tom cruise, lee, and there's lots of the now. really great things. the fight over benghazi, nina, on all these issues.

when you fight, people get excited and they get passionate and they come out and there's a cause. we should be very careful about, you know, there are principles that definite divide us from our political enemies. but be very careful about what those principles are. >> when he talked about george h. to the bush squandering much of the reagan legacy, and i couldn't agree with you more. i remember the first thing george h. to be pushed, an and i like them in person, said, and i cringed when i heard, he said, we need to be a kinder and gentler america. implicitly, kinder and gentler than ronald reagan. the republican party isn't yet up to tea party standards and i

don't think i've will be because of soft districts, but it really has changed. the days of rockefeller republicans, that wing of the party is gone. a little rikers and the john cheapies, they are gone. a soft republican is different efficiently of what they saw it public 30 years ago. when you look at states like maine with to liberal women senators, olympia snowe and collins, i was in happy but they give two votes in the senate and those are the only kind of people main would elect. >> this is an ongoing war, battle. the reagan era was terrific but there's more to it. life is still to be lives. the importance of the goldwater campaign was to begin to turn the party around and said this on the track so that we are at a point where there are lots and lots of goldwater's in reagan's out there. this is not going to end this year or next year, o frankly far as i can see, ever.

we just have to show up for the battle every day. >> guess what? we're over on time. so thinks to those rate questions that are not going to get to be asked. let's give a great round of applause to our panel and the discussion. [applause] >> very well done, thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> on capitol hill, the senate gavels in at 2:00 eastern. a vote at 5:30 p.m. on whether to begin debate on ukraine legislation to it would provide $150 million in economic assistance and impose sanctions on russia and guarantee the imf has resources to assist ukraine. the house gavels in at noon eastern and then again at 2:00 for legislative business. dealing today with nine bills under suspension of the rule. votes after 6:30 p.m.

you can watch the house live on c-span and live coverage of the senate on c-span2. also on capitol hill, the acting director of the white house office of national drug control policy will testify on the president's budget request or next year. of the $3.9 trillion in the request, 25.4 billion would go to the drug control office. you can watch live coverage of the hearing starting at 3:00 eastern on c-span3. also on c-span3, a markup of the 1988 satellite home viewer act which is set to expire this year. it aims to make broadband available to underserved areas around the country. 1.5 million households would lose access to broadband content without congressional reauthorization. you can watch the market at 5:30 p.m. eastern on c-span3. >> on friday george washington universalist of college professors from ukraine and estonia to talk about -- a look

at regional politics and recent history for about two hours. >> good afternoon at one. i'm cory welt, associate director of the institute for european, russian, and eurasian studies here at george washington university's alley school of international affairs. at the institute i codirect with my colleague, professor henry hill, the program on new approaches to research in security in eurasia. it's a network of about 100 scholars and specialists on russian and post-soviet affairs that include scholars and experts from across north america, russia, ukraine, other post-soviet states and europe. the program is supported by the carnegie corporation of new york, the macarthur foundation and george washington

university. we all of course been transfixed by the russian government audacious invasion and annexation of crimea in ukraine. much of the conversation has concerned the response of the international community, specifically the united states and the european union, and rightly so. as well the effectiveness of that response and also there's been much discussion concerning the impact of russian action on russia's future role in the region and its global status. we will address all of these issues in our q&a, in our discussion as well. but first we would like to take some time to discuss the implications of this crisis on ukraine. we are very fortunate to have several of our colleagues from ukraine in town for a conference. we have two of them who will be speaking to us today. ukraine is a country that has gone from a revolution to an

external invasion practically within a matter of days. still reeling from this. and also beginning to look forward to its political future and the steps out of its current economic crisis. as well, we have the opportunity to discuss, trying to make sense of russian policy in the region, the russian actions in crimea, what the russian government seeks to be achieving with the annexation of crimea. and also an issue that hasn't been discussed as much press in recent days is the impact of russian actions on domestic politics and governance inside of russia itself. so we have an excellent panel. i need to get my -- [inaudible]

first, we will have turned 11, professor of international relations and director of the center for initial studies at odessa i.i. mechnikov. he has conducted research at the kennedy institute at the woodrow wilson international center for scholars and that the senate for a national security studies at the university of maryland. esa co-author of ukraine and european security, and is published numerous articles on news and ukraine relations regional and international security and ukraine's foreign policy. next we will have professor oleksandr for soon -- he is the founding editor of a journal for global and comparative studies. is held visiting fellowships at the woodrow wilson center institute and at the international forum for democratic studies of the

national endowment for democracy. he published a book, democracy, as well as other book chapters and articles and comparative democratization and regime change and post-soviet eurasia and ukraine politics. third, we will have viatcheslav morozov, a professor. before moving in 2010 a top or 13 years at st. petersburg state university in russia. he has published extensive on russian national identity and foreign policy and more recently on russian domestic politics and discourses on democracy. is the author of russia and others, identity and boundaries of the political community, and the editor. and, finally, we have dimitri gorenburg. in addition his work, he is editor of the journal's problems

oppose him is an russian politics and law and an associate at harvard university data center are russian and eurasian studies. from 2005-2010, who was executive director of the american association for the advancement of slavic studies. is published numerous articles on these topics in journals like the current history, world politics and post-soviet affairs. is the author of nationalism for the masses, and he blogs on issues led to the russian military. before i turn over to the panel-itis also want to extend our deepest appreciation to the carnegie corporation of new york, the john d. macarthur foundation and also george washington university for their support. so i now turn the podium over to volodymyr dubovyk. thank you. >> good morning. i would like to focus my position on several major blogs.

first i would like to say a few things about the crimea situation here to secondly about the situation in my home town of odessa and generally south of ukraine. then a few things about the agenda for ukraine as a country, the way i see come and find a few words on western support and assistance were receiving in these critical days. in crimea, we just received another word that the so-called referendum has been absolutely illegitimate, didn't send any criteria that usually we try to apply to events of this sort. the commission of the council of europe have spoken today and added its voice to the numerous voices basically already trying to call the reverend as absolute illegitimate. it's been a force, a show in the worst conditions of society. the voices were not counted, the votes were not counted. in fact, would have been in

crimea is an armed robbery. it's when you have a gain of people with machine guns injuring french bank or an apartment and taking everyone hostage. this situation does not change really in the way that some people profess. although some of us would like to see those people coming with those guns because it still an armed robbery because you take something, you steal something from someone else which is not yours. crimea referendum, the specification for it is pure rubbish. there was no threat for crimean population, ethnic russian, russian speakers in crimea. there was nothing like the nationals moving into crimea. it has all been great but russian propaganda machine. we know it now for sure. what we're having now in crimea is we are witnessing a human drama there over the highest degree and level. we have crimean tartars who have

been extremely loyal to ukraine statehood for a while. there's been absolutely, they have been actually antagonistic to the russian invasion, but right now they still are there. are trying to figure what they going to do next. it is the potential for conversation there. we've seen episodes and we see on tv that they have buried already one of their own, a young person was found there. that was the site of -- what is going to happen, i don't know. have been already examples of tatars been pushed away from the land. there have been instances of one small hotel which belongs to a crimean tatar person being burned to the ground. at the same time i think we are to anticipate the russian government trying to buy part

ours with a brace positions in the regional government with some financial assistance, perhaps given them some land in very sparse of the crimean peninsula. there will be some maneuvering back and forth but right now cremeans are unhappy about what's happening to their land. and not just crimean tatars. ethnic russians of crimea are only a portion of ukraine were ethnic russians are majority. 60% of population. what about the 40? 40 which is are not ethnic russians? and also the most recent polls taken in crimea our primary, prior to russian troops moving in, but democratic initiatives and also international -- have shown us only 41% of people in crimea were in favor of becoming seating from ukraine, becoming part of russia.

what about the rest of the people? so those voices are not heard. what we'r we are seeing today, e are fleeing crimea. families being disunited. we are seeing internally displaced persons appearing in ukraine in vast numbers. we've seen 2000 people coming from crimea and looking for refuge. these people are going to need a place to stay and they will need jobs, and people in the schools for the kids. so the human drama actually happening developing before our own eyes. what's going to happen to crimea next quick what should we do about crimea? it is an annexation, occupation and crimea still remains part of ukraine. we should operate facing this assumption. the troops i believe and many people in ukraine share the same assumption, should be evacuated as soon as possible. some people might call it

surrender. perhaps so but those people behaved bravely and it's shown signs of courage and restraint and they did not give pretext to russian troops for further escalation, further invasion in other parts of ukraine. now, there's a lot of debate on what should we do next in crimea, she we tried to strangle crimea? should we try to prop them with a supply of water, for example, our electricity or should we not? a lot of people are still debating this. myself, i believe we shouldn't be doing this because there's a lot of people who are innocent there. it's not their fault that the referendum took place. it's not their fault the annexation took place but we shouldn't do anything that would make people suffer unnecessarily. now also the big debate with ukraine is what should we do with the social pensions? for example, pensions and so

one. should we continue or stop those? so that's a big question. i think for the time being we should continue, even though it's difficult to do, especially considering that our budget as we all know is kind of empty. also another thing that we should of course continue to call this issue of intention of international order stations, our friends and allies around the globe, an agenda of various organizations. we should bring it to the courts as well. armed robbery is armed robbery. when russia takes control of our oil, drilling facilities by the crimean sure, it's nothing of the robbery and that should be probably seen as such library supports. on the other hand, we are hearing voices and falling ukraine that we should probably national and some other russian property, the russian oligarchs

in ukraine. i don't think that's the right way to proceed but i think that probably would even more destabilize ukraine and that would be a bad sign for any person think about investing money in ukraine, and we do need investment to coming to ukraine. now even more so than is to be in the previous years. i don't think speaking for my point of view that nationalization of russian property should be taking place. what's going on in augusta? difference in favor of ukraine main into pendants integrity. they figured there shows us that 24% of citizens, residents of odessa support this idea of seceding and becoming part of russian federation which means three force a population of odessa is not enthusiastic about this idea. the highest percentage is an area where you have about 33%,

one-third population thinking about leaving ukraine enjoining russia. so everywhere in the east and the south of ukraine should be aware that. most people, vast majority are strongly in favor of maintaining territorial integrity of ukraine. why some people do come to the separatist camps, so to speak? many of them are being brainwashed and subjected to russian propaganda which has been carried for years i russian tv stations and also by ukraine central station. and also by many local channels. many of them are senior citizens who have their nest osha for soviet times so they've been trying to think of situation in terms of some kind of time machine that would probably transport them 20, 30, 40 years into the soviet past which is not possible but that's another important element in segment of that kind of camp that i've been talking the. there's a constant manipulation with the language issue, which you are well aware, and, of

course, most of the calls are coming from moscow. but for one, i am russian speaking ukrainian from odessa. i never felt any persecution but i've never felt any kind of fear of this new government in kiev. under the any kind of scare of this radical so-called radicals coming to odessa and trying to forbid me to use russian language and talking to my friends and my family. i'm very pro-ukraine might a person but even my teaching i do teach russian because that reflects the liquid situation in my hometown, in the region. that has been in effect for years so what kind of repression against russian speakers are you talking about in the case of odessa, or anywhere else in the south or east ukraine? finally of course the separatist movement and actions of that movement have been will organize, no doubt about it. the plans have been drafted a long time ago.

the monies falling from the sky in colossal numbers on those people. i mean it's almost limitless funding for someone who is in that kind of separatist movement in ukraine now. people brought from outside of ukraine, i'm sure many of you of heard about the cases, in trenton. we have people off amounts of ukraine odessa and many of them were brought from a nearby place which is very per russian as well. there are a lot of people basically younger thugs i would say more but specifically to participate in the demonstrations and group meetings and even attacks on public buildings and odessa. and nothing which remember that the you know coverage power was basically left untouched anyways. a lot of people who were there, you know coverage wasn't our are still there. a lot of people in the loss was

the agency they feel demoralized, they question their loyalty. they don't know what to do. and the new government in kiev is not be successful and not very quick in terms of actually working with these people and making them to do their job which is among other things arrest the people who are attacking public buildings, or talking separatist movement and so on and so on. also speaking of court, speaker prosecuted, i, for one, believe that most of the people should be fired. all of them, and then new bunch of people actually brought, should be brought into their positions. that's a very important issue to us because the judiciary branch the power in ukraine was for years basically nonexistent. still is, same people there. how do we talk about new government with the same people in those positions? that's also very important

issue. the party in my hometown dominated everything that we had in odessa. those people that are complacent in crimes of the criminal regime of yanukovych those are the people who were deciding violence, including use of armed forces. those of the people are not taking part in separatist activities. so i believe that that should explain to you somehow the situation we find ourselves in odessa. why there are some separatist demonstrations and actions that are not countered in a proper way by local government or by police or by security services. security service we should remember has been heavily infiltrated by russian agents. it started happening even before yanukovych came to power. that's been a fact of massive russian infiltration into the ukrainian security service.

that's why we see what doesn't in the south and east, well formed, well organized and well-funded. we have a very strong ukrainian court in odessa. it's been reinforced i russian aggression. we had a lot of people basically were saying well we don't know about yanukovych. maybe we would like them. we had a lot of people who were not interested in maidan. a lot of people who are questioning various political party loyalties are now united, they are now united because the country is under attack. so that's a very important fact. we have a lot of people taking part in various marches, singing anthems, social media is booming. there are soccer matches from odessa and others based under the slogan of south and east and west being together. we have a generational change in

place for sure because a lot of youngsters, most of the extras are definitely pro-ukraine, unlike some senior citizens in odessa. with intellectuals in odessa came out in vast numbers stronger support for ukraine's integrity. there is actors, painters, sculptures, i don't know, musicians, they have recorded their own statements and made statements in support of territorial integrity. some of them have made a video basically saying -- mr. putin, please go home. that was the main message. on the other hand, of the spectrum the separatist cans, these are people who are absolutely unknown in our city. nobody knows their names, nobody knows where they came from. those people are aliens to odessa. they were not in existence prior to this event. so we are talking about the brighter side, the more active

side of odessa speaking strong in support of in territorial -- territorial integrity while there were a bunch of troublemakers bringing from outside ukraine that is -- activities in east and the south of ukraine. for ukraine there are several priorities today. first of all to withstand the invasion. to stop russian aggression, to try to continue to fight for cranium, to prepare for for the invasion. we hope it's not going to happen but we need to be ready. to support our forces. yes, we are keeping our money from a small salaries, from our own wallets to support our army. and there have been millions of millions just a matter of one week. people are giving the money to support the army. it would be impossible if not for the drama of the situation but, of course, the government should be supporting the army, providing money and locating money, enough money for the army to survive.

but that was not the fact in ukraine in recent years. the army has almost been destroyed. people like myself, universe professor, giving some of our savings to the armies of the army could actually be operating and performing its function. the second priority of course is to drive the country out of the deep, deep economic pit that they find ourselves in. that would require passing unpopular reforms come accepting money from international monetary fund, for one, which requires us to do some drastic measures. for example, radically increasing the payments that the people would have to do for the citizens. that's not only popular but it's needed. there's no way to delay. i mea think that needs to be do, sooner the better. ukraine is deeply wounded now. it's very much in a week state. we have a week authority in the

government but we have a strong civil society. that is very important. ngos and so on a plane very active role now in ukraine can basically keeping the country together. i am happy that everything the new government in kiev does? actually not. there are issues about -- about sending indecisive in many cases. that are same phrases some people are tired of seeing. but it is much better than the one that we had under yanukovych and whether we like it or not this government can we tell it, but we are for the time being we are coalescing around this government because we're under attack. so we stay united. finally, on the sport we're receiving from the west and particularly from the united states. we're very grateful for that. we have an inpatient, we've been thinking that sanctions had been delayed. we are thinking the sanctions

are not drastic enough. you bet we are. but at the same time whatever support we are receiving from this country, it is very important. symbolic and also is a matter of fact, it's very important to the financial aid i hope will be, the bill will sail through congress and we will receive financial assistance. i wrote on facebook on my page the other day that we would like to have for part-time working as foreign affairs to ukraine. that would be great for our country. a lot of people monitor her activities and statements and security council with delight. whatever kind of military assistance we might get, including the ready-to-eat meals, rations and so on, the commitments of our u.s. armed forces will support allies in eastern europe within nato. that's a good sign.

we are hearing talk about a joint military exercise with nato and u.s. military. that's a good sign. we understand the sanctions face a lot of difficulties. nothing moves fast and quick enough in this town. there are difficulties. it's a democratic country so you need to coordinate activities with theirs agencies until. it's not a country where one person decides everything. and, finally, i just would like to say, finally, that we claim, we ask that the united states do the right thing. to us wha but the united statess doing now, supporting ukraine, corresponds to both values and interests for this country. and the help that we are receiving today is duly noted by ukrainians, no doubt about it. like i said, we're grateful. he can see clearly now who our real friends are. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you very much. now i'd like to invite to the podium oleksandr. >> [inaudible conversations] >> hello. at the start of the crimean crisis, a number of ukraine cities experienced -- restoring

the legitimacy of the government. or unification with russian federation. in some places protests were a company by disturbances of public order. [inaudible] attempt to take over of regional administration and rising of russian flags, demand for the referendum and for russia to introduce military troops to ukraine. such events have been called russian think took place in -- [inaudible] and others. pro-russian forces proved to be

small and they are weighted by much larger ukraine protests. a similar situation obtained in odessa, a protest were at least several thousand people strong but peaceful, in part due to the presence of ukraine demonstration and the possibility of violent collisions. local elites have emphasized working with so-called legal frameworks. in my comments i will briefly speak about the general context, actors, the position of ukrainian official elites and the role of russian government in the eastern and southern ukraine. i will be sure to pay region of

public -- [inaudible] of odessa and the republic of crimea. together, the territory has about 48% of the total population of ukraine. out of 23 million people, there are 14 at half million in ukraine today. and around 7 million our russian. 50% of the population of this region. in other words, southeastern region, approximately 83% of ukrainians, russians -- [inaudible] the ratio of the russian population today is from 14 to

72%. in other regions, russians account for 38% of general population. 36% of the population in crimea about 60%, 58%. ukrainians and russians are combined to 95% of total population. the exception in crimea where crimea tatars are an ethnic minority. politically, eastern region of ukraine has position of being stronghold of region, and the communist party of ukraine has a level of support for

symmetrically declined from parliamentary elections in 2012. during the 2012 parliamentary elections, the support for the party ranged from 55%, 30%, 52% in crimea, 57% in the region and around 65% in trenton region. russian national party has traditionally been political in marginal in ukraine in large part due to the fact that they've applied -- the calmest party of ukraine and party of regions. the part of reaching a particular -- alternate political conversation in place

like odessa and crimea were russian nationalist forces, for example, -- [inaudible] but then didn't do much better than they have. the deposition of mr. yanukovych and intervention in crimea, one of the keys disgusted by paul on ukrainian statehood which produced an interesting results. in terms of unification with russia was ported by 41% of people in crimea. 33% in donetsk, 24% in turn 11 to 24% in another region. 15% in the region, 15% in another region. around 4% in a different region,

and 3.7% in another region. so this is not difficult to see a direct correlation between the persecution and deep support unification with russia. several individuals and workstations have come forward. [inaudible] and paramilitary or decisions, the name of the organization is

-- headed by a man from a region in ukraine. and there are several groups in august the region. there is reason to believe that not all people who participate in the anti-maidan, during russian federation. the art a lot of different, different motivations to participate in the protests. first of all, social and economic considerations. pro-russian, at least for some participants of demonstration --

symbolic support with the russian federation rather than direct unification. the maidan protests was blocked in kiev. so the ukrainian media presented the current protests as the current activity of russian special service and russian -- there is likely also evidence of protest of russian citizens who arrived from russia territories. but one should not downplay the importance of the actors in these protest. it's clear that the maidan protests were not supported by 50% of the ukrainian population. a number were significantly high in the cities south and east of the country.

and while anti-maidan protests were by administered means, some groups were activated ideologically. [inaudible] on the other hand, the size of recent protests in odessa, the protests are something the case of russian federation organization is not over estimation. and i think direction of ukraine authority developing in the southeast, the post-yanukovych period, it's important understand the political energies of the transition after the collapse of yanukovych's government which has yet to be completed. there are three ways -- system

in eastern and south ukraine. there is a direct defection of local elites from a party of power, and other regions, an example of this defection from power. the second model is a so-called transition. while settlements or arrangements to be part of local elites from former power, party of power. from a home city, this example -- transition with parts of leaders in city council and regional council. and even -- makes them

arrangement with new power about new governors. this is part of the transition you can see in some regions of ukraine. probably in the odessa region. the third model, rebellion of local elites again central government, with the support of foreign military troops like in crimea over with the support of paramilitary protesters like in lugansk region. with strong support on the part of local economical elite.

anyway, in the aftermath of the revolution oligarch an important part of regional elites, the fact that yanukovych networks will lead to new power. there are separatist movements. as you can see, you can see it, for example, the governor of donetsk region. even the city -- [inaudible] now local elites try to facilitate and support ukrainian antiwar protest after much of russian intervention in crimea.

it's an interesting model of intra- elite settlement. some eastern ukraine regions and probably the best way to accommodate local elites is to reach agreement between central and regions. at sometime, some regional elites to position to the one voice by anti-maidan protests, creation of local paramilitary defense organizations. the head of the fraction of the party region has been openly speaking in favor of this and protection of russian language and other eastern european -- ukrainian regions. at the same time, yanukovych and

his team have weekend the structure of the state. especially -- the replacement of security officials proceeded very slow unfortunately. [inaudible] the consolidation of the state and the systematic attempts to eradicate separatist abilities. for example, -- there was an arrest of a governor and activist in donetsk region and south of -- members, after

shooting occurred, lost, weakend in my home city. two people are dead and around 12 were wounded. there is a lot of evidence of decline of productivity as a situation remains shaky with the presence of russian factor. for example, referendum on march 16, last week, a lot of demonstrations in odessa. in the conclusion i would like to outline new political order for ukraine after the annexation

of crimea. in preparing our presentation, i have made some calculation about results of presidential elections, 2004 in presidential election of 2010. here are the results of crimea and sevastopol. actually we have a new political tool, and one of the more interesting results is a runoff election of november 21 in 2004.

the leader of the election, it's very interesting. between yanukovych and others in 2010, there is only 0.38% difference. close results. situation is similar to moldova. probably in the future residential elections in 25, in parliamentary elections. you can see a new result that is more, national allies -- nationalized. there is a new division between political parties.

so annexation of crimea republic and new political situation in ukraine from international point of view, it is the start of international relations and transformation of international order. some domestic point of view of a result of this integration, and result of a generalization of power in crimea come in eastern and southern ukraine. local political regimes are very different type of arrangements. thank you for your attention. [applause]

>> thank you very much professor. now please professor from the university in estonia. >> thank you. my presentation will be about russia and trying to make sense of the russian position and behavior in the situation. and let me start by saying that russia, as i see it, is also going through very difficult times. and i don't mean it as a request for empathy or even by no means as an attempt to somehow downplay the plight of the ukrainians. in the current situation. but the country divided between brainwashed majority and minority which feels violated and threatened is not a good country to be in.

actually being at the border in estonia is also not very emotionally easy place, because there is anxiety of the local committee which is deeply concerned about the possible consequences of the annexation of crimea for the baltic states. and all sorts of conspiracy theories which we thought were conspiracy theories suddenly prove almost true. and we know what to expect. but nevertheless, which i can make sense of what's going on. there are of course different explanations of what rush is trying to achieve here, and the simplest one is probably that russian behavior just takes whatever is there, it grabs. and this is a simple geopolitical logic which somebody takes that it expands whenever it can expand the there is of course some truth to this

explanation, but i would say that it wouldn't qualify as a full explanation of russia's behavior. for filling the empty space would imply for instance, well, i would say it would imply inviting other countr countriesn the union a long time ago. the next thing, incorporating and russian federation, have long been requesting the. but for some reason it started only with crimea. and, of course, all of that can still happen, but i would say that now if it happens it would have been because of crimea, not for its own reasons. but also myself, feel uncountable describe russia's behavior is simply opportunistic and kind of cold-blooded russian, expansion excellent.

there's too much ideology of what's going on, too much passion even. so of course there is a different explanation which also helps to clarify why, for instance, not tajikistan and that is of course quite a few people have argued this point that putin has now completely sided with ethnic russians in russia. he supports policy of defending the russian speakers whatever they are, and where ever there are conditions, and this is why tajikistan for the moment outside of the picture because somehow integrating them further with russia would mean of course integrating also the population and there's a lot of xenophobia and negative attitude towards migrants which already in russia so that is not very effective scenario for ethnic nationalists, were as crimea is in this regard the perfect case where you're helping fellow

russians and that is kind of -- that brings you a lot of false points. .. this is sort of intuitive knowledge we all have about the possible consequences of this

watershed that we have just passed but it doesn't really fit into the nationalist logic. the only logic which is out there in operation. yet another explanation is to say that this is a sort of a calculation of a different sort, domestically motivated an attempt to divert attention from potential economic crisis to start short, victorious war which would probably long, last long enough to divert the attention from the domestic problems. well, but such, if it was such a calculation, cold-blooded calculation, once again it should have included some assessment of risks and costs and i wouldn't say that it looks rational from this perspective because the costs are already there. the risks are huge for the economy in the first place.

and the russian economy, okay, it was stagnating, or had been stagnating before the intervention. it was in pretty bad shape but it wasn't collapsing. and doing, doing what russia does now, strongly increased the possibility of a collapse, economic collapse. so, basically the logic then would be, okay, well, what do we do? we risk collapsing the economy for sake of preventing a collapse of the economy. somehow doesn't sound very rational to my. lost touch with reality, putin lost touch with reality, probably part of the picture but at the same time the whole operation was executed too skillfully. so it is kind of a mixture of different factors, each in isolation looks credible to some extent but not really fully creditable. of course we also can always go the usual academic way and say this is combination of factors. that is overdetermined

phenomenon and so on. but i think there is certain magic formula, if you apply it to the situation it will actually put all the pieces of the puzzle in place and this magical formal might sound banal, but i'm still going to say it and this is the restoration of the soviet union and i mean it not as a policy or intention even. i mean i'm not going to try to prove that putin is, intent of putin's motivation to restore the soviet union. what i'm argue something more practical. i'm arguing that the restoration of the soviet union has already happened. let me explain what i mean. yes, sir, russia is still smaller than the soviet union tear torely and probably never regain the lands it lost during the soviet collapse but the image of the world which is shared bit majority of the

public and of course by the elites is, in this image the country's stretches beyond its internationally-recognized borders and vladmir putin's description of ukrainian state as having been in permanent political crisis for the past 20 years actually reflects a view shared among his compatriots. more many russians the post-soviet states are nothing but a quirk of history. these are nations whose claims to sovereignty are questionable at least. and in order to understand what is going on one simply needs to, and also what might happen elsewhere, one needs to simply look at these events through the prism of the soviet world view. ethnic nationalism and self-determination is the slowing began of russia were key components of soviet ideology, we all know that ethnic russians were the dominant group in the ussr, first among equals but

they were also other officially recognized nationalities and they had their ethnic homelands, they enjoyed some cultural autonomy. this is exactly what is being promiseed to the ukrainian tatarses today. but, there is of course, much more an tex ages of. it was historical illusions clear to anyone like myself grew up in the soviet union. they originate in the history textbook which every soviet boy or girl have on their desk and it is form like is the land sold with russia blood or about crimea and they are directly from soviet mythology. it is, it is not even an interpretation. it is a direct quote.

then of course the soviet legacy explains why propaganda has been so effective in the russian revolution as a fascist coup. of course if you stalinist cliches about the ukrainian national liberation movement being just a hoard of nazi collaborationists but it is also, the opinion is based on the profoundly anti-western attitudes inherded from times of the cold war. in this mentality all political developments derive from geopolitical struggle between the east and the west and there is actually no such thing as people asserting their sovereignty in the face of corrupt authoritarian regime by going to the streets, by protesting, fighting for their rights. everything which happens in ukraine or elsewhere as long as it hasn't been plotted in moskow, must have been plotted in washington. no other possibility on the table. and of course the ukrainian revolution in this image was a

victory for the west, not for the ukrainians and if russia doesn't fight back the next revolution will happen in moscow. annexing crimea was putin's way to turn a defeat in the victory and stabbing the revolution in the back and consolidating domestic support for the regime. so unfortunately seems that the crimean case made it clear that the project of fostering international identity for russia which was initiated in 1991, 1992, has largely failed, instead what happened was russian society falling back on the, only shared legacy of that it has. the memories of the soviet empire, but what is important to emphasize here. not just imperial means as such but imperial means which has been promoted by the soviet system.

because the soviet system was the first universal system, fully modern system. universal education and universal indoctrination reached all over the country. everyone went to the school and listened to the cliches and these cliches now work. they have other memories to rely upon. appears didn't have anything like that and this is the main reason for the failure of the new identity project. and the new generation, the argument was of course, about, well, 10 years back, 15 years backing that the new generation will no longer be, no longer be soviet but this new generation have fewer alternatives to choose from and since they have no first-hand experience of living in the soviet times and experiencing the hardships of the soviet regime, or soviet life, they were even more eager than the people in the 40s and 50s to embrace this new soviet identity. and, i would argue that with the

russian nation rallying around putin over the annexation of crimea, the, the soviet union has actually been restored in terms of the continuing in terms of the identity of this political entity, in terms of its outlook, global outlook. so anyone who wants to understand what's, what's going on and what to expect from the kremlin in the future must look at the soviet past. of course this outlook doesn't give us 100% certainty. we don't know what's going to happen next exactly. we can not predict whether eastern ukraine will be intervened in or it will happen elsewhere or nothing will happen for the next few years or even decades but, these of course, hope because we can say that crimea was a special case, very symbolic, very mis-- in this outlook. would be logical there to stop

for the time-being and see what, what comes out of this whole move. but i think and here i'm coming back to where i started, we should also think about russia and its future. this soviet restoration is also crucially important for any restoration of the putin's regime. the main reason for the soviet collapse was flagging economy. it was too dependent on hydrocarbon exports, western loans, similar picture today. it might be that putin's russia will follow the same path and finally, there will be some economic, well, catastrophe but the crucial question is what happens next, not what brings down the current regime but what happens next afterwards. optimistic answer would be that the soviet people with their deeply-seeded anti-western mind-set still admired the west

as consumers. and, the same phenomenon is observed in today's russia. brandishing their patriotic feelings doesn't prevent russians from relying on imports in almost every aspect of their daily experience. and everyone who can afford it would gladly travel abroad for tourism, we all know that. should the russian economy deteriorate to the point of unraveling the population might welcome another round of from the west of hope of achieving a higher living standard but, at this point parallels become too risky, historical parallels become too risky. the painful memories of the imperial collapse are still too fresh and the ukrainian crisis has actually reopened the old sores. it didn't heal any of the wound. it is actually, it, the contrary

was the case. as a nation russia remains extremely fragile and this is not good news for anyone who wants it to be democratic and peaceful. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. that was dr. morozov of the university of tartu in estonia. our final speaker will be doctor, dmitry gore renburg. also an associate at harvard university's davis center. >> thanks, cory. i'm going to, my main expertise is in, on in the military so i'm going to start at least talking a little bit about the russian military operation. and expand a little bit on couple of things that he touched on the why now aspect why putin did this. and talk about some of the u.s. policy and response and some of

the policy implications where this might be going. so as far as, as far as the military operation we have to remember one key fact that makes crimea very different from the rest of ukraine and most of the rest of the former soviet union, which is there is relatively large contingent of russian troops based there, by treaty, by agreement, long before any of these events happened. it was about, the normal contingent that were there around 14,000 to primarily navy personnel but that included some naval infantry, some naval aviation. so a wide range. so when the, when the operation began, on, or about february 26, the, it was relatively easy to augment those forces with some

special forces troops that russia could bring into the existing base without it being as noticeable as it might have been in other parts of ukraine or elsewhere. so and then, then as we remember from tv, they could then take off their insignia, appear as little green men or as the, they were called in the russian, sort of social media, the polite people and, then occupy kilocations. government buildings. ukrainian military bases. go up the to it must -- is must --is it hums connecting rest of crime crime with ukraine. that could be done very quickly. done very quickly before people

knew what was going on. that was the key for the success of the operation. so by a time, so by the. just having, taken over, saw what was going on. they were already effectively in control of most of the key, facilities what it tells about the russian military that at least the special forces are well-trained and equipped and can carry out covert operations effectively. we can be careful. doesn't necessarily speak to the quality of the entire military force and shouldn't make assumptions that the, a lot of the other other brigades and other forces in russia have a much lower state of readiness. the forces that were brought into crimea came from the

southern military district, which is the best prepared of russia's four military districts because, that is where, they have expected combat for the last 10 years, both, first, chechnya, the war with georgia, various counter-terrorists operations. so those are the units that are at close to full manning. relatively few conscripts. a lot of units don't have any, but relatively few and the most modern equipment goes there first. so, so that and it was interesting, there was a kind of a diversionary tactic used where there were these highly publicized exercises that were conducted by the western military district around eastern ukraine with lots of troops supposedly being used and lots of, everyone pay attention over here while at the same time

troops from the southern military district which, if you, if you followed the open press, they seemed like there was nothing going on there. it was completely quiet. they were the ones who were brought in together with some airborne forces from forces generally kept at higher state of readiness from other parts of the country. that is kind of how it was done. we have to remember, the rest, that is fairly small number of troops that are at that level of readiness. if you look at other russian forces a lot of the brigades are manning levels of 40 to 60%. older equipment. lots of conscripts. so this, what i'm trying to say just because these are, russia has some highly effective troops we shouldn't assume that it has 750,000 highly effective troops. so that is just something to keep in mind and there are also some serious limitations on

command-and-control and logistics which would make sustained operations much more difficult to carry out than a quick strike like this, which in fact didn't actually involve any war fighting in this case. so, there is, in terms of, in terms of implications for, what we know about russian military capabilities, they can plan a good operation and do it and carry it out well, but we haven't necessarily learned that much about you the russian military would function in an actual serious conflict, especially over a period of time that is longer than a few weeks. so, i will, i will leave that, leave the military aside for now, and talk a little, i just wanted to, i'm mostly, i had a few points on why did putin do this and mostly kind of crossed

them off after following through them but, which is good because, it is always nice to sort of be thinking along the same lines but i think there is there is this, you know, obvious question of why now? and, it feeds into what i think is an important corrective that needs to be made to a lot of commentary and that is, that, this is not a victory for putin. this is a loss for putin. when, when we look at everything together. because when, if we look at putin's position at various points in time, in november, when he, when yanukovych agreed to go with putin and not sign the association agreement with the e.u., he thought he had all of ukraine.

in february when the protesters, when i thought he had a deal with yanukovych to repress the protesters, again, he still, it was, there was instability but it looked like he had all of ukraine. and then suddenly ukraine is lost, right? so, what happens is, and this goes to the why now question, right? so, and, he kind of mentioned it briefly and i want to highlight it, why now because you have to make the best of a suddenly bad situation. and so that's where this tactical reaction to, to losing ukraine is to take what you can get and crimea is easy to, relatively easy to get. the, and not only does that, it

reduces the blow in a way but it also as we see destablizes ukraine at least in the short term and so that, there's benefits for putin there. to me this kind of a miscalculation, you know, from, based on past, unless ukraine has changed a lot, you know, the, it seemed to me that the government was ripe for a kind of a situation that was similar to what happened after the orange revolution where there were disparate elements in a coalition. they would probably fall to infighting relatively quick level the russian government could choose one or more of them to make an alliance with or buy off or both and then kind of restore its position to some kind of a equalibrium. had it not intervened. by intervening, as we heard, it

unites the rest of ukraine against the attacker and so it becomes much -- and now we have, it also provides a lot morsi stance from the west and all the cost that is we've heard about. so i think that, was, was the miscalculation, not miscalculation, but that is where we get into some of these idealogical and historical factors that prevent purery rational calculation and lead to all of the things that slav talked about. let me, i don't have a lot of time and i want to get into some of the other, some of the only u.s.-based, i will talk a little bit about the u.s. policy. i think the obama administration handled this pretty well.

it wasn't initially clear, now sitting back after crimea has been annexed, we can say of course putin was going to take over crimea, we should have hit him hard right away. but that wasn't clear initially and by warning of serious consequences, while allowing for putin the opportunity to deescalate i think very much the right course of action and then, and then as it became clearer and clearer that deescalation was not on the table for putin, then now we're seeing the ramping up of sanctions. the second part of that is that, you know, some people say that, well, sanctions, these sanctions aren't really hurting enough. you know, the administration looks weak because this is all we can do. i'm not seeing what the alternatives are from those

critics. i don't, i don't think that military intervention is really on the table far as the u.s. is concerned and nor should it be. so i don't see what the alternatives are. to serious sanctions and so serious sanctions are, at the same time, the best sanctions are one that is don't necessarily hit the average russian because as, you know, it is not really, you know, their fault and so hitting the regime i think is exactly the right target. now what's, what's more, if we did go after, implement sanctions that hit the average russian, this would make it easier for putin to rally the population around the flag so to speak. so whereas what, what i see

going forward now is that the sanctions are going to hurt the elite. at the same time the, our conception, both in the u.s. and in europe, of, what russia's about, what russia, what russian foreign policy is about, is fundamentally changed. that is going to affect how, you know, the willingness of the west to invest in russia. that is going to cause economic pain to russia without sanctions. in a way that can't be directly blamed on the west, right? so there is going to be less investment. the russian stock market is down. it is going, stay at a low, it may rise in the future but this is going to be priced in. so it will be at a lower level. the, europe is going to, it will take some time but there is going to be steps to reorient away from dependence on russian energy. that is going to take time. but again, it is going to cause

economic pain to those russian elites over time. so, that is kind of why i think this is the right direction and it is going to, and it is not just a slap on the wrist but it is actually going to have some consequences. let me conclude talking about some of the risks for the future. i see kind of short-term risks and medium-term risks and longer term. the short-term risks and obvious one is instability in the eastern ukraine. there's, it seems pretty clear there are russian intelligence type agents in eastern ukraine, working with locals to create, to foment more instability. it is going to be, very difficult but very important for the ukrainian government to stablize that situation. so that, so that is one.

the second risk is in crimea. and that is also been alluded to, the crimean tartar population. -- tatar population. this is a population of about 300,000 i think people, who are not happen with the way things are. it is possible that they could be bought off, i don't know. i haven't talked to them. okay, so, so there is source of instability for russian control of crimea but there is also some smaller, some number of ukrainian patriots still in crimea. some have fled but some are still there. so those are the kind of the short-term risks. the medium-term risks are i think are the key and this is one of the big things, for me,

out of, coming out of putin's speech a couple of days ago, was this statement about defending ethnic russians outside of russian borders. because that is a huge threat to a whole bunch much countries ukraine, kazakhstan, we mentioned the baltic states. this creates a security threat to, to the region and has potentially, if carried out has potentially much broader implications for the international order because there are lots of other countries, that have ethnic minorities that live in other countries.

china. hungary. so there, this is, this is something that if russia doesn't back away from could, you know, putin talked about a fifth column domestically in russia but this is essentially operationally i think regular people living in the their regular lives as a potential fifth column in other countries where they will now be treated with suspicion. and that is very dangerous. so that's a huge risk. and there is, you know to go with that, there is potential efforts to piggyback on annexing other territories. south setia. , so that all, obviously can create more instability. and then, longer term, i won't speak much about that, but ukraine is something has to be dealt with is the which

that ukraine wins in the long run to become more attractive as a place to be that than crimea is in russia. so that now, that's kind of where ukraine needs to go. i'm not an economist so i have no idea how to do that, go about doing that. i have hope somebody does but that seems to me to be the big long-term challenge. not just economy but also governance as well. so i will stop there and maybe we can do some -- [applause] >> thank you. dmitry gorenburg of harvard university. we have time for discussion. i invite questions. please keep them brief. please identify yourself. right there. >> hi i'm from georgetown university. a question for mr. gorenburg. do you think that