there is an academy a residual detestation of her ignorance of her condescension to the study of military history, i wish its perpetrators could have been here. thank you all very much. good evening. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> why is it that abigail is the one name that we all know? it really is because of her man because she married john madams. i must say being here today, i feel sort of like i've come home because i've come to john and abigail's home, a home that all three sisters spent a lot of time in. but the other two sisters that i know less about i argue in my book or even that they didn't mary presidents come and they equally important and remarkable women. first there is the older sister, mary cringe and she was sort of

the uncrowned queen of the family because in the puritan family hierarchy was very important and she was born first, so she was the firstborn, she she was very important and especially after her brother was disinherited by their father, she was the one who inherited the first son's role because there was no brother. and she grew up, she proved herself to be a wonderful administrator. even though she was a woman in couldn't be elected to any position, she was de facto mayor of quincy. her husband would be appointed to positions, but everyone would know mary would take care of everything. and then there is then there's elizabeth shaw peabody who was the younger sister of hours that neither of her older sisters gave her enough attention and she was constantly clamoring,

listen to me, listen to me. she was the most literate and best educated of the three of them. she had the ambition when she was young to grow up and become a published writer, a published letter writer and she wanted her letters to be published by command and the setting is. i'll let you make about to find out whether that actually happened. but she did become, with her has-been, the founder dissecting coeducational pool in america. that itself is pretty impressive. >> here's a look of the best-selling nonfiction books according to public radio.

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>> you have to remember to things they need. first, we are there because we were attacked in new york city in 3000 americans were murdered here that play went to afghanistan to get those people killing us. second, president obama has said there's a limit within two years were not doing it anymore. so i agree with you, julie, at some point you have to let them do it. but our first goal if we get away from the afghan government that are a unlike at what our first goal was, if i told you or any of the listeners in 2001 that we would not be attacked again in the united states of america for the next decade, none of us would have believed

that because at that point al qaeda had more of the advantage. now we have al qaeda in the terrorist definitely on the defensive. so we can at this point get out most of our forces from afghan jihad. so i agree with you, but with a success on what we really wanted to do as a country and that is to protect ourselves. >> one of the concluding sections of the book is in effect unless and learned about water. one of the things that you think people would understand what he how frequently people who

advocate going to water and people who make decisions to go to war almost always circumvents the war will be short. this year will celebrate the centennial race of world war i, which is eight k. classic example of where everybody thought the war would be over by october and november 1914. the problem in iraq in particular it really is true of iraq and afghanistan that would be in as swift military victories quickly degenerated into thought and grainy noirs. in the case of iraq, it was always believed that would be a short-term commitment. i think it would be interesting to ask those who are participants in the decision-making had they known in march 2003 that the country would be at war in iraq for six or seven more years whether they

would've made the the decision they did. but this assumption that the war would be short or that it was right around the corner of flick at the department of defense as badly as it did the decision-makers themselves. and because everyone assumed that the war would be over quickly, there is a great reluctance inside defense to spend significant sums of money on equipment that might be needed to protect the troops, but that might be useful only in iraq or afghanistan. as i describe it in the book, the department of defense is organized to plan for war, not to wage war. so the services dedicate all of their efforts, pretty much all of their efforts to developing their long-range procurement plans and then defending those

plants in the budget process regardless of what comes along. and so, people reluctant to, for example, find, develop and fund the 90s this a protected vehicle is the date so many lives because that particular vehicle was not in any plan for the army or marine corps. >> i like to ask about that in just a moment. what it the key themes in that portion of the book it seems to me that the military planners inside the belt way come the civilian leaders inside the beltway simply didn't adjust to respond to. in fact, they do not adjust to changing situations. >> the fact that i also read after the initial invasion, there is stunningly bad decisions in the state.