through to the conclusion of the incident. and i would add we would also involve the care team as well and mobilization of web eoc. >> about how long would one of these drills run? >> it can run all day. >> and one last question for you, sir. if you are operating, you can speak just to your company, unless you're aware of others, but if your vessels operating in remote regions, how do you ensure a quick response if there's no coast guard or navy assets? ..

and again we would tap into all those resources. it has been very infrequent need to do that. in the event of an incident we would much prefer everybody stays on board. >> just a follow up. would you partner with other cruise ships that might be operating in this area and that is your only other resources? >> absolutely yes. we used to cruise in antarctic and partner with other ships.

>> thank you. hernan zini. >> i will look at as the operating captain and evacuation systems but the challenges you face your crew faces with a brand new load of passengers on board. you are going through drills. they are trying to get a vacation started. how do you in part this seriousness of what they are getting caught in that short time before you end up getting under way? >> there is a lot more awareness of drift than ever before. that focus is to make sure we conduct it proportionately. have to be affective throughout the process, and find, make sure guests understand the critical things we expect from them in case of an emergency. it tends to be very short in nature.

i can see typically seven minutes in, 90% people to 15 minutes but there we have information before that, announcements, 16 minutes before the drill. on an important day we have the tv channels returning to a safety channel so the minute you walk into the ship you get your state room, the tv plays the safety channel, the procedure is important about the drill and we take it seriously and i think this is a large majority of our guests they appreciate up professional drill conducted in a timely and effective manner. we see very good safety. >> following up on that how about the small minority that might be unruly or not willing to participate? does your crews take crowd control and if they have unruly

passengers they need to get their point across tell me how your crew accomplishes that? >> we do anything short of pulling up to the station in the most polite way that is important. and it works. if a guest refuses to attend the drill and members tried the best we have to talk to the supervisor. they try to engage on that commercialization and the neighborhood guest but we approach lately with another, explaining they missed the drill and we value them and make ourselves available at a different time. sometimes they took that advice and sometimes they don't but basically we do our best, at least they understand the safety proceedings aboard the ship. i will say the percentage is another matter we see, about 97%

to 98%. >> thank you. that includes questions from the technical panel. >> thank you. >> another interesting panel we talked about, how frequently the drills are conducted. we talked about mastering and getting off to the ship through any evacuation. i would think mr. rai caluori, i want to ask you does princess require any man overboard detection systems? >> i should say not yet. there really is no proven successful technology available yet. >> okay. that was going to be the follow up. they have cameras that are trained down the rails and someone constantly walking those monitors? >> yes and no.

there is extensive coverage of areas around the ship but it is not monitored. >> what is it going to take to get the -- we have facial recognition software that law-enforcement can use to pick people out. all kinds of things can be done with software. what is it going to take to get the sort of system to bring to fruition so it can be reliable? >> very good question. it is the right technology. i don't know whether anyone else will comment on this but i haven't seen any robust technology yet. we piloted, trial imaging technologies that was far too sensitive so it would be triggered by a bird or something like that and establish too many false alarms. so right now we rely on human

factors to alert us as soon as possible that somebody has gone over the side by throwing over something that floats and alerting the crew and there have indeed been some positive stories in that regard where we have retrieved individuals. >> does anybody else on the panel have anything to add about the man overboard detection systems, lack of maturation of those systems and how long it is going to take to get them to the market. if that is currently being explored. >> the comment was made, the technology was related and we have not found a reliable source so we welcome any additional technology that detect that in a timely manner. we continue to have training and preparation for dealing with

those situations, typically when the situation comes we have to recover people to the company from. >> thank you very much. anyone else on the panel? thank you. >> having been on a number of cruises, what kind of a dreaded events was the minister as you are trying to leave port and start your vacation. on a cruise last month, i found the process was vastly improved through the use of some technology cards but one of the things that always impressed me was everyone who is pressed into service including entertainers, cabin stewards, dining staff and so forth, these people change on

a fairly frequent basis. this is probably to start with, rai caluori, how do you keep these folks who are so important in handling all the guests and passengers, how do you keep these people informed, assigned with clear expectations so that when the real event should happen that they in fact are prepared and it will go on smoothly? >> thank you, very good question and one of the most inherent challenges operating a ship is the staff. we invest a lot in training. any new higher would go through extensive familiarization process. a returning employee goes through similar training, tier one or tier 2 training.

and the safety officer and the ship. and the training is pervasive. as you quite rightly point out, the responsibility for safety when it comes to mustering an evacuation responsibility is pervasive throughout the ship. one of our ships, 113,000 tons, where we have approximately 1250 crewmembers, 1-third of them would have specific responsibilities in the event of an emergency including searching cavan's 4 occupants. would be approximately 200 of those staff responsible for being stairway guides and mr. personnel. in answer to your question this requires constant familiarization and indeed so constant investment. that speaks to the safety culture question that has come up many times, one of the leading indicators for us with crew is that they have to see us

walk the walk and talk the talk and constant investment in particularly technology and electronic mustering is a significant example of that. >> hernan zini, you mention technology you are using in this process, to keep forward of who is on or off and so forth. many of these events are a stack up of remote events so how do you assure power? all of these devices required electrical power. and what is the reliability of the best power source.

>> they're constantly charged. and a particular incident will be considered, lasting eight to ten hours and many of those victims are supplied by emergency power. and the physical pd a to the bridge down loaded to a separate computers that they could using case of emergency. i would not be able to prefer the technique because online a constant information operation which is one of the things we like but in the case -- still centralized information. this is something we hope we never have to use. we are planning and training for places that will continue to go on shore with our efforts and very quickly assign our care teams and solid teams to make sure whatever policies are in

charge at the time to call in and collect all this information in a timely manner. that is one way to use that technology. >> i notice one of your slides talked about the use of wi-fi on a ship to keep the commission did this communication going to. is the wi-fi on a battery backup? >> it is but basically the wi-fi is the framework we use for the line update. if that fails you can take it to a centralized recognition center and download the data. a third backup will be basically to the paper manifest we have, as that would be other options too. >> still is a paper manifest. >> a paper manifest.

>> one last question regarding the life raft situation, to follow on from captain jones i'm kind of amazed at the vertical drop. you said there were several layers you went through on the descent. how do these, just out of curiosity, how do these -- >> the best comparison is you have an elastic sunk that goes around your body when you go down and that is reducing your speak all the way down and is made of elastic and combined with inflammable material to make sure it can work for a long period of time. >> just to follow that along i

presume this is the one person at a time -- >> correct. >> otherwise it could be kind of comical. >> no chance of colliding in a system like that. three senseless on the way down that signals to the implication point where the last person to come through is located. there is a green light coming up at the implications station and you can take the next one through because it indicates the person left the skate way. >> this is amenable to having several shoots for a single lifeboat. >> yes. there are two in the system. also a basic principle of redundancy because of an incident should happen, one material failure or something you would still have the other

escapeway available. >> very good, thank you. >> i think that is the video we would like to have seen. if there is anything you can head to, i am trying to get big picture. we heard safe return to port for all this discussion came into being in 2010 so it remains aspirational, it is not pervasive. what you are talking about on this panel is what is available now. help me understand, given the size we're talking about, 8,000 souls, we get them into these systems. how long can they survive out there and what is the plan for rescue? you were talking earlier about unless there is a shippable even then a ship of a size that is going to handle that many people, what is the plan right now as far as managing the number of people we have got before safe return to port is pervasive through the industry?

i don't need it from everybody but give me a sense of current state, what is the plan? >> if we can take it from there, the life raft, that is long international voyages. that will allow you to sustain in a comfortable way and get food and drink, that is the criteria. >> i have six days with 8,000 people on the water. what do we do next? just trying to get a feel. you can have relationships with others where ships could be nearby. they may or may not be assigned to help you with that. there are many other vessels, aircraft carriers i am familiar with. now we have six days for those people in the world. what is the plan next?

>> earlier it it was mentioned about the area to make the comment what you mentioned, 8,000 people, implemented and returned to port ahead of the regulations, they understand the company that is important for us to have an operation. nevertheless we have to be prepared for the worst-case scenario but i want to make sure the ships we operate that have been -- >> those are the ones -- >> the requirements, i have many things that have not been required by the industry and i think that shows how seriously we take this issue, to develop the best possible should to operate safely.

and a lot of traffic so god forbid we have the need for that, we have enough resources around. >> here is the communications system, i need ten, are those kinds of this kind of scenario is practiced. >> all industry, involved in one of our ships to go into dry dock. and portrayed people, afghans, equated to porche. and mention our own sufficient management and use the resources from other companies that have

other technology that come quickly to tell us which ships are in the area so we have an incident, they can tell us what is in the area very quickly and threw them get assistance to the ship quickly. in addition to that, it was mentioned, a willingness to continue to work on the industry but that hasn't happened for many years. in some instances it is wonderful to see ships next to each other and one second to stop as required. >> the way it was portrayed, we got you into the vessel safety for six days and what is the next step, i will ask a question to wrap up. i am curious, what is the criteria for emergency response? all the teams and stuff, what is an emergency? i am curious to get a sense of the range of incidents the

center response to? >> it is quite wide ranging and we air on the side of caution so it can raise the incidence of man overboard. a weather incident where we may not be able to get back to court and have to make contingency arrangements for passengers, anything from the serious collisions to propulsion failure. it can range from any of those in terms of order of magnitude but we always air on the side of caution. >> is that defined somewhere? they are ready to call you to fit within their purview? >> we don't constrain it. we leave to the discretion of the duty manager and if he or she feels it necessary, we

absolutely support that. >> vice-chairman? >> this is a sad topic. i am particularly interested in how you handle the variability of the scenario. someone who has been drinking too much and someone in a wheelchair, someone who doesn't walk very well, they're old and someone else is blind, so much variability, someone says i am not getting off in july find my whole family, all kinds of variable situations. how does this evacuation scenario address that variability? >> i can speak to the situation where if there are passengers with special needs, if they are confined to a wheelchair or motor scooter that is noted on embarkation and specific specially trained crew are assigned to those passengers so in the event of an emergency we would match some up, and ensure

they are with assistance brought to the master station. >> you mentioned several contingencies, we all have assistance in place to handle people. in terms of the youth immigration plan and all our teenagers with wristbands, explain this to the parents and almost done with that, the best thing to do in case of emergency is not to wander around the ship trying to find a child but go to your station, and the quickest and safest way to do that with your family. and their own possibilities, in a very organized manner and drills for kids running around on their own and have their wristbands, to guide them and taken to the right stations so

we try to make sure they understand that on day one because the best way to reunite with your family is to go to a station and trust we will do the right job to get them there. >> different categories assimilated and already are, people that are assimilated and perhaps it is not assimilated that people need help, but that is operational process that is considered in assimilation so is not extra assimilated but really is slow walking speed assimilated. >> i know you practice mastering but the practice of the vertical shooter, how does that work?

>> how you managed disabled people? >> on a general question of the vertical shoot and how that works, i know you do the most during drills but do you also do anything to let somebody have a clue what this is going to be light? >> typically on board the ships where that is used in connection with the evacuation of passengers, the p r system on board the system or the cabins, you could say it is more an issue of educating crewmembers because the systems on board the ships are primarily on some cruise lines only used for crew members and can be educated in the functionality. >> is mastering the same for the ship as life but as it is for the evacuation or is it two

different types of mustering? >> it is the same mastering. >> last question goes to the man overboard question. how often does that happen? i don't have a sense what numbers we were talking about in terms of man overboard. >> my experience as captain, i have been 23 years at sea, captain for 12 years. i also have been involved in rescuing people at sea and been involved in similar rescues that didn't come from our ship but it annoys themselves in five years, operation have rescued 160 people at sea that didn't belong to us. we have received four or five accommodations from public

service for doing this. somebody goes overboard for whatever reason, many of which are volunteering some nature. it is best to save a life and as the captain only one area at, one degree you have to tell us what is enforceable stays with you. we tried to do our best but it is very difficult. also, in many cases when the person goes overboard even when you detect it and react quickly and find it in many cases the same impact that this could come up -- i continue to encourage technologies that could help that would be great. i had to also put my experience to know that would be great,

would be less optimistic about the total percentage to save a life but that is the welcome addition to safety. >> thank you very much. >> want to go back to your experiences with respect to the simulated evacuations. helping to understand, what is the lifeboat capacity on any ship? what percentage of souls on board? >> the capacity was 75%. >> what happens to the other 25%? where are they supposed to go? >> they are using equipment on board which will be launchedable fast or in marine evacuation systems. >> marine evacuation systems? >> those are systems with

gateways like the shoots or slides. >> okay. so what confidence do you all have with respect to your simulations that they are actually representative of conditions? you had a number of questions that have gone to some of these factors. in the video you ran, rai caluori, three healthy men simulated walking to. i have been on cruises, that is not what the population generally looks like. helped me to understand how much confidence you have in your simulations that those actually replicate what we might see in a real-world situation? i will just go down the line. obviously you work dissimulation.

>> the video just showing the principle of course. if you look especially at the cabins considered, at they are considered between 6, and 12 minutes roughly. and so the corridor, the first corridor will not be that crowded as you may expect because they are not just jumping all out of their cabins and standing in the corridor. ..

there are some bigger tests but the problem is if you want to identify the time you cannot run the test in the reaction time for insurance reasons and for the safety of the people attending. >> the question is how much confidence do you have in the assimilation that they represent real-world conditions? >> i believe they are good. we do that for many years and we have a safety factor considering

the uncertainties. so the 25% plus safety factor we are on the safe side. >> 25% means -- >> for the assimilation of the funds. >> okay. so, you feel confident that this represents the real world conditions? anyone else on the panel have a comment? if you could do it quickly. >> with the capacity on the system one of the systems we have in the capacity of the 980 people within 30 minutes it sounds like a high number and got is done as two different ways. the regulatory bodies are conducted as a physical test, not assimilation. we have to get 908,000 people with a representative

demographic representing the distribution from the 22 at the age of 60 knots to bring anyone into harms way. then we simply do a race against the clock and we are not allowed to instruct the participants to a more in-depth as actually you would do in connection with the borders. >> so there is a combination of an actual testing that goes on. and in the aviation world we have to be for the aircraft can be certified a have to do a test to 50% within 90 seconds. >> my question would be we do have an actual event. how did the cost compare with what you're expectations were with the assimilation. idid exceed the assimilation or

the problems i know that you are not all involved directly but for what you know and what you're role in the industries or have they made changes based on what came out? >> as we heard yesterday, there were some operational things a little bit wrong. not only the navigation after the process, but we did not assimilate this so i cannot say anything on how it was assimilated and we did not run the assimilationist or that incident as we don't have information yet where other people are located and distributed on board and so that

is hard to assimilate something that you do not know a lot of. >> many of the buildings seeing the assimilation taking place i have seen also a technical improvement of that so certainly those make certain access platforms. i don't have the capability to comment on the details of the assimilation so that is beyond my abilities. i see the value of conducting the improvement of the deterrent with so many of those elements in the second to that we are trying to refer to the incident or issue but it is great to see

the smo leash and taking place. but we don't really want to pass the time. so if we have a situation that put us in the slightest doubt part of what we do is the process immediately. to a symbol that guests and get the machinery getting people in the right places as quickly as possible assessing the situation. if i have to dismiss it either sorry. i apologize. but you need to understand as aa captive data that is the primary responsibility because while all of the wonderful work has been on the sign that we need to ensure that we quickly and efficiently just as important in the u.s. we have a much larger signal we have many ways of training to make sure the

leadership from the bridge and communication and the use to call him people and reassert them and the leadership so you know you are in charge when you are doing all the right things it is critical. the process is much more smooth and effective and really can help you save a lot of time. so i welcome any improvement on that in the future. we operate a calling with those principles and we have to understand today. >> i think the challenge is in the assimilation or the drill to talk about what the expectations are and how to be called the plan actually something like that happens they understand things work as they were planned

or are designed. they didn't call for the evacuation they had problems with access to a lot of things that didn't get launched they were very fortunate in that situation, but in another situation i think the question is do we have the ability to evacuate, launch and rescue the people that can be on the cruise ship and the assimilation's are good and had a real-life scenario things didn't go as planned. >> somebody mentioned we started at the preceding byway but we also decided to market quickly so we started the modeling process and the conditions are different but they are doing the modeling and very good timing

with accurate information to the timing. on the ship that i have commanded with the assimilation's on the sign of the circumstance that is the best i can offer you. >> are there any additional comments from the panel? >> of the lessons learned from a number of the initiatives that were processed particularly with regards to the passage of mustering in terms of the recorded passages, and additional lifejacket that i think is indicative of the collaboration in the industry and improving the criteria. thank you all very much. we used all of our time so we won't be coming back for an additional round of.

we will reconvene 2:55. the house and senate are one on their two-week holiday recess and other members tweeting what they are up to.

on th the policy side of the ned number of things. we do need to have people with security clearances so as the problems arise they are able to access information and act upon it so if your ceo happens to be traveling in singapore and something happens and you have to respond in five minutes it's pretty good to have the general counsel have a way into the

discussion and we need a better information sharing to have actionable information as cyber threats including the department of defense, the department of homeland security, the treasury and more to work without the fear of legal liability is important for the kind of protection into the kind of things you mentioned and frankly the current law in that regard needs to be updated and they are not in the current state. i love duke and i'm an alum and i didn't do this to hurt duke. i did this to figure out what happened in a dispassionate way. there's there is a tremendous af

passion about the story even to this day. all one has to do is go on amazon and see that i have 25 reviews. the book had even been out for a week so i'm pretty much guessing that not many of those writers have read this book. my last book was about goldman sachs but this is in another realm altogether next a discussion on the muslim brotherhood influence in the middle east over the past several years. panelists include a former state department advisers and also talked about the u.s. reputation in the middle east and stability in the region and relations between turkey, israel and europe. the american task force on palestine posted this 90 minute

event. i want to thank you on behalf of the border for attending and hopefully participating in the panel on the muslim brotherhood status and future. without further ado, i want to ask my colleague this distinguished panel moving forward in a very active engagement. >> thanks so much all of you for coming out on a particularly inclement day in washington and we would like to welcome all of the viewers on c-span and television networks. turn your mobile phones on

silent and vibrate and off, depending on what you want or any other noisemaking device. please come to silence it. thank you very much. and again, thank you for joining us today. we are also particularly pleased with the presence of the panel, and we thank them a lot for coming out in general and in particular on such a jury morning here in washington. we are joined today, i am hussein ibish i will be monitoring i should say first. i will begin to my immediate right and go down the line by very distinguished panel of experts to discuss the status and the future of the muslim brotherhood be generally in the middle east and we will also be talking about more country specific areas as well for about 45 minutes in a kind of roundtable conversation. i will start with a series of

observations that leads to a big question which the panelists can deal with as they see fit and will follow that logic and we will also pursue narrow range as we go along. so that is a basic first 45 minutes and there is a wireless microphone and we will be using that to give your input as well. the first panelist is michele dunne a senior associate at the middle east program where her research focuses on economic change in the countries particularly egypt and u.s. foreign policy in the middle east and at the end of the table is william mccants at the center for middle east policies and on

relations with the arab worl wod and the brookings institute so thank you for joining us. between them is hassan mneimneh, senior transatlantic fellow for the middle east and africa at the fund of the united states and the islam world. all of them have very distinguished careers and backgrounds and you can access their biographies you have in front of you and certainly it is on the website as well. so, thank you very much for joining us and if you want to know more about them refer to that. we will then turn it over to you. so, what we are here to do is to evaluate and take stock as far as we can the future outlook of

the muslim brotherhood as an orientation of the political movement across the middle east especially across the arab world and we will get as i say to the specific states in the region a little later on in the conversation. i woulbut i would like to starth an overview of where we are now it seems to me particularly compared to where many of us thought we were a year and a half ago. it seems at first glance to be very different. just looking across the region,n committee orientation,the oriens orientation of the muslim brotherhood and the affiliated parties that many people expected hiexpected and they bey thought they were seeing come to power in the post-dictatorship appears to be in a crisis. the epicenter of this is perhaps egypt where the former president has been ousted and the organization declared a

terrorist group. it's also been designated a terrorist group in saudi arabia and is being investigated in britain as well and other countries. they have resigned and although the party remains viable and may have peaked in its popular appeal. the muslim brotherhood affiliates never gained the momentum that many of them expected them to have it both libya and serious which two countries that remain in turmoil i think it is fair to say. they appear to be any total disarray divided among many different lines. the palestinian affiliate of the muslim brotherhood is in a crisis unlike anything say since at least 2007 if not in its entire history. and about one remaining muslim brotherhood presence that looks

like something resembling a governing position in morocco, the prime minister sort of custody for to the king and v. for an interior finance ministers who are to put it mildly rocking his faction. so, that is sort of a very attenuated situation. so the opening question come into this is the longest one i'm going to ask i assure you. this is just giving you a sense of where i see things going so that you can play off of that. what's going on? i painted a very grim picture for the brotherhood, but is it accurate? what is your sense of where this is going and what does the future look like in the broadest possible terms and let's begin in the datacenter an data centee will move back and forth. >> i think the muslim

brotherhood -- underlining the fact that the characterization i argue later on but this is almost an international discussion rather than the reality to speak about the muslim brotherhood as a collective. but nonetheless i would say the muslim brotherhood is both humbled and in courage by the united states that has unfolded in the region in the past year and a half or so. it has tested itself to the limits of its ability in being able to deliver to the government in some cases in egypt and effectively i would say it was an ideal opportunity and therefore it may be partly involved by the coup that has happened. this is reflected even in the literature in their own as much of an apology but what you hear

is the underlining of the fact that the assessment which effectively if you like exposes the characterization. but encouraged because nonetheless it seems to be a concerted effort in many respects as limiting and content in and diverse in their appeal as it happens. and i think it isn't just in terms of egypt where they have this time to quantify but i would say i think it's important for us to try to understand why such an appeal from the organization is in the formulation of the accommodation has not articulated its position in the explicit or elaborate

terms. therefore where that comes from and this is a part of the important question and the aspect i think it's largely stems from the fact that the muslim brotherhood is more of a tried and identity belonging than an ideology. the ideology is just a cover while as a matter of fact in the different manifestations what we have is a loyalty in the region to the fact of what amounts. i will leave it at that because the question is complicated in itself and i don't have a lot of lines that will require. >> i'm sure you will. >> okay well the way that you

laid it out i think that i agree with what you said although i think there is more to it because we have more if you are looking regional wide you have different states that have had uprisinguprisings have significt upheavals that are in a period of change whether it is tunisia, egypt, libya, yemen etc., and you have other states in which there is a -- you know, there is freedom of political maneuvering in which brotherhood groups do operate in places. you mentioned that morocco, jordan to some extent and so forth and then there are those states in which there is very limited political freedom and so forth. so virtually in all of the states there is a muslim

affiliated group of some kind that is active and the degree of popularity is relative to other groups and varies a lot from one place to another. so i think and i know that you would see it this way this idea that the brotherhood was somehow going to sweep the whole region and now they are rolled back would have been a very exaggerated idea to begin with and that would not have been in a realistic expectation. the other aspect that hasn't been mentioned is it isn't only the case that morsi was removed on the brotherhood following that. in egypt there are now some 20,000 people in prison or so in egypt. so, the questions of what are the ripple effects of this going to be in egypt and elsewhere.

you mentioned the brotherhood had been declared a terrorist group as well as in saudi arabia there's something else going on which is the prohibition of the anti-terrorism law which is a very broad definition of tourism. a lot of the states in the region have criminalized. it's always been in the code that one could be prosecuted for criticizing the ruler and so forth. that is the case in many states but now what is happening is much of the dissent is good to be covered under anti-terrorism laws which means there will be heavier sentences that can come with expressions of the dissent if it is related for example to the brotherhood or so. there is a change underway in the whole legal environment in the region, and i think it's, you know, it's important that we

discussed that as well what is that going to mean for the ability of people in a lot of the countries even to express the dissent, and it's very, very early. it's only been nine months since this large crackdown began in egypt and i think we are only beginning to see the affect some of my switch will be on the brotherhood and some that need to be brought back into the picture here as well and then on the broad picture of the rights and liberties throughout the region. >> i agree with the other panelists. the picture that was drawn up the brotherhood of strength after the arab spring is always incomplete and didn't take into account the different political realities for the brotherhood

branches in the region or the history of some of these organizations. if you take a look at the brotherhood, it had been crushed. it had been in exile. they had to rebuild the capabilities of the country but it's much stronger outside and inside the country. so some of the so-called failures are really just legacies of decades of repression. the other part of it is very different in the political context where the brotherhood operates. say in kuwait or jordan. and in some of those countries they have actually fared pretty well. i wouldn't you b you believe tht yemen as a good example where the brotherhood has managed to weather the political storm quite well and is serving as a part of the transitional

government and the brotherhood has a long legacy of working with the government even as a part of the loyal opposition. so as he said, it is useful to view that in these different brotherhood branches as clans within the tribe into some of them won't even go there own way liktheir own waylike in the 199e innovation of saddam hussein. so that would be a big pipe to beapoint tobear in mind is the t political realities and historical trajectories of the groups in the region. the other thing to bear in mind, and this goes to the point at the brotherhoothatthe brotherhot on the back footing is the recent move by saudi arabia. this is a big change in policy particularly for saudi arabia. they tolerated the brotherhood for decades as it has been a big booster of the brotherhood

sometimes depending on the political interests. and about turn against the brotherhood is pretty striking because they know who the brotherhood is. a lot of the members of the brotherhood are still in important positions and the government is still very much a part of the establishment and they are not on the out. this has a lot to do with the events of egypt. so these ripple effects. this is one of the big ones. this is a sort of tsunami that has come off of the earthquake in egypt and is causing a loss of unrest in saudi arabia when i visited there a few weeks ago talking to some people in the brotherhood orbit, they said that the level of anger at the government has never been as high unless you look at the early 1990s. so we are talking about the level of agitation and the government for the saudi regime support for the coup in egypt,

but there's also a greater amount of fear. the security establishment is capable of crushing them and there is a sort of wait and see attitude to what the politics play out in saudi before they make a push but it's going to constrain the brotherhood in ways that are difficult to see why but it will hurt it fund-raising. it will hurt its ability to move personnel and also to get its message out over satellite television. similarly the constraints in the uae will also hamper the ability to operate in the region. region. it's also leading to a lot of confusion. the brotherhood political organization in kuwait had to come out and make a statement that said we think we are not subject to this new counterterrorism law. we aren't sure because it's

broad. the foreign minister came out and said well, we are kind of talking about the egyptian brotherhood and we have a brotherhood political associations that we are obviously not talking about them. it doesn't seem that it is really well thought through but it has a lot to do with the need for solidarity with the military transitioning government in egypt. egypt. with that said, it also seems to me -- and i got the impression from my trip that the government is quite worried about the domestic dissent, and i think that they were taken aback by the expression of support for the muslim brothers in egypt, some of the most prominent sympathizers in saudi arabia over the bitter and this comes in the wake of this expression of the support.

and the saudi government is taking a risk by tidying itself so strongly with the new government in egypt because if things continue to go south, they could face in the domestic unrest in their country. i would like to pick up and go a little bit later on to the point about reassessment. but let's start with the tribal issue. by the way just echoing what will said, it's important that the muslim brotherhood related party in morocco was it to say they were not a muslim brotherhood at all. that is not true. but they went to great lengths to say such a thing which ties into the question that i'm going to ask which is if the muslim

brotherhood is an identity movement that is essentially tribal and local affiliates tend to be seen as clans within the broader drive if it is more affiliated then it is ideological, then that would sort of seemed to me to bolster an argument that i've made and printed couple times which is that the brick wall that this mainstream version has run up against in the past couple of years is actually state specific nationalism that sees in this identity movement something fundamentally outside a primary commitment to the state as such. the individual, not national but of the present. and it seems to me that in a crisis that has fallen all of

these parties has that in common that people perceive the brotherhood and its affiliates for the tribe in the clan if you will and insufficiently prioritizing the state in favor of something that is transnational and ideological. what do you make of that and we will begin with michele. >> i don't agree with that. i would have to say i don't, you know, from my own experience of watching the brotherhood, and there are others in this town and at this table who i would acknowledge publicly have studied the brotherhood more deeply that i have to say, i mean i don't see the brotherhood as being something that is more about identity then about ideology. i need, it is a very broad

movement and there are different tendencies within the brotherhood and yes there are certain families and so forth that would tend to be brotherhood families but not exclusively and there's also those that left to be -- tend to be leftist families. i don't see this -- i see it as more than a political party. the brotherhood has always been a religious and social movement with political expression. this whole idea that they are not nationalists, they are transnational lists i find him as being used as a way to make

them other especially in egypt it has been used to say they are not like us they are not egyptians, they are something else. >> has it been a successful campaign because that is the claim i am making. >> while i think anything that has been blocked by the national media the way that this has with a lot of stories to go with it and so forth about the conspiracies and so forth to give away the canal or all kinds of crazy things will begin to have a certain hold on the public. so i have to say i don't -- we just heard for example when you look at -- it's true that the muslim brotherhood a very early went out and started branches in

all of these countries and they have all gone in their own production of little bit. they remain in contact but they've also teach taken on distinct characteristics and i think that they generally are in the pains to make sure that they are in the national context of each of these countries and so forth. >> okay. what do you think? the >> i agree that each one is nationally focused. they have a loose affiliation with the tribes so to speak and i also agree with her characterization of the big tent party. it really encompasses a range of viewpoints. you have the more liberal islamists and that covers the way that we think about the politics of the region perhaps

we can get to this later but a lot of people when they talk about this tend to think of their political behavior in the same sort of way. but they are at a different creature and they might be used to see the contract. they are ideologically quite coherent and sure, there's little breaks between them on certain issues, but there is an ideology here. but there is no strong organization. they are victorious for being quite loosely affiliated. they have somewhat been able to pull together some parties like the party in egypt, but even that is true then with factionalism as opposed to the brotherhood which i roughly think of as a fraternal order not quite where terri ends but that is sort of where my head is when i think about the brotherhood. there is a shared sense of

ideology. excuse me, the political organization, and some loose beliefs in the need -- >> i am having a hard time reconciling these two ideas. on the one hand we have a very big test and on the other hand we have something that is very higher ar hierarchical and at te same time it cannot be both, can it? >> i think it can. they have trouble reconciling those things and there is a tension in the organization when they have to make actual political choices and that's why in some ways it is easier to be in opposition than to be in the government but it is attention that there. >> why is it so broad and not relatively detailed? the >> to re- calibrate some of the terminology to some extent and others are thinking of the

region as a tribe with plans. let's think of each national in the consideration of the tribes. the reason it's an important distinction is because the loyalty -- despite the fact there is the dimension is nonetheless national and the question rather than the country specific movement is largely stands on the distinction between the two would take the egyptian example. the instructor as a presentation is global. we are talking about really we have the blueprint for global organization that has not just

-- you have a whole plan on how to do this to the government and the state. but if you look at the literature and what is officially produced and what is the reflection of the members of, it is overwhelming. this was not about -- you have to dig deep to find the reference to myanmar. so this nationstate specific focus tends to become a history that predates the regional level

and it's important to underline that the focus of the organizations here i think we ought to make a distinction between the ideologues and if you like, the party hats and then their constituency which i would argue lies on the identity basis. it is not articulated and nothing is stressed in the way that allows. therefore what we have is very much in the specific organizations that we have heard quite a bit of debate to use the word tribal. in that case o the case of leba- ample, is the permit of the

reflection to the capital centric. in the case of celiac used to be before that transformation in the urban en urban and will ovee class which we are talking about ultimately. beyond the motion of the affinity's that cuts across the region we are talking about a very specific and complete actual conditions that sets the tone and therefore has to be used accordingly. just as a further illustration not just that of bahrain has the effect of any accusation but for jordan regardless of the u.s. that would be similar with other organizations. so what we are talking about is if you would like a higher level network and the lower-level of the state entities that operate

not in the choice as much out of the history. >> let me follow up with you on a plane that you were making earlier in the conversation that i think is important. you said that there is a period of assessment going on across the board. i see some signs of it in some places, but i don't see it as -- i see it as very nascent to say the least, and it strikes me that it could just as easily lead to a evolution into something post-islamist in some cases into a kind of reinvigorated lesson for what would happen. where do you see that going on? talk about it a little bit and see what the colleagues have to say. >> by underlining the fact that this assessment into the

reconsideration of the treaty -- even jihad is organizations have gone through the process by trying to learn the lessons of the arab spring. they weren't facing the organization that had nothing. a young man in the town in tunisia advances he hadn't anticipated the example so there was the need. and even in the case of al qaeda and the jihad i and the rulersh, you had of the reassessment of taking into account the will of the people. i think in the case of the muslim brotherhood the issue was more i would say concrete and practical along the lines that being in opposition, they have

to focus on and develop a love of social support networks and a lot of service provision networks and they did quite a bit of that. what they were not faced with beyond the nominal they were not faced with the need for the social theory and the political theory or economic theory. there is no such thing as the political sort. what you have is the claim of such. you have the presentation of guiding principles as if they are solutions. keep in min mind the ideas thats on the proposed ideas and the 20 principles and the progression ocean because of the lack of the needs it was brought into the claim of the total solution and for example would never flushed

out because as a matter of fact it never needed to be. they were never faced with a situation in which they would show us how. when i started by saying that they are humble and you hear the consideration in the process is along those lines that had a realistic chance in some places and despite the fact that we were ousted being certain of a level of popular support this is the time to try to force framework into something more concrete. what i see tha that up in that e evolution itself i see an awareness of the need. we can no longer pretend that a framework is a theory. this is what i would argue in the case of al qaeda is doing

today or i should say people sharing that mindset of al qaeda and syria they also feel expos exposed. i'i am speaking about the islamc state and they keep pretending. this matter of pretending it's good when it comes to the population to the claim and therefore you need to go beyond it and i would say in the case of the more realistic more tangible and more possible change that might have been i wouldn't say that we move into the islam is some as much as the rational that is no longer based on the sloganeering. >> you are beginning to se see

short signs of the critical look inward. we have the islamists across the region looking carefully at its missteps and i think that it is as it was said in his introductory remarks short-circuited that reassessment. the brotherhood members from egypt are quietly willing to admit that mistakes were made. but there's also a feeling that publicly airing this reassessment now is somehow damaging to the solidarity that the islamists want to express with their brethren who are being persecuted in egypt. and i think the reassessment must be happening across the region. i cannot imagine that it wouldn't. but i think that there is a hesitancy to publicly air that's because it's somehow left the

military in egypt and the people in egypt that supported it off the hook for what they did. and i think that it is the real -- one of the greatest tragedies of the arab spring that it wasn't allowed to fail and it had been rescued. >> it would have been a full failure. you have different worldviews have the events been allowed to play out. >> look i agree there are some parts of the brotherhood which are really in crisis now and

maybe the saudi brotherhood to some extent they are in a crisis mode and in the egyptian brotherhood those that are not in prison, and they are very few. i think that it's exactly along the lines that will lead out. the other example that is raised and the fact that they made a lot of compromises integrated to step back down and allow the government to come back in would be very risky and move forward because there was the fear of course that what happened in egypt would have been in tunisia and they would be pushed out of the picture and so forth. that hasn't happened and there

are some people that say they wouldn't have done what they had. i don't know if that is true. before that they had made some big compromises such as agreeing not to mention what was in the constitution, so already they have the wisdom to see that the consensus with the other political forces would be needed and that it would need to make some nature of compromises. this is exactly what the egyptian freedom and justice party and the president failed to do was to make compromises and build broad alliances with other political forces. so what happened in egypt may have also been a negative example that affected in some ways tunisia, and of course it will affect the calculations of the branches of the brotherhood across the region. >> we have a lot of people in

attendance and i think that we will begin let me just ask you to keep it to a question because the panel can adequately respond. let me begin with you. >> you'll have covered several aspects of the brotherhood in the border crossing, nation crossing. and it's understandable that with a lack of consensus there are specific attributes that have not come up in the discussion which are many great concerns. one of them is within each nation can each state they have to act as citizens of the state that would respect if they are to advance.

one of the accusations that have been leveled right from the very beginning is the resort of violence about taking the law into their own hands and enforcing the will whenever they could. an example of this would be in gaza for example what they have done at least after the resort to violence which gave treatments to the critics that you can't change the colors. the other is the lack of action as a responsible group within the society to hold themselves accountable economically, financially for the hierarchy would make them an acceptable participant in the future

organization. for that country or across the nation. the claim to the movement excuses them from being held accountable why aren't you acting like citizens. the third thing that they have in common is that they are national and global and they have relations into these relations translated into eight financial aides and that's times at least it was claimed very strongly in the very s. ongoing in the region and not just in egypt. so i would be pleased. >> i would say there are some

fundamental contradictions even that constitutes the framework, not the ideology. it's mostly a work in progress at the ideology but even in that framework there are some inherent contradictions going back all the way. even the model is our way on the path is the ultimate wish. fish. then when you have for example on their website and it's a very interesting we are a peaceful movement. >> we are a peaceful movement. there are lots of conflicting elements. the fact of the matter i would say if i were to make a general characterization, there is a genuine and a sincere weekend operate within the system and it actually goes back that was

quite a bit of what is in the political system and the constitution provides for the way of fighting that the disagreement. there is such an ability but at the same time on the muslim brotherhood it's not actually -- they have been collectively every militant movement of the graduates become this and that so you your self can pretend to limit your desire through a certain range of options, but it seems to not be limited that w way. ..

there are others, the role of non-muslims and the whole notion of citizenship, if you like, has to be cleared. and the dynamic between loyalty to the faction and loyalty to the nation. you see, all of these are major issues that remain, if we are to accept bona fide approach on the part, really work in progress at the very beginning, and that's with a claim of having the total solution somewhat, i just

exaggerations. >> anybody else on the panel? >> let me add a few words to what hassan has said. i thought he already dealt with the transnational global aspect of your question, but regarding the other things, the lack of accountability by which i think you also mean secretive, this idea the brotherhood is a secret society at that type of lack of transparency and so forth. now, resort to violence committed penzone which are talking about here. as we know, and i'm going to speak primarily here to the egyptian case since that's the really hot one now, right? you know i mean, we know there are these other groups based in the sinai that are not brotherhood, that are carrying out a lot of the terrorist attacks and so forth. but there are the claims that there are small arms at marches,

that the violence, that while morsi was empower violence was used against demonstrators at the brotherhood headquarters and so forth. there may be much do these things but i have to point out that, that is also true by the parties in egypt, right? small arms have been present at demonstrations, and sit-ins. violence has been used. in many cases, right? some of these things may be true, they are far from unique, unfortunately, in the egyptian context. the other thing that i would say is, hassan was talking and i agree with much of what he was saying about how this sort of lack of development in some ways, the brotherhood came to political power without having many of these contradictions result and so forth. there's a broader issue of think particularly in egypt about religion and politics. i think particularly in the

early period after the overthrow of mubarak there was a rush. the rich very quickly into politics, and the loss and so forth related to the use of religion and politics were not very well articulated and they were not observed, even the ones that were there about not using religious slogans and politics and so forth were not, they were not observed and not in forced and that applied very much to the southeast and so forth as well. the last thing you want to say is while all these concerns that your ticket i think have some validity, there's some validity to all of them. the problem with them right now is that they're being used to justify an extreme form of repression. an extreme form in terms of the crackdown against the brotherhood in egypt and in terms of these broader antiterrorism and so forth laws that are being passed. it's just come while all of these things might be true to some extent and might be

problems, it might need to be addressed, might need prosecution in some cases but the response is so out of proportion that it makes it difficult to match these things up. [inaudible] >> right, but these things that are being said about the tendencies of the brotherhood are being used to justify the actions of the egyptian government, the saudi government, et cetera spent the accusations of violence against the muslim brotherhood, whether you credit them or not, go far beyond small arms and little instances and things like that. they are pretty dramatic accusations, and you know, lead to kind of the question is do you dismiss them out of hand, or do you take seriously at all the possibility that this

deep-seated collusion, and there are armed factions emerging from within brotherhood contraries -- cadres responding to reactions of the interim government. these are just the accusations, not small arms demonstrations. >> i don't have any way of knowing that, right? but what is surprising is that the egyptian government has not yet made the case publicly, has not yet, they declared the brotherhood a terrorist organization but they have not made the case as far as i know, of the operational links, you know. >> can i get a finger on that? >> absolutely. >> i think it's also noteworthy in egypt that the government has arrested almost all of the leadership of the brotherhood, as we've been saying, it's a very hierarchical organization. you cut off ahea the head of ths organization, the body parts are

going to start moving in different directions. you're going to see factionalism, some of these violence, develop a life of their own as we saw back in the 1970s. one other point to make is that in countries in the arab world that have been relatively tolerant of the brotherhood on the political stage, you almost never have appeals to violence, within those countries. so i think this is also part of the dynamic is that the political openness of these respective regimes shapes the tactics that the brotherhood uses to engage in politics. >> thanks. we've got two questions over and into questions over here. and then went back there and then we will get to the rest of you. >> i don't know if you address this but i have two questions. how do you evaluate the role of the leadership in western europe considering the british government is having a close look at the brotherhood and

whether there links to violence or not. and whether this decision was influenced by both egypt and saudi arabia declaring a terrorist organization. second question is for hassan. you said the brotherhood still has a wide appeal in the arab world. if you look at hamas many people believe if there were election tomorrow hamas would lose despite carrying the resistance banner and that's because people see them coming and they don't like what they've seen. can you address that and how do you see the relationship between the new egyptian government as those of us believe that's going to be led by general sese and the government in gaza led by hamas? >> again, i'm speaking about certain matter of appeal that make them confident that they can make a comeback. not talking 70, 80% level. talking more about let's say a quarter to a third of the population that they can count on, again, largely on the basis of a general identity appeal rather than an ideology if you.

i stress that because of the level of ideology i would say that the numbers go down and go down considerably. in the particular case of hamas we have and come with the fatigue to a large extent especially with the government or sort of the government that has been so incompetent and has been engaged in so much not just corruption but really miss management of the situation and it has effectively been a victimization of the million plus, million of people they commend. i'm not surprised that's all they would be if they were to be free and fair elections. you effectively vote your interest and your interest is to have such a government. go back beyond that. the whole notion that i think speaking of european command or the leadership in europe, et cetera, i think they are

liberated by two parties. one party, the accuser, whether it's the egyptian government and others, that claim that such an organization or such a structure has designs and capacity to act in malevolent ways across the globe. that's one exaggeration. the other being the party itself. very often we have almost kind of absolutely fantastic claims and attribution to powers to one on the part of really individuals with very little ability. in the case of the so-called leadership in europe, in terms of actual capacity, and this is what the british government is investigating. the actual capacity is minimal to nonexistent. nonetheless, they have dilution or whatever you want to call it and on the other hand, you have people who benefit from the and point fingers to the public agreed with what michele has said holding on the question.

there is indeed a whole set of issues and some of them often exigent of character that needs to be actually addressed by the muslim brotherhood, if ever they are to evolve into a credible national or international organization. but what we have also is building upon these issues, we have an overreaction very often not so innocent. it's not like an incidental overreaction to it's almost an overreaction by design and go o act with political considerations in mind. i would say, for example, the whole current situation with the egyptian irwan on the part of the saudi sins as actually as well underlined in part from internal saudi considerations of needing to keep a lid on political agitation in saudi arabia, but also from the fact that there were hints and beyond hands that hamas is serving as the continent between iran and the most brotherhood in egypt.

and this is like a red line that even if not fully demonstrated, that saudi arabia could not tolerate in any shape or form. and, therefore, we've not mention iran so far, but i think i ran is an important component of the decision in terms of criminalizing or preparing the muslim brotherhood as a terrorist organization. >> with the other two like to weigh in on that, or should we move along? >> just a quick one. i would note in the 1980s and 1990s, it was very important for the leadership, the exiled leadership of a number of these brotherhood branches to live in europe because it had a real moderating effect on their politics. the libyan brotherhood, the syrian brotherhood and the brotherhood like -- leadership. been in europe was really important to the development of a tamer kind of irwan politics.

and visit drive to root out or discover the first brotherhood activities in europe i don't know who's pushing it. i know it's been alleged that saudi and the uae, but regardless of the intent i would hope that one of the of the considerations that some european governments would make would be that sometimes it's good to have this leadership in europe. >> thank you. i want to thank the panel for tremendous force today but you focus moakley on the internet at ideological and structural dynamics with the muslim brotherhood. i want to ask if i make a comment more on the geopolitics involved, especially as relates to tiki countries which have not been mentioned today, turkey and qatar. i think after the uprising in 2011, especially turkey we saw one almost take a victory lap and some of the countries where

the islamists have come to power. -- erdogan. qatar on the other hand, is continuing, if any of you and untreated, follow al-jazeera you would see you are inundated about egypt and was going there. help us to understand if i could ask you to do that some of the considerations that erdogan had as he chose to retrench if i might, if my such as greg and why they're pushing it. some of us, distance observers thought there might be reconsideration or realignment after the prince came to our offense does not seem to be the case. >> not yet, no. anybody? >> in regard to qatar you asked i think its momentum rather than decision. and i said i would say, i think saudi arabia and uae realize that the new leadership is in need of arguments or being

convinced to restrain the momentum. this is why you have that type of respect i give actions that are taking place. and upping the ante with regard to attacks on the policies of qatar, this little principality that thinks it's a giant, to quote someone saying it. i think what you have been qatar is a possibility but within the new administration and qatar to retreat. but which also have is what you can term as a gentleman's agreement for the leadership that is there and in particular, that al-qaeda had the space and please use the space. restrain yourself if you can but after all you are the elder and we respect you. that kind of dynamic, the interpersonal dynamic i think has to be taken into account. i would bring in the interpersonal dynamic can't even in the case of turkey. to a larger extent, turkey's decision to retrench which stems actually from a far wider

failure of turkish foreign policy of the zero problem with the neighborhood into problem with every single country in the neighborhood, the part of that retreat is also having to do with personalities, and with effectively what is described as victory to her on the part of erdogan was also, almost like kind of recognition tool of the importance of revenue she in particular but also the egyptian muslim brotherhood in the formulation of ideas that seem be a good compromise between progress, capitalism and conservative religious attitude that goes with it. so i think in the case of turkey, i would say it's internal turkish consideration that make it more urgent to have had the chance but in the case of qatar i think the action is not done yet. the saudis and the uae are

determined, and they think there's a good chance that someone will convince him in particular and al-jazeera to tone it down. >> michele, did you want to add something about turkey? >> i think is pretty much covered. certainly you know what happened with the arab uprisings upset the regional calculations. we've been talking about saudi arabia. also to turkey in a different way. turkey tried to ride with a little bit with some of the governments coming to power, but i also think syria, i mean, turkey's inability to deal with what has happened in syria and to get others, the united states and others to do what it would have liked to resolve this very issue if that was possible was another thing, and then, of course, the internal, very serious internal political problems. >> we've got this and gentlemen here. >> good morning.

thank you for a very good discussion. >> thank you very much. >> i am president of the center for the study of islam and democracy. first, i'd like to really take issue and disagreed with hassan's description of graduates of the irwan who went to join the radical movement. it's actually drop out of the irwan because these are people who left the irwan because they didn't disagree, i think they did not disagree with the peaceful approach and the slow approach, and the patient approach of the irwan and the list. they wanted faster and more violence, approaches, and they left the irwan. so they're not really can we should not call them graduates. they are more like dropouts. and it's a very important distinction because as you said their graduates as if the irwan actually teaching people to become violent radical extremist. and i think that would be really dangerous if that was the case. these are dropouts of the irwan

but anyway, my concerns and put them in forms of questions is as these islamic movements including the irwan go about reevaluating their position, their attitudes and everything, i think i'm really worried that their is more and more of them especially the younger people will give up on democracy and will say, you know, the heck with this. this is ridiculous. we won the election and we have a military coup and you know, only violence is going to be the solution to this is the biggest problem and the biggest worry that i have is that we will evaluate yes, but they would evaluate in the wrong direction. that democracy does not work. that democracy is futile and is a waste of time. this is my biggest concern. so do you think this is going to happen? are you worried if this is going to happen? that's my question. secondly, i'm also very worried about the image of the united

states in the arab world and the islamic world. who is going to believe that we actually support democracy, or even believe in democracy, when we fail to even call it a true. we have destroyed our credibility in the region. nobody believes us anymore. nobody believes that the united states really supports democracy anymore. it's obviously a coup. the whole world knows it's a coup and get what you don't want to call it a coup. we are in bed with saudi arabia and uae, two of the most authoritarian regimes in the arab world, if not in the entire world? this is very dangerous. this is destroyed our credibility in the region. i'm really worried about it. >> that's a good three parker. you do know of course that both sides in egypt blamed the united states heartily for everything. >> that's right. [inaudible] >> that's very much depends on who you ask, because they both

seem absolutely convinced that the united states is plotting massively against the. to let me to the to the panel. having observed it. please, michele. >> okay spent it is a three parker. >> i think the idea of younger islamists in general whether they be brotherhood are other kinds of islamists, giving up on democracy and giving up on the possibility of peaceful change is a big concern. and i would see egypt and syria would have to bring in your very much. also this, you know, a narrative of betrayal by the united states or by the west i think even much stronger in syria that it is in egypt. so these are megatrends, and trends that can feed into increasing terrorism and insurgency and stuff but i do agree these are very concerning the regarding the u.s. reputation, look, i very

freakily criticize u.s. policy on the middle east, including u.s. policy toward egypt and i think the united states has made a lot of mistakes in its policy toward egypt. i do think though you have to give the president obama all a bit of credit. he has for the first time ever suspended military deliveries to egypt from last summer onward. you're quite right to in the beginning the administration waffled and they wouldn't call it a coup and this was never used that word. but in the end, and from about the middle of august on board, especially after the breaking of the sit in and the massacre, they did basically quietly implement the law, the u.s. law that says that if a military leadership overthrows an elected leader, we have to suspend assistance. they quietly implement a data, and that's why there's a fair amount of tension now between the u.s. and egyptian

governments. you know, the u.s. administration is trying right now to send a two-part message to say, we want a relationship with egypt. we want a certain amount of cooperation with the egyptian government. we want a relationship with egyptian people, but we are really concerned about the course of events in egypt, and because of that we are suspending. and it's basically the big weapons deliveries is what is suspending the other forms of assistance like economic assistance and counterterrorism cooperation even are still going on. but, now we will see. that may change. there certainly is, there's plenty of impetus from within the administration to resume those a deliveries, but as of now they haven't. i know it's not a very satisfying policy, but i mean, i think they are trying on those you say, egypt is a long-term ally. but we worried that it's on the

path towards instability. and so, you know, that's the message they're trying to send for not. >> hassan, in the response to dropouts versus graduates? >> absolutely. i guess it's the number of dropouts that should be of concern for any institution. if you have that many dropouts that engaged in that many and various activities, you have to question your curriculum. [laughter] this is effectively, this is effectively what i think is needed. this is effectively what i would say, some people are considering doing. along the lines of what you have here, as i am, we have a progression that goes far beyond the irwan and because look at, if you'd like maternity in the arab terms in terms of succession to we start with mohammad up to it and we have hassan al been a and then we have others then we have osama bin laden. but we also have leading a different track all the way.

somebody in the air the context has led to different path. it's a question of how, which direction in which tendency instant when he. and i was exactly because of the lack of development of a political theory within the irwan, what happens is principles with contradictions have not developed. i'll tell you, you are rigid from tunisia whether one experience to my knowledge of a serious attempt at resolving the internal contradictions is taking place. some would call it hypocritical, some would call it -- as a matter of fact, talking to another activist, you realize the searches conflicts that they're having and they're trying genuinely to resolve them. but we cannot deny that this school of thought, that is accommodationist, islamism, which basically considers that islam and democracy are not only

compatible but are intertwined. this school of thought has effectively served as a hybrid model that has either allowed some islamists who were of radical inclination to move towards a more democratic mindset, but it has also served as a conduit. and i would say historically, this proportionally so inexact of the coded has been the dominant one of radicalizing people by effectively positing islam as a total system and not just as the overriding framework. we have to keep in mind that the whole notion of islam as a total system, okay, as opposed to a framework for life, is very much for being islamism by the 20th century experience, actually go all the way to the 19th century, and other thoughts. but the 20th century that is also great a new man, a socialist new man and a muslim demand, et cetera but it's

important to assess. i'm afraid if you call than dropouts instead of calling them graduates you are absolving islamism of the need to redress why is this our curriculum is causing problems. problems. >> we've got the lady right here. >> i just wanted -- >> sorry. >> to echo treacheries point, you also have these divergent trends within the brotherhood itself. i would look at the example of syria where in the 1950s, the very early 1960s give a figure like mustafa who is very much in this constitutionalist sort of islamism, very much trying to find a marriage between the need for some role of sharia in the state but also a representative government. after assad the father take stock you have a great change industry brotherhood discourse,

and by the end of the 1970s it's a figure like hawa, and then to him by the teachings. you have both of these trends within islamism, and particularly the brotherhood within the same country. and what i would note then, having seen that the variety of intellectual trends, i wouldn't focus much on the intellectual trends, but rather the political environment that is making one trend or the other appealing. >> great. the lady here and then the gentleman in the back. >> thanks. middle east news agency, egypt. my question is for michele. i would just like to look to the story from the other side. you see, for democracy, this question that we raised, i want to know about how to think about the future of the muslim brotherhood since their experience, the whole year, i

don't want to say it's a failure but i want to say it didn't work, you see. for them, in a democracy, for example, morsi was the one who declared the constitutional declaration after the people had already voted for a constitution. so he was the one who shouted the democracy in egypt. he was the very first one. so how do you think about in this? and for the ideology i don't think that they are talking in an ideological way, you see. they are not talking for islam. they are talking politics. they are just seeking their own interests. even when they did established a political party, still they are looking for the own group, not looking for politics, you see. for mr. hasan come you said about the muslim brotherhood is

just like a tribe. so how do you think about their future? again, i see it like an umbrella. you see the muslim brotherhood as an umbrella for the whole region your so how do you think about this umbrella in the future? is a going to be shattered and everybody going -- each country will have its own muslim brotherhood from the own point of view? >> okay, we've got two questions, one for michele and one for hassan. >> what the questioner said was that, you know, the brotherhood and morsi when he was in office gets a very undemocratic things like the constitutional declaration, like the sort of forcing through the constitution at the end of 2012 over the objections of a lot of egyptians. ..