they can sell and monetize that data to lionesses 1% of 1 percent of with these companies know about you. >> that is a great case for being much more discreet online. i will speak a little bit to the institution. i covered the nsa. it has taken a beating of a bill last year. it is -- i was struck by a post written by jeff stone who is a card-carrying member of the aclu and is one of the members of the presidential white house advisor is surveillance review panel. the same one that said that the

program was not essential for preventing terrorism. over months he and other members of the panel spent interview airing intelligence community members and had come to the conclusion that the nsa employees, officials were well intentioned for my did not come to work every day wondering who's privacy cannot violate. they have made mistakes. they had, at best they could corrected them. he felt they deserved americans respect, but not their trust. he said, you should never, never trust the nsa because to distrust, it's essential to the foundations of democracy. and i thought that was very interesting.

so i think it is worth thinking about. to really try to understand the issues that are at stake and not, you know, try to personalize our demonize our impede their intent, but to understand where it is coming from from what the issues are at stake and to hold them accountable. that is their job. >> both of those. to kind of combine them. i see three things to consider that we are experiencing. one is, there is no practical way to use technology today and

not leave a digital trail of some sort. obscurity tools essentially every interaction you engage in by e-mail, carrying a cell phone, driving a car or walking in the street with cameras leaves some sort of digital trail. we essentially as a result of these trails, a collection of this data has become incredibly cheap. previously it wanted to surveil you are would have to allocate men and people to follow you around, take notes, photographs. has gotten incredibly cheap because these digital trails exist. i knew sir john google, -- windy you search on google it creates a trail that governments can monitor or collect. and then, the mandate the nsa

has been given is not to reduce the tax court to keep 9/11 type of events to one in every ten years. they demand attacks on u.s. soil . the fact at your data is now everywhere, incredibly cheap to collect. do your best to prevent attacks. those three things in canned and -- tandem, even if you are rare personal, the likelier that you might get sucked up in the subject because of the mandate, the cheapness, and because of the kind of data has. the only thing restricting that are legal restrictions which is kind of the worldly and.

>> it is hard to top all of that. i will say that house surprised lots of people were. i was surprised by the detail of it. senators and its committee in some cases seem kind of surprised how responsible in a democracy such as ours, something that those surveillance system says sleeping and powerful could grow to become as robust as it clearly has become without all sorts of important people knowing and having it, some sources say. we had this panel the year ago. people all over the world and

whether or not we are targeted an intentionally. i find that a little unnerving, how little we knew before. whether you think we are right or wrong, you know, i do sort of feel like to place these issues in the public's fear so as citizens we can wrestle with that come to more enlightened decisions on what the limits are these people don't want the limits. and get the sense that some people do. there is no possibility of that if we don't know enough to draw these lines. >> it was not an accident that we did not know, and it is not an evil motive at all, but there were deliberate efforts to mislead as when anyone got anywhere near the trail.

okay. so the program that correct of -- collects all the records of all the phone calls that you make, that is referred to as section 215, a provision of the patriot act. it had been a little controversial. people were worried that the fbi would use it to get people's library records. and so for a long time the government said that even the number of times we use this provision of the law is classified and would do great harm to national security if we told you. that was the position for several years. eventually they were mandated by congress to disclose. there is nothing to worry about. section 215 -- 2,009 we only used it -- i think they said 29 times. what is the big deal? well, it turns out that 12 of those times were at trillion phone records. that is not an accident. that is a deliberate effort to

distort a public debate because they think what they're doing is important. >> one supplementary -- who was not surprised, the security geeks who for a long time warned that as technology makes this possible, systems are vulnerable you can essentially get people's phone records by hacking into. so they warned. i think given that snowden was a security gap he decided to highlight them which indicates not just a deliberate misleading but a technical misleading. a technical community can use their prowess and understanding of the way systems work to skirt around public perception because people don't know.

i think that is another gap that needs to be informed. >> i just want to add to that, there were people who knew. the executive branch agencies. the problem is these companies, committees, the courts were all sworn to secrecy. they could not disclose anything publicly. so if it is conducted entirely in secret, how does that a public understanding and enable us to hold the government accountable? i think that is the important part of this issue. do you create another independent oversight board? >> well, clearly this has invoked so much debate.

we actually cover a lot of ground, but this is your chance. please raise your hand. we have two people on each side who will come to you. if you can stand, please, when you ask a question. if you have one directed straight for one of the panelists, please ask by name. [inaudible question] >> sorry. just one second. >> can you hear me now? abcaeight. i actually have three questions. i guess they are all for mr. mr. gilman. the first -- i will read them all out and then sit down and let you answer them. one is, do you worry about your personal safety because of what you know, either from terrorists

because they know you have of this information or from nsa? second, what do you think should happen to snowden? it's third come on to you and reporters at the guardian consult with one another, have you on what to deadfalls in terms of security issues? >> no, i do not fear for my personal safety. i worry a lot that -- i have good evidence that there are unknown actors trying to get into my material digitally. i mean, i cannot feel my entire life on the internet. i got a warning.

compromising my computer don't know who is doing it for what they can do about it. a number of other fairly specific indicators. you can say you tell me so. i'm not worrying about that. it what should happen tap snowden, i am the last person you should ask. i have a relationship with him. i am not his judge. there are people with a lot more things to say that i have about that. no, we do not consult with any other news organization about what to publish and win and what to hold back. the post makes those decisions independently which includes third parties, no sort of secret council workable.

we are competitors with them, frankly. >> next. >> we hear you. >> okay. i find that the average person, a lot of times to my gauges plus side of the debate they are on depending on whether there were supporting bush or obama. you know, it yesterday you trust to have that information and what they're going to do with it and whether it they trust them as that insiders or u.s. that insiders of what is going to be divulged. i think back over, for instance, the whole debate about torture and that it was finally disclosed that it really was not that effective, and i am wondering whether ultimately is

this nsa gathering of information effective in protecting this country? have they really toward it some attacks or plans? how does that way into the decisions that are being made? >> so the practical benefit of this program. does anyone want to talk? seriously there has been an lot of debate about the effectiveness of the two major domestic surveillance programs that have been discussed. section 215 records program and section 702 with fisa, part of which is called prism. and the head of nsa last year on

the hill came out and said that the program contributed to forging over 50 attacks, terrorist attacks. then senators pushed back on that. the clarified, seven of two, prison, was responsible for thwarting most of -- a lot that or overseas. section 215, which obama said he wants to end, was responsible or would have had a role in may be only 12 of those domestically and also may be only one in which it actually yielded some information that was useful to

an investigation, and that one case involved a san diego cabdriver material support of terrorism for sending money to somalia which did not involve an attack on the u.s. and all or any attack that was ever carried out, which led not only to surveillance review boards to conclude that the program was not essential to preventing terrorist attacks, but also the privacy, civil liberties and an oversight board said it had not contributed in one case of preventing an attack. >> clearly from time to time the government is going to exaggerate the importance of a program that it is trying to defend. on the other hand, having spent lots of time with the material and interviews, how sad would it

be if we're spending $2 million a year and hiring some of the greatest talents in the world, mathematical and computer science and linguistic and all sorts of other things and accomplish nothing? that is clearly not the case. they find out a lot of information that is the essential to our security. there are a lot of things in the file that i would guess almost all of you if you knew would say, well, i did not know that they can do that. i'm glad that they did that. it seems like a legitimate operation. five published it u.s.a., i wish they had not done that. there are definitely success stories. problem is they're exactly the kinds of things that the government least wants me to write because it would -- they could not be replicated afterward. the point you made about bush obama, that issue of trust is

the fundamental point of snowden which is that even if you are prepared to accept that that people who have this enormous power right now are responsible, you are also accepting that the next people in the next people after that will have the same or more power. plenty of examples in this country the very serious abuses of this specific amount of power from j. edgar hoover, one of the articles of impeachment against nixon was domestic surveillance. i have seen documents that have now been declassified better decades and decades old, in experiments, experiments on human subjects, delivered exposure of american service people to radiation. they specifically say this would create big problems for us with public opinion of people found

out we are purposefully exposing ourselves to radiation. you don't want to give sole power to anyone. >> i don't want to leave this impression about section seven dear -- 702, the light tapping programs that broke in 2005. that program is considered quite successful and useful. and then i think it said it contributes the bulk of the president's daily brief or the majority of the intelligence. >> more than any other. one out of seven. so there is some utility. >> trust, it is correct.

the trust of other nations states or actors or other kind of -- those with malicious intent. the collection of the data. we have learned that the nsa have weakened the standards for computer security or does not disclose the companies when their systems are vulnerable. the fact that nsa can exploit data center links between google and overseas means that other countries can also do that. the fact that they're government has chosen not tow it disclose those but take advantage and collect that data, one of the questions to ask is, you know, is it effective? and at what cost? >> let's take another question. over there. every year. and don't forget, if you have a

card where you can write a question we will answer later on line. >> my question, we learn this week that general clapper has issued a new directive that makes it unacceptable to the -- for any member of the intelligence establishment to talk to any reporter about anything that is either classified or unclassified. and under pain of being fired or being possibly even prosecuted. my question, number one, have they learned anything? this seems like all they want to do is make it harder. number two, does this have a chilling effect on your ability to cover this national security? >> anyone, please. >> i saw that and thought, really?

periodically and after there is a big story and they do investigation, crackdown, more polygraphs. you hear about that they will be doing polygraphs unannounced on people. i had stories, they had to report any time they get a call, things like that. and i think these things go in waves. it does have a somewhat chilling effect and reminds people that, you know, they are being watched and should not talk to the press ultimately it is utile. it. >> i am a little more concerned than your. here is what the order says. if you work anywhere in any abcafifteen intelligence agencies you may not speak to a

member of the press or anyone whose job involves a number of non-governmental organizations and certain lawyers and so on about anything related to intelligence, whether or not it is classified, and if you do then you will probably lose your job and your security clearance. lots of organizations, they frown on employees speaking for the company or disclosing the internal of the company. suppose you could even do it so grievously that you get yourself fired. what you cannot do is have that be a death penalty for your career. there are over 4 million jobs in this country that require classification. if you run into me at the

promotion ceremony of some general and they're is a cocktail party and you -- and we talk about what is happening in crimea these days and you don't report it, then you could lose your ability to work anywhere in your chosen field. it's a shame because a lot of the context and the richness of the stories that you get from the reporters that you admire, suppose that there are any you actually love reading, that a lot of what they know and their ability to tell you the story relies on informal, not classified, conversations just about the way that things work in the world. >> and s&p officials understand that which is why it is self-defeating. they know that the better

informed we are as reporters the better informed our coverage will be. it ultimately is in their benefit to give us as much of an understanding from their perspective on the issues. and that comes to and formal context, just relationships of trust built up over years. you cannot do that by going in the front door. staffed by well-meaning people that they cycled through. people often no. not even a ." >> i like the panel to comment. is in our security system fundamentally flawed that someone, this yarn at this low

level and the government could release this amount of material, this class of of -- classic amount of material fundamentally flawed. >> i will try to be brief so that we can get to more questions. sure it did not work the way they wanted to work. you know, you would not want to see an open -- we don't think everything should be published. there are huge problems. huge trade offs. if you button-down hatches so securely that there is next to no possibility of a bridge like this could mean that lots of people around the government and not going to know that information exists that is vital to their job and the damage to security could be greater. that was the conclusion of the commission that investigated the

terrorist attacks in 2001. the data had been stuffed piped. it was so protected that there was so little sharing. they could not put the big picture together. it made us less secure. so the trade off, you should not be surprised to here. >> questions from this side. >> at what point to you realize or start to believe that this is a story you needed to tell? at any point did you doubt that believe? >> i have lots of doubts. taps every day. these are hard questions, and it tells you that it is obvious where to draw the line. i would strongly disagree. i worry all the time about where to draw the line. i don't worry at all, deciding to put resources and attention

and time and space. from the beginning at thought it would be very significant and important and also really, really hard. >> yes. i commend you very much for your work if. the intimation, and you have done a marvelous job in responding to that. my concern is with a different situation where citizens to have lawfully attempted to call attention to major issues are not getting attention by the press. i refer specifically to the fact that in 1992 congress unanimously passed a law requiring the disclosure of jfk assassination records, thousands

of pages of jfk assassination records that still remain with held by the national archives at the behest of the cia. does not require an edward snowden to get public attention focused on the release of those records? and that in 2013 on behalf of a number of prominent citizens including the former chief counsel of the house select committee on assassinations wrote a letter to the "washington post" about this. the letter was not even the knowledge. >> we are going to try to keep this pretty focused on the nsa project that the panel worked john. so if you have a question that is specifically related to this. [inaudible question] >> it's not a subject i have any

expertise on. .. that drove right to focus up revealing sources and methods so i'm curious about your decision process. >> yeah it's a plausible surmise in looking at the cloud at the drying for a layperson but

respectfully sir nobody who is in bolotin intelligence gathering or telecommunications networking would think that drug itself or the idea that there are places on the internet that are good places where it's not, no one would think that that's revealing something to an enemy that the enemy doesn't know. anybody who works in that field that's fairly elementary. the clue was toward what they were doing and there are lots of things that i have actually thought were highly sensitive because i'm a layperson too and i look at that and say i knew that was possible and i would realize as we proceeded through and in consultation with the government that it's not actually very sensitive at all and there would be occasionally things where it didn't strike me at all that they would be worried about something and explained to me quite.

the reason we withheld an elementary fact from our last story on the nsa's ability practice of recording every single call in the entire country and they didn't name the country is not just to avoid alerting the country about being a target but it have to do with specific operational surmises that might be made by others if they knew which country it was. i can't get into most of the reasons but we were very concerned to avoid blowing it capability. what we are trying to do is enable a debate and not cause a result. there are certain disclosures that are self-executing. once you say it, it's done. that's not what we are trying to do and i would strongly defend the claim that we never have done it and the government doesn't claim to have. >> just to add on the data center coverage so the present

program still exists in the nsa still can under 700 to get information about individualize targets or broader than individualized selectors from google legally through prism through the 702 program so that capability on googles infrastructure still exists to collect data from google. we describe a program where it seemed like they were going after the same piece of data through the multiple means, some more legal and some less. >> a question right there. >> i would like to, a lot of things have been revealed in this discussion as well as to the revelation of snowden throughout the past year have shown that these programs have been defended i the executive office all the way down throughout the brass.

at the same time it was brought up that nixon was impeached for an infraction which was relatively much more minor in comparison and yet at the same time there has been no discussion within the mass media or within the political establishment to even you know, hands at the level of criminality which the former president was removed from office for yet is currently going on within our society and the same time it's asserted that we have a democracy, democratic process. i just wanted to know if any of you wanted to comment on that? >> since i'm the one who mention nixon i want to clarify. i do not believe that what nixon did was trivial in comparison to what's happening now. what nixon did the article of

impeachment said that he used national security surveillance tools to spy on an attempt to crush a split glenn amaze. there's absolutely no evidence that anything the but like that is happening now and believe me if i sign the evidence of that would be the first news i would be getting added unless it was about spying on journalists. so the issue here is not that we have big brother and that abusive sense. it's trying to control, suppress dissent. and yet it is a set of powers that exceed anything that orwell could've imagined so we have to worry about what might be, that. and i'm not going to comment and i don't think any of us are whether so-and-so broke the law. it's not our job. >> eight question right here. >> thank you very much for the work that you have done. i am daily amazed.

my wife and i are just so pleased at what you are letting us know. i'm a retired radio journalist from maryland. i interviewed six district congressman roscoe bartlett. he has retired sense, but his repeated votes against the patriot act and he said the thing that trumped it for him was once you let the government into your house you will never get them out. is there any hope that we could turn the clock back and have them not spying on us? >> i don't know what the outcome will be but i think that it's not that -- there will be embarrassing newspapers articles and they will change their minds. that is not how it all works. it believes in checks and balances in terms of market capitalism and in terms of self

government. what transparency has done is enable people not just to yap about it but to do something so silicon valley which by the way knicks a lot of political contributions and has a fair amount of sway both in the executive branch and the congress in terms -- and has the ability as we discussed to make changes that thwart some of the programs if they think they are legitimate. the transparency has caused many of those big companies to change their policies as well as their technologies. it has created environment in which there are all these privacy startup so that you might actually be able to buy e-mail and not pay for it to having them sell your data. it has enabled lawsuits to proceed that were getting thrown out of court for because the plaintiffs lacked standing and couldn't prove they were effective. now they can for the first time federal courts can decide what the constitutional lines are. proof that congressional

oversight was dysfunctional before consists of the fact that the same congress is now proposing and voting for completely different measures in the life of the public disclosures then it was proposing in passing before we knew what was happening. and on the list. we have lots and checks and balances that are the ones with her learned in civics class and they are operating because of the information. >> someone has been patiently waiting that they are. >> thank you. and december the amazon packages and spyware on laptops and things like that. you think the story strays too close and to the line of revealing nsa techniques and did you hold on the -- hold back on the story or would you have? >> i don't comment on other peoples journalism because i don't feel i'm the right person for that. i can't be a critic on a story

uncovering. i will distinguish that story from the things we have been focusing on. if you are intercepting a particular passage. they are not planting chips on every time you order an upgrade. those are broad definition targeted operations. general speaking we have not been writing about targeted -- and we don't want to reel the method they are using or the identity of the target. in other cases and this is not our story. others have written about ways that the nsa has undermined encryption standards for example. i think those are harder calls but i see a strong public case to be made for publishing those so go back to world war ii. the japanese and i think i want this mix this up. the japanese had a secret code they use called purple and the germans had ultra-but they were homegrown.

they were used exclusively by the military commands of those enemy countries with the united states government at war. now almost everybody uses the same encryption. good guys, bad guys, my health records my bank account terrorists, foreign governments use the same thing. if they make the job easier on their targets by undermining the encryptioencryptio n that all those use that raises some pretty big public policy questions even if you can legitimately say you are revealing a technique that they are using. you are revealing it in order to say is that a good idea and by the way of revealing it doesn't stop them from doing it again because it's just a matter of technical compliance. >> a question on the side over there. >> hi. does nsa now know aside what's been revealed from your stories what snowden took? >> i can't know that for sure.

it appears from a variety of interviews they have done that they are not sure. i think they have a very strong picture by now of what he had access to, what he could have touched or didn't touch. i don't think that they know with any confidence what he actually took. they have claimed that at some points he took 1.7 million documents. if that's the case, and i do not know, that's a much larger number than if he gave any combination of journalist. >> we have a question appearing the front. >> thank you for taking my question. you have talked a lot about how much you have -- self-censored. >> we call it editing, not censorship. >> you are going to write a story about this aspect of what you know but you're not going to reveal every aspect of that

story and i get the sense there are things that you have documents from snowden that you aren't going to touch at all. you aren't writing story about that at all so it's commendable that you have self-edited you said? he may not have sent you 1.7 million documents but i get a sense he sent you quite a lot certainly more than you are going to publish. what is your view of the fact that he did it and not just because legally he should bakshish sent you nothing but if he felt that there was a public interest in you covering some of that stuff he sent you clearly more than he should have. trusting that you and your colleagues at the post that team and the other outlets etc. that you are all going to be very careful have good judgment not

put this stuff on the network, not get hacked and not talk to their girlfriend etc., etc. okay so i am not balad pfizer spokesman but i will speak to the fact of the question. he did give me and others, to others a lot more than he actually believe should be published. if you wanted it to be public he's pretty good at computers and he could put it up on the web. he could put it up in ways that could not be taken down around the world. it is not uncommon actually. what is unique in what i have never seen happen before and what has never happened before that someone would turn over this many secrets with this much sensitivity but it has been routine in my reporting career for four people to tell me things there were things they didn't want me to publish and i did not publish for the purpose of understanding the stuff that i was going to publish. suppose the prison document the

first one i wrote about the program in which the u.s. government gets information directly from u.s. technology companies like facebook google and yahoo! and so on. he knew that i would have to read that whole thing in context that examples would help me be able to understand what was happening in increasingly what was not happening so sometimes people tell me off the record for the purpose of not letting me write something that's wrong. he also knew i would be deeply suspicious if he gave me a document with scissors marks and lacked out parts. does that undermine the whole basis of the story so there were lots of reasons why people tell you more than they wanted you to publish. >> we have a question back there. >> a question about the journalistic approach to this and the philosophy that you have here.

you have been criticized and in some places -- there was a piece in the new republic saying this was not deserved and you were a pass-through. >> that was a former employee. >> a pass-through for sources and agenda as there are all kinds of sources that if you could speak and say a word about that but i also want you to know that i have an understanding that is not what occurred because when you discuss the slide and the work that went into it, the five to six weeks of just trying to figure out okay what is this clearly that is reporting that had to occur that is supposed to the wikileaks dump you had to bring expertise to bear to figure out and analyze what was going on and secondly if you could also say a word about the traditional journalistic approach you have adopted to not advocate for a result to say that you know i am a reporter and this voice from

nowhere as is sometimes called. i'm here to start the debate and not to abdicate on behalf of edward snowden and are you limited by that in some ways? thank you. >> okay you guys can pitch in anywhere you want to. agenda advocacy. first of all i don't care what my sources motives. what angered -- i want to triangulate and find context. if i know someone is telling me something because they hate their boss and they are trying to embarrass him that doesn't decide whether or not i have read the paper. i want to get the truth and talk to the loss and talk to people who know why he hates his boss. i want to know what motive he or she has so i can cure it in terms of understanding the full context of the story but many many great important stories that whatever your values are

that you think should have been published have come from scurrilous people with scurrilous motives and as far as whether withholding my own advocacy or my own point of view harms journalism i think putting it out there, i mean where i don't have a view from nowhere and this is the idea that reporters in the traditional way to a he said she said in they don't try to referee that, that's not at all what we are doing when it comes to facts. we are not saying joe says it's white and gene says it's black. we are trying to find out and say what it is. i'm not trying to say what you should think of it. >> if i could add to the point on the reporting and dumping documents, i have had a number of journalist friends approach me and tell me they are desperatedesperately trying to contact snowden and get copies

of the documents in they feel like this is this huge thing that they want a piece of. it's true that there is a lot of sensitive documents that you'd be mistaken to think with the exception of one or two of the early stories like the verizon order where was clearly the order itself was in plain english and clearly a story. the reporting is much more like wheel of fortune where you have three letters and a clue and it's about the nsa and you have to guess the word or the phrase and a lot of it involves piecing together little bits and pieces and you get a thread of the program name that you suspect is somewhere near the u.s. and you want to link it and it involves a lot of weeks of works. if you notice the time it takes each subsequent story has been kind of flipside it because the

deeper harder stories are basically harder to piece together. while snowden to collect a lot of documents that wasn't the case that it was a conference of map with an index and syllabus and a dictionary. it takes quite a lot of reporting where the other journalists have come and and really colored and provided context and done sourcing and gotten sources on the record to help fill in all of those missing letters. >> we have time for about two more questions. right here. >> thank you. i have a question. i have read virtually every single article that the post wrote on the nsa and what i found out is that it was all one sided against nsa. my question is why didn't you do it fair and say let's look at the other side, namely the threat and how bad is the threat and how hard did the nsa work to

prevent the threat? >> we do have an nsa reporter who covered the nsa quite a bit. would you like to respond? >> well i think in terms of the stories i did and probably to get at the policy debates, i think i tried -- i tried to be fair, strives to be fair and honest about what we are hearing and reporting. there has been and it's a legitimate debate to have as to whether having this discussion about prism, about section 215 program, encryption methods, cyber offense whether that harms national security. the extent to which it does you know i think is difficult to

discern. >> i would just say there is an extraordinary volume of reporting by us and everyone else on threat material. north korea, missile launches and nuclear weapons development and terrorist plots. there is a huge volume of that. it has been at an accelerated place since 9/11 but dating from the cold war it has dominated coverage of national security matters and the biggest part of the word news is new and what has been new is a lot of inside material about the u.s. response about u.s. surveillance about the nsa that we didn't know before. and so what i'm doing now is certainly focusing on that but if you look at the whole package of reporting in the "washington post" i don't think you are seeing threat information about the interesting things happening in the world and i'd be happy to

direct you to several articles a day. >> we have time for one more question. this person right here has been quite patient. >> thank you. i think the key as to whether or not you have warrants i don't see any reason or any benefit for having a priority gathering of data. i understand and believe they can get information by analyzing data but i don't see why you have to do it without a warrant so that's one question and the other question is who in the government has been held accountable? i know your panels made a comment about keeping people accountable but who was accountable and who has been held accountable? >> first of all to your question about warrants, that is one of the big points of contention, the focus of losses --

lawsuits and the constitutionality of some of these programs. the government believes that when you are collecting so-called metadata the phone numbers or the call durations and call times but not the actual content of the conversation than taking and collecting that does not require warrant because it is not seen as sensitive as hearing the word of the conversation. we have done reporting as well about collecting that metadata can enlarge quantities have the potential to disclose all sorts of things about who we are as people like our habits, where we shop or what her religion is or what our preferences are and who he might visit at night when our spouses are gone but anyway that is one reason why some people feel metadata deserves more

protection than just certainly shouldn't be collected on a vast scale like the government had been doing without a warrant. holding accountable the administration has said repeatedly that it has not found any willful abuse of the authorities by the intelligence community and by the nsa, that when they have mistakes and when there have been compliance violations and there have been serious ones those have been reported and corrected and that is one level of accountability. the question is how accountable are they to the public for the overall for the balancing the intrusiveness versus the benefit

to national security, that level of transparency is so key to accountability and we haven't had that. we are starting to see a little bit now which has led to efforts by the administration to rain and a little besides obama saying he wants to -- collection he has ordered there be a public advocates now before the foreign intelligence surveillance court which traditionally hears only from the government on surveillance issues. he wants to have advocates to give the public interest side of surveillance issues. he has ordered that there be stronger privacy protections before heirs who data is incidentally collected and that collection on dozens of heads of state be halted. a lot of that is in reaction to stories about angela merkel so

that is some measure of accountability i guess you could say but it certainly doesn't go as far as some would like, some reformers who want to see not just an end to the nsa's collection of phone metadata about an end to all boat collection by intelligence community. they would like to see a warrant requirement for searches of americans communications in a program called prism. they would like to see greater disclosure of what the other bulk collection programs are and greater transparency around the overseas collection which we are now trying to learn a bit more about. >> clearly we could continue talking for a long time. their sales still seems to be many questions and he can fill out those cards with a question we'll answer those on line after this event. i really would hope that you

will continue to talk about this issue and please join me in thanking bart gellman ellen is sheena ashkan soltani anne craig timberg for letting us walk through and tube marty beran who introduced the panel and a huge supporter of what was an enormous difficult hard and as you saw the nuts and bolts of how difficult this reporting was reporting over the last year and leading barton and ashkan and craig walk us through and get a sense of what they are dealing with. thank you again. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> you some independent scientists looks after was on the market and found the gene that was normally silent was switched on in that gene produces an allergen called canvassing so you may have in allergic reaction and someone you know may die from being the corn genetically engineered on labeled as containing an allergen but the process of genetic engineering created a switch on of the dormant gene and change 43 other genes as well as changes in the shape of proteins. monsanto's soy has a sevenfold increase, up to seven fold increase in a known allergen. this was an intended. this was the background side effects of the process of genetic engineering, the process that is used to create this soy and the corn that we eat. ..

the author "the loudest voice in the room" about the creation of fox news and he discussed the book with a journalism professor jane hall on booktv after words