an opportunity to? up at this table over here and purchase it from her and she will sign it for you. thank you all for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> book cbs covered several books on modern russian and u.s.-russian relations. in light of the current conflict between russia and ukraine and the u.s. involvement in the situation, but tv presents portions of author talks on russian leadership in foreign relations. in the next hour camillus

analyst edward lucas, author of the new cold war, politics professor allen lynch, author of "vladimir putin and rssian statecraft." columnist ilan berman, author of "implosion: the end of russia and what it means for america" and government in foreign service professor, angela stent, author of "the limits of partnership: u.s.-russian relations in the twenty-first century." we begin with edward lucas, author of the new cold war: putin's russia and the threat to the u.s. before moscow bureau chief economist presents his thoughts on russia's influence in former soviet republics and the importance of ukraine entrance into the european union. >> russia is not in numbers day. we talked seriously with the russians about north korea. we sometimes talk with the russians about iran. it true. russia is engaged.

but the two reasons to be worried about what happens. i don't need to remind you here about the cases of fascism in the russian media. if you've not done and you speak russian, odom for it to get on those videos. music, images, the i.t. of russia -- it's poisonous. it is poisoning russian public. anti-westerners who are deliberate. the whole thing, sovereign a common managed democracy, out

the west and so on is made up in order to fool the russian people. but i'm not that of domestic. that's what's really scary. the russian public opinion. it's leaking. it leaks to central europe. it leaks to countries that we thought were firmly angled. he raises back in the 1980s. this is using countries that we thought we gained the freedom and democracy, coming up the russian money and that's really scary. i was amazed to see how

successful the russians were. they didn't just beat us. the way they cut outstream -- the way most russian money is causing problems in latvia, lithuania, russian money is already public disgrace. this is scary stuff. i would like to say this tough but we are winning. i can't. i think we are losing. not just countries people have never heard of. it's worse. if i sat here come the eight years ago, six years ago in the audience to distinguish serving german chancellor would signoff on what is not only commercially preposterous, but it directly

threatens the energy security of journalism, eastern allies. there is compared -- the team leader, the success billy brandt, but a major within weeks of leaving with then take a lucrative position as chairman of that consortium. he said the man is not. this doesn't happen. this is the west. these standards. if i set the western country of all take on deeply dodgy russian companies and then when the russian companies became life and easily justified but then route the benefits of what they've done. then the missing companies came up, they would say we sat in the

audits for 2000, 2001, 2002 a user can't account for in order. people are relying on this order. i was fantasizing. the boy and bean counters, at least they are honest. you've seen an extraordinary push with russian money into what we regard as the sentiments of the western economic system cared if i turned up in the city of london with a suitcase is still okay and said i need to think, i need a lawyer to make some money and i'll pay you, people would call the police. seventeen dollars or just stolen in broad daylight in his pinstriped geniuses, these captains of finance are queuing

up in the apa tunic of the tivo and that is one that is not just trying to say they push the russians back and hang on to central europe. it's happening right here. it's happening k street. communism had to 30 communism must attract to and to work fast. but the first time in russian history, none of the checkers attacking us and if we run, we believe only money matters and people attack us using money. so on that cheerful note, i've got lots more to day.

>> i kept thinking about coming in now, the pretty common view that there is a cultural aversion to political pluralism and an affinity for a strong hand at the top of his run through russian that trend and the governmental style at the moment from desires into communism and now to the post-communist europe. to what extent do you think that is a fact during this happening? >> well, i'm always very cautious about extrapolating from history to the present because you can say this countries never known good government. i think one of the stories in the last 10, 15 years as we perhaps haven't had a history

very good government. we been able to help voters situation, but make government work. so i'm a bit skeptical about the idea that russia is doomed by its history. it's one of the reasons i'm so passionate that we really offered ukraine a pathway to european union membership. it can make success in the ukraine, if we can help ukraine, they live now with more money, more prosperity, more security than russians, that undermined at great argument. the russians already will chip away, can't bring democracy to ex-communist countries. yes, we did. you can't bring democracy. we did. he can't bring democracy to all those countries. the day. you can't bring democracy to be

countries. okay, if we can make you kramer, the lineup say in the father, orthodox countries whose names begin with fire. a novel really have made a big dent in that argument. but i do feel that the history is digested history is really difficult. i will chat through the book in which the invasion to months, the way we perhaps underestimated russia in the 1990s. >> to the flick of russian leadership in foreign relations is with allen lynch, international relations professor at the university of virginia from a director at the university center for russian and east european studies. mr. lynch, author of "vladimir

putin and rssian statecraft" explains how russia's president is it that much of the country's population. >> not joining us here at of virginia is the author of this book, "vladimir putin and rssian statecraft" politics professor alan lynch. alan lynch, would you describe russia as a new? >> it is certainly not a political he peered at the same time, putin is very popular. in fact, his approval ratings have increased since he was reelected on march 4th in now approaching about 68% according to an independent russian polling agents he. they're very interesting paradoxes here. putin has supplied the apparatus democracy to obtain political legitimacy. but he has certainly been able to avoid strict accountability to diverse elements in russian society. he has constructed an interesting political machine

that combines the forms of democracy, but without the substance. >> whitest vladimir putin -- why did he get reelected and why is >> cominco but for yours first. in 2001, 2008, putin was reaching the end of his second term is sophistry that is the end according to the constitution two terms in the road. actually, most russian in the elite in society were genuinely could turn that putin might actually obey the terms of the constitution and step out because they saw no credible alternative leader at that point. in fact, putin has been arranged for some succession by placing his protége, junichi medvedev ament hooton became prime minister, but remained at the center of the russian political system to the great relief of most russians actually. you may remember shortly thereafter we at the world economic is in the price of oil in which the russian government

and economy tightly dependent with saudi arabia almost every year, the price of oil collapsed from $145 a barrel to about $33 a barrel. this is a major existential crisis for the russian economy. couldn't have been able over the past five or six years with the rise in oil prices to squirrel away enough money in spite of massive corruption to be sure that he had a sharp observer of money, finances, reserve on to be able to weather that storm in the russian economy did not collapse or implode by comparison to two other times in recent history. one in 98 when the price of oil collapsed a 10 barrels of under yeltsin, putin's predecessor to its domestic and foreign obligations and to value 75% almost overnight. under gorbachev, the collapse in the mid-80s to about $10 a barrel meant that gorbachev had no financial sharp observer it

were to weather the storm of his own economic reforms. hooton, by contrast, to those previous leaders, most adult russians know that. very well were raised by people who do that. if chaos and collapse very well. they credit putin to a large extent with the least whether in that storm and presiding over a period of relative prosperity and russia. remember, most russians view. by comparison to the situation inherited 1999 when russia was virtually failed state. the economy had just suffered a depression twice as deep as that which the united states suffered in the 1930s. a new stage in the war chechnya had threatened the territorial integrity of russia, had just risen up. the suspect who was appointed prime minister and nato expansion was proceeding on all fronts with no limits to space and time. russia was virtually failed

state. putin was able to restore an element of order out of this chaos, an element of prosperity and an element of international respect that of humiliation. this is not the whole picture to be sure. he presides over a very corrupt authoritarian political machine. it is more dependent on oil and natural resource revenues than it was before. citibank, for instance, thinks the price of oil has to be at about $150 a barrel. it's about 110, 115 for the russian government to balance given how much the state depend on oil revenues. this is a major failing of is the fact political secession still remains a matter of court politics are not event to show its rules and procedures so however most russian has to procedural element and see where they came on in the 90s, from the late gorbachev. to the yeltsin. and they have a very different take on putin did we do in the

west when we compare them as they tend to do to parliamentary democracy and by the standards put in a very short. unless we begin to take into account the predominant frame by which most russian won't understand how he certainly did get an majority in elections on fourth. perhaps it is 63%, 64% reported, the cert by over 50% and independent ravings gave 60% approval. >> professor alan, how political institutions in russia to develop enough they can quote, unquote survived vladimir putin i'm been in office? >> is certainly have not. in fact, this is a major concern a political scientist at the decision. it also has to be a major concern of pigeons. two years ago the tragic train crash in russia, which wiped out the polish leadership civilian military from about 80 liters, the highest levels in your poll

and continued to. institutionalize real political democracy. russia is the only country in post-soviet europe for executive power has not yet changed the hansbrough lecturer means. they truly free and fair election. it's always been a moderate structural elections under yeltsin or putin and the executive essentially structured to secession after term in office. or putin to somehow disappear in the scene today or tomorrow, it is very likely the system could implode in a war of one set of elites under another set of elites for the past natural resource base and industrial base and mineral base that makes russia's largest natural resource and mineral base in the world. most russians know this at the elite level in the social level. to some extent, the absence of alternative as a consequence of this on a politics ideas not allow general opposition to the

system, which is temporarily stable and can remain with the high price of oil nevertheless is blatantly fragile because fragile because it's not institutionalize. it's very much a one-man sum of power. >> did you have a chance to interview vladimir putin quick >> now come i didn't have a chance to interview putin. i did have a chance to talk with several russians who are very close to. read confidential conversations that he treated the text of the book, by the way. one is acknowledged in the process because these issues are somewhat critical. as you just heard, i try to put hooton in the context in which most russians had to see him. i've also set a number of very critical things about his tenure in office and you do have to be careful about tainting those close to putin was excessively vertical comments. i have to keep that anonymous, but i did manage to show it to

several people and i was very grateful for their comments, both positive and critical. >> would you be able after writing this book was published -- could it be published in russia? >> yes, it could be published in russia. it could be. we have heard their offers of interest in poland and russia, but will be published in chinese, by the way. still a communist country politically, but a country that is a strong interest in russian affairs. i think it could be published. the majority of the books i used were actually published in russia. so there is actually a fairly wide range of opinion in russia outside the televised political news. televised political news and the virtual monopoly of government. the government controls all five television stations that reach 90% of the russian audience. most russians get their political news from tv. that's a monopoly. however, outside that -- so you

can check information against the other and talk to people and read other sources. i used a lot of a lot of foreign sources well. german, french italian visitors as checks against different sources of information. as a paradoxical situation. remember, what are we comparing putin to? a jeffersonian democracy? the idea with? are we comparing them to in the soviet union was in 1985? if in 1985 era to say here's the vision of russian society that i propose to putin system is dealt, how much would the united states have paid to get the system in 1985? we would've paid a lot. it all comes down to her perspective by which we establish criteria of evaluation. >> tvs programming on russian leadership in foreign affairs continues to next, ilan berman,

author of "implosion: the end of russia and what it means for america." the vice president of the american for policy council opines on russia's future and how it will affect u.s. foreign policy efforts towards the country. >> the state, to stay have built over the last dozen years or so is built for the hero now. it is not built as a long-term national enterprise. so what putin does the broad -- by the way, all your member that political sign up and you have problems at home to go abroad. with that in mind, think about this grandstanding on syria and iran to be not only reflection of russian strength, but may also be a reflection of russian internal weakness. because the state could use those simply has not dealt with the strains in a serious fashion. part the reason it hasn't is because it's not wired that way. russia's government a few years

ago they would talk about it being a form of vanished democracy. they don't even talk about managed democracy anymore. it is more than anything else a personality built on vladimir putin and his close circle of followers. it is one kept in place by massive corruption and sweeter contracts and this doesn't mean it's total lawlessness, but what it does mean is the track the real serious, sustained from international investment, fdi and other things that are required to turn this demographic trend lines around would require the dismantling of the least part of vladimir putin stay. and that's not going to happen. the russian government is caught in a cul-de-sac of its own political making. but that doesn't mean it's going to go quietly. it doesn't mean it's simply going to dissolve, disappear, collapse. what it could mean his best to

look into the future and what you guys to understand we're not talking about trendlines soliciting earnest in the next couple years. in the next couple years where you see a russia's pretty much what you get. i see look further into the future a decade or two for an upcoming trends will exert an pull on how russia behaves. for example, you can expect them to enhance russia's imperial impulse. we know that bush is still in its rear wheels and cut its territory cities to be part of the soviet union, territory stripped away as a result of history, as a result of political acts in. vladimir putin himself talking to fascinate about the collapse of the soviet union in the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. this ideological reclaim to loss plans is likely to be given a shot in the arm by the loss of lands elsewhere as russia begins to lose it eastern periphery,

they expand westward could not medical terms mind you, the territorial terms is going to be reinforced if not becomes complete unquenchable. the second trendlines and you will see this sooner, is it is very likely as you see the rise of an insurgent strain of extreme islam and places elsewhere in what is called the eurasian heartland, you are going the a widening of a conflict between the russian state and the sources they can't control. so we are not talking about when chechnya. we are talking about many chechnya. and this all may sound like an overstatement if you did not watch the emergence of the chechnya conflict. it's maturation over time has taken on a conflict to a far larger proportions than was originally vision and what i am

saying is the trendlines your seat in the russian heartland that we set up at chill. they may not, but they have the potential to do so. the third tram line and i will stop there is that you can imagine as russia contorts internally for this ideological and religious tensions and because to press westward for demographic as well as economic reasons there is going to be heightened tensions with europe and the nato bloc. all of this is a long way of saying what i said at the out there, which is that we americans tend to see russia at face value. on vladimir putin strives very large in the world stage, when he creates and has geopolitical coup with this deal in syria, with his relationship with the red, we tend to assume that what you see is what you get. russia is rising in russia has to be dealt with are accommodated to make russia world affairs.

what i'm telling you is that my not be so simple. in fact, the real challenge for the united states in 20 years or 30 years may not be from russia's strength, but maybe russia's weakness. that i think should inform serious policy thinking about russia and our approach to it because we know the reset of relations and the obama administration is orchestrating with moscow in the last four years is not as healthy as it could be i would say today. we know the reset has been a failure and we know now the white house is at least beginning to think about what comes next. so what this is intended to do is give them a little bit of food for thought about where russia is heading because knowing where russia is heading is determinative to figuring out what her policy towards it should be. thank you, guys. i will stop there.

[applause] >> we will take questions. it will be so kind as to wait until the microphone is passed to you and we would appreciate you state your name and affiliation if you'd care to have the courtesy of our gas. i'm going to take the prerogative of reading one of the questions we received all my. i'm going to change it a little bit. how can the u.s. or could the u.s. effectively support positive transformation in russia without creating the perception of foreign interference, which only aggravates the anti-american feeling and also would target liberty issues in that country? >> well, i think it's a great question and actually to go for a second, one of the reasons bush is so uncooperative on middle east policy, for example, has spent 2.5 years supporting the assad regime against it domestic opposition is because it has seen this movie before.

a decade ago, russia witnessed what we now call the color revolutions and elsewhere. russia was petrified brad and dispatcher fight now that those trendlines from abroad will take withhold in russia. here's a dirty little secret. vladimir putin isn't all that popular. the last credible polling that i saw came not in the spring from the la plata center in moscow and a suggested that of respondents who voted for -- to participate in the vote for the presidential election, only 34% said they would vote for vladimir putin. in a democratic society, that is catastrophic. even an authoritarian one is deeply charlo, which is why what you see it has to do with the last year has been a deepening of russia's antidemocratic church. the real dilemma for u.s. policymakers is how to square that circle, how to invest in

democratic institutions, democratic infrastructure without the messiness meddling in internal affairs about having proxies, whether it's the international republican institute, democratic answer to plot us to commiserated kicked out of the country. i think that's a very difficult needle to thread. that is the reason why the obama it restrictionist spent so little time actually thinking about it because there's large things we can work with with regard to russia. ..

have that become a larger conversation, but it is not an easy conversation half. >> we conclude our programming on russia's leaders and foreign relations with angela stent, author of "the limits of partnership: u.s.-russia relations in the twenty-first century". the director of the center for you eurasian at georgetown university examines the current relationship between the united states and russia. remarks on how the past four presidential administrations have faired in communicating with their russian counterparts and presents her thoughts on russian president putin. this will appear on book tv after words were she spoke with president or the center of national interest is the one do

we need a partnership with russia? >> guest: we certainly do need a partnership with russia. the united states and dress it -- russia, the two remaining nuclear superpowers. between as we cannot resolve a number of the world's major problems if we don't work together and are seeing that now in terms of syria, and ron, even of issues like terrorism and counter-terrorism. russia is not always an easy partner for the united states, just as the united states is not an easy partner for russia, but we have to work together. we have seen this year when there were plenty of reasons why their relationship deteriorated, but in the and we are working together and will continue to work together. those in the u.s. political class to say that russia does not count any more and is not important are flat out wrong. it has to be a partner, even though, as i say in my book, it

is a cranky partnership. >> host: well, in your work queue make clear there are two kinds of limits. first what i would say structural limits. different interests, at different historical traditions, at different circumstances. but then also withes which are through policy, russian policy. can we do better than we are doing now? >> guest: on the structural limits i would exercise that the fact that we are the world's two nuclear powers makes it in some ways we are still living in a cold war time more and focus on these issues. the kind of relationship that we don't have that we would have to have were this a better partnership would be a much more fully fleshed out economic relationship, and we are not natural economic partners because russia is mainly a raw

materials exporter, selling oil and gas, military hardware. these are not things we need to purchase from russia. we are trying to improve their relationship. structurally this is, if you like, a very one-sided relationship. then i would say, the limits of partnership also go back to the fact that we see the world rather differently from the russians. the russians want to focus on the sovereignty of state. russia is a state of power. they looked at the united states as a revisionist power, largely because they think we are invested in regime change, that we want to go around changing governments that we don't like. one of the real limits is, the u.s. foreign-policy in general focus on the fact that we represent certain values. those include democratization, free-market, the rule of law, and human rights. we believe that we have the right to pursue those issues when we interact with other

countries. russia does not see the world that way. it now says that the u.s. the case as the old communist state, trying to go around and recreate the world and its image. fundamentally one of the limits to the partnership is, if you are going to interact with a country like russia, a great power, do you focus on your mutual interests and try and pursue them, or do you focus on values, what is happening inside russian society? that is one of the very sore point that has been there throughout the 23 years since the soviets in the collapsed. >> host: this is an issue clearly. if your view of foreign policy is if you, then perhaps in partnership with russia. saudi arabia is considered one

of america's closest allies. i was born in the soviet union, and i remember vividly. i was still quite small, but i still remember on russian tv suddenly i see vice president richard nixon appearing with khrushchev, the soviet leader. that was a very interesting exchange. nixon said to khrushchev at that time, mr. prime minister, i understand that you believe that americans are going to live under communism. that is what he said it -- stated. he said this is fine, as long as you except that you have your system, we have our system, and we will not try to change them by force of coercion. this is 59. here we are in 2013. sometimes you get the impression

that the american position is that the model to have good relations will actually require other countries to move closer to our political system and beliefs. to what extent is this a problem with the u.s.-russia relationships? due to the obama administration, the focus of national interest and human rights. be too well, this has been a constant issue. to your question about saudi arabia, let me just say -- and of course the russians always say that the u.s. pursues double standards, criticize russia for doing things that we don't criticize china for or saudi arabia. the russians have said that russia is a european country, a member of the council of europe, signed all the conventions to agreements that they're supposed to adhere to the zero atlantic norms which, of course china and saudi arabia have not

done. it is true that i think the u.s. has come in the past, not been consistent in the way that it has criticized russia for some things that happen domestically and go into this in the book. they are important strategic partners for the united states, at least in the war on terror. i think the obama administration has been pretty skilled at dealing with these issues. the reset, when it worked -- and it as not for your to -- explicitly differentiated between working with pressure on these common interests like arms control, iran, missile defense, like afghanistan, and saying it was a 2-track policy separated from what was happening domestically in russia. it is the quiet and reserved. this is -- in the last year or the last couple of years since mr. putin returned to the

kremlin and has thrown out the united states agency for international development, the u.s. ngos. we had a spot over the so-called [inaudible] which bans the adoption of russian children by americans. i think we have to understand is, we have to differentiate between the obama administration and the u.s. congress. the obama administration, i think, has been fairly reserved. if you look at the entire 23 years, they have not been promoting better relations. those people in the congress who are interested in russia have tended to be people who are highly critical. so things like this, the banning of visas and the assets of officials, that originated in the congress and was not something that the obama administration wanted. the russians then retaliated with this legislation on

adoption. the administration understands it, but we are a pluralistic system and the congress is important. they take a rather different approach. >> host: one very important thing about your career is that in addition to being a leading academic, you, of course, work with several administrations. starting with the last days of the soviet union and goes to the current time. you were in the clinton administration. you were in the obama -- the bush administration, the state department's on policy planning. tell us, if you look back, clinton administration, bush administration, obama administration, who handled russia better? if you want, of course, you may

start with bush won. favorably disposed. >> guest: right. in my book i discuss for resets that we have had since the close of the soviet union. i was in policy planning in the last 18 months of the clinton administration, six months of the bush administration and then the national intelligence. both times when i served in government we were already on the kind of downward slide in the u.s.-russian relationship. i think the first reset was brief because obviously president george h. w. bush did a lot with president yeltsin, but that was very much when the focus and, of course, general scowcroft was the national security adviser -- with best focus was on disarmament, arms control issues, denude keel are rising ukraine and making sure after the collapse of the soviet

union then the clear weapons are safe. there was probably not enough attention given to helping out the camino, new russian government financially, economically. i know president nixon himself was in favor of that. that was a time to improve relations with russia focused on concrete issues. then the new administration came into office and had a much more ambitious agenda for its own reset. clinton himself, he says that clinton was the russian and. clinton himself was interested in russia. i think he and those around him really thought that they had eight years, at the maximum allowed to refashion russia and turn it into a democracy and market society that was clearly over ambitious. you cannot remake a society like

that in eight years, and there are strong forces of russian tradition and history that have to evolve in their own way, but there was certainly an attempt to five more financial assistance, but also an attempt to get russia to buy into the u.s. view of international relations and european security which is why we had problems when we got involved in the war in the balkans. that first reset ended badly with the coastal war. so towards the end of the clinton administration, i mean, mr. yeltsin was quite sick. then mr. putin came in. the time i was in government was a downward time in their relationship. recognition in the u.s. that it had not been able to achieve what it wanted to do. the recent under president george w. bush was really initiated by vladimir putin. i think at the beginning of his time in the kremlin mr. putin

was interested in a better relationship with the united states and the closer integration with the west as he understood it. obviously, after 9/11 he was the first time offer condolences and offer support in helping the added states establish its bases in central asia. i think in president putin point of view the desire was to have, as one of my colleagues colet, an equal partnership of and naples. in other words, to have a strategic partnership with the united states. in the beginning the bush administration was very inclined with that. the personal relationships seem to be better, and that cooperation in 2001, the war in afghanistan, russia was instrumental in helping the united states in a variety of ways because it knew more about afghanistan and the u.s. that began to of fall apart when president bush and his people and particularly vice president cheney embrace the free and

agenda, the belief that the u.s. should go around actively promoting democracy, particularly in russia's backyard, ukraine, georgia. of course, that ended very badly in the russell of georgia war in 2008. the obama administration came in to focus on the issues which russia itself wanted to of focus on. arms control, very important for obama. an area where we are equal with russia and can interact. afghanistan, iran. i think it began to fall apart because to some extent that was also based on the personal ties between president obama and president. [inaudible] even if people understood that mr. putin, the prime minister, the most important decision maker, but still the decisions were based upon the relationship between those two younger

presidents. when it became clear that mr. putin was going to come back into the kremlin which coincided with the demonstrations in the fall of 2011 against mr. putin and the elections which they said were falsified, that, that was really a breaking point. mr. putin blames the united states. since then i think the relationship has been on a downward slide. this year, of course, we have the episode with mr. snow. now we're at a point where we are working together and have to work together in syria, but where president obama himself has said we have to take a pause and reconsider how we want this relationship to move forward. president obama is already a lame duck president, and i think mr. putin understands that. >> host: when we talk about democracy promotion to one problem in my view, at least, with the russian government, more broadly with the russian

political elite is almost no one believes in american sincerity. it goes back, as far as i am concerned, to the clinton era, particularly the elections of 1996. i remember vividly meeting with the secretary of state. i think you were there. i said -- i just came back from moscow. yeltsin was bound to win this election by hook or by crook. the government people, state department officials did not like what i said. immediately, what is your evidence? and i was taken aback as they were asking this question. later with the bush administration at that time, and i thought that they were reporting very objectively how

yeltsin was stealing the election. completely identified because yeltsin seemed to be more agreeable on foreign-policy shifts, and we were willing to support him blindly. russians got the impression that the american way of democracy, you're a democrat if you are prepared to not walk in lockstep with american policy. >> guest: i do not think you are wrong. from the u.s. government point of view of the belief was that the worst disaster that could befall russia was if the communists came back to power. again in the '96 election it looked like the leader of the communist party still a very good chance. he had actually been to the world economic forum at the beginning of the year and made a speech where he sounded quite reasonable. the belief in the u.s. embassy and the state department was that without yeltsin the system

that everyone was working so hard to try and create in russia would collapse. and therefore, of course, you are right that people on the ground at the embassy understood . they understood that this probably would not be a free election. we also know, of course, dick morris, people who work for him when and advised, not yeltsin himself, but his daughter and the people around him. the belief was that he had to win an all costs. we now winning an election which people have not forecast. you can ask the question now, would it be so terrible if the communists would have one? no one knows the answer. there are different views in russia and year. you are correct in saying that from the point of view of a lot of russians this created a degree of cynicism about the u.s. commitment to free and fair

elections. and, in fact, that was something that in the election campaign in the u.s. in the year 2000, the republicans, in fact, criticized the clinton administration. >> host: talking about being fair, one thing that is very impressive about your book is that you are, in my view, very fair in kind of an informed way. one reason you are so informed is that you are not just a scholar, a practitioner, but you actually know. you mentioned in your book where you had many opportunities to interact with yeltsin, but i also know from my personal experiences that you know quite well many members of the russian opposition. one problem with american scholarship is that there are two kinds of people, scholars in of the russian government and

scholars to know the russian opposition. you're one of the few people who know both. let me start with putin. you have written many times. could you talk a little bit about that? >> guest: that is been going on for ten years, organized by an news agency that is now being dissolved, but very interesting meetings for experts on russia. we have had dinner with mr. mr. putin basically every year since then. he is a very impressive political leader, man in charge. you will come to these dinners and give free -- three or four hours of his time answering a variety of questions which not too manyward leaders that i know what do. he never uses notes. he never turns to any of his aides to ask them questions for help. he is particularly interested in economic data and energy. he is passionate about energy. and he is respectful.

he can be sarcastic when he wants to be. he can also they did his own kind of charm. everyone who has met with him on these occasions has been impressed by the amount of time is willing to give to this group of foreigners and his willingness to answer a variety of questions. sometimes even complains that the questions are not tough enough, but that is not surprising. so one comes away from these meetings, i think, with a good sense of the messages was to convey to these russian experts in the outside world, and in that sense i think it is a very effective form, these meetings with him. >> host: how would you compare putin, not just because of his views, but how would you compare putin as a leader, has a personality, to other world leaders you have observed?

>> guest: i have never had exposure to any other world leaders in the same way i have to a putin because i have not had a 3-hour dinners for years. he is a leader. i think that he has become, over the ten year, much more convinced of the correctness of what he is doing. he believes that he came into office when russia was in a chaotic state. the ruble had defaulted. as he himself said, he has restored stability to my great economic growth, at least until 2008, and he has now restored erections place as a great power i think that is visible. i think -- and, of course, on light world leaders and a more democratic system he is less tied by -- there is no separation of power. he, obviously, is constrained to some extent, but not in the same

way, the visible way that many western leaders are. in many ways you would come across as being more decisive than leaders to have to listen to parliament, public opinion and things like that. >> host: i read what some leaders of russian opposition say. it appears that russia today is almost a totalitarian country. there is no fundamental difference between putin and stalin. the democracy is a charade, and that putin. [inaudible] then, of course, you can see that people like stalin, a former kgb agent and self. how would you describe his attitude for democracy and the russian political system today? >> guest: first of all, you

have to go back to the 1990's. again, from what putin writes himself. we talked about democracy in the 1990's. for many, not all, the word democracy has connotations with the poverty, the lack of order, if you like, the perceived chaos i do not -- i mean, and then, i think, you have to look at his own background. he, of course, comes from the kgb. he was in east germany when it collapsed and he also saw -- you know, he had experiences there were the mob, if you like caller is trying to tear down the headquarters of the east german secret police. then, i think, you can also see after words in the 1990's he worked for the mayor of st. petersburg. i think it was quite clear from what mr. putin saw that that also was not a very clean

election. i think that his attitude toward democracy, one has to look at his past and worry comes from. he is not a democrat in any western sense of the word, but russia is also not stalinist russia, even though some people describe it as such. but it is not that. the internet is pretty free. people can express different views. not on state-run to limit -- television. putin is not all-powerful in the way that probably stolen west. he is probably the single most powerful individual in the system which is not very transparent. it is a hybrid system. the groups but different people with whom he interacts and his views he does have to listen to. we can see in economic transactions he cannot determine everything. i think the best way to describe

it may be managed democracy. there are elections, but they are not free and fair in the same way that we believe they are. and it looks as if the tendency is going toward less pluralism then there was, certainly less pluralism under putin then yeltsin, but it is very hard -- neo patrimony of state is the way a lot of people describe it. the very close relationship between economic and political elite, but it is a hybrid system that i think we still have a long difficulty in understanding exactly how what works. >> you can watch all of the programs featured of the past hour or numerous other programs on the topic of russian foreign affairs at our website, booktv.org. here is a look at some books being published this week. c-span latest book recounts over

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>> next on book tv new york's university economics professor william easterly talks about the failure of the united nations and other organizations to reduce global poverty cents world war ii. the program is from the rand corporation in santa monica, california. this is just over one hour and 15 minutes. [applause] >> thank you so much for that warm introduction. it is a pleasure to be here. i want to talk today about something that has