houses to them. and then their daughters were raised to work in the house with them. they were tutored and their minds were taken care of but they helped in the house and there was wash day and i explored that with betsy cranch; daughter of mary cranch. abigail brought two servants to europe and she thought that was fine. this is a woman and man i trust and they can take care of everything. and then she arrived in paris and found out someone does our hair, someone puts your dress earnin somebody does one room and someone cleans another room.

so she was very resentfull and said this is ridiculous and i have to pay them a fortune and it was outf of the money they were being paid. >> how did abigail handle the son's alcohol problem? >> she didn't talk about it. two things you didn't talk about and one was alcoholism. her brother died from alcoholism and when her son was ill all they said was he was a problem. it was clear he was dying. she dealt better than john. john said i will have nothing to do with him. but i found a wonderful letter from john to their youngest son after charles had died saying my loosing the presidency is

nothing. i would never have been president and i would have given my life itself for charles to live. so you know how deep the afffection was but it was a horrible thing. and if anyone coughed, you just ignored it. if they sneezed, it was all right. but if you coughed it might mean you had tb. so you would never mention, particularly in a letter, someone was coughing. you might say they have a fever and down the road you would find out -- i mean just the personal had to be just about dead for people to say that is consumption. ...

oyster kate grandma there, there was a lot of spirit in her mother as well but it is easier to have respect and easier as a grandmother to be more forgiving than as a mother but the other statistic didn't. mary was always helping her mother and when mary got married to, elizabeth for a while, when the parents were all right, elizabeth left, john and abigail, but it was quite soon

and she had to be home taking care of them. >> they believe in starting a precedent? to set a new example? >> what kind of life? >> decision in life. >> that is interesting. childhood. all the different stages matter. for my knowledge of children, you make one impact before they are 6 or 10 or whatever and when they run out of lessons they

have forgotten everything. i am surprise to remember something. they did the best they could as parents, they were strong parents, and some of them turned out well and some of them didn't. [applause] >> thank you so much for coming. >> that was diane jacobs on booktv. for more information visit the author's web site, diane jacobsauthor.com. >> up next we bring you mark johnson's radio show, he into these participants in the 2014

colby military writers symposium. appearing on the program are douglas macgregor, warrior's rage, the great tank battle of 73 eastern, john borling, author of "taps on the wall: poems from the hanoi hilton," jack segal, former nato adviser in vietnam veteran and logan beirne, author of the 2014 called the award winning book "blood of tyrants: george washington and the forging of the presidency". this is just under two hours. >> your phone calls, radio vermont presents the mark johnson show. >> thanks for tuning in, thanks for spending part of the day with us. coming up on the program we are broadcasting live from norwich university, we are here at the cold the military writers symposium. it is a great honor to be here. this is an event we have had the great fortune to broadcast for the past of living years and is

one of the events i look forward to in the first of the broadcast year. we want to thank a bunch of folks, and what we are broadcasting from a beautiful facility build five or six years ago that i would very much encourage you to come down and visit. it is a great pleasure on the mark johnson should have our friends from c-span who are going to be filming our program today. we will keep you apprised of when that might be showing. what an honor. as somebody who holds brian lamb in the highest regard, the founder of c-span, if anybody out there i ever tried to model my interviewing on it is brian lamb, he is the master of the short question and for him it is all about making the guests looked good and i will do my best to make that happen. we will not be able to take phone calls this morning due to some technical limitations, but we do hope that you kick back

this morning and enjoy our broadcast. we have an incredible line up. i want to say one more thing about the event before we get to our guest, this was an event that began in the mid-1990ss, dedicated to former cia director william colby who was a real force early on. this is so valuable about this event, this is a military institution. when i was first invited here my assumption was this was going to be an event that was going to be a series of guests that were nothing but pro-military, and i have found it to be exactly the opposite. you got to give the folks, general richard snyder and the rest of the leadership lot of credit for making this event happened because what it really is all about is providing guests who challenge the status quo, the make this a 3-dimensional discussion and the bottom line is they try to get the message across that war is the last resort and i have to say i have

been impressed with the quality and criticism that they have allowed in this university from some of the guests. we have a great line up and we will conclude the program at 10:30 this morning and talk with jack segal who served on the national security council, an expert on the ukraine, he will talk about whether the ukraine is the next cold war. in our second hour this morning we will talk with the colby award winner logan beirne who has written a compelling book about george washington. later this hour we meet who i am sure will be an incredible man, john borling who spent 6-1/2 years at the hanoi hilton and has written a compelling book talking about the poems he was able to tap out at that facility. we begin this morning, a warm welcome this morning to somebody who will just fit right into what i was just talking about, challenging the status quo. a warm welcome this morning to

colonel douglas macgregor, author of "warrior's rage: the great tank battle of 73 easting". thank you very much for joining us. how are you today? >> great, thank you. >> i want to begin where you begin which is challenging the decision by george bush i to not go into baghdad to not finished off the republican guard. you say this decision in fact lead to the 2003 invasion. let me read one short paragraph. just as world war ii began where world war i operation iraqi freedom ended where does it sort ended in 1991. despite its initial success on television reminiscent of the first gulf war americans eventually discovered operation iraqi freedom was fundamentally flawed. the negative assessment is an insight not easy to develop. why do you feel the way you do? >> guest: in both cases in 1991

and subsequently in 2003 there was no coherent strategy. no one sat down and said what is the purpose of the intervention to begin with? what we're trying to achieve? how do we best achieve that aim and finally, what do we want things to look like when we are thrilled? we call this in military terms purpose method in state. it is a very basic framework that you are taught early on to apply to planning operations yet there is no evidence anyone at the strategic level either in 1990, 91 or in 2003 did. >> host: when you talk a battle 73 east, it was a bloody affair. >> the 73 easting is very interesting. first of all, understand what that means, it refers to a north/south grid line and we referred to north/south redlines as eastings in the northern red line that -- we talk about 73

easting as in a desert that is essentially flat, there's nothing out there you could identify. you can't point to a town or river or something. the only thing you could say is the 73 easting is where the collision largely occurred so we call it the battle of 73 easting. it was inside iraq a little north and a little west of kuwait. in the flat open desert that otherwise no one would ever have known. >> host: you write that it was quite a challenge. >> guest: we have to be careful. what we have to understand is on the 26st of february at 4:00 in the afternoon we had been periodically held back for several days. you could have covered with the unit that i was applied to -- assigned to, i was in cougar squadron, the second squadron, turned out to be the lead element in the 7th core across southern iraq. we could have covered that

territory that we took three days, 120 miles, probably in 6.5 to 8 hours and we were very frustrated because constantly we were halted and halted. there was an emphasis at high levels on traffic control, moving everything that you own very slowly forward. it really resemble world war i, moving thousands of troops on line across this battlefield. announce -- around 4:00 in the afternoon when coming got a heavy sandstorm and we knew we had already driven through lot of artillery. we encountered lots of enemy outposts, we knew we were in what the soviets would call the security zone so we knew we were going to make any contact but we were being held back and when we were finally released to move forward we were given no other unlimited advance. another of these reliance, but as chance would have hit the

people at high levels who were trying to micromanage us were unaware that their picture of the battlefield was inaccurate. it was a sandstorm, nothing was flying, they had no idea with any specificity what was out there and we collided literally with a brigade of about 2500 iraqi troops, a republican guard brigade, this brigade was at 100% strength because it was actually the rear guard the attachment because most of the republican guard sadly had already escaped because of this very slow ponders advance across southern iraq. we collided with this and broke the back of this brigade within 15 minutes. it took another 40 minutes to complete the job and once again we had to hold because we ran out of things tissue. i was leading the attack and realized there was nothing else out there and so i said cougar squadron this is cougar 3, we

have a halt so this whole juggernaut of 1100 men came to a halt and i called eagle troop which was the main attack. i had placed them there and i said find out where we are, we had no idea where we were and that came up 73 easting and we were halted and subsequently an hour later i was ordered to withdraw and became unglued i was so furious. why would we withdraw after we just won this battle. why not exploit it? and i got into an argument briefly and finally the deputy regimental commander who is a great man named steve robyn was in the regimental headquarters and said tell douglas macgregor to see where he is if he thinks it is a tour. we had two cavalry troops, 125 men each with the rest of the squadron behind us an artillery battery on this peninsula. it looked literally as flow probably two or three miles in front of the rest of the regiment which had halted as

they had been ordered to and we stayed there and sustain the number of counterattacks, we ultimately lost one bradley fighting vehicle struck by iraqi fire and the crew was wounded, one man was killed. that was their only loss but again we were halted and once we halted the enemy had a chance to shoot at us effectively. as long as we were on the move and attacked on the move we were almost in vulnerable to enemy fire. we probably killed, estimates vary, 1200, 1800 men, destroyed 70 tanks, probably 100 armored fighting vehicles so it was not an even fight. we really annihilated them and they stunned to see us because we came out of a sand storm from a direction they didn't expect. >> host: we're talking with colonel douglas macgregor about his book "warrior's rage: the great tank battle of 73 easting". at what point did you find out that you were going to stop, that you were not going to push even further and try to annihilate the republican guard? >> we sensed that this was the

case probably at 8:00 in the evening. this was four hours after the initial assault. we were told that we would eventually going to reserve status because the divisions that were behind us would move through and, quote, complete the task. what i did not know at the time was most of the republican guard was already gone. they had begun withdrawing 24 hours earlier and again, we had had this long, long punishing air campaign and the assumption was that the air campaign would destroy iraq's command and control, dismember the force. that wasn't the case. saddam hussein had absolute control of his forces and was able 24 hours earlier to make the judgment it was time to leave and he was most concerned about republican guard, 80,000 men. they had the best equipment, the most reliable troops and i would argue they were the only ones who actually fought. he got them out.

we had been so slow and i say we, i am talking about the senior officers. general franks, core commander and general schwarzkopf in saudi arabia and most of what happened was on auto pilot. each service, army, navy, marines, air force, he wasn't really a hands-on commander and all of the senior officers were vietnam veterans who had a picture of war based on their experience in viet nam which was completely irrelevant to what we were doing and they didn't understand in my judgment what a brilliant force had been built in the 70s and 80s and the air force generals understood that they had enormous advantage over the opponent but on the ground both the army and marine generals understood they were facing an enemy comparatively speaking of the not present real resistance. >> host: how close do you think you were to getting rid of the republican guard? how much more work would it have taken? >> guest: we should have gone into the pursuit immediately.

there is no reason we should have stopped. we rain excellent condition, we lost one vehicle, one killed and a few winded and frankly speaking when you lose the man like that you lose soldiers in combat, you want to vindicate the effort, make the loss worthwhile so we very much wanted to continue the attack but it was obvious there was no interest in that. everyone seemed to be interested at high levels in ending this as soon as possible, declaring victory and taking vows for this great achievement they had nothing to do with. in fact a friend of mine after it was over, 73 easting is a larger battle and what they are in. victory has many fathers, we are victorious and i never saw anyone who out ranked me, and --

>> host: how do you draw the line? had more effort been made in gulf war i that gulf war ii wouldn't have happened a lot of people feel gulf war ii shouldn't have happened no matter what. how do you draw this line? >> a couple things to consider. in 1991 you had an opportunity with very little force with saddam hussein. this man was almost universally unpopular inside his own country popular -- country to put to the belief. brigade commander and few surviving members of the iraqi republican guard brigade actually spoke to us in english at the time. i am standing here at 8:15 in the evening, so many fires burning and so many secondary explosions that it is almost a light at night and he says to me in perfect english, why are you stopping? you must go to baghdad. you must end this. you must remove this man saddam hussein.

he killed our best generals, he tells us, he needs to go away. i of course was quite struck by this. it turns out this man had been at fort benning during the iran/iraq war and receive instruction and training when we were backing saddam hussein against iran. you could have removed saddam hussein without a great deal of difficulty and turned it over to other generals in the iraqi army were patriots and interested in being read of saddam hussein. the problem is in the united states the people at the top 5 in very absolute terms, in terms of if we go into iraq we have to occupy it. why? the history of occupation in the middle east is disastrous for any european army. it is the bucket of water. put your hand in as soon as you withdraw your hand the water returns. >> that is what we ultimately did. >> in 2003 we all knew in 1991 as we breathing in may and june of 1991 we stood around and looked at each other and set in

ten years we going to be back because saddam hussein was not going to run. to was not going to back away from the policies he had pursued. was no surprise in 2003 when i was approached by newt gingrich and actually was in 2002 to began planning intervention in iraq. again as i went forward and put together the plan which was largely adopted and was sent down to see tommy francs who was then in command to talk to his inner circle two things became clear. first of all we don't want to occupy, we simply want to remove this inner circle at the top because to occupy is an invitation to disaster. who wants for an army in their country. if you occupy north philadelphia where i am originally from with the army and marine corps after a month we would have shot at them too. you don't want foreign entities in your neighborhood. the second part was it wouldn't take a lot.

we bombed this country on a scale of the second world war off and on for the previous ten years so we did need to bomb anything. and in the iraqi military would cooperate with us. it seemed pretty straight forward. all of this subsequently changes and i think as a result of dr. w wolfoitz and others in the administration determined they were going to transform iraq into a liberal democracy, friendly to the west and is real and so forth and so on. >> host: a lot of what you are talking about happened after 9/11. did you say to them did you feel that it made sense to do some sort of limited invasion into iraq or no invasion at all because it didn't have anything to do with 9/11? >> it had nothing to do with 9/11. i always understood the 1991 war

was the unfinished work which is really what this book is about. the unfinished work, the war we did not finish. we didn't finish it as world war i ended the combatants were exhausted so there was no possibility of pursuing a. that was not a case in 91. we had this brilliant force on the ground, in the air, we could have done anything we wanted. is the unfinished war. 2003 it was clear to me that saddam hussein was facing the very high probability that sanctions would be lifted. and the assumption was when the sanctions are lifted he is going to return to his pursuit of building weapons of mass destruction primarily -- you go back to pursue a nuclear weapon and he enjoyed a strong position particularly with the russians, the french and many others who wanted to get their money out of him. to restore the oil and gas industry. he knew they would be very happy to help him and in return he would go back to the weapons of mass destruction so there was good reason to remove him.

there was no nuclear weapon in the country. that was all nonsense and this mushroom cloud business was completely unnecessary but the larger problem was the notion of liberation. it was liberation but only if you didn't occupy it. if you let the arabs do it, allow arabs to govern themselves and that opportunity was thrown away and you get a disaster. there are people making an excellent argument that we didn't need to go in at all. we could have waited and if he returned to nuclear-weapons or tried to build them, deal with that as it came. that is a legitimate position. i wasn't asked for my opinion. of the tests specifically as a colonel on active duty, how would you do this? and i said this is not difficult, this is not hard, this is how you would approach it, two maxis of advance, armored force, bring in light infantry, once baghdad folds but i encountered all the senior officers who imagine there would be some great war. it will be 90 days before we reach baghdad.

i said you should be there 96 hours. that is impossible. no it isn't. what if they shoot at you on the way in? drive around them. pick of the iraqi army as you find them, bring them along. we had been with trash bags full of cash in afghanistan, pass out the cash, the afghans joint u.s. of we would. we probably didn't even have to do that. we should fly iraqi flags. should be liberation of iraq by iraqis with us in the background. and we get this clerk that is responsible and eliminate them but that didn't happen. >> host: we are talking with colonel douglas macgregor. when i read your book you sound very angry. is that a fair characterization. >> we were angry collectively. one reason i wrote the book, 1100 men in the battlefield, for things that they never got any credit. i wanted to go through and as you described the battle give people credit for doing things because one of the things you

learn about real war is you don't micromanage battles. essentials the an armored cavalry squadron of 1100 men, 42 tanks, 41 bradleys, eight self propelled guns and hundreds of other armored fighting vehicles is a cruise missile that you launch at the enemy. then it is up to the soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants and captainss to make good decisions, to think and act on their own understanding what our objective is which is to destroy the enemy. they did that brilliantly. the book is a testimony to the extraordinary brave, courageous and exceptionally well trained soldiers, lieutenants and captainss, that had to be written. people need to understand that but they also need to understand the scene of leadership failed miserably, and unfortunately they manage to failed the game when we went back and the rest is history. >> host: that is the lessons learned, don't trust the senior

politicians? >> guest: politicians have defaulted to the senior generals? the generals forward, say yes, and implementing policy, the general office requirement. they really didn't want to fight any more. they will not anxious to do it. they were quite happy to occupy once the fighting ended. that is a different proposition. they are very risk averse and we tend to cultivate people and personalities that are risk averse, will do nothing rather than something and you get promoted to higher levels not by doing something but by going along, questioning nothing and effectively repeatedly demonstrating your unconditional loyalty to, quote, the boss, whether the boss is a civilian or another four star. >> host: what is the reaction from people you are criticizing? >> guest: the generals are very

unhappy about being exposed. that is something they don't like. the point is the real culprits i am talking about are the senior ones and unfortunately they have not liked the book and have done what they could to suppress it but it has been extraordinarily successful with soldiers, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels and many generals, some who are retiring agreed with that but again, they have to be careful what they say for fear they will be cut out of the club. it is very important for americans to understand the problems we do have in the military, organizationally, structurally, policywise are not at the lowest levels. the most professional, the most capable people in the armed forces are at the lowest levels. the problems begin at much higher levels because their self-interest takes over. >> host: you have answered part of the image, after the wars,

what have we learned from iraq and afghanistan and what is the future role of the u.s. in our military? talk about the second part of that question. >> first of all americans have concluded that we have over used the military instrument over the last i would argue 23 years, ever since desert storm which was this bloodless victory presented to the american people as evidence for our capability to dominate the world with military power. we have been intervening all over the world of all sorts of pretexts, haiti, somalia, bosnia, kosovo, afghanistan, iraq. and the results are universally bad because inevitably we turn every intervention, whatever the justification for the intervention may be into an exercise in exporting liberal democracy as a bayonet point. exporting liberal democracy with military power doesn't work very well. you are going to talk about washington later on, washington

and hamilton said america's mission in the world is to be the engine of prosperity and as we demonstrate our prosperity and success because of the republic we built and our enormous economic wealth, they want to work with us and ultimately may imitate us. absolutely oppose the idea of using the united states army and armed forces to intervene in someone's country with the object of installing liberal democracy. i think we learned that doesn't work. the american people understand it. people in washington haven't figured it out and that is why you saw an attempt to bomb syrian. people stood up and said what? for what purpose? i go back to purpose. those are the critical questions in military affairs that are not asked, they have to be asked. we shouldn't go anywhere unless we have satisfactory answers to

those questions. >> host: appreciate it very much. colonel douglas macgregor is the author of "warrior's rage: the great tank battle of 73 easting". before you run away we want to give you a bad as we will with any from vermont, the company. thank you again. appreciate it very much. we will take a short commercial break, broadcasting live from norwich university, we are here at the colby military writers symposium. back right after that. >> rubin and his team have been creating -- >> thank you for your time. and i t specialist. we go to him. [inaudible conversations] >> any situation we run into,

customs service is great. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> you are a legend in your own time. >> you look exactly like your

picture. not many people can claim that. >> that is the problem. i look like my picture. >> before we go any further, before i ask a question and you don't like me anymore. >> in you were in the military? >> i was not. i was born in 1960, right in between all of that. two -- too young for vietnam and too old for everything else. >> best wishes. >> more time to play. >> have you been here before? >> never. i had a problem being invited back in but i already appeared once. cleared the room. if you want something simple you

have got that. >> i know more. >> have you done research? >> oh yes. >> find the perfect birthday gift. >> all right. >> collectible plush creatures with a unique online code and if you have spring fever we have the cue. >> i will ask you to read. >> i will do a piece of it. not the first time. >> we are broadcasting live at norwich university, the cold the military writers symposium, this is an extraordinary event, want to remind you coming up tomorrow afternoon there is a panel discussion that will be on the topic that i just was asking our last guest about, the future of war and the future of the military at 1:00 tomorrow. what a great honor.

let's give a warm welcome to major-general john borling this than 6.5 years at hanoi hilton and put together this incredibly compelling book, "taps on the wall: poems from the hanoi hilton". thank you for joining us. how are you? >> you don't expect a fighter pilot to write poetry. >> i don't know, the thing i can't figure out more than anything else, you have poems in here that are extremely lengthy that you complete the remembered in your head. >> guest: created first and memorized and when through the walls so my wife and little girl who was three months old when i left, 7.5 when i walked in the door might have a legacy in case i died. i didn't die, buried the book for 40 years because it is a piece of my soul but in fact is you have already said, had to make time, run that answer race and won a way as i did it was by creating this verse and tap it

through the walls but buried the book for 40 years and thanks to john mccain for doing the forward and people are urging me after all this time to publish this book which was a piece of my soul. >> host: how do you remember? how were you able to recreate that? >> guest: necessity is the mother of invention and i returned to the notion you have to make time, i missed the ability to compete, to be out there doing things. after i recovered from my injuries, the early years were very hard and a student of the war knows that so you had to have a chain of command, let people know you were alive and tapped on the walls, the tap dozen the book, and the master the tax code. >> let's describe how this works. it works on not 5-5 matrix.

>> 12345, gee would be 222, k drops off by the way so it is 25 letter grid, you would be surprised, 30 to 40 words a minute we could do that, a lot of abbreviations and in fact -- [knocking] >> i just typed g b c. 12345. for those few who are adept at it and recognize it, we didn't have many of the abbreviations that i used today. we didn't have l o l. >> you retesting me to see a fine new. >> absolutely. >> host: tell us about your experience when you got shot down. you were flying -- >> guest: f 4 will morris, no rescue possible. got out of the jet under adverse circumstances, miracle to

survive, hit on a hill, rolled down this hill, hundreds of miles an hour and ended up at the bottom of the hill with a broken back, sprayed everything, couldn't walk, crawled into a lot. they were all around me, passed out. they moved on up this hill to save my life, this till the by rolled down and had to break all the rules and elected to try to hijack a truck. and i had a six gun in my pocket and got out in the middle of highway 1 and klaus tivo like, got there and stared down the truck because my thought was i would have this guy breaking all the rules, take me to the coast and steel of boat and then they give up and that is not an option. >> host: there was one problem. >> guest: you've done your homework, as your reputation precedes you. you don't go in asking questions you don't know the answer to sell i commend you for that.

i made a slight mistake, hijacked truck of north vietnamese regular troops. cell management decision i have reviewed on occasion. >> host: what happened next? >> guest: stripped nude except for combat boots. i was wearing a ring, a wolf's head ring made of a dental metal, it is a world war ii wing and c a b 24 type, and the bulls said wing got out on the be 24, spent 22 months as pierre dubyas install and reform. he gave me that rain and said it is a get me home ring as i am lying in the road nude, last thing that came off my dog tags

was that ring. a celebratory ring, the officer, made by bombardier, he gave it to me but the rest of the story, paul harvey like, tapping on a wall one day, new guy moved in next door, you don't have windows, don't have the trappings of hogan's he rose and tried cap back john borling here, pop kern was really old, might have been 57 or 58. and he said hi, dick, and i said no. john. he said i was with you, he lived with my uncle as a pow and i was a pow in vietnam. you know what his mission was? he took a flight of 4 f. 4s over a site to see if it was operational. it was.

across from three airplanes. dumb stuff in wars. >> host: we're talking with john borling, author of "taps on the wall: poems from the hanoi hilton". you divide this book into four sections of your captivity. as you were just mentioning the early years were particularly difficult. was it the isolation or something else? >> guest: the isolation for the first four years, physical pain, psychological pain was the norm, we tapped on the walls, that was our lifeline because we wanted people to have our names, needed to have a chain of command so we could continue to be resistive of their efforts to propagandize us and we had to use time. was our lifeline, communicate back-and-forth to fulfil the and this empty days if they caught you, they would hurt you and this isn't modest stuff.

this is reverting punishment of some duration and yet none of us ever stopped because we knew we had one task and it was but most in our minds and i find it so relevant even today, the military just wants us to be proud of them and that is what we wanted. we wanted to return with honor and survival but we wanted it on our terms, our heads of. this book got buried after the war. i downloaded it. that was not a verb in 1973 and/or tape-recorded and left it there for many years and a number of people pressed me to publish and very nice people in new york and chicago, military museum and library got together and this was the first imprint of that library so i am proud of that and being a book of poetry

principally, there is history, and back end stuff and a polo i wrote just for you. taps on the walls, significant recognition as you may know around the country, i do have to make one admission. may i? >> host: please. >> guest: there was a new york times critic apparently, got a nice right of the new york times but there was a person who suggested that i may have on two of the poems created rapid for which i have to apologize to the world at large. certainly your listening audience. >> host: you were truly ahead of your time. wikipedia in orwell behind it, i am not sure. so they will find that rhythm and meter. i do a lot of sonnets in the book and i would hope that the book would read and i urge

people to read sections out loud or pieces of it, read the front end and baxley land dive in and out depending on if you want to laugh or cry, or think. much like looking at a picture you won't have to puzzle over the words. if you want to go down a level two on some of the sonnets, it is like looking at pictures and you have an instant gratification or not, but i do urge people to do it allowed. makes a big difference. >> host: i am fascinated by people's ability to survive extreme situations and what really fascinates me about your situation is it is different than if someone were put in prison for example and you know how long it is going to last. you had no idea how long this was going to last so how did you mentally cope with that a know? >> a lot of the was to stay mentally sane. each one of those sections of the book has some 1-liners and if you look at the first part it

talks about optimists and pessimists. sorry, that is the second part. the dark and bitter stuff. we should comment for your listening group is about flying in the first part and a dark and bitter stuff, the pow stuff, third section is about family, and those kinds of the event flow of great joy and pathos and this long epic poem of 80 pages, southeast asia which talks about all the things i suspect your listeners care about politics, sex, religion, love, hate, war, peace, renewal, self renewal, national renewal but going back to your question, we had optimists and pessimists up there. the pessimists thought we were going to die and they would send the our bodies come. the optimists were convinced that they would send our bodies

home. you are looking stern. that is a very funny joke. gallows humor. to fill the time, i talk french for example through the walls, speak in a french to be dangerous in bars. >> host: at one of your combatants. >> guest: one of the principal revenue share east in 2002. and scamming five minute tour an hour-and-a-half, the guy who greeted him. and did some translation and he handed me back and we work hand in hand in this room and found out throughout that trip up and down vietnam with the delegation that we won the war, the american values and culture is pervasive in vietnam and they are probably our best friends in southeast asia strangely put

perhaps, but often that is the outcome of grinding conflict that somehow an enduring bond develops afterwards and so it has been with vietnam. >> host: i imagine you have an interesting perspective on this perspective on cia, torture, water boarding and all that. >> i have a view, we are americans and we do not torture and we do not treat our captives badly. i think that is very much a part of what we stand for. i will make an exception however, if there is some very reasonable expectation that a person captured has immediate knowledge of something that may cause tremendous harm to american forces or america, that

then given appropriate level of sanction or review and i would say something this serious needs to get to the presidential level is that serious, that he or she would say yes, you may use extraordinary measures because it is so important. but it literally takes that level of authority in my view. otherwise, most combatants don't know very much and we are certainly not in the business of trying to create propaganda. if there's anything we learned from the wars over the years it is that we need to get -- once war is elected the objective ought to be to wrap it up neat and fast because we lose the body politic and the imperatives we go in with. i may comment on that. >> host: john borling is author

of "taps on the wall: poems from the hanoi hilton" calfs. we are going to ask you to read a short section of one of your poems. there is the part of survival where you get through the experience at the hanoi hilton but then there's the survival of the experience when you come back to the rest of planet earth, what was the reentry like? >> guest: for me it was most noteworthy calling my wife who i had no contact with for years, high school sweetheart, almost 51 years married for, tough lady, greatly, her pictures in the back of the book when weaver youngsters starting out and now, she is the formidable and wonderful woman. i called her from clark and she said i am so happy you are back etc.. sounded like we went out for a pack of cigarettes and then the telling question what we going to do next? i set i will go back to fighters and defiant any good wheat

oyster around but if i can't compete with the people who have been out we will get out and i will do something else. i wasn't going to back up or not be able to belly up to the bar. it meant more to me to be within a few months of getting operational, top gun in my wing than anything else i have ever accomplished because it meant i could do what i loved and that was served in the air force and i could do so with credibility and went on as you probably know commanded one of the first 15 squadrons. >> host: you jumped back in. >> guest: jumped back in, go for it. and the book got buried because i didn't want to be a professional pow and talk about these things, my manhood has matured significantly, and leaned on me and these are important not just for me but race to use the time and keep

them memorized, may have changed a few words over the years, people say you change boneyard which is the first poem by davis, alone i walk the desert fence beneath the sky of red along a fence that split the world. chains a heart instead. i reviewed the middle night of man and emotionless parade and through the mesh reviewing stand legends that were made. it goes on and tells the story about what happens as you visit the boneyard. after having created daily going through the entire repertoire are faced a with me. >> host: share with me what was the worst physical experience you had at the hanoi hilton? >> yes i would mind.

i would mind because how many purple hearts do you guys want? kind of a senseless question, 50, 100? by the rules. the method of pain that they used, they were too cool to kill, they wanted to hurt. so rather than go through old torture stories, combinations of combination of rope tricks and restrictive handcuffs and irons and body contortion, or coaxial

cable or fan belts for routine punches and beatings over four years. >> host: was the -- >> guest: when i say daily, that is an overstatement, and if they wanted you to see a delegation they would torture a bunch of people until somebody broke and the guys who broke got to see a delegation. don't describe to me the bravest of the brave, we have this to do the best, make them hurt you encourage you bad and then, don't break. in my case i didn't see a delegation that that is nothing and no criticism of those guys who did were forced to. we must jerry denton recently.

under very hard times. and tapping on the wall i kept it so hot. that was all i could get up, they were all tied down and reach the wall with your hand and he would tap back dying. dying. >> host: was the physical part worse or the mental? >> guest: the physical part was episodic and could stay with you. and at first eddie or privation deal with that because you've been on your buddy's, or keep faith with your buddies, come back and beat you and said something you didn't want to say but they forced you to say, could make you in 30 minutes claiming your entire family were

from outer space and were going to invade and body snatchers us all is not hard to do if you are willing -- it wouldn't take 30 minutes. but the reality is you deal with adversity because you don't have an alternative. what you find out is it is a lot harder to do with success in life. the greeks had a concept, four concepts, characteristics that made up a good man of good woman, a city state or nation, core concepts of courage. it wasn't battlefield at least as i interpreted. corporate types, i added four short of the market. they were talking about encouragement to do the right

thing in life. success is a real tester. >> host: why do you say that? >> guest: it is a rarity of life. you have to deal with things and assume arrogance. you have to deal with exercise power, you have to deal with the fact that your jokes are so funny you could go to an improv act overnight. other temptations come down the road with the trappings of success. we read about the mall the time in the paper and the courage to do the right thing in life is the real test and particularly hard in the face of great success, and the other thing, we are through the hole and deal with that by having commitment out side of self, substantial commitment outside of self. >> host: helping others.

enabling them to help themselves you can't give self-esteem, i don't think you can provide stuff, don't give them a fish, but give them a fish in line. it is the challenge for our nation now that we struggle with the issues of equal to or egalitarianism when i think the essence of the american experience has been and going to make it on my own. and i am willing to help others and willing to provide societal safety net but not one that stays forever. to do that we have forgotten perhaps because of the comfort level and we fail to have the courage to do the right thing and that is despite best efforts which have got to indoor losses and we are going to have some

significant portion of the population fail for fair reasons and foul land we need to make judgments as to how much of our resources and efforts and care factor we devote and you do so by setting extreme cases. if we spend all the money in america to save one child would we do it? and the answer is likely no. it gets into a gradation circumstance about how much do we spend or how much -- we are compassionate people, but i think we need to be a thoughtfully compassionate people with respect to expenditure of resources and efforts and this is a tough spot politically and it is tough personally. ..

>> then they hurt you so bad and all they want you to do is talk. almost out of politeness and they force you not to bend not break. and i remember when they got me to talk, i found a stem in the

back of a jeep and it was hanging up, and it isn't pleasant to remember. they wanted to know -- i was a lieutenant and i didn't know anything about the war. they came in and told me i was an f-4 pilot and the squatter with i was in with the wing and they would ask how do you find yourself to the target area? and in my case i started to tell them about -- i said i cannot tell you, it is a secret. and we want the secret they said. and we will make them hurt you more and they would say well it is the whims and that is a code word. what is that they would say? the wheem plotter and it is

really just a compass i am talking about. you buy it at any pilot store. and i said then of course -- i said i cannot tell you. i said iced tee and that is how you go to true ground speed. we spent a week on -- i cannot remember and then they brought in a couple pilots. that spent a total of 3-4 minutes with me and got very angry and that started another bout. but i bought some time. you go through these things. the harder part was when they wanted you to vilify your country and write propeganda statements and they will torture

you to do so. and they would want you to make a tape or force you to sign something and you don't. so i can remember signing off on a statement and it was if i have caused injury to innocent vietnamese people i am sorry for that. and i went back to my cell and cried and tapped on the wall saying i am a trader to my country. that was the phrase. so you have tried hard to maintain your honor and your honesty with your buddy and when people failed and got hurt they gave them something worse. there was no retrobution but there was understanding and forgiveness because we were honest with one another. we wanted to come home and we did our best and in 99% of the

cases it was difficult time served with extraordinary men. many of them gone now. i continue to march. i am most fortunate and give thanks for that routinely. >> host: does it make it uncomfortable someone like you holds me in hire esteem because you survived what you did? >> guest: i don't like the term hero being used. >> host: i didn't go that far. >> guest: no, i know. i think medal of honor guys -- that is where hero is. we use hero so much it cheapens the term. there is a gradation of being in the military and you are utin combat you are lesser and if you

are in com president bat and not wounded you are the lesser and at the end have to be killed to be accepted. >> host: they want you right up to the line. would you share with us your epitaph? put down the book and you put it in my hands. do you want me to read along? >> guest: you picked the poem out of the dark and bitter recesses of the heart and experience but here is it. at this time i was living in a room that was probably 6x8, nole walls, windows or ventilation. you had another guy from time to

time. when days of dim hope and bord n abound, and halfless in the desperate sound of emp tty tap code conversation. when the heat is so hot and the cold so cold you think of your youth and how you have grown old now lived confined at life's lowest station. when the floor is furrowed by tired feet and life slips away against the pounding beat, you trudge on in the dark desolation. and the poem goes on for another 10-15 versus in a similar way and it ends up when years have past the many decembers, and no one knows, and no one remembers

the sound of your voice, your face or your name. so you dream of steel charges and skies to roam, mostly you dream of just going home. but you dream out hope and conviction. i tapped that through the walls to the guys. and sometime later they came back and gee, thanks a lot for that one. we have suicide pact going on down the way. would you like to join? the thing with poetry is you will laugh, you will cry -- there will be one you will cry over. but you will think, too. i want you to come away -- what is that thing once more with feeling.

i tried to be honest in the book as i was with my fellows. and just to keep marching skwf that is the clarion call for the day. with whatever wisdom we can summon often it comes in the form of questions other than pronouncements. i am leery of pronouncements but sure of questions. thank you for letting me with you. >> host: that is john borling and his book is "taps on the wall: poems from the hanoi hilton": we will be back at the colby military writer symposium after this announcements.

>> guest: my direct background was as the first u.s. counsel

general in russia. came back to the states with my wife and went to work first as the -- >> host: we are back and broadcasting live. let me remind you about our sponsor. jet service envelope and thank you for the folks who have been going to see them. just got another e-mail from them saying another client. if you have printing services get it done at 229-9935. we want to encourage you to use a local internet service provider. green mountain service is the one we use. you can find them on the web at gmavt.net. we are broadcasting live from the colby military symposium and

a reminder at 1:00 there is a talk about what we are learned from the past war and the future of the united states military. let's welcome jack siegel. he is not an author but may have a more useful role for us today. jack is an expert when it comes to the ukraine. he has served as a political advisor to the nato joint force commander and was initially going to talk at the event and talk about afghanistan but because of the events with russia in the ukraine an audible has been called and he is going to talk about ukraine and the next cold war question mark. tell me about your work with the national security counsel? >> guest: i went after serving in russia and moscow first and

central russia. i was one of the four directors for russia, ukraine and urasia. i served as the director in muldova and poland. i game to go-to guy for the western slavic countries. the situation at the time was back after the collapse of the soviet union but the last prime minister was lazerinco and he is just finish up a six year prison sentence for money laundering here in the united states. and he reflects a trend that the

wonderful people of ukraine have suffered from for more than 20 years of mismanagement, bad government and corruption in the most extreme forms. >> host: two military services in vietnam? >> guest: i was drafted and turned into an officer and sent to the third bir gade on the cambodian border. but a sergeant walked up and said sir, you are in charge, but i have been here seven months and if you let me help you we might get out of here alive. >> host: what is the enduring experience for you? >> guest: i learned i needed to learn more history and how political decisions are made.

i also decided that a military career was a huge advantage for me and an opportunity for me to learn to conduct myself as an officer, to lead people, to motivate people and motivate byself. and focus energy on what was important at the moment in a combat situation it is a very focused thing. but in life in general, you always have to find of keep your mind on the target. and then i decided to become a diplomat and went through the process of qualifying and passing the exams. and i found those skills i learned in the military were quite relevant and the experience was useful. >> host: we are talking with jack segal and she is -- he

is -- talking to us about ukraine. how did you educate yourself about ukraine? >> guest: when i learned i was going to be the director of those countries, i emersed byself in the ukraine history and the other countries i was responsible for. i decided i needed to talk to as many ukrainians as possible. i reached out to communities in the immediate washington areas and cities in the midwest where there were large ukrainian populations and found there were second and third generation americans who still thought of their heritage as ukrainian although ukraine didn't exist as a country until the collapse of the soviet union. so there was a complicated change and that change is still relevant today. people who are more than 20

years old lived in the soviet union and were subjects of the soviet empire and were members of the ukrainian social republic. they went to school and spoke russian at school and ukrainian is something they only spoke with their grandma at home and not even much of that. so after independence you have a generation of young people who think of themselves as ukrainian and they are quite confused. they don't understand the relationship with russia. they don't understand where their loyalty should be. they are in a complicated and difficult position i would say. >> host: go ahead. >> guest: ukraine as an entity.

if you look at an old map you see the ukraine name and it comes from a phrase that means on the edge. so it was just seen by the rush russian empire as being the edge of the russian empire. the russian empire began in the city of kiev and moved to moscow. there is a huge divide in this country of ukraine that we see today. the borders that exist today only came about after the second world war and the eastern part of ukraine is still that part that is on the edge in the russian empire part. the western part was carved out of what was the austrian region. and the divide is religious as well. and the lingustic thing only

came about recently because ukrainian wasn't encouraged in the empire and wasn't used in government offices and schools. it was only in recent years now that ukrainian is the language of ukraine. a lot of ukrainians feel they are ukrainian and not russia and have nothing to do with russia. and that is only those that speak primary ukrainian. people intermarried and were soviet citizens and didn't thing of them in an ethnic way during the revolution. the recent events made that a problem. >> host: talking to jack segal and he is talking about ukraine. it sounds like the two countries

we have been hearing about. >> guest: they are deeply divided and now the leaders on both sides are expanding the divide for their own political purposes. the wonderful people of this country have suffered from bad leadership and we can hope the next groups of leaders will be better, but that is only a hope and may not be based on evidence. >> host: it seems like they will be controlled out of moscow. >> guest: moscow will always have a lot of leverage on ukraine. the dependence of ukraine on russia for gas and oil, but even beyond that for market. ukraine's biggest market is russia. so they are tightly linked together economically.

tom freedman wrote about how the world is getting interconnected and they are more connected in this case to russia than they are the european union and the european union is an opportunity and that is what caused this issue: the i said of choosing between the european union or russia. maybe that was a false choice and they could have done both. but the choice has turned into open conflict, killings and really created a much sharper divide than was ever there. >> host: when you hear vladimer putin, the russian president, talking about wanting to put back together the soviet union. what was your reaction?

>> guest: a lot of russian citizens and soviet citizens thought that. they were a super power and the only equal to the united states of america. and then they went to become a basket case and we were providing food aid when i went to russia to be general. they were in need of food which is not imagineable how they could not feed their people. they dugout from the hole from the oil prices but more from the strong leader that russia and soviet union have had who takes the reins and make ss all of th decisions. that is something a lot of soviet citizens are comfortable with. they don't have a lot of schooling in democracy and that is less true in east ukraine but

it is true. they don't like the huge upheaval they face either. it was a financial collapse they had they had to go to get to a more economically viable system. they don't have all of the cards. putin is a member of the same flat society that tom freedman wrote about. he has to sell goods overseas and he made one important move already. he annexed crimea and in 1954 crimea was part of russia and then at the time they decided to celebrate an event in ukrainian history by giving crimea to ukraine as a gift. and it meant nothing because the

soviet union wasn't going to collapse. it was 86% russian and a russian base primary. when they absorb crimea back to the russia they also took a million and a half russian voters out of the political system. if they absorb the three or four other cities they will take several million more russian voters away from the ukrainian body politics and you will ensure that the government that is elected in these elections will be pro-eu and nato. so he has a complicated problem on his hands. >> host: isn't that interesting? the topic of the discussion is

ukraine: is it the next cold war? and i am wondering it will be a cold war based on what our reaction is to what is going there. is that fair to say? >> guest: that is fair to say. we are in a space geographically that influenced by russia not dominated by russia. that is not our space: we don't have the resources and military power to confront all of russia's military. ki kissinger says we should make a deal saying russia will never be a part of nato. he said they are looking for the pack they had in the warsaw pack countries but nato is in this

country now so the buffer is long gone and ukraine, bell ruse which has no intention of being part of nato. and the three baltic states which are member of nato and the united states supported even under soviet domination. so those three baltic states feeling vulnerable and poland feeling vulnerable and because they are part of nato it makes it part of our political set. i live in michigan for every billion dollars sent broad doesn't fix our schools or fix our roads. >> host: if you were called in, what would you recommend? >> guest: we don't need to see this as the beginning of a new

cold war. we have to address the fears that putin is stoking that this is another move by nato into one step closer into russia's heartland. we have to sit with putin and discuss that. but right now we are doing something very dangerous, i would say. >> host: isolating him? >> guest: not only that but meeting with him without the ukrainians at the table. this is something that was done over poland before the second world war got going. we have to be careful in discussing the future of ukraine we don't do it in the absence of the ukrainian people. they will have to make choices, too. they have a tough choice set ahead. and they have financial pain they have to go through if they want to be part of the west and

i am not sure if they are ready for that. i would advise we should cool off the rhetoric and shut up with the public broadcast. i saw a statement by a senior official of the government, our government, that said if they take any action against eastern ukraine, if russia takes any action, we are going to be very, very disturbed by that. as if that is more disturbed than very disturb. if we are very, very disturbed what the hell does that mean? excuse me. we have to be realistic about how much influence we have over the situation and how much we are willing to commit to it. there are others, i mean i have a friend who will argue this is a really soft bone they are throwing to putin and we need to be tough and move nato into ukraine right now.

we need to protect and offer membership in nato to ukraine. there is another set of ideas out there and they need to compete in what passes for a political process in washington these days. we need to have a discussion. >> host: what is your message to the cadets here today? >> guest: well, i would say when i first realized the national security council is you are not handed a piece of paper that says in this example ukraine. a blank sheet of paper and what do you want to do about it. you are handled a messy paper with scrimbling on it and says decisions in 1954 -- decision to expand nato into eastern europe and all of these historical events that influence your choices as a political leader

and that is the reality any leader or business person faces -- you don't get to start from scratch. you start with where we are today and you have to look forward and say how can i incrementally improve the situation. i met a guy who circled the moon. we didn't go to the surface but was in the capsule who waited. >> host: collins? who? >> guest: there was a guy name tommy england. he said if anything goes wrong, you don't close off options. and that is what we have to do. the russians play chess a lot. we have to look forward four moves and saying what is putin trying to get here. what do we need to do? we want to play the game or the

game isn't going to happen. but we want to play it in a way that ends in a draw at least. >> gues >> guest: the most likely scenario in ukraine a year from now it will look like what? >> guest: i think that ukraine will have had a series of elections which will not be recognized. the european union will hold back most of the money they are promising because the ukrainian government will be unable to bring about the economic reforms that are needed. so we will be in a limbo situation without really resolving this crises. i always want to add whenever i have the opportunity, we talk about the 99% in the united states, well the 99% has nothing to do with money. it has to do with the fact that 99% of the american public

doesn't communicate their views to the representatives in washington and believe me they keep track of it. they count how many people got in touch with me regarding ukraine and what side of the issue were they on. everyone who is listening can do that right now. they go go to their computer or write a letter to their members and say this is what we can do. they need to register their view. our politician is sensitive to the views of the people. we were going to go into syria and there was a weekend where 80% of the people communicated and said we don't want a war in syria and we didn't have one. >> host: >> host: thank you for your time. jack segal has been talking about the ukraine.

we are broadcasting from the symposium here. let me remind you of our friends at the taylor shop. if you need clothes adjusted, mens and womens, our friend mike has 50 years of experience. but that to work with you. he has done a few for me. he is on the right hand side of route 100. look for the shell station. he is in the next building and open wednesday-friday and opens at 10 a.m. mike at the taylor shop with more than 50 years of experience. we will we back right after this.

>> we are back broadcasting live at the colby military writers

symposium. we want the thank the folks here and general synder and the folks at the sullivan museum. a reminder at 1:00 is the public forum, and there is going to be a panel about lessons learned in the iraq and afghanistan war and also the future of the military. let's welcome logan beirne who has written "blood of tyrants" and this is his book about george washington and the forging of the presidency. congrats! >> guest: thank you very much and thank you for having me. >> host: were you surprised? tell me about the phone call. >> guest: i received the call i won and didn't realize i was nominated and i didn't think i

would be part of that group. >> host: tell us about your background. >> guest: i was practicing law and had this book nagging at me for years. as it started as my thesis and professors told me to expand on this and keep working. and my constitutional law professor and i were having a debate in class about what the commander and chief clause meant and you would think after all of these years we would have an idea. we are still not sure. i thought why don't we look at the one and only commander in chief we had upon radification of the constitution, george washington. so i expanded on my thesis and went back to yale to write the book. >> host: i said to myself when i

saw this don't we know everything we can know on this guy? >> guest: right. we do and there are so many great books out there on him. i wanted to make a twist and see what principles we could learn as commander in chief to form an undering of where the founders were coming from when they said in article two, section two, what were the few words mean to them? and so i was starting to dig into washington and finding interesting things that were not spoken about too much in books. and i don't think it is because i am a special researcher but i think i had the benefit of the digitalization of these materials. the papers of george washington project for example in virginia and they compiled all of these

documents scattered throughout the country and made it accessible. so it allowed me to find interesting lines and track what washington was thinking and saying about different subjects much more easily. >> host: let's talk about your background and your connection to at least one of the founding fathers. >> guest: james madison, the founder of the constitution and that influenced me growing up. my parents would be telling me you are descended from these patriots and that is important. remember this. remember, remember, remember. >> host: not to set too high expectations. >> guest: i hope i am not letting them down. but they said remember and think back to the past and the history where you come from. so i would see things in the news and instantly relate back to the founding era and see what

principles mirror each other. >> host: you take the book forward and try to apply it to some of the contentious things going on today. like george washington and how you treat prisoners of war and torture and things like that. i interviewed a woman about her book about calvin coolidge and she was confrontational with me when i suggested she was having coolid coolidge shoe horn us into the 2 21 st century. but you have no bones you were trying to put a what would washington do today almost. >> guest: what i am getting out is the concept of originalism and reading the constitution based on what the people who

ratified it thought. and there is debate among the justices, judges throughout the country about how much weight to give to that history. i fry to stay away from that. i say the vast majority give it some weight so i am looking into history and seeing what we can derive as general principles. i hope i pull it off but i am earring to though this is how they are thinking about this gruesome subject and i think there is much to learn, but i try not to say george washington did x so therefore x is correct today. >> host: and in your conclusion you try to make that fine distintion but at the same time it is clear to me you are trying to impart some of the messages from the past whether it is torture, the finances of the

country come up too, so what are you trying to extract from washington's time that we should use now? >> guest: absolutely. i am trying to start the conversation and stir the debate and remember where he -- we are -- coming from. one strong narrative for the books and the difference in commenter in chief other than foreign nationals and citizens. so even things like torture and military commissionsory citizen's rights during war time, i find an interesting divide where washington is part of the way into the war and she shows great authority and has great discretion over defending his people, but when it comes to empat empathing the people themselves

he has to defer to the courts. >> host: you write the direct impact of the struggles on modern law provide a practical reason to study the revolution era. i am not trying to oversimplify that washington did x so the modern presidents can do x. but instead i am trying to say the president washington at war time should be taken into consideration. >> guest: we lose sight of where the country started and by bringing the knowledge from the founding era where they defined what it meant to be an american can help us. what struck me when i started writing this was with a quote from washington in which he said the foundation of the empire was laid not during a gloomy age but with the rights were defined and

understood. the united states came into existence as a nation and its citizens should be free and happy than the fault is entirely their own. >> host: that is impressive you remember all of that. >> guest: when you work with this you enternalize it. i am reciting things i forgot about. but you internalize these notions to remember the past and what we can derive from the great period in which we had the clarity of women to be american and sort of, again, not an x-x comparison but take the analogy and principal. >> host: i was interested to read about the development of citizen ship. we take it for granted. but that was a revolutionary

concept back then. >> guest: it was so confusing to them. 20% of the country were loyalist and wanted britain subjects but but we were trained as american citizens and there was even conflict within that because other people thought of themselves as citizens of their state than any kind of nation. in one episode washington asks for his troops to pledge an oath to the united states of america and they come back and say new jersey is our country. so there is conflict about citizenship and we were trying to create what it meant to be a citizen and that unclear at the time of the war. but we did something amazing and revolutionary for revolutionaries and that was define the loyalist were still citizens and largely washington tried to protect their rights

which seems insane if you think about a good part of your population spotting against you and if the were running at him with a gun he would not mind shooting them but when it came to raiding their homes and persecuting them he thought of them as citizens. >> host: i am glad you mention state's rights. you were clear on how much more powerful the states were compared to today. >> guest: we didn't have a national government back then and it was losely tethered the state and the congress had little power and they could not tax and they were dependented upon the state to donate tuplies and troops to the army and this is why one of washington's great frustrations throughout the war was that he was under supplied

because the states wanted to keep the supplies at home to protect their state as opposed to helping sister states. and under the articles of c confederation we we had this revolution where it wasn't working well. >> host: and do you remember where in vermont chase hung out? >> guest: he did go back home to massachusetts. >> guest: i am thinking b bennigton. southern vermont. >> host: i learned some things i didn't know. he was comfortable talking in a small room, but not a public speaker. how come? >> guest: when you think thiof

washington you think of someone with a big voice commanding the room. and physically he was tall and strong and athletic and great dancer. but when it came to speaking, his teeth, he had terrible dental problems and it would garble his voice. he had many illnesses as a child and he had a breathy voice that didn't project well. >> host: and the other thing was unlike everyone in the era where everyone drank excessively in part because the water was bad and you had to drink something but he wasn't a big booze guy. >> guest: he wasn't. you would find adam with his tanger of sider in the morning. >> host: and then at lunch and dinner. >> guest: and then go out to the

pubs and have bowls of rum that quote ducks could swim in. and they were drinking heavily and part was because if you drank the water you could get sick and die. but washington stayed away from gambling, cards, excessive drinking. he would drink wine with dinner but we would try to keep everything unemployed -- with moderation because he saw the country needed to be united. >> host: i didn't know if i should determine if he was a weak leader or a strong leader? >> guest: i think he was extremly strong. i think looking back in the history books that you learn in grammar and high school, you sort of see him as this one dimensional figure who