.. deep and abiding. and what has happened is that all of those people who have given up on america are starting to think that maybe they are not the only ones who feel that way. maybe there is some logic and some common sense, maybe there's hope. and that's what they represent to a lot of people.

i think there are a lot of people who represent the same thing. i'm very much hoping that one of those people come along soon and, you know, who understands the constitution, who understands freedom, what true freedom is all about, who understands how to empower people, who understands economics and the importance of taking the heavy foot of government off the neck of business and industry, and who understands that this is, in fact, a judeo-christian nation with real values. [applause] >> political pundits have defined you as a conservative, particularly following the prayer breakfast. how would you define yourself, politically? >> that easy. i consider myself logical. [laughter] you know, as far as i'm concerned, common sense should be in both parties.

that's why it's called common sense. so you know, you look at something that has been politicized, you know, like benghazi. now, what's the big issue there? a big issue as far as i'm concerned is that we are telling our troops that if you get into a difficult situation, you're on your own. we are not coming to help you, even though we've always had your backs, we no longer have your back if you get in trouble. we are also saying that we don't care if we put you in a place where we can't protect you. these are horrible messages. these are not partisan messages. these are something that should outrage every one of us. everyone of us should want to get to the bottom of that but you have one group saying we've asked all the questions, it's okay, forget about it. how did we get to that place in our nation? so because i want to know the answers to that, because i want

to know the answers to what happened with the irs, excuse -- abuse of government which affects everybody, i don't think that necessarily makes me conservative. i think that makes me an american who understands america and what freedom really is a plot back -- what freedom really is. [applause] >> if this is as you just said a judeo-christian country, how would you govern to include those who are not jewish or christian? >> the same way that we always have. everybody is free to do whatever they want to do. and to try to impose one's religious beliefs upon someone else is absolutely not what we should be doing. but we also need to understand that data goes in both directions, and you know, someone who is an atheist

doesn't have a right to to somebody who isn't an atheist what they can or cannot do, or what they can or cannot say. so we have to be fair but it has to be there in both directions. [applause] >> are you now registered with any of the political national parties? if not, will you? >> i am and have been for many years a registered independent. i have experienced both parties. i have been a democrat. i am quite a flaming liberal democrat, and i have been a republican, quite a very conservative republican. and now i'm an independent. i have voted for people in all different parties. in fact, i don't really even like the party system. i would be in favor of a new law that says people's party

affiliation can not be on the ballot. and, therefore, you would actually have to know who the person was and what you're voting for. that would make a big difference. [applause] >> politics in this country is terribly polarized. is there room for someone who won't toe the line for either party to? >> i think we have to make room. you know, we have to remember, and this is so essential if our nation is to survive as the pinnacle nation of the world, that we are americans first your not that we are democrats, not that we are republicans, not that we are independent. this is destroying us. a wise man by the name of jesus christ once said, a house divided against itself cannot

stand. it never has stated. it never will stand. we are an exceptional nation. some people try to make you believe that we are not. just think about all of those people who preceded you. think about the nathan hale's of the world, teenage rebel, spot, caught, ready to be executed. he says, my only regret is that i have but one life to give to my nation. think about all of those troops stepping over their dead comrades at normandy, being mowed down, not fearing for themselves, but fighting for you. changing the course of the world. those other people who preceded us, who cared about us. and the question is, do we care about those were coming after

us? and if we do, we have to manifest the same kind of courage. [applause] >> you are sometimes described as a tea party favorite, but is there a formal organization that could be defined as a tea party, what does it mean to be a tea party favorite? >> well, i hope it means eating a favorite of ordinary americans who feel that they have a right to say of what goes on in their country. and the reason that they have been demonized by so many is because there has formed an elite group who feels that they are the ones who get to see what everybody else does, and this is a country that is four, of, and by the government. the tea party is saying no, no, no. it's for and i'll buy the people.

they are not a formal organized group. they are you, you, you, you, anybody who cares about freedom in this nation. we love to label people but they are just ordinary americans who want to have a say. [applause] >> from where do you expect to draw the most support? >> honestly, i don't care. [laughter] and i'm serious. as long as i have the support of god, that's what matters to me. i think that one of the reasons that this nation rose to the pinnacle of the world so fast, faster than anybody in history of the world, is because we live godly principles, loving your

fellow man. of caring about your neighbor, of developing your god-given talents to the utmost, to become valued both to the people around you, but having values and principles that govern your life. and if we can regain that, then we truly will have one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. [applause] >> what steps have you taken toward a presidential run in 2016? >> i have taken no steps towards such a thing.

and i've had to tell you, i do not wish that job upon anybody. including myself. have you noticed how people age when they get to that? i mean, after a long and arduous career of your surgery, i was looking forward to learning how to play the organ. and playing golf and learning dueling which is where i bought all these rosetta stone's. but it appears to me that perhaps god has a different plan for me. [applause] >> you know, i don't, i don't -- [cheers and applause] i -- [laughter] i don't know what those plans

are right now. it's to continue to go around trying to wake our nation up and help the people to realize that our strength is in our unity, and we need to stop fighting each other and we need to cool our collective resources -- pool our collective resources. we are very innovative and if we just stop this my way or the highway stuff and work together, we really can be an effective force. and we need to recognize that if we go off the world as the pinnacle nation we will be replaced by somebody else. the likelihood that they will be as benign as we are is extremely unlikely. is go back and read your history books about what the world was like before we became the pinnacle power. [applause] >> you say you are concerned about partisan politics coming up the governing process. your views seem very much to the

right. could you cite any example of liberal or progressive views you support? >> i can cite many evidences of commonsense things that i had the cake, and that's what i advocate. i don't advocate -- for what's insured or for what's liberal. i have a case for what makes sense. and what makes sense for our entire nation. know, if that tends to be looked at as conservative, then maybe people should know that in their own lives. >> a few medical related, health care related questions. you've been highly critical of obamacare. how would you fix the health care system of this country? >> i'm glad you asked that question last nigh -- the most important thing you have in your

health care is in your own hands. so there a number of ways to fix it. but the linchpin is health savings accounts, because you have control of that yourself. we have a number of different ways it can be funded. bear in mind we are we spend more than twice as much per capita on health care in this nation as the next closest nation in the world. it's not a matter of putting resources. it's a matter of using them the right way. give everybody a health savings account the day they are born, and keep it until the day they die. and you have control over that. you sprain your ankle, you need an extra, go to your s. -- agency. birth control pills? hsa. no hobby lobby issues. very few things are coming out of your catastrophic or breach insurance. the costs of that would plummet.

you make it cumulative. in other words, if you don't use it, you don't lose that he keeps a team-leading. if you have a from the time of birth and it's a team-leading each year, the vast majority of people ar aren't using substantl amounts of it well into adulthood, they are acting relating enormous amounts of money. the other kicker is you allow people to shift money within a health savings account within the family. so say the fathers $500 sure, the mother can give $500 out of first, or the sun or the grandmother or anybody in the family. every family becomes its own insurance company with no middleman. incredible amount of flexibility. very few things are not going to be handled that way. there are other aspects of it. american legacy back, just go to that website and you can read all about it. more things are coming out each week. i've been trying to encourage congress that they need to start

looking at some alternate is because the fact of the matter is, anybody who knows much about economics knows that the current system that is the law now i will admit, is unsustainable. it just won't work. [applause] what will eventually happen after the collapse of his people will say, well, let's just have a single-payer system. but we are being proactive, coming out with things that everybody will be able to understand and will be able to see for themselves all the numbers are being worked out, ma that it's much less expensive, ma g. you control. when you control it, then it brings the whole medical system into the free market. that's the you control costs. that's how you control quality. [applause] >> no, dr. carson, do you think the obama administration is handling the va crisis seriously enough? why or why not?

>> no. i think that any type of system that places a large number of bureaucrats between peopl the pe and their care is a bad system. did they mean well? yes. have a work in va facilities? yes. are the many wonderful people there who have dedicated their lives to take care veterans? absolutely. but there's a lot of bureaucracy there. and it needs to be fixed. and it will need to be held accountable. that's one of the problems that i have with this administration. you have to hold people accountable. in the bible, in th the book of proverbs it says it's a rumor hearkens allies, all its servants are wicked. and basically what that means is if you don't hold people accountable, people will observe that in person they will say i can get away with that.

i can do this. so yes, there needs to be accountability. and as long as i'm talking about accountability, it's hard to accountability when you have a government that is so large that nobody can even comprehend where all the problems are. it tells us that we need to reduce the government. i talk in the book about how to do that in a compassionate way. by attrition. we have thousands of government workers that retire every year to let them go. if we need more workers in that particular area we can shift somebody from another area within five years, you've got a lean and trim and efficient government. we have to create sufficient is as we go. but these are not difficult things to do and they are not things that have to be mean to anybody. again, we use our collective intellect, our collective common sense to start thinking about how we improve ourselves, how we improve our government and stop pointing fingers at each other.

you will notice that i never say horrible things about the president. i may say horrible things about his policy but i don't say horrible things about him or about anybody for that fact. because why get in the mud and act like third graders when we have such big problems to solve? [applause] why did you decide to retire as a neurosurgeon, a very successful one? are there other doctors out there who can do or want to do what you did? >> well, it's very simple. somebody told me that neurosurgeon die early, and i didn't believe it so i wrote down the name of the nest in neurosurgeon i know died, calculate the average age of death, and it was 61. so i said, if i'm still alive i will retire when i'm 61, and i did. [applause]

can you give us more details about the carson scholars fund and the recipients of the money from the fund? >> well, you know, we noticed many years ago when we're going to schools, see all these trophies, all-state basketball all-state wrestling, allstate this, that, and the other, quarterback was the big mr. mckay but what about the academic? what did they get? national honor society 10. a pat on head there, there, little nerd. [laughter] nobody really cared that much about them. and at the same time we were unaware of a survey, international survey looking at the building of eighth grade equivalent also called complex math and science projects. we came in number 21 out of 22. so that was really quite alarming. so we said we've got to do something about this.

so we started giving out skull the awards to children starting in the fourth grade, from the fourth to 11th grade from all background who achieve at the highest academic levels, and demonstrated humanitarian qualities, that they can do that other people. we are trying to develop future leaders. we want to but not just smart by people who actually care about others. in 1996 we started with 25 scholars, and now we've given out over 6200 scholars in all 50 states. we also have a reading room that we put reading rooms all over the country. they are fasting places that no little kid would pass a. we put them at all kinds of places but we particularly target title i schools were a lot of kids come from homes with no books. they go to a school with no library. those are the ones who drop out. to the detriment and to the detriment of society. so they get points for the amount of time they spend in these reading rooms with their decorated, just incredibly fancy

place. talk to my wife about it after. she goes almost all the reading room openings all over the can she. they get points and they can trade them in for prizes. in the beginning they do it for the prizes but it doesn't take long before that shows up in their academic performance. if you get a kid to the point where he enjoys reading, the likelihood of him dropping out is almost zero. these are the kinds of things that we need to start thinking about, anybody who wants to get involved, carsonscholars.org. thank you. [applause] >> turning to another subject, you have shed some of weapons should be banned but you've also said that the second amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear arms. can you explain in more detail how you feel about guns and what do you think this countries gun policy should be? >> once again i'm glad you asked that question. yeah, i think there's some weapons that probably are not

appropriate, like, no, tanks. [laughter] i'm not sure that people should have a rocket launcher in their bedroom. .com you know, conventional weapons, i don't have any problem with. the second amendment is the essential part of our constitution. it's there for a reason, because it would give a populist the ability to sit assist the military in case of a foreign invasion, but more importantly it's there because if we ever have a rogue government that wants to dominate the people, the people will have the ability to defend themselves. we must always protect that. [applause] >> however, however, what i have said which some people have misinterpreted is that in places where there's a lot of crime, with assault weapons, that

keeping the second amendment on the table and always protecting it, we should be able to engage in conversations about it. what can we agree on that doesn't violate the second amendment, but that provide some degree of protection for our citizens? unless we can talk to these kinds of things, we will never succeed with these kinds of things. and one of the things that i've been somewhat critical, particularly conservatives, is they sometimes have these litmus tests and they say, you know, the person has to do this, and i just can't deal with them, otherwise i'm taking my marbles and going home. that is such an infantile attitude. what people have to realize is sometimes you have to be able to prioritize. i think about the story of estes in the bible, you know. she was a jewish.

she sort of kept that hidden, and she ended up marrying a king of the group that was open a singer people. and to some people who knew that she was jewish and they thought that was horrible. how could she subjugate her values and principles like that? she had a bigger picture in mind. and because of her position as queen, she is able to save all of her people. we have to understand that concept, the guns, be it abortion, the any number of things. people have to be in position, the right people, people who have common sense, people who value life, people who value freedom. but if they're never in position they were never be able to do anything about those things. [applause] >> we're almost out of time, but before asking the last question with a couple of housekeeping matters to take care of. first of all i'd like to remind

you about our upcoming events and speakers. on june 11, we will have hollywood writer, director m. night shyamalan will discuss his offscreen campaign to close america's education achievement gap. august 1, we'll have some other speakers in the interim an august 1 with confirmation that we'll have the president of the republic of congo who will discuss peace, security and stability of the central african region and oil investments in his country. now i'd like to present our cup -- would like to present our guest with additional national press club mug. and, dr. carson, if you make multiple visits, you get multiple copts. [laughter] >> thank you very much. [applause] >> our final question, what is your favorite book that is not

the bible or one of your own books? [laughter] i'm going to tickle you with this. it was the first book that i ever read. it was called chip the dam builder. it was about a beaver. it was really what started me on my journey of reading. i mean, this beaver was so wise, and he made this birchbark seem so tasty i wanted to eat one myself. [laughter] but it really sort of got my imagination stimulated. and i read every animal book into public libraries and i went to the downtown bridge. i read all the animal books. then i started reading about plants and then i started reading about rocks because we live near the railroad tracks. what is there around railroad

tracks? rocks. present i could identify any rock, tell you how was formed, where it came from. still in fifth grade at the time, they called me the dummy. one day the teacher came in with a big shiny black rock. anyone tell me what this is? i never raised by him. nobody did. i waded into one of the dumb kids to raise their hand. nobody, so i raised my hand. everybody turned around. they couldn't believe carson has his hand up. this'll be good. the teacher called on me, and i said, that's -- there was silence in the room because it sounded good. nobody knew whether i was right or wrong. he said that's right. i said that's from the volcanic eruption of allowable flows down and hits the water and it cools down -- everyone was staring at me. but i was the most amazed person in the room because it dawned on me at that moment that i was no

dummy. and that the reason i knew those answers was because i was reading those books. and from that point forward, you couldn't get a book out of my hand to my mother would sit benjamin, put the book down in each of the. it didn't matter and it completely transformed my life. that's the reason that we are so passionate about giving our young people to read now and to value education. because that is what will save our nation. thank you. [applause] >> i do like -- [applause] >> we are running out of time. i'd like to remind everybody to remain seated so that we can get dr. carson to the lounge where you'll be pleased to sign copies of his new book, co-authored with his wife.

and there are still copies available outside in the ballroom corridor. i'd also like to thank national press club staff, including its journalist of institute and broadcast center for organizing today's event. also if you'd like to get a copy of today's program or to get more information about the national press club, please check out our website at press.org. thank you all for being here today. thank you again, dr. carson. we are adjourned. [applause] [inaudible conversations] ..

>> the house veteran's organization has a hearing to get an update over failure to supply a subpoena. news today that author and poet maya angelo has died at her home. she was very active in the civil

rights movement and was well known were her memoirs and delivered the inaugural poem at the president's clinton swearing in ceremony and in 2011 president obama awarded her the presidential honor of freedom. angelou passing away at the age of 86. the president's statement saying in part that mitchell and i join millions around the world in remembering one of the brightest lights of our time. a brill i want writer, a fierce friend and a truly phenomenal woman. we will have her bock book appearance on her sixth bock set in between the assassination of malcolm-x and martin luther king

junior. and then debates on several issues. the first on gun control and the second on charity. that is tonight starting at 9:30 eastern. >> the problem now is future peace. that is your job in germany. by your conduct and attitude while on guard inside germany you could lay the groundwork of a piece that could last forever or just the opposite. you could lay the groundwork for a few war to come. and just as american soldiers had to do this 26 years ago, so other soldiers, your sons might have do it another 20-odd years from now. germany today appears to be beaten. hitler out. swasticas gone. and nazis propaganda off the

air. concentration camps empty. you will see ruins. you will see flowers and pretty scenery. don't let it fool you. you are in enemy country. be alert and suspicious of ev y everyo everyone. you are up against more than scenery of tourist. you are up against german history. >> in the first look at hollywood directors who made u.s. government film during world war ii. sunday at 4 p.m. eastern part of american history tv this weekend on c-span3. >> on the same day the president announced the plan to keep 9800 troops in afghanistan after the

2014 with draw the formal interior administrator says the police force faces challenges but has come a long way. this is two hours long. >> we will get going. i am andrew wild sker. i am the vise president of the central and south asia program here at the institute of piece. particularly thanks to the panelist for joining us. many have come a long way to discuss a topic that i think is important. i am really looking forward to getti getting an update on this issue but i am afraid things haven't changes since the paper i wrote

in 2007 called cops are robbers the struggle to reform the afghan police. i thought i will starled by reading the final paraograph. they are likely to have the resources to refining the police sector they have today and where was wrong on that. this was written in 2007 and after that there was a recognition of response to the police and the resources given to policing was more in that your than the previous last five years together. so there was a recognition and it increased from there. i wrote there is a unique opportunity to move away toward a coordinated long term approach

that stands a greater chance of reforming the task of the afghan national police. it is time to clarify the blurred vision on the role of police in afghanistan and achieve concensus for developing a police force that will operate as cops rather than robbers. i highlighted in that paper key areas that i thought were key to reform in the success of the area. first was the need to develop a shared division and strategy for the afghan national police. we had a major counter insurgency operation from the west and from the south and there was a desire for more boots on the ground and the need for training for the police. we had the europeans in the north leading police reform

efforts who wanted more of a civ civilian police force. and then you had the afghan government that i believe was reformed by the police in the afghanistan. and i would describe that as regime protection. we were too naive, i think, you could say there was an efficient police force around regime. the second big point was making donor assistance on interior reform. unless the issues around the minister of interior were addressed, and some again had a common vision on what the objecive was, and it we didn't have political will, it would be hard to see the reforms and move

forward. prioritize quality over quantity. quick fixes which was the afghan ox police can often undermine objectives. the need for secular organizations which is a huge issue and one of concern as the resources are going downward. but police reform is a political under taking and not a technical one and that has remained a consistent problem. the unwillingness to understand the politics that enter. i am hope to get more good news. there has been progress and i was in afghanistan and observing

on election day north of kabul. there was a lot of violence on election day but what we anticipated it was more peaceful and the afghan authorities deserve credit for that. and the out pour of support aftr the election on social media was a picture of what was done. the girls handing out flew flowers to the afghan police wasn't something we would have thought of years before. i think the police issue is important and we are lucky too an incredible gifted panel of

experts here with lots of experience working on this issue. both in terms of the afghanistan national police but also the local police. i want to do a pr pitch. this event is also to launch papers that we have done on the police. the most recent being the afghanistan national police in 2015 and beyond by mitchell h hueghs and happy to have her. and you look at the afghan local meeting from the people who have joined us. prior to that a year ago we published this with bob who is in the room and john is on the

panel. so we will get an opportunity to hear them present it and discussion following it. it is a great honor to introduce the guest of honor here. the minister of in interior in afghanistan from 2005-2009. he is a profester at the southeast asia for strategic studies at ndu. he had a 20 year career with voice of america covering the middle east and prior to that he served as a colonel in the afghan army. we are anticipating the publication on the military

history he has been working on for years. with that i welcome him. thank you very much, andrew, and good afternoon. i am pleased to open this sessi session. we have a panel of experts and you will learn from them more so from my remarks. i will share a few parts with you based on my experience as i started forming the police and later on that i continue to foll

follow and today when we saw there is protection or security of the first round of elections in afghanistan. although the police have been very successful in providing security of these major events. for example, the security of the constitution in 2004 and presidential and parliamentary elections later on. these are single events and don't tell you about the overall capacity bogue being the force you do on the job that is required from them as law enforcement of the citizens. actually afghanistan national police seize to exist during the civil war.

during the communist rule the police were fighting insurgeants. and in a police state most were shifted to the intelligence service. so that tradition of police we had in afghanistan was being forgotten and before that traditionally in afghanistan few things were helping the police to fraction at the section of the population. one was governance, security and the rule of law. they were all combined together in the center and in the provinces. then, i think, with many years of war and violence they fragmented. governance and the rule of law

fragments. the minister of interior was in charge of local government, the criminal investigation police and the border police/security police. so a combination of these different categories provided a comprehensive plan of security and stability. after 2001, when the international committee stepped in to reform the police and security forces, we saw two major problems. first of all, there were many actors that came with different priorities and procedures and different levels of commitment. and the development of police and secured forces happened while fighting was going on in the country. fighting and building took place at the same time. most of the building in fact was

influenced by -- prior -- to the fighting. that was the major problem in the beginning. however, even if they are doing the building process, it was poorly sourced, coordinated and fragmented at the same time. in 2003 when all district governments, border police, and municipalities were under the minister of interior, the budget was $127 million a year at that time. that is a fraction of what happened after 2009. after 2009, the budget of training afghan national security forces was $1 billion a month. i wish we had a fraction of it

in 2002. it would be different. in that time a police officer was drawing $16 a month. if you don't pay the police well, they will get themselves paid by shaking down. that was the beginning of the major corruption in the police force. however, at that time, i had to remember in order to move from kabulto other provinces we had to news people's vehicle. the police development and reform was going on in the context of security sector reform, a broken uncoordinated system. different countries same to take one part of the security sector.

they came with different levels of commitment, different levels of resources and also priorities. afghan national army did well because it was well funded by the united states. it was slow but good. police nation was with germany and they were the god father for a long time however germany wanted to build the police as they were law enforcement but many other donors were looking at the security force. just the sector was being built by another country was italy. some by the united kingdom and nddr by japan. the system wasn't coordinated by the different country. at that time, police could annex violators but the next day the

justice system wasn't working so they would go loose. that is why the justice system and police were not coordinated well. however, since 2009, we saw that there was a more interest investment in police and that helped. whatever you see today, 140-150,000 police officers started with the serious actions in 2009. now with the context that the police was built in afghanistan was such that what you have today has many many problems as the law enforcement. the major question is what is going to be the future of police? is it going to become an arm of

law enforcement to protect the population or is security force to protect the state? unfortunately, with the surge of violence in 2006 there was a rush to build the police as a security force and that continued until today. today police is a security force but it isn't the kind of force that will resolve or solve the challenges of insurgency in afghanistan. police are the best arms of fighting insurgeants but not as a fighting force. boy protecting the population, win the trust of the population by itself it becomes an asset to fight the insurgency. when i was looking at the

challenges facing the police in afghanistan today i counted to ten and i stopped. the first one was the numbers. they say 157,000 police and then you have it will be to 160,000 but it is an odd assortment of different categories. you have the police force where the uniform police are called it, you have counter terrorism police, counter narcotic police, you have border police, but all together there is no very close institutional connection between them because from day one instead of reforming the ministry of interior we want to force generations of the police. so institutions are weak. each minister comes and make

changes and the next minister comes and he just, you know, makes more changies and there i no contenuity and that started from day one. in 2004, before the presidential election, the contractors were a pleasure to build 40,000 police officers by the october of 2004 date. in order to meet that target they started correspondence -- courses for one week and two weeks and sometimes a couple days and they said they made the target. there were many good contractors

from across the world including the united states. but they were not up to the challenge. they tried hard. many of them were big cops of small towns america. retired big cops. so it was a forced generation and continues to be the case. the third was outsourcing the police or building the police force. one of them is the mini experience with local police or village guards or whatever you call them. some of the experience was not very successful. we would hear about the experience of afghan's police but in 2003-2006 some of the experiences were not successful. the problem is that in afghanistan, local police when

militia or tribal contributions work only when they become part of one system. when that system breaksdo down isn't going to work. so wherever the state has influence, or the tribes or communities believes in the viability of the state, they contribute. otherwise, they go find their own ways. the reason that people in afghanistan are doing the instability, go to warlords, because they do not see the state capable of protecting them. and otherwise in afghanistan, the nightmare is when the state is weak. they want the state to be strong. in 2014 during the constitution

there was overwhelming support for a building of a strong, centralized state. well, but then they went to other options. they are not going to discuss this here, though. the security and focus on security for police weakened other capacities of police. building cases, building evidence for cases is becoming very, you know, ineffective because one police officer today is in charge of a police security function in a province and the next day he joins the investigation police. so there is no institutional con

tenuity of the police. the coordination of international donors is always a problem. and they get contributions from many countries, but it only works when there is a coordination with the priority of the afghanistan government and the priorities the international community with the same. i hope in the future the international police coordination board will become more kind of athoritative to bring that coordination. the appointment of police officers is another problem. it isn't based on their capacity and compitance or their training. one day a general changes uniform from the ministry of defense and goes to become the

head of the police department of a province. and he brings the experience of the military to the police force. this isn't something new from the beginning the minister of interior was loaded with the army officers there. and they were oriented toward security more. there are many other things i don't want to get into. but looking forward, i think the security can establish an afghanistan the future only through winning the support of the successors. and that can happen when police function as a community police. there is no doubt as long as there is insurgency in afghanistan, instability in afghanistan, police will be

forced to do security jumps. but however, two conditions should be established: first, all forces that are providing security, police force, should at the same time should become capable of switching to normal police jobs when the need comes. in the past what afghanistan has used a military force that is deployed across the border and doing heavy lifting but they were first going to become a police officer then they would send to the course to become a paramedic force. this is something we should see in afghanistan, too, if a person comes from the minister of defense, if we wants to be

appointed as police, he has to be trained by the police officers, i think. the continued international support is required for the sustainment of the afghanistan national police. after 2014, when the bulk of the naval forces leave afghanistan, this is going to be a challenge whether the international community will make good on the promises to support and continue to fund the afghan national security forces or not. without that kind of support, without the siding of the united states, there is a possibility that afghan national security forces, including police will not hold together. if there is a particular risk because in some units or some parts of the national security

forces the ethnic balance isn't there. if that force cannot hold together, then it can fragment it along ethnic lines. priorities should be unified in the future. i think where we can do this is a more empowered international police meeting board. the other issue is instead of continued force generation or focus on generations, i think institution reform should take presence over other things. i think it is regretful that in 2006, they re resisted to remove and the discussion of the

government to take the local administration and local governance and gave to another entity. now we have problems we know the governor and police force. as i said stability is the combination of governance, security and rule of law. that fragments in 2006. i think somehow this should be -- now the government is an important person. it doesn't represent the central government because all departments report to the ad ministries in kabul. it doesn't have a budget because the budget of the province is the sum of the department and they get it from kabul.

all of the departments report to the ministries of kabul. that situation should be reviewed and corrected. then, i think, there is a vision now they talk about vision of police in the future, which is good, but as long as the capability isn't build and the current flaws are not corrected, i don't think the vision will be implemented in the future. so therefore, vision can work. unfortunately, in afghanistan, also take pride with papers but there is usually no connection between the ends, ways and means. and finally managing the afghan

local police. it has worked well in some areas. there are two reasons for this. in the south, when the taliban failed to recover the area they lost after the surge, they switched to terror tatics and isolation of influential people and communities. flashback and the people themselves became supportive of local police. you can see it in many areas there, everywhere. many years ago, i think there were more unstable areas but today it is stable because of the local police. in particularly certain districts i have recently spoke with. it has been very successful experience for some.

but at the same time, those who use this idea in order to reempower the militia who are very unpopular in afghanistan, then i think it will fire back. so afghan local police is good as long as it is managed well. and also, it should be also, you know, the plan of how to redo it later on once these afghanistan local police or regular police is powerful. what will you do with the local police? are you going to integrate them into the national police or in the worst case let them go and that is the possibility of seeing another militia.

so key points. first of all the afghan national police have come a long way. it isn't comparable who to 2003. second, the afghan national police is still a security force. it needs to become a regular civ civilian police. it can't happen overnight but have a plan to do it. and finally, unless the police force is integrated with other elements of the stability and security and rule of law in the country, it can't become a single instrument of stability in the country. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you.

thank you very much minister jalali. it is my honor to turn it over to bob perado who has done a lot of work with us on afghanistan and pakistan on police reform and led the secretary reform work here. bob will moderate the discussion. >> thank you minister for your presentation. i would like to welcome you all here. for many years i was here and it is great to be back again. our focus today is looking forward. it is the first 2014 transition of the afghan national police. as you heard from the people this isn't the first transition the afghan national police have

undergone. today we find ourselves in a situation where the afghan national police are around afghan national police 150,000 members and the question is is that the force that afghanistan needs going forward into a democratic future. we have a distinguished panel with us. two of them are authors of new reports and andrew introduced and they are available outside the room. inside the packets is the

biographies of the panelist so i will limit them in the interest of time. each panelist will speak for ten minutes and we'll open it to the audience and this is a group of people who know it well. our first panel began this morning -- we have been together since about 11 a.m. so we got off to n early start. the first is ambassador catherine royal the former deputy ambus basder of the united kingdom in kabul. sean smith is the second and the thornily pan-- third panelist i

mitchell hughes when he is one of many things. finally we will change subject in the middle of the presentation and look at the afghanistan local police. we have two people who have written a report. one is dr. johnathan goodhand and his ph.d candidate who is a co-author of the report and a student at the university of london. we will get started and i will turn it over to ambassador catherine royal. >> thank you very much, bob. great pleasure to be here. i need to preface my remarks by saying i am a member of the

diplomatic service but the last two jobs i have been taken out of the mystery so they can take the blame out of what i will say. i am glad to see people interested. it was a subject where everyone said having a police source is vital to any country and that is a motherhood apple pie statement you can make. it isn't just about security it is about legitimacy and you saw that with ukraine loosing them being legit when the police left the square. we didn't behave in afghanistan

certainly at the beginning and the minister set that out well, we didn't behave like the police was something we knew this was an important foundation for the way we were going on this. so we think it but don't act on it. we found ourselves in the complicated situation of building that institution in the middle of a fight. when you talk about reforming our own countries and trying to do it in the middle of an insurgency they collapse. so we set ourselves with a big task. having sited it was important but nut doing we identified these mistakes in iraq. it wasn't new stuff. when i was head of the ipc secretary and found myself

having to convince a reluctant mta that we needed to work together and have a partnership one of the things someone drew my attention to was a pamplet down at the army center for lessons learn. 2007 good pamphlet called from zero to blue and i was able to get in front of the slightly hostile mta and say the american military identified 13 golden lessons and i would like to say we have proudly broken 11 of them so maybe we should have another go. and so we found ourselves in that situation in 2012 which is really quite shocking. and it explains why this has a long way to go. the most critical lessons i would say that come out in that

pa pamphlet were three. and three of the biggest mistakes are you need to focus on policing early, there needs to be local ownership of the process you are doing and that was looking and it took a long time to understand this was someone else's country and maybe we ought to talk their opinion seriously. and you need to separate the police from the military. the goals of the two are differences. that is the bases of the difference. the old principles of policing by con sent and the relationshi of the countries was vital and not what we were doing. so basic problems. and i would agree with what the

minister said about our misjoint misjointed. different nations picked them up and went forward and you can argue some have done a good job but how they relate to others and the police that is integrated into the the justice system just didn't. fundamental fundamentally, we have not really created an a and p. that is a name and even now you don't join. you join an the border police. you don't have a leaf that you feel your loyalty is to something called the a and p because that is a name. in 2009, a really important new phase in all of this.

i cann i cannot express for what i did and generating the force it did. absolutely extraordinary. when i arrived in kabul people were saying you could not generate the force even. but we did. and an awful lot of work went into that. we would not be able to have the discussion now about where to go or how to turn this into a proper police force if that force had not ben generated in the first place. so i am not coming from the place of they got it wrong. they started us off and gave us something to build on. and i think on the overlooked but most important thing mta has done for a afghanistan on a whole is put literacy at the forefront of training and

development. i would start to meet young guys joining the police and i was talking to people in the training college and saying why are you joining the police? this is a death sentence. i didn't put it like that it was in the back of my mind and a number of them said because i know in my course i will be taught how to write and that brings you into civilian work and you can look after joyour family better. there is something we must not forget. that is an angle that recruits and gets people in the police and it is developing the coaptry. so all of that is good. on the other hand, we didn't build a police force. we build a security force and paramedic force.

we needed to start preparing for the future and i was talking to general alan about this. he said he recognized there needed to be a proper eye out for a tipping point of when the need for security, you know, deminished and you had to go on looking at the rule of law force. i agree to a point. i think the problem is there is no tipping point. you have to start preparing for a rule of law force. there is not a moment when you can say you move from one to the other. you have to have priorities and do it all and shift the balance of what you doing depending on what the activity is going. it is different priorities and balance and places in the country. i think one thing you could say is where there is a less problem of in surgeoncy -- insurgency --

and to look at that earlier on gives you on idea of what it might look like. but we were not able to build the two at ones and run parallel but that is what we need to get to. i became the head because in the run up to the 2012 nato summit, this issue of creating a rule of law force or a para military came to a head, and it came to a head because the non-american donors were being asked for a billion euro a year to finance it but were told they could not influence it. and then they say said we won't

pay suddenly and that stimulated a useful discussion. the results were we need a proper discussion and to tackle the difficult issues. we have grappled with the generation of start and have gone a long way and now we need to look at what kind of police force it will be. we managed not to create a new institution. someone said we have something with the right man dadate. let's use something and bring it back to life and i got the job of doing that. i had limited aims which is just as well because i didn't have a budget for the first five months and had to do things like beg for furniture and i had a stuff made up of contributions and i had great people and then i had

people i needed to entertain but that is the way of the world in international organization. we gave ourselves limited goal. was one to agree, a vision, discussions started on this but had not gotten us anywhere. there were a lot of people who were putting forward their vision and saying that this is what the afghans wanted. it struck me that if we were over going to coordinate national support and get off the plate and coordinate behind anything they want. in 2003 we could have proposed a vision and got it rounded but now in this state it has to be an afghan vision. so we have to have it happen and get the international support

behind it. and the other thing was to come up with implementable plans so it wasn't just this is what we are trying to asspire it was this is what we are going to do about it -- aspire -- and i managed to help the afghans produce a vision in that time and stack it towards the beginning of the planning process that now has finally produced, you know, some stimulator, a set of two-year plans that looked implementible. we have quite a long way on it. the vision is genuinely afghan. i gave the afghans space to do this themselves and once they were given that space they knew what they wanted.

it was rubbish to say they didn't know. and nothing is going to be put on paper was one thing before it was discussed. we have a terrible habit of saying we want to hear what you want and by the say here is our suggestion and that closed down the debate. so we ended up with nothing. so it was we are going in with nothing and we will talk about it. you have no idea how upsetting to was to culture dominating by a power point saying you cannot put anything on paper. we proved we can do it. and there were problems with it. one of the problems was, what i think, as a false dichotomy between community policing and uncoying. community policing isn't helping old ladies across the road, it

is getting to community to tell you where the ied's are. and that is a combination of many organizations so we have to get out of that battle. i will not go through the whole institution but i would like to say a few things about the problems coming up. we made huge progress. no doubt. the problems and doubts i have in mine mind and my successors have to deal with is afghan commitment. what is the next leader going to do? will it get pasted to the next minister that is vital. the stove pipes have to be resolved. the cutting across of personal interest and building an institution that is not there to serve the various people in it but serving the afghan state is the biggest challenge of all.

call it anti corruption. the political threats. karzai has done weird things to the police and that is very worrying and shows you how easy it is to undo stuff. you have to be as old as me to remember what a proper generation of police looks like so that means the whole younger generation needs to be taught what to expect from the police and understand what their rights and duties are and that ed edgeication haz to be formatted. and who is going to on the international side going to be the bodies that are there talking to the police on the

ground, discussing things? up to now it has been nato and resolute support isn't going to look the same. there is still a lot of discussion about what the mandate is going to look like and where policing fits into that. and there is a lot of people out there saying nato isn't doing police anymore and if nato doesn't we in dep trouble and have thrown away a lot of money. i thinkf of the people doing their best and taking deaths at twice the rate of the army. we have invested and need not to lose that investment. >> thank you very much. that is a lot. a big topic and a lot to cover.

sean will speak next and we will keep in mind the time limit so we can get to the audience. >> i, too, will do a preface for my comments. all of my roles work within the interior advisory group. i am not a law enforcement professional at all. i have got budget experience, experience with organizational change but not in policing either in afghanistan or iraq else where. i did two tours in 2011-2012 and 2013-2014. i have been back in the united states ten days so my observations maybe a bit dated given the change that occurs

there. they are formed by interaction from people who donated and by afghan leaders within the provinces for the potential chief of police. and based on my observations of the police performance at the many events that have happened over the months. as has been mentioned, nato focused on force generation originally and what a tremendous effort occurred there, in less than three years the size of the police force went from 67,000 to what is real over 200,000

personal right now. they are the largest of the afghan national security forces because they include the 157,000 members of the afghan national police and the local police, 30,000. the 20,000 members of the afghan public protection force. 10,000 civil servants and the prison direct for and judicial security units. it is closer to 230,000 members that fall within that infrastructu infrastructure. it is an increasing capable and credibility force with both the coalition and the people of afghanistan especially in the wake of the elections security. that is a key aspect in ensuring

the government of afghanistan and the coalition of supporting them. the mio and the anp have a lot of challenges. political influence is paramount and seen as the most susceptible to political influence. high personal turnover especially in leader ship positions. it is fragmented control structure. even within the 157,000 it isn't on organization like the army. it broken into the the afghan

uniform police which provide half of the force, but also the border police that is given the task of securing the nation's bord border for the first 50 kilometers. if they are met by an invader it is the job of the police to stop them for the first 50 kilometers. i thing of them as a police force with military capabilities but tasked like law enforcement. ...

because all of those police force is, that 200,000 person force relies upon pay to be processed by the minute care. relies upon supplies and food and facilities to be provided by administration. it is these ravishment of enduring and repeatable processes, institution, a

bureaucracy if you will, but a well running bureaucracy that the minister really needs in the police forces of afghanistan really need to endure. transitions are occurring with enough force. geographically, the afghans are in the lead throughout the afghans gave. even as the geographic transition started in 2011 though, the police were key to point out that in 20% of the districts, the police had always been in charge. because neither the coalition nor the afghan national army had ever had an enduring presence in 20% of afghanistan. the police were, are and always has been in charge of those areas. additionally, the establishment of security privacy by the police rather than the army is increasing. police are still present in

every single district and precinct of afghanistan. that is not something that can be said by any other security force. at the same time, in the touche and the capabilities need to be established in transition for me their coalition provided were underwritten to enduring organic afghan capabilities. a few of those areas. while that is the key to this police force, they are establishing and taking ownership of end-to-end processes for recruitment for retirement. they are actually reforming their own process these right now to build inefficiencies that the coalition had thought of. it is tough because they don't have an automated system. while it is being implemented right now, there are still challenges with it, conductivity and implementation and execution down at the lowest levels. that will need to be maintained.

strategy plans and policies is another area progress of the afghan themselves only with coalition guidance, but not capability replacement again updated their national police strategy, their national police plan and unlike any of the other ansi if developed their own planning and multiyear program themselves this year. it's important to note that while the ama is pointed out as having superior products in that regard, it is done on a contract basis, underwritten by coalition funding and not inorganic capability to the administrative defense. there are areas that need improvement, areas of material sustainment required a lot of maturity in the process documentation and implementation. everything from financial execution of their budget, acquisition procurement,

contract management as well as logistics in the timely order warehousing and distribution of materials to the operational forces as well as the maintenance of their extensive facilities. while the army has decided to maintain 149 locations in and, the police have to maintain over 1640 facilities for that nationwide presence. it's a different type of game for police. other errors of progress include police intelligence. they've changed the paradigm. they've recognize the police intelligence of the military intelligence. but the maturity of their actions will be the result of the population willingly providing an permission to the police so they can respond when people are in need.

other areas are slow and will be time-consuming. gender integration will require cultural changes well beyond the afghan security institutions. and movement to follow western-style community policing will also be generational in its implementation. in summary, the complete transition to transitional policing roles, and the establishment of enduring repeatable and self-sustaining ministerial processes will take time. it will take years to fully implement and mature. it will also be reliant upon the aligned, coherent and consistent approach of coalition forces in supporting their efforts. and really come at the establishment of a comprehensive, achievable and

resourced plan by all international partners. i want to -underscore plan as being critical. not a collection of good ideas, but in articulated plan that leads from our current state to our final goal. additionally, afghan commitment to that effort will be critical as well as the integration of the ministry of interior with other aspects of the government at large, including the ministry of foreign affairs controlling border issues as well. the ministry of finance for resource management. the ministry of justice for sector reform in the ministry of defense, their partners and security operations. only when all these prerequisites are met will we truly be able to transitional capabilities to afghan initiatives. >> thank you very much, john. i will let you introduce

michelle and talk about her report. >> well, first of all before i begin, i would be remiss if i didn't say thank you cusip for giving me the opportunity to go back into afghanistan again this year and really look at some of the aspects of the afghan national police development that i was able to see at the very beginning starting at 2009 and now i am starting to see come to fruition and i'm frankly grateful to usip for having the vision to look forward and the willingness to project out into the future of the afghan national police in 2015 and beyond. i agree with all of my colleagues here at the anp really are critical that we get this right and the afghans know that and they share that. in fact, they are preeminent in

that sense of importance. i would also be remiss if on this day after memorial day i don't acknowledge the sacrifices of those individuals who have for over the years on behalf of the international coalition to help build the ministry of interior in the afghan national police. sacrifice on the military side and turns that -- in terms of data and sacrifice the way has been phenomenal when you look at the coalition and the civilian side as well. long for is that professionals have played a huge role in helping the afghan national police get to where they are today and their personal sacrifices are not publicized, but they are great. so i just wanted to make sure we don't forget what this has cost us. it is more than dollars. it is lives. i am very fortunate as we sit here in the first of all my major conclusions are embodied in this report, which you will have.

so you get to read it and i don't have to hammer it into you in 12 minutes. say thank you for that. but i am also fortunate because as we sit here today, i am one of the few people who has actually come back to a comprehensive security sector reform-based assessment of the afghan national police over a period of time. i have conduct did on behalf of the u.s. government and most lately usip an assessment that looks at the linkages between police and government injustice. from the policing is, every year since 2009. and i think it is a sad statement frankly on the degree of continuity that we have in the international community and i gauged that with afghanistan that there aren't more people like me. because until you are able to set back and put some perspective on what has been

achieved, what are the challenges remaining in the what are the gaps it to be close, it is very tough to be opportunistic. it's also tough to be optimistic. i remain as we say here polish on the anp. i see them in a disastrous state and through the years i've seen in a capabilities increase immeasurably, not the least of which is their ability to do strategic planning and articulate and execute their own vision for policing in afghanistan. when i started with nato training mission in afghanistan in 2010, i was asked to help the coalition come up with a strategy to connect the key with the rest of rule of law, whatever that meant in the afghan context. because of the absence of continuity in the fact that police development was over in a line of operation for security

and governance injustice development were in their own lines of operation for governments and rule of law, there had been very little connection between the two in thinking how these things all worked together. so ntma looking at what happened to the anp during the 2006-2007 timeframe, knew something had to be done and said they wanted a strategy that would allow us to move forward and connect police to justice and the rule of law. and i was asked to look at that and i was told at the time that the afghans that there was no vision for the future of the p. and so i began to engage with afghan senior leaders and i realized i was dealing with professional police officers who in some cases i've been policing in this country for 30 years through three regimes and they had a vision of what policing

was in afghanistan. but we didn't understand it. and we hadn't really stepped back and taken the time to articulate it. so that is what we began to try to do. and ntma started talking in terms of helping an institution, building an institutional culture and building an operational force. how do we address all three top-down and bottom-up? as we started to engage with the afghans and bring them into the strategic planning process and strategic thinking process, it was very clear that they had got through many of the aspects of these and in particular there is this question that shawn stith brought up about the change over the last three or so the am peak. when you build an institution the question is how do that in the ability to manage transition

and change? this is where we talk about it in the report from this year. this is where the afghans have, i believe, really made significant progress. as they have looked forward in each of the last three successive ministers of interior have in fact articulated vision for where they want them to go and then how do they build this institutional culture or restore the tradition of policing in afghanistan and with each successive ministers vision and the refinements of it, you have seen more of these elements put in there about community policing and the relationship between the police and the government that they served and the government with whom they have to interact. and so i believe this is one of those areas that is significant for the future of the anp. it is one of those areas or bs in international community have an opportunity to quite frankly be opportunistic, to link our

governance development programs that continue in 2015 and beyond to clear deliverables that will help the ministry of interior strength in its own vision and strength in this institutional functions that enable it to manage change and manage the resources necessary to carry the vision forward to i want to talk about this issue very quickly if building an operational force. the problem of the national police force and what that means in the afghan context. this fascinates me when i was doing field research in january of this year that every single afghan i talked to at every level of government, inside government, outside government have a civil society organizations, individuals, even shopkeepers because i was able to get out and about this past january, even individual afghans, when i would ask them about the afghan national police

and its future, the very first thing they wanted to talk about was the need for the police officers themselves to understand the culture and values of the country. several people pointed out from the get-go that at the national police force is going

and start asking the question of what can we build into this existing programs that will further strengthen our sustained progress that we have either

begun with the anp or that the anp itself was just to carry forward. the last thing i'm going to say because i know i'm about out of time and i'm very sensitive to do what you ought to be able to ask questions. to me, the greatest impediment out of all of this has been the absence of consistency and continuity in the international community's approach. but every single change of leadership, whether it is on the civilian side or the military side, there has been a change in emphasis, priorities and object days. the international community's framework for security set to reform, which is ambassador royle pointed out was a volunteer for a province or a function or volunteer for an organization has allowed these shifts and prioritization with leadership changes so that it has been nearly impossible to

have a consistent development approach. and when we build an institutional operational force, this is truly a generational undertaking and we have to recognize that and accept it. and that means that there are certain decisions that really should not be made below the strategy and policy level. there are objectives that need to be set at the top and have to be adhered to at the operational level whether we are talking about civilian development missions or whether we talk about military training advice in the great missions under operation resolute supporter. so these are decisions that have to be made at the policy level and agreed upon by the international community. i believe if we can get this kind of at least some degree of consistency and continuity, then it will confuse the afghans a lot less. but it will also enable us in

this time of diminishing resources to put our focus on some critical institutional development issues. we've mentioned a couple in a special report. ambassador royle as mentioned a couple, as has mr. stith. it will allow us to focus over an extended period of time so we can build those institutional capacities in a way that the afghans can then adapt, that are culturally and resource appropriate and will become enduring. i believe in the afghans. i would not have committed the amount of personal time and effort to it if i didn't. i am actually really impressed and amazed at the amount of progress that the afghans has made in the short period of time that they've had to do this. when you think about the task that not only the coalition took on, but the afghans have taken on, it is monumental change

management. contrast this with their own effort and government to stand at the department of homeland security and the stars to put things back in days. i think you can appreciate what has gone on here. i believe that we can sustain this, but i believe that we have to do a strategically and carefully in a very focused way. thank you. >> thank you very much, michelle. we are now going to change our focus and move from focusing on the transition of the afghan national police, looking at an element of the police force, the afghan local police while the future of the anp may come into question, the future of the alp may have been already decided. if you look at the afghan national police strategic plan, it has been a strategic vision document, you'll see the alp is supposed to be phased out by 2018. so we'll ask jonathan if this is

a good day to you and ask him to talk about the research. >> thank you are a match. thank you for inviting us in today. first of all, it seems in some ways quite strange to talk about the context of a debate on policing, but i think the fact we are shows us that in about the very hybrid ambiguous nation of the security environment in afghanistan. although there seem to be clear divisions between a soldier, policeman and militia men, but in afghanistan, many afghans may have been all three at one point in their lives. sometimes even simultaneously. there's a lot of ambiguity around these terms. i'm going to talk very briefly about this study and disease will take over and talk about the findings. this is really the first study of its kind in aziz has been the

primary person to do longitudinal research on militias and it was based on research. the research question were asked to was the impact that the alp on dynamic. how do we understand this and other interventions in the country. the first thing to say is that history between the alp. we didn't come in on a blank slate. that we have seen they have extreme fragmentation of the means of violence.

dinner causes of military and also a long history of militia information. sometimes it has been about supporting, strengthening the regime in power. other times it has been about frank mentioned in the mining of the regime in power. one of the ways of dealing with what is taught about as democratization, falling in to this day. what we've seen them a call arrives in state and a set of informal map works in power relations linked to the various military actions. perhaps because it does come that we only go in a sort of

trade-offs and paradoxes in the way the international act as are tempted to do with the security paradox in afghanistan, the one hand trying to centralize the means of coercion to assess our programs, policing and activities we've been talking about. on the other hand, there've been various ongoing attempts to work with formal structures, hybrid structures and centralize domain of violence. this became increasingly the case post 2006 and top-down state building and formalized over the attempts and ponderous efforts to build this state. they can be seen in relationship to their contacts. this is where counterinsurgency doctrine state building came

together they will be aware of laborers. it was about the conceptualization between warmaking and politics. it was not clear in the grounds to take over. it's about 80% politics, 20% friday. it is about persuasion as much as about coercion. so it's interesting in militias was very much linked to the idea that warmaking was a battle for governance. they need to penetrate society, to reach out to society and to provide security at the local level. that is for ideas about militias

were kind of reproduced, recycled, experimented with. it also came out of a long kind of longer-term history of experimentation and counterinsurgency doctrine in relation to the late wars, vietnam. most recently the sons of iraq. in many ways it's kind of old imperial history. many of you know the system on the northwest frontier, from within direct rule of strategizing out the means of policing to people on the periphery. and in afghanistan, there was debris in pension of ideas like the other key, tribal forms of policing. wednesday we highlighted in the report is how these ideas, often at their worst first of all misunderstood the nature and how

they became a specific political, geographic condition. secondly, there was a misunderstanding about how society has been to change over the last 30 years. we can't simply reinvent tradition. but before we go to aziz, the point is to say these experiments came out of a complicated set of imperatives both within afghanistan more broadly and how they played out on the grounds, the results of the very complicated set as of broken arrangements, negotiations, power plays and the outcomes that are very much in one context or another and usually not ones that were planned.

>> i will start by reinforcing very briefly what jonathan was saying. if you look at the titan, the study was done in the context of insurgency and talk about the inferior origins. also, its impact on the statement because what we need to remember and there has been this afternoon, the panel discussed the need for transition for civilian policing, but i think what we try to highlight an report is the political economy, which has roots back in the 1980s, did she hide, the armed groups that came to power. then, post 2001, many of the act is that we studied were partners that the military that defeated and became the new powerholders.

so it is important to remember because quite often we forget there's a large political economy that would probably not change all that much, although western resources are withdrawn. but i think there have been more sordid war trying to generate sources of revenue as international resources strut down. in that context, it is important to remember that the war is not going to die down. the americans believe the full front of the fighting. to discuss civilian icing police for the past 10 years or so much effort in so much money to me seems simplistic. i will contextualize